The Thought of Rabbi Gedaliah Nadel – Rov – Lecture 5

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Talmud brings the cruse of oil, but in the prayer, for example, that’s not how it is. The fact that this appears here is very interesting in terms of how this whole thing developed. And it could very well be that with Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, that was the process. Meaning, they instituted the candle lighting because they were already around the period of the destruction, a bit after the destruction, so they now decided that candle lighting also had to be instituted in order to add the spiritual miracle in place of the military miracle, which had become more problematic to celebrate. And then they had a dispute about how to institute it: increasing and continuing, or decreasing and continuing. That’s why they argued. I remembered this because here too, I mean, how can there be a dispute if we received a tradition? Right, that’s the same question he asks here. So with Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel you have the same question, and the answer is really that there is no tradition. And here too I’ll give the same answer: the answer is, there is no tradition. It’s not true that a verbal analogy needs a tradition.

[Speaker D] But according to Maimonides, explicitly, in an explanation I once saw,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know if it’s Maimonides. I think that’s what Maimonides says, but—

[Speaker D] According to Maimonides, from what I remember, this enactment was apparently already known in the time of the Temple. On the question in “When you raise up” — why is it juxtaposed to the section of the princes? Because he was distressed — Rashi — because his mind was weakened, so the Holy One, blessed be He, said to him: yours is greater than theirs. Why? Because you prepare and light the lamps. So what’s the answer? So what if you prepare them? So Maimonides says the answer is — Maimonides adds to Rashi — that they were only at the time of the dedication of the Temple, whereas your lighting will be for all generations, even when there will no longer be a Temple. Meaning, the enactment that in the future all of us, all the Jewish people throughout the generations, will light even when there is no Temple—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Hanukkah.

[Speaker D] Hanukkah lights — that is Aaron’s consolation. When his mind was weakened — what does that say about when this was created? I’m asking: when was it created? Later there would be an enactment, Rabbi? So the enactment isn’t dependent from then — from when?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously the enactment is after Aaron, so there’s no argument about that. Aggadic midrash — so yes. But how long after Aaron? It could be at the time of the victory, and it could be, as I just said, after the destruction. I don’t know. It’s all open. In any case, it’s after Aaron.

[Speaker D] Obviously after Aaron, but the enactment was enacted after the destruction.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying, I don’t know whether it was after the destruction or at the time of the victory.

[Speaker D] But if it was already, so to speak, at the creation of the world — you’re bringing this from Maimonides — but—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it’s aggadic midrash, then how did they console Aaron?

[Speaker D] That we would still be lighting candles to this day. And they celebrated the dedication of the Temple as a one-time event. That was the consolation.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] By the way, Hanukkah really does have hints that it was more ancient, before the Hasmonean victory. The Arizal already writes this, and others too. Hanukkah — there was already such a festival, an ancient festival on Hanukkah, even before they lit candles, before the Hasmoneans. There was a connection to candles. What exactly its nature was, I don’t remember; I once read an article about it. There are several sources for this, that it was some ancient festival in that period. The dedication of the altar? There’s even some hint of this in Megillat Ta’anit, it seems to me, that in these days, from the days of Ezra the prophet?

[Speaker B] Before the Hasmonean victory.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but there’s something even earlier there. I think in Scroll of Fasting there’s some sort of hint to the matter. I don’t remember; I once read something about it. I really don’t remember anymore; I’d have to look again. There was some ancient festival there that is already mentioned before Hanukkah. Okay, but that’s just in passing. Let’s get back to this. So the claim is that since there is a dispute, that means the verbal analogy does not necessarily rest on a tradition. Because if that’s what he says, it teaches us about the essence of verbal analogy in general. Rabbi Yishmael did not receive the verbal analogy from Sinai, because if he had, Rabbi Akiva would not have disagreed. Rather, he learned from the fact that the Torah continues to use the same expression to indicate equality in content, in that same passage — which is not exactly a verbal analogy, but it’s the logic of verbal analogy. Okay? And we find that they even learned a verbal analogy from words that are not really identical. A teaching from the school of Rabbi Yishmael: “This is returning, this is coming.” They make a verbal analogy from “returning” to “coming.” But that is only where there is nothing else similar to it. But where there is something similar to it, we learn from what is similar. Right — where there is a similar word and a non-similar word, you learn from the similar word. But sometimes they make a verbal analogy even from a non-similar word, if there is no other similar word. Say there is a word that is available for derivation, and I need to make a verbal analogy with it, but I can’t find another such similar word elsewhere that is also available, or in general I can’t find another such word, or not in a context that can be compared, or something like that. Then they make a verbal analogy even from a non-similar word. Meaning, you can see that this whole business is not technical. Meaning, it’s not some clear algorithm that tells us what to do here. It’s all a matter of interpretive or homiletical judgment. And we also find that if one can learn a verbal analogy from two subjects, and the law in each is different, they prefer to learn from the one that has more similar aspects to the thing being learned. It turns out that comparing subjects by verbal analogy depends on judgment that examines how similar they are. What that really means in his whole move is that some judgment is needed here in order to decide what to derive through verbal analogy, and that is really the meaning of the tradition required for verbal analogy. When they say a person may not derive a verbal analogy unless he received it from his rabbi, the meaning is not that he received the verbal analogy itself from his rabbi, but rather the modes of thought and judgment that tell you what to compare and what not to compare, where to derive and where not to derive, and so on. And we sometimes find that the sages make a verbal analogy between the language of the Torah and the language of the Prophets. At first glance, that makes no sense. Does the Torah rely on what will later be written in the Prophets? But if you understand that verbal analogy means that the use of a certain expression indicates a certain meaning, then from a prophet’s use of that expression one can also learn the intended meaning of the use of that expression in the Torah. That is learned by way of clarifying the matter. That really is the language of the medieval authorities (Rishonim). Verbal analogies of this type are called clarifying the matter. That’s already basically in the Talmud itself, but the medieval authorities formulate it explicitly. That there are really two kinds of verbal analogies. There is a verbal analogy that is genuinely between two similar words in different contexts, and we make a comparison. And there is a verbal analogy that simply teaches me the meaning of the word. In another context the same word appears, and there I know what it means, so I say: okay, so that’s what the word means, and that’s true here too. I’m simply learning the meaning of the word; it’s not a comparison between two contexts, it’s a dictionary. Just understanding the meaning. In a regular verbal analogy, it has nothing to do with the meaning of the word. For example, “taking-taking” from the field of Ephron. “When a man takes a woman,” and “I gave the money for the field; take it from me.” So “taking-taking” teaches the law of a woman from the field of Ephron, that a woman is acquired with money. So “taking” means only with money, the Talmud says there. But what does that mean? Does it mean that the definition of the word “taking” is with money? I don’t think there’s a linguistic claim here. It’s a verbal analogy. Just as the taking done there is done with money, so too the taking done here is done with money. That’s a law.

[Speaker B] I think Tosafot rejects the possibility that this is only a lexical derivation.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, and so does the Ritva. The Ritva perhaps in the end does stay with it; there is a contradiction in the Ritva. After all, that “taking-taking” appears in both places, at the beginning of tractate Kiddushin. There it is pretty clear that this is not clarifying the matter; it’s an actual verbal analogy. Meaning, it’s not that the meaning of the word “taking” is with money, but rather it is a law, that wherever “taking” is written it must be done with money. That’s not a dictionary definition. Therefore it is not clarifying the matter; it is a verbal analogy. But here, for example, “the field of the injured party” and what appears here in the same passage — this is clearly clarifying the matter and not verbal analogy. Tosafot says: what is that field being discussed? Meaning, this is not some law that I learn — just as the law is there, so too the law is here — rather I understand the meaning of the word “field”: who is this “that one” being referred to? It is that same one who appears above. So this is more clarifying the matter than verbal analogy. The medieval authorities even write that clarifying the matter may be something that does not require a tradition from one’s rabbi, unlike verbal analogy, which does require a tradition from one’s rabbi in order to derive it. Meaning, they even distinguish between these two things, which somewhat undermines his argument. Because he is trying to show that even ordinary verbal analogy has within it the logic of clarifying the matter. He is basically saying: ordinary verbal analogy has logic. What is that logic? Lexical logic, like clarifying the matter. But in the medieval authorities you see that this is not so. In the medieval authorities you see that this is treated as two different kinds of derivations. Both may perhaps be called, here and there, sometimes — and not always — verbal analogies, but they are two different types of verbal analogies. They are not the same, and they operate differently. One of them is lexical clarification of the matter, and that can be done even from the words of tradition — meaning from the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh), not only from Torah to Torah. Actual verbal analogy is done only from the Torah. What does that mean? That verbal analogy is not lexical clarification of the matter. It’s not true that it is lexical clarification of the matter. But you still do need the ways of language, what he said earlier, and that is true. The identification he makes between the two things, I don’t think he is right about.

[Speaker E] The truth is, clarifying the matter gives a bit of the feeling that it’s stronger than—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, because that’s something we do everywhere. With any text you have — if there’s a word you don’t understand, look at other places in the text where that word appears and see what it means. Once you understand what it means, that is probably what it means here too. And that is a very logical thing. So it is very plausible that clarifying the matter is not even one of Rabbi Yishmael’s thirteen hermeneutic principles at all. It’s just an interpretive rule; it’s even plain-sense interpretation, not midrash. By contrast, verbal analogy is midrash. According to Maimonides, that makes a practical difference, because derivations are rabbinic law. And if clarifying the matter is a plain-sense tool, then what comes out of clarifying the matter is not rabbinic law; it is Torah-level. Okay? That is how they learn by way of clarifying the matter that “if an ox gore him with a horn” includes even a detached horn, from what is said in the Prophets: “And Zedekiah son of Chenaanah made for himself horns of iron and said: with these you shall gore Aram.” That is the passage in tractate Bava Kamma where they learn the damages of a horn, that a detached horn as well — they learn that too by way of clarifying the matter, and they learn it from a verse in the Prophets. Right, “And Zedekiah son of Chenaanah made for himself horns of iron” is not a verse from the Torah. And still they learn the meaning of the horn with which one gores. At first glance, one could challenge what we said above, that one does not derive a verbal analogy from connective words because they do not express a special content. This somewhat contradicts the “et” that we come to include according to Rabbi Akiva. That is not a verbal analogy, but we are still grounded in a word that is a connective word. Meaning, we still derive it. But really, as I said there, I think this can only be done where the “et” is apparently superfluous or unusual or could be replaced — I don’t know exactly. There has to be some indication of where you derive from it and where you don’t. So he says that one does not derive a verbal analogy from connective words because they do not express a special content — except for the famous verbal analogy of “fifteen-fifteen” from the Festival of Matzot, from which we learn that eating on the first night in the sukkah is obligatory just as on Passover night. The Talmud in tractate Sukkah makes a verbal analogy of fifteen-fifteen from Passover to Sukkot: just as on Passover on the first night there is an obligation to eat matzah — the rest of the time there is no obligation to eat matzah, only a prohibition on eating leavened food. Meaning, if you want to eat bread, you have to eat matzah. But it’s not that there is a commandment to eat matzah; it’s just to avoid the prohibition on eating leavened food. On the first night of Passover you must eat matzah; that is the commandment of eating matzah that we perform on the Seder night. It is obligatory to eat matzah. Okay? He learns the same thing regarding Sukkot: also on Sukkot there is no obligation to eat in the sukkah — if you don’t want to eat, then don’t eat. But if you do eat, eat in the sukkah in order to avoid the prohibition of eating outside the sukkah, let’s say. The wording here assumes something a bit, but never mind — for the sake of the analogy, I’ll put it that way. But on the first night of Sukkot there is an obligation to eat an olive-bulk in the sukkah. Okay? There is an obligation to eat an olive-bulk of bread in the sukkah, and they learn this by the verbal analogy of fifteen-fifteen from Passover. Now he asks: doesn’t the Torah have to write the date of each festival? Why make a verbal analogy of fifteen-fifteen from the fact that the Torah wrote fifteen here and fifteen there? It wrote it because the date here is fifteen and the date there is fifteen. What should it write — not fifteen, should it write thirty? It has to write the real date. So how can a verbal analogy be made here? If so, apparently there is no special content here from which to derive a verbal analogy, and it is not even available for derivation. It’s not superfluous either. So there is no hint here, no reason at all to make verbal analogies from this. So why do they make a verbal analogy from it?

[Speaker G] Because “take” like a festival? Because “take” like a festival and “you shall take”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, because there you can say: why did the Torah use “take” and not, I don’t know, “receive” or some other word. Meaning, there could be some consideration there that says we need to compare. But fifteen — what else should they say? Not fifteen, it’s fifteen. Because “taking” is not exactly self-evident—

[Speaker H] Why would it have to say “receive” when it says “take”? What happened? Why? Because in the Torah, for example, there is also this whole issue with agents — from where do we learn agency? So they take “and he shall send her from his house,” and say it should have said “and he shall divorce her,” and therefore since it says “and he shall send her,” it means one can send by means of an agent. What happened? Why did it have to say “and he shall divorce her”? Isn’t “and he shall send her” a fine word?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “And he shall send her” also teaches you agency.

[Speaker H] No, the opposite — in the language, first of all, the sages decided—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] in a very—

[Speaker H] important way that it is very important that betrothal be done through an agent.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it works in both directions. Since from “and he shall send her” we learn agency, now when the Torah — when the Holy One, blessed be He, comes to write the Torah — He has to think: if I write “and he shall send her,” they will learn agency from it. So if He did not want us to learn agency, He would have had to write “and he shall divorce her,” not “and he shall send her.” Why did He choose specifically to write “and he shall send her”? Because He really wanted us to learn agency. Do you understand? It builds itself. Do you understand?

[Speaker B] But agency is a concept that was constituted by “and he shall send her.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no — what do you mean? The concept exists. When Abraham sends Eliezer his servant, he sends him. Agency is a concept in Hebrew.

[Speaker B] “I called this man,” and therefore it says “when a man takes a woman,” because “I have given my daughter” — if one gives, the other takes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but why “when he takes” and not “when he receives,” I don’t know, or “because I have given my daughter” — if one gives—

[Speaker B] then maybe the other doesn’t give; maybe he receives. Why “takes”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m just saying — I don’t know if that’s the consideration, but I’m saying that with “taking-taking” I could have thought — I also don’t understand the ways of language well enough — but I’m saying I could have thought there were considerations there that explain why to make a verbal analogy. But with fifteen-fifteen, what do you want them to write? They write the correct date. Right? So here there can’t be any such consideration. So what do they want? How can they make a verbal analogy from this?

[Speaker H] It all looks as though they set the goal, mark it, and then look for the biblical source — for example with this agency. One of the sages apparently decided that it was very important that one be able, perhaps, to divorce through an agent, and then he looks for the word in the Torah and finds it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not ruling that out. I’m only saying it works in a more complex way. It works in both directions. Because after he really does this, it also has justification. Because the fact that there is an alternative, and the Holy One, blessed be He, also had two alternatives before Him for how to write there, and He knew as well that I would derive agency if He wrote it one way and would not derive agency if He wrote it another way — and nevertheless He chose to write “and he shall send her” and not “and he shall divorce her” — that means that from His perspective too, apparently, I am supposed to derive this. I’m saying: I agree with what you said, I’m only saying that in the end it also comes out justified. I have no problem with the fact that people came with that kind of agenda; obviously that’s how it works, I said it. Every derivation is based on some reasoning — either prior reasoning that indeed made that law seem logical, or at least that once there is a trigger, that seems to me the most logical inclusion. There are several levels at which this can be done. But I’m saying it is not just a forced reading, as though we simply do whatever we want. In the end there is also supposed to be logic in it after I do it. So true, I come with the aim of finding a source for the law of agency, but after I find this source, it really is a source. Meaning, it’s not just “let’s inspect the source of things in the Torah.” Right, so we’re now talking about the fifteen-fifteen. In the passage “Bo,” which is the first source for the festival of Passover, we read: “This month shall be for you the beginning of months; it shall be for you the first of the months of the year. Speak to all the congregation of Israel, saying: on the tenth of this month they shall each take for themselves a lamb according to their fathers’ houses.” It is understood that the language “this month shall be for you,” etc., is not merely intended to indicate the date of Passover, but is phrased as an independent command, from which many laws are learned. “This month shall be for you” — the beginning of months, sanctification of the month, and all sorts of things like that. And further on: “And it shall be kept by you until the fourteenth day of this month, and the entire assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the afternoon,” etc., “and they shall eat the flesh on this night,” etc. Fifteen, the date on which the festival begins, is not mentioned here. It is mentioned that the fourteenth is the time of slaughtering the Passover sacrifice, and that on the following night it is eaten. That is what is written. It does not say fifteen. It says that on the fourteenth they slaughter the Passover sacrifice and it is eaten on the night after the slaughter, which is essentially the night of the fifteenth. Okay? And the Torah continues: “And I shall pass through the land of Egypt on this night and strike every firstborn,” etc., “and the blood shall be for you as a sign on the houses, and I shall pass over you,” etc., “and this day shall be for you a memorial, and you shall celebrate it as a festival to the Lord for your generations,” etc., “for seven days you shall eat matzot,” etc., “and on the first day there shall be a holy convocation, and on the seventh day there shall be a holy convocation,” etc., “on the first, on the fourteenth day of the month in the evening, you shall eat matzot.” Again — not fifteen, but the fourteenth day in the evening, right? “Until the twenty-first day of the month in the evening.” End of the quotation of the passage. It turns out that in the whole passage fifteen is never mentioned at all. Even though they are talking about the fifteenth, they do not say it; they say “on the evening of the fourteenth,” or “they shall slaughter the Passover sacrifice and on the night they shall eat it.” Meaning, there are always indirect references that lead us to the fifteenth, but the word fifteen is not written. It does not appear anywhere in the whole passage. Rather, the beginning of the festival is described as the night after the fourteenth, which is the time of offering the Passover sacrifice, and clearly that is enough to establish the time of the festival. Now in the passage “Emor” we find: “In the first month, on the fourteenth day of the month in the afternoon, is Passover to the Lord. And on the fifteenth day of this month is the Festival of Matzot to the Lord; for seven days you shall eat matzot.” Why not write it the way they did in the book of Exodus? “In the first month, on the fourteenth day of the month in the afternoon, is Passover to the Lord, and in the evening the Festival of Matzot to the Lord; for seven days you shall eat matzot.” No — here it says: “And on the fifteenth day is the festival to the Lord; for seven days you shall eat matzot.”

[Speaker D] And it’s not a commandment all seven days?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? No. “For seven days you shall eat matzot” means if you want to eat, not bread — only matzot. It is an implied prohibition from a positive statement, not a positive commandment. It stands out here that the mention of “and on the fifteenth” is superfluous, because it should only have said “in the evening” or “at night” is the Festival of Matzot to the Lord, as was said in the passage “Bo.” A very beautiful explanation. Meaning, it actually is true that there is an alternative. Not only is there an alternative, but in the passage “Bo” they consistently use it, only that; they do not mention the fifteenth. So if so, the fifteenth is indeed available for derivation. There is a usage here that says something here calls out for interpretation; it needs to be derived. And later in that same passage: “On the fifteenth day of this seventh month is the festival of Sukkot.” In that same passage, after they used “fifteenth” for the festival of Passover where it is superfluous — what does that mean? The sages say this: the sages come and read the passage and say, okay, apparently the “fifteen-fifteen” — why is it mentioned by Passover? In order to compare it to Sukkot. By Sukkot there was no option not to write fifteen. Right? Because there is no “on the evening of Sukkot” — it’s not like the slaughter of the Passover sacrifice, which is done on the fourteenth, so then you can say “on the fourteenth slaughter it, and in the evening eat matzot.” Okay? By Sukkot there is no such option. By Sukkot they certainly had to write fifteen. It is available on only one side, not on both sides. But since by Passover they mention the fifteenth even though in the passage “Bo” it was not mentioned at all, and this is done in the same passage, “Emor,” where later the fifteenth of Sukkot appears, the sages understand that apparently these two fifteens came in order for us to compare Passover to Sukkot. Beautiful, in my opinion.

[Speaker B] So why do you say the derivation is on a different plane from the plain meaning? This looks very much like depth of plain meaning. No, really—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, absolutely not.

[Speaker H] If they did it — fifteen means obligation also on Sukkot. Exactly, exactly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The law that you derive from this is midrash. You don’t — if this were clarifying the matter, then you would be right. Then I would say: what is the meaning of the word fifteen? And that I learn from the word fifteen in Sukkot. But here it is a verbal analogy, not clarifying the matter. I’m saying that since here it says fifteen and there it says fifteen, then just as here there is an obligation on the first night, there too there is an obligation on the first night.

[Speaker B] The very fact that the Written Torah itself directs you to this derivation means there is a direct relation between the Written Torah—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It directs you to a derivation; that’s something else. You decided that this is the one. Like general-particular-general. The Holy One, blessed be He, Himself formulated it in a way that tells me: derive here. Obviously. But still, in the end I decide what to derive here, what to include. Therefore Maimonides, for example, calls it rabbinic law, even though there is a trigger in the text. But I decide what to derive. I could have derived something else. Okay. And maybe in another generation they would really have to derive something else. It could be that it changes between generations, depending — certainly. Therefore it still remains, according to Maimonides, rabbinic law. It’s not plain meaning. If it were clarifying the matter, then you would be completely right: that would be Torah-level. I said earlier that a derivation of clarifying the matter is, simply speaking, plain-sense interpretation; it is not midrash.

[Speaker B] But you’re using a very parallel, very mechanical language here: the Torah tells me I have to derive something, but what I derive, that’s what the sages will say. You could use slightly rounder language and say that the Torah wants you to realize some kind of link, to express a connection between Sukkot and Passover. Okay, and that’s all it demands. And you have to implement it somehow, and this is one way.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I have no problem accepting that formulation as well. In some places maybe it’s like this, in some places it’s like that; it’s not necessary either. It could be that sometimes it’s this way and sometimes that way. Yes, I accept the formulation; I have no problem. Let’s pay attention to the content of this verbal analogy. By Passover it says: “For seven days you shall eat matzot.” What does it mean to eat matzot for seven days? To eat all the time for seven days? Of course not. To eat two or three times a day? That too is not written here.

[Speaker B] By Sukkot, yes… what? By Sukkot there is such a requirement to eat twice a day according to Rabbi Eliezer.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but in Jewish law we do not rule that way.

[Speaker B] True, but it’s not absurd. No, okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In Jewish law we do not rule that way. So what — in the end, so what? It’s not written here. You are forced to say that the Torah means that whenever you eat bread, it has to be matzah. That’s the meaning: “for seven days you shall eat matzot.” That’s what you asked earlier — it sounds like a positive commandment, “for seven days you shall eat matzot.” Okay? Maybe that is indeed how Rabbi Eliezer learned it. But according to the halakhic reading: for seven days, only matzot shall you eat.

[Speaker F] You shall eat — if you eat.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. An implied prohibition from a positive statement always turns the positive into an implied prohibition by adding the word “only,” always. For example, “to a foreigner you may lend with interest.” Right? So Maimonides says it is a positive commandment to lend with interest to a foreigner. But the simple reading is not like that. The simple reading is that this is an implied prohibition from a positive statement. There is no commandment to lend with interest to a foreigner; rather, if you do lend with interest, then only to a foreigner may you lend with interest, not to a Jew. Meaning, if you lend with interest to a Jew, you not only violate the prohibition of interest, you also negate the positive commandment of “to a foreigner you may lend with interest.” But if you lend with interest to a foreigner, you are not fulfilling a positive commandment. Okay? I’m saying this aside from Maimonides. Okay? So an implied prohibition from a positive statement is always a positive statement to which, in interpretation — not actually in the text, but in interpretation — you add “only” before it. “For seven days, only matzot shall you eat.” As if to say, and not something else. Meaning, it comes to create an implied prohibition from a positive statement. It is like a doctor telling a person accustomed to white bread: you must eat only black bread. Again, he has already added the “only” here, of course, right? The idea is, he should have said: you must eat black bread. The meaning is that when you eat bread, don’t eat white but only black. But if you want, you don’t have to eat bread at all. But if you do eat, don’t eat white; eat only black. Okay? We add the “only.” The doctor should have said: you must eat black bread, not only black bread. We understand from this that it means only. But if you want not to eat bread at all, that is up to you. How do you recognize that this person has begun the diet the doctor prescribed? When he eats black bread for the first time instead of white. Right? After all, you can’t know that he started. When? How do we know he’s obeying the doctor? The first time he eats bread — if he eats black, that’s an indication that he is obeying the doctor. Therefore the Torah commands us to eat matzot for seven days instead of bread, but if we want to eat only potatoes, that’s up to us. All that is for the seven days, but on the first night eating matzah is obligatory, so that it will be known that the commandment has gone into effect. “In the evening you shall eat matzot.” Meaning, it is exactly like the first time you eat — that is obligatory. Why? Because you need to show that here you are beginning to fulfill this commandment. From then on, you may eat or you may not eat. The first time, which is the first night of Passover, or on Sukkot the same thing, you must eat, because there you need to show that you are fulfilling the commandment. If you don’t eat the whole festival… that’s the indication. So that’s fine; you’ve violated nothing and not neglected any positive commandment, everything is fine. But where is the indication that you are obeying the Holy One, blessed be He? So he says this is a kind of rationale of the verse. Meaning, on the first night, when the festival begins, give us some indication that you are obeying the doctor — meaning, obeying Him. So you have to eat. Okay?

[Speaker H] And during the seven days you also fulfill a commandment. What? And during the following seven days, do you fulfill a commandment?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no. You are only avoiding a prohibition. Yes. By the way, that’s an interesting point, because there is a dispute—

[Speaker B] The Vilna Gaon says one should recite a blessing over eating matzah on all seven days.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, right, that’s the Vilna Gaon. Fine, but we do not follow the Vilna Gaon on that. There is a dispute on the question, say, of the first night of Sukkot — this is relevant also to Passover, by the way, but on the first night of Sukkot it is clearer, because there it is really explicit in the halakhic rulings. There is a dispute about what the commandment is. Is the commandment to eat an olive-bulk of bread? Okay? Such that on Sukkot, if you eat an olive-bulk of bread, it must be in the sukkah. Or no — is the commandment to eat an olive-bulk of bread in the sukkah? Only bread-eating in the sukkah — other eating need not be in the sukkah. So are you commanded to eat in the sukkah on the first night, or are you commanded to eat bread on the first night, except that bread is eaten in the sukkah? Okay? A practical difference: it’s raining. Okay? It’s raining on the first night, and you are exempt from the sukkah; there is no sukkah. Okay? The question is whether you still need to eat bread. If the commandment is to eat bread, and if it’s raining then you’re exempt from the sukkah, then—

[Speaker H] eat bread at home.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If the commandment is to eat bread in the sukkah, then that doesn’t help. The Mishnah Berurah indeed writes that if it rains on the first night, one should eat bread in the sukkah despite the rain, even though it’s not a sukkah at all when it’s raining. That’s a strange ruling, but that is basically what his words imply. He apparently understands that the commandment is to eat in the sukkah; only eating in the sukkah means specifically bread, while something else doesn’t require a sukkah.

[Speaker H] What does eating bread have to do with the sukkah? What? If the commandment is to eat bread, what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because that is a fixed meal, an important meal.

[Speaker H] No, but why specifically in the sukkah? I can understand there is a commandment to eat on the festival. I don’t understand. No, the opposite: with the sukkah I understand there is an obligation of “you shall dwell,” but if he can simply not eat in the sukkah, then maybe he just shouldn’t eat bread.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, so that’s the question. It could be that on Sukkot there is a rule, as on every festival, that on the first night one should eat an olive-bulk of bread. To establish a meal with an olive-bulk of bread. There is such an idea in honor of the festival, unrelated to sukkah. In honor of the festival — possible. Yes, it’s like that on Passover too. I said that on Passover too there is room to discuss the olive-bulk — there too there is room to ask: is this an obligatory olive-bulk of matzah, or an obligation to eat an olive-bulk of bread? Only on Passover you cannot eat other bread, only matzah, so you eat matzah. On Passover it is more plausible that it is the first option; it is harder to assume the second. But on Sukkot it is a dispute. Okay? Now I don’t know — this issue just came to mind now — because I don’t know which of the two interpretations fits what he writes here. After all, what does he write here? He writes that basically on the first night it is the beginning of the festival. There you need to show that you are obeying the command of the doctor, right, of the Holy One, blessed be He. So therefore you need to eat, because if you don’t eat, then you are still obeying, but it is not noticeable. Okay?

[Speaker C] And with that diet, when he starts eating black bread, then we’ll know he obeyed.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. And if he never eats black bread at all?

[Speaker C] No, but here if he eats bread on the eighth day?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, so—

[Speaker C] it’s no longer Sukkot; Sukkot is over.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously, right. Therefore it has to be on the first night.

[Speaker C] Yes. No, so that’s different from the doctor’s command, or from what he means.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? He says the first night is the beginning of the festival. At the beginning of the festival you are commanded to show that you are obeying this commandment.

[Speaker C] But on Sukkot too, the same thing? Yes, obviously.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, so I—

[Speaker C] am saying that in his example he says that when we begin to eat black bread, we’ll know you obeyed the doctor. That’s the first night. But not specifically the first night.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, obviously. But the commandment — no, no, no — the rule is—

[Speaker D] that the Torah commands you about a day and an hour. What do you want?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the rule is that whenever you begin to eat, that will be the indication. The Torah wants you to make that indication on the first night because that is the beginning of the festival. It wants that already at the beginning of the festival you show that you are obeying the will of God. Now, in any implied prohibition from a positive statement, it is hard to show that you are obeying, because maybe you simply aren’t doing it. Okay? So therefore the Torah requires you to do an act already at the beginning of the festival, which shows from the start that all festival long, even if you eat nothing at all, you are someone who obeys the command of the Holy One, blessed be He. It colors your not eating throughout the whole festival differently, even if you don’t eat the whole festival. If on the first night you already showed that you are in fact listening to that instruction, then the whole festival is colored by that. Therefore this is the rationale of the verse for why we are commanded on the first night. What I was just saying is that I don’t know which of the two formulations his explanation fits. I think you can say it according to both. I just thought of it now, so I’m thinking out loud. Because if indeed, according to what he says, the aim of the commandment is to show what? That I do not eat outside the sukkah. Not that I eat in the sukkah, right? Rather to show that I do not eat outside the sukkah. Because there is no commandment to eat in the sukkah; there is only a prohibition on eating outside the sukkah, right? After all, it is forbidden to eat outside the sukkah. When they tell me: on the first night show that you are obeying the commandment — what does that mean? That on the first night eat bread, and automatically, after all, you will have to eat it in the sukkah, and that way you show that you are not transgressing. Or no — on the first night eat in the sukkah to show that you are obeying. I think the first formulation seems to fit his idea better.

[Speaker B] Why? We said it’s specifically matzah and not bread, and in this case it happens to be matzah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, so I said Passover is more unambiguous. But let’s talk about Sukkot. Fine, I’m saying that on Passover too you can say it, but that’s why I present the dilemma with Sukkot, because there it is easier for me to present the two sides. Understand? So I’m not entirely sure which of the two formulations fits his idea.

[Speaker H] What is unique about Sukkot is eating in the sukkah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No — it’s not eating outside the sukkah.

[Speaker H] No, the seven days — you’re talking about the first night.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m asking why. Why that command on the first night — what does the command mean there?

[Speaker H] So I’m saying, if I go with the interpretation of eating bread and automatically you have to do that in the sukkah, then are you also obligated to eat bread on every festival?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. But how do you show that you are obeying the Holy One, blessed be He? The moment you eat bread, that is basically your opportunity to show that you do it in the sukkah and not outside the sukkah. The focus is basically that you are commanded to eat bread. The purpose of that eating is that the bread be an indication; we will see where you eat it. If you eat it in the sukkah, that is a sign that you obey the Holy One, blessed be He, because you did not eat outside the sukkah. Not because you ate inside the sukkah.

[Speaker H] And that’s exactly like matzah — to eat bread, and you’ll show it through the fact that you eat—

[Speaker B] matzah — that you don’t eat bread, you eat matzah. Same thing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying you can formulate it that way on Passover too, but on Sukkot it is easier, I think, to present the two alternatives.

[Speaker B] In any case, if it rains, there is no commandment to eat bread at home. There wouldn’t be such a commandment, because by doing that you are not carrying out the indication. So either you are obligated to eat an olive-bulk in the sukkah even when it rains, or you are exempt from eating altogether.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And that I agree with. I agree with the practical difference regarding rain. Meaning, in any case, according to his view, there is no logic at all in eating bread at home.

[Speaker B] What?

[Speaker I] According to what the Mishnah Berurah says, even if it is raining he is obligated.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, fine, so he says otherwise. Fine. From his view, according to his explanation, that’s what comes out. Yes, that I agree with, correct. On the first night, eating matzah is obligatory so that it will be known that the commandment has entered into force: “In the evening you shall eat matzot.” Similarly, the Torah said regarding Sukkot: “In sukkot you shall dwell for seven days.” A person may choose not to eat, but when he eats a fixed meal, that eating must be in the sukkah. Therefore it makes sense to learn from the verbal analogy of fifteen-fifteen, which as stated is available at least on one side. On which side? On the side of Passover, right? The fifteen of Sukkot is not available; there was no other way to write it there. But on Passover there was another possibility. So it is available on one side, that on the first night, the night of the fifteenth, there is an obligation to eat, so that it will be known that the obligation of the commandment has begun. A beautiful explanation in my opinion. The question is whether, continuing what we said earlier, one can infer a halakhic conclusion from this — that when it rains, then the Mishnah Berurah is not right. Let’s say I was persuaded by this explanation.

[Speaker E] Everything—

[Speaker B] is possible.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What he says is also possible. But if I’m persuaded that this really is the explanation, then right, the Mishnah Berurah is not right and I will not do what he says. What’s the problem?

[Speaker B] If I’m persuaded, then it is simply obvious that there really is a commandment specifically to eat matzah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Anything is possible. Now decide what seems more logical to you. In the end, you have to decide; anything is possible. So if you always want to be concerned for every possibility, fine. But if you want to decide what seems plausible to you, then if you were persuaded by this explanation — and what does the Mishnah Berurah say? That when it rains, one should still eat in the sukkah on the first night.

[Speaker H] Ah, that would come out according to this explanation.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. So here I’m saying that the Mishnah Berurah is right. What? Why?

[Speaker E] Because just as on Passover he wanted to show that the commandment had gone into effect,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] so—

[Speaker E] he wanted that on Sukkot too you show that the commandment has gone into effect, so even when it rains you sit in the sukkah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, you’re saying the opposite. You’re right.

[Speaker E] No, but then what the Rabbi says is difficult.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, I don’t agree. I think he is right — not what you said earlier. You’re right that there is no point in eating that olive-bulk of bread at home. Those who say that — according to his view that clearly makes no sense. Now as for eating in the sukkah when it rains, that is difficult in any case, regardless of these explanations. Simply because it isn’t a sukkah when rain is falling—

[Speaker H] If it rains, then there is no commandment of sukkah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s just difficult. I’m saying, if someone already says such a thing, then it actually does fit what he’s saying, because you have to show—after all, the issue is not eating in the sukkah. There’s no intrinsic issue of eating in the sukkah; the issue is not eating outside the sukkah. Rather, you need to perform a symbolic act. On the contrary, it actually does fit. You have to show a symbolic act that demonstrates that here, yes, you are complying. So you eat in the sukkah even though it’s raining. But what are you showing by that? After all, you didn’t eat in a sukkah—this isn’t a sukkah. Obviously. But since it’s only symbolic, that’s not a problem; after all, you’re not really obligated to eat in the sukkah either. It’s all just a symbolic matter, to show something. And once it’s a symbolic matter of showing, then show it even when it’s raining. You ate in the sukkah while the gutters are underneath, inside. Fine, granted—but you’re doing it in the sukkah. There are a few categories here.

[Speaker C] First of all, there is a commandment to eat bread on the first day, on the first festival day of Sukkot. Now where do you eat the bread?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, so I’m saying, if that’s the definition, then they tell you: fine, then eat at home if it’s raining.

[Speaker C] But the commandment is not to eat at home.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, according to your formulation there’s no problem. The commandment is to eat an olive-sized amount, except that on Sukkot you eat in the sukkah.

[Speaker C] Yes, no, the commandment is to eat an olive-sized amount of bread in the sukkah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, so the commandment is about the sukkah? Fine, then of course there’s no point in eating at home.

[Speaker C] Now, you are obligated to eat bread at night.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? In the sukkah?

[Speaker C] Wait, wait—I’m saying, you are obligated to eat bread at night, and you can’t eat it at home even if it’s raining. You can’t eat it at home. You’re making formulations—you’re making two opposite formulations.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What’s the objective? What is the commandment? Is the commandment to eat bread, except that on Sukkot when you eat bread you have to do it in the sukkah? Or no—the commandment is to eat bread in the sukkah. That’s the commandment. Yes. What do you mean, yes? Yes to the first one or yes to the second?

[Speaker C] Yes, yes to that—to eat bread in the sukkah. So? Now, also, you’re not—you’re forbidden to eat outside the sukkah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, what do you mean, you’re forbidden to eat outside the sukkah? I’m asking about the commandment, not the prohibition. The commandment is to eat bread in the sukkah. Yes. So now what’s the claim? It’s raining.

[Speaker C] If it’s raining, you’re exempt.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then obviously there’s no point in eating bread at home.

[Speaker C] Not only is there no point—you’re prohibited from eating outside the sukkah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there’s no prohibition, because when it’s raining there’s no prohibition. What—when it’s raining you have to fast? When it’s raining you can eat outside the sukkah. But not in the sukkah. No, what are you talking about? When it’s raining, throughout the other seven days you eat at home, no problem. Once the porridge spoils, you can leave the sukkah and eat at home. You don’t have to fast on Sukkot. It’s forbidden to fast on Sukkot—not just that you don’t have to.

[Speaker D] Because of “and you shall rejoice,” and with rain he is distressed. “And you shall rejoice”—there is a commandment, “and you shall rejoice on your festival.” Right, and in the rain he is distressed.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, “distressed” is not by virtue of “and you shall rejoice on your festival.” Why? “Distressed”—and “and you shall rejoice on your festival” has on—well, that’s a question whether it applies on all seven days or only the first night, only the first day. But “distressed” is not by virtue of rejoicing; rather, it is by virtue of “you shall dwell as you normally live.” It’s unrelated. It’s specific to sukkah. What do you mean, unrelated? It makes a big practical difference if you don’t eat. It’s specific to sukkah; it has nothing to do with “and you shall rejoice on your festival.” You have to dwell in the sukkah. Now, you dwell in the sukkah in a place where it is normal and reasonable to dwell. But if it’s a place not fit for living, then there’s no point in dwelling there; that’s not called dwelling there, so you are not fulfilling “you shall dwell as you normally live.” Because of the distress. Fine, I’m saying, on this issue it’s an interesting question beyond just how one disagrees with the Mishnah Berurah or whether one disagrees. I don’t think it’s all that problematic. If I were convinced, then I would have no problem at all going against him. But this is a question of interpreting the reason for the verse. And all explanations of this type—that’s what I wanted to note here.

[Speaker E] It always comes back to that point. It always comes back.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. I’m saying all explanations of this sort always raise the question: how far can you go with deriving the reason for the verse? Do you now, for every commandment in the Torah, look for its reason and according to that decide how to act, determine its parameters? Because plainly this is a dispute among the Tannaim, between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, and in Jewish law we rule like Rabbi Yehuda, that we do not derive the reason for the verse. Meaning, we do not do purposive interpretation, as it’s called today in the legal world; rather, interpretation is textual interpretation, let’s call it. Meaning, no—you do not look for what this is meant to achieve, what the idea behind it is, and on that basis decide. That’s good for interpreting Scripture, but in the halakhic world you do not derive the reason for the verse; you do not conduct yourself based on deriving the reasons. So now here again, even if I were convinced that he is right, I’m not sure I can use that to determine what the Jewish law is, because we do not derive the reason for the verse—not because I’m afraid to disagree with someone. Rather, the question is whether such a rationale can really suffice to determine it. On the other hand, how else would we decide? After all, we already talked about the fact that it’s pretty naive to think that we really do not take the reason for the verse into account.

[Speaker E] You always take it into account; you just don’t say so.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. The what and not the why, with Brisk—we already talked about that. Brisk asks only the what and not the why. There is no what without why; there’s no such thing. And someone who asks what—it is fed by your understanding of the why; otherwise how will you determine what the what is? How will you determine it? After all, there are several possibilities. Because you try to think what the logic of it is. Fine, but that’s always the big question of—

[Speaker G] Where it is in the background.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So the question is always where this matter stops—that we do not derive the reason for the verse. Fine, let’s stop here.