Midrash and Methods of Interpretation – Lesson 5

Table of Contents

• The second root: midrash-derived laws as rabbinic law and the consequences of not deriving punishments through inference
• Law given to Moses at Sinai, leniency in cases of doubt, and defining Torah-level law as “written in the Torah”
• Exceptional examples in the Mishneh Torah and the classification between creative interpretations and supportive interpretations
• Nachmanides’s objection to a supportive interpretation: “Does zero plus zero equal one?”
• Reading Maimonides on the second root: the condition for something to be “Torah-level” depends on the Sages saying so and on “the text indicating it”
• A verse never loses its plain meaning: the dispute between Maimonides and Nachmanides and the theory of interpretation
• Two innovations in Maimonides: an interpretive innovation and a halakhic innovation, and the possibility of accepting one without the other
• The Ran in Nedarim: an oath can take effect on a law learned through interpretation even though it is from the Torah
• The example of linen garments in Yoma and Maimonides in the Laws of Temple Vessels: a halakhic consequence of the interpretive distinction
• Summary of the lecture’s framework and continuation

Summary

General Overview

The lecture continues the discussion of Maimonides’s second root and presents his view that laws learned from interpretive derivations are divrei sofrim—rabbinic law in the halakhic sense—with practical ramifications such as not administering punishment and tending toward leniency in cases of doubt. This is in contrast to a common reading, starting with the Tashbetz and onward, that Maimonides is dealing only with the question of source and not with the question of legal force. The argument here is that Maimonides defines de’oraita literally as “what is written in the Torah” in its plain sense, and therefore both a law given to Moses at Sinai and a law derived through the interpretive rules are not Torah-level by definition. After that, a two-stage understanding of Maimonides is presented: an interpretive innovation, according to which the interpretive rules are an expanding tool rather than a revealing tool, and a halakhic innovation, according to which such expansions receive the force of rabbinic law. The Ran is presented as someone who accepts the interpretive innovation but disputes the halakhic one.

The second root: midrash-derived laws as rabbinic law and the consequences of not deriving punishments through inference

Maimonides relates to laws that emerge from interpretive derivations as laws that are divrei sofrim, and the claim is that he means they are rabbinic, not merely that their source is the Sages. Maimonides rules that for laws derived through the interpretive rules one does not punish—one does not flog and does not execute—and only when the punishment is written explicitly in the Torah and the prohibition is learned through interpretation can one punish. Maimonides calls this “we do not punish based on inference” or “we do not formulate a prohibition based on inference,” and he extends the accepted rule from an a fortiori inference to all the interpretive rules. This is presented as a halakhic practical difference that proves we are dealing with the legal force of the law and not only with the question of the source of its content.

Law given to Moses at Sinai, leniency in cases of doubt, and defining Torah-level law as “written in the Torah”

Maimonides writes that in at least one or two places even a law given to Moses at Sinai is classified as divrei sofrim, and that in cases of doubt one rules leniently. That is presented as strange, because this is a tradition received from the mouth of the Almighty. The explanation given is that Maimonides understands de’oraita in its literal sense—”from the Torah,” meaning what is written in the Torah—so anything not written there, even if it originates at Sinai, is not defined as Torah-level. The lecture emphasizes that this approach is unusual among the medieval authorities (Rishonim), and notes a similar approach brought by Rashi in Ketubot 3a in the name of his teachers, as a remnant of the Geonic tradition. From that, several questions arise: why is being written in the Torah the criterion, how does that fit with the Talmud’s tendency to treat doubts in interpretive derivations stringently, and why in practice there are very few places in the Mishneh Torah where Maimonides classifies as rabbinic what is generally treated as Torah-level.

Exceptional examples in the Mishneh Torah and the classification between creative interpretations and supportive interpretations

At the beginning of the Laws of Marriage, Maimonides defines betrothal through money as divrei sofrim, while betrothal through document and intercourse are Torah-level. At the same time, he writes that one who has relations with her is liable to death, which generated extensive discussion about his position. Maimonides also writes that disqualifications of testimony involving maternal relatives are divrei sofrim, even though many consider that Torah-level as well, and here too the question arises whether this is connected to the second root. Maimonides distinguishes between creative interpretations, which generate the law and therefore are rabbinic, and a supportive or sustaining interpretation, where the interpretation merely anchors an existing law in the text, and therefore the law is Torah-level. In a responsum he writes that most of the interpretations we possess are creative, and only “maybe three or four” are supportive, and that strengthens the expectation that in Maimonides we should find many more rabbinic classifications for laws that usually appear to be Torah-level.

Nachmanides’s objection to a supportive interpretation: “Does zero plus zero equal one?”

Nachmanides objects that if Maimonides considers a law given to Moses at Sinai to be rabbinic because it is not written in the Torah, and likewise a law derived through interpretation to be rabbinic, then it is not clear how an oral tradition anchored by an interpretation suddenly becomes Torah-level. Nachmanides explains that a supportive interpretation is not based on a law written in the Torah, but on an oral tradition for which one finds textual support. The lecture presents his objection as targeting the logic of combining tradition and interpretation, since according to Maimonides’s premises each one by itself does not produce Torah-level law.

Reading Maimonides on the second root: the condition for something to be “Torah-level” depends on the Sages saying so and on “the text indicating it”

In the second root, Maimonides states that anything you do not find written in the Torah, but do find in the Talmud as having been learned through one of the thirteen interpretive principles—if the Sages themselves explained that this is an essential part of the Torah or that it is Torah-level, it is fitting to count it; but if they did not explain this and did not speak of it that way, then it is rabbinic, “for there is no text that indicates it.” The lecture identifies this with the distinction in his introduction to the Mishnah between supportive and creative interpretations, so that when the Sages say that a law is Torah-level, that reveals that the interpretation was supportive rather than creative. Maimonides establishes a default: an interpretation whose Torah-level status was not clarified is presumed to be creative and therefore rabbinic, and this is explained on the basis of his claim that most interpretations are creative. The argument is that the Sages are expected, in one way or another, to make it clear from the Talmudic discussion that the law is treated as Torah-level, even if there is no explicit declaration in the wording, “and this law is Torah-level.”

A verse never loses its plain meaning: the dispute between Maimonides and Nachmanides and the theory of interpretation

Maimonides attacks the Behag for counting commandments learned from interpretive derivations and argues that such things are “without doubt rabbinic,” because “the plain meaning of the verse does not indicate” them. He relies on the principle that “a verse never loses its plain meaning” and on Talmudic questions of the type, “what is the verse itself speaking about?” Nachmanides attacks Maimonides and argues that “a verse never loses its plain meaning” means that the plain meaning remains in place alongside the interpretation, not that only the plain meaning is the correct interpretation; and the claim of “seventy faces to the Torah” is mentioned as well. The lecture emphasizes that Maimonides is unusual in claiming that a verse has only one correct interpretation—the plain meaning—and that interpretation in the midrashic sense is not the explanation of the verse but an expansion. Maimonides defines the interpretive derivations as “branches from the roots,” not as a tool that decodes the written text. The example from the Minchat Chinukh on “do not place a stumbling block before the blind” is presented as an application of the question whether interpretation replaces the plain meaning or joins it, and a suggestion is raised that a metaphorical reading could turn the prohibition into part of the “plain meaning” rather than an interpretation.

Two innovations in Maimonides: an interpretive innovation and a halakhic innovation, and the possibility of accepting one without the other

The lecture argues that Maimonides’s position is made up of two innovations: an interpretive innovation, according to which the interpretive rules are an expanding tool rather than a revealing one, and a halakhic innovation, according to which such expansions have the status of rabbinic law rather than Torah-level law. It is emphasized that one can, in principle, accept the interpretive innovation without accepting the halakhic one, and vice versa, and that the two are independent. A logical possibility is presented: to accept Maimonides’s definition of Torah-level law and at the same time argue that interpretive derivations are revealing, in which case laws derived through interpretation would be Torah-level, while a law given to Moses at Sinai would still remain non-Torah-level because it is not written in the Torah.

The Ran in Nedarim: an oath can take effect on a law learned through interpretation even though it is from the Torah

The Ran explains the passage in Nedarim 8a about “I will rise early and study” by saying that even though one is always obligated to study Torah according to one’s ability, the broader obligations are learned through interpretation, such as “and you shall teach them diligently”—that the words of Torah should be sharp in your mouth. The Ran writes that anything “that comes through interpretation,” even though it is from the Torah, since it is not stated explicitly in the verse, an oath can take effect upon it. The lecture uses this to show that the Ran disputes Maimonides’s halakhic innovation and considers laws derived through interpretation to be Torah-level, but accepts the interpretive innovation that the interpretation is an expansion and therefore not part of what was sworn to at Sinai in the sense of being already under oath. The conclusion is that the interpretive innovation itself can generate halakhic consequences, even without adopting Maimonides’s definition of rabbinic status.

The example of linen garments in Yoma and Maimonides in the Laws of Temple Vessels: a halakhic consequence of the interpretive distinction

The Talmud in Yoma brings a baraita from which it is derived that “twined linen” means a thread made of six strands, and from repetitions in the verse additional laws are learned, such as twisting, applying the rule to other garments, and making it indispensable. Maimonides rules that wherever “linen” is stated, the thread must be made of six strands and this is indispensable; but where the verse says “bad,” a single strand is valid, though it is a preferred commandment that it be made of six. The lecture presents the precise question: how does Maimonides accept the textual inclusion that applies the six-strand rule even to “bad,” yet not apply to it the law that it is indispensable? The explanation given is that indispensability applies to what is “written here” in the verse, while expansions that are not “written here” are not included in the derivation of indispensability. The claim is that this understanding rests on the interpretive innovation that interpretation expands rather than reveals, and therefore what we include from here to another case is not considered part of what the verse itself said was “indispensable.” It is emphasized that even someone who disagrees with Maimonides about the Torah-level/rabbinic classification could in principle still accept this consequence if he accepts the interpretive thesis.

Summary of the lecture’s framework and continuation

The summary concludes that Maimonides introduces an interpretive innovation: midrash is an expanding tool, contrary to Nachmanides’s view and the common view among the medieval authorities (Rishonim), according to which midrash is a revealing tool. Alongside that, he introduces a halakhic innovation: Torah-level law is defined only as what is written in the Torah, and therefore a law given to Moses at Sinai and laws derived through interpretation are not Torah-level. The lecture emphasizes that the Ran joins him in the interpretive innovation but rejects the halakhic innovation, and shows a halakhic conclusion that emerges from the interpretive innovation in the case of an oath taking effect on a law derived through interpretation. The lecture ends by stressing that the two innovations do not depend on one another, and one can logically adopt each one separately, both together, or neither of them, and the continuation is postponed until next time.

Last time I began dealing with Maimonides’ second root. And there we saw that Maimonides basically relates to Jewish laws learned from midrashic derivations as laws that are from the words of the Sages—that is, rabbinic law. I spoke about the fact that there are several approaches among Maimonides’ commentators as to what he means. Does he mean actual rabbinic laws, as the plain meaning of that expression suggests—“from the words of the Sages,” rabbinic laws—with all the implications: in a case of doubt we rule leniently, and all those kinds of things? And there are approaches, from the Tashbetz onward—it became very widespread—that Maimonides only means to address the question of source, not the question of authority. Meaning, he says that laws that emerge from midrashic derivations have their source in the Sages, in the rabbis, but in terms of their halakhic status they are Torah-level laws. Okay? And I argued that that’s not correct. In other words, Maimonides really means to say that these are rabbinic laws. I brought several proofs for this. Among other things, we spoke about the rule that punishments are not derived through legal inference. We saw that Maimonides says that for laws that emerge from midrashic derivations, we do not punish. No lashes, no execution, no punishment. Only if the punishment is written in the Torah and the warning is learned by derivation—then punishment is possible. But if I have a warning and no punishment in the Torah—which in principle should mean lashes, because every punishment other than lashes has to be written explicitly—if the punishment is not written, the assumption is that it’s lashes, unless it’s a prohibition without an action or something like that. So if there is no punishment in the Torah and I have a warning that comes from a derivation, we do not punish for that. And Maimonides calls this “punishments are not derived through legal inference” or “warnings are not derived through legal inference.” Why? Because from Maimonides’ perspective, any learning whose basis is a derivation is basically a legal inference, like an a fortiori argument. And just as the accepted understanding in the Talmud is that “we do not punish on the basis of legal inference” applies to an a fortiori argument—this is how all the medieval authorities (Rishonim) understand it—Maimonides says: it’s not only an a fortiori argument; it’s all the hermeneutic principles. Anything learned through the hermeneutic principles, we do not punish on that basis. So you see that something that comes from the hermeneutic principles is not only a question of what its source is—that its source is the words of the Sages—but that there is a consequence regarding its authority: we do not punish for it. That is a halakhic practical difference. It’s not just a theoretical statement about where it came from, from the Sages or from the Torah; there is some statement here with halakhic significance.

I mentioned that Maimonides, regarding a law given to Moses at Sinai, writes—and there are some contradictions in Maimonides on this, but in at least one or two places Maimonides writes—that a law given to Moses at Sinai is also “from the words of the Sages,” and in a case of doubt we rule leniently. Meaning, a law given to Moses at Sinai is also rabbinic law in terms of authority, not in terms of source. And that already seems very strange, because it’s a law we received from the Holy One, blessed be He. What difference does it make whether it is written in the Torah or transmitted orally? Seemingly it should be the same thing. In a case of doubt we should have ruled stringently. Maimonides says no, in a case of doubt we rule leniently. So these indications tell us that Maimonides apparently understands that the concept “Torah-level” has to be interpreted literally. What is called “Torah-level”? What is the literal meaning? “From the Torah.” That’s what “de’oraita” means in Aramaic, right? When I translate that into Hebrew, it means “from the Torah.” Maimonides says: that means that a Torah-level law is a law written in the Torah. That is a Torah-level law. Anything not written in the Torah—whether it comes from a derivation or whether it is a law given to Moses at Sinai—it comes from the Holy One, blessed be He, everything is fine, but it is not written in the Torah. If it is not written in the Torah, it is not a Torah-level law. With all the consequences as well. So that is the meaning.

But there are still several difficulties here. First, we have to understand why. Why should I care whether it’s written or not written in the Torah? If the Holy One, blessed be He, said it, it’s Torah-level. If the Holy One, blessed be He, did not say it, then it’s rabbinic. But if it’s a law given to Moses at Sinai and it’s not written in the Torah, it still comes from the Holy One, blessed be He. Why should it have a different halakhic status? In fact all the medieval authorities (Rishonim) do not accept this—not regarding laws that emerge from derivations and not regarding a law given to Moses at Sinai. This is Maimonides’ method. There is also in tractate Ketubot, on page 3, where Rashi cites in the name of his teachers such an approach. This is something left over from the Geonic period. But among the standard medieval authorities (Rishonim), this is basically only Maimonides’ view. So that is the first question: how to understand this logically.

And there are many, many other questions here. In the Talmud itself we see that in a doubtful case regarding laws that emerge from derivations, we rule stringently. Meaning, the Talmud treats them as Torah-level laws. Maimonides himself—there are almost no places. I would have expected that in the Mishneh Torah there would be many laws that we think are Torah-level, and suddenly we would find that according to Maimonides they’re rabbinic. According to Maimonides, everything that comes from a derivation is rabbinic. There are lots of such laws—most laws are like that, not laws explicitly written in the Torah. But there aren’t. The examples in Maimonides that contradict what we would have thought are very, very few. Earlier I mentioned Maimonides at the beginning of the laws of marriage, right? Where he says that betrothal by money is from the words of the Sages. Betrothal by document and by intercourse is Torah-level; betrothal by money is from the words of the Sages. And there too, immediately in the next law, Maimonides writes that there is a death penalty involved. If I betrothed a woman through money, which supposedly is only from the words of the Sages, someone who has intercourse with her is liable to death. That isn’t rabbinic—it would have to be Torah-level. Okay? So there are many discussions there around Maimonides. That’s one place where this appears.

And there is another place regarding relatives disqualified from testimony through the mother’s side. If I have relatives who are my relatives through my mother but not through my father—say brothers through the mother, who are not brothers through the father but only through the mother—their disqualification from testimony, they are disqualified from testimony, and Maimonides says that their disqualification from testimony is from the words of the Sages, even though everyone said it was Torah-level. So there too a discussion begins: is this connected to the second root or not connected to the second root? But these are isolated places. Very few places in Maimonides where this appears. And the question is why. I would have expected there to be many such places.

Maimonides writes—and I mentioned this—that Maimonides writes, and I’ll add something else: Maimonides says that laws learned from derivations, but where the derivations are supporting and not creating—those are indeed Torah-level laws. Again: if the derivation is a derivation that created the law, then the law is rabbinic, from the words of the Sages. But if the derivation merely supports an existing law in Scripture—what’s called a supporting derivation or a confirming derivation—then that is a Torah-level law, not rabbinic. That is Maimonides’ claim. Now in a responsum he writes that most of the derivations we have are creating derivations, except for maybe three or four—meaning, just a few. Other than that, most derivations are creating derivations. This strengthens even more what I said earlier: if so, I would have expected to see many places in Maimonides where he writes of some law that it is rabbinic even though I would have expected it to be Torah-level. So these are some of the difficulties.

There is another difficulty I mentioned—the difficulty raised by Nachmanides. Nachmanides asks: Maimonides, you say that a law given to Moses at Sinai is a rabbinic law, from the words of the Sages, because it is not written in the Torah. It is an oral tradition, not written in the Torah. A law learned from a derivation—Maimonides says that too is rabbinic, right? So how can it be that a law that comes to us by tradition, but we anchor it in a derivation, suddenly becomes Torah-level? Zero plus zero equals one? Oral tradition by itself is not enough for Torah-level; it’s a rabbinic law. A law that comes from a derivation is also not Torah-level; that too is rabbinic. But if there is a tradition and there is a derivation that anchors it, suddenly it becomes a Torah-level law? Nachmanides asks: what logic is there in that? If each of these mechanisms by itself is rabbinic, how does their combination create something Torah-level? Okay? You’re noting that this is a supporting derivation, right? What? It’s a supporting derivation. We’re talking about a supporting derivation. Nachmanides asks why, according to Maimonides, a supporting derivation is Torah-level. What is a supporting derivation? I have a law that comes through tradition; a supporting derivation never supports a law that is written in the Torah. If it is written in the Torah, I don’t need to support it by a derivation—it’s written. A supporting derivation is always a tradition that comes orally, meaning a law given to Moses at Sinai. I have some oral tradition, and I find a derivation that supports it in Scripture. And an oral tradition has the status of rabbinic law. A derivation also creates a rabbinic law. So why does a tradition anchored by a derivation suddenly become Torah-level? How does that happen? Okay? That’s Nachmanides’ question.

So here I want to proceed in two stages. I want to argue that Maimonides’ approach regarding laws that emerge from derivations, and in general regarding the concept of “Torah-level,” is made up of two innovations—special innovations of Maimonides. Regarding the first innovation, a number of medieval authorities (Rishonim) share it; regarding the second, no. The second is Maimonides alone. To see this, let’s look for a moment at the second root. We glanced at it a little, but let’s see if there are several important hints there for understanding Maimonides’ approach on this matter. Okay, he says: Therefore, the proper rule in this matter is that anything you do not find written in the Torah, but you do find in the Talmud that they learned through one of the thirteen principles—if they themselves clarified and said that this is the body of Torah, or that it is Torah-level, then it is appropriate to count it, because those who received it said that it is Torah-level. But if they did not clarify this and did not speak about it, then it is rabbinic, because there is no scriptural text that indicates it. Yes—if there is a law that came from a derivation and the Sages themselves said that it is Torah-level, Maimonides says: then if so, it is Torah-level. But if the Sages said nothing about it, then it is from the words of the Sages, it is rabbinic. Why? Because there is no scriptural text indicating it—because there is no text that points to it—so it is rabbinic law, not a Torah-level law. So “there is no scriptural text indicating it”—but there is a derivation. A derivation does not count as “a text indicating it.” Okay? That is an important point.

Now I want to identify this with what I said earlier, which Maimonides writes in his introduction to the Mishnah. There Maimonides divides between creating derivations and supporting derivations. Creating derivations are rabbinic; a law given to Moses at Sinai is also rabbinic. But supporting derivations are Torah-level. That is what I said earlier. I want to argue that what Maimonides writes here is simply the expression of what he wrote there. Maimonides says: if the Sages told me that this derivation creates a Torah-level law, what they are basically telling me is that this derivation is a supporting derivation. And of course, we know that a supporting derivation is Torah-level. It’s just that when we see a derivation, we have no way of knowing whether it is a supporting derivation or a creating derivation. They bring a derivation and the result is some law—how do you know whether that law already existed or whether it was created by this derivation itself? So he says: if the Sages told us that it is Torah-level, by that they revealed to us that this derivation was a supporting derivation. Therefore, the law that emerged from it is a Torah-level law. But if the Sages said nothing, then apparently it is a creating derivation and this is a rabbinic law.

And that itself raises a question. Why isn’t it a case of doubt? If the Sages didn’t say it is Torah-level—they just didn’t say anything—then it’s a doubt. Maybe it’s creating, maybe it’s supporting. Why does Maimonides say it is a rabbinic law? Apparently Maimonides understands that, as I said before, there are three or four supporting derivations; all the rest are creating. So the default assumption is that the derivation is creating, unless the Sages said otherwise. And the Sages themselves are also supposed to be careful about this, because they themselves understand that if they do not say so, it will confuse me; I need to know whether the law is Torah-level or rabbinic. Therefore, whenever the law is Torah-level, the Sages said that it is Torah-level. If they did not say so, then apparently it is rabbinic. They don’t need to say that it is rabbinic; it is enough that they did not say that it is Torah-level. Okay? That is what emerges from Maimonides.

Did they actually say it right next to the derivation itself? No, every time it appears in a different form. Sometimes it is only the result of calculations. What do I mean? You see somehow from the Talmudic discussion that the Sages understood it to be a Torah-level law. Not that they said, “and this law is a Torah-level law”—usually the Talmud doesn’t talk that way. But you see from the flow of the discussion that they treated it as a Torah-level law. You have evidence. In Maimonides there are examples, and sometimes he brings some indirect proofs of one kind or another from which it somehow emerges that it is Torah-level. So the Sages told us that it is Torah-level, and that’s fine. Yes.

That is a bit of a comment on Maimonides, because if the Sages are supposed to be careful about this, they should have said it—not left me to make calculations and arrive at the conclusion that it is Torah-level. They should have said: this is Torah-level, in order to make it clear to me. Otherwise I’ll get confused; if I don’t make those calculations, I’ll think that it is a rabbinic law, and that confuses me. Okay, that is a bit of a comment on Maimonides, but that is his claim.

Now the question is: what is the meaning of this? What does it mean that “there is no scriptural text indicating it”? You can see that for Maimonides—and this appears in dozens of places in Maimonides—the criterion for what counts as a Torah-level law is whether it is written in the Torah. Therefore, a law given to Moses at Sinai, even though it was given to us by the Holy One, blessed be He, at Sinai by divine speech—and it is not written in the Torah—so it is not Torah-level. Here is Maimonides’ innovation: a law that comes from a derivation is also not written in the Torah. “There is no scriptural text indicating it.” He is talking about a law from a derivation—what does he mean, “there is no scriptural text indicating it”? The derivation tells you what is written. No—that does not count as the text indicating that law. This law too is rabbinic because it is not written in the Torah. And Nachmanides is indeed astonished by this—but I’ll get to that in a moment. First let’s look at one passage in Maimonides.

You see? Look, for example, at this: his criticism of the author of Halakhot Gedolot. “And their foolishness reached an even worse point, namely that when they found a derivation in a verse from which it follows that one must perform some act or avoid some matter—and all of these are certainly rabbinic—they counted them among the commandments.” The author of Halakhot Gedolot includes in the count of commandments things that come from derivations, even though the plain meaning of the verse does not indicate any of those matters. Even though the plain sense of the text does not teach that—it is a derivation. You see again? Maimonides understands that only if the plain sense of the text teaches that law is it written in the Torah. If that law comes from a derivation, then it is not written in the Torah, so it is not Torah-level. Right? Here this is written very clearly.

And with the principle our Sages of blessed memory taught us—“a verse never departs from its plain meaning”—and the fact that the Talmud asks in every place, “what is the verse itself speaking about?” when they find a verse and learn from it many things by way of explanation and proof. Meaning, we see in the Talmud in many places that even though the Talmud learns derivations from verses, learns various things by derivation from some verse, still the Talmud asks: what is the plain meaning of the verse? Leave aside the derivations—what does it say? Okay? Or, “a verse never departs from its plain meaning.” The fact that you made derivations is all very nice, but the interpretation of Scripture is its plain sense. This is Maimonides’ proof that derivations are not Torah-level laws. Only something written in the Torah in its plain meaning is Torah-level. Derivations are not something written in the Torah, and therefore they are not Torah-level.

So Nachmanides attacks Maimonides here. In his glosses it’s very long—I won’t go into it now, I won’t read it inside—but what Nachmanides basically argues, and what most medieval authorities (Rishonim) understand, is this: what does “a verse never departs from its plain meaning” mean? It means that although you learned some law through a derivation, don’t abandon the plain meaning—there is also a plain meaning. It does not mean that only the plain meaning is the correct interpretation. It means that if you made a derivation, don’t forget: the plain meaning is also a correct interpretation. That is how it is usually understood. Maimonides does not learn it that way. Maimonides understands “a verse never departs from its plain meaning” to mean that only the plain meaning is the correct interpretation. There are not two correct interpretations of the same verse. Only the plain meaning is the meaning of the verse; the derivation is not. In a moment we’ll see what it is, but it is not. And Nachmanides attacks him on this. He says: the Torah has seventy facets—what’s the problem? You can interpret the same verse in several ways. “A verse never departs from its plain meaning” means that it is not only the derivation but also the plain meaning—not that it is only the plain meaning. And that is the standard explanation among the medieval authorities (Rishonim). In this matter Maimonides is exceptional.

I gave an example this morning, I think: the Minchat Chinukh claims that there is no prohibition against tripping a blind person on the road. It says, “do not place a stumbling block before the blind.” There is no prohibition? Why? Because the Sages expound it as: don’t give him bad advice, or don’t cause him to sin. Fine, so the Sages removed the verse from its plain meaning; there is a derivation, and so what Jewish law learns from this verse is the derivation. But the plain meaning of the verse—that one may not trip a blind person on the road? No, according to him there is no such prohibition. Now Nachmanides says: this is actually what the Sages mean when they say “a verse never departs from its plain meaning.” It means that if we made a derivation, that does not mean the plain meaning no longer exists. The derivation does not replace the plain meaning—we spoke about this. The derivation stands alongside the plain meaning; there is both plain meaning and derivation in parallel. That is what “a verse never departs from its plain meaning” means—that the Minchat Chinukh is not right.

Okay. This morning someone suggested to me a possibility I hadn’t thought of, really—what did the Minchat Chinukh think? Someone suggested that maybe the Minchat Chinukh means that “do not trip a blind person on the road” is a metaphorical expression; it is not a derivation. We read the verse metaphorically. “Tripping” means causing sin, not literal tripping. If it is not a derivation, then it is really just a replacement of the plain meaning. The plain meaning is not read literally, but metaphorically, and in the end that is the plain meaning. So in that case maybe actually tripping a blind person on the road is not prohibited. It’s an interesting suggestion; I hadn’t thought of it. Okay, but in any event, if this is a derivation, then clearly beyond the derivation there is also the plain meaning. That is what Nachmanides says. Therefore, says Nachmanides, when we say “a verse never departs from its plain meaning,” the meaning is: it’s not only the derivation—don’t forget, the plain meaning is also an interpretation of the verses.

Wait, but isn’t derivation itself basically a kind of metaphor? No. Why not? A derivation is an additional mode of learning, not a metaphor. “You shall fear the Lord your God”—to include Torah scholars. What metaphor is there here? There is no metaphor at all. The word “et” comes to include another law besides the law written in the Torah. Okay?

But Maimonides does not accept this. Maimonides says: “a verse never departs from its plain meaning” means that a verse has only one correct interpretation, and no other. Only the plain meaning. The correct interpretation is the plain meaning. Derivation is not an interpretation of the verse—which is an enormous innovation. He repeats this later. This is Maimonides’ claim: only the plain meaning. He repeats it later: And perhaps you will think that I refrain from counting them because they are not true, and because the law derived through that principle is either true or untrue. In other words, Maimonides says: do you think I don’t count among the commandments those commandments that emerge from derivations because they are not true? Because they are not binding—there are no such commandments? Certainly not—they are binding. Right? It is not because they are true or untrue; that is not the reason. Rather the reason is that everything a person derives are branches from the roots that were said to Moses at Sinai in explanation—and those are the 613 commandments. And even if the one deriving them were Moses himself, it would not be proper to count them. What is he saying? That when I learn some law from a verse through a hermeneutic principle, it is like a branch that grows out of the root. In my language: the derivation does not expose another layer that is inside the text. The derivation is an expansion of what appears in the text. A derivation is not an interpretive tool.

Yes, the standard view is that derivation is an interpretive tool: there are interpretive tools of plain meaning, there are interpretive tools of derivation, and there are two interpretations of the same verse—the plain interpretation and the derived interpretation. That is how Nachmanides understands it, and therefore “a verse never departs from its plain meaning” means both interpretations are correct. Maimonides says no: “a verse never departs from its plain meaning” means only the plain sense of Scripture is the correct interpretation. Why? Because the plain sense of Scripture deciphers what is written in the verse. After you use the tools of plain meaning, you know that this is what the verse says. That is Torah-level, because that is what the verse says. But if you derive a law from the verse, the hermeneutic principles are not revealing tools; they are expanding tools. Meaning: if it says “You shall fear the Lord your God,” then the Torah means fear of the Holy One, blessed be He, not Torah scholars. When the Sages come and say “et comes to include,” they are saying: I expand what is written in the Torah—not only fear of the Holy One, blessed be He, but also fear of Torah scholars. They are not claiming that the verse itself says that one must fear the Holy One, blessed be He, and Torah scholars. No—that is an expansion. It does not decipher; it does not reveal what is in the text; it expands what is in the text. That is Maimonides’ claim, and that is the metaphor of branches emerging from roots. Okay?

But in terms of authority or obligation? Wait—we’ll get to authority. For now I’m still in Maimonides’ theory of interpretation. I divided Maimonides’ approach into two innovations; right now I’m dealing with the first one. Okay? Right now Maimonides has an innovation in interpretation theory. Maimonides says that a text—or at least the biblical text, maybe he says this about every text, I don’t know—but about the biblical text, there is only one correct interpretation. There are not two interpretations of the same text. There is no such thing. This is a novelty in hermeneutics, right? In interpretation theory. The other medieval authorities (Rishonim) do not accept this.

Accordingly, says Maimonides, only the plain meaning can be considered the interpretation of the verse. So what is derivation? After all, Maimonides says it’s not that it isn’t true—Maimonides accepts derivation. The derivation, the law created by the derivation, is binding. It’s not because of that that I don’t think it is Torah-level and don’t count it among the commandments. Correct—it is binding as an expansion of the text, not as a deciphering of what the verse says. The tools of derivation, the hermeneutic principles, are not revealing tools but expanding tools. That is Maimonides’ claim.

The question regarding expansion: expansion is when we talk about something that already exists. What if it’s really something else entirely? Why? Let’s say once again, let’s go back to “You shall fear the Lord your God.” So there is a commandment to fear the Holy One, blessed be He, right? Now I make an expansion: not only fear of the Holy One, blessed be He, but also fear of Torah scholars, because they too have some aspect resembling the Holy One, blessed be He—they bear Torah. Okay? That is an expansion. Yes, but let’s say: you do not fear Torah scholars the way you fear the Holy One, blessed be He—that would be idolatry. So these are really two separate things that have some kind of… But one is an expansion of the other.

And in the same way they could have placed this derivation elsewhere. It seems a little arbitrary… It doesn’t matter where they put it… They could have placed it elsewhere, but there too it wouldn’t be deciphering, it would be expanding. Okay, so what? No, I’m saying: it’s not expansion—it’s something else. No, it is expansion. Why is it expansion? Because “et” comes to include—include besides the Holy One, blessed be He, the requirement to fear Torah scholars. Now I say to you: suppose there is the word “et,” right? Include what? We already discussed this derivation once. Include what? Maybe chairs. “You shall fear the Lord your God”—to include chairs. Okay, why not? Or pigeons? I don’t know—candlesticks. Why Torah scholars? Because we choose that interpretation because of the similarity. But if I find another interpretation that also has similarity… no problem—then choose it. And the interpretation you chose because it is the most similar—that is what you choose. Why? Because fear of Torah scholars is an expansion of fear of God. It is not a different law. If it were a different law, then maybe it really could have been pigeons. Why Torah scholars? Once you understand that this is an expansion of “You shall fear the Lord your God,” you say: okay, what is most similar? What is most similar is Torah scholars. So you see that such a derivation is inclusion, and that is why it is called inclusion. Inclusion means that I expand the law written in the Torah and add another law similar to it, which is an expansion of it. Okay? But this is expansion, not revelation. Therefore it is a rabbinic law.

We saw this, I think—the Talmud in tractate Pesachim 22b brings this law, that Shimon HaAmsoni used to expound every “et” in the Torah, until he reached “You shall fear the Lord your God,” and then he stopped. He couldn’t find anything. Why couldn’t he find anything? Because he found nothing that could resemble the Holy One, blessed be He—after all, as you said, that would be idolatry. Fine, so apparently there is nothing to include here. So Shimon HaAmsoni’s simple assumption was that this had to be something resembling the Holy One, blessed be He, because this is inclusion. It is expansion, not just some other law. It is an expansion of the law written in the plain sense. Derivation expands what the plain sense says; it does not just add a totally different law. That is the assumption there. Then Rabbi Akiva came and said that it includes Torah scholars. But Maimonides’ whole idea is that derivation consists of branches emerging from roots. And this is exactly the metaphor of expansion. The roots are fear of God, and the branches are fear of Torah scholars.

But that’s what’s hard for me, because a branch necessarily grows out of the trunk. Right. Here it seems more like some kind of drawing or mosaic—meaning, I choose what to draw out from… Maimonides tells you that what seems that way to you is not correct. No, it is specifically from here, because fear of Torah scholars is an expansion of fear of God. It is not something else. It is an expansion of fear of God, and that is why it is included from here. It is not included from here arbitrarily; it is included from here because it belongs to it. It is an expansion of it. Fine, so then to say it was latent inside? No, no, no. It is an expansion. No, it wasn’t there. No, I’ll get to that in a moment; I’ll define it better. But no—that is what Maimonides says. Branches emerging from roots were in some potential sense latent within the roots. But it is not that I actually deciphered something that was inside the root—no, it is an expansion. In a moment we’ll see: this tension that on the one hand it is not just an invention of something separate, and on the other hand it is not actually found inside the root—it is something in between. We’ll see that in a moment. Okay? This is Maimonides’ interpretive innovation.

Notice: so far we have not said anything halakhic. Because the question whether this also becomes rabbinic law—that is still another question. Someone could come and say: I agree with Maimonides’ interpretive thesis, that derivations expand and do not reveal, but I claim that expansions also have Torah-level status. You could say that, right? Only enactments—enactments are not expansions, right? Enactments are laws the Sages invented or created; they do not expand from Torah law. Okay, so that is rabbinic. But expansions made through the hermeneutic principles—their status is Torah-level. Here Maimonides comes with a second innovation. Aside from the interpretive innovation, that the hermeneutic principles expand and do not reveal—that is interpretive—Maimonides’ halakhic innovation is that expansions have the status of rabbinic law, not Torah-level law. That is a halakhic innovation. The first innovation is interpretive; the second is halakhic.

I’ll give you an example. The Ran in tractate Nedarim 8a. The Talmud says as follows: And Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav: one who says, “I will get up early and study this chapter; I will study this tractate,” has made a great vow to the God of Israel. Really this is not a vow but an oath, but never mind—in the Talmud the terms sometimes switch. Yes, if someone says, “I will get up early and learn a certain chapter or tractate,” it takes effect—the oath takes effect. The Talmud asks: But is he not already sworn and standing from Sinai? And an oath cannot take effect upon an oath. What does that mean? For any Torah-level law, if someone swears to fulfill a commandment, the oath does not take effect. Why? Since he is already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai to fulfill the commandments, and the rule is that an oath cannot take effect upon an oath. If I am already sworn to do it, and then I swear again, the second oath has no significance. That is the rule. Since he is already sworn and standing from Sinai to study Torah, what does it help that he now swears to study this chapter or that tractate? Why does it take effect?

The Talmud says: What is the new point? That even if it is only for encouragement, that is just Rav Giddel’s earlier teaching. The Talmud answers: The new point is that since, if he wished, he could exempt himself by reciting Shema morning and evening, therefore the oath takes effect on him. Since according to strict Torah law one can fulfill the obligation of Torah study by reciting Shema in the morning and evening, one does not need to study anything beyond that in order to fulfill the positive commandment of Torah study. Yes, this appears in several places—the view of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai. So when a person says, “I swear that I will study a chapter or some tractate,” he is not obligated to do that by Torah law, because he can fulfill the positive commandment through Shema morning and evening. Therefore, the Talmud says, the oath takes effect, because he was not already sworn and standing from Sinai to study tractate Tamid. Read Shema morning and evening and you have fulfilled the obligation; tractate Tamid is beyond what you are obligated to do. So to swear to do that takes effect; it is not called swearing on something you were already sworn to do. That is what the Talmud says.

Now there is a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) about how to understand the Talmud. From the Rosh and other medieval authorities (Rishonim), and from the commentator there, it seems that there really is no obligation to study Torah beyond that. Shema morning and evening fulfills the obligation, and that’s it. Everything beyond that is voluntary. Now on this you could give a whole lecture—I won’t go into it now. This voluntary element is actually more severe than the things we are formally obligated to do. There are things we do not turn into formal Jewish law because they are too important, not because they are less important. We do not want to turn it into formal Jewish law lest you think it is just one more commandment out of the 613; there is something much more fundamental here. Maybe that connects to the giving of the Torah next week, but let’s leave that aside for now.

The Ran, however, there explains it differently. “The new point is that since, if he wished, he could exempt himself”—since he can exempt himself by Shema morning and evening, the oath takes effect. The Ran says as follows: It seems to me that this is not literal—that one really exempts himself that way. It is not that one truly does not need to study beyond Shema morning and evening, and that one is exempt if one recites Shema morning and evening. For every person is obligated to study constantly, day and night, according to his capacity. There is a commandment of Torah study; a person is held accountable for neglect of Torah study. If Shema morning and evening were enough and everything else were voluntary, then what would “neglect of Torah study” mean? And we say in the first chapter of tractate Kiddushin: “And you shall teach them diligently”—that the words of Torah should be sharp in your mouth, so that if someone asks you something, you should not stammer and say… and so on. And Shema morning and evening is not enough for that. What is the definition of Torah study? The Talmud in Kiddushin says: until the words of Torah are sharp in your mouth, so that whatever they ask you, you know how to answer. Can you reach that with Shema morning and evening? Obviously not. Shema morning and evening is clearly not enough; there is certainly an obligation to study all the time according to one’s ability. Right?

So what does he say? Then why is this called an optional matter, such that the oath takes effect? He says this: From here it seems to me proof for what I wrote in the chapter “Two Oaths” at the end, in tractate Shevuot, that any matter that comes from a derivation, even though it is from the Torah, since it is not explicitly stated in the verse, an oath takes effect upon it. What is he saying? A thing that comes from a derivation, even though it is from the Torah—and not rabbinic; it is a Torah-level law—the Ran knows Maimonides and disagrees with him—even though a thing that comes from a derivation is Torah-level and from the Torah, an oath takes effect upon it. Even though it is Torah-level. This is unlike something explicitly written in the Torah, where if you swear regarding it, the oath does not take effect. If it is from a derivation, in principle it is Torah-level law, yet an oath takes effect upon it. That is his claim.

And then he says: And here this is what we mean. Since he can exempt himself from what is explicitly written in the verse, namely “when you lie down and when you rise,” by reciting Shema morning and evening, he can exempt himself from the verse concerning the commandment of Torah study—“when you lie down and when you rise”—how? Through Shema morning and evening. The obligation of the verse he fulfills. Therefore the oath takes full effect upon it, even for a sacrifice. But that does not mean that one does not need to study beyond Shema morning and evening. It is just that the obligation to study more does not come from the verse but from a derivation: “And you shall teach them diligently”—that the words of Torah should be sharp in your mouth, well honed in your mouth. That is a derivation, says the Ran. One must study all day, all the time, everything—not just Shema morning and evening. But that comes from a derivation, whereas Shema morning and evening is the Torah-level obligation of “when you lie down and when you rise.” According to the Ran, both are Torah-level: both what comes from a derivation and what is written in the Torah. But there is a difference between them regarding whether an oath can take effect. According to the Ran, an oath takes effect on something that comes from a derivation even though it is Torah-level, and it does not take effect on something written in the Torah.

So is this some kind of intermediate status? I’ll explain. First of all, I want to clarify why I brought this Ran. The Ran basically… there’s an infinite loop here. Why is the computer flickering? It’s showing me, and it’s supposed to come back infinitely many times. Fine, I hope the computer doesn’t explode here with positive feedback. So why did I bring the Ran? I brought the Ran to show the difference between Maimonides’ two innovations. Maimonides introduced two innovations. One innovation is in interpretation theory. Maimonides says that something that comes from a derivation is an expansion of what is written in the Torah, not a revelation of what is found within the Torah. Right? That is an interpretive innovation. On top of that, Maimonides says a halakhic innovation, a second innovation: something that is an expansion and not a revelation is not written in the Torah, and therefore its halakhic status is rabbinic. Right? Those are Maimonides’ two innovations: an interpretive innovation and a halakhic innovation.

The Ran disagrees with the halakhic innovation and accepts the interpretive innovation. The Ran says: something that emerges from a derivation is from the Torah; it is Torah-level. He disagrees with Maimonides on Maimonides’ halakhic innovation. But he apparently accepts the interpretive innovation. And what does he claim? He is basically claiming that the derivation expands what is written in the verse, not reveals what is in the verse. Why is that important? Because when you swear to fulfill a commandment, why does an oath not take effect upon an oath? Because you are already sworn and standing from Sinai. There is already an oath to fulfill it—you swore at Sinai. Now you swear again? That is an oath upon an oath; it does not take effect. But if it is not written in the Torah, rather it is an expansion, then when we received the Torah at Sinai, that is not what we swore to. It is Torah-level—of course it is Torah-level—because we received that the hermeneutic principles are also a legitimate tool for adding Torah-level laws. That we received at Sinai. But we did not receive at Sinai the law of fear of Torah scholars; Rabbi Akiva derived that. So when you ask what we swore to when we were at Sinai—we swore to what is written in the Torah, right? That is what we received then. Laws created later, even if they are Torah-level laws, are not part of the Torah. If derivations were revealing what is inside the Torah, then when we received the Torah at Sinai, fear of Torah scholars was also written there; the derivation would just be the tool that helps me see that this is what is written there. If that were so, then when I swore at Sinai to fulfill the Torah, I also swore regarding fear of Torah scholars, because it is inside the Torah.

But the Ran agrees with Maimonides on his interpretive innovation. Maimonides says that a law that emerges from a derivation is an expansion; it is not a revelation. So when Rabbi Akiva expanded “You shall fear the Lord your God” into fear of Torah scholars, he did not reveal another layer already in the Torah; he expanded it, added another layer. So when we received the Torah at Sinai a thousand years earlier and swore to fulfill what is written in the Torah, we swore regarding what is written in the Torah—what is in the Torah. The hermeneutic principles do not reveal what is in the Torah; they expand it. Therefore, says the Ran, an oath does take effect on that.

Again, this innovation is interesting because it is a halakhic consequence of the interpretive innovation. In Maimonides there is an interpretive innovation and a halakhic innovation. Seemingly the interpretive innovation is just a theoretical matter, a question of whether interpretation is singular or not singular. And that doesn’t matter, because halakhically there is the halakhic innovation, and that is what one can debate. The Ran says: I debate the halakhic innovation, but that does not mean the interpretive innovation has no halakhic consequences. It does have halakhic consequences, and those too I agree with, says the Ran. Okay, is what I’m saying clear? The interpretive innovation is the issue of expansion; the halakhic innovation is the idea that anything expanded is not Torah-level but from the words of the Sages. That is the halakhic innovation. The Ran does not accept that. But that does not mean that according to the Ran the interpretive innovation has no consequences. It does. There are halakhic consequences—not in the context of the authority of the law that was created. The authority of the created law is Torah-level. But there are consequences for the question whether I can swear regarding that law. According to the Ran I can, because I am not already sworn and standing from Sinai. And that interpretive claim projects onto Jewish law regarding whether an oath takes effect on that thing. It is not a direct halakhic statement; it is a halakhic result of the interpretive innovation.

And in general, whether one can distinguish between what we received at Sinai and what is written in the Torah, in relation to an oath that takes effect. One can distinguish. The Ran does not distinguish. But can one understand from the Ran that perhaps he also disagrees with the interpretive innovation—that here specifically he says the issue is whether one is already sworn or not? Fine, but why wouldn’t he already be sworn if the hermeneutic principles were revealing tools rather than expanding tools? Then why am I not already sworn regarding laws that emerge from derivations? After all, I swore to fulfill the Torah, and inside the Torah it also says fear of Torah scholars, because the derivation reveals what is inside the Torah, according to that assumption. So why am I not sworn regarding that? I swore to fulfill what is written in the Torah, and this is written in the Torah. Therefore I claim that the Ran accepts Maimonides’ interpretive innovation. He disagrees with the halakhic innovation. He will also agree that the principles expand, not reveal. Otherwise he could not have said what he said. And together with that he writes explicitly that it is from the Torah—it is a Torah-level law. He does not accept Maimonides’ halakhic innovation. Okay?

So this Ran is a definition that sharpens very much the relation between Maimonides’ two innovations: an interpretive innovation and a halakhic innovation. It turns out that the interpretive innovation has halakhic consequences. Do you want to see another innovation, another halakhic consequence of the interpretive innovation? I’ll tell you in a moment.

Rabbi, but then what was the question that came back—why do we call it an expansion and not an addition, an addition that is similar? Fine, what difference does it make? That’s what I call an expansion—what difference does it make? Fine, because expansion is something that already existed. Like, say, in a building plan, when they designed the house, there was already in the plan an expansion for such-and-such a room. No, not at all. You can make an expansion of a room that was not planned in advance—on the contrary. Usually expansions are not planned. I’m not saying… it means it was not necessarily there, and it means it will not necessarily be there either. Building expansions are usually not planned in advance. No, but then there are people who build… There are, okay, but don’t tell me that expansion is only… what? Building expansions usually are not planned in advance. Right, but first of all there are people here who plan. There are, okay, but don’t tell me that expansion is only something planned. Because as a metaphor for whether it really was something latent there, I say no—why assume that? But does the Ran claim that? No, the Ran accepts Maimonides’ innovation that the law emerging from a derivation is an expansion of what is written; it is not a revelation. And still he treats it as a Torah-level law. Why is it a Torah-level law? Because he does not accept Maimonides’ definition that only what is written in the Torah is Torah-level. Anything that is not an invention of the Sages, but rather emerges as an expansion or revelation from the Torah, is Torah-level. A law given to Moses at Sinai too, according to the Ran, is Torah-level, because it does not come from the Torah, but we received it from the Holy One, blessed be He—it is not a creation of the Sages—so it is a Torah-level law, not a rabbinic law.

Maimonides defines what a Torah-level law is—that is his halakhic innovation. Maimonides defines a Torah-level law as a law written in the Torah. That is a definition—that is Maimonides’ halakhic innovation. And the Ran does not accept this innovation. According to the Ran and all the other medieval authorities (Rishonim), a Torah-level law is any law created by the Holy One, blessed be He, or out of His words, as opposed to enactments or decrees, which are laws created by the Sages ex nihilo.

But I can understand something one way from the words of the Holy One, blessed be He, and someone else can understand it a bit differently. And that too will have halakhic consequences. There is a dispute—so what? No problem. But then I won’t give divine certification to what I say. Why? Of course I will. Why? Because in my view that is what the Holy One, blessed be He, said. If you think otherwise, then you think otherwise. No problem. But I won’t present my view as Torah-level. Of course you will. Why? Because if I understand that that is what the text says, then it is Torah-level. After all, I am saying that is what the text says. You don’t agree? Fine. Then in your view Torah-level means something else. We have a dispute. And if I think that is what the verse says, then from my perspective that is what the Holy One, blessed be He, said, so it is Torah-level. What do you mean? The fact that you disagree—so what if you disagree? If you convince me, fine. As long as you do not convince me, as far as I’m concerned, that is the verse. What is the issue here? Is there a question? Meaning, if we argue about the interpretation of a verse, would each side then refrain from saying that what he says is Torah-level? You don’t say such a thing. No, but I’ll say it’s my interpretation; I won’t say that it is the source. Doesn’t matter—but it is Torah-level. In my view that is what is written in the verse.

We relate “Torah-level” to something beyond all doubt, meaning the original intent. No—what the Holy One, blessed be He, said is Torah-level. If I think this is the interpretation of the verse, then from my perspective that is what the Holy One, blessed be He, said, and so it is Torah-level. You don’t agree? Then there is a dispute, perfectly fine. But according to my position, it is Torah-level; that is what the verse says. Can one read a verse without interpretation? There are always interpretations of verses. Through the interpretation I understand what the verse says. Once I have understood what the verse says, that is what it says for me; that is Torah-level. You don’t agree? There is a dispute, fine.

I’ll give you another nice example—I just remembered I have one. I think it’s right here. Look at the Talmud in tractate Yoma. The Sages taught in a baraita: things concerning which the word “six” is said—“twisted fine linen”—in the craftsmanship of the Tabernacle, their thread is six-ply. Meaning, when they spun the thread, they twisted six fibers together and made a thread from that. Okay? That’s “six.” “Twisted” means eight. The robe: twelve. The curtain: twenty-four. The breastplate and ephod: twenty-eight. Fine, that’s the rule.

Now the Talmud details the baraita. From where do we know that their thread is six-ply? Because the verse says: “And they made the tunics of fine linen, and the turban of fine linen, and the ornamental caps of fine linen, and the linen breeches of twisted fine linen.” Five “fine linens” are written. “Six upon six,” so to speak. So one is for itself—that one “fine linen” means linen. One is for itself, that it be linen. One is that the thread should be six-ply—“six” in the sense of the number six. And one is that they should be twisted. And one is for the other garments in which “fine linen” is not stated. If there are garments in which “fine linen” is not stated, then there is an extra “fine linen” here to teach that in those too it is required. And one is to make it indispensable. So we have five things learned from the word, from the five appearances of the word “fine linen.” The first teaches that it must be linen. The second that the thread must be six-ply. The third that it must be twisted. The fourth that it applies to the other garments. The fifth that it is indispensable. Okay? That is the Talmud.

Now look at Maimonides. Maimonides, Laws of Temple Vessels, chapter 8, laws 13 and 14: The white garments are the four garments in which the High Priest serves on Yom Kippur, etc. And all four are white, and their thread is six-ply, and only from flax. Okay. Everywhere in the Torah where it says “six” or “bad,” that means flax and fine linen. Law 14: Everywhere in the Torah where it says “six” or “twisted fine linen,” the thread must be six-ply. And in a place where it says “bad,” if it is a single thread alone it is valid, though it is the preferred commandment that it be six-ply. Again, let’s summarize what law 14 says, because it’s important for us. In every garment about which the Torah writes that it is “six,” it must be six-ply, and this is indispensable. If you did not make it six-ply, the garment is invalid. In a garment where it says “bad,” not “six,” there too it should be six-ply, right? We saw this—that even for garments where “six” is not stated, it should be six-ply. But there it is not indispensable.

The commentators there ask: I don’t understand. The fifth “fine linen” that appears in the Torah teaches that all these laws are also indispensable. That it must be six-ply in the other garments too, and all of this is indispensable. So how does Maimonides distinguish between garments in which “six” is written and garments in which “six” is not written—saying that here it is indispensable and there it is not? He accepts the derivation that in garments where “six” is not written it still has to be six-ply. But he does not accept the derivation that this is indispensable there. How do you make that split? And they get tangled up with it. It’s simple—completely simple.

After all, this is a derivation, right? It is a derivation. The plain meaning of the word “six” is linen, right? All of this is derivation. Okay. What are you saying? You are saying: the garment where “six” is written—what does “six” mean? “Six” means it has to be made six-ply. And that is also indispensable; fine. There is another “six” written here. That teaches me that in a garment where it says “bad,” know that there too it must be made six-ply. Now there is another word “six” written here. Here it is a garment where “six” is written, and there the law is that this is indispensable. Now what does this innovation—that it is indispensable—speak about? About what is written in this verse here, right? That whatever is in this verse is indispensable. Okay. Is the obligation to make the garment where only “bad” is written—not “six”—six-ply, is that written in this verse? No. That is included from this verse; it is a derivation because of the extra word “six.” So it is not indispensable. The word “six” can be interpreted in two ways, and Maimonides too agrees that our needing six threads is from the Torah and is indispensable—in garments where “six” is written.

In garments where “six” is written, you’ll say this is not the plain meaning. Correct—“six” does not mean six threads. Therefore a special verse was needed to say that this too is indispensable. A derivation, not a verse. There is a special derivation that says it is indispensable. And that derivation is Torah-level even according to Maimonides? Meaning, what is the question whether the rule that it is indispensable is Torah-level? Not necessarily. It is indispensable. But in the other garments that rule does not apply at all—not that it is not indispensable; there is no rule there that it is indispensable at all.

Again. Where the rule exists that it is indispensable, it could still be that the rule is rabbinic—that rabbinically it is indispensable. But where the word “six” is not written, the law is not indispensable at all, not even rabbinically. Since the entire derivation saying that what is written in this verse is indispensable refers to what is written in the verse. And what is written in this verse is garments in which “six” is written. The fact that a derivation comes out of it concerning garments in which “six” is not written—that there too the threads must be six-ply—of course that is a correct law, but it is not a law written here in the Torah as an expansion. When I say that what is written here is indispensable, that does not refer to that, because that is not written here.

And to say here too “six threads”—yes, “six,” to make six threads, six fibers. “Six” means one fiber. Right, but that is written here, about this garment, and about that it is said that it is indispensable. Why? Because “six” is written five times. Okay? One of them comes to teach that it is six-ply. But what are derivations when you say one of them comes to teach? Okay, but these are derivations on this verse. Now there is another derivation that says that this entire verse and its derivations are indispensable. A special derivation is needed for that—exactly because of this. A special derivation is needed to say that it is indispensable. But that derivation speaks about what is written or newly taught here. Yet when you tell me that from here I learned about another place, that when it says “bad” there too it must be six-ply—that is not written in this verse, and it is not included from this verse. This verse teaches what is done there. So concerning that, it was not said that it is indispensable.

But the argument is that this is about this verse, because the logic really is that the verse teaches me how garments of “six” should look. And then every garment that has “six” in it is… right? But garments of “six”—not garments of “bad.” That is exactly the point. The garments where “bad” is written are not garments of “six.” They need to be six-ply because we learn that from this verse. But it is not indispensable. Why is it not indispensable, if from this verse I learn that garments of “bad” are basically like garments of “six”? Because this is a disclosure about what is written in the verse there. It is an expansion of what is written in the verse there. Therefore it is not indispensable. What is indispensable is what is learned from here, concerning here—not only from here. And what is learned from there applies to all garments of “six.” I didn’t understand. The idea that it is indispensable is about garments of “six” insofar as they are garments of “six.” Right. And garments of “bad” are not garments of “six”; they need to be six-ply, but they are not garments of “six.” This is an inclusion that also garments of “bad” should be made six-ply. And indispensability was said only about garments of “six,” just as you say—exactly so. Therefore there it is not indispensable.

But derivation number four basically equates, or parallels, or whatever, garments of “bad” with garments of “six.” Right, and therefore there is a rabbinic law, or a law from the words of the Sages, to make garments of “bad” six-ply as well, and not only garments of “six.” But that law is not indispensable, because that law is not written in the verse here. And when we say that here the laws written here are indispensable, we are talking about the laws written here. I understand.

I claim that this too is another halakhic consequence of the interpretive innovation, just as with the Ran. There too there was a halakhic consequence of the interpretive innovation. Let’s say the Ran could join this innovation too, even though he does not agree with Maimonides halakhically. Because here it is not a halakhic statement because it is a derivation. Rather the claim is that because it is a derivation, it is not written here. If it is not written here, then what is said to be indispensable was not said about it. And the Ran can accept that too. Because that depends on the interpretive innovation, not on the halakhic innovation.

Wait—how does this connect to the interpretive innovation? How does it connect? Because if you say it was expanded from the verse, it does not decipher what is inside it, then it is not written here that garments of “bad” need to be six-ply. So what is written here—that what is written here is indispensable—does not include that, because it is not written here. It is included from here, but it is not written here. So what is the interpretive innovation—that it is addition and not…? If the derivation were revealing, then it would basically mean that garments of “bad” are written here too. The sixfold doubling of garments of “bad” is written here in the verse. And then if I say that everything written in this verse is indispensable, then that too would be indispensable. And if I say that the principles are expanding principles, not revealing principles, then the requirement to make garments of “bad” six-ply is not written here. There is a hint here, but really it renews what is written there. So when I say that what is written here is indispensable, it does not include that law. It is not written here; only what is written here is indispensable.

But “that it is indispensable” is on the same level as garments of “bad.” Meaning, “six” is written five times, and we expound each one independently, let’s say. Each is expounded independently for some purpose. Then one of them, because it doesn’t come from somewhere else… No, of course. The extra word “six” here… but that’s a derivation on a derivation. You derive based on what is here in the verse; you do not derive based on things not written here but elsewhere. So what is here “for indispensability” is indispensability for what is written here, not for what is not written here but elsewhere.

This is a bit similar to… you know, there is a Rabbi Akiva Eiger who makes a precise point from… no, this is the Ran. In tractate Sukkah, two laws. Say you have a sukkah wall ten handbreadths high, and then it ends. And at, say, twenty handbreadths high there is the covering, but the covering does not reach the edge; it stops two handbreadths short. To validate the sukkah you need to apply “extend the wall upward,” and then apply “lavud,” closing the two handbreadths that are open there. The Ran says: no legal rule built on another legal rule. If that wall is itself only a legal extension of a wall—not a real wall—you don’t apply “lavud” to that wall. Something like that is what I want to say here. You do not make a derivation about something that is itself a derivation.

Now, that is not entirely precise, because making the garments here six-ply—you could also say that is a derivation. Making the garments of “six” six-ply is also a derivation, because the plain meaning is to make it from linen. Okay? But this is a derivation that tells me what there is in these garments. And when we say that this is indispensable, I am saying: everything written here is indispensable. But the derivation of “six” that includes garments of “bad” is not an expansion of what is here; it is an expansion of what is there. So when I say that everything here is indispensable, including the expansions, that does not include it. So what is the claim if this is expansion or addition? So it is not here. It belongs only to the place where it is. No, no. Expansion is also correct in that other place, because in fact garments of “bad” do need to be six-ply. I accept that derivation. Just as the derivation is written regarding garments of “six”: the extra “six” teaches me that even garments where “six” is not written should also be made six-ply. And that is a law I accept; it is a correct law. But a derivation that emerges from here can teach about another place; that is not the problem. One just has to understand that if it teaches about another place, it does not belong here. Therefore, if I now say that everything written here is indispensable, that does not include that law, because that law is not written here; it belongs there. But that law is true—I am not claiming that if it speaks about another place then it is not true. I am saying that if it is not written here, then what is said about the laws written here does not apply to it, because it is not written here.

How does this connect to the very fact that it is an addition? If, say, it were not an addition—if it were revealing—so what? Then in this verse itself, this verse that deals with garments of “six,” you are mistaken: it also deals with garments of “bad,” not only with garments of “six.” The extra word “six”—and derivation reveals. The extra word “six” teaches me that this verse actually deals also with garments of “bad,” not just garments of “six.” But when it is an addition, when it is an addition, then this verse deals only with garments of “six.” Why? Because the verse deals with garments of “six.” Read it—it says garments of “six.” But that derivation, that derivation is an addition. The derivation teaches you that garments of “bad,” which are written there—the verse does not deal with them; they are written there—that they too must be made six-ply. That is what the derivation teaches you. And that does not mean that the verse here also speaks about garments of “bad.” That is if the concept is that derivation reveals. If it expands, then this verse does not speak about garments of “bad,” because there is a hint here that garments of “bad” should also be made six-ply. Now another derivation comes and says: everything in this verse is indispensable. Let’s see—if this verse also speaks about garments of “bad,” then there too it would be indispensable. If it does not speak about garments of “bad,” then that law is not indispensable.

I don’t understand what is so hard to understand here. It just seems to me that the distinction the Rabbi is making doesn’t really connect to whether it’s an addition or whether it reveals, but rather to how I understand the derivation itself. Are there several categories here in any case? Does this category refer to “bad,” or are all the categories “bad,” and then it has nothing to do with…? No, that’s not right. I am assuming something on which there is no discussion: the derivation deals only with what is in this verse. Okay? That is an assumption not under discussion. That is what Maimonides claims, okay? Now I say that we accept that. Once you assume that, how can you say it is not indispensable? How can you say it is not indispensable? Yes, that the sixfold doubling of garments of “bad” is not indispensable. So why should it be indispensable? Because it is said that what is here is indispensable, and this is learned from here. No, but all of this only points to the verse. Right. And what is learned from this verse includes that garments of “bad” need to be six-ply. But even if it were revealing, what difference would that make?

How? Since in this verse it is written that garments of “bad” need to be six-ply—here it is written. And about that it is said that everything written here is indispensable. So why shouldn’t it be indispensable? No, but that category of “indispensable” refers only to “six.” Why? Where do you get that from? Where are you pulling that from? That’s what the Rabbi… no! I’m trying… There is a derivation here with several components. You can ask whether Achilles overtakes the tortoise. Obviously he does—just look, and you’ll see he overtakes the tortoise. I’m showing you an argument that this can’t be. You say to me: yes, but it is so. Exactly—that’s what I’m saying to you. Even though it can’t be, it is so—so what is the explanation? No, then I’m returning the question to you. No, I’m explaining it to you. That is the question I’m answering. Listen to what I’m answering. I’m trying. So I’m saying: follow what I’m answering. Don’t think about alternatives. Follow what I’m answering. Okay? I claim that it is agreed that the derivation deals only with what is in this verse. That is given. Okay? Good. Now I ask: what is written in this verse? The derivation says that what is written in this verse is indispensable. Okay? That’s the derivation from the final word “six.” Now all that remains for us to clarify is what is written in this verse. Right? And whatever we find to be written in this verse will be indispensable. I claim that this depends on whether derivation reveals or expands. The question what is written in this verse depends on whether I conceive of derivation as revealing or expanding. Why? Because if I say derivation reveals, then that means that when I derive, the result of the derivation was actually latent inside the verse. The derivation only uncovered it. I didn’t know it, but it uncovered it. So if derivation reveals, and the derivation tells me from this verse that garments of “bad” need to be six-ply, then the derivation actually revealed that this verse deals not only with garments of “six” but also with garments of “bad.”

For this specific matter? Not for this specific matter—the verse deals with garments of “bad.” Because that is the derivation from “six.” No, only for this matter. There is another derivation claiming it is indispensable. But for this matter it is written here—why should I care whether it is this matter? Is it written here that garments of “bad” are six-ply? So then it should be indispensable. Why? Since everything written here is indispensable. No, that is indispensable only for garments of “six.” But you are inventing things! I’m asking you why. But that is exactly the problem with the derivation. There is a derivation here with several different components, and right now my feeling is that you’re not listening to me. Try not to insist—try to listen to me. No, I’m answering exactly what you’re saying; you’re just repeating it again. It’s simply not right. Look, I’m saying that if garments of “bad” are written in this verse, derivation reveals. Then garments of “bad” are written in this verse. It only says to make them six-ply, not everything about garments of “bad,” fine. But is it written in this verse that garments of “bad” are to be made six-ply? Okay. Good. Now everything written in this verse is indispensable, right? So sixfold doubling in garments of “bad” is indispensable. I got it. That’s it, period. What is wrong with that? Explain it to me. No, it seems to me like a verbal game. Explain what! Game or no game—what is wrong with it? What’s wrong is that we are saying this derivation has several components, and now I’m choosing based on whether it is addition or revelation. No, revelation! I’m talking about revelation. I’m taking it clause by clause. Leave me alone with addition—I’m talking about revelation. Answer me on that: why, under revelation, would it not be indispensable? It would definitely be indispensable if the derivation reveals. That’s also what I would have said at the outset. That’s all. Now what is the problem with that? Wait, wait, but if not… No, I haven’t said that yet. So far I’ve only said if it reveals. Do we agree? Meaning, if derivation reveals, then sixfold doubling in garments of “bad” is indispensable, right? Provided that the verse itself contains all the “six.” It doesn’t contain anything. The derivation reveals—we’ve gone over this again and again, we already agreed on it. I’m saying: if the word “six” tells me that in this verse it says that garments of “bad” are made six-ply, that is what is written here. Right? Then it is indispensable, right? Do we agree on that? Not necessarily. Why? Because this derivation has several clauses. No, but we agreed it reveals! No, we agreed that indispensability applies to everything written in this verse. That was our starting agreement. Don’t challenge that now and go backward—you keep going backward. There is one clause here, one clause, that also explains something specific. No, it explains nothing! Again, you are going back to expansion. It explains nothing! Neither revelation nor expansion—I’m asking about the derivation itself. But if the derivation reveals, then it doesn’t explain what is there; it is written here! What is written? It is written that garments of “bad” have to be made six-ply. Right! This verse says that garments of “bad” have to be made six-ply. One clause. And all the clauses written here are indispensable. They make the six indispensable, not the garments of “bad.” Why do you decide that? Why specifically garments of “six”? Maybe it’s only for garments of “six” that are square? Why are you deciding arbitrarily? First of all, you can’t object based on arbitrary distinctions. You can answer with a forced distinction, but you can’t object with a forced distinction. If by forcing it I can object to you, that is not an objection. No, that’s not what I want. You can distinguish—an arbitrary distinction can explain anything; you can also say that every even-numbered verse is non-binding. Fine. Rabbi, but if from the outset I would have thought exactly as you say, exactly as we are saying now: we have this derivation here, it creates for me a situation in which every time there is “six,” that thing has a variety of properties—it always applies to everything that has “six.” And if “six” also included garments of “bad,” then in the same way one makes garments of “six” one would make garments of “bad,” and I wouldn’t care whether it expands or reveals. It wouldn’t interest me at all. Right, right, agreed. And then the Rabbi says, wait, wait, but specifically when there is… No, what I’m saying is what I’m… no, wait, don’t put words in my mouth—I agreed with you. What do you mean, “then I say otherwise”? I agreed with everything you said. I agreed with everything you said until now. I don’t care about revelation or expansion; doesn’t matter; everything is always indispensable. But you have a Maimonides who says that it is not indispensable for garments of “bad.” Now I ask why. How did he learn it? Yes. So I understand—he split the clauses. That’s all. He did not split the clauses! No! There is no clause-splitting. Clause-splitting is arbitrary; it’s made up. No, no. He distinguished between what appears here and what does not appear here. What appears here is indispensable. Clauses—what I meant was that every time “six” is mentioned, it is indispensable, and we learn an additional lesson. So this derivation has six clauses, and basically we think all those clauses always apply. Then the Rabbi says here: fine, know that if there is a clause that refers to something else, then not all the clauses also apply to that other thing. Right—that’s what the Rabbi said. Right, right—what is the problem with that? But what does that have to do with whether it reveals or is an addition? If it reveals, it does not speak about there; it speaks about here. If derivation reveals, then to say that garments of “bad” have to be made six-ply—that is written here; it is not revealing something written there. This verse tells me that garments of “bad” must be made six-ply—not that verse. Because derivation reveals. Derivation tells me what this verse says. So this verse says it, not that other verse. This verse says that garments of “bad” must be six-ply. And still, and still, that does not require that every time clause four, right, that every time there is “six” it means “bad”… not every time “six” means “bad,” what are you talking about? “Bad” is not “six.” The fourth time “six” is mentioned in the verse, right, we learn from that that whenever there are garments of “bad,” those too need to be made six-ply. Right, six-ply, sorry. Six-ply. Now that still does not require, even if derivation reveals, that all the other clauses—I didn’t say the other clauses. Again, I’m not speaking about the other clauses. I mean the clause of indispensability. Why? Because clause four tells me that this law—that garments of “bad” must be made six-ply—is written in this verse here. It is not a disclosure about what is there, because it is a decoding of what this verse says. That is what is called a revealing derivation. So this law is written here. And if afterward another clause comes and says everything written here is indispensable, then it should have been indispensable. But if it is not written here, and I claim that the derivation is an expanding derivation and not a revealing one, then it is not written here. Here there is a hint about what is written there. And now the derivation says that everything written here is indispensable, so it is not indispensable. That is how Maimonides learned it. What is so difficult about that?

I understand that he learned it that way. I just don’t think this move is… no, again, it’s just a matter of decision. There’s nothing logical here where I say, ah, because of this move. Fine. I’ll make one more comment, the one I made earlier, and I think with that we’ll finish. You can resolve by a forced distinction, but you can’t object by a forced distinction. Meaning, if you say: look, what you’re saying is not necessary—I agree, it is not necessary. I didn’t say it was necessary. Okay. But I did say it was possible. Okay? No, it’s possible to make that distinction. Now since Maimonides says here it is indispensable and here it is not, then Maimonides certainly learned this way. I am not claiming that what Maimonides says is necessary. If someone comes and disagrees with Maimonides, fine, that isn’t irrational. But if you tell me: look, it isn’t necessary—I agree, it isn’t necessary. Of course there is another possibility too. But when Maimonides makes a distinction, then clearly he learned this way. You can’t learn Maimonides otherwise. So the fact that it isn’t necessary is not an objection. To object by a forced distinction—I have another possibility, therefore I object—that isn’t an objection.

But if I’m trying to understand Maimonides’ view, because Maimonides understands it this way—there is a lot of logic in it. You’re just saying it isn’t necessary; there could also be another logic. Fine, but this was Maimonides’ logic. What’s the problem? In every dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim), you explain the logic of this one, explain the logic of that one, and you understand that each has a valid side. There is no problem with that. The other medieval authorities (Rishonim) who disagree with Maimonides and say everything is indispensable—that is most of them—apparently they learn like you, or whatever you’re saying, whether everything is indispensable or not, but they say everything is indispensable. I would also have said that—“six” is indispensable. Fine, so they learned like you. I didn’t say that is impossible; they were Jews too. But I’m saying Maimonides learned differently, and in Maimonides this is clearly the explanation. I am not claiming this explanation is necessary. This is not an objection to those who disagree with Maimonides. But if Maimonides makes a distinction, clearly he learned this way. It can’t be otherwise. That is the claim, that’s all, and it also makes sense. It is possible. It doesn’t mean it is necessary.

So what does that teach us regarding…? It means there is another halakhic consequence of the interpretive innovation. Since the halakhic consequence that says here it is not indispensable—that is a halakhic consequence. And where does it come from? Not from the statement that laws emerging from derivations are from the words of the Sages. It doesn’t come from there. It comes from the statement that derivations are an expanding tool and not a revealing tool. It comes from the interpretive statement, this halakhic innovation—not from the halakhic statement. Or in other words, with regard to this rule that Maimonides writes here, the Ran can also. He doesn’t have to agree, but he can agree. Even though he does not accept Maimonides’ halakhic innovation, only Maimonides’ interpretive innovation. The Ran can agree to this rule, because it comes from the interpretive innovation and not from the halakhic innovation. Okay.

All right, I see we’re getting close to the end, so I’ll just summarize and we’ll continue next time. Basically, what I want to claim is the following: Maimonides introduces two innovations. One is an interpretive innovation: derivations are an expanding tool, unlike Nachmanides, for example, who understands derivations as a revealing tool, and that is probably how most of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) learned—although with the Ran we saw that he can apparently join Maimonides. The Ran also apparently agreed that it is an expanding tool. On top of that, Maimonides says there is another innovation, a halakhic innovation, and that too is against the medieval authorities (Rishonim)—most of them, almost all of them. Namely what? That a Torah-level law is only what is written in the Torah. A law transmitted by divine speech is not necessarily Torah-level. If it is a law given to Moses at Sinai, it is not Torah-level. If a law emerges from a derivation, it is not Torah-level because it is not written in the Torah. So Maimonides’ halakhic innovation concerns the meaning of the concept “Torah-level.” Torah-level is what is written in the Torah—literally, “de’oraita” means “from the Torah.” That is Maimonides’ halakhic innovation.

I said that these two innovations are independent of each other. The Ran, for example, can accept the first, interpretive innovation, but not accept the halakhic innovation. And how do I see that? Because the Ran derives a halakhic conclusion from the interpretive innovation even though he does not accept the halakhic innovation. The Ran says that an oath takes effect on a law that emerges from a derivation even though he says that it is a Torah-level law. A law that emerges from a derivation—he does not accept Maimonides’ halakhic innovation. So you see that there are halakhic consequences to the interpretive innovation. And then I brought this example of the garments of “six” to bring another example of that. This too is another example of a halakhic consequence of Maimonides’ interpretive innovation—to which the Ran too can join, not only Maimonides. Because once you say that interpretively a derivation expands and does not reveal, then what revolves around what is written in the verse will not apply to it, because it is not written in the verse. That is a halakhic innovation, a halakhic consequence that emerges from the interpretive innovation even if you do not accept the halakhic innovation.

By the way, logically the reverse is also true. You can accept the halakhic innovation without accepting the interpretive innovation. I don’t know of such a position, but in principle that too is possible. You can accept that Torah-level means only what is written in the Torah, but claim that laws learned from derivations are not expanding but revealing. And therefore a law that emerges from a derivation is Torah-level even if I accept Maimonides’ definition of Torah-level. A practical difference, for example, would be with a law given to Moses at Sinai. A law given to Moses at Sinai is not written in the Torah, so it would not be Torah-level. But derivations—if I do not accept Maimonides’ interpretive innovation and I say that derivations reveal and do not expand—then derivations would be Torah-level. In principle, logically, there is no problem at all with such a position either. I don’t know anyone who actually holds it, but in principle such a position could also exist. There is complete independence between the two innovations in both directions. You can adopt the first without the second, the second without the first, both of them, or neither of them.

We got a little delayed today, but that’s okay. More power to you, more power to you.