Rabbi Gedalia Nadel’s Thought – Explanation in Halakha – Lesson 6
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- Scripture and reason as sources of Jewish law
- First principles, axioms, and the debate over arbitrariness
- Truth, proof, and observation in facts versus judgments
- Translating morality and aesthetics into factual claims and the moral cost
- The eyes of the intellect, viewing ideas, and the possibility of non-sensory truth
- “The Holy One, blessed be He, implanted in man” and what that means for norms
- Halakhic reasoning that one can think differently about
- Legal reasoning: utilitarianism versus normative truth
- Non-consequentialist examples and the categorical imperative
- Uncertain truth versus arbitrariness
Summary
General overview
The text presents Scripture and reason as central sources of Jewish law and sharpens the point that the term reason is not identical to “first principles” or axioms. It examines the dispute over whether axioms are arbitrary assumptions or primary truths, and argues that one can build consistent systems even from ridiculous assumptions, but that is only a logical exercise, whereas first principles are truths that the Holy One, blessed be He, implanted in man. From there it develops a broad discussion of truth and proof in facts versus ethics and aesthetics, of the naturalistic fallacy and the gap between facts and judgments, and of the price of translating normative claims into factual claims. Later it explains that halakhic reasoning is a consideration about which one could also think differently, brings the rule “the burden of proof rests on the claimant,” and suggests that legal reasoning is not merely utilitarian but can be understood as normative truth seen through a kind of “observation” that is not sensory, with the eyes of the intellect or the conscience.
Scripture and reason as sources of Jewish law
The text states that the two main sources of Jewish law are Scripture and reason, and begins clarifying what reason means in this context. It places the discussion on page 16 and notes that we need to return and dig deeper into the matter of reasoning in order to understand the concept.
First principles, axioms, and the debate over arbitrariness
The text explains that reason is not what philosophers call “first principles,” that is, something whose truth is completely clear without proof and about which “one cannot think otherwise.” It describes a debate in science over whether axioms are arbitrary assumptions that can be replaced by others with no preference, or whether they contain primary, unshakable truth, and says this debate is pointless because it is easy to assume arbitrary premises and build from them a consistent system with the law of non-contradiction, but that is only a logical amusement. It argues that in truth first principles are the truths that the Holy One, blessed be He, implanted in man and that every person is convinced of them, and gives as an example Euclid’s axiom about parallel lines as a result of the spatial perception implanted in man. It distinguishes between Euclidean space and non-Euclidean geometry and argues that someone who assumes otherwise is simply speaking about a different space, not replacing first principles but using an appropriate application.
Truth, proof, and observation in facts versus judgments
The text analyzes two possibilities regarding basic assumptions: to see them as arbitrary, or to see them as obvious truths that need no proof because proof is “crutches” for someone who does not see. It clarifies that the existence of disagreement does not cancel truth, and one side may be right and the other mistaken even if there is no immediate resolution. It defines factual truth as correspondence between a claim and a state of affairs in the world, and raises a deep difficulty regarding ethical and aesthetic claims, where there is no clear criterion of correspondence and the question “corresponds to what?” remains open. It explains the naturalistic fallacy, according to which norms cannot be derived from facts, and stresses that this does not force subjectivism, but does create philosophical pressure to claim that there is no truth in judgments.
Translating morality and aesthetics into factual claims and the moral cost
The text shows how one can turn statements like “this picture is beautiful” or “murder is forbidden” into factual claims about people, such as what people will buy or what most people feel, and argues that such a translation empties the judgment of its content and turns it into scientific research about tendencies and programming. It emphasizes that if every ethical claim is nothing more than a fact about psychological structure, then a person who is “built differently” and feels no problem with murder is not worse, and the cost is the cancellation of the concepts of “right” and “wrong” in a normative sense. It notes that the dilemma also exists in the factual realm, because even with parallel lines there is no observation to infinity and no proof in the sense of proving the axiom itself, and yet people experience the claim as non-arbitrary.
The eyes of the intellect, viewing ideas, and the possibility of non-sensory truth
The text suggests that in order to justify truths that are not the result of sensory observation and are not merely deductions of thought, one must assume some other kind of perception of reality, such as the “eyes of the intellect” in the language of Maimonides, or “viewing ideas” and “eidetic seeing” in Husserl. It describes how, through the particular, one can “see” a general idea like horseness, and likewise see the idea of parallelism beyond sensory measurement. It argues that if the claim about parallels were only a product of internal thought, it would not obligate the world, and therefore what is needed is a perception that is cognition of reality and not just a psychological mechanism. It expands that if one accepts such a model in the realm of facts, one can in principle apply it also to ethics and aesthetics through observation of something like the “idea of the good,” provided one also assumes that there is something there to observe and not only a means of observation.
“The Holy One, blessed be He, implanted in man” and what that means for norms
The text raises the possibility that the Holy One, blessed be He, implanted truths in man, but argues that in ethical and aesthetic contexts this alone does not solve the problem if normative truth has no meaning in the first place, because implantation can be interpreted as an innate psychological fact rather than a justification of truths. It states that a textual decree can solve a case in which there is truth but it is inaccessible, but cannot solve a case in which the question has no essential meaning. It uses the example of ranking values and conflicts such as Sabbath observance versus saving a life to show that a verse is of no help if there is no common measure that makes the question of what is “higher” than what meaningful, and concludes that in order to speak of normative truth one must assume ideas and the ability to perceive them.
Halakhic reasoning that one can think differently about
The text returns to its topic and defines reason in Jewish law as not being a first principle, because wherever there is reasoning one can also think differently. It gives the example of “the burden of proof rests on the claimant” and quotes the Talmudic rationale: “the one who has the pain goes to the physician,” as justification for why the plaintiff bears the burden of proof. It suggests that the author reserves first principles for what is perceived as certain and self-evident, whereas reasoning is what appears reasonable but open to challenge, and remarks that this distinction does not seem essential to him, because even in what appears self-evident one can err and the degree of certainty varies.
Legal reasoning: utilitarianism versus normative truth
The text presents a common interpretation of legal reasoning as utilitarian decisions in favor of social order and good outcomes, similar to explanations that translate “murder is forbidden” into considerations of utility and deterrence. It proposes an alternative according to which there is a “this is simply what is right” here, not merely a calculation of outcomes, and argues that many people would intuitively say that it is right to leave an object in the hands of its current possessor without analyzing the probabilities of lying. It describes a sharp debate with Rabbi Yosel Schreiber around this claim, in which the question was asked, “What does it mean to call something right?” and in what sense one can speak of truth without a criterion of factual comparison, and presents this as an example of the clash between an approach that reduces norms to facts and an approach that recognizes normative truth.
Non-consequentialist examples and the categorical imperative
The text gives examples such as the claim that there is no point in voting because one vote almost never has an effect, and the claim that small-scale tax evasion causes no noticeable harm to the state treasury, and stresses that there remains a sense that it is still “not right” to act this way even when there is no convincing practical-consequential translation. It connects this to Kant’s principle, the categorical imperative, and distinguishes between “what will happen if everyone does this” as a mistaken consequentialist consideration, and the hypothetical test of a universal law in a corrected world. It also brings an example from the debate over the Sabbatical year and the sale permit versus a court-administered produce system, where it was argued that it is improper to base conduct on the fact that others will buy anyway and keep the system running, and presents this as an application of a principle dependent not on outcome but on norm.
Uncertain truth versus arbitrariness
The text concludes that one can relate to first principles, including non-factual claims, as non-arbitrary even without proof and without sensory observation, if one assumes observation with the eyes of the intellect that yields truth. It emphasizes that the absence of certainty does not turn a claim into something arbitrary, and compares this to distant observation where it seems one sees a horse but it may turn out to be a donkey, so the observation exists but is not sharp. It suggests that also in the category he calls reasoning, including legal reasonings such as “the burden of proof rests on the claimant,” one can see the product of normative observation that generates truth that is not absolute but also not merely subjective.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A section, or a chapter, I don’t know what to call it, on Scripture, and we already started the matter of reason, but we’ll come back to it in order to get into it a bit more. Okay, so let’s look at page 16 in the book. We said that the two main sources of Jewish law are Scripture and reason. When we say reason, we do not mean what philosophers call first principles. A first principle is something whose truth is completely clear to a person without any need for proof. Something a person recognizes and about which he cannot think otherwise. That’s already slightly different terminology. “Cannot think otherwise” sounds like something subjective. So it’s not necessarily really true, but I
[Speaker B] am forced
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] to think that way. Meaning, I can’t think otherwise. Let’s see, we’ll come back to that point. Nowadays, there is indeed debate in science over whether first principles, the axioms, are systems of arbitrary assumptions that a person posited, and he could just as well posit other assumptions and derive results from them, and these have no advantage over those. Or whether first principles really do contain primary, unshakable truth. What page? 16. But this debate has no point whatsoever. It is obvious that as a thought exercise one can assume as axioms just two arbitrary assumptions, even ridiculous ones. And if they are independent of one another, meaning one cannot be proven from the other or from elsewhere, one can build from them—there are some inaccuracies here, but we won’t get into that—one can build from them, with the aid of the law of non-contradiction, a system of propositions. Meaning, you can assume other premises, even absurd ones, and derive things from them; as long as you are consistent, you can derive all kinds of propositions. But that is only an exercise in logic. In truth, first principles are the truths that the Holy One, blessed be He, implanted in man, truths in whose correctness every person is convinced. For example, Euclid’s famous axiom according to which from every straight line and a point outside it one can create two parallel lines that will never meet. That is a first principle arising from the very perception of space that the Holy One, blessed be He, implanted in man. A person cannot think otherwise. Someone who says he will assume something else and that too can be valid is talking about something else, not about space. For example, not straight space. For example, he can talk about circles on the sphere whose radius is the radius of the sphere, and say that any two such lines must meet, that it is impossible to create two parallel lines. That is non-Euclidean geometry, which cannot come in place of the first principles of ordinary geometry, but one can find an application for it in a certain place where it does fit with the first principles. Okay, actually, the truth is I should have read the whole thing, but it’s too long, so I’ll do it paragraph by paragraph anyway. Here he’s basically explaining what he does not mean when he says reason. Meaning, this paragraph is devoted to what he does not mean, but I דווקא want to discuss this matter that he does not mean, because he also says various things about it. After that we’ll move on to what he does mean. So what he does not mean is what is usually called first principles or axioms. And there he claims that there is some debate in science—I don’t know exactly where. One can argue in philosophy, one can argue over whether these assumptions are arbitrary or whether they are true, necessarily true. Everyone is clear that axioms have no proof; otherwise it wouldn’t be an axiom. Meaning, an axiom is something that has no proof. So on what basis do I assume them? Meaning, if there’s no proof, who says it’s correct? Two possibilities. Seemingly two possibilities, at first glance. One possibility is that it really is arbitrary. Meaning, it is not making any claim that this is how reality truly is, that this is how the world is actually built; rather I posit some assumption arbitrarily, and as long as I’m consistent with it, I’m fine. And behind this basically stands the view that says that reality itself is not accessible to us at all, and in some cases perhaps doesn’t even exist, depending on what field we’re talking about. And therefore all I have is only to posit some arbitrary assumptions however I like and remain consistent with them. Now here it is fairly clear that if one grasps the basic assumptions in this sense, then they lose all significance entirely. Meaning, this remains nothing but an intellectual amusement. Fine, make assumptions and derive conclusions from them, and that can be very amusing and very clever and very interesting—but as a tool for grasping the world or saying something about the world, obviously it has no significance whatsoever. All the propositions that come out of axioms that were posited arbitrarily are equally arbitrary. The whole thing has no significance, whether in the factual realm—where in the factual realm the usual assumption is that there is some truth, only perhaps it is inaccessible to us and therefore we posit assumptions arbitrarily—or in non-factual realms, for example in the moral realm or the aesthetic realm. In those realms, when we make ethical or aesthetic judgments, if you say that the matter is arbitrary, that can stem not from the fact that the truth is inaccessible to us, but from the fact that there is no truth. What is truth? Usually when we talk about truth on the factual plane, it means correspondence between a claim and some state of affairs in the world. Right? Simply that the content of the claim corresponds in some way to the reality it describes. If there is correspondence, it is a true claim. If there is no correspondence, it is a false claim. So there is an intelligible, reasonable definition of what truth or falsehood means in the context of factual claims. But in the context of judgment claims—ethical or aesthetic, it doesn’t matter—claims that are not factual claims, beyond the question of how one can reach truth at all, the deeper question is whether there is truth there at all. Since truth, at least in the factual context, means a criterion of correspondence. And here, when we want to ask ourselves whether it corresponds or not, the question is: corresponds to what? When we make some ethical judgment and say stealing is forbidden—fine. What does it mean to say that this is true? Or that saying stealing is permitted is false? In what sense is it true or false? Does it correspond to some fact out there or not? Meaning, if that’s what true or false means, what kind of fact is it supposed to correspond to? In the background here is what is called the naturalistic fallacy, which says that one cannot derive norms, or judgments in general, from facts. Right? If I see that this wall is white, I cannot infer from that that this wall is beautiful. Because I need to add the claim, the assumption, that white is beautiful. Okay? Meaning, without an additional assumption, if all I have are facts—this wall is white. Fine, that’s a fact. How do I jump from here to the determination that this wall is beautiful? There’s no—it depends on my view whether white is beautiful or white is not beautiful. One cannot derive a judgment from a factual claim. There is some unbridgeable gap between the factual sphere and the judgmental or normative sphere.
[Speaker D] Is that basically the distinction between the objective and the subjective? What? Is that basically the distinction between the objective and the subjective?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, not necessarily. Because someone could come and say—it’s a big question how—but at least on the conceptual level there are people who argue that ethical statements do have right and wrong. Someone who says murder is permitted is mistaken. A lot of people would say that. And they too would have to agree that the claim that murder is forbidden is not derived from any fact, because that’s obvious, that’s a logical fact. Meaning, it is not derived from that. So the naturalistic fallacy does not automatically mean that the ethical claim is subjective. It only means it is not derived from facts. Now of course the next step is tempting—this is a bit of philosophy—but it is tempting to say, okay, if it is not derived from facts, then it’s subjective. But this is exactly the delicate point I’m aiming at, because that jump, for example, I am not prepared to accept. Meaning, I don’t think that’s right. So again, the claim that basic assumptions are arbitrary can stem either from the fact that the truth is inaccessible to us—we have no proof, or the truth is inaccessible, we have no ability to observe the thing, or however else—or from the fact that there is no truth at all. In the factual context, the accepted assumption is usually—it seems to me it sounds very strange to assume there is no truth at all on the factual plane. Usually the assumption is that there is truth: either two parallel lines do meet or they do not meet. There’s no way there can be no truth. It could be that this truth is inaccessible to us. We have no way of knowing. Who knows, if you extend the two parallel lines to infinity—not that this means anything, but say you go all the way with them—do they finally meet there or not? No one can go and see. So because of that, the truth here is inaccessible. But that doesn’t mean there is no truth. Fine? That’s something else. Because we are talking about facts. When I talk about two lines, I’m talking about actual lines in our world, not lines in the hypothetical mathematical sense. The reason the truth is inaccessible—that’s in the factual context. To say that in the factual context there is no truth at all, I don’t know, that’s some kind of nonsense I never understood. There are those who want to say that; I don’t understand what it means. But in judgmental contexts, value contexts, ethics and aesthetics—those are usually the fields here—there, when you say the basic assumptions are arbitrary, it’s not necessarily because the truth is inaccessible, but perhaps because there simply is no such thing as truth and falsehood in that context. Not just that it is inaccessible. And there that is already a stronger claim, unlike the factual context. Because there, as I said earlier, there is no criterion of verification—verification with an “a,” right? Meaning, not how do you know whether it’s true, but how is truth defined at all. Even if it’s impossible to know, at least explain to me the definition. What is the definition of truth in the context of an ethical or aesthetic claim? This picture is beautiful. What does that mean? Against what am I supposed to compare that statement in order to see whether it is true or false? There is nothing out there, or anywhere else, that is the candidate for such a comparison. And because of that, it is not merely that truth in these contexts is inaccessible to us, but that there is no truth in these contexts at all. That’s what some people would claim. And because of that, in non-factual fields there is a much stronger tendency to say that the basic assumptions are arbitrary, simply because there is no truth, not merely because the truth is inaccessible. Okay, so I’ll come back to this, but that is basically what he says here, that the assumptions are arbitrary. So he says that this is one possibility. The second possibility is that these assumptions are true in a trivial, self-evident way. One does not need proof for these assumptions. And therefore, despite the fact that they have no proof, so what? I need proof for things that without proof I don’t know whether they are correct or not. That’s what proofs are for. But if there are things regarding which it is obvious to me that they are true—or not true, whatever—but I know their character even without proof, then what do I care that there is no proof? Proof is crutches for someone who can’t walk—he needs proofs. But someone who manages fine without proofs, who knows it is true, doesn’t need proof. Only of course that raises a subjective question. What? Where is the subjective part? Why subjective?
[Speaker E] Because if I think that this is… if I can manage to see it and I don’t need a proof, and someone else does need a proof.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that doesn’t mean subjective. It means there are disputes about it. There are lots of subtleties here, but these are very important subtleties, because all the confusions in this field sit on them. Meaning, subjective means that you accept the claim, you accept that it is arbitrary, that everyone has his own assumptions. But here I’m correcting that a bit—or at least it may be that it’s not subjective. You can decide what you think, but if there are two possibilities, the second possibility says: true, this is not universally agreed upon, there are disputes about it, but the fact that there is a dispute does not mean both sides are right or that there is no truth. One side is right and the other is wrong. Even in physics there can be disputes. Why? Because for now we don’t know who is right; maybe later, when we know, it will become clear who was right and who was wrong. The mere fact that there is a dispute does not mean there is no truth. It doesn’t even mean that the truth is inaccessible to us—not even that. At the moment we just don’t know.
[Speaker F] In aesthetics it’s very hard to accept that—in ethics, the claim that it’s true.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, that’s why I made the distinction, I’ll get to all that in a moment. But I’m saying that the second possibility—the first possibility says the claims are arbitrary. I said that in factual matters it’s because the truth is inaccessible; I think that’s more plausible. In non-factual contexts it’s because perhaps the truth doesn’t exist, there is no such thing as truth in that context—or perhaps because it is inaccessible.
[Speaker E] There is a claim—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For example, x squared equals four.
[Speaker E] I see—that’s not a claim. x squared equals four is an equation.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Once you substitute two in there it becomes a claim.
[Speaker E] So I see—I can see that it’s true, and someone else will want a proof because he doesn’t see it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Two squared equals four. x squared equals four doesn’t make any claim; it’s an equation. It’s a riddle: tell me who x is such that x squared equals four. Two squared equals four—so what’s the question there? So if someone says that’s not true, would you agree that here there is no truth?
[Speaker E] There is this issue—some people will need a proof for it and some people see it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, exactly, that’s what I’m saying. So proof is basically crutches. But if it is clear to you that it is true, then what do you care that there is no proof? The absence of proof need not disturb you. Proof is a means to become convinced of something—to become convinced, that’s exactly what proof is—for something that without proof I don’t know whether it is true or not. But if there is something that I know, why do I need proofs? It’s like asking—what? I don’t need proof for that. To me it’s obvious that if I see, it’s there. Fine? It’s a flawed argument; someone might not accept it. I’m not saying it’s necessary. But I don’t think it’s a flawed argument. Fine, it’s a reasonable argument. So that means I can accept claims that are basic assumptions, with no proof, and still not say they are arbitrary. I can say they have no proof, but I accept them anyway because these are claims that are so clear to me that no proof is needed. Fine? That’s in the factual realm. Okay? Now what happens in the ethical realm? Or the aesthetic realm. It doesn’t matter. In fields that are not factual. In those fields it becomes harder, because there the challenge really stems from the fact that you can’t say, look, I see—like with the wall, right? I simply see that there is a wall here. I don’t need proofs, I see and that’s it, so there is a wall here. But in the ethical or aesthetic context—what do you mean, you see? You don’t see anything. You see the picture, but how do you see that it is beautiful?
[Speaker G] You don’t see the two lines either.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, I’ll get to that too in a moment.
[Speaker G] Maybe there are things everyone agrees are beautiful.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what if they agree? They could all be wrong.
[Speaker H] They could all be wrong?
[Speaker G] Yes, why not?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does that mean? The fact that we are all built in some particular way—does that mean it is therefore also true?
[Speaker H] Not that they’re all wrong, but rather that it’s subjective.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Huh? I didn’t understand. Either they’re all wrong or it’s subjective—it doesn’t matter. Fine, but the fact that everyone agrees is not proof that it’s true.
[Speaker B] Unless that means something exists that has an effect.
[Speaker C] Something we think. You tell some dealer, listen, out of these three paintings, take this one because it’s beautiful. And he works with you that way many times, with his own theories, and he sees that he does business, meaning every—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A beautiful picture in the house, and in the end he doesn’t regret it. But here all you are saying is that this is an economic statement. I know—it’s not a statement about the picture at all. It’s a statement about people. It’s the type of picture people will want to buy at a good price. Huh?
[Speaker C] What does beautiful mean?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, if so, you’ve turned beautiful into a factual claim. Because what you’re asserting now is a factual claim. A factual claim: many people will buy this picture at a certain price. Exactly—that’s a factual claim, not an aesthetic one. I’m talking about a judgment. You are turning the judgment into a fact; that’s exactly the point. That is basically to say there is no such thing as a judgment; the judgment is subjective or arbitrary or whatever. What do people actually mean? They mean a factual claim about people. It’s not a judgment claim about the picture. It’s a factual claim about people.
[Speaker C] How else can you say it’s beautiful? What does that mean?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So there—you hear? There you hear exactly that approach that says judgment claims have no meaning, they are arbitrary, there is no truth and falsehood here. That’s exactly where I’m heading.
[Speaker C] Not arbitrary—they’re really factual. Yes, fine. Someone who says the picture is beautiful—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] means that all people live under the illusion that it is beautiful and will buy it. Yes, exactly. It’s a neuroscience claim.
[Speaker B] Moving to ethics is harder. Huh? Moving to ethics.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, in an ethical claim too, same thing. Why? Everyone you ask will tell you that murder is bad. What’s the problem? It’s a factual claim about people.
[Speaker G] The brain—
[Speaker B] ours is programmed that way, but it is clear to us—at least to me it’s clear, I think to everyone it’s clear—that this claim is a claim unrelated to whether all people—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, right. No, that’s what I told Yossi. You turned the judgment into a fact.
[Speaker B] No, but I’m saying, in aesthetics it’s easier to do that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can argue about that. In ethics—fine, so you’re saying in ethics you accept it, in aesthetics okay, but logically it’s the same logic. You can say here you accept it and there you don’t. But I’m saying: when we speak about judgment—at least when I speak in this context about judgment—I do not mean factual claims about human beings. Fine? Someone may come and say, okay, if that’s not what you mean, then you’re just saying arbitrary things. Fine, but I do not mean a factual claim. First of all, in terms of the meaning of the sentence, the meaning of “this picture is beautiful” is not that many people will buy it at a good price. That is not what I mean. Again, let’s synchronize the dictionary: that is not what I mean. Okay? Okay. Now when I say that sentence, Yossi will come and say, fine, if you don’t mean a factual claim, then it’s just a subjective matter. You’re basically reporting your feelings to me. That’s all. You are not making any claim about the world; there is no truth or falsehood here. Yes—that’s what he says. Now I say—and in ethics, as Shmuel asked earlier, regarding murder for example—when I say murder is forbidden, how do we translate that into a factual claim? That every person you ask whether murder is permitted will tell you no? Do you translate that too into a factual claim? That murder is forbidden?
[Speaker C] Yes. Because there are cases where it is permitted to kill.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, let’s not talk about people whom it is permitted to kill, not people sentenced to death. Just ordinary—you’re walking down the street, murder is forbidden. I don’t know, I’m asking you what you think.
[Speaker C] There are people it’s permitted to kill.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, leave that aside. I’m talking about an innocent person walking down the street—
[Speaker B] To go murder a person because—
[Speaker C] you want to, there is—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] he has something and you want to get rid of him for that. Because the probability is one in ten thousand—you shouldn’t murder. But what does “you shouldn’t murder” mean? I’m talking about—leave the probability aside.
[Speaker I] So start with the fact that there is God and God commanded.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One second, I want to hear what Yossi says, because there too they’ll force you into the same place in the end. So just—again—
[Speaker C] you turned—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] it once again into utility. Fine, no problem. I’m the biggest thug in the world. The biggest thug in the world—no one will murder me. Because I’m the biggest thug, the biggest thug, with iron walls and thugs guarding me and tanks—no one will murder me.
[Speaker C] Right. A bug—you want to?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Is it permitted or forbidden? No, no, human beings. Human beings. With a bug, yes. Human beings.
[Speaker C] Tal, is it permitted to kill?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m asking about human beings, Yossi. Don’t drag me into Tal.
[Speaker C] Don’t be a murderer, Tal. We said it’s permitted to kill.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why is that a mistake? It’s not a mistake. After he killed Abel, no one would murder him anyway because no one else was left. So everything is fine. According to your approach, it’s not even a mistake.
[Speaker C] And God—whoever finds him—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, so I’m asking you—you’re saying the whole matter is utilitarian. That the only reason I don’t murder him is so he won’t murder me. So what’s the problem if we are on a desert island, I murder him and I remain alone, no one will murder me. What’s the problem? Because I’ll be lonely. No, no, that’s not what people mean, because I’ll be too lonely—that’s not what people mean when they say murder is forbidden. Only you can say—and here I think it will be harder to say, though maybe you would also say it—that even with ethical claims there really is no right or wrong. Not only in aesthetics—even in ethics there is no right and wrong.
[Speaker J] No, with murder for example I would define it as a natural human intuition.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes—what is a natural intuition? I’m asking what that is. Again, that’s a factual claim. It just means most people think that way. True, but you are still leaving it on the level that most people are built in such a way that they feel disgust toward murder.
[Speaker G] Intuition or instinct? Intuition.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, exactly. Or you are claiming it is true—that’s not the same thing, you understand? If it’s a claim about people, then again you’ve turned it into a factual claim. So one person isn’t built that way, he’s built differently, and in his eyes there’s no problem with murder—do you condemn him? No. I’m saying that is not what people mean when they say murder is forbidden. But then a hard question really does arise: what is it based on? After all, even in ethics—where it seems to me harder to empty this claim of judgmental content and turn it into a factual claim—the logical problem exists there too, exactly as in aesthetics. Against what do I compare the sentence “murder is forbidden” in order to determine whether it is true or false? In what sense can one speak of it as true or not true? Here too, in that sense, ethics and aesthetics are the same problem. Though, as I say, I think most of us, if we examine ourselves, will feel a difference. By the way, I don’t agree even in aesthetics—but even someone who agrees there, in ethics I think many won’t agree. And then again the question returns to us: all right, so what is the meaning of the claim that “murder is forbidden” is true? In what sense is it true? What does “true” mean? Do you want once again to translate it into the fact that we are built in such a way that we feel disgust in the face of murder? Fine, there is one person built differently and he has no problem with murder. I have no reason to condemn him—unless I am built in such a way that I condemn people who are built differently. Fine, but then we have completely emptied out the whole matter.
[Speaker C] That murder is forbidden is definitely not an instinct. No—it stems from… Give me a child from the day he is born, raise him however you want, he won’t have a problem.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is no instinct not to murder. Let’s say—suppose. I’m not sure about that, but suppose.
[Speaker C] It’s something that is learned.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I’m asking whether it is true or not.
[Speaker C] What is the definition of truth?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Truth—whether it is correct. If someone thinks otherwise, is he mistaken?
[Speaker C] If you ask me whether a person has an instinct not to—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, instinct—I’m talking about a judgment claim, not a factual claim. Whether a person has an instinct—you are once again translating it into a factual claim. That is a scientific question: whether a person is born with an instinct for murder or against murder. An interesting scientific question, I don’t know. I’m talking about a judgment claim. Is murder forbidden—is that a correct claim? Is murder forbidden? Is someone who says murder is permitted mistaken?
[Speaker C] That’s true—it’s not even the right question. I’m asking whether it’s worthwhile—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, not worthwhile, not worthwhile. I’m asking whether it is right not to murder. What?
[Speaker C] Human beings. Any thing… what’s the definition?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Innocent human beings. Leave it—don’t drag me now into content— I don’t know. But there is someone who doesn’t ask to be murdered. Yossi, it’s not relevant.
[Speaker C] I’m in terrible pain—is it permitted to kill?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But that’s not relevant. You’re taking me to places where maybe the answer to whether murder is permitted or forbidden is unclear. Let’s talk about the places where it is clear, because the question exists there too. The question exists regarding an ordinary person. He doesn’t say to you “don’t murder me”—he says “don’t murder me, I don’t want to, I love life.” He committed no sin, no crime, nothing. You take a gun and shoot him in the head. Did you do something wrong? Maybe. I don’t know—what do you mean maybe? Yes or no? What do you think? Okay, I’ll tell you. No—he cannot prove that it’s wrong. That’s exactly the point. I’m saying there is no proof here either. The question is whether, because there is no proof, I am automatically forced to treat such claims as arbitrary, subjective claims. That is the question I’m putting on the table. Now it is seemingly tempting to say what Yossi says: you have no proof, so in what sense can you talk about this as truth and falsehood? But notice the implications. And again, one can go all the way with this—it is consistent. But notice the implications, and let everyone examine himself to see whether he agrees.
[Speaker B] What was his name, that professor who was at Tel Aviv University and later moved to Australia? Moshe Kroy. Right? Moshe Kroy. He argued—he was also an egoist, Ayn Rand style. Yes, the egoists. Yes, the egoists.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So the claim that murder is forbidden—what it intends to claim is not a factual claim, on the one hand. On the other hand, of course it has no proof. It is also not the result of observation, nor anything else. Now the question is: how do I relate to such a claim? So again, if I translate it into facts, then leave it—I’ve once again emptied it of its content. I’m not translating it into facts. Let’s first agree on the meaning of the claim before we talk about how to treat it. First of all, what does it say? Its meaning is that murder is forbidden, not that there are facts or tendencies in human beings. I am not willing to accept any factual translation. Now I make that claim. Now, it doesn’t come from observation, I have no proof for it, nothing.
[Speaker B] Is it because—not only is there no proof, there cannot be.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, there’s nothing to compare it to, and everything I said before. So now the question is: how do I relate to this kind of claim? Is it really something arbitrary because there’s no proof and it isn’t the result of observation and so on? And then there’s no choice but to say, okay, it’s rooted in the soul—once again we translate it into facts, because there’s no meaning to a normative statement. But notice the price of that, the moral price. Meaning, a person can say, fine, but what can you do, that’s reality. The moral price is that if someone is built differently and has no problem murdering, then he’s just as okay as I am. Meaning, there’s no okay and not okay here. The question is just how you’re built, that’s all. Right, because there is no concept of okay—that’s the point.
[Speaker E] ISIS on the basis of family honor?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, or without family honor—just murder. Forget family honor, just plain murder.
[Speaker E] Just as an example—does he think that’s his morality, or that it’s the right thing?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, even if he doesn’t think it’s the right thing—so what? He’s just built that way. He doesn’t think. He’s built that way. Not morality and not purity. He’s built that way; he doesn’t think—that’s exactly the point. Just as there’s no significance to what I think, there’s no significance to what he thinks either. Why should I care what he thinks? He does what he doesn’t think—so what? That’s how he’s built, and that’s all. The moment I translate ethical claims into factual claims, they’re emptied of content, of their ethical content. They become scientific claims, factual claims. The question becomes how human beings are built. Fine, you can argue whether they really are built that way or not; that’s for scientists to investigate. But the question whether there’s something beyond that—that’s really what I’m arguing or asking. Okay? Now here it really is much harder—that is, to adopt the second way of relating to first premises. Namely, that they are not arbitrary but self-evident, and therefore don’t need proof. I accept them despite there being no proof because it’s clear to me; the proof is only crutches. What I said before in the factual context, fine. But in the non-factual context—ethical, aesthetic, and so forth—it’s much more problematic. But in order to understand this issue, let’s go back for a moment to the factual context. As Shmuel remarked earlier, even in the factual context the situation isn’t simple, because when I talk about two parallel lines that don’t meet, how do I know that? So you can say: there’s no proof; it’s an axiom, okay? It’s not the result of observation, because nobody went all the way out there to see whether they meet or don’t meet. So there too there’s no observation and no—nobody went, nobody can. Right, so there too there’s no proof and no observation. Even in the factual context—you don’t have to get to morality and aesthetics—even in the factual context we have first premises that we accept even though we have no proof for them and they are not the result of observation.
[Speaker G] So someone will come and say: if there’s no proof then it’s not—there’s no such thing as no proof without the thing—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because there’s no proof without first premises. You always need first premises, yes, of course. So that’s simple. So what does that mean? That basically even in the factual context there aren’t really two options for relating to first premises—apparently only the option that they are arbitrary. Right? What Yossi said earlier: after all, you don’t see it—how will you prove it? So really, how do you relate to the axiom that two parallel lines don’t meet? So that too is arbitrary. Even though it’s a—a claim—I’m talking about parallel lines in our world, not mathematical parallels, right? So it’s a factual claim. But who says it’s true? Nobody can check it, it’s inaccessible, I haven’t seen it, it can’t be proven, so it’s arbitrary. I think that here many of us already won’t agree to say that it’s arbitrary, right? I’m willing to bet my head that if someone goes all the way, those lines will never meet, even though I’ve never done it, of course. After a hundred meters I collapse, so going to infinity is a bit much.
[Speaker B] Mathematical induction—isn’t that a proof? Of course it is.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Mathematical induction, yes, but non-mathematical induction, no. In mathematical induction you can prove it—mathematical induction is deduction. Induction, you need—
[Speaker B] to start from a first premise,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s only called induction because that’s what they call it. You mean scientific induction, generalization. Induction like in—yes, you see two horses with four legs, so you say all horses have four legs. That’s induction, scientific induction. Mathematical induction is a deductive proof; it’s not induction. So here there’s no generalization. I don’t think I can make any sort of generalization here. I look at it and say: wow, it’s certain that if I go all the way, it still won’t meet. How do I know that? So what will you say, that this too is arbitrary?
[Speaker B] No, but here we’re talking about reality—meaning, clearly either something is true in reality or it isn’t.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, the definition of truth isn’t problematic here. But I’m asking: do we really think it’s true?
[Speaker G] But there too the definition of truth is problematic, because in the same way I assume here that there is some truth, and I assume here regarding my respondent—yes, maybe reality includes that too.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, so now you’re already getting into skepticism.
[Speaker G] Totally. No, no, I don’t want to get into skepticism. No, but it’s the same pattern. Truth too is an intuition I have about existence.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Like that same philosophy I don’t want to get into. Meaning, as I said before, you can also challenge that this is—
[Speaker G] the same principle, the same mechanism.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, let’s see whether it’s the same principle. That’s what I’m talking about.
[Speaker E] In the part that you see, you see that they don’t meet.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s like two non-parallel lines—in the part you see, they don’t meet, and they can meet very far away if the angle between them is tiny. That proves nothing, so what? There are also lines with a tiny angle between them that meet only after a hundred thousand kilometers. You’ll never see in your life that they meet, but you already say they meet even though the gap—
[Speaker C] If you get closer with a precise instrument—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] here, the gap is small.
[Speaker C] That can be proven. Those, yes, right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but who said the parallel lines don’t meet?
[Speaker C] That can be proven. Who said they don’t meet?
[Speaker B] It’s obvious to you.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It can be proven on the basis of the axioms.
[Speaker C] It’s like with the four legs. No, sure. And from what I’ve seen up to now, so they won’t—
[Speaker B] meet even another half meter. So those too, that have a tiny little angle and meet only after three hundred thousand kilometers, they also don’t meet.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can calculate it—but who says it’s true? That what? That they meet. You didn’t see it, you didn’t check it.
[Speaker C] You can do it to scale, shrink it down and see.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] All of that is built on the axioms of geometry. Without the axioms of geometry, all the measurements and calculations in the world won’t help you. Everything starts from the axioms. The axioms build all the trigonometry you use; everything is built on geometry, and geometry is built on its axioms. You can’t escape that. So in the end, notice that the same problem that existed in ethical and aesthetic contexts also exists in factual contexts.
[Speaker C] Exactly the same. Here you can really see how obvious it seems.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, so someone will tell you: to me it’s very obvious that murder is forbidden. And to you it’s very obvious—to most people it’s obvious—
[Speaker G] no less than that two parallel lines—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, I can even raise my hands here too.
[Speaker G] For most people, what he writes here about first premises—it sounds a bit binary, the way he writes it. Either it’s obvious to you or it’s— But it’s really not like that. There are different levels of obviousness. Meaning, it’s very—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not important right now. I’m not getting into the question of whether it has to be certain.
[Speaker G] Even among first premises there are things that are a bit more certain and a bit less certain.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. I don’t think he necessarily means certainty. Maybe we’ll see that later. I only mean to say: even if it isn’t certain, if I think it’s true, I can think it’s true even without observation and without proof and still think it’s true—maybe not with certainty, fine. By the way, regarding the world, for example, it really isn’t certain. The world might have some small curvature that I don’t feel within the range around me. As we know, that actually is true in general relativity. So the problem that exists in normative contexts also exists in factual contexts, and that’s actually good. Why is that good? Because it means that anyone who still wants to claim that there are first premises in the factual realm that are true even though they aren’t proven and aren’t the result of observation and so on, will have to explain why—on what basis he says that. Here there are two possibilities. So everything really branches out here into possibilities. There are two possibilities—maybe only one, I don’t know, but— One possibility: the Holy One, blessed be He, implanted in us the understanding of what is right and what is not right. As he says here five lines from the bottom: first intelligibles are truths that the Holy One, blessed be He, implanted in man, truths of which every person is convinced. Fine? Another possibility—and again, I don’t think it’s essentially different—is to say that we have the ability to observe it. What Husserl called intuition of essences. Eidetic seeing. Meaning, you can observe not the tangible thing in front of you, but the ideas standing behind it. When you look at a horse, then through it the horse is as if transparent; the concrete horse is transparent, and through it you actually see the idea of horseness. How do we abstract horseness from horses? After all, the idea of horse doesn’t completely resemble any of the horses we’ve seen, right? But at least the common assumption is that for all of us, the idea of horseness is roughly the same. That means that the idea of horseness is not the result of simple observation, but some ability to see what stands behind the concrete horse—what abstract theoretical idea stands behind it or is embodied in this horse. Okay? Now in the same way, apparently we have some ability to look at two parallel lines and see—not with the eyes; with the eye of the intellect, in Maimonides’ language in Guide for the Perplexed—to see in some sense that they won’t meet. I simply see. I look at two parallel lines; I see that they will never meet. What does “see” mean? After all, I never walked along them; I don’t really see these two lines from infinity to infinity. I don’t see it with my eyes. Right.
[Speaker C] So that’s when I say that I could put before you two pairs of lines and only one of them is parallel and you wouldn’t be able to tell. No, fine, fine—one is parallel, or—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course. I’m saying: given that they’re parallel. I draw two lines and at the same—
[Speaker C] at the degree measured by a very precise instrument, exactly—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that the two distances are the same distance; in both places it’s the same distance. Right. Now I’m saying: now it’s clear to me—from that it’s clear to me—that they won’t meet; it’s clear to me they won’t meet. What does that mean, “clear to me”? So either the Holy One, blessed be He, implanted this in me, because after all the eyes don’t see it and there’s no proof of it, or the Holy One, blessed be He, implanted it in me—or it could be that we have some sixth sense, some ability that is not seeing with the eyes but the eyes of the intellect, what Maimonides calls at the beginning of Guide for the Perplexed, or eidetic seeing, or whatever else people call it. It has several names in the history of philosophy. We have some ability to grasp this through observation. Now why is it important to understand this point? Because it basically means that when I say that these two lines don’t meet, it isn’t the result of thinking. If it were the result of thinking, then you could say: fine, that’s just how thinking works inside us, as opposed to observation, which is looking at something outside us. Fine? Now if this thing is the result of thinking—that two parallel lines don’t meet—then you could say: fine, that’s how you’re built, but the world doesn’t owe you anything. Who says the world behaves that way too? The fact that you’re built that way is very nice, that you think that way, but the fact that you think it doesn’t mean that that’s really how it is. And you have no observation, and no proof either. The only possible solution to this—unless you agree that it’s arbitrary—but if you don’t adopt the position that this thing is arbitrary, but rather that it is true and self-evident, and therefore I adopt it even without proofs, that can only be because we have some ability to derive the claim that they won’t meet from observation, not from thought. Now it’s not observation with the eyes, because with the eyes you can’t see it. It’s some other kind of perception of reality, perception with the intellect, not perception with the eyes. But it is a perception of reality; it’s not thought taking place within us. It has to be some kind of interaction with reality, cognition itself and not thinking.
[Speaker C] But it’s not—look, I’ll tell you: two straight rods twenty meters or ten meters long—you’ll never in your life set them up so that they won’t meet.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course not. That’s why I’m not talking—
[Speaker C] It doesn’t exist in reality, because whatever measuring instrument—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that you bring. I’m not talking about two—
[Speaker C] concrete rods. The tiniest deviation is enough—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that another thirty kilometers— I’m not talking about two concrete rods. I’m talking about two non-concrete, theoretical rods, okay? No. And it’s not just in the head, because it’s a claim about the world. It’s a claim about the world that if there really were truly parallel rods—whether or not I can verify it—they would not meet. Now physicists usually formulate this as a limiting process, at least experimentalists. Theoreticians say it the way I said it, and the experimentalists say that the more parallel it is, or at whatever degree of precision it is parallel, accordingly one over that is the distance at which it will meet. If that holds, it means that parallels don’t meet. It doesn’t matter that everything meets, but if—
[Speaker C] you can make it infinitely precise—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] now you’re already abstracting further beyond that. But basically that’s how experimentalists, say, look at it. Doesn’t matter. But parallel lines on the theoretical level—it doesn’t matter; you’re right that I can never know exactly whether they’re parallel or not. I can still claim that they never meet. If someone says that’s arbitrary, fine, there’s nothing to say to him. Maybe he’s right. I have no way to argue with that. I think he’s mistaken, but I have no way to argue with him. I’m only willing to bet him any amount he wants that you can go any distance he wants and he won’t find an intersection. On that I’m willing to bet him a thousand to zero.
[Speaker C] There’s no such thing in reality; there are no two parallel lines in the world.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean there are no two lines—
[Speaker C] that won’t meet later on after forty kilometers?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] After forty kilometers? Of course there are.
[Speaker C] Of course there are, you just need to measure more precisely—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] in the right way. Measure with very, very precise measurements—of course there are. Besides, roads—what do you mean “of course”? And if they’re far apart, then what’s the problem altogether? Put them a kilometer apart from each other.
[Speaker C] There are lots of these here, there are—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] lots of roads. It’s a matter of the distance between them. Come on, what are you—this is simple geometry. It depends on the distance between them. What do you mean? You can bring—never mind. I can produce for you two parallel lines—
[Speaker C] and you can walk your whole life and they won’t meet. There’s no problem doing that, no problem doing that, no problem doing that.
[Speaker B] Now, now—I’m telling you, two laser beams. What do you mean? No problem at all. Two laser beams. How many digits after the decimal point do you need? Doesn’t matter how many. If you set them straight. Listen, Yossi, it’s arithmetic. No—two laser beams. No, but it’s a function not only of the precision of your measurement but also of the distance between them. Put them twenty kilometers apart.
[Speaker C] Doesn’t matter. It’s enough for me that after forty kilometers they’re at nineteen point nine nine—they’re not parallel. What do I care about the distance? No, you won’t find it. Put them one inside the other and that’s fine.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s a technical issue. Things can be done.
[Speaker C] Your measuring instrument will show it there.
[Speaker J] But it also doesn’t matter; it has no significance. Fine, there’s a rule in legal matters: proceedings regarding temporary matters must come to an end.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. So in short, what I want to claim is that if we adopt the second conception regarding first premises—the conception that says that first premises are not arbitrary; they are self-evidently true, and therefore I accept them even without proof—then even in the factual realm, when I say such a thing, I’m basically assuming that I have some kind of non-sensory ability—
[Speaker K] No—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] to observe.
[Speaker K] But even if you were alone, you might have something that is self-evident to you with no proof, and only when you ask many others and it’s self-evident to them too does it become a true claim. Because even then it doesn’t—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] become a claim of certain truth, but much more—
[Speaker K] In the eyes of the intellect, in my opinion, that still doesn’t solve the problem completely. What do you mean completely?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not talking about certainty of truth or not.
[Speaker K] As I said before, I’m not talking about certainty.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not certain. I’m saying it’s true. The level of certainty isn’t important. The claim is that it’s not arbitrary.
[Speaker K] The claim is that it’s not arbitrary—that I agree with. But true or false—that’s not— No, true or false depends how you define it. Again, truth on one level. Yes, I don’t know, no, maybe it isn’t. Fine, not important.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not talking about what level of certainty I require from such a claim. But I’m saying: the question is whether I’m forced to say that it’s arbitrary. Absolutely not. That’s enough for me. That is what I call true—not important; I don’t need it to be certain. Now, if I accept this in the factual context, then now let’s return to the non-factual context—the normative, ethical, and aesthetic contexts. If so, then there is room to understand there too why such claims can be true or false—ethical claims or aesthetic claims. Maybe there too there is some sort of observation that yields ethical claims or aesthetic claims.
[Speaker B] Observation of the eyes of the intellect.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Observation not with the physical eyes, but observation with some other senses. Our conscience, what we call it—maybe that’s some kind of observation. Except that here, of course, you need to add another assumption to our developing metaphysics, and you also need to add that there is something to observe—not only that we have a means of observation, but you also have to assume what this vague means is observing. There is something there in the world that is being observed. Now what is that thing? That thing is some sort of idea of the good, just as there is an idea of horseness or an idea of parallelness. After all, even with parallel lines I’m not observing the lines; I’m observing parallelness, the idea of parallelness. Right? There too I’m observing an idea. So in that sense, if I look at the idea of ethics, the idea of morality, the idea of the good, I see that murder is forbidden. It is self-evident; it is clear. So someone who accepts—someone who wants to adopt first intelligibles in non-factual contexts as something that is self-evidently true and therefore needs no proof, not as something arbitrary but as something self-evident, simply has to continue what we saw in the factual realm. He has to assume that there is some sort of observation here. Fine? Now I said another possibility is to say that the Holy One, blessed be He, implanted this in us in some sense. But in the ethical and aesthetic context that won’t help. Because in the ethical and aesthetic context, what does it mean that the Holy One, blessed be He, implanted it in us? After all, it’s not even defined as being true or false at all, so what does it help that the Holy One, blessed be He, implanted it in us? He implanted a fiction in us. Therefore, specifically here it seems to me that this model—that the Holy One, blessed be He, implanted it in us—has no meaning. What good does it do that the Holy One, blessed be He, implanted in us that murder is forbidden? It doesn’t make it true; it makes it innate, that’s all. But “innate,” we already said before, is a fact. On the contrary, when I say it is true, I mean that the judgment is true.
[Speaker G] He didn’t implant it in us the way He implanted the first thing in us. It just solves the problem of seeing, that’s all. He—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] created a reality.
[Speaker G] Exactly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So therefore what I’m really saying is that “the Holy One, blessed be He, implanted it in us” means that we can see—see, again, with the eyes of the intellect—contemplate some idea and conclude that it is true. And that’s what God implanted in us; it’s not something physical. Therefore I say—on the contrary, that’s exactly what I’m saying—that “implanted in us” could simply mean this. And therefore I say I’m not sure these are two different possibilities. We have this ability.
[Speaker C] Is that the reality—that it isn’t so?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean?
[Speaker C] There are cannibal tribes, there are—no shortage.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, they don’t see. They don’t see; they’re blind. There are blind people too. So does that mean my sight is wrong?
[Speaker C] But he doesn’t understand what it means to be blind. He murders and eats a person.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, he is blind to this moral vision. He doesn’t see.
[Speaker C] If he acts like that—everybody does, all the animals do that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, blind people don’t see either, so does that mean it’s fine not to see, that there’s no such thing as seeing? So what? Animals do that, but animals eat animals. I’m talking about human beings.
[Speaker C] Human beings gradually decided that it’s not good—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] to murder.
[Speaker C] for their own benefit.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So you’re saying—you’re again translating it into a factual claim. But I’m now asking whether one can make another kind of claim.
[Speaker C] No, the reality is that if you raise a baby—he’ll murder.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The reality—but the naturalistic fallacy says that reality is not relevant to the question—
[Speaker C] when you see that it isn’t true.
[Speaker B] But why do you educate him not to murder?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why do you educate him not to murder?
[Speaker B] So they won’t murder you.
[Speaker C] It’s expediency, that’s all. Not that God really implanted in him not to murder.
[Speaker B] Yossi, but if a situation arises in which it is—
[Speaker C] worthwhile. But if—
[Speaker B] if a situation arises in which it is worthwhile to murder, then murder is okay? Is there a situation where it’s worthwhile to murder?
[Speaker C] Suppose you and I are on a desert island and I have nothing to eat.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no, you’ve gone back—yes. Yossi, Yossi, let’s move on. The guys in this gathering want to do an exercise where someone will come and kill you. That’s a bit far—let’s continue. A newborn baby also can’t answer your question about the sum of the angles in a triangle. And if nobody teaches him, then even when he dies he still won’t be able to answer it. Now when he learns that the sum of the angles in a triangle is one hundred and eighty degrees, is he learning something arbitrary? Wait, listen to what I’m asking before you answer. I ask him now what the sum of the angles in a triangle is, and he says, I don’t know. Now I teach him geometry. After I teach him geometry, I ask him, tell me, what’s the sum of the angles in a triangle? He tells me: one hundred and eighty degrees—and gets a perfect score. Now the question is: when he says one hundred and eighty degrees, when he gives that answer, is it only because I educated him into it, or because I opened his eyes? Meaning, before he didn’t see, and I helped him see, and now he already understands that it’s true.
[Speaker C] Same thing—there’s a professor at the university, he teaches geometry, and he proves to you that it isn’t true.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he can’t—
[Speaker C] prove—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that in flat space.
[Speaker C] That’s his lab. You just didn’t educate him enough.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean?
[Speaker C] Just as you know that they told you one hundred and eighty—how do you know? After all, he can also check.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know. All the students I know and all the professors I know—none of them has yet told me that it isn’t true, that the sum of the angles in a triangle is one hundred and eighty degrees. It’s not a matter of definition. In Euclidean space it is a truth; it’s not a matter of definition.
[Speaker C] Really, really—is it true that through lines pass two parallel lines, or is it an axiom?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] An axiom that is true. An axiom that is true. I’m saying: the fact that the baby is born—
[Speaker B] Otherwise, I suggest you don’t fly in airplanes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let’s move on. A baby who is born and doesn’t see something or doesn’t understand something can learn it. Now when he learns it, that doesn’t mean we are programming him—not necessarily. Sometimes we are opening his eyes. And after we help him open his eyes, now he sees, and it’s true. The fact that a baby didn’t see it when he was born doesn’t mean that the thing is a social construction or something arbitrary. It doesn’t necessarily mean that. It could be, but it doesn’t necessarily mean that. You can say that I simply helped him open his eyes. And the truth is that when you—this is always the claim against moral relativism; I spoke about this once. They always say: look at cannibal tribes in Africa and things like that. The truth is, even factually—even though I said facts don’t determine anything about morality—but even factually, notice this: when such a society encounters Western culture, it almost always becomes like the West and not the other way around.
[Speaker B] There’s here—what?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—
[Speaker C] No, it’s not always like that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] When missionaries came—when missionaries came to Africa, they were not the majority. They ate the first ones. The others managed to persuade them.
[Speaker G] Western culture and Eastern culture—let’s take—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Which East, the Far East?
[Speaker G] China and—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s something else.
[Speaker G] The Chinese are becoming more like Americans in many ways.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] True, but that’s a bit different from Africa. It’s not exactly in the moral realm; it’s more in the realm of culture—maybe also morality, and I don’t know who benefits from whom.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying, with all these things, let’s move on because we’re lingering too long.
[Speaker C] What I’m really asking—a rotten fish, is that allowed?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Chinese eat it freely. Yes, of course it’s allowed. I also say it’s allowed; it’s just not tasty, that’s all.
[Speaker C] It’s not a good thing—in an American accent.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not good—not good for the palate, not morally bad. In any case, the claim I want to make is that there are two ways to ap—just as he says, what he is really saying, two ways of relating to first intelligibles. Either it is arbitrary, or we have some ability to observe these things and see that they are true. And that has to be bound up with some kind of observation. Meaning, to assume that the thing is built into me is not an explanation, because if it is built into me—and here I return to his first expression, where he says, “he cannot think otherwise”—if it is built into me, you can say that I cannot think otherwise, but you cannot say that it is true. And that is something else. And if you want to say that it is true, it won’t help that the Holy One— It’s like, say, years ago we spoke about a hierarchy of values. How do you determine a hierarchy of values? There is really a very difficult problem in ethics here, because you need a common measure of the values in order to determine which ranks above which. Say, Sabbath observance and saving a life—they conflict. Now the question is which overrides which. So in order to determine which overrides which, you need to establish some common scale on which both are measured, and then you see which is higher on that scale than the other. If there is no common scale—if it is incommensurable, yes, lacking a common measure—then you can’t compare them, you can’t rank them. Right? What is greater—the water in the ocean or, I don’t know, the molecules in the table? That’s a meaningless question. Because more water in the ocean is not more objects; it’s not number. It’s something else—weight, volume, I don’t know, depending on what I mean when I ask. It has nothing to do with— You can’t ask such a question. They aren’t measured in the same way. Fine, that lacks a common measure. Now, in Torah contexts, for example, saving a life overrides the Sabbath. And this is a question that when I teach this topic, I always ask the students: when you encounter a conflict of this kind, since there is a problem of incommensurability, of the absence of a common measure, that means that in principle it is impossible to rank them. Not that I don’t know how to rank them, not that the ranking is inaccessible to me, but that the ranking itself is meaningless. You can’t rank things without a common measure. Now there may be a verse that says that saving a life overrides the Sabbath. That doesn’t help at all. What good does it do? The verse says that saving a life overrides the Sabbath—that doesn’t help. The Holy One, blessed be He, revealed to me— That can solve a problem where the truth is not accessible to me. It exists, but I can’t get to it, so the Holy One, blessed be He, reveals it to me. But if there is no such thing as truth here, then even the Holy One, blessed be He Himself, cannot tell me whether there is more water in the ocean than molecules in the table or not.
[Speaker B] The question has no meaning.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly, there is no answer to that question. It’s a meaningless question. So therefore it won’t help to say that the Holy One, blessed be He, implanted it in me or revealed it to me. That only solves problems that have an answer, except that the answer is inaccessible to me. About that you can say it is a scriptural decree. But problems that essentially have no answer—a scriptural decree won’t help there. It won’t solve the problem. It may be that you can treat it as some kind of behavioral instruction. Just that. It doesn’t really override anything. I’m saying that the Holy One, blessed be He, says: I always want you to desecrate the Sabbath in order to save a life. Not that there is really some determination of a hierarchy here. And if you treat it as determining a hierarchy, there must be meaning to the question. Otherwise it won’t help that the Holy One, blessed be He, revealed the answer to me. Now here too it’s the same. If the Holy One, blessed be He, implanted ethical truths in us, fine? That solves nothing. Because if there is no such thing as ethical truth, then what does it help that the Holy One, blessed be He, implanted it in me? Obviously the Holy One, blessed be He, created me, so obviously He implanted in me everything I think. That’s trivial. Obviously He also implanted in me this feeling that murder is forbidden, just as He implanted in me everything else I have. He created me, right? So what does that mean? That’s nonsense; it says nothing. I’m still asking: fine, He implanted it in me, all true. Now the question is whether it is true. If that question has no meaning, then it won’t help to say that He implanted it in me either. Rather, you have to say that the question has meaning. How does it have meaning? Against what do you compare an ethical claim in order to determine whether it is true or false? You have to assume the existence of some idea that you observe, and an ability to observe. Meaning, some sort of sixth sense, or non-sensory observation, or whatever you want to call it. Fine? All that has to be assumed. Once I have already assumed all that, then I don’t need Him to have implanted it in me. That’s it. Just as He gave me the ability to see walls, He gave me the ability to observe ideas. Fine, obviously He implanted everything in me—that has no significance. The point is that we have such an ability. We can distinguish what is true and what is not true. And that is the meaning of the claim that there are propositions that seem self-evident to us, so we don’t need proofs. “Seem self-evident to us” means: we are present to see that they are true. That’s all. Okay? So that is the meaning of these claims. Now to say that it is arbitrary, in the non-factual context, is basically to say that in that context there is no truth at all. Not just that it is inaccessible to us. Right? That is something entirely different. In the factual realm it’s as I said before. Okay, so those are the two conceptions he presents here. But he says—basically he says—the dispute, what he calls this scientific dispute, is pointless; it has no value. Why does it have no value? Because obviously as a thought experiment one can posit axioms, arbitrary claims, and derive conclusions from them and everything else. But obviously someone who assumes that two parallel lines do meet simply isn’t talking about Euclidean space; he is talking about another space. That’s all. So what is he really saying? He is basically assuming, of course, the second possibility. It’s not that he—he presents two possibilities: either it is arbitrary, or it is self-evident and therefore I adopt it. He says: but this discussion is a hypothetical discussion with no value. Why? Because it is self-evident. What kind of argument is that? No—after all, those are the two options for interpreting it.
[Speaker H] And that is the correct option. This discussion is just pointless because we all know that the right answer is this one.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, that’s what you say. I think like the second option. That’s what he says. Not only that you think it—we all think it. No, not sure that we all think that.
[Speaker H] I don’t know, I—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ve heard people who say—not so many people. Here, Yossi just told us in the ethical and non-factual contexts. No, no, don’t stir up the— Here, Yossi just told us in the non-factual contexts. Fine, and in those contexts too it’s the same. He spoke about everything, about everything—what’s the difference? First intelligibles in any field whatever. Okay, so this whole paragraph is about what he does not mean when he says sevara. The first intelligibles. So what does he mean, then? What is this sevara? Let’s get back to our matter. The sevara we are talking about in Jewish law is not a first intelligible. Wherever there is sevara, one can also think otherwise. For example: “the burden of proof rests upon the one who seeks to extract from another.” The Talmud says that “the burden of proof rests upon the one who seeks to extract from another”—that is sevara: “one who feels pain goes to the physician.” “The burden of proof rests upon the one who seeks to extract from another” is a legal rule: if you sue me and the money is in my possession, the burden of proof is on you. How do we know that? “The master of the matter shall approach them”—either a verse or sevara. And the Talmud says the sevara is: “one who feels pain should go to the physician.” You want to take money from me? I want nothing. The money is with me; I’m satisfied with the situation. I have no requests of the religious court. You want to take the money from me? Something hurts you? Go to the doctor. Meaning, you need to make sure the religious court has a reason to act. You want the religious court to act? Then make sure to bring them a reason that will move them to act. I don’t want them to act. As far as I’m concerned, I’ll go home with things as they presently are. So what is this sevara? Is it a first intelligible? He wants to claim that this is not a first intelligible.
[Speaker G] Maybe he wants to point out lack of certainty?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll come back to that in a moment. I’ll come back to that in a moment because on exactly this point I think I disagree with him. And this claim, he says, is not a first intelligible, and that is what is meant when people say sevara. What does that mean—why is it not a first intelligible? He says because one could also say otherwise. It isn’t necessary; it isn’t absurd. Meaning, true, it sounds reasonable, but someone can also come and say no. You can say otherwise—always draw lots, I don’t know, or always split it whenever one person sues another. So what does that basically mean? That first intelligibles are something certain, and sevara means something that is not certain? Meaning, the threshold that distinguishes them is the question of the level of certainty? If so, then I really think that this distinction is not a substantive distinction. What difference does it make? Meaning, even the intelligibles—say, if you asked me whether two parallel lines don’t meet, I’m pretty convinced that’s true. To tell you that it’s one hundred percent, that I’d stake my head on it? I don’t know. I don’t stake my head on anything. Meaning, a person can always be mistaken. Even things that seem self-evident might be wrong. Therefore, I’m pretty convinced it’s true. I’m willing to bet a thousand to one. But to tell you that it’s just absolutely obvious, nonsense, it has to be true—I don’t know, I’m not—
[Speaker G] He’s dividing here between things that probably most people would agree on and things that—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. So what comes out is that this distinction between first principles and reasoning is not really an essential distinction. He’s talking either about things everyone agrees on, or things that are somehow self-evident, let’s put it that way, as opposed to things you might perhaps argue about. Although, again, notice that even the claim that the burden of proof is on the one who seeks to extract property from another—even though Sumchus disagrees with it in certain contexts—it seems to me that this is a generally accepted claim, I think, in every legal system in the world. I’m not a legal expert, but that’s how it seems to me. Which means that basically all human beings more or less agree with this claim in broad terms, in ordinary cases.
[Speaker B] But how does the Talmud there say, “Why do I need a verse? It’s reasoning”? If it’s such a thing, then why do I need a verse—it’s reasoning?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He wants to argue that even about something like that they say, “Why do I need a verse? It’s reasoning.”
[Speaker B] Even if it’s not certain. But if it’s not certain, then you do need a verse in order for it to be certain, because you can argue about it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Even if it’s seventy percent, that’s not… that’s exactly his claim. His claim is that when the Talmud says, “Why do I need a verse? It’s reasoning,” it’s not speaking about first principles that are certain, but about things—
[Speaker B] —that are plausible. If it makes sense, then you don’t need a verse for it. But you do need a verse.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because we use our intellect. Things that seem plausible are also perfectly fine from our point of view. We don’t need full certainty, because a person can’t have full certainty. Even if there were a verse, that still wouldn’t be full certainty—maybe you didn’t understand it correctly. So a person can never reach full certainty. Human beings always have error crouching at the door. So therefore his point, what he wants to say, is that this applies even to things like these, not only to first principles. Fine. That’s how I would translate it, because I don’t think there’s really a genuine distinction here between these two things. Now, how do I actually reach a conclusion? Let’s look at the example he brought: “The one who feels pain knows his pain,” right?—and “the burden of proof is on the one who seeks to extract property from another.” Where does the source of that reasoning come from? Here too there will be people who say, who will translate this into utility, into consequences, teleological arguments. Meaning: for the sake of social order, so that not everyone attacks someone else in the street and starts taking things from him, we give preference to the person who currently has the money. Even though who knows—maybe he’s actually the liar? You can’t know. But order, or legal logic, says that it’s preferable to establish the default rule that way, that the other side has to bring proof. Otherwise we’ll always leave money with whoever it happens to be with. That’s one way to look at it. And then it means that claims of this sort—and generally, by the way, that’s how people tend to see it—that claims of this sort are basically not normative claims. It’s not that it is truly right to act in such a way that the burden of proof is on the claimant, right in a value-laden sense. Rather, it is useful to act that way, simply because otherwise the results will be bad. Right? Exactly. Like moral translations: don’t murder because otherwise they’ll murder me, or all kinds of things like that. Not because it’s actually right not to murder. I’m making the analogy so that you’ll see that the discussion continues here too. Okay? I once argued—I wrote a little booklet on the law of migo, and at the end there was an appendix on legal reasoning. What? There?
[Speaker E] In the law of migo, or somewhere else where Sumchus disagrees with it?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Sumchus is about money that is in doubt—property of uncertain ownership. Yes. They disagree. So there at the end I wrote an appendix on legal reasoning. And the claim I made was that this reasoning—“the one who feels pain knows his pain”—does not stem from utility or legal order, not only from that. Of course that’s there too. But not only that. Somehow it’s clear that this is what is right. Clear that this is what is right. It is more correct to leave the object in the hands of the one holding it. Now, I don’t think I know how to translate this into laws of evidence. Meaning, I don’t think I’m prepared to claim that the one who possesses the object is less likely to be lying than the one who claims the object. I don’t think you can say such a thing, certainly not always. And therefore I think there’s something here that anyone who looks at it simply sees as right. Not because of some calculation of consequences. Ask people who aren’t jurists and haven’t thought through the implications and the consequences and all that—they’ll tell you this intuitively, I think. It just seems right. Only what? I once had a bitter argument with Rabbi Yosel Schreiber. He’s the one who wrote that booklet; he got hold of my booklet and came out strongly against this, and we had arguments there, a kind of ping-pong. It’s printed there—his notes and my responses and so on. So basically he asked: what do you mean? What does it mean to call something right? What is “right”? In philosophical language, if I translate what he was asking: compared to what are you measuring it when you say that it’s true? What are you observing? Against what? What has to obtain for me to say that this thing is right or not right? There’s nothing to observe. It isn’t a fact. So in what sense can you speak of it as right or wrong? Here’s a classic example of the kind of view he rejects—the view that says that all normative claims, claims that are not factual, are really disguised factual claims. They’re just disguised facts, that’s all. Everything can be translated into facts. Okay? In contrast, what I presented is the second possibility, what Rabbi Gedaliah Nadel writes here: no, there is some kind of normative truth, not only in the consequential sense. It isn’t measured only in consequential terms. By the way, one of the indications of this—everyone can decide what they think, because there are no proofs here—but I can bring test cases that may help you form a position. So look, for example—yes, I think I mentioned this once before. Every election system, every election campaign, I have an argument with my son. My son claims there is no point in going to vote. Why? Not because everyone does the same thing—that’s also true—but I’m talking even if it weren’t so. One voter has no effect. The only chance your vote will have any effect is if the number of seats of the party you want happens to be short by one. Meaning, it’s missing exactly one voter in order to gain one more seat.
[Speaker B] Every single one. Exactly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now what are the odds, when you need, I don’t know, thirty thousand votes for a seat, what are the odds that they’ll have exactly twenty-nine thousand nine hundred and ninety-nine? The chance that I’ll make a difference is zero. It’s not worth investing even ten agorot in this. The chance is so tiny. In real life we never invest in things with such a small chance. Therefore, he says, there’s no point in going to vote; it’s just a waste of time. So what do people always tell him? He’s always arguing with the whole world—he’s a well-known debater. So they always say, yes, but what will happen if everyone thinks that way? But that’s a mistake. It’s a mistake. Why? Because suppose everyone thinks that way—so what? Everyone will think that way and do what they do. My only impact is my own vote. Suppose I decide not to do it—still, everyone else will make their own calculations and do what they do. So after everyone thinks or doesn’t think that way, and does or doesn’t accept that argument, now I arrive to make my own decision. And my decision—and I’m not revealing it, right—and still it doesn’t matter, because what they decide doesn’t depend on me. I decide independently of them.
[Speaker H] If everyone did that, then your vote would count.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because no one would go vote. Fine, okay—but experience shows us in every election that this is not true. Quite a lot of people do go vote, and my vote is still negligible. Okay? Therefore this consideration of what would happen if everyone acted this way is not correct. It’s a mistake. Because after, say, I reveal this consideration to everyone, then they’ll all make their own calculations and either decide to vote or not, each according to his own decisions. After whatever they decide, I sit alone deciding whether to vote, without revealing to anyone whether I’m going to vote or not. Certainly I have no influence whatsoever. It doesn’t matter whether everyone does that—they’ll do what they do. I don’t want them to do that, so I won’t reveal this clever idea to them. But as far as I myself am concerned, I know that it’s a shame for me to waste half an hour or an hour on this.
[Speaker B] That’s a consideration not on the religious plane but on the value plane.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And that’s exactly why I’m bringing it up. And nevertheless, there is some kind of feeling that it isn’t right to act this way. And it’s not only here—it’s the same with evading income tax. With evading income tax, okay, evade one hundred shekels or a thousand shekels of tax—big deal. The state treasury won’t feel a thing, nothing at all will be missing.
[Speaker G] I think you had an example of the Sabbatical year when we talked about this in categorical terms.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. In that article I wrote an article about this. The dispute about the Sabbatical year was a dispute—
[Speaker B] But evading income tax is stealing from the public. Stealing from the public, stealing a penny from a millionaire, stealing a penny—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —from a millionaire, same question. It’s forbidden to steal, okay.
[Speaker G] That’s exactly the point.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So the penny dropped for me when I saw a dispute—there was a dispute in Tzohar about the Sabbatical year. Someone there wrote an article saying that it cannot be that—he argued against Otzar HaAretz. He’s a rabbi of a community, and he wrote that Otzar HaAretz’s policy in the previous Sabbatical year—and that’s still their policy today—was that they do not rely on the sale permit unless there is no alternative. They prefer Otzar Beit Din or all kinds of other things, Arava produce, it doesn’t matter, various things like that. But the sale permit is only a last resort, okay? And he argued that this can’t be; you have to adopt the sale permit, because what are we building here—in short, you have to use the sale permit; what do you mean, you have to stand behind the sale permit. So the fellow from Otzar HaAretz answered him and said: what do you want? After all, it’s obvious that the sale-permit growers won’t even feel it. The percentage of people who actually observe the Sabbatical year at that level is tiny. The number of growers who grow under the sale permit—every one of them will find buyers for their produce, they won’t be harmed. Secular people will buy, those who buy sale-permit produce will buy, everything’s fine. We want to be more stringent—what’s the problem? No one will be harmed by this. We want to enhance the observance, and they’ll find livelihoods, and everything is fine. So what’s bad about that? So he says, fine, but what are you building on—on secular people? He says to him, meaning, what do you mean? You find a halakhic solution and you build it on the fact that there are sinners—or slackers, however he phrased it—but that can’t be. Now what stands behind that? I think he didn’t express himself fully and precisely, but what stands behind it is the same principle that stands behind the two examples I brought earlier: what is called the categorical imperative, yes, of Kant. The categorical imperative basically says: do what you would want to become a universal law. It’s somewhat similar to Hillel—the question is whether it’s the same thing, yes, maybe the same thing, there are old debates about this—“What is hateful to you, do not do to your fellow.” But the rule is that you should do what you would want to become a universal law. According to Kant, that is what defines a moral act. Okay? Now, he has a long argument to prove this, and that’s not interesting, because certainly that proof is not correct. But, but, but, the conclusion I think is correct. The fact that the proof is not correct does not mean the conclusion is not correct. The conclusion, I think, is correct. There is an incredibly strong intuition that this is right. Now notice the point that many people miss here: the Kantian claim—do what you would want to become a universal law—is not the same kind of claim we mentioned earlier, namely, what will happen if everyone acts like you. Because “what will happen if everyone acts like you” turns it back into a consequentialist consideration. Kant creates a barrier against consequentialist considerations in morality. Morality does not come to achieve good results. There are moral acts and immoral acts; this is a morality of intentions, not of consequences. Therefore the claim is not what will happen if everyone acts like you, but rather: in a hypothetical world in which everyone behaves properly—okay?—what, in your opinion, should be there? Would such an act be practiced there or not? If yes, it is a moral act; if not, then not. That is Kant’s claim. Now I’m not here to argue whether it’s correct or not. I only want to show an example of a moral rule that is not consequentialist. It has no consequentialist translation. Because all consequentialist translations fail—that’s exactly the point, you can’t make them work. And nevertheless there is a feeling that this is the right way to act. So what does that mean? You can say, nonsense, it’s an illusion, an imaginary feeling, ignore it. But someone who takes that feeling seriously—like with the sale permit, like with voting, all kinds of things of that sort—is basically saying that this is also what stands behind our saying that a religious soldier should not let a secular soldier desecrate the Sabbath, even though the other person would desecrate the Sabbath anyway. So why do you care? At least you yourself should keep it. The halakhic guidance is generally not to do that. I think the same principle stands behind that as well. But in any case, the claim is that there is an action here—no, fine, think about it, I don’t want to get into it right now. There is some kind of action here that cannot be translated into practical terms; that’s why I brought this example. And nevertheless, it seems to me that not a few people would say that this is the morally right way to act. Meaning, since it cannot be given a practical translation, that means that this moral claim is not a disguised practical claim, but an ethical claim. Why is it true? Because my conscience tells me it is true. Because conscience—my way of perceiving knowledge of the good—tells me it is true. Therefore it is true. It is the result of that perception of knowledge of the good, the moral perception, yes, with the eyes of the intellect. So here too, “the one who feels pain knows his pain”—I return to the example with which I began: the burden of proof is on the one who seeks to extract property from another. The immediate tendency is to say that this is a translation of principles, of disguised factual claims. Basically I calculate what the consequences will be, and therefore I prefer to establish this rule. I’m proposing something else here. I have no way to convince you of it. Each person will have to decide whether he sees it or doesn’t; it’s not a matter of persuasion. If I had proofs, there’d be no need for persuasion. I don’t. But I’m saying: as for me, I see it this way. I think it’s true. I think many people who look at it say: this is the right way to act. And it is true, even though it doesn’t have—maybe in this context it does, but in other contexts it doesn’t—factual translations. So this, I think, just sharpens the possibility that Rabbi Gedaliah Nadel is really advocating here: that there are first principles, both in the factual realm, like two parallels, and certainly in the non-factual realm, and still one can treat them not as arbitrary but as true. I have no proof. It is not the result of observation in the simple physical sense, yes, in the sensory sense, and yet one can still regard it as true. There is true and false here, and it is not merely a subjective matter. And that’s it. And I think that the category he calls reasoning here—the non-absolute category, the merely plausible one, not certain—that too is exactly the same category. This perception with the eyes of the intellect of knowledge of the good can also yield non-certain judgments, and say: in my eyes it is reasonable that this is right. Not that I’d stake my life on it; it’s not one hundred percent, but I think it’s true.
[Speaker I] There’s much more doubt.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s always doubt.
[Speaker I] As the generations become more refined, morality becomes more purified…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No problem, I can always be mistaken.
[Speaker I] Right, and you see that there are people who are more…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, there can always be error. But the fact that there may be error can’t paralyze me; I still work with what I know. Right, and I take into account that maybe I’m mistaken. But even things that are not one hundred percent certain in my eyes, that doesn’t mean I’m not deriving them from the same kind of perception I’m talking about. Meaning, there is a difference between visual perception with the eyes and this ideational perception. Visual perception, as it appears to us, seems very, very certain—there too I don’t… it’s not one hundred percent, but it’s very close, and very clear. Okay? Perception with the eyes of the intellect is less sharp-cut. Maybe not regarding two parallels, but in moral claims, certainly in legal claims of this kind, like the burden of proof being on the claimant, it is less unequivocal. And still, it seems to me that one can treat these as truth-claims, not subjective claims—only the truth yielded by this perception is uncertain truth. Think about a situation in which you are looking at a very, very distant place, and you see a horse there. Now because it’s far away, it could be a donkey and not a horse. But it seems to you that it’s a horse. That is the result of observation. But because it’s far away, the observation is uncertain. Does that mean it’s arbitrary? No, it’s not arbitrary. It’s just uncertain. Uncertain and arbitrary are not the same thing. Uncertain means: okay, I’m not one hundred percent sure. Arbitrary means that it being a horse or not a horse are equally probable—I can’t say anything at all about it. Okay? So the fact that something is the result of observation does not have to mean that it is certain. That’s just not true. Sometimes also—and with the eyes of the intellect, usually—the observations are not certain observations, unlike, say, our ordinary eyes. Okay, let’s stop here.