Halakha and Reality – Lesson 6

Table of Contents

• Normative decision-making and the skills of halakhic ruling
• Formal authority and substantive authority
• Formal authority in Jewish law: the Holy One Blessed be He, the Sanhedrin, and the Talmud
• Authority after the Talmud and autonomy versus a “great halakhic decisor”
• The local rabbinic authority and his public authority
• Facts versus norms and authority with respect to them
• The conceptual impossibility of formal authority with respect to facts
• Belief in the Messiah as an example of a fact, and the difference between persuasion and authority
• Maimonides: “We do not issue a halakhic ruling on matters that have no practical relevance,” and the logical claim
• Responsa versus general law books, and “once one sage has forbidden, his colleague may not permit”
• “Legal facts” and the authority of a religious court to determine facts for the sake of a ruling
• Factual determinations in the Talmud: the presumption that “a person does not pay before the due date” and lice on the Sabbath
• Rabbi Avraham son of Maimonides: the prohibition against accepting an opinion without analysis, and the distinction between Torah and science
• Pesachim 94: the sages of Israel versus the sages of the nations, and Rabbi’s intellectual honesty
• Audience questions: facts in Jewish law, the seven leading townsmen, and heresy
• Audience questions: “do not deviate,” the authority loop, and Christianity and Conservatism
• Kabbalah, the language of mysticism, and the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification

Summary

General Overview

The speaker summarizes a distinction between formal authority, which obligates by virtue of the identity of the institution or person, and substantive authority, which is based on expertise and therefore only means it is “advisable” to listen. He argues that in Jewish law, formal authority exists mainly for the Holy One Blessed be He and for the high religious court by virtue of “do not deviate” and “according to the Torah instruction that they teach you,” and in an expanded sense also for the Talmud by virtue of public acceptance. After the Talmud, what remains are mainly substantive authorities—halakhic decisors and Torah scholars. He argues that there is no coherent concept of formal authority with respect to facts, because you cannot command a person to believe a fact that he is convinced is false. The one exception is the ability of a religious court to determine “legal facts” for the sake of deciding a concrete case. He uses Maimonides and Rabbi Avraham son of Maimonides to ground a non-authoritarian attitude toward factual statements of the sages in areas of nature and medicine, and he concludes with a discussion of audience questions about facts in Jewish law, the authority of sages today, heresy, and the status of Kabbalah and mystical language.

Normative Decision-Making and the Skills of Halakhic Ruling

The speaker explains that the previous discussion dealt with how normative and halakhic decision-making works, and what skills a halakhic decisor needs in order to be considered great and successful. He uses that as background for moving to the question of the kinds of authority that operate within the world of halakhic ruling.

Formal Authority and Substantive Authority

The speaker defines formal authority as binding by virtue of the identity of the sovereign or institution, like parliament, such that obedience is required even apart from agreement or correctness. He defines substantive authority as a case where someone like a doctor possesses knowledge, so logic justifies listening to him, but there is no duty to obey him. In that sense, the term “authority” is misleading, because what is involved here is advisability, not obligation.

Formal Authority in Jewish Law: the Holy One Blessed be He, the Sanhedrin, and the Talmud

The speaker argues that formal authority in Jewish law exists in principle for the Holy One Blessed be He, and after Him for the high religious court by virtue of “do not deviate” and “according to the instruction they teach you.” Therefore, their words are binding even if they are mistaken in ordinary situations. He notes that at the beginning of tractate Horayot there is discussion of situations in which, if one reaches the conclusion that the Sanhedrin erred, there may be no obligation to obey, and he emphasizes that the commentators greatly disagree about the boundaries of this. He adds that it is also customary to attribute to the Talmud the status of formal authority, and the Kesef Mishneh at the beginning of the laws of rebels explains that this comes from public acceptance, similar to the way the Amoraim accepted the authority of the Tannaim.

Authority after the Talmud and Autonomy versus a “Great Halakhic Decisor”

The speaker argues that after the Talmud there are no more formal authorities, but at most substantive authorities—Torah scholars—where it is “advisable” to obey because the likelihood that the decisor is right is higher. He says that personally he does not agree with that approach, because in his view autonomy has value: a person should act as he thinks, even if the probability that he is mistaken is high, so long as he has not been convinced. He cites the Talmudic statement that the law was not ruled in accordance with Rabbi Meir because they could not fully grasp his reasoning, and interprets that as a duty of autonomous ruling: even if Rabbi Meir is probably right, so long as the person has not been persuaded, he is not supposed to rule like him.

The Local Rabbinic Authority and His Public Authority

The speaker presents an exception in which formal authority does exist even after the Talmud: the authority of the local rabbinic authority in his locale. He argues that at least today, the local rabbinic authority is empowered to determine how matters of the public domain and the community will be conducted in public matters, but he is not empowered to determine for an individual how to rule in his own home or which customs to follow. He defines this authority as formal because it stems from local standing rather than wisdom, and he places its source in the community’s contractual acceptance of him, like the laws of contracts, so the obligation exists even if the individual thinks the rabbi is mistaken.

Facts versus Norms and Authority with Respect to Them

The speaker distinguishes between factual questions, where something is either true or not true, and normative questions of “what the Jewish law is” in a given case. He argues that with norms there can be both formal authority—such as the Sanhedrin and the Talmud—and substantive authority, meaning a halakhic expert. But with facts, one can speak only of substantive authority, of experts like a doctor, a physicist, or a jurist.

The Conceptual Impossibility of Formal Authority with Respect to Facts

The speaker argues that formal authority with respect to facts is an oxymoron, because formal authority obligates obedience even when one thinks the authority is mistaken, and with facts “obedience” means cognitive agreement, not merely performing some outward action. He gives the example of a Sanhedrin that determines that the earth is flat, and explains that it is impossible to demand that a person think X when he thinks not-X, even if there were such a source in the Torah and even if the Holy One Blessed be He were to compel him. He distinguishes this from norms, where one can demand behavior in accordance with the ruling even without changing one’s opinion, as in a prohibition against separating waste from food even though the person thinks the law is the opposite. He addresses the question of “even if they tell you that right is left,” and argues that this is a metaphor with respect to norms, whereas with respect to facts such “obedience” has no meaning.

Belief in the Messiah as an Example of a Fact, and the Difference between Persuasion and Authority

The speaker presents the question of whether the Messiah will come as a factual question, and cites the opinion of Rabbi Hillel in tractate Sanhedrin: “Israel has no Messiah, for they already consumed him in the days of Hezekiah.” He argues that if a person has reached the conclusion that the Messiah will not come, the Sanhedrin cannot “rule” that he must believe the opposite by force of formal authority. The only way to change that would be to persuade him. He clarifies that one could claim that the Sanhedrin is expert in matters of the Messiah and therefore accept its words as substantive authority, but that would be because one is persuaded, not because of formal obligation.

Maimonides: “We Do Not Issue a Halakhic Ruling on Matters That Have No Practical Relevance,” and the Logical Claim

The speaker notes that in Maimonides’ commentary on the Mishnah, in three places, it is said that we do not issue a halakhic ruling on matters that have no practical relevance, and many understand this as a halakhic determination that a religious court has no authority in intellectual or factual matters. The speaker argues that this is not because Jewish law does not grant such authority, but because Jewish law cannot grant formal authority with respect to facts, because that is a logical contradiction that cannot be bypassed even if sources are brought to support it.

Responsa versus General Law Books, and “Once One Sage Has Forbidden, His Colleague May Not Permit”

The speaker distinguishes between responsa literature and rulings on a concrete case, on the one hand, and general law books like Maimonides and the Shulchan Arukh, which rule on types of cases, on the other. He explains that the rule “once one sage has forbidden, his colleague may not permit” refers to a specific case on which a status of prohibition has already taken effect, not to a principled dispute over halakhic categories, where disagreement is both possible and common.

“Legal Facts” and the Authority of a Religious Court to Determine Facts for the Sake of a Ruling

The speaker argues that in a concrete case brought before a decisor or a religious court, there is formal authority to determine the relevant facts for the purpose of ruling, even if this is a factual question in the ordinary sense. He clarifies that this does not mean the person changes his inner belief about the fact, but that he is obligated to accept the ruling and conduct himself according to the “legal truth” determined for that case. He compares this to civil courts that determine a factual finding such as irresistible impulse regarding a defendant, without this changing psychiatry textbooks, and adds the qualification that in a case of obvious error, the ruling may perhaps be void automatically.

Factual Determinations in the Talmud: the Presumption that “A Person Does Not Pay Before the Due Date” and Lice on the Sabbath

The speaker returns to the example of the presumption in Bava Batra that “a person does not pay before the due date,” and argues that the Talmud is not trying to teach a fact for its own sake but rather the “bridge principle” that connects fact to norm, so that if reality is different, the ruling can also change accordingly. He argues that even if the Talmud were trying to impose a principled fact, it has no formal authority to do so. As an example, he cites the Talmudic permission to kill a louse on the Sabbath and argues that if the factual assumption of the sages—that it does not reproduce sexually—is mistaken, then the permission was a “mistaken transaction” and is void. Therefore, one who kills a louse on the Sabbath would be liable to stoning despite the wording of the Talmud. He distinguishes between a case of changed reality and a case where it turns out that the sages were already mistaken then, and argues that in the second case the ruling is void from the outset.

Rabbi Avraham son of Maimonides: the Prohibition against Accepting an Opinion without Analysis, and the Distinction between Torah and Science

The speaker quotes at length from an essay by Rabbi Avraham son of Maimonides, printed in the first volume of Ein Yaakov, on how to relate to the aggadic statements of the sages. Rabbi Avraham son of Maimonides says that one who adopts an opinion and accepts it “without analysis and understanding” because of respect for the one who said it is acting with “bad opinions,” and that this is “forbidden by the way of the Torah and also by the way of reason.” He supports this with verses such as “You shall not favor the poor, nor honor the great,” and “You shall not show partiality in judgment.” Rabbi Avraham son of Maimonides argues that one is not obligated to accept from the sages of the Talmud factual claims in medicine, natural science, and astronomy in the same way one accepts their interpretation of the Torah, because their authority was entrusted to them for instruction in Torah, “as in the matter stated, according to the Torah that they teach you,” and not in the sciences. He brings examples of medical statements that were not verified. Rabbi Avraham son of Maimonides adds that one should not attribute blanket truth or falsehood to Aristotle because he was right or wrong in some matters, and he requires examining every claim according to its evidence, to the point of “refraining from deciding the matter when it has not been resolved.”

Pesachim 94: the Sages of Israel versus the Sages of the Nations, and Rabbi’s Intellectual Honesty

The speaker cites the passage in Pesachim 94 about astronomical disputes between the sages of Israel and the sages of the nations, where Rabbi brings proofs and concludes in one case, “their words appear more correct than ours.” He quotes Rabbi Avraham son of Maimonides’ explanation, which emphasizes that Rabbi ruled according to evidence without paying attention to the identity of the speakers, and highlights that even if the proof is “weak and feeble,” the value of the baraita is that it teaches love of truth. Rabbi Avraham son of Maimonides explains that “appear” is connected to evidence and determination, and concludes that the ability to cast away falsehood, determine truth, and retract one’s opinion when its opposite becomes clear is why Rabbi was called “our holy teacher,” because “there is no doubt that he is holy.” The speaker concludes from this that the factual realm requires evidence, not formal authority, whereas in Jewish law there is both formal and substantive authority.

Audience Questions: Facts in Jewish Law, the Seven Leading Townsmen, and Heresy

A questioner raises the principle that “a person is not brazen enough in the presence of his creditor” and tries to present it as a fact that the Torah determines. The speaker replies that the facts are the interpretation of the sages, not the Torah itself, and that the law can remain even if the factual explanation is mistaken, while distinguishing between an original mistake and a change in reality. The questioner raises “and you shall do what is upright and good” and “you shall remove the evil from your midst” as a source of authority for the sages, and the speaker argues that these are general commandments directed to the individual and the public, and that when the sages insert a moral consideration into Jewish law, they do so as a rabbinic enactment, not because the commandment was “handed over” to them. He argues that today there is no authority to innovate new laws or decrees, and limits “we act as their agents” to defined cases of “common matters that involve damage.” With respect to heresy, the speaker argues that “we lower them and do not raise them” does not apply to someone who denies out of his genuine belief, because he is coerced by his understanding, and he identifies in that the idea behind the category of “a child taken captive,” while arguing that today the presumption is the opposite of what it was in the time of the sages.

Audience Questions: “Do Not Deviate,” the Authority Loop, and Christianity and Conservatism

A questioner challenges the loop whereby the sages interpret “do not deviate,” which grants them authority. The speaker replies that whoever stands at the top of the pyramid determines the boundaries of his own authority, and that this exists in every hierarchical system. Another questioner asks, “Why not be Christian,” if there is God and revelation and interpretive authority. The speaker replies that Christianity does not present itself as an authoritative interpretation of the Torah but as a replacement that cancels the Torah, whereas any framework that offers an interpretation of the Torah is a legitimate interpretive dispute, even if he does not agree with it. He states that even Conservatism can be an internal halakhic dispute.

Kabbalah, the Language of Mysticism, and the Distinction between the Context of Discovery and the Context of Justification

The speaker explains that Kabbalah can serve as a language that illuminates connections and helps one come up with ideas, but after discovery one has to translate those insights into philosophical meanings and justify them rationally. He uses the distinction from philosophy of science between the “context of discovery” and the “context of justification,” and argues that the way an idea was discovered does not determine its truth, but only its examination and justification do. He rejects formulations like “there is no place devoid of Him” and “everything is one” as meaningless chatter in their extreme sense, and interprets the correct intuition as the claim that the Holy One Blessed be He stands at the root of everything but is not identical with everything.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Last time I finished the discussion of the question of how normative decision-making works exactly, and especially halakhic decision-making, and from that we also drew various insights about what the skills are that a halakhic decisor needs, what a great, successful, skilled decisor is. After that I started talking about differences between two kinds of authority: formal authority and substantive authority. I’ll just briefly summarize, because I want to finish this topic now. I spoke about two kinds of authority. One authority is formal authority, which basically obligates me by virtue of the identity of the institution or the person involved—usually an institution and not a person. For example, the authority of the Knesset. When the Knesset legislates a law, it has formal authority in the sense that it obligates me regardless of whether it is correct or not, and regardless of whether I agree or disagree. The assumption is that the very fact that this is the Knesset, the authorized authority here, the sovereign you might say, means that its words are binding. That is what is called formal authority. Substantive authority is authority like, for example, the authority of a professional—which is really the topic we are dealing with. A doctor: when a doctor tells me to take medication or undergo some medical procedure, I don’t actually have to obey him; there is no obligation to obey him. Logic says to obey him. Logic says that he knows and I don’t know, and therefore if I trust him, then I will obey or do what he said. But I call this substantive authority only because we are used to calling that too “authority.” But when you think about it, you understand that this is not really a concept of authority at all. The doctor has no authority; he has knowledge. And if he understands the matter, then logic says to listen to him. It’s not that one must obey him, but that it is advisable to obey him. Authority is supposed to be something binding, okay? Something advisable has nothing to do with authority. I go to work not because someone has the authority to force me to go to work, but because I want to make a living; in other words, it is worthwhile for me to go to work. So the concept of authority here can be a little misleading, but I use it because in discussions of the concept of authority people really do use it in both senses. So that is the distinction between formal authority and substantive authority. I said that formal authority in Jewish law exists in principle only for the supreme religious court, beginning with the Holy One, blessed be He. The Holy One, blessed be He, has formal authority, and after Him, the supreme religious court. The supreme religious court because authority was delegated to it by the Holy One, blessed be He—“do not veer,” “according to what they instruct you”—and therefore they too have authority. Beyond that, there is no formal authority in Jewish law. There is a certain extension to the Talmud. It is commonly thought that the Talmud too has formal authority, and usually the accepted explanation—this is what the Kesef Mishneh writes at the beginning of the laws of rebellious elders, for example—is that the authority of the Talmud derives from the fact that we accepted it upon ourselves. Just as the authority of the Tannaim over the Amoraim is because the Amoraim accepted the authority of the Tannaim upon themselves. These explanations are explanations showing that this is formal authority, because if they were right—the explanation is not that one must obey what is written in the Talmud because it is right, but because I accepted it upon myself. There is some obligation to act as it says even if it is mistaken, just as in the Sanhedrin, in principle, they have authority not contingent on their being right. That is not completely precise, because at the beginning of tractate Horayot there is a discussion about one who errs in the commandment to listen to the words of the sages, meaning there are situations—and there is a major dispute among the commentators exactly when—in which once I reach the conclusion that the Sanhedrin erred, I do not have to obey it. But in principle the Sanhedrin has authority, and in ordinary situations, not extreme situations, one must obey it not because it is right, but because it is the Sanhedrin. So that is formal authority. After the Sanhedrin, after the Talmud—the Talmud too received that same status. After the Talmud, basically, there are no more formal authorities. There are substantive authorities. Meaning, people who are halakhic decisors, who are great Torah scholars—we are supposed to follow their rulings, but not because we must; rather simply because if he is a great decisor, then he is probably right. In other words, he probably hits the truth with a higher likelihood than I do. And therefore, if I want to do the true thing, it is worthwhile to follow him. That is at least the meaning I am able to give to the authority granted to halakhic decisors. I’ll just say in passing that I personally don’t really agree with this. I don’t think it’s correct, because even if there may be a greater chance that that decisor is right—a greater chance that he is right than that I am right—still, there is also the value of autonomy. And the value of autonomy basically says that there is value in my doing what I think, even if the odds are that I’m wrong. There is a Talmudic passage—and this really is just an aside—but the Talmud says that the reason Rabbi Meir’s colleagues did not rule like him was because they could not penetrate the depth of his reasoning. And because he was such a genius and they could not get to the bottom of his view, therefore the Jewish law does not follow him. And that is seemingly the opposite of logic. In other words, if he is such a genius that they couldn’t even get to the bottom of his view, then obviously one should listen to everything he said. And if I don’t agree with him, then apparently it’s simply because I didn’t understand him. So that is a reason not to follow him? It is a reason to follow him. I think the simple explanation there is no—it is a reason not to follow him. And why? He may be right, it may be more likely that he is right than that I am right, but there is an obligation to decide autonomously. If I think a certain way, then I am expected to act according to what I think, even if I myself also agree that Rabbi Meir is most likely right and not me. Of course, that is as long as he has not persuaded me. Meaning, if he persuaded me, that is something else; it’s not that I’m just stubborn and not following him despite being persuaded. But if he did not persuade me, even though in reflection, if I look at myself, I can estimate that this is simply because of the intelligence gap between us—that I simply don’t understand what he said—it doesn’t matter. As long as this really is my position and I was not persuaded that he is right, then that is what I am supposed to do. That is the duty of autonomy. I add this only in passing because I do not agree with this accepted approach that grants substantive authority after the Talmud. But those who do grant authority after the Talmud—my claim is that this is substantive authority, not formal authority. This authority is relevant only for one who is not competent. Meaning, someone who has not reached the point where he can decide for himself, then truly “make for yourself a rabbi”; then he needs to follow the words of accepted, qualified halakhic decisors. And there indeed the authority is not formal authority but substantive authority. So after the Talmud, if so, the authorities that exist are only substantive authorities, if any. An exception to this is the authority of the local halakhic authority in his own place. A local halakhic authority in his place has authority, with certain limitations. Meaning, it seems to me that at least today the view is that the local halakhic authority has the authority to determine what will be done in the public domain—meaning how the community will be run in the synagogue or in the public sphere in communal matters. But I do not think that the local halakhic authority can determine for me what I will do at home—according to which laws I will rule or which customs I will follow. In that regard I do not think the local halakhic authority has authority. But still, at least on the public level, the local halakhic authority has authority, and in that sense this is again formal authority, not substantive. Because if I regard him simply as a Torah scholar who knows, that has nothing to do with him being the local authority; I consult people who know and I do so simply because they know more than I do—that is not authority. What distinguishes the local halakhic authority is not that he is wise; there may be greater sages elsewhere. What distinguishes him is that he is the local authority here, not that he is the wisest. Why does it matter that he is here? Because his authority does not derive from his wisdom but from the fact that he is the local rabbi. In other words, this is formal authority and not substantive authority. Where does this formal authority come from? It is actually very similar to the authority of the Talmud. The formal authority of the local halakhic authority derives from the fact that we accepted him upon ourselves. The authority of the local halakhic authority is basically part of contract law. It is not because of “do not veer,” but contract law—we made a contract with him, or a contract among ourselves, that as a community we accept the authority of the rabbi upon ourselves, and fine—if that is the case, contracts must be honored. Therefore the local halakhic authority, regarding his place of course, only regarding his place, has authority that can be regarded as formal authority. It is formal authority because I must do it even if I think he is not right. Meaning, not because he is wise and not because he is right, but because he is the local halakhic authority. So that too is formal authority. After that I said that one has to distinguish between questions of fact and normative questions. Questions of fact—well, these are facts. Either it is true or it is not true. Normative questions are questions of what the law is, what Jewish law says in a certain case. That is a normative question. Substantive authority can exist both with respect to facts and with respect to norms. A halakhic expert has substantive authority with respect to Jewish law. Substantive authority and not formal authority means that if he is a Torah scholar, then there is probably a greater chance that he is right than that I am right. Therefore it is worthwhile to heed him. One need not; it is worthwhile to heed him because he is an expert. Just as I obey other experts, there are also halakhic experts. And of course there is also formal authority, as we said earlier: the Talmud, the Sanhedrin, the Holy One, blessed be He. Okay, so that is formal authority. So with respect to Jewish law, or with respect to norms, there is both substantive authority and formal authority. But that is with respect to norms. With respect to facts, one can speak only of substantive authority. One who is an expert in that factual field has substantive authority. Meaning, if he says something, there is a reasonable chance that he is right, and therefore it is worthwhile to heed him. Not obligatory—worthwhile. Meaning, like a doctor in the medical field, or a physicist in physics, or a jurist in law, he has substantive authority because he understands that field. Okay? So also with respect to facts, as I said, a physicist is an expert in facts, not in norms. And he is an expert, therefore he has substantive authority. What about formal authority with respect to facts? My claim is that one cannot speak of such a thing at all; it is conceptually undefined. Not because there is no source in the Torah granting authority in the realm of facts. Even if there were such a source, I would not accept it. Simply because it is an oxymoron. There is no such thing as formal authority with respect to facts. Why do I claim this? Because when I give someone formal authority with respect to something, that means I have to obey him even though I think he is mistaken. Right? Not because he is wise, not because he is right, but because he is who he is—the Knesset, or the Sanhedrin, or whoever. Now suppose the Sanhedrin rules that the earth is flat. Okay? It made a factual determination. Now I reached the conclusion—through various scientific tools, observations, whatever—that they are mistaken. The earth is round; it is not flat. Now what do they tell me? Suppose we give the Sanhedrin formal authority with respect to factual determinations. They tell me: listen, you are required to accept that the earth is flat because the Sanhedrin said so and there is “do not veer.” Now what does that mean? Not because it is unjustified to demand this of me, or because the Torah did not give the Sanhedrin authority with respect to facts but only with respect to norms. I’m not interested at all in what the Torah gave them. Even if it gave them, and even if the Holy One, blessed be He, stood here and put me in chains, I still would not accept it. Why not? Because one cannot speak of formal authority with respect to facts. What are they expecting of me? They expect me to agree that the earth is flat even though I think it is not flat? But if I think it is not flat, then that is what I think. I can say with my mouth, “I think the earth is flat,” but I cannot think that it is flat if I am not convinced of it, if I think the opposite. And when they demand that I obey formal authority with respect to facts, what they expect of me is not speech; what they expect of me is agreement. Agreement is a cognitive act, not moving one’s lips. A cognitive act of agreeing to a fact means saying, “I agree that the earth is flat,” but I do not agree. Do you understand? With respect to norms—sorry—with respect to norms, they can demand of me: suppose I think that separating waste from food is permitted on the Sabbath. I think specifically that food from waste is forbidden. According to Jewish law, separating waste from food is what is forbidden by Torah law. Suppose I think that only food from waste is forbidden and waste from food is permitted. Now the Sanhedrin determines that waste from food is forbidden. They say there is formal authority; if the Sanhedrin determined it, I must obey. There is no principled problem with that claim. If there is a source granting formal authority to the Sanhedrin, then there is no problem—indeed one must obey them. That does not mean that I have to agree that separating waste from food is forbidden. To agree—either I agree or I don’t—but I do have to obey, meaning I have to do what they say. I am forbidden to separate waste from food, even though I think that is a mistake. That is the meaning of formal authority. Now let us try to formulate the same sentence with respect to fact. What is required of me is to think that the earth is flat even though I think it is round. You understand that this cannot be done. If I am required to do something even though I think it is forbidden to do it, that is a coherent sentence. One can debate whether one must or must not, but anyone making such a claim is not committing a logical fallacy. It is well defined, okay? But anyone making the same claim with respect to facts is simply talking nonsense. There is no such thing. One cannot demand that I think X when I think not-X. Persuade me that it’s not not-X, and then I will think not not-X. But as long as I have not been persuaded and at the moment I think not-X, and now the Sanhedrin tells me: you must think X. Okay, I must, and I very much want to obey you too, but what can I do? As long as I have not been persuaded, that is not what I think. Okay? So therefore the claim is that one cannot speak of formal authority with respect to facts. Someone here asked—I just see chats only when they pop up—someone here asked: so what about when they tell you that right is left and left is right? So first of all, that is a dispute among the Tannaim. Not everyone agrees on that matter. It is in the Jerusalem Talmud, and opposite it there is the Sifrei; the Babylonian Talmud is not entirely clear, but there is Sifrei versus Jerusalem Talmud. Second, “they tell you that left is right and right is left” is a metaphor. It refers to something that is halakhically incorrect; they tell you that this is how you must act. So you must obey them even though it is clear to you that the thing is forbidden. That is about norms. But if they tell you that the right side is the left side on the factual level, then obviously obedience to them is irrelevant. “Right is left” is a metaphor; one should not take it literally, as if they tell you that the right side is the left side. Right? Or someone says, yes, they tell you to turn right, so you can’t—then you mustn’t turn left. Fine, turn right, but you… one also cannot tell me to think that this thing is the left side. That cannot be said to me. I cannot think it is the left side; I think it is the right side. They can tell me to turn there and I’ll turn, because I can fulfill a practical demand, but… but… but one cannot demand that I think something that I do not think. It is simply an oxymoron. It is not… even if I wanted to, I could not fulfill such a thing; it is an impossible demand. Therefore in this context the claim that there is formal authority with respect to facts is categorically false. I do not bring sources for it at all; the sources do not interest me. Even if all the sources said the opposite, I still would not accept that from them. Because even if all the sources said that a triangle is round, they can say it until tomorrow, but I know that a triangle is not round. And therefore one cannot bring me proofs from sources that I am supposed to accept oxymorons. There is no such thing. Therefore the sources here do not interest me in the slightest. Meaning, even if you find sources that say this—and you will find sources that say this—it is simply nonsense; there is no such thing. One cannot speak of formal authority with respect to facts. One can speak of substantive authority. Now of course one can discuss, say I ask whether the messiah will come or not, fine? That is a factual question. Either the messiah will come or he will not come—a factual question. Now suppose I reached the conclusion, like Rabbi Hillel in tractate Sanhedrin: “Israel has no messiah, because they already consumed him in the days of Hezekiah.” The messiah will not come; we already used him up. Okay? The messiah is not destined to arrive. So now let the Sanhedrin rule that one must believe that the messiah will indeed come. The Thirteen Principles—whoever does not accept this is a heretic. Nonsense. Simply nonsense. Why is it nonsense? Not because it is nonsense that the messiah will come. But if I reached the conclusion that in my opinion the messiah will not come, the only way for you to change that is to persuade me that I am wrong. You cannot command me to think otherwise. There is no such thing. Therefore the demand to obey the Sanhedrin when it determines a fact is a baseless demand. Someone can come and say: the Sanhedrin is expert in messianic matters. And if it said he will come, then surely they are right. Okay? That may be; I don’t think so, but maybe—that is at least a coherent claim, meaning there is no logical problem in it. Then all one needs to do is simply be convinced that this really is the case. Meaning, if I become convinced that the Sanhedrin is indeed expert in matters of the messiah, then I simply become convinced that I was wrong and that the messiah will indeed come. No problem. Then I was simply persuaded, not that I accepted it because they have authority; I was simply persuaded that I was mistaken and changed my position. That is fine. I am allowed to change my position merely because someone wise says otherwise. That too is a legitimate consideration, as long as I understand that I was wrong, and even if I do not understand why, I reached the conclusion that I was wrong, so I will comply. No problem. But that is not formal authority, because here I comply because I was persuaded, not because he said so. True, what persuaded me was not the arguments but my trust in him that he is extremely wise, but still in the final analysis what that trust did was cause me to be persuaded. It is not that by virtue of his status I have a duty to obey. There is no duty to obey. Rather, because I am sure he is wise, I adopt what he said. Therefore this is not formal authority but substantive authority, if one accepts it at all. Now, in Maimonides’ Commentary on the Mishnah it appears in three places that one does not issue a halakhic ruling in matters that do not pertain to practice. In Sotah—there are a few places where Maimonides writes this. People usually understand it as a halakhic determination. A halakhic determination that Jewish law does not grant authority to the religious court, or in general to halakhic ruling, in contexts that are not halakhic—in intellectual contexts, factual contexts, contexts unrelated to practical action. The way I’m saying it now, that’s not the case. It is not because Jewish law does not grant the religious court authority in that domain, but because Jewish law cannot grant the religious court authority in that domain. Even if someone proved to me with signs and wonders that Jewish law does grant such authority, it would not affect my position in the slightest. Because in the end I cannot. Even if I want to, I cannot obey. If I reached the conclusion that the messiah will not come, all the judges of the Sanhedrin can shout, “The messiah will come for sure and you must obey.” I must—but I can’t. As long as you do not persuade me, I think he will not come. The fact is that I think he will not come. What do you want me to do with that? To say outwardly that I think he will come? That is a lie. You expect me to think differently. For me to think differently, you need to persuade me. So one has to understand: this is not an autonomous stance, not a liberal stance, not a stance saying that Jewish law does not grant authority in some area. It is simply a logical contradiction. It is a conceptual logical consideration, and therefore there is no way around it. There is no formal authority with respect to facts. This is the connection between formal and substantive authority, facts and norms. But—and here there is a qualification that completes the topic I discussed in previous sessions. I spoke about the difference between responsa literature and regular books of Jewish law. In responsa books, the subject is a case—a particular case—and in that case, the one who writes the responsum determined that the Jewish law is such and such. Or a halakhic decisor before whom a certain case comes: they ask about a chicken, is it non-kosher or not non-kosher, and he says non-kosher. That is responsa or a specific halakhic ruling. There are books of Jewish law like Maimonides, the Shulchan Arukh, general books of Jewish law. They do not deal with a particular case that came before them; they rule the law with respect to types of cases. In such and such a type of case, the Jewish law is such and such. They are not talking about a particular chicken; they are talking about a type of chicken where there is a hole of such and such a kind in the lung, and then that chicken is non-kosher. That is a principled determination; it is not a determination about a specific chicken. There is a difference between these two things. I think I mentioned this. The Talmud says that if one sage forbade, his colleague may not permit. Obviously this refers only to the type of specific halakhic rulings, responsa or a practical decisor, not to the Shulchan Arukh. It is obvious that if one sage rules in principle with respect to some kind of defect, as in the chicken example I gave, another sage is allowed to say that I disagree with him. I think it is not non-kosher. There is no problem at all; all halakhic disputes are of that sort. What, there are no halakhic disputes? According to this principle there could be no halakhic disputes. So what is this rule speaking about—that if one sage forbade, his colleague may not permit? About a specific case. If a specific case came before a sage, or a book of responsa, no matter, which deals with a specific case, not a type of cases but a concrete case: a man and a woman did such and such, what is their status? This particular chicken—is it non-kosher or not? Now of course one draws upon what the Shulchan Arukh and Maimonides and the Talmud and medieval authorities and later authorities wrote and so on, but in the end one rules on this particular chicken or on this particular couple. Here the ruling is binding. Someone else cannot permit what the first decisor forbade, because the object already has a legal status of prohibition attached to it. That’s it. That is how the Talmud determines. Now here there is an important point connected to the distinction I made earlier between formal and substantive authority, and with respect to facts. I want to claim that here there is formal authority with respect to facts, even though apparently no such thing can exist. Suppose a religious court determined that this chicken has a hole of such and such a size in its lung. Okay, now in my opinion it does not. In my opinion, I saw the X-ray, and in my opinion the hole is a different size. Okay, that is a factual question. And with factual questions there is no formal authority. But no: once the religious court has ruled law with respect to this specific case, even if that ruling rests on the platform of a factual determination, because this case was brought before this specific decisor or this specific judge, the authority of the decisor or judge includes determining what the facts are. And one cannot disagree with him even in the realm of facts. Again, this does not mean that I will now think in my heart that the hole is the size the decisor said and not the size I think. On that point I still remain with my own view; there is no such thing as formal authority with respect to facts. But I do have to accept the ruling even though that ruling clearly rests on a factual foundation. Okay? Because with respect to this case, the authority to determine the facts was given to that decisor before whom the case was presented, or that judge before whom the case was presented. The same applies, by the way, to courts of law. When one comes before a court, after all, the court is no more expert than any other psychiatrist. But if the court determined that the defendant standing before it was not responsible for his actions, that he acted under an irresistible impulse, then the authority of the court determines this for this case. That does not mean that now we will change the psychiatry textbooks and write that in cases of this type this is called an irresistible impulse. No, the psychiatrists will argue and think this way and that way and decide whatever they decide. But with respect to this specific case that the court determined, no one can argue. The court has the authority to determine the relevant facts as well. And I spoke about this two lessons ago or something like that, where I said that in the context of legal deliberation in a religious court or before a decisor, one also needs factual questions, and suppose experts disagree among themselves about the facts—the authority that will determine what the relevant facts are will be the decisor or the judge. Even though he is not an expert in that field and the experts disagree. Correct, but he is the one who must make the decision, and there I argued that this is formal authority. This is not knowledge, not expertise, not skill; it is authority. Okay? So what I’m saying now connects to what we discussed in those sessions. In other words, this is the framework within which one can at least speak of formal authority with respect to facts—but one has to understand, this is not really formal authority with respect to facts. It is authority to determine the facts for the purpose of the halakhic-legal discussion. It is not really authority to determine what the facts truly are. We are not going to change the physics books or psychiatry books because of the ruling of the religious court. But regardless of what the psychiatry books say, in the case that came before the religious court, if the court determined that this is the law, then that is what determines and that is how the law must be, even if I think that the factual foundation is mistaken. Okay? Well, that too is not completely precise. If it turns out that it is obviously mistaken, then perhaps this ruling is based on a fundamental error and is void automatically. But let’s say there is a dispute among experts, there is one side and the religious court took one side, but I am sure the other side is right. It won’t help—the religious court determines. If the religious court determined that the fact is A, I cannot claim that the fact is B. I must obey. I can think that the fact is B, and I probably will think that the fact is B, I will not retract, because thoughts cannot be changed by command, but in behavior I am obligated to adopt what is sometimes called the legal truth, the legal facts. Meaning the factual-reality determination in relation to the legal context. In other words, what are the facts for the purpose of the legal decision, not what are the facts truly. Okay? So here there is a certain qualification: we see that there can be formal authority also with respect to facts. But again, these are not really facts, but the legal significance of facts. In other words, for this legal matter, the fact has to be set this way. But it is not that this is really the fact. As for the fact itself, there is no such creature. What happens with facts established in a halakhic book—not in responsa and not by a practical decisor? So I brought an example of this a few sessions ago, and we dealt with it extensively: the presumption in tractate Bava Batra, the presumption that a person does not repay within the term. So the Talmud seemingly determines a factual rule: people do not repay a debt before the due date arrives. They do not repay early. So that is a factual determination. Do I have to obey this factual determination? I then argued that I do not, and now I’ll simply repeat it and explain in light of what I said now why not. So there I said that I do not have to obey it because the Talmud never intended to teach me the fact at all. The Talmud wanted to teach me what I then called the bridge principle—the relation between this fact, the presumption, and the norm, the halakhic determination. That is really what the passage wanted to teach me, not the fact itself. The fact itself it did not intend to teach at all; it simply stated the fact because only on its basis could it proceed to the halakhic ruling. But someone who does not accept the fact—fine, let him posit a different fact and automatically the ruling will also be different. Okay? The Talmud does not insist either on the fact or on the ruling, but only on the path from the fact to the ruling. I spoke about this in terms of bridge principles. Now I want to claim the same thing but from the angle I described now. My claim is that even if the Talmud were trying to establish the fact that a person does not repay within the term, I still would not accept it. I would not accept it because I see around me that it is not true; a person does repay within the term. Suppose for the sake of discussion that the reality around me is like that—I’m talking now about that situation—let us assume for the sake of discussion that that is the case. Then I do not accept the Talmud’s determination even if it did intend this determination. I do not accept it because with respect to facts there is no formal authority. The Talmud cannot demand that I think differently from what I think. This is different from the previous case, where I spoke about a specific ruling regarding a specific case, where the facts relevant to that ruling need to be as the religious court determined. But when the Talmud determines facts not about a specific case, but determines some principled fact that a person does not repay within the term, then it is not determining a specific case; it is determining the fact itself. That I cannot accept when the fact itself is not true. This is not a legal fact; it is a real fact. Over a real fact there is no formal authority. Therefore, if there are incorrect factual determinations in the Talmud, then there is no authority whatsoever. Meaning, again, the Talmud erred and we are supposed to act the opposite way. Therefore, for example, a louse, which the Talmud says it is permitted to kill on the Sabbath because it—never mind—it does not reproduce sexually, so it is not really a living creature in the usual sense; today, since we think this is not so, or know this is not so, the Talmud apparently made a factual mistake, and therefore one who kills a louse on the Sabbath is liable to stoning, even though the Talmud says it is permitted. Liable to stoning because the Talmud erred. The fact that the Talmud assumed a certain factual assumption is irrelevant. This assumption is simply incorrect. There may perhaps be room to distinguish between a situation in which reality changed and a situation in which it became clear retroactively that the Talmud already then did not grasp reality correctly, as with lice. With lice I do not think it is reasonable to assume that reality changed. The Talmud simply did not understand where lice come from. Today we do understand. It is not that the lice of today are different from the lice of then. There the decision from the outset was simply a transaction in error; it was based on a mistaken assumption, therefore it is automatically void. Meaning one need not revoke it; it is simply void. What happens if the decision then was correct, but today reality has changed? Like the presumption that a person does not repay within the term, but today reality is that people do repay within the term. Then I did not discover an error in the original decision. The original decision was based on a correct fact, but today’s fact is a different fact. Here my claim is that if that is really the case, then the Talmud itself did not intend to tell me the facts. It intended only to tell me the bridge principle. Therefore if today the facts are different, I will use the same bridge principle and reach a different conclusion. But if the Talmud had intended to tell me the fact as well, here perhaps there would be room to hesitate whether I need to adopt that fact for legal purposes—not to be convinced that the fact is correct; if I was not convinced, then I was not convinced—but for legal contexts perhaps there is some obligation to accept those facts because that is what the Talmud said. It does not sound reasonable to me, but at least it is logically defined, okay? I think it is not reasonable because I do not think the Talmud intended us to obey factual determinations. If the factual determinations changed, then I need to apply the rules the Talmud gives to the facts as they are today, and that is all. Therefore the Talmud did not mean to require this of me. But if it had intended to require this of me, there might perhaps be room to say that it is binding. In contrast, in a place where the Talmud assumed from the outset a determination that today I understand was mistaken, there the decision from the outset was simply based on an error, so it is void from the outset. It is not something that was right and now I am coming to change it; it was never right, they simply did not know. Today I know that it was never right. So this is not a change; it simply was never right, there is nothing there to change. So there it is clear that it simply does not exist. Therefore what I basically want to claim is that when there are factual determinations in the Talmud, even if halakhic conclusions are built on them, as with the louse for example, the Talmud has no authority in the factual domain. In my opinion, even if the facts in the Talmud were correct and merely changed, certainly in a place where today I know that already then the Talmud did not grasp the facts correctly, then certainly there is no authority there. Now in this matter it is very interesting to see—I’ll share with you where this is here—there is an essay by Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides, a well-known essay printed in the first volume of Ein Yaakov. There are various essays there about how to relate to the aggadic statements of the sages. One of the essays is by Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides; there is an essay by the Maharal, one by Maharatz Chayot, one by Ramchal. Maharal I actually don’t remember—by Ramchal; there are several essays there. One of them is by Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides, a kind of epistle. So it begins here; up to here are the publisher’s words. Yes, from this section, one line above what I marked—I don’t know, it refuses to mark it for me—from here begin the words of Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides. So let us read it, maybe with a few skips, but it is really a remarkable essay. “Know that everything found in the Talmud and other similar books from the compositions of the sages of blessed memory, the authors of midrashic and narrative works, and legal rulings found in our hands today, are scarce and hidden from the eyes of all those who study the Talmud, and most commentators did not lay their hand to them and were not drawn to their secret.” People do not engage with aggadah. If it does not appear in Ketzot, it doesn’t count. “And my father and teacher of blessed memory thought to compose a book explaining them, as he mentioned at the beginning of the Commentary on the Mishnah, but in the end he turned away from it, and ‘Moses feared to approach it’”—yes, he did not want to tackle this matter—“as he said at the beginning of the Guide. And I explained a little of it.” And now: “And I, after his death, explained a little bit in this matter and did not finish, because I was occupied with writing this book,” namely HaMaspik LeOvdei Hashem. “For I saw its benefit as great and trustworthy from the start.” “Even so, I will enlighten your heart and your mind, and you open your eyes to the way the sages spoke in the expositions found with them, and from it their intention will become visible to you, and it will be to you as God and you will be to me as a mouthpiece, and through this you will save your soul from mocking the words of the sages or denying the truth of their words, or thinking that these are miraculous deeds,” and so on. He is basically repeating what Maimonides writes in the introduction to the chapter Helek. Maimonides says there that there are three groups regarding interpretation of aggadah. There are those who take them literally—those are the fools, because there are many things there that are not literal. There are those who take them literally and believe them—those are the fools. There are those who take them literally and mock them, because after all this is nonsense, it cannot be—that is the wicked group. And the third group, the ones who truly proceed correctly, are those who understand that some things there are parable and some things are real description, and one has to know that not everything is to be interpreted according to its plain sense. And if one adopts this view, it can spare you all kinds of doubts and mockery of the words of the sages, because you can understand that they did not intend a simple description of things but some parable or other matters. Now in the next section—and this is the part important for us—he starts something else. “And know that you must understand: whoever wishes to uphold a known opinion and to show favor to the one who said it and to accept his opinion without examination and understanding as to whether that opinion is true or not—this is among the bad dispositions, and it is forbidden by the way of the Torah and also by the way of reason.” In other words, if you want to accept something only because someone said it—not because you were persuaded, not because it is true, but because of formal authority, because someone said it, “to show favor to the one who said it and to accept his opinion without examination and understanding of that opinion,” okay? He says this is among the bad dispositions. Dispositions here, by the way, I think means bad character traits, because the laws of dispositions in Maimonides are the laws of character traits, so this is not opinions in the modern sense of worldview and outlooks, but dispositions—sometimes that is the meaning and sometimes that is the meaning. In Maimonides’ laws of dispositions they are laws dealing with character traits. So here too he says this is among the bad dispositions, meaning it is a bad trait to do such a thing. “And it is forbidden by the way of the Torah and also by the way of reason.” It is forbidden halakhically and forbidden rationally. “It is not by the way of reason, because it leads to deficiency and lack in contemplation regarding what should be believed.” Meaning, you simply do not contemplate; you accept something merely because it should be believed, and you do not contemplate it. If you had contemplated it, again because you did not merely accept it, you would actually understand it more correctly, you would understand what it really says. Therefore, by reason too it is a mistake to do such a thing, because it is a sure recipe for not understanding properly the things you accept, because you do not bother to think about them since there is authority and therefore it is correct and all is fine. And from the Torah’s perspective—so why is this wrong rationally? Up to here, that is why it is wrong rationally. Why is it wrong from the Torah’s perspective? “Because it inclines from the path of truth and veers from the straight line. And God, may He be blessed, said: ‘You shall not favor the poor, nor honor the great; in righteousness shall you judge your fellow.’ And He said: ‘Do not show favoritism in judgment.’” Interesting. Meaning, the claim is that your veering from the path of truth and straightness is not the rational problem; that is the Torah problem. The Torah forbids one to veer from the path of truth, yes? That is not just the problem in reason; he specifically defines it as a Torah problem. And where is the source that there is a Torah problem here? From “in righteousness shall you judge your fellow” or “you shall not favor the poor nor honor the great; in righteousness shall you judge your fellow.” Meaning, you may not accept things simply because you pity someone, or simply because you admire someone. You must accept things only because you were persuaded that they are true—that is the only criterion. “And there is no difference between accepting that opinion and upholding it without proof, or believing the one who says it and showing him favor and claiming that the truth is certainly with him because he is a great man, like Heman and Kalkol and Darda…” Wait. “…or believing the one who says it and showing him favor and claiming that the truth is certainly with him because he is a great man, like Heman and Kalkol and Darda. For all this is not proof.” But it is forbidden—it is forbidden to accept things only because someone is a great person, or to accept things without proof. Forbidden, not only by way of reason; it is a Torah prohibition, a Torah-level prohibition. “According to this introduction, we are not obligated, because of the great stature of the sages of the Talmud and the perfection of their understanding in the interpretation of the Torah and its details and the uprightness of their words in clarifying its generalities and particulars, to grant them and uphold their opinion in all their statements in medicine and natural science and astronomy, and to believe them in those just as we believe them in the interpretation of the Torah, whose ultimate wisdom is in their hands and to whom it was given to instruct people, as it is said: ‘According to the Torah that they instruct you.’” This sentence is the key sentence. He says: why do I accept the words of the sages in the interpretation of Torah? He gives two reasons here: “whose ultimate wisdom is in their hands.” What does that mean? They have substantive authority—they were great sages, so they are probably right. And the second reason: “and to whom it was given to instruct people.” They have formal authority. We accepted the authority of the Talmud upon ourselves, even if it is not right. So for those two reasons I accept the halakhic determinations in the Talmud. What about determinations in astronomy and medicine? Astronomy here means astronomy, yes, natural science, medicine, and so on. What does that have to do with anything? In that there is no obligation at all to accept what the sages of the Talmud say. The fact that they are great sages in the Talmudic field and the fact that they have formal authority in the Talmudic field—both substantive and formal authority—those two things do not exist with respect to science, with respect to facts. There they have neither substantive authority nor formal authority. Therefore one need not accept their words in those fields. Then he brings all kinds of examples from the Talmud. He needs, of course, to bring proofs for this, because bringing proofs for it is self-contradictory—then he is saying I should accept this because someone said it, but this itself I am not supposed to accept because someone said it; this itself I am supposed to accept because I was persuaded. So he says: you see, among the sages, regarding what was not established for them by their own reasoning and dialectic, they say, “By God, even if Joshua son of Nun had said it, I would not obey him.” Yes? An Amora in tractate Hullin says: even if Joshua son of Nun were standing here—one of the greatest prophets, yes, except for Moses—if he came and stood here and said this before me, I still would not accept it. I would not accept it. Because what does not… what does not seem right to me through reasoning and dialectic, I do not accept. That is, I would not believe it, even though he is a prophet, since he has no ability to make the matter known intentionally by way of reasoning and dialectic and the methods by which the Talmud is expounded. “And that is sufficient proof and demonstration.” For persuasion I need proof and demonstration. And if you do not bring me proof and demonstration, then I do not accept it. “And they were not given further authority, since we find them saying things that were not verified and not upheld in the Talmud in matters of medicine, such as the matter of the preserving stone that they said prevents miscarriages, which was not verified,” yes, remedies that do not work. “And many similar matters they discussed in the eighth chapter of tractate Shabbat. But what the sages said: ‘If constipated, eat beets; if your pot is boiling over, pour it into a date basket’”—yes, never mind, all kinds of recommendations on when to eat, when to drink, when to relieve oneself. “This statement is the essence of health, as observation and physicians’ medicine have confirmed,” meaning that a person should not eat until hungry and should not drink until thirsty, and so on. So what is he saying? All the medical, scientific, factual determinations of the sages need to be judged on their own merits. What among them is true, of course we will accept. And we will accept it not because the sages said it; we will accept it because we were persuaded. And if we were not persuaded, then what is not correct we will not accept, even though it is written in the Talmud. The Talmud has formal authority, not only substantive authority—true, but only with respect to Jewish law. Not with respect to other matters that are factual matters, matters of medicine or science and natural philosophy and so on. And the same applies to the Talmud, which is of course a more extreme case. After that he moves on: “And likewise, we should not appeal to Aristotle and say: since he is the master of the sages of philosophy and established true demonstrations of the existence of the blessed Creator and the like among true matters that came through demonstration and met the path of truth, therefore he is also right in the belief in the eternity of the world and that the blessed Creator does not know particulars and the like.” Meaning, if Aristotle demonstrated marvelous things—yes, marvelous inferences proving the existence of the Holy One, blessed be He—that does not mean that I will also accept what he says about the eternity of the world, or that the Holy One, blessed be He, does not know particulars and does not supervise particulars. That does not mean I accept it. Why? Because his being right about one thing does not mean he now has authority and whatever he says I accept because he said it. I accept things because he persuaded me. The first thing I accepted also was not because he said it; I accepted it because I was persuaded. The latter things did not persuade me, so I will not accept them. So he said them—so what? I need to accept things only because I was persuaded. If among the sages of the Talmud this is so, then certainly with Aristotle. Now he says the opposite, says Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides, yes, the other side. “And we should not deny him and say: since he erred in these beliefs, therefore he erred in all his statements.” Yes, if he erred in the matter of providence and the matter of the eternity of the world, that does not mean that now I will not accept other things he says either. No—if there are other things that are convincing and logical, then I will accept them. In short, each matter on its own merits. We do not accept or reject things simply because some great person, however great, said them. Neither to accept nor to reject. We accept things because we were persuaded; we do not accept things if we were not persuaded. Yes, the Nazis said about relativity—or quantum theory, and mainly relativity—that it was Jewish physics. Jewish physics basically means: I do not accept it because Jews invented it. Okay? That is what is called ad hominem. Yes, I attach the matter to who said it, and I attack it because of who said it rather than making a substantive attack on the thing itself. So that is what Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides is saying here—that one may not do that. “But every intelligent and wise person must examine every opinion and every statement in the proper way and verify and uphold what should be upheld, and reject what should be rejected, and refrain from deciding where the matter is unresolved.” And if I do not know, then I am in doubt. Meaning, if I am persuaded, I rule that way or adopt it; if I am persuaded otherwise, I do not adopt it; if I do not know, then I am in doubt. That is all; it has nothing to do with who said it—that does not matter. “As we see the sages of blessed memory say: ‘If it is a halakhah, we will accept it, but if it is a matter of reasoning, there is an answer.’” Yes, if it comes from the Holy One, blessed be He, we’ll accept it. You want to tell me something by way of reasoning—your reasoning is not acceptable to me, so I will not say it, I do not agree with it. “And so too they do where one of two opposites has not been resolved—they leave it standing by saying ‘teiku.’” Teiku means it stands, yes? “And they retract from an opinion once it is established for them otherwise, saying in many places…” Meaning, everything goes according to the evidence. If I was persuaded—good, I retracted, I retracted. “And greater than this in their admission and love of the path of justice, they said…” Another even greater praise in favor of the sages of the Talmud: “Rava set up an announcer before him and expounded, saying: ‘The things I said before you were an error in my hand.’” Meaning, not only did they retract, they stood before the entire public to whom they had said the earlier things and said: friends, what I told you was a mistake. They retracted publicly. “And such matters and the like are not to be understood and examined because the speaker was great in counsel and wisdom, but because of the proofs and demonstrations supporting them. And so too my father of blessed memory said in the Guide”—that is Maimonides—“and this is a clear matter and a simple point in the eyes of everyone who inclines away from the desires of his body.” Yes, obeying the sages is bodily desire—notice his terminology. How is it viewed today? Someone who stands by his own view and does not listen to the sages has an evil inclination, right? He has desires, he is arrogant. The one who subdued his inclination, who overcame his inclination, is the one who obeys the sages even though he does not agree. So I don’t know—I obey Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides. I obey the sages and his father, yes, Maimonides. And what do they say? They say not to obey anyone. Obeying people is desire, that is inclination. It is inclination—you want an easy life, so you obey them. Your duty is to be autonomous and decide for yourself what you think, to measure things according to what you think, and that is not inclination—that is truth. The inclination is to follow great people—that is the inclination. Look at how very, very strong these statements are. There is a nice famous story about Rabbi Shach. Yes, Rabbi Shach would give a general lecture at Ponevezh. Very special lectures—I was never there, but I heard from people—they were very special lectures. He would say a few sentences and then total pandemonium would break out, everyone arguing, shouting. He would be silent for ten minutes, fifteen minutes, everyone arguing and shouting and agreeing and disagreeing and so on. When they finished, he would speak a little with people about their claims and their questions, continue for a few more sentences, and again a break of chaos—everyone shouting and arguing and so on. Once they convinced him there, in the middle of that tumult, that he had erred. He got down from the lectern and said: friends, the lecture I was about to give is probably mistaken; I was persuaded—and left the lecture. Meaning, he stopped the lecture and went back to learn. That was something that does not happen often, even though apparently it is very simple: you found an error, you understood that it is an error—why continue saying mistakes? The fact that people found it fitting to praise Rabbi Shach for this says that it is not common. Usually people will find weak excuses of one kind or another just to stay with what they said; they will not give it up. You know, there is a famous story about the Ketzot. Ketzot, yes, that is the book very common in yeshivot. Someone from his generation came to him who had also written a book, but the book was not so well received. He asked the Ketzot: tell me, what is your secret? Why was your book accepted? My book, in my opinion, is no less good, and it was not accepted. So the Ketzot asks him: tell me, when do you write the book? He says: in the morning, when I wake up, I am fresh, so I sit down to write the book. The Ketzot says: when I get up in the morning and I’m fresh, I erase. I write the book in the evening. In the morning, when I’m fresh, I erase. It is much harder to erase a novel idea of yours than to produce it. And anyone who has developed ideas and written things knows how hard it is to give up things you arrived at and were excited by and thought contained a beautiful insight. It is hard to give something like that up. Okay? So this is exactly what Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides says here—that this is the duty imposed upon us. Now look at this beautiful thing—the last paragraph I’ll read here. “And I saw fit to bring here a statement that our sages said, and I will explain it to you so that their love of truth and acknowledgment of it will be settled and accepted in your mind. They said what they said…” So before we move to that, let us look for a moment at the Talmud itself. The Talmud, tractate Pesahim 94b: “The sages taught: the sages of Israel say the sphere is fixed and the constellations revolve, and the sages of the nations of the world say the sphere revolves and the constellations are fixed.” The idea was that they thought then that the stars sat on some large sphere around the earth, and the fact that they move is simply because the sphere rotates, but the stars are attached to the sphere and the sphere rotates, and therefore the stars move. That is what the sages of the nations of the world said—that the sphere revolves and the constellations are fixed on the sphere. And the sages of Israel say the sphere is fixed and the constellations revolve. The sphere stands still, the stars move, okay? Not that they are fixed to the sphere. The sphere is fixed, the stars revolve. “Rabbi said: their position can be refuted, for we have never found the Wagon in the south and Scorpio in the north.” After all, the sun moves from east to west, or things move; there are things—we see stars that are not planets that do not move, or not the sun. Yes, mainly the sun moves, because today we know that it is the earth that rotates, not the sun, but from our observational perspective the sun revolves around us. There are other things that do not revolve. If all of them were on the same sphere and the sphere carried all of them, they would all revolve. Why does only the sun revolve and not the others? Apparently the stars themselves revolve, not the spheres. So what is that? It’s evidence against the sages of the nations of the world, right? In favor of the sages of Israel. “Rav Aha bar Yaakov objected: perhaps it is like the pivot of a millstone or like the hinge of a door.” Again, the reality there is millstones and so on. The claim is that perhaps there are several spheres—some spheres rotate this way, others another way. In short, you have no proof against the sages of the nations of the world. Meaning, even if you bring proof in favor of the sages of Israel, if the proof is not conclusive, then one must be honest and say so. It may be that the sages of the nations of the world are actually right and the proof is no proof. And that is exactly what Rav Aha bar Yaakov says. But look at what follows; it is even stronger. Another dispute, the second dispute: “The sages of Israel say that by day the sun travels beneath the firmament and by night above the firmament.” Yes, the conception of the sages of Israel was: there is earth, above it there is a firmament, and the sun circles around the firmament, all of this above the earth; it circles around the firmament. When it is below the firmament we see it—it is day. At night why do we not see it? Because the firmament hides it. After all, it stands above it, so it hides it; therefore we do not see it. That is the sages of Israel. “And the sages of the nations of the world say: by day the sun travels beneath the firmament and by night beneath the ground.” Meaning, if here is the earth and here is the firmament, the sun revolves beneath the firmament, around the earth, passes beneath the earth at night—let’s say this is the earth, it passes under the earth at night—and then comes back. It does not revolve around the firmament; it revolves around the ground. That is what they say. And by day we see it above us. The difference between them is what happens at night, not what happens by day. What happens by day is that it is above us; the question is what happens at night: is it at night still even more above us, above the firmament, or is it below the earth and therefore unseen? “Rabbi said: their words seem more plausible than ours.” After hearing the opinion of the sages of the nations of the world, Rabbi says: you know what? This sounds very logical to me. Why? He has evidence: “for by day the springs are cool and by night they are warm.” Since the spring water is warm at night and cool by day, apparently the sages of the nations of the world are right. Why? Because the sun apparently passes beneath the earth and then heats the springs from below, and therefore they are warm at night, because that is when the sun is below, which is night, and afterward it comes up and moves away, and the springs are cool. Okay, that is basically the claim. And because of that, says Rabbi, apparently the sages of the nations of the world are right and not the sages of Israel. Of course, the proof is no proof and the positions are not positions—this is all nonsense—but the discussion here is what matters. The discussion here: we see also in the first discussion that Rabbi brought proof in favor of the sages of Israel; in the second discussion Rabbi himself brings proof in favor of the sages of the nations of the world. Meaning, he is not biased in favor of the sages of Israel; he simply really thought that in this case they were right. The fact is that in the second case he thought the sages of the nations of the world were right and he said so. More than that: after Rabbi brought proof for the sages of Israel, along comes someone—Rav Aha bar Yaakov—and says to him: what are you talking about? That is no proof. Maybe the sages of the nations of the world are right and the proof is no proof. Your proof is not good. Each thing on its own merits. So what if the sages of Israel say this? Each thing on its own merits. More than that, in the second case Rabbi himself brings proof not merely that maybe I have no proof for my side, but that I have proof for their side. I am wrong and they are right. The conclusion is that the sages of Israel were mistaken and the sages of the nations of the world were right. We have clear proof: the springs are warm at night. Okay? On this Maimonides writes in the Guide for the Perplexed, and Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides in the passage I now return to repeats this; it is basically taken from there. So here: “And I saw fit to bring here a statement that our sages said, and I will explain it to you so that their love of truth and acknowledgment of it will settle and be accepted in your mind. They said what they said. Our sages of blessed memory said in tractate Pesahim: ‘The sages taught: the sages of Israel say the sphere is fixed and the constellations revolve, and the sages of the nations of the world say the sphere revolves and the constellations are fixed,’ and so on.” Yes, he skips already to the second case: “‘Rabbi said: their words seem more plausible than ours, because during the day the springs are cool and at night the springs are warm.’” Up to here this is the Talmudic quotation we just saw. “And when Rabbi heard these things, which are conclusions from the premises over which they first disagreed, he decided in favor of the opinion of the sages of the nations of the world based on this proof.” Meaning, he decided in favor of the sages of the nations of the world when he said: “their words seem more plausible, because by day the springs are cool and by night the springs are warm.” “And behold this—even though this proof is weak and feeble…” Do you hear? This is really upside-down upon upside-down. Since you see—as every child can see—that this is simply nonsense. “And consider what this teaching has taught us in this baraita and how precious is the lesson it teaches. For Rabbi looked at these opinions only from the standpoint of proofs, paying no attention either to the sages of Israel or to the sages of the nations of the world. And he decided in favor of the sages of the nations of the world because of this proof, which he thought was an acceptable proof, that by day the springs are cool and by night the springs are warm. This is what he meant by ‘their words seem more plausible.’” What does “their words seem more plausible” mean? It means I reached the conclusion that they are right because I have proof. “Seem” is related to seeing—proof and seeing come from the same root, yes? “This word indicates a decision. And they said: the sages of the nations of the world defeated the sages of Israel.” What is he saying, basically? He is saying it doubly. First of all, Rabbi’s proof is nonsense. And therefore Rabbi’s conclusion too is nonsense. And in fact who was right here? It may really have been the sages of Israel, I don’t know. But the proof in favor of the sages of the nations of the world—we know today that the sages of the nations of the world were right in the second dispute, but not because of Rabbi’s proof. Rabbi’s proof is nonsense. So Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides says: Rabbi’s proof is nonsense too. This itself already shows you how Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides himself relates to Rabbi. Rabbi said it—how can you say that a Tanna, the redactor of the Mishnah, is saying nonsense? And afterward Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides says how Rabbi relates to the sages. Both Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides’ attitude toward Rabbi and Rabbi’s attitude toward the sages teach us the secret of substantive engagement. One must accept things because of the proof, not because someone said them. And what he is really claiming is that the entire discussion in this passage did not come to teach me at all whether the constellations stand still or revolve, or where the sun goes—that interests no one. That is not the concern of the Talmud. The whole discussion came only to teach us this lesson: that one must accept the truth from whoever says it so long as his words seem right, and not accept it, no matter who says it, if his words do not seem right. That is the lesson. The proofs are worthless, these opinions are nonsense, and the decision is incorrect. None of that matters, because that is not the Talmud’s lesson. The lesson the Talmud came to teach us is the very fact that one must accept the truth from whoever says it by virtue of the proofs. That is the lesson of the Talmud. And now Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides concludes: “And in truth, this master, Rabbi, our holy teacher, is called in tractate Shabbat ‘the holy one,’ because when a person casts off falsehood from before him and upholds the truth and decides it truly and retracts from his opinion when its opposite becomes clear to him, there is no doubt that he is holy.” This is the meaning of why Rabbi is called Rabbenu HaKadosh—our holy teacher. Not Rabbenu HaHigyoni, our logical teacher, but our holy teacher. Why? I refer you back to what he said above: to follow someone only because he is wise or because he has authority and said something is forbidden by way of the Torah and forbidden by way of reason. Why is it forbidden by way of the Torah? Because it is falsehood. The fact that it is falsehood is not the reason it is forbidden by way of reason. It is the reason it is forbidden by way of the Torah. The Holy One, blessed be He, His seal is truth. He hates those who speak falsehood. “He who speaks falsehood shall not be established.” Therefore Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides says: to accept something without proof is forbidden by way of the Torah. And therefore one who does this is not called a philosopher, not called a man of truth, not called an upright man—he is called holy. Because what he is doing is being faithful to a religious value, not only to a philosophical value. That is the point—one of the interesting points here in Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides. He is not claiming that we should fulfill the religious values and also be upright because one should be a decent human being. No. He says uprightness is a religious value, and being dishonest is a religious prohibition. It is forbidden by way of the Torah. Therefore Rabbi—Rabbi Judah the Prince—is called holy because he was intellectually honest. That is why he is called holy. Not because he observed all the laws in the entire Torah, but because he conducted himself with intellectual honesty. “For the person who casts falsehood from before him and upholds the truth and decides it truly and retracts from his opinion when its opposite becomes clear to him”—the examples we saw above—“there is no doubt that he is holy. And behold, it has become clear to us that the sages of blessed memory do not examine opinions or regard them except from the standpoint of their truth and their proofs, not because of the one who says them, whoever he may be.” Okay? That is basically the epistle of Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides. Now one has to pay close attention. Basically the example brought here from Pesahim is not a halakhic example. It is an example of a physical dispute, a dispute in physics. About that Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides says: there one must accept the truth according to the proofs. What about the halakhic realm? There he said above that in that realm the sages do have authority, because why? Both substantive authority and formal authority. They are both great sages and therefore probably right, but beyond that they also have formal authority—the Sanhedrin or the Talmud which we accepted upon ourselves—we need to accept it by virtue of the fact that it is written in the Talmud. So one has to pay close attention: this is exactly what I said before, that in the normative context formal authority has meaning. There it is not said: accept the truth only when you have proofs. No, it depends. If the one standing opposite you has no formal authority, then you need to judge according to the proofs. And if you think he is a great sage, then even if you do not understand, you may say: okay, he is probably right. But if you are speaking about facts—in the factual realm it is only with proofs. There are no formal authorities there. There are experts. You can be persuaded by experts. If you do not understand the matter, go to an expert. But you go to the expert because you understand that what he says is correct, it persuades you, and therefore you accept it. Not because he said it and you have to accept it. That is called accepting things through judgment. A person is not expert in every field. So obviously if there is an area I do not understand, I go to an expert and ask him, and I accept what he says also regarding facts—but I accept it because of my own rational judgment, which says that if he is an expert then he is probably right. So in the final analysis there stands my own rational judgment, not his authority by virtue of his simply being someone. Therefore in the factual context there is no such thing as formal authority. In the factual context there are only proofs. And notice: even one who knows the factual truth and does this with justice and intellectual honesty is called holy. So says Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides—not only with respect to halakhic engagement. Okay? And I think this really represents very well what I was trying to say in the first part of the lesson. It seems to me that I’ll stop here. We have, I think, one more meeting on this topic, and next time I’ll already finish this series. I’ll open microphones now. Okay, so you can ask. We’ll start with the lesson, and afterward if you want to talk about something else. May I have a question?