The Way of Halakha – Halakha and Ethics – Lesson 6

Table of Contents

• Types of arguments about change in Jewish law and the move to discussing reform
• An extra-halakhic layer: loyalty to the system and deciding between systems
• The paradox of “a transgression for its own sake” and the limit of halakhic inquiry
• Torah, Jewish law, and the will of God as a broader domain than formal commandment
• An internal conflict within the will of God versus a conflict with external values
• Broad principles versus specific principles: “We will do and we will hear” versus “What is written in it?”
• The source of the conflict: specifically all-encompassing loyalty invites clashes
• You can’t decide a conflict between systems using the tools of one of them
• The loyalty claim: deciding against Jewish law as a matter of identity, not just a local choice

Summary

General Overview

The speaker continues the discussion of whether changes in Jewish law, or decisions that do not accord with it, are possible, and places the problem mainly around a conflict between Jewish law and another value system. He argues that the first layer of the inquiry cannot be halakhic, because the very question of loyalty to a system and of deciding between systems requires tools that come from outside the system. He illustrates this through analogies from medicine and economics and from conflicting values. He distinguishes between an internal conflict within the will of God and a conflict with external values, and proposes an additional distinction between accepting the Torah in an all-inclusive way and accepting its components one by one. According to him, it is precisely the all-inclusive acceptance that makes deep conflicts possible. In the end he presents a possible normative claim: even if a person decides against Jewish law for extra-halakhic reasons, he cannot at the same time claim that he remains loyal to Jewish law or to the will of God, if the system itself defines loyalty in a way that excludes such decisions from the category of loyalty.

Types of arguments about change in Jewish law and the move to discussing reform

The speaker mentions that in previous sessions they distinguished between “two types of conservatives, a reformer, and a heretic,” and that with regard to the Meiri, a conservative position was presented: a different application of existing principles regarding gentiles, without presenting an explicit source for the change. The speaker says that up to this point the two approaches that were discussed are conservative and therefore do not constitute a change in Jewish law, and he wants to move to “the other side of the equation” and ask whether there is internal legitimacy for changes within the framework of Jewish law. He describes a common feeling in recent generations that even people loyal to Jewish law sometimes want change, and asks whether every such desire is necessarily outside the halakhic framework.

An extra-halakhic layer: loyalty to the system and deciding between systems

The speaker states that the principle that justifies loyalty to a system cannot belong to that same system, and therefore clarifying the boundaries of loyalty or deciding in a conflict between systems cannot be done with halakhic tools. He uses the example of an actor-cigarette-commercial situation, where a person receives different answers from a doctor “wearing his doctor hat” and “wearing his friend hat,” to show that from within a given system one will always receive an answer that advances that system’s values, but the overall decision requires stepping outside the system. He argues that moral distress does not necessarily require changing Jewish law, and that sometimes one simply remains in a conflict and decides as one does in any clash between considerations, without turning the counterarguments into arguments in favor.

The paradox of “a transgression for its own sake” and the limit of halakhic inquiry

The speaker argues that the question, “From the standpoint of Jewish law, is there legitimacy to act contrary to Jewish law?” is paradoxical, because if there is halakhic legitimacy, then it is no longer “contrary to Jewish law.” He distinguishes between “saving a life overrides the Sabbath” as an internal halakhic ruling, and “a transgression for its own sake” in the plain sense, as acting against Jewish law in extreme circumstances. He argues that in that sense, one cannot investigate “a transgression for its own sake” by searching for halakhic anchors in responsa and precedents, because such an anchor would cancel the very definition of the transgression. He presents a disagreement from the discussion over whether “a transgression for its own sake” is actually an internal halakhic override, and emphasizes that he himself tends to understand “a transgression for its own sake” literally, and therefore does not accept a complete identification between Jewish law and morality. He notes that the Talmud brings examples such as the daughters of Lot and Yael, the wife of Heber the Kenite.

Torah, Jewish law, and the will of God as a broader domain than formal commandment

The speaker suggests that a situation like that of the daughters of Lot can be presented in two ways: as a clash between a halakhic principle and an external value, or as a clash between formal Jewish law and “the will of God,” which is found in the Torah in a broader way. He says one can identify “the will of God without a commandment” through hints and verses such as “And you shall do what is upright and good” and “You shall be holy.” He gives the example of the amount of terumah, one-fortieth, one-fiftieth, or one-sixtieth, as something for which there are indications that it is a Torah-level law that is not a sharply defined formal commandment. The speaker notes an opposing position according to which there are things that are not commandments not because they are less important, but because they are “too important” and “so fundamental that they are not turned into a commandment in order to preserve their higher status.” In this context the commandment to settle the Land of Israel and Maimonides are mentioned as a question.

An internal conflict within the will of God versus a conflict with external values

The speaker argues that a conflict between Jewish law and the will of God is theoretically “easier,” because it is still a matter of clarifying what the Holy One, blessed be He, expects, even if that does not always find expression in formal Jewish law. He says the more problematic conflict is when a value from within Jewish law or the Torah clashes with a value outside the will of God, because then the question arises whether the other side can even be taken seriously. He notes that a common solution among religious people is to say that the will of God is always what is good and moral, and he attributes to Rabbi Kook an approach according to which, in practice, there should not really be a conflict, because the will of God “always comes out the most moral.”

Broad principles versus specific principles: “We will do and we will hear” versus “What is written in it?”

The speaker presents a distinction between “broad principles” and “specific principles” as the basis for commitment to a system. He cites the Talmud in Tractate Shabbat 88, with the Sadducee’s words to Rava, “A rash people, who put your mouths before your ears,” and Rava’s answer, “We who walk in wholeheartedness,” and quotes Rashi’s explanation, “And we relied on Him that He would not burden us with something we could not endure,” to describe an all-inclusive acceptance of the Torah out of trust, without checking every detail. Opposed to this, he places the midrash about the nations asking, “What is written in it?” and recoiling from “You shall not steal,” “You shall not murder,” and “You shall not commit adultery,” as a model of item-by-item acceptance in which commitment is conditioned on agreement with each component separately.

The source of the conflict: specifically all-encompassing loyalty invites clashes

The speaker argues that item-by-item commitment prevents a head-on moral conflict, because someone who accepts each value only after examining it cannot then accept another system that teaches the opposite of that value. He argues that a deep conflict arises when at least one system is accepted on the basis of a broad principle, and then one can feel committed both to Jewish law and to additional values such as morality, and become caught in a contradiction. He uses Amalek as an example of a clash between a religious command and moral intuition. He adds a distinction between a head-on clash of values and an “incidental clash” of circumstances, such as saving a life and the Sabbath, where the values themselves are not contradictory but reality forces a decision.

You can’t decide a conflict between systems using the tools of one of them

The speaker returns to his claim that deciding a conflict between two systems must be done outside both of them, and therefore it makes no sense to ask Jewish law what to do when it clashes with another system, because its answer will always be to obey it. He says that since the discussion is extra-halakhic, “there is no obstacle to the decision coming out in favor of the non-halakhic side,” and emphasizes that from a halakhic standpoint the decision will be considered problematic, and even the person deciding may agree to that, but this is not a criticism that can settle the discussion itself.

The loyalty claim: deciding against Jewish law as a matter of identity, not just a local choice

The speaker suggests that the main claim against someone who chooses morality over Jewish law in a conflict is not a halakhic claim about “permitted and forbidden,” but a claim about the definition of loyalty, because some systems “tell you that if you answer to another system, that means you are not loyal to me.” He states that someone who decides against Jewish law can say that he is loyal to truth or to some other value, but he cannot at the same time claim that he is “loyal to Jewish law,” because the halakhic or Torah system defines loyalty in a way that excludes such decisions from belonging. He adds that within a broader framework of “the will of God,” there is an even sharper claim: that loyalty itself to a value external to the will of God, even without a direct contradiction, already removes one from loyalty to the will of God.

Okay, last time — maybe it was even twice ago, I already don’t remember — we talked about a few basic approaches to changes in Jewish law, or non-changes in Jewish law. And we distinguished between a few types of arguments, and gave them labels, right? Two kinds of conservatives, a reformer, and a heretic. And in the end, last time I mainly talked about the relation between the two kinds of conservatives, in light of what you find in Meiri. Meiri’s attitude toward gentiles, or the attitude of Jewish law toward gentiles according to Meiri. Today I specifically want to deal with the other side of the equation, the issue of reform. Because really the conclusion that emerged from the discussion up to now is that the two kinds of approaches we discussed are both conservative. There still isn’t any change in Jewish law here. Not even Meiri’s argument, which is maybe the most far-reaching, because he sort of makes a change in Jewish law — it’s a different application of Jewish law, and that’s even without bringing a source or proof for it. And we said that that is precisely where you see the midrashic conservative. But that too is a kind of conservatism. Meaning, basically what you have here is the application of the same principles, where of course if the circumstances are different then the application is also supposed to be different. The question is to what extent, if at all, there is a possibility of change within the framework of Jewish law. Can one even talk about such a thing? Does it have halakhic legitimacy? Or is all of that entirely in the camp of what we called the reformer, meaning in the camp that perhaps is not fully faithful to Jewish law.

Now, on the face of it, these things sound simple: that there is no such thing. That there is no possibility of making changes — that was exactly the claim, that the two kinds of conservatives can both come under the heading of faithfulness to Jewish law, while the other arguments are extra-halakhic arguments, arguments that come from outside. And still, many times there is some feeling, especially in the later generations, that people are looking for, or arguing in favor of, changes from within as well. Even people who are faithful to Jewish law feel that there are things they would want to change, or to see changed. And the question is whether every such thing necessarily lies outside the framework.

Now here too, I think we need to divide the discussion into a few parts. Because the first discussion that has to be held is actually not a halakhic discussion at all; rather, it is a discussion that has to be conducted using extra-halakhic tools. And that is for the simple reason I spoke about the first time when we discussed the question of why serve God. There we talked about the fact that the principle that justifies or obligates faithfulness to any system cannot itself belong to that same system. Meaning, it has to be located outside it. It cannot be that the law determines that there is a law requiring you to keep laws. Although this morning I heard something on the radio — was it this morning or yesterday, I don’t remember — that there is some initiative by Dalia Itzik to legislate something saying that laws must be obeyed. That was really amusing. In any case, something — I already don’t remember exactly what it was — I heard something like that, and it caught my ear because of this issue. In any case…

So since the principle of why I should be faithful to the system, or why I am obligated to the system, lies outside that system, then if I want for example to examine the limits of my faithfulness to the system, or what I do when there is a conflict with another system to which I am also loyal, it is very hard to accept a discussion conducted in halakhic terms on such a question. Meaning, for example — I’ll give an example — I already spoke the first time about this with the example of the movie actor, the cigarette, and the doctor, right? Did I mention that example? No? I did mention it.

So the claim there basically was that not every time I feel distress is the solution to change Jewish law, even if that is possible at all. Sometimes one can also remain in the conflict and say: okay, from the standpoint of Jewish law it is this way, from the standpoint of the other system to which I am also committed it is that way, and now I am in conflict and I have to solve that conflict the way I solve any halakhic conflict. That doesn’t necessarily mean that Jewish law itself has to be changed so that everything fits. After all, we do all kinds of things even in situations where there are 150 reasons in favor and 150 reasons against, and we have to decide what our bottom line is. That doesn’t automatically mean that all the reasons against themselves become reasons in favor. They don’t. They remain against. It’s overridden or permitted, however you define it, but I still have to make some decision about what I do in a situation where there is a conflict of values.

So therefore, the solution is not always a solution of changing the system. But still, when I ask myself what I am supposed to do in a situation of such conflict, where a certain system instructs me to do one thing and Jewish law instructs me to do something else, then it is rather absurd to look for the solution to that question in halakhic terms. Meaning, to ask Jewish law what I am supposed to do in such a case. Because after all, what I am asking now is whether to obey Jewish law; if I ask Jewish law, the answer will obviously be: obey me. That is clear. Exactly like in that case of the movie actor, when he turned to the doctor and asked him whether to go act in that commercial, the doctor told him, what are you talking about? If you’re asking me as a doctor, certainly not. It isn’t healthy to smoke a cigarette. If you’re asking me as a friend, that’s another matter — then certainly yes.

Meaning, what does that mean — that the health considerations changed? No. Clearly the health considerations remain as they are, but the economic considerations override them. That’s one point. And the second point is: on what plane was the answer given? Clearly not with the hat of a doctor. With the hat of a doctor one cannot give that kind of answer. Rather, I can put on another hat: I’m now wearing the hat of your friend, and as your friend I recommend that you do it. Meaning, clearly within the medical system I cannot ask the medical system what is preferable — to earn a lot of money at the cost of a slight harm to health, or to preserve health. Because within the medical system, the answer will always be: preserve health. But that doesn’t mean that this is the correct answer. It means that from the medical standpoint, the answer really is that one should preserve health. But there is another standpoint too, the economic one. And when I now want to decide which standpoint prevails, I cannot make that decision either with halakhic tools — or in that case with medical tools, or with economic tools. I somehow have to decide what I do when I stand outside both systems.

Each system separately — when I want to discuss it, I said that I have to stand outside it, with respect to my very obligation to it. And when I want to decide what I do in a conflict between two systems, that certainly cannot be conducted within one of them. Because I have to step outside both of them and ask myself what my relation is to these two systems, and then make some decision about what I do in the situation of conflict.

Therefore the question whether, from the standpoint of Jewish law, there is a possibility of granting legitimacy to act not in accordance with Jewish law — that is a paradoxical question. Certainly not. Because if from the standpoint of Jewish law there were legitimacy for that, then it would not be acting against Jewish law. The moment I look for a way to act in a manner that does not fit Jewish law, I can never ask that question within the halakhic framework. That does not mean that the halakhic framework is the whole world. We talk about issues of transgression for its own sake, for example. So in issues of transgression for its own sake, in the simple understanding of the passage — leaving aside all the apologetics developed over the generations — the view is that one can commit the transgression, and it is a transgression; it goes against Jewish law. And still one may do it in certain circumstances when what is at stake is something so significant that there is no choice but to suspend halakhic considerations. But that answer itself cannot be a halakhic answer.

When I say that saving a life overrides the Sabbath, I do not call that a transgression for its own sake. That is not the concept of transgression for its own sake, when I violate the Sabbath in order to preserve my life or someone else’s. True, Jewish law says this after weighing two opposing values and deciding which one overrides the other, but that determination itself is a halakhic determination. When I ask a broader or more fundamental question — whether there can be a situation in which I am in conflict with Jewish law and do not obey it, but rather commit a transgression for its own sake — there certainly I cannot ask that question within the halakhic context. And therefore the claim that a transgression for its own sake is greater, or that one should commit transgressions for their own sake in certain circumstances — whether that is correct or not, one can discuss — but one thing is clear: that question cannot be examined within the halakhic framework. It simply does not belong there.

And therefore, many times when people examine the question whether it is justified to commit a transgression for its own sake — actually, many times they do not examine it at all — but when they do examine it, then usually how do we do it? The way we clarify any halakhic question. We open the responsa, the precedents, the medieval authorities (Rishonim), the later authorities (Acharonim), and we check. But that is an absurd form of examination. Because obviously, if I am speaking about a transgression for its own sake in the simple sense — not transgression for its own sake in the meanings that were later poured into the term, which I think are simply incorrect — but transgression for its own sake meaning to commit a transgression, to act against Jewish law, then what does it mean that I am looking for a halakhic anchor for whether I am permitted to act against Jewish law? If there is a halakhic anchor, then it is not a transgression. So what exactly is the question?

It seems to me you can distinguish between Jewish law and — as if — transgression for its own sake, if we say that maybe it is not in the category of Jewish law, but in the category of Torah more broadly. So it seems to me that then you can indeed look for precedents. I agree, and that is the next distinction I want to make in a moment. Wait, another comment: even when we discuss, say, the relation between Torah and an external system, another external voice, still the statement of Torah can be a very significant statement of Torah. It seems to me that it says that if you necessarily have an ideology in which at a certain point you determine that you think one should go not according to Torah, then you have completely left Torah and have no share in it at all. Okay, we’ll get to that too, God willing. We’ll get to that too, God willing. One second.

If we understand that the halakhic system is basically a platform that does reflect our whole moral system, then it could still be that transgression for its own sake is a statement I make from within the halakhic system. But then how is that different from saving a life overriding the Sabbath? In saving a life overriding the Sabbath, in the halakhic sense that is not considered a transgression, but the statement of the halakhic decisor is also about transgression. A transgression is violating Jewish law — that’s what a transgression is, no? No, saving a life overriding the Sabbath would be an expression of the fact that in reality you did not blemish anything at all, whereas with transgression for its own sake you say yes, you did blemish reality. And what if it is overridden and not permitted? It could be that even there there is a dimension in which you did not blemish reality. What is the difference between overridden and permitted? If it is permitted, then you had to do it; and if it is overridden, why do you have to do it? According to everyone you have to do it, that is clear, that is not even a question. The question whether it is overridden or permitted is precisely, seemingly, the difference: whether you nevertheless blemish something, but you must blemish it because another value overrides it, or not at all — in such circumstances nothing is blemished. That is the difference between permitted and overridden. But both determinations, whether permitted or overridden, are determinations made within the framework of Jewish law.

No, someone who would say that transgression for its own sake is not necessarily overridden or permitted — transgression for its own sake is a statement that yes, you did blemish Jewish law. The Talmud speaks there about transgression for its own sake; the Talmud doesn’t bring derivations for it the way it does with saving a life overriding the Sabbath — there are no derivations about that. And the Talmud says: “A transgression done for its own sake is great,” and it doesn’t bring proof from saving a life overriding the Sabbath to this topic that a transgression for its own sake is great. It brings the daughters of Lot there, I don’t know, all kinds of things — Yael the wife of Heber the Kenite. I really don’t understand all the semantics. For me, Jewish law is just a word that was invented, by definition, to describe the totality of my obligations in the world. So how can there be something outside Jewish law? Jewish law is the totality of your obligations in the world? What are you talking about? Meaning, there is nothing else that obligates me. Jewish law is what obligates me after all. Meaning, I don’t have several systems, one of which could be outside Jewish law. Meaning, Jewish law is what obligates me.

If that’s a statement about you, then fine, maybe. But if it’s a general statement — if you are describing what you think, that is perfectly fine. There are people for whom Jewish law or Torah is their whole world. But the question is whether this is the only possible model. I can have other things, but not in contradiction. Meaning, there is no such thing as contradiction to Jewish law. Something that contradicts Jewish law means that it is forbidden to do it. It means that it is halakhically forbidden to do it. Yes, obviously. Fine, so it is halakhically forbidden, and again I just added another word in order to… No, but it’s the same thing. Just like something that contradicts the rules of health is health-wise forbidden to do, right? Yes, but the difference is that health is not a system to which I am committed one hundred percent. Meaning, with health I can allow myself extra-health considerations. Fine, maybe “not committed one hundred percent” is another matter; you mean that it does not cover the whole range of reality. No, I mean that I am not committed to it one hundred percent. But that means there are other norms that are outside the health system, even if I am committed to it one hundred percent — but there are other norms. Other ones that override it; so what do I do in a situation of conflict? If I were committed 100%, by definition — this is an analytic proposition — if I were committed 100% there would be no other norms that override it. That is simply not true. That’s why I corrected you before and told you that you do not mean committed 100%; you mean — I’ll define it more later — you mean that it covers all aspects of reality, and not the intensity of commitment to each principle. On the contrary, on the contrary: I am committed 100% to the laws of the Sabbath, and I am committed 100% to saving a life, and still when there is a conflict I have to decide. No, then you are not committed 100% to those; you are committed 100% to the totality of Jewish law that will tell you… You are committed 100% to each of the principles that together create the whole, only when there is a conflict you have to decide what to do. But one principle prevailed, it could be that a principle prevailed, meaning I am not committed to it 100%, I am committed to the whole system 100%. Fine, but still the question… So that means that to one of those you are not committed… There cannot exist in reality another principle that overrides Jewish law; it cannot be. Why can’t it? I do not understand the claim. If you say that for you it does not exist, then fine, a claim about you, but why… No, I think that in the definition of the concept Jewish law means what the Holy One, blessed be He, wants.

Wait, when I read “A transgression done for its own sake is great” and I say that the daughters of Lot did not… “A transgression done for its own sake is great” is a phrase said in aggadic literature, meaning one cannot translate it into “it is permitted to commit a transgression for its own sake,” because then even if I bring in another substantive system I have an internal contradiction here — it cannot be that it is permitted to commit a transgression for its own sake. “A transgression done for its own sake is great” — why not? That’s what the Talmud says. In the plain meaning of the Talmud, that’s what the Talmud says. The Talmud says “A transgression done for its own sake is great”; it does not say that it is permitted to commit a transgression for its own sake. “A transgression done for its own sake is great” — what does that mean? It is great but don’t do it? In circumstances in which it is required, you are also supposed to do it. What does it mean “A transgression done for its own sake is great”? “A transgression done for its own sake is great” means something better than a commandment not done for its own sake around it. No, no — well, one has to see the plain meaning of the passage. It is not only better than a commandment not done for its own sake, it is… Fine, one has to see the plain meaning of the passage if you want. All right, fine. I wrote something about this not long ago, but I don’t think it was published in the end. If you want, I’ll send it to you. I think that when you look at the plain meaning of the passage, it doesn’t work. Meaning, that is what one should do; it is not… In the circumstance where it is required, transgression for its own sake is no longer outside Jewish law; it is inside Jewish law. The difference between that and saving a life is that with saving a life, one always has to prioritize one system over the other, whereas here transgression for its own sake is within Jewish law but is willing to take into account the specific circumstances of that moment. Jewish law includes all the circumstances. So why is it a transgression? What do you mean? Then it is no longer a transgression. It is a transgression in terms of my everyday concepts — it is a transgression for its own sake, it is a transgression of the everyday rules of Torah. So that is a kind of halakhic suspension — that’s what you’re claiming? Yes. Fine, okay. But that is what I am saying I think is not the plain meaning of the passage. But fine — for that one has to study the passage. I only brought it as an example, so I don’t want to get into that now.

Okay, so really this whole business was just an introduction in order to say that the first layer of this discussion has to be conducted not within the halakhic framework. First of all one has to understand how this whole thing works at all, whether such a conflict can arise in the first place, and then ask ourselves what we do in such a situation. But that is only the first layer of the discussion. In the second layer of the discussion, assuming we reach the conclusion that such a conflict can arise, now we have to ask ourselves whether there really can be someone who is faithful to Jewish law and still decide the conflict differently, meaning in a way opposed to Jewish law. So I will do the first discussion, because I think it sharpens several important points, but I will try to do it briefly.

Actually, maybe before that I need to make one more expansion that someone anticipated earlier. Really, when we speak about Jewish law in this context, we have to define the concepts better. For example, someone in a transgression for its own sake — say the daughters of Lot found themselves in a situation in which they thought the whole world had been destroyed, and if they did not commit incest then humanity would become extinct. And because of that, they decided to commit a transgression for its own sake. Let’s say that is the description right now — let’s not argue over that point; let us assume for the sake of the discussion that this is the description.

One could present this as a situation in which Jewish law forbids incest at any price. There is no halakhic source that qualifies this prohibition; there is even “be killed rather than transgress” about it, meaning it is not permitted in any way, there is no halakhic qualification to the obligation to that principle. On the other side stands another value, and that is the continuation of humanity — this is a dramatic situation. Meaning, if I do not commit this transgression, then humanity has finished its career. This is not a question of saving the life of this person or that person, which is no small matter either, or even questions of large financial loss. We are speaking here about the continued existence of the world. So one has to understand that the situation we are discussing here is a critical one, meaning that the value standing opposite is perhaps not a value you can point to in a paragraph of the Shulchan Arukh or in the enumeration of the commandments that defines it, but it seems quite clear that it is a very, very, very important value, and when it is harmed in such a way that can perhaps justify dramatic steps.

But that itself can be presented in two ways. It can be presented as a collision between a halakhic principle and an extra-halakhic, extra-Torah value, extra — simply because I believe that this is truly the important thing to do — and then indeed there is a collision here between Jewish law and some completely external system. And it could be presented differently, and one could say: I think — and right now it doesn’t matter what my reasoning or sources are — I think that this is what the Holy One, blessed be He, expects from me; this is the will of God. It is indeed not Jewish law. From the standpoint of Jewish law it is forbidden to do this; there is no qualification that we know of in halakhic sources to this prohibition of incest. But the will of God in this context is not a value external to Torah. It is a value perhaps external to Jewish law, but not external to Torah. And the will of God in such a situation is, of course, to preserve the existence of humanity. And now there is some kind of collision between formal Jewish law and the will of God.

What? How do we know that? Excellent question. I don’t know how one knows that — by reasoning, a hint from a verse, all kinds of things. One can suggest various directions. There are examples in which one can see the will of God without there being a commandment, also from within Torah, from Torah’s own hints. It seems to me that this was an article I wrote in Tzohar — I think — about the will of God, one of the later issues, about the will of God that is the will of God without a commandment. The measure for separating terumah — one-fortieth, one-fiftieth, one-sixtieth — there are several proofs that this is a Torah-level law, not a rabbinic law, but it is a Torah-level law that is not exactly a commandment in terms of formal Jewish law. Rather, there are different indications that this is the will of God — to separate more than a single grain of wheat, which would exempt the whole heap. So that is, for example, a hint in the text.

There are other situations in which the will of God will find expression through a moral principle, and I think the Holy One, blessed be He, expects me to be a moral person. Perhaps it is even written: “And you shall do what is right and good,” and “You shall be holy,” or verses of that kind. But these are verses into which it is very hard to pour clear halakhic content, to the point that it is not entirely clear whether one can even call them a commandment at all. But something is written there that hints to me that this is the will of God. And now I am in conflict between Jewish law and the will of God. In certain respects, this is an internal conflict, because it is between two different parts of the will of God. There is Jewish law, which expresses some of His desires, and there are some other sources, or I don’t know exactly what, in which other desires are expressed, and sometimes there can be a collision.

And usually Jewish law represents the more prominent things through which we understand the will of God. Meaning, if it is really, really the will of God, then it will also be expressed as a commandment; and if it is something less, then apparently it probably also has less value — meaning, if it is not expressed as a binding instruction. No, that does not have to be so. There are many things — well, again, this deserves a whole lecture of its own — but there are a great many things that are not commandments because they are too important, not because they are not important enough. There are things that are so fundamental that one does not make them into a commandment in order to preserve their superior status. To preserve their superior status. What? The commandment of settling the Land of Israel — not according to Maimonides. Fine, that is a question whether that is why, but maybe. Okay, one can understand it that way too. No, there are things where I think it is clearer. This is one of the examples I think I nevertheless brought, although I am not entirely sure about it.

So of course, if we are speaking about a conflict between Jewish law and the will of God, it seems to me that this is an easier conflict, at least in the theoretical sense. Fine. In the end I am only trying to determine what the Holy One, blessed be He, expects of me. I will do what the Holy One, blessed be He, expects — it’s just that not everything He expects is expressed in what we call Jewish law. Sometimes it is something broader, something outside Jewish law, something found somewhere else in Torah, and then the question is what I am supposed to do in order to fulfill the will of God in the best possible way.

Of course, the more problematic principle, or the more problematic conflict, is when something within Jewish law or within Torah collides with a value that lies outside Jewish law. And then of course the question arises whether there is any possibility at all of taking the other side in such a conflict seriously. So here indeed one has to distinguish between a collision with something that is the will of God and a collision with something outside the system of the will of God.

Now I’ll make a short discussion in the non-halakhic or even non-Torah context, I would say, and I’ll present it as follows. We began earlier and I said that the principle by virtue of which I see myself as obligated to a certain system lies outside that system, by definition. There are two kinds of such principles. There is one kind of principle — let’s call them comprehensive principles — and there are particular principles.

What do I mean? Take for example the Talmud in tractate Shabbat 88a. The Talmud says that this Sadducee says to Rava: “A hasty people, who put your mouths before your ears! First you should have listened. If you could endure it, you should accept it; and if not, you should not accept it.” So this Sadducee says: what is this “we will do and we will hear”? First listen to what is involved, and afterward decide whether to accept it or not. So what does Rava answer him there? “We, who walk in wholeness — of us it is written: ‘The integrity of the upright shall guide them.’ But those people who walk in crookedness — of them it is written: ‘And the perverseness of the treacherous shall destroy them.’”

And Rashi there says: “We, who walk in wholeness — we walked with Him in innocence, in the manner of those who act out of love, and we relied on Him that He would not burden us with something we could not endure.” Meaning, we basically accept the Torah without examining each of the principles that appear in it individually. We have some general principle of obligation to the will of God, perhaps trust that when the Holy One, blessed be He, places something upon us it is probably something good, and therefore even without individually examining each of those principles we accept the system. So let’s call that a comprehensive principle. A value principle, or a principle that gives value to the system, is a comprehensive principle.

There is a situation of a particular principle. Where do we find that? Exactly in the parallel midrash, where the Holy One, blessed be He, goes around to all the nations and asks them: do you want the Torah? And they ask Him: what is written in it? If it’s free, give two. What is written in it? So the Holy One, blessed be He, says: “Do not steal.” Not for us. He comes to another one and says: “Do not murder.” Not for us. “Do not commit adultery,” and so on. What is the point of this whole thing? Basically what appears here is a conception of obligation that is different from the conception Rava states here to that Sadducee. My obligation to Torah, or that gentile’s potential obligation to Torah, was supposed to be based on his accepting the logic and value present in each of the individual details within Torah. And consequently he would take Torah upon himself. In other words, he does not at all take upon himself an obligation to Torah as such merely because it is Torah. Rather: if these principles seem right to me, then I will obey them, and if they don’t seem right to me, then I won’t obey them. That is what is called a particular value principle.

A particular value principle means that I take upon myself a system of norms, a system of values, in light of the fact that each value has undergone some examination by me and seems reasonable to me. Fine. So there are two ways to take upon ourselves the yoke of such a system. Either in an a priori comprehensive way, without checking the details of the system and without needing to understand and accept each of those details, on the basis of some general principle; or I take upon myself each principle separately.

We usually connect serving God with the first form, and not for nothing; the Sages also connect it this way. Meaning, basically we are obligated to serving God not because we checked each of the details. It seems to me that none of us really understands the logic and value in all the details. But there is some obligation that stems from a comprehensive principle. Meaning, if it is written in Torah, then it is probably something good, or it is probably something that obligates me even if it is not good — the precise wording doesn’t matter right now, there are various formulations — but it is a comprehensive principle.

What would we say about an obligation of the particular kind? Meaning, okay, suppose that the Holy One, blessed be He, had come to some nation and they would ask Him, “What is written in it?” and He would say, “Do not steal.” Ah, really a very nice law. Then they would come and ask, what else is written? He would say, “Do not murder.” Wonderful. And what else? Redeem a firstborn donkey. Excellent, we were just thinking about that. And what else? Recite grace after meals. And what else? And everything would seem excellent. Like Abraham our patriarch, or Saadia Gaon, who says that the whole Torah could really have been derived from reason. That Abraham our patriarch, who… That is not obligation to serving God, even though he may have observed minor and major commandments alike. Rather, everything seemed fitting to him, and fine, so he does it because it suits him. But if there had been something that did not suit him, then he would not have done it. Only — yes, everything suits him. Fine. But fundamentally there is not here, I think, what we usually tend to think of as full commitment to serving God. There is simply some accidental convergence between what I think is right and what is written in Torah. Accidental or not accidental.

In this context — well, it seems to me there is some commitment even in the second example, because the specific quantities — for example how much terumah I need to give, and all kinds of things like that — I can say, fine, one needs to give something to the poor, I strongly identify with that. But exactly how much to give, I don’t know. And that, it seems to me, I do accept. What difference does it make right now? After all, it is a hypothetical question. So let’s speak — they too know the… Exactly, I was thinking precisely about one-fortieth for terumah. I was thinking precisely about that point. So excellent, it is written in Torah — great, accepted. Meaning, he accepts everything, all the details, everything you want. After all, it is a hypothetical case. What would we say about such a person? Is he committed to serving God? It is obvious that this is not a kind of serving God.

But notice well: let us now take these two examples — or not two examples, it is more or less all there is; I don’t think there is anything else — either a comprehensive principle or a particular principle. And now I ask myself: which of these two models allows normative duality? Meaning, commitment to another system in parallel to this one. Only the comprehensive one. Only the comprehensive one. Why? Because if the particular principle is what underlies my commitment to the system, then what does that actually mean? I checked the prohibition “do not steal” — excellent, that is exactly what I think. I checked the prohibition “do not murder” — same. Redeeming a firstborn donkey — same. I checked everything and it all seems right to me. Now how could there be another system that tells me that now I need to steal, and that too would seem right to me? That cannot happen. Because after all I checked, and it turned out that I do not think it is right to steal; I think it is forbidden to steal. It cannot happen.

When can such a duality arise? Only where I basically did not check. Theft may seem very wrong to me personally, but I am obligated to what is written in Torah. Meaning, what the Holy One, blessed be He, says obligates me. That is a comprehensive principle. It’s just that there are other things I am obligated to as well. I am also obligated to morality. So if morality tells me that I need to spare Amalek, for example, then I am also obligated to spare Amalek. And that does not contradict the fact that I am obligated to Torah, which tells me to kill Amalek. And now I am in conflict. The only way to enter into conflict is only if you are an Orthodox fanatic. Meaning, if you are not an Orthodox fanatic, but rather you are some kind of reformer or whatever you want to call it — not exactly that, but rather you check each thing according to whether it seems right to you or not — that is not even reform; it simply has nothing to do with serving God. You simply do what seems right to you, period. So if you are such a person, you will never be in conflict. You simply do what seems right to you, and obviously if this seems right to you, its opposite will never seem right to you, and no conflict will arise.

Meaning, conflict always arises when we are in a situation where at least one of the systems we accepted on the basis of a comprehensive value principle. One. The second can be particular, but at least one has to be comprehensive. Okay? So if we are talking about Jewish law, then when I accept Jewish law comprehensively, a situation can arise in which there is conflict with additional systems, even systems external to the will of God, external to everything. There is no obstacle to that happening. In contrast, if I accept it like those nations — if they would have accepted it because everything seemed right to them — then conflict would never arise. They simply accept what seems right to them.

The gentile who accepted the value of saving a life in a particular way and the value of the Sabbath in a particular way would certainly enter into conflict. No, that’s why I gave the introduction. Saving a life overriding the Sabbath does not enter my discussion here. Maybe now I’ll define better why. Saving a life and the Sabbath — this is somewhat related to the distinction you made earlier. Saving a life and the Sabbath is an accidental collision. Meaning, the value of saving a life does not contradict in any way the value of Sabbath observance. There is no connection between them. They are two completely independent values. Only because of factual circumstances can there be a situation where these values meet in one inn and are found in conflict. It isn’t always like that — why always? In most cases it isn’t like that at all. Because the value of saving a human life could also apply on Tuesday. And the value of observing the Sabbath is regardless of saving a human life — simply keeping the Sabbath. What connection is there between these two values? Every value always stands on its own as something very, very good and important, but their collision will always happen in a situation where reality does not allow you to keep both values.

That is not correct. A collision between values… Fine. But I am speaking first of all about my commitment to the two values. In the very commitment to the two values there is no contradiction at all, because even if I am fully committed to Sabbath observance, there is no obstacle to my being fully committed to saving a life as well. Yes, and the same is true whether someone is committed comprehensively or particularly. No, because why? Because that is not a collision at all. When I speak about collision, I mean a collision between values, not a clash between situations or in a certain situation. A frontal clash between values, where in essence one stands against the other — where one system tells me to steal and another system tells me not to steal. This is not a case where by chance I am in a situation of Rosh Chodesh that falls on Sabbath during Purim, and as a result there is suddenly a convergence of two things and they clash. That is not a clash between values. It is a conflict in which I have to decide what to do so as somehow to manage with them. But I am equally committed to both. A conflict between values in the full sense means where the values themselves are opposed. That cannot happen if the value principle is particular.

But someone who accepts fully, someone who accepts comprehensively, accepts all the values. That necessarily means that he also accepts them in such a way — that he places his hands upon each and every one of them. Meaning, if now someone comes and he wants to accept a value outside the system that contradicts the system he accepted, then certainly he cannot accept it. He is already committed to the comprehensive system. I didn’t understand. In a moment we’ll see what he will do in practice. But there is no obstacle at all to his finding himself in conflict. I took upon myself a full obligation to the will of God at Sinai as it was given there. Fine. On the other side, as a human being I feel fully obligated to moral principles. That too is a fact. And now there is another fact: sometimes there is a contradiction between them. What do I do now? You are not obligated to both. I am obligated to both. You cannot be obligated to both 100%, because if you accepted a moral principle that contradicts what you accepted before, then you are asking now what I will do in practice. Fine, I am in conflict; I have to decide what to do. No, what are you talking about? A person who accepted the principles of Torah comprehensively — one of the principles of Torah is that one has to redeem a firstborn donkey. Now if another principle comes that you want to accept, then you are basically not accepting the principle of Torah. No, I do accept it. It’s just that I will have to make this prevail over that, and set that aside because of this. You cannot tell me that I do not accept it; I do accept it. You did not accept the principle of Torah. Of course I did. I accepted full obligation; that contradicts nothing. I eat chocolate. Chocolate tastes good; I am obligated to eat tasty things. But I am also obligated to health, and chocolate is not healthy. Fine? So what does that mean — that there is some contradiction here? So clearly I am not obligated to one of them? I am obligated to both 100%. But what can I do? There is a conflict between them and I need to decide what to do. No, but that is a conflict in reality, not a conflict in values. A conflict in values is when you say there is something tasty, and you say there are things that are not tasty. That one can discuss. I think it is not a conflict in reality. It is not a conflict in reality. Everything healthy is not tasty and everything tasty is not healthy. It is not an accidental convergence. Really? Yes. No, it doesn’t matter; for the sake of the example I am taking it that way. So what do you call that, then? Not full commitment? This is just semantics. It is full commitment, and there is nothing to be done — just that it comes from two different laws. This one from the aspect of health and this one from the aspect of taste. So they can clash.

But in reality it can clash with saving a life, where there are two values that rub against each other and I accept both. Why? Here, I’ll describe that too as chocolate. My obligation to kill Amalek as a religious obligation, and my obligation not to kill Amalek as a moral obligation — and both are full. It’s like the standpoint of taste and the standpoint of health. Here it’s the standpoint of morality and the standpoint of Jewish law. What do you mean? It’s exactly the same conflict. But if you accepted the obligation to kill Amalek, how can you accept the obligation not to kill Amalek? I am not accepting the obligation not to kill Amalek; I am accepting an obligation to morality. I am speaking about the comprehensive principles. Now when we translate them into the particular principles that I have announced… You have deceived yourself. I have not deceived myself. Yes, because you accepted upon yourself the value of killing Amalek and then accepted upon yourself the value of not killing Amalek. Someone who is in conflict as he goes to kill an Amalekite — has he deceived himself? I don’t understand this. Do you really think that? No, there can be something else: a person says, I have a value. In the end he may kill, fine, but he is in conflict. No, this is a substantive conflict. Killing Amalek is always immoral; it is not a factual issue that by chance there is some problem here or there. So a person has deceived himself when he accepted upon himself that he is willing to kill Amalek? He did not accept upon himself to kill Amalek; he accepted upon himself to serve God. The Holy One, blessed be He, included killing Amalek, so He has gotten me into a mess. He accepted upon himself to serve God before he even heard what the Holy One, blessed be He, said. That is the midrash I brought earlier. He had not yet heard what He says; he says to Him, “We will do and we will hear.” I trust Him.

No, so what you are saying is acceptance that is not really full. You accept the will of God, but you do not really accept the details inside it. You accepted in a general way, but not anything that did not find favor in your eyes. If it did not find favor in my eyes, does that mean I did not accept it? What is the connection? After all, the whole meaning of accepting the will of God is that you are obligated to it. Logical contradictions exist between facts; between values there are no contradictions. Values can clash, and I can be loyal to both of them. Not values that are logical opposites — yes, to steal and not to steal. But principled values, like being moral and being faithful to Torah — there is no obstacle to fully accepting both of these things. This is somewhat semantic, true, but I call that full acceptance.

Now I am in conflict. In that conflict you can tell me: look, as a servant of God you must always decide in favor of Jewish law, because otherwise it would be improper. Okay, that is the next stage. First of all, the question is what I am obligated to, what places me into conflict, what determines the straits within which I stand. Those straits have two sides, and those two sides exist, and this is full acceptance, and there is no contradiction in it. No contradiction at all. I want both things completely; both of them I want all the way, one hundred percent. You know what? For the sake of the discussion, as you tell me — and I don’t even know how to behave now. I don’t know. There is no solution; it’s one hundred percent both. That’s it, there is no solution. Finished. I didn’t manage to resolve it. So that there won’t be a problem — because the moment I resolve it, I’ll resolve it by saying that this contradicts and overrides that, and then you’ll tell me it wasn’t one hundred percent full. But I think even that is not correct. Still, for the sport of it, let’s say there is no solution. I found no solution. I am one hundred percent committed to these two sides, and I have no practical solution. Who said I won’t act? I don’t know — maybe I don’t know — maybe I’ll kill him with a change, indirectly, or I don’t know exactly. I don’t know what to do. “I don’t know what to do” is not non-action. I don’t know what to do. Maybe in the end I won’t do it, but that won’t be my value-decision that I won’t do it. I simply won’t do it because I don’t know what to do. That’s all, okay? So maybe that sharpens the point even more. One can accept both of these things one hundred percent. That does not mean that one of them is accepted less fully. That is not true. That can only be if these two values are not opposite but merely contradictory. If they are complete opposites, then you are just fooling yourself. No, that is why I say: if you say, “I want to serve God” — that is the principle to which I am obligated, within whose framework I need to kill Amalek even though I do not want to, because I am obligated to do what… Fine, obligation — that is exactly the difference. It is obligation, fine — that is the conclusion that came out of it. The question is whether you are obligated because of the will of God, or obligated because you want to kill Amalek because that is the right thing. Then you have gone back to the distinction between the particular principle and the comprehensive principle. The comprehensive principle is the obligation to serving God in general. That is a comprehensive principle. Whatever that serving God says — I don’t know, it can say all kinds of things. I am not entering the question. Whatever it says, I am obligated to it.

The moment you begin to be obligated and examine each principle individually, and you feel obligated to it — that is exactly the point. Once your mode of acceptance is truly particular, conflicts really cannot arise. I agree, that is exactly what I said. So what emerges here is a somewhat unexpected situation. It is precisely full faithfulness to Torah, faithfulness that comes from the very fact that it is Torah — not through this value or that value, or this commandment or that commandment — but specifically full faithfulness, precisely that, invites situations that can indeed be in conflict. And precisely those forms of faithfulness that perhaps we do not see as real commitment to serving God — there, conflicts never arise.

I think, by the way, that this fits reality well too, even if at first glance it may be surprising. In reality itself, it seems to me that what we call reformers, many times — or never mind the definitions right now — usually the feeling is that there are no very deep conflicts there when they decide to go in a direction that is, say, against Jewish law and in favor of some external value. They simply think that is right, period. And why? Because for them every value is examined on its own merits. Meaning, that is very close to particular acceptance. Now I am defining it a bit differently from how I defined reform last time; I am not entering now into comparing those definitions.

In contrast, the definition of a priori commitment to the will of God — the very fact that it is the will of God obligates me, regardless right now of the question of what exactly that will of God says — that kind of commitment specifically opens the door to conflicts. And I think — I don’t know — at least I often feel these conflicts. I don’t know about you. Meaning, many times there is a sense that this commitment is full, but I also have other commitments, and I am in trouble — I am in conflict. Now one can come and say: okay, the conflict exists; now the question is how to resolve it. Maybe someone who truly serves God will always let the will of God prevail over everything else. Fine. That is already the next layer of the discussion. But first of all, regarding the very question whether such a conflict is possible. The answer is: precisely among those whose commitment is fuller, precisely there such a conflict can arise. Precisely there.

I think that usually people solve this conflict by saying that the will of God is always the good. Meaning, I do not know a religious person who really wrestles with whether the moral side — although it is hard for me — I will somehow resolve it so that in truth that is what will lead to good, and in truth good will come out of it. He will never say: no, there will truly be something terribly bad in it and it will be a catastrophe, and still it is the will of God and I will do it. I know quite a few such people. I don’t know — every morning in the mirror I see one such person. Every morning when I look — though one must not look in a mirror, only if a gentile is cutting my hair. But absolutely yes, there are many such people. I know many such people. I myself am such a person. Fine.

Anyway, the simplest solution is indeed what Ophir just said. It is a kind of solution — for example, in Rabbi Kook I think this is very common — that there cannot be any conflict at all. Not because logically there cannot be; the logical structure is correct, but in practice the will of God also always turns out to be the most moral, and consequently everything works out fine. But then of course one has to understand what “transgression for its own sake” means and all kinds of things of that type, which is another whole chapter. I think transgression for its own sake is to be understood literally, and therefore I do not accept this identification between Jewish law and morality. What? What is “transgression for its own sake”? For the sake of the transgression? No, for the sake of the will of God, for the sake of God. You said “for its own sake.” And you called it “a transgression for His sake.” A transgression for His sake — it doesn’t matter — for the sake of Torah. It sounds… The whole concept is “for its own sake”; we already discussed what “for its own sake” means.

There’s just one thing I didn’t understand in what you said. The commitment of a person who accepted the Torah one hundred percent cannot accept within it commitment to anything else without first checking it through Torah. Why? The moment I accepted Torah one hundred percent, that means that before I accept any other value, say morality, I need to check whether it fits inside my one hundred percent. Why? I already grasped myself as standing with the one hundred percent. If I have two… So once again you are returning to what was said here earlier. Not exactly, not exactly. If I have two points, two values that guide me, then I give each one fifty percent, not one hundred. No — one hundred. If I am already committed to one value one hundred percent, that means everything I do has to be seen through that one hundred percent before I accept… Why? But both are one hundred percent — what can I do? If there is a value I already accept one hundred percent… Both simultaneously. Rabbi, the very acceptance of the second value has to pass through the first value if you already accepted one hundred percent… But I say, let’s talk about simultaneously, fine? You accept — the chronology here is not essential. Simultaneously one hundred percent? Certainly. Then we are back to the previous discussion. I accept both one hundred percent. One hundred percent, not even one millimeter less. I accept both. And you know what? Only for the sake of the hypothetical, what I said before too: I have no solution to the conflict within either system, nor outside the systems. If what you say is true, that means you did not accept either one of them one hundred percent. What are you talking about? Why not? I accepted both one hundred percent. These are just different definitions of the word one hundred percent. No, that is why I say: this is somewhat semantic, but this is full acceptance. I do not think it is a less full acceptance than anyone else’s acceptance. No, because the most complete acceptance would be acceptance where I say this is the absolute, and everything… and all the rest I have not accepted. But with regard to this there would be no difference; you just would not have others that collide with it. No, I can accept something and say: essentially, whatever comes now — no matter what it is — will be set aside before it. Fine, then you accepted… That is a more total acceptance. So that is primary. It’s not one hundred percent; rather it means there is also a hierarchy, that this comes before the other systems. Yes, it is not simultaneously — it is an inclusive or additional prohibition. Yes, fine — not necessarily that they stem from it. There can even be additional systems, but it will always override them. I can accept from the outset that whatever… Fine, you are saying that in some sense it comes before them, even if not temporally — I don’t care right now whether it’s temporal or essential — but it comes before them. But that priority is a priority that does not necessarily express itself in the intensity of the commitment. Meaning, if by chance there will now be something I also take upon myself one hundred percent, although I didn’t think so at first glance, that means I accept both one hundred percent; I am fully obligated to both. This thing reduced the percentages in which I am obligated to the first thing at the place where they clash. I don’t see it that way. I just don’t see why it should be that way. I don’t…

Okay. So in principle such a situation is clearly possible. Meaning, this is not an impossible situation. That is first of all, the first datum of this analysis. Now the question of course is what does one do in such a situation? And that too is not completely clear on its face. Because when I ask what one does in such a situation, I already said earlier that the answer to that question has to be given not within one of those two systems. Because when I discuss what to do when there is a conflict between two systems, clearly the discussion has to be conducted outside both of them, using some more universal, more basic tools, and not tools connected to one of the systems.

So it is absurd to look within the halakhic system and ask what it tells me to do in a situation where it itself clashes with something else. It is perfectly clear what it tells me to do. But if I accept what it tells me to do, then basically I am not in conflict; I immediately accept what it tells me. Conflict means that even if it tells me, I am not sure I accept it; rather I have to decide what to do. Okay? So I am supposed to make that decision using tools that lie outside both those systems. And therefore there is no obstacle to the decision favoring the non-halakhic side. There is no such obstacle. Why? Because if the tools are extra-halakhic tools, who determines which extra-halakhic tools are correct? Jewish law? Meaning, now each person with his own tools. I, for example, with my own tools reach the conclusion… that this prevails rather than the halakhic side. Fine, that is my decision. Will you tell me that I am improper from a halakhic standpoint? That is trivial; I too will tell you that I am improper from a halakhic standpoint. So what can one say about such a thing? After all, this is an extra-halakhic discussion. It is not a halakhic discussion.

Exactly as a transgression for its own sake cannot be a statement made within the framework of Jewish law. The fact that it is said there… Not in Jewish law — it is said in the Talmud. That is not Jewish law. It is something else. Therefore I say there is a difference between the will of God and something external. The question is whether this — meaning, this discussion still remains within the system… Within the will of God, not within Jewish law. That is what I said earlier. To try to look for it there. Correct. No, that’s fine — within the will of God it is indeed true. There are some ways to deal with it within the system of the will of God. But when you are in a parallel conflict with something completely external, then the tools are outside both systems altogether, and then you are in an even more external condition, yes? And you are speaking about much more fundamental things that you cannot put through halakhic review. Because it cannot be that Jewish law reviews my decision whether to be faithful to Jewish law. That is simply not… it is not consistent.

It could be that it allows me only certain extra-halakhic systems, like morality. Morality — then I found proofs that there is transgression for its own sake, that there is… No — then once again you are saying that it simply fits. Let’s say it doesn’t fit. What do we do then? No, Jewish law does not recognize it. That’s it. It could be that if Jewish law does not recognize it — I think that only systems that Jewish law recognizes, I am basically permitted… What do you mean permitted? Permitted halakhically. One hundred percent. But the discussion is not a halakhic discussion. That is exactly the point. And therefore our tendency is always to move immediately to permitted and forbidden, but we do not notice that by doing so we have already, even before saying the result of the conflict, in fact adopted one of the sides. It is not the result of your argument that you will reach the conclusion that Jewish law prevails; that is the assumption of your argument. You have already implicitly adopted the halakhic side before you said it. But that is exactly the point — in principle this is not an unavoidable reality. This human condition is one that is open in both directions.

Now I want to conclude, simply because I’m about to finish, and I still want to finish the little bit more that I can say here. The only thing one can claim about such a situation is basically the following claim. Someone will come and say: listen, gentlemen, this is my situation. I am obligated to Jewish law, I am obligated to morality, and I choose morality. In a certain conflict I choose morality. That’s all. It sounds somewhat problematic to us from the standpoint of serving God. But what is the claim against him? If you make a halakhic claim, he joins us in the dances of celebration. Meaning, he too agrees that Jewish law stands against his decision. He only says that he does not accept that side of the conflict, the halakhic side, in this conflict. So what exactly is the claim?

It seems that the claim here is true generally of any normative system we can think of. But there are certain normative systems — and apparently Jewish law or the will of God is included among them — where the system itself tells you that if you respond to another system, that means you are not faithful to me. Now I can always decide: okay, then I am not faithful; I respond to another system. But I cannot say that by doing so I remain faithful to both sides. Meaning, if one of the systems tells me: listen, from my perspective you can decide whatever you want, but from my perspective if you obey another system, then you are not considered loyal to me. You are not one of my soldiers. So you cannot say: listen, I am faithful to both sides one hundred percent, only I am in conflict and need to decide using extra-halakhic tools. Because basically part of system A is not to obey system B when there is a conflict.

What did we gain from that? What? What did we gain from that? You call it loyalty, but what did you gain from it? Why? There? That if the halakhic system said that if you are outside, then you are not faithful to it. Fine, you are not faithful to it — so what? You are faithful to truth, you are faithful to… One hundred percent. You are faithful to truth. I said nothing. I am only saying that you cannot say you are faithful to Jewish law, that’s all. Don’t live under illusions. Faithful to Jewish law you are not, that’s all. Now decide whatever you want. You cannot say, “I am faithful to…” It’s like someone who says, “I am faithful to health, only this overrides…” That’s just a word — what do you mean? What do you mean “just a word”? That word is the whole issue — to be obligated to serving God, that is serving God for its own sake. That was the first lecture we spoke about. What do you mean “just a word”? That is the whole point. That is what you are tested on — tested, yes, in Heaven — if you… Fine, let me…

This thing itself can appear in two forms. The halakhic system, or the Torah system — let’s call it that in this context — can say that things that contradict me, you cannot be faithful to them from my perspective. And therefore if you do feel faithful to them, then you have left our battalion. Meaning, you cannot say that you belong to both armies at once. But it seems that in Jewish law there is something even more fundamental. I can’t really enter the details now; I’ll just say it telegraphically. In Jewish law there is something more fundamental. The very fact that you are faithful — not to Jewish law, to the will of God, to be more precise — the very fact that you feel faithful to an additional system, even if it does not contradict anything, but is merely external — it is not the will of God, it is something external, it does not contradict anything — that itself already means that you are not faithful to the halakhic system. That itself already means that you are not faithful to the halakhic system. Can you also say that you are not doing the will of God? Yes, that is the point. That is the point; that is what I am talking about. Meaning, even if you have, even if you grasp the will of God as a prior system, as we said earlier. Yes, I am speaking right now in relation to the will of God, not in relation to Jewish law. Some value external to the will of God, not external to Jewish law. No, no, no — but you are saying that the will of God is the prior thing, meaning even if you say there are other things, maybe other things.