Halakha and Jewish Legal Theory 5

Table of Contents

• Halakhic territory and an internal limitation
• Rabbi Shimon Shkop, the law of legal systems, and the laws of property
• “The burden of proof is on the one seeking to extract from another” and stealing from a gentile
• Moving beyond the topic of Choshen Mishpat and the plan going forward
• The division of guilt-offerings and the question of how they differ from a sin-offering
• The guilt-offering as a sacrifice that does not distinguish between intentional and unintentional acts
• The guilt-offering of the designated maidservant, Pnei Yehoshua, and the territory of marital status
• Maharik, types of error regarding a married woman, and the concept of “misusing a woman”
• The guilt-offering for misuse of sacred property: becoming non-sacred as a result, and the exception of an unintentional act
• Misuse in vow-prohibitions and a vow as a territorial object-status
• The blessing over enjoyment as misuse of sacred property, and liability for a guilt-offering according to the students of Rabbenu Yonah
• The guilt-offering for theft and its unique link to the oath concerning a deposit
• Choshen Mishpat, legal systems, and the relation to dina de-malkhuta
• The provisional guilt-offering, Maimonides, and doubt as a “house of doubt”
• The three “Please say you are my sister” passages, sin-offering versus guilt-offering, and the suggestion of rape involving a married woman

Summary

General Overview

The text defines halakhic limitations as internal boundaries of a field of application rather than as a clash between values, and connects this to Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s conception of monetary law as a “law of legal systems” that precedes the prohibition of “do not steal” and generates territorial prohibitions by virtue of ownership itself. It proposes that the essence of the guilt-offering, as distinct from the sin-offering, is connected to breaching boundaries and entering territory that is not one’s own, in such a way that liability stems from the result and from the object-status rather than from the person’s guilt. That is why, at times, a guilt-offering applies even without a formal prohibition or without depending on whether the act was unintentional or intentional. It examines this through the various types of guilt-offerings, rabbinic sources, and implications in sacred property, vows, blessings over enjoyment, halakhic doubts, and the use of verses from the “Please say you are my sister” narratives in order to propose a model in which the guilt-offering expresses “desolation” and a violation of the world’s boundary-structure.

Halakhic territory and an internal limitation

The text states that there are commandments whose scope is limited from within, not because of another commandment that clashes with them, and illustrates this with honoring parents, where parents have authority within their domain but not the power to dictate essential points of a child’s life. The text defines this as a boundary of the commandment itself, not as one value being “overridden” by another, and describes it as a kind of halakhic rule of application based on an internal radius of the Jewish law itself.

Rabbi Shimon Shkop, the law of legal systems, and the laws of property

The text presents Rabbi Shimon Shkop as viewing monetary law as a “law of legal systems,” halakhic property law that precedes the Torah and is mostly not created by the Torah. The text argues that property boundaries create prohibitions that precede the prohibition of “do not steal,” and that the prohibition merely gives formal endorsement to the legal determination. The text explains that this is why the very act of entering another person’s domain and taking from his possession is prohibited even without invoking “do not steal”; the prohibition stems from the fact that the item lies outside the taker’s territory.

“The burden of proof is on the one seeking to extract from another” and stealing from a gentile

The text brings Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s difficulty with the rule that “the burden of proof is on the one seeking to extract from another” and asks why one should not be stringent because of a possible prohibition of theft. It answers that if, on the legal level, the defendant may keep the money, then the prohibition of “do not steal” is not triggered, because it comes only to ratify the legal ruling. The text adds an implication regarding stealing from a gentile and cites a dispute among medieval authorities (Rishonim) as to whether stealing from a gentile is forbidden by Torah law under “do not steal,” but states in the name of Rabbi Shimon Shkop that even according to the views that deny a Torah-level prohibition in that verse, stealing from a gentile is still forbidden by Torah law by virtue of the property laws themselves, because the money belongs to the gentile. The text formulates this as entering territory that is not one’s own, where the prohibition stems from the very belongingness of the object and not from the formal command.

Moving beyond the topic of Choshen Mishpat and the plan going forward

The text states that it is concluding the line of discussion that began with Choshen Mishpat, rights and obligations, and territorial considerations, and announces that starting next time it will deal with the commandment of Torah study in preparation for Shavuot. The text then shifts to the central topic of the current lecture and seeks to clarify the essence of the guilt-offering and connect it to meta-halakhic territories that are not determined by Jewish law.

The division of guilt-offerings and the question of how they differ from a sin-offering

The text presents three categories of guilt-offerings: guilt-offerings brought for a sin, namely the guilt-offering for misuse of sacred property, the guilt-offering for theft, and the guilt-offering of the designated maidservant; two guilt-offerings of purification, those of the Nazirite and the leper; and a separate category of the provisional guilt-offering, which is brought for a doubtful transgression. The text asks why certain sins are called a sin-offering while others are called a guilt-offering, and argues that the difference is unlikely to be one of severity. It cites Nachmanides at the beginning of Leviticus, who struggles with the meaning of “guilt-offering” and rejects an interpretation based on greater severity. The text seeks to propose an approach in which the guilt-offering expresses an element of boundary-breaching and disruption of territorial order, and differs from the sin-offering, which is a response to the individual’s unintentional sin.

The guilt-offering as a sacrifice that does not distinguish between intentional and unintentional acts

The text cites a Mishnah in Keritot: “And these are brought for deliberate sin as for unintentional sin,” including one who has relations with the designated maidservant, a Nazirite who became impure, and the oath concerning a deposit, and concludes that there is a correlation between the guilt-offering and the absence of any distinction between intentional and unintentional conduct. The text cites Rashi in Horayot, who states that regarding guilt-offerings, “one is liable for a definite guilt-offering for intentional sin just as for unintentional sin,” and notes exceptions such as misuse of sacred property, where the guilt-offering is brought only for an unintentional act, and the oath of testimony, which is not a guilt-offering and yet still applies equally to intentional and unintentional conduct. The text proposes that the guilt-offering is aimed at the result and the object-status and at the meaning of the act itself, rather than at the person’s criminality, and therefore its liability does not depend on whether the act was intentional or unintentional, but on the very occurrence of the result.

The guilt-offering of the designated maidservant, Pnei Yehoshua, and the territory of marital status

The text defines the designated maidservant, following the Talmud’s conclusion, as a woman who is half slave and half free, in a way that gives her a marital bond to a Hebrew slave, but states that according to the conclusion of most medieval authorities (Rishonim), the man who has relations with her commits no prohibition, while the maidservant receives lashes, making this an asymmetrical case in the laws of forbidden sexual relations. The text cites Pnei Yehoshua in Gittin on the statement “we do not find a wife of two dead men,” and asks how it could be that the possibility of a woman being married to two men is never entertained if the man who has relations with the designated maidservant violates no prohibition. It brings his answer that betrothal involving a married woman is invalid not only because of the severity of the prohibition, but also because she already belongs to her husband and is not available to receive betrothal. The text mentions that Pnei Milu’im disagrees with Pnei Yehoshua, and also cites Maimonides’ wording in the Laws of Kings concerning the people of Shechem, that “Shechem stole,” in order to show that taking a woman is understood as entering someone else’s domain and not only as adultery. The text concludes that liability for a guilt-offering in the case of the designated maidservant is not for a prohibition, but for invading a marital territory that is not one’s own, whereas in the ordinary case of a married woman the guilt-offering is swallowed up within the severity of the transgression and the existing punishment.

Maharik, types of error regarding a married woman, and the concept of “misusing a woman”

The text cites Maharik, who distinguishes between an error in fact and an error in law, and argues regarding a married woman that if the woman committed adultery through an error in law, she becomes forbidden to both her husband and the adulterer, because Scripture says, “and she committed a trespass against her husband,” since she intended to harm the family unit even without knowing the halakhic prohibition. The text presents this as completing the picture in which a marital bond creates a territory whose breach produces a halakhic result even without dependence on the formal structure of prohibitions. The text notes the puzzling aspect that “misuse” regarding sacred property is connected specifically to an unintentional act, whereas here the term is applied with respect to an intentional act or a deliberate injury, and uses this difficulty as a bridge to understanding the guilt-offering for misuse of sacred property.

The guilt-offering for misuse of sacred property: becoming non-sacred as a result, and the exception of an unintentional act

The text states that in the case of unintentional misuse of sacred property, the object becomes non-sacred, and one is liable for the principal, an added fifth, and a guilt-offering, whereas in the case of an intentional act there is a prohibition, but the object does not become non-sacred and there is no liability for a guilt-offering. The text explains that the guilt-offering does not come for the prohibition, but for the result of leaving the domain of sacred property, while the principal and added fifth relate to the prohibition itself. Therefore liability for the guilt-offering is limited to an unintentional act only because only then is the result of becoming non-sacred created. The text formulates the guilt-offering as atonement for the “desolation” and the disruption of order and of the boundary between sacred and ordinary, rather than atonement for the person as an offender, and presents this as an explanation for the exception of misuse of sacred property relative to the general rule that the guilt-offering does not distinguish between intentional and unintentional conduct.

Misuse in vow-prohibitions and a vow as a territorial object-status

The text presents the Talmud’s novel idea that there is “misuse in vow-prohibitions” and emphasizes the question of the Mishneh LaMelekh, who asks what the source is, since for violating a vow there is already the prohibition of “he shall not profane his word” and liability for lashes. The text explains that the novelty stems from the fact that a konam-vow is a law in the object-status itself, and therefore creates a separate territory around the object, and entering it is a boundary-breach that requires an additional guilt-offering beyond the treatment of the personal transgression through lashes. The text compares this to the Ran’s distinction in Nedarim between a vow as object-status law and an oath as personal law, and concludes that in a vow there are two dimensions: the personal prohibition of “he shall not profane his word,” and an object-status-territorial effect, and the guilt-offering belongs to the second dimension.

The blessing over enjoyment as misuse of sacred property, and liability for a guilt-offering according to the students of Rabbenu Yonah

The text cites the Talmud in Berakhot, where the source of the blessing over enjoyment is explained by the idea that “whoever benefits from this world without a blessing is as though he misused sacred property,” and cites the students of Rabbenu Yonah, who write that someone who ate without a blessing is liable for a guilt-offering for misuse of sacred property. The text emphasizes that this sounds like “non-sacred slaughter in the Temple courtyard,” because the blessing over enjoyment is generally viewed as rabbinic, and cites Pnei Yehoshua’s question: how can we rule leniently in cases of doubt concerning blessings if the source is a Torah-level rationale? The text proposes a solution according to which there is a Torah-level obligation to give thanks without God’s name and kingship formula, while the requirement of God’s name and kingship formula is rabbinic. It then explains the liability for the guilt-offering as a response to entering territory that is not one’s own, because the earth belongs to the Holy One, blessed be He, and was given on condition of blessing. So the guilt-offering is not conditioned on a prohibition but on the very act of taking without meeting the territorial condition.

The guilt-offering for theft and its unique link to the oath concerning a deposit

The text connects the guilt-offering for theft to Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s view that theft stems from property laws that precede “do not steal,” and therefore includes a dimension of entering a domain that is not yours beyond merely returning the stolen object. The text cites, in the name of Binyan Tzion, the claim that one must give up one’s life rather than transgress applies also to entering another person’s territory in matters of humiliation, bodily injury, and theft, because this is outside one’s domain and not only because of the severity of the prohibition. The text raises an internal difficulty, namely that the guilt-offering for theft does not apply to every theft but only to theft involving a false oath, and offers a tentative possibility that the use of the divine name or of an oath creates a special element that triggers the guilt-offering. It notes that medieval and later authorities discuss whether the liability is for the oath or for the theft, and that neither side alone fully explains the law.

Choshen Mishpat, legal systems, and the relation to dina de-malkhuta

The text presents Choshen Mishpat as the definition of property territories within Israel, and emphasizes that according to Maimonides’ view concerning the commandment of laws, every nation is entitled to establish its own legal system and is not obligated to adopt Choshen Mishpat. The text adds that accordingly, even within Israel there is room for another system to determine matters in practice through dina de-malkhuta and custom, though Choshen Mishpat is described as “the truth” and not merely an ideal. The text addresses the question of the relevance of Choshen Mishpat today and formulates the point by saying that territories are not necessarily universal, but depend on the legal system that defines them.

The provisional guilt-offering, Maimonides, and doubt as a “house of doubt”

The text cites Maimonides in the Laws of Impurity from a Corpse, who states that all doubtful impurities and the like are rabbinic, and that “all doubts, whether in matters of impurity, forbidden foods, sexual prohibitions, or Sabbaths, have no force other than by the words of the Sages.” It notes a printed addition that has no basis in the manuscripts, which tries to say that a doubt involving karet is forbidden by Torah law because of the provisional guilt-offering. The text explains that the later authorities who relied on this addition did so in order to explain how there can be a provisional guilt-offering if the rule that Torah-level doubt requires stringency is itself only rabbinic, but argues that this stems from the mistaken assumption that a guilt-offering requires a prohibition. The text presents two conceptions of doubtful prohibitions and cites Rabbi Shimon Shkop in Sha’arei Yosher, Gate 1, that the prohibition is the very act of “entering the house of doubt”—that is, creating a forbidden territory of halakhic risk even if it later turns out to have been permitted. Therefore the provisional guilt-offering fits as a response to entering a territory, not as the result of a Torah-level prohibition. The text stresses that rabbinic doubt is treated leniently because rabbinic prohibitions are directed at the person and therefore do not generate this kind of territory.

The three “Please say you are my sister” passages, sin-offering versus guilt-offering, and the suggestion of rape involving a married woman

The text analyzes the three “Please say you are my sister” passages and distinguishes between Pharaoh’s response in the Written Torah, where there is no description of question and answer but only taking and immediate plagues, and the passage of Abimelech with Abraham, where the Holy One, blessed be He, appears in a dream and emphasizes an element of unintentional wrongdoing and the language of “sin,” and finally the passage of Abimelech with Isaac, where Abimelech discovers the truth himself through the window and warns, “and you would have brought guilt upon us.” The text concludes that in the third formulation, “guilt” appears precisely where there was in fact no guilt, but there was almost a created result of harm to the family unit, and suggests that if a complete rape involving intercourse with a married woman were to occur, there might be room for liability for a guilt-offering, because the result would be a breach of marital territory even without criminality. The text argues that when there is a transgression, whether unintentional or intentional, the sin-offering or the death penalty “swallows up” the guilt-offering, whereas in places where there is no transgression that can “swallow” the dimension of result—such as the designated maidservant or, according to the suggestion, complete rape—that dimension of the guilt-offering appears on its own.

Last time we talked about the issue of halakhic / of Jewish law territory, and basically a kind of limitation on various laws that doesn’t arise from a clash with some other law standing opposite them, but rather a limitation from within, not from without. Meaning, from the inside it’s clear that the scope of application of the law under discussion does not extend beyond a certain radius. For example, honoring one’s parents—I’m just reminding you of one or two examples. For instance, with honoring one’s parents, the claim was that parents can speak about things that belong to their territory, but when they want to dictate to the child how to live on essential points, they don’t have the ability to do that—not because there is some other commandment or value standing opposite and limiting the commandment of honoring parents, but because this is an internal limitation. In other words, the commandment of honoring parents is simply not broader than the area that pertains to parents. And that too is another route. So this is basically another kind of halakhic limitation or rule of halakhic override that is not an override of one value by another value. This came against the background of what we saw in Rabbi Shimon Shkop, who also understands monetary law as built in this way. There is what he calls the “theory of law,” which is basically the halakhic property laws. And the halakhic property laws precede the Torah, and for the most part are not created by the Torah, by the way. Some of them are, but most are not. And these boundaries, these proprietary boundaries that say such-and-such property belongs to this person and other property belongs to that person, create prohibitions that do not depend on “do not steal.” They precede “do not steal,” and the law of “do not steal” comes and gives them a kind of formal stamp. So when I enter my fellow’s domain, when I take someone else’s property, I violate the prohibition even if there were no prohibition of “do not steal.” We saw a few implications of this. One of them is the question Rabbi Shimon Shkop raises about how we say: “The burden of proof is on the claimant,” right? The burden of proof is on the plaintiff. Why don’t we go stringently on the commandment, so that in a case of doubt the money should be given over? After all, there is a possible prohibition of theft here. And then Rabbi Shimon Shkop says that if at the legal level we rule that he may keep the money, then there is also no prohibition of “do not steal.” The prohibition of “do not steal” comes to give formal confirmation to the legal determination. Once the legal determination is that “the burden of proof is on the claimant,” then the prohibition of “do not steal” is not activated either. A second implication is stealing from a gentile. There is a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) whether stealing from a gentile is prohibited by Torah law under “do not steal” or not. Even according to the views that say stealing from a gentile is not prohibited by Torah law, Rabbi Shimon Shkop says it is obvious that stealing from a gentile is prohibited by Torah law. It is prohibited by Torah law because the money belongs to the gentile, and from the very fact that it belongs to him according to the laws of property there follows a prohibition on me taking that money, even apart from “do not steal.” Meaning, I am forbidden to take that money—why? Because it does not belong to my territory. I’m invading someone else’s territory, and that itself constitutes a prohibition, not because of the commandment. So this is a phenomenon somewhat similar to the territorial limitations I spoke about earlier. What I want to do today is basically finish this matter. I started from the discussion of Choshen Mishpat, and now Choshen Mishpat itself, in essence, seems to me to be Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s foundation. We talked about rights and obligations, and from here I moved to implications regarding territory, territorial considerations in general, and that I want to finish today. Starting next time we’ll deal a bit with the commandment of Torah study in anticipation of Shavuot. And what I want to do today is actually talk about the essence of the guilt-offering. How does that connect to what we’ve done until now? I’ll try to show that the essence of the guilt-offering is actually connected to this issue of meta-halakhic territories, territories that are not determined by Jewish law. I think that is exactly the core of this offering, as distinct from the sin-offering. And I’ll try to show this through the various verses, through a discussion of the different kinds of guilt-offerings. There are several offerings brought for sins. There is the guilt-offering and there is the sin-offering. And the question is: why for some sins is it called a sin-offering and for other sins it is called a guilt-offering? It’s not plausible that the difference is a difference in severity. You can bring examples in both directions. Nachmanides himself, at the beginning of Leviticus, tries to propose something like that, or wrestles with the meaning of guilt, what the word “guilt” means. And he rejects it. It is not about severity or non-severity, and it’s not entirely clear from his language what his conclusion is. There is some contradiction there that I’m not quite… He says one thing and its opposite there, at least as far as I understood his words. And I want to try to offer a suggestion, part of which is already found in Nachmanides, but there too there are contradictions, so I’m not completely sure what his conclusion is. First of all, a general survey. What kinds of guilt-offerings are there? We can divide them into three categories. There are guilt-offerings that come for a sin. Guilt-offerings that come for a sin are the guilt-offering for misuse of sacred property, the guilt-offering for thefts, and the guilt-offering of a designated maidservant. Those are the three guilt-offerings. The guilt-offering for misuse of sacred property is when someone makes improper use of consecrated property unintentionally, so the consecrated object becomes ordinary property and he is obligated in a guilt-offering. That is the guilt-offering for misuse of sacred property. The guilt-offering for thefts is in the case of an oath regarding a deposit: when someone claims money from another—not necessarily for outright theft, but also wages owed to a hired worker or things like that—and the other swears that he does not have his fellow’s money, and in the end it turns out that he swore falsely, then this is basically theft by means of an oath. When you steal by means of an oath, you bring the guilt-offering for thefts. For ordinary theft, you do not bring the guilt-offering for thefts. And the third guilt-offering is the guilt-offering of a designated maidservant: someone who has relations with a designated maidservant—I’ll define that later on—brings a guilt-offering, the guilt-offering of a designated maidservant. Those are the three guilt-offerings for sin. Then there are two guilt-offerings of purification, for the Nazirite and for the leper. And a third guilt-offering, which can also be defined as a guilt-offering for sin, is the provisional guilt-offering. The provisional guilt-offering is a guilt-offering brought for a doubtful transgression. Meaning, if I ate something that, had it certainly been forbidden, would entail a sin-offering and karet, then for the doubtful case I bring a provisional guilt-offering. So it really belongs with the guilt-offerings for sin, but it’s a separate category, so you can put it in a third category. What is common to all these guilt-offerings? How can I use them to understand why specifically in these places a guilt-offering is brought? I’m going to talk about the guilt-offerings for sin, and after I show what is common to the guilt-offerings for sin, I’ll say a word about the Nazirite and the leper, but that won’t be our topic. There is a Mishnah in tractate Keritot. The Mishnah says: “And these bring [an offering] for intentional sin as for unintentional sin: one who has relations with the maidservant, a Nazirite who became impure, and the oath of testimony, and the oath regarding a deposit.” Meaning, all these bring an offering even when they acted intentionally, and not only when they acted unintentionally. There are four cases here; of them, three are guilt-offerings. One of them is not a guilt-offering: the oath of testimony is not a guilt-offering, it is a sliding-scale offering. But one who has relations with the maidservant, a Nazirite who became impure, and the oath regarding a deposit—all three are basically guilt-offerings. So we see that there is at least some correlation between a guilt-offering and no distinction between intentional and unintentional sin. There is Rashi on the Mishnah in Horayot, and Rashi says: “Furthermore, with guilt-offerings there is no law of communal error, for one is liable to a definite guilt-offering for intentional sin as for unintentional sin.” Meaning, Rashi says that the characteristic—one of the characteristics—of a guilt-offering is that one is liable for it for intentional sin just as for unintentional sin; there is no difference between intentional and unintentional. So it would be more correct to say that with all guilt-offerings… no, that’s it—I’m saying there is the case of the oath of testimony, which is not a guilt-offering, and still one is liable for intentional as for unintentional, that’s the example from the Mishnah in Keritot that I read before. And there is the opposite example: misuse of sacred property is a guilt-offering that comes only for unintentional sin; there is no misuse of sacred property in intentional sin. Meaning, there is a prohibition, but the object does not become ordinary property, and there is no obligation of a guilt-offering. So there are exceptions. But still—we talked about Popper in the past—this is something where one example does not topple a theory. Meaning, if there is something that generally works, and you have one example that doesn’t, you usually remain with the general theory and have to think about why the exception really is an exception. I’ll explain both the theory and the exception later on. Popper said that when you bring a counterexample, the theory collapses. People criticized him a lot afterward—it’s not true. There is almost no scientific theory that doesn’t have a few exceptions, and nevertheless we don’t so quickly throw it out. Meaning, we try to look—if it works well in many cases, then it is probably right. Maybe not perfect, maybe you need to round off some corner somewhere, but you don’t throw out the theory just because of one counterexample. That doesn’t happen. And this is not just psychology or a defect of our conservatism; it’s not true. There is something real here. Fine. So for our purposes here, I’ll assume for the moment that the characteristic of a guilt-offering is that it comes for intentional sin as for unintentional sin. And remember in parentheses: misuse of sacred property is exceptional; I’ll explain that exception. But apart from that, guilt-offerings are brought for intentional just as for unintentional. What does that mean? If an offering comes for intentional sin just as for unintentional sin, I’m trying to think what that says about the offering. What kind of thing is it where I don’t care whether the person acted intentionally or unintentionally, unlike a sin-offering, which comes only for the unintentional. So the obvious claim is that a guilt-offering is brought for the result. Not for the criminality of the person, right? Not for how much atonement is needed for the guilt or criminality of the person, because offerings of that kind—that’s the sin-offering—and that is only for inadvertence. A guilt-offering doesn’t care whether it was intentional or unintentional. You have to bring a guilt-offering if you did something. Why? Because the act has significance in itself, regardless of why or how you did it. It’s not in the person; it’s in the act itself, in the object. Therefore, once it was done, or once the result occurred, you have to bring a guilt-offering, and it makes no difference whether it was intentional or unintentional. That’s the proposal. Now let’s try to examine this. What I’m going to do is simply go through all the kinds of guilt-offerings, and I’ll show you that this is so. So one of them, the first guilt-offering, let’s start with the guilt-offering of the designated maidservant. There is some discussion in the Talmud, but the conclusion is that a designated maidservant is half slave and half free. A maidservant who belonged to two masters, one of whom freed his portion, and so she remained basically half slave and half free. And she is married, say, to a Hebrew slave, and therefore there is in effect a bond of marriage between them; they are a couple. But one who has relations with her, with a designated maidservant—according to the conclusion of the Talmud, there are opinions, and in any case most of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) say this—there is no prohibition at all. No prohibition at all. The maidservant transgresses a prohibition, but the man who has relations with her does not transgress a prohibition. This is the only case in the prohibitions of sexual relations that is not symmetric. The Talmud says that every time the man who has relations transgresses, the woman also does, and vice versa. The designated maidservant is the non-symmetric case, perhaps the only one—I think it is the only one—where she receives lashes because she committed a transgression, of course I’m speaking not in a case of coercion but where she did it willingly, and the man who had relations with her did not transgress. But he brings a guilt-offering. The man who had relations with her brings a guilt-offering. So before we get to why he brings a guilt-offering, there is the Pnei Yehoshua in tractate Gittin. The Talmud there says that we have not found “the wife of two dead men.” What does that mean? It means there cannot be a situation where a woman is married to two men, and if both die, she has levirate bonds in two directions. Right? Two husbands, so if they die without children she needs levirate marriage from both brothers, from the brother of each one. There is no such thing. A woman—or in plain language, it is impossible for a woman to be married to two men. And that is basically the question. Describing it in terms of levirate marriage is just the style of the Sages; they always speak in the language of halakhic consequences. “We have not found the wife of two dead men” means that we do not find a woman of two living men. Why does that matter? Because then she would be obligated in levirate marriage from two directions, so they call it “the wife of two dead men.” That’s what the Talmud says. Tosafot at least explains the Talmud that way, but it doesn’t matter, I’ll assume that explanation. On this the Pnei Yehoshua asks the following question: we know that when a person betroths a relative, a forbidden relation, or a married woman, the betrothal does not take effect. Right? Betrothal does not take effect in prohibited relations. What happens in cases of ordinary prohibitions? Say, a priest who betroths a divorcee. A priest who betroths a divorcee—that is a dispute among the tannaim. The law follows Rabbi Akiva that betrothal does take effect in cases of ordinary prohibitions. Right? If it is only a prohibition and not an incestuous relation, then if you betrothed her, even though there is a prohibition, in intercourse at least there is a prohibition, still the betrothal takes effect. The Pnei Yehoshua asks: there is the designated maidservant, and someone comes and betroths her. After she is already married—the designated maidservant is married—and now someone comes and betroths her. If he betroths her, there is no prohibition on him, as I said before. If there is no prohibition on him, then the betrothal takes effect, right? Even in a mere prohibition the betrothal takes effect, so where there is no prohibition at all, certainly the betrothal takes effect. So he says, if so, then this woman is the wife of two husbands. And why does her prohibition not prevent the betrothal from taking effect? Even if her prohibition were there, it would only be an ordinary prohibition. According to Rabbi Akiva there is no problem. And according to the law following Rabbi Akiva there is no problem. But for her there isn’t even an ordinary prohibition. But why is she betrothed? Because there is no ordinary prohibition? Yes. Exactly. Betrothal takes effect if it is not one of the ordinary prohibitions. Is there some other reason why she cannot be betrothed? What do you mean there? Is there another reason the betrothal doesn’t take effect? Where does that reason come from? Where is that written? What? A married woman? Ah. We’ll see that in a moment. That’s what the Pnei Yehoshua says. So the Pnei Yehoshua says that apparently in the case of the designated maidservant we can create a situation where a woman is married simultaneously to two husbands. She would be “the wife of two dead men.” So how can the Talmud say that we have not found “the wife of two dead men”? So he answers—really what you said. Let me formulate it in my own language: in all prohibited relations, the reason betrothal does not take effect is because of the severity of the prohibition—the prohibition of incest or forbidden relation. But in the case of a married woman, besides the severity of the prohibition, there is also the fact that she is simply already the wife of someone else. She has no legal hand, as it were, to receive betrothal again, to put it in technical language. Meaning, she is someone else’s wife; she is not available for betrothal. You cannot betroth her not because of the prohibition involved, but because she is already someone else’s. Now, that exists regardless of the severity of the prohibition. In the case of an ordinary married woman there are both aspects: both the severity of the prohibition and the fact that she is someone else’s wife. In the case of the designated maidservant, the prohibition is absent, but in a married woman betrothal does not fail only because of the severity of the prohibition, but simply because she is someone else’s wife. So with a designated maidservant certainly betrothal also will not take effect, says the Pnei Yehoshua, because in the end she is someone else’s wife. That is his claim. And since that is so, truly here too there cannot be a case of “the wife of two dead men.” Meaning, there cannot be a situation in which a woman is married to two men. Or in other words, when the Talmud says we have not found “the wife of two dead men,” or that a woman cannot be married to two husbands, that is an essential determination. It is not some accidental summary that somehow it just always works out that with a woman there is a problem in the validity of betrothal. Essentially, by virtue of the fact that she is the wife of the first, she cannot become the wife of another. Yes. You’re distinguishing between a forbidden relation that is an inherent status of the woman, which will be there in any case, and an existing state of marriage at the moment. What, for example, about two sisters? There is a prohibition of forbidden relation with two sisters. Right. Seemingly very similar. Only while the first wife is alive is the second prohibited. There is no inherent prohibition in the body of the second woman. Right, but still, as long as the first one is alive, there is a prohibition on the second one. What difference does it make? A prohibition because of the severity of the prohibition. Here too it isn’t because of the severity of the prohibition, because it depends on the life of her sister. So if she dies then it becomes permitted? No, but that is the prohibition. The prohibition is while her sister is alive. But the validity of betrothal—there being no betrothal—isn’t similar to some other aspect of transgression. So what? But still, the reason betrothal does not take effect with a wife’s sister is because of the severity of the prohibition. The fact that after his wife dies there is no prohibition—so what is the problem? Then betrothal takes effect. Meaning that the severity is not permanently attached; rather only the situation of the relationship is prohibited? No, why do you think that if it depends on the situation it is not severity of prohibition? Because that is exactly the designated maidservant: because she is married to the slave, if she were not married to the slave there would be no problem for betrothal to take effect. Why not? So why? It’s not because of the temporary nature of the prohibition. Because with a designated maidservant there is no prohibition, but with a wife’s sister there is a prohibition of forbidden relation. As long as the sister is alive. So because of the severity of the prohibition I cannot betroth her, the second one. The problem is the magnitude of the prohibition, not that she is someone’s wife. True, in that case it is a prohibition that depends on another situation. Some would call it a prohibition on the person; I’m not sure that is the right definition there. But even if so, what difference does it make? As long as the prohibition exists, that prohibition is severe enough that I cannot betroth her. Meaning that betrothal does not take effect with a wife’s sister because of the severity of the prohibition, not because of something side-related. In contrast, with a married woman it’s not only that—there is also the severity of the prohibition, but also the fact that she is someone else’s wife. And with a designated maidservant there is only the second aspect, and therefore the betrothal does not take effect. The Avnei Milu’im disagrees with him, but that doesn’t matter; he does not accept this point. There is a formulation in Maimonides, in the Laws of Kings, from which people try to derive a broader conclusion. Maimonides writes about the seven Noahide commandments, and he says: “And because of this all the men of Shechem were liable to death, for Shechem stole, and they saw and knew and did not judge him.” What does it mean “stole”? What did he steal? He married Dinah. Why is marrying called stealing? It is called stealing because I am relating to the woman as something that—in that case, by the way, she was not married, so it is probably in relation to the father and not to a husband—but they still use here the term “steal” because taking a woman is not just adultery. Meaning, it is not only a problem of prohibition. There is some problem here that she is in another domain and you want to take her from that other domain, and therefore basically you cannot do it; the betrothal does not take effect. So what emerges from the Pnei Yehoshua is that the reason betrothal does not take effect with a designated maidservant is not because of the prohibition but because she is someone else’s wife. In light of this, we can understand why a guilt-offering is brought for it. A guilt-offering is brought for it because—after all, there is no prohibition involved, as I said, right? There isn’t. One who has relations with a designated maidservant or betroths a designated maidservant violates no prohibition. So why does he bring a guilt-offering? He brings a guilt-offering because a guilt-offering is not brought for a prohibition. With a guilt-offering, the problem is not the prohibition. The problem is that you are invading someone else’s domain. And even if there is no formal halakhic prohibition on it, the very intrusion into someone else’s domain, someone else’s territory, obligates a guilt-offering. And therefore you bring the guilt-offering, and therefore this is indeed specifically with the designated maidservant. You can ask: what about someone who has relations with a married woman? Or betroths a married woman, it doesn’t matter—someone who has relations with a married woman—why does he not bring a guilt-offering? There too, besides the aspect of prohibition, there is also this aspect. But that is a kind of “something from a different category,” because there, somewhere else, there is already a prohibition, and therefore the guilt-offering is swallowed up within it. And with the designated maidservant, that is exactly the point: because with the designated maidservant there is no prohibition to swallow up the guilt-offering, what remains? What remains is only intrusion into someone else’s domain. Intrusion into someone else’s domain obligates a guilt-offering. Later I’ll try to claim—I haven’t found a source for it—but it seems there is a source in the Written Torah for this idea, that if someone does this under coercion, where then there is no prohibition—maybe with an ordinary married woman or a designated maidservant—then there is no prohibition, but there would still be a guilt-offering. Why only a guilt-offering? Why not a sin-offering and everything else? A guilt-offering, anywhere there is intrusion into someone else’s domain, there will be a guilt-offering. Let’s wait; I’ll bring more examples. According to Maimonides, in the story of Dinah, why would he not have to bring a guilt-offering for taking her without the father’s permission? He is also intruding. Who says he wouldn’t have to bring a guilt-offering? Maybe he would need to bring a guilt-offering. I don’t know what the halakhic category today would be for what happened there. But I’ll come back to that, because that really is Written Torah. And if the whole point is that I am intruding into someone else’s domain, then the logic would say that I should compensate that other person whose domain I intruded on. Why suddenly do I bring a guilt-offering? No, it’s not compensation. It has nothing to do with compensation. We are talking here about a type of wrongdoing, but the wrongdoing is not the halakhic wrongdoing where there is a commandment; rather, it is the wrongdoing—or not even wrongdoing exactly, but the significance of violating the normal order. You are entering a domain that is not yours. So not the criminal dimension of it—the criminal dimension is what the sin-offering deals with. A guilt-offering means the blurring itself, the breaking of boundaries itself, meaning the alteration of the regular order itself, the intrusion into another domain. Okay? Not specifically because of the harm to the other person; not on that aspect. It comes because of me; meaning it comes because I did what Nachmanides calls desolation—guilt, from the language of desolation. There is something I ruined in the world. Meaning, it is not specific compensation to the person I hurt. Why not both an obligation of compensation to the person and also an obligation toward Heaven? There may also be compensation to the person, depending on the circumstances and what we are talking about. In a place where, for example, with thefts, there really is compensation to the person. I’ll still speak about the other kinds. Maybe I’ll bring in this context a very famous responsum of Maharik. By the way, in that same responsum I brought last time on another topic, there are several topics there—or maybe it was the previous responsum, I don’t remember. Maharik talks there—we know that in the Torah there are two kinds of unintentional error. Say, the Mishnah in tractate Shabbat, chapter Kelal Gadol, speaks about two kinds of unintentional error on the Sabbath. Someone who does not know that today is the Sabbath—he’s ignorant, say, and he didn’t know that today is the Sabbath. That is factual error; meaning he did not know something about reality. And there is legal error, meaning he knows today is the Sabbath but he doesn’t know that sorting is forbidden. There is factual error and legal error. In both these cases he is called unintentional, and he is liable for a sin-offering, say on the Sabbath. As far as the sin-offering goes, both these kinds of error certainly are inadvertence that obligates a sin-offering. What about a married woman whom someone had relations with unintentionally? So the basic law is that if she is the wife of a priest, then even in inadvertence or under coercion she must leave him. But if she is the wife of an Israelite, then in intentional adultery she becomes prohibited to the husband and the adulterer, but in inadvertence or coercion she is not prohibited; she can continue to live with her husband. Now his question is—unintentional, I assume, on her side. Actually that should be checked; I assume on her side. In any case, Maharik asks an interesting question, even before bringing proofs—just the fact that he asks it, why does he ask it? He asks whether that is true for both types of inadvertence. What happens with a woman who committed adultery, but her error was not that she thought it was her husband—that would be factual error, factual mistake—but rather she thought it was permitted, that there was no prohibition. Maharik says that in such a case she becomes prohibited to the husband and the adulterer even though it is inadvertence. Why? Because it says “and she commits a trespass against her husband,” and therefore she becomes prohibited. When she did this, behold, she committed a trespass against her husband—meaning she wanted to damage the family unit. True, she did not know that there was a halakhic prohibition in it, so what? But she wanted to do it. Factually damaging the family unit, not because of Jewish law—again, notice, it’s not the prohibition. The damage to the family unit is called a trespass against her husband, and therefore she is prohibited to the husband and the adulterer. Again, this is the other side of the coin from the Pnei Yehoshua. Understand? That is what we saw: that the marital bond does not only generate prohibitions—for example that it is forbidden to betroth or have relations with the woman because there is a prohibition—but the marital bond also creates a kind of territory that one may not intrude into, or one may not break the walls around it. And if someone breaks the walls around that territory, irrespective of the question of prohibition—even if there were no prohibition here—there is still something here that obligates a guilt-offering, or that prohibits her to the husband and the adulterer. There is something else here beyond the prohibition. And that something is the boundaries of the territory. There is a territorial definition here that has these two implications: the prohibition to the husband and the adulterer, and the obligation of a guilt-offering. So I think this completes the picture we saw regarding the designated maidservant in the Pnei Yehoshua. Fine. Let’s take a very modern case, almost as practical Jewish law. Suppose we drew here the case of a concubine, okay? Today there is no halakhic category of concubine. Okay, a concubine is a different law. The question is whether that too creates a territory into which it is forbidden to intrude, or not. So let’s say today—in the non-religious world, yes, even in the religious world too, this happens, okay—that there is some woman who is uniquely attached on the side. Can we say today that if someone else then betroths her, okay, or something like that—can that be discussed in terms of territory because he defined it for himself and society sort of understands it, even if it doesn’t formally accept it in that way? It can be defined. It can be defined. In principle I think there is definitely room for that. Meaning, forget concubinage, let’s talk about what Rabbi Herzog once called “Noahide marriage,” even though he does not define it precisely. But this notion is basically this: after the giving of the Torah, in order to marry I need prior betrothal. What happens if I did not do betrothal? Am I going back to living with her as they lived before the giving of the Torah—just deciding to live together, what today is called common-law spouses or something like that? Can such a thing create marriage—not the full halakhic marriage, because it does not come after betrothal—but marriage like among gentiles? That is what gentiles do to this day, and the Torah says it: a person takes a woman, they live together, and she is his wife. And there is a prohibition to have relations with her, with all the rules. I think that certainly this would exist for a Jew as well. Certainly it would exist for a Jew as well. After all, there is never a case where something is forbidden to Noahides and permitted to Israel. So how can it be that for Noahides, marriage of this kind, without prior betrothal, creates a prohibition on someone who has relations with her, but for a Jew it would not create that? Certainly it would create it. It would not have the death penalty aspect that requires a full married woman and so on, but the guilt-offering or that dimension, definitely yes. Okay, this can be expanded, by the way. There are halakhic sources for it. I think I can bring a lot of proofs for this matter, that there is such a thing as marriage without betrothal or betrothal without marriage, and these are two different components. Now there is an interesting thing I’m getting to. That was the guilt-offering of the designated maidservant. Now from the discussion in Maharik, notice what Maharik said—a somewhat strange thing. Maharik argues that it says “and she commits a trespass against her husband.” Since it says “a trespass against her husband,” this is called trespass against her husband because she intended to damage the marital bond even if she didn’t know it was halakhically forbidden, but she knew she was dismantling the family bond. Therefore it is “a trespass against her husband.” That is very strange, because misuse of sacred property, if you remember, is exactly the exception I spoke about—it comes specifically for inadvertence. He derives from the fact that it says “a trespass against her husband” that intentionality here is actually the important thing. When does a woman become prohibited to the husband and the adulterer? When she acts intentionally. Right. So he says: when else? Also when she errs in law and not in fact. That too. Why? Because that too is basically intentional with respect to the damage. But you learn that from the verse “a trespass against her husband”? Misuse of sacred property is specifically unintentional. If it is called “trespass,” I would have said that a woman becomes prohibited to the husband and the adulterer specifically in inadvertence, like misuse of sacred property. So she commits a trespass against her husband, and in intentional sin not. How can one learn from “a trespass against her husband”? Why didn’t you say unintentional? I don’t understand. No, but Maharik said the opposite. Maharik said: although it is inadvertent, since there is an element of trespass in it, therefore she becomes prohibited. So what is this element of trespass? It is exactly the dimension that is not the inadvertence, but the intentionality. That is his reasoning. He says: after all, it says “and she commits a trespass against her husband,” therefore one who acts intentionally becomes prohibited, and this type of inadvertence is also basically intentional for our purposes. So trespass here represents the side of intentionality, not the side of inadvertence. And that is very strange, because misuse of sacred property comes in inadvertence. By definition it exists only in inadvertence. And here I come to the second offering. We did the guilt-offering of the designated maidservant; now I move to the guilt-offering for misuse of sacred property. Here too there is room to discuss many proofs, but I’ll just state the principle. In misuse of sacred property, what is the difference between intentional and inadvertent? In inadvertence, the object becomes ordinary property. In intentional misuse there is a prohibition—when you take a sacred object intentionally there is a prohibition, but it does not become ordinary. One can explain that in a couple of ways, but that is the law in any case. When are you liable for a guilt-offering for misuse of sacred property? Only in inadvertence. The guilt-offering, the principal, the additional fifth, and the guilt-offering. The principal and the additional fifth are for the prohibition, and the guilt-offering is for the becoming ordinary. What? No, I’m saying: the guilt-offering is for its becoming ordinary. Why? Because the essence of a guilt-offering is going out beyond the boundary. So once there has been a becoming ordinary, you are liable for a guilt-offering for misuse of sacred property, exactly as we had with the guilt-offering of the designated maidservant. Only when is there a becoming ordinary? Only in inadvertence. Meaning that the inadvertence is not the reason I am liable for the guilt-offering. The inadvertence is merely the instance in which it becomes ordinary. When it becomes ordinary—exactly—the result is that it became ordinary. Now that it became ordinary, because it became ordinary I bring a guilt-offering. Meaning that the guilt-offering for misuse of sacred property, which seems at first glance to be exceptional because it comes only for inadvertence and not for intention—and we said, how can that be, after all guilt-offerings come for both unintentional and intentional—it’s simple: here the theft is created only when you do it unintentionally. That belongs to the laws of misuse of sacred property; it has nothing to do with the laws of guilt-offerings. In the laws of misuse of sacred property, only in inadvertence is there becoming ordinary. Therefore only there do you bring guilt-offerings. There are many nice practical consequences of this; I’m not going to give a whole class on that now, but it solves many problems in the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and later authorities (Acharonim), a lot of problems. I think you can prove it from many places. Let me prove it to you from a few points where it is really directly relevant to our issue. There are two types of guilt-offering for misuse of sacred property that appear. Before I prove it, let me just define what I am claiming. In the guilt-offering for misuse of sacred property, the claim is exactly as I said with the guilt-offering of the designated maidservant: the obligation of the guilt-offering does not come for the prohibition. For the prohibition there are the principal and the additional fifth. The obligation of the guilt-offering comes for the becoming ordinary, for the reality, for the result, for the fact that the wall fell here. Not for the prohibition. For the prohibition there are the principal and the additional fifth. Why are they entirely separate? Because this one comes for the becoming ordinary and that one comes for the prohibition. Okay? Therefore, exactly as we saw with the guilt-offering of the designated maidservant, so too with the guilt-offering for misuse of sacred property. True, here there is a prohibition, unlike the designated maidservant, but the guilt-offering does not come for the prohibition but for something else that happens alongside the prohibition. The prohibition is dealt with by means of the penalty of principal and additional fifth. The guilt-offering comes for the becoming ordinary. So although here there is a prohibition, the guilt-offering does not come for the prohibition. Meaning, this still fits with what we saw in the guilt-offering of the designated maidservant. And the guilt-offering is some sort of atonement? Yes—purification, atonement, something like that. But atonement not in the sense of his sin—that is the sin-offering. Atonement in the sense of cleaning up the consequences. Meaning, you made a desolation in the world; there is something here that somehow repairs that. Not for the person. No, on the contrary—the sin-offering is for the person, and therefore here it matters very much how the person committed the transgression. And the guilt-offering is for the desolation you made by your act—for example, that it became ordinary, or with the designated maidservant that you harmed the family unit. Again, you broke some wall. Okay? I’ll show you in two nice examples that there too it is very strange, and I think here it’s simpler. So you’re saying that it leaves the territory of the Holy One, blessed be He, and enters the territory of human beings? Right. I broke the wall between the Holy One, blessed be He, and human beings. Yes, so that parallels the woman moving from the couple, the family unit, to what is outside. Yes, exactly. And in that it parallels property again. Property I’ll get to in a moment. So it’s the same thing. I agree. But there is a parallel here. Right, exactly. Meaning, the claim is—and the point is also—that even if there is a prohibition in the collapsing of this wall or in this blurring of boundaries, the guilt-offering does not come for the prohibition. Sometimes there is no prohibition at all; sometimes there is a prohibition but the guilt-offering does not come for it; it comes for something else. Look. There are two examples of guilt-offerings for misuse of sacred property that are extremely strange. One of them is misuse of sacred property in vow-prohibitions. The Talmud invents this out of thin air. A “konam” is a vow, right? “This loaf is forbidden to me.” I make a vow and then that loaf becomes forbidden to me. Okay? This is the prohibition of “he shall not profane his word,” a vow. If I violate a vow, I transgress “he shall not profane his word”; there are lashes and everything else that is needed. Suddenly the Talmud, out of nowhere—there is no source for this, no one knows where it comes from—the Talmud says there is misuse of sacred property in vow-prohibitions. What does that mean? If you violated the vow-prohibition again, then you are liable—whether in inadvertence or intention, we’ll see in a moment, I don’t think it’s true that it’s only inadvertence—you are liable for a guilt-offering. Where does this come from? The משנה למלך cannot understand where it comes from. He runs here and there and says it requires great investigation. Where does this invention come from? For the prohibition itself there are lashes. What is the problem? There is treatment for the prohibition, as with all other prohibitions. What is a guilt-offering doing here? What sacred property is there here? A guilt-offering for misuse of sacred property. Misuse of sacred property in vow-prohibitions, yes? What sacred property is there? The vow is entirely ordinary. I did not consecrate something to the altar or to Temple maintenance, but rather we are talking about a prohibition on a loaf of bread that I vowed not to eat. You know that the Talmud says that a vow, unlike an oath, is a law in the object. Tractate Nedarim—meaning, a law in the object means that the object itself is seized by the prohibition or becomes an object of prohibition, unlike an oath, which forbids me to do an action but the action or object in itself does not become prohibited. And the question is: where does this “konam” come from? And the משנה למלך remains with “requires investigation”; he does not understand where it comes from. And I think the answer is very simple. The moment you define a vow-prohibition as a territory in itself, because it is a law in the object—as opposed to an oath, where only I am forbidden to do something, there is no wall surrounding the thing—then with a loaf of bread that is forbidden to me there is: it suddenly becomes some separate territory that I am forbidden to enter. It is a law in the object. Once I entered there, then true, there is a prohibition, and for that you get lashes. That is unrelated. But beyond that, I also crossed a boundary here. For crossing a boundary one brings a guilt-offering. The boundary of the vow. Yes. But with other things you can distinguish. Right, with a vow it was newly established that it belongs to no one. That is something important. Right, it belongs to no one. Right. It is like a non-territory. Fine, but it is still a kind of vacuum territory. Meaning, it is a territory that belongs to no one. So why a punishment? You know, even the empty set is a set. Meaning, why a punishment? That is exactly the point: it is not a punishment. You keep viewing it that way. Earlier too they asked that. It is not compensation to the owner of the domain I harmed, because after all a guilt-offering does not compensate him. I bring an offering to the Temple. How is that compensation to him? Compensation to him is returning the theft, or paying him something, whatever. In any case, this would not be compensation here, even if there were something to compensate. Here there isn’t even anything to compensate for. Doesn’t matter. I bring an offering for the disorder I created in reality. That is the point. This is metaphysics, kind of. Yes, ontology—don’t call it metaphysics. Yes. So that is a rationale that has to be assumed. Right. This is the Sages’ rationale; it has no source anywhere. It emerges from nowhere in the Talmudic discussions. There is no source, no exposition, no verse, nothing. Rather, the Sages say: once you define this as a separate territory, then of necessity there has to be a guilt-offering here. If there is crossing of territory, then by pure reasoning there must be a guilt-offering—no source, no verse, nothing. Why? Why does everyone ask? Because everyone assumes that a guilt-offering comes for sin. And in order for a guilt-offering to come for sin, you need to define a source that defines this act as a sin. But there is no source. So then it’s unconsecrated slaughter in the Temple courtyard. How can you bring an offering when there is no sin? But here there is the sin of “he shall not profane his word.” Yet the sin of “he shall not profane his word” is handled by regular punishment law. What does that have to do with a guilt-offering? But here too one can distinguish: in other cases the territory belonged to someone. I didn’t say otherwise. One can distinguish, but the Sages did not distinguish. What? One can distinguish, but the Sages did not distinguish. The Torah defined that you do not enter the territory; it did not belong to someone else. Right, I said: it doesn’t belong to someone else, but still I created a territory here. The Torah’s innovation is that when I vow, I have the capacity—the Torah says that when I vow, I can define a territory; I impose a prohibition on the object. And that is assumed. No, that’s the Torah. No, that’s not “assumed”; the Torah says that. From where? How do we know that? In the section on vows, and the Talmud at the beginning of Nedarim. But where is it defined that there is separation? The Talmud at the beginning of tractate Nedarim. What do I know? I’m just musing—I’m musing about the objects themselves. Fine, you can muse. I don’t care. I’m only saying what the Sages’ rationale is. So you think differently, but for the Sages this is their rationale. Let me give a more extreme, more radical example. The Talmud in Berakhot—the Talmud in Berakhot that I once mentioned in connection with the Pnei Yehoshua and its implication for the principle that pure reasoning can generate Torah law—the Talmud searches for a source for the blessing before deriving benefit. To say “Who creates the fruit of the tree,” or “Who creates the fruit of the ground,” “By whose word all came to be.” And they do not find one. And then the conclusion is that anyone who enjoys this world without a blessing is “as if he committed misuse of sacred property.” Therefore there is a prohibition to eat without a blessing, and one must bless. How is the misuse of sacred property here—this is very deliberately misuse of sacred property here, isn’t it? “As if he committed misuse of sacred property” is already language of intention, yes. Also intention. So “as if he committed misuse of sacred property,” and therefore one must bless. The students of Rabbenu Yonah there on the Rif write that he is liable for a guilt-offering. A guilt-offering for misuse of sacred property—someone who ate without a blessing is liable for a guilt-offering for misuse of sacred property. And they write this in two places. In two places. Why suddenly a guilt-offering? This is unconsecrated slaughter in the Temple courtyard. After all, this is a rabbinic prohibition—right? To eat without a blessing. “In cases of doubt regarding blessings, we are lenient.” Right? So why is he liable to bring a guilt-offering? How can you bring a guilt-offering without a sin? This is unconsecrated slaughter in the Temple courtyard. I’m bringing a guilt-offering without a sin. Where did they invent this from? “As if he committed misuse of sacred property”—that’s some kind of interpretive exposition, but not really. It means they take it literally. Meaning, “as if he committed misuse of sacred property” means this is misuse of sacred property, as if misuse of sanctity. That is the “as if,” but it is fully misuse of sacred property. Why is it fully misuse of sacred property? Because they require a guilt-offering. The Pnei Yehoshua there asks—that’s the Pnei Yehoshua I brought then—if this comes from pure reasoning, then why are cases of doubt treated leniently? We know that pure reasoning is Torah law. The Talmud says: “Why do I need a verse? Why do I need reasoning?” Meaning, the Talmud sees the verse and the reasoning as two equal alternatives. Right? So if that is the case, a doubt regarding a prohibition that emerges from reasoning should be a Torah-level doubt requiring stringency. So why are doubts regarding blessings treated leniently? Okay? Doubts about blessings before enjoyment? Yes, yes—from reasoning, yes. Grace after meals is explicit Torah law. But I’m saying a doubt about blessings before enjoyment is lenient, and the Pnei Yehoshua asks why, since this is a doubtful Torah prohibition, because something that emerges from reasoning is Torah law. So in my humble opinion, what needs to be said here is that really a doubt about blessings should be treated stringently, not leniently. One who does not know whether he blessed or did not bless should bless again. In practice, in Jewish law. In practice. But the blessing does not need to be with the Divine Name and kingship formula. Since the requirement to bless in the formal formula of Divine Name and kingship is a rabbinic requirement, in that I am lenient, especially because there is a prohibition of taking God’s Name in vain. So not with Divine Name and kingship; just say thank you to the Holy One, blessed be He, for giving you an apple. But that you are obligated to do by Torah law, and if you do not do it, you bring a guilt-offering. You bring a guilt-offering not because of a prohibition—there is no prohibition. So this is a wonderful example, because in all the previous cases, except for the designated maidservant, there was a prohibition, except that the guilt-offering did not come for the prohibition but for something else. Here it is best of all, because here there is no prohibition at all. So what does the guilt-offering come for? The guilt-offering comes because the earth belongs to the Holy One, blessed be He, and He gave it to human beings on condition that they bless. If they did not bless, that is misuse of sacred property. Misuse of sacred property not in the sense of a prohibition, because there is no prohibition. Misuse of sacred property in the factual sense: you invaded a territory that is not yours. For that one brings a guilt-offering. But you just invented that misuse of sacred property is only in inadvertence. No, misuse of sacred property in consecrated property becomes ordinary only in inadvertence. But if you ate the apple, then the apple no longer exists, whether you did it intentionally or not. But when is it more severe? Clearly, factually, it is more severe. And clearly that’s so. In consecrated property, what happens when you misuse it is that you remove the object into ordinary status while it still exists. So the whole question is whether its legal status is now ordinary. Its legal status becomes ordinary only if you acted inadvertently. But here you ate the apple; it is no longer there. It’s not a matter of legal status. It simply no longer exists. You took it from the Holy One, blessed be He, and now it is gone. So what difference does it make whether it was intentional or unintentional? It’s gone. That’s it—you took it from Him. Therefore in this context you bring a guilt-offering. You could say that about every positive commandment. Putting on tefillin—you could say that is a kind of misuse of sacred property. Why misuse of sacred property? I did not take anything out of a domain. That is a prohibition. The Holy One, blessed be He, commanded to put on tefillin; I did not put them on. So what? The Holy One, blessed be He, sustains you. No, I did not misuse anything. That is exactly the difference. There are things in which I disobey the command of the Holy One, blessed be He. That is not good, but it is not an invasion into a domain that is not mine. It is not entry into or violation of the order or these territorial partitions, as it were. Rather, it is a prohibition. Like an oath, as I said, which is a prohibition on the person: I did something wrong. But in a vow it is not only that I did something wrong—“he shall not profane his word”—but there is also the breaking of this entity, this territory, and for that one brings the guilt-offering. By the way, this is an interesting point. There is a Ran in Nedarim 16a. The Ran discusses there—the Talmud says that an oath does not take effect upon a vow. An oath does not take effect at all on a commanded matter, not only on a vow, because “he was already sworn from Mount Sinai.” An oath cannot take effect upon an oath, and every commandment I am basically already sworn to fulfill, so an oath cannot take effect upon an oath. So now he says, and in an oath of course particularly it does not take effect upon another oath—that is one of the prohibitions: an oath does not take effect upon an oath. What about an oath upon a vow? An oath upon a vow likewise does not take effect. In contrast, says the Ran, a vow upon an oath does take effect. That is exactly the difference. For example, I am already sworn from Mount Sinai to sit in a sukkah. Now I forbid the sukkah to myself by a vow-prohibition. Does that take effect? The answer is yes, it does. A vow takes effect upon an oath. Fine? But if I now swear that I will eat this loaf of bread, and it was already forbidden to me by a vow, that cannot work. An oath does not take effect upon a vow. Fine? What is the difference? The Ran explains as follows: basically, an oath is a law on the person, and a vow is a law on the object. Therefore, if you are already sworn from Mount Sinai to sit in the sukkah, then there is an obligation on the person to sit in the sukkah. What does that have to do with the sukkah itself? If you forbid it, true, you create a problem, but nothing prevents forbidding the sukkah. The sukkah is an ordinary object; I am obligated to sit in a sukkah. There is nothing about the sukkah that prevents the vow from taking effect on the sukkah. Only then the question arises: so why is the reverse not true as well—that an oath should take effect on a vow? Why? In the same way, the vow is on the object and the oath would take effect on the person; there is no collision between them. Why does an oath not take effect upon a vow, while a vow does take effect upon an oath? And the answer, of course, is very simple: in a vow there is also the person. After all, in a vow there is also the prohibition of “he shall not profane his word.” I came to… Again: when I say that a vow takes effect upon an oath, that is understandable, because an oath is on the person. Say I swear that I will travel to Jerusalem tomorrow. There is nothing here that becomes prohibited in itself. I need to travel to Jerusalem. It’s on the person; it’s the action; it is an undertaking to do an action. Right? But if I prohibit this loaf of bread to myself, the loaf itself becomes an object of prohibition like pork. Fine? So they tell me: when I am sworn to travel to Jerusalem and now I forbid the car to myself by a vow—and there is no other car around, okay?—I forbid the car to myself by a vow, that takes effect. Why does it take effect? Because the car itself is not obligated to travel to Jerusalem; the obligation is on me. So there is no obstacle to the vow taking effect on the car. Then the Ran asks: why should the reverse not also be true? If the car is bound up in the obligation to travel to Jerusalem—if there is a vow—and now I swear not to travel, why should that not take effect? It does not take effect; an oath does not take effect upon a vow. Explain the example again because it’s not clear to me. The car—now I am obligated to go to Jerusalem with the car. I’m on foot, doesn’t matter. There is something in the object-status of the car: I have to travel to Jerusalem. This car has to go with me to Jerusalem. Fine? In the object. Just an illustrative example. Now I swear not to travel. The Ran says: the same logic should say that the oath takes effect. After all, the vow took effect on the car, and the oath is on me. I am not bound by the obligation to travel to Jerusalem; the car is. Just as object can take effect upon person, person should also be able to take effect upon object. They don’t really speak to each other. So what is the problem? And the answer the Ran gives is that a vow is not just object; it is also object, but it is also person. After all, a vow also has a prohibition. What, there are no prohibitions with cars? Prohibitions are on human beings. It’s just that the definition of the prohibition is a prohibition of object-status. But certainly the person too is obligated not to transgress this prohibition or to perform that commandment. So in a vow there are both aspects, object and person. And therefore the person-aspect of the oath cannot take effect upon the vow because the vow also has person. So the person-aspect of the oath cannot take effect. But in the reverse direction there is no problem: the vow can take effect upon an oath because the vow also has object-status, and the oath has only person. So the vow is broader than the oath; therefore it takes effect. The oath does not. It cannot take effect; it is narrower than the vow. Why am I saying all this? Because then we see that in a vow there are two aspects: there is the territorial aspect, the thing itself, and there is the prohibition on me. That is the person, right? “He shall not profane his word” is written in the Torah—what is that? That is certainly on the person, right? Therefore the prohibition here is a prohibition on the person. What happens in a vow—that it takes effect on the object—is something beyond that, something additional. Besides the fact that there is a prohibition on the person not to profane his word, in addition some legal effect also takes hold on the object. For the prohibition that I profane my word there are forty lashes. But what about the invasion of the territory that is created, the second aspect of the vow? That is misuse of sacred property in vow-prohibitions. That’s all—simple and straightforward. Therefore one does not need a source for this matter. So what have we seen so far? A brief summary. We have seen basically the guilt-offering of the designated maidservant, where a guilt-offering is brought without any prohibition at all. The very fact that you invaded a domain that is not yours—the wife of someone else, entering someone else’s family—and also the woman’s becoming prohibited to the husband and the adulterer, there it is called trespass. That is the guilt-offering of the designated maidservant. In the guilt-offering for misuse of sacred property, we first saw the prototype, misuse of sacred property in consecrated items. There I explained that it is not really an exception that it obligates only for inadvertence. It is not a real exception. In principle it should have come also for intentionality, if there were removal from the sacred. But the law in misuse of sacred property is that only in inadvertence is there removal into ordinary status. That’s all. And the implications—two implications. One is misuse of sacred property in vow-prohibitions, where we saw there is a guilt-offering for misuse of sacred property. There is no source whatsoever for it. And for the prohibition they are already dealing with it through forty lashes. Why are you dragging in a guilt-offering here with no source and no anything? The students of Rabbenu Yonah. What? Yes. No, misuse of sacred property in vow-prohibitions is in the Talmud. In the Talmud, yes. The משנה למלך doesn’t know where it came from, but it is in the Talmud. And then what I explained is that in a vow there are two aspects: there is the aspect of prohibition—the person is forbidden to profane his word—and that the Talmud handles with forty lashes and all that. But beyond that there is the law in the object. The law in the object is handled with a guilt-offering. Two things. Likewise we saw regarding vow and oath with respect to the application of vow and oath—there too we saw this dual-faced nature of the vow. The third example in the area of the guilt-offering for misuse of sacred property was the students of Rabbenu Yonah, who obligate a guilt-offering for someone who eats without a blessing. And there there is no prohibition at all. Not merely that there is a prohibition and it addresses another aspect—there is no prohibition whatsoever, and yet they obligate a guilt-offering. How can that be? The answer is because this is like misuse of sacred property. It is as if this belongs to the Holy One, blessed be He. You enter a domain that is not yours, and you are liable for a guilt-offering. You do not need a prohibition for that. The problem is not the prohibition that the person transgressed; the problem is the desolation you created in the world. Okay, so that completes for us the guilt-offering for misuse of sacred property. The third guilt-offering is the guilt-offering for thefts. Here too, what the lady said earlier is exactly what we would expect, right? The guilt-offering for thefts is where we began. What is the guilt-offering for thefts? Rabbi Shimon Shkop argues that theft does not derive from “do not steal.” Theft derives from property law, which exists even before the Torah. There are territories. A person has his territory, I have my territory. We saw the Binyan Tzion, who says there is a rule of “one must be killed rather than transgress” with regard to entering someone else’s territory: humiliation, injury, not only murder—stealing, everything—“one must be killed rather than transgress.” Why? Because it is a reality: you cannot enter someone else’s domain. It is not about the severity of the prohibition, exactly like the designated maidservant. The problem here is not the severity of the prohibition. The problem is simply that this is outside your boundary. You cannot make decisions about something that lies outside your boundary. We saw that in previous sessions, and therefore it is obvious that there too there is a guilt-offering for thefts. A guilt-offering is brought because in theft, beyond the prohibition of “do not steal,” which is handled by returning the stolen item, there is the problem of entering a domain that is not yours. Entering a domain that is not yours obligates a guilt-offering. Okay, one brings the guilt-offering for thefts. Now with the guilt-offering for thefts there is one point that needs explanation. I have an idea, but it is not settled—I mentioned Popper before. Because the guilt-offering for thefts is not brought for all thefts. It is brought only for theft of the kind done by means of a false oath. A person comes and claims from me, and I swear that it isn’t with me, or swear falsely. In ordinary theft—in “and he stole the spear,” when I take something from him by force—there is no guilt-offering for thefts. Fine. So here one probably has to say that only theft that uses the Name of God has something in it that obligates a guilt-offering. But really the question why exactly it is so here—I don’t know. I don’t have a good answer. By the way, the medieval and later authorities discuss, with regard to the guilt-offering for thefts, what exactly you are liable for. Are you liable for the false oath involved? But for that we see that with other false oaths one is not liable for a guilt-offering. Or are you liable for the theft involved? But with theft involved, in other thefts not done by means of an oath, one is also not liable for a guilt-offering. So there is something here about the combination—stealing by means of the Name of God or by means of an oath—that somehow creates liability for a guilt-offering. Again, I’m saying there is a small hole here in the theory, and we have to think about it more. Okay, so what I don’t understand is: if today we have all these tools and we understand territories and order the way you say, then what is the relevance of Choshen Mishpat today? Choshen Mishpat is the definition of the territory, so what do you mean? No, but if it is agreed upon—no, not in all countries. Every country can determine for itself, and among Jews, Choshen Mishpat is the definition of the territory. It doesn’t have to be a universal determination. There can be another legal system that determines things differently, and that is perfectly fine. So you’re saying that aside from Torah there are conventions like this? No, before Torah. But for us it can be conventions of one type, and for another nation it can be a different legal system, and that is perfectly fine. According to Maimonides’ view at least, the commandment of law—which is one of the seven Noahide commandments—means that every nation can establish its own legal system. It does not have to know Choshen Mishpat. There is no need to test all gentile judges on Choshen Mishpat or rabbinical judge examinations. They can establish another legal system for themselves, and there is no problem with that; it is valid, perfectly fine. It goes without saying that we too can basically establish another legal system, precisely because we are no worse than any other nation, and therefore the law of the kingdom and custom and everything else determine there. But Choshen Mishpat is the ideal. Choshen Mishpat is the truth, not the ideal. If you want that—we talked about this. In any case, another example—or really the third example I brought, I’m jumping to the third before the second—is the provisional guilt-offering. There there is an especially amusing example. With the provisional guilt-offering, after all, it is brought for doubts, right? Now there is a formulation in Maimonides. Maimonides, chapter 9 of the Laws of Impurity of the Dead, writes as follows: “It is well known that all these impurities and the like that are due to doubt are rabbinic.” Right—doubt of impurity in the public domain or private domain. “And a person is impure by Torah law only if he became definitely impure. But all doubts, whether in impurity, forbidden foods, forbidden relations, or Sabbaths, are only rabbinic.” This is Maimonides’ famous view that the rule “a Torah-level doubt requires stringency” is itself a rabbinic rule. Meaning, the obligation to be stringent in Torah prohibitions is itself a rabbinic obligation. Fine? There are medieval authorities (Rishonim) who hold that this is by Torah law; Maimonides says that the obligation to be stringent in a Torah-level doubt is itself rabbinic. Now he says—someone adds in brackets there for some reason, in square letters: “Nevertheless, in a matter whose intentional violation is punished by karet, its doubtful case is forbidden by Torah law, for one who does it is liable to a provisional guilt-offering.” This addition has no source in any manuscript of Maimonides. It is an invention. Where does this invention come from? It comes from a very great difficulty raised by later authorities (Acharonim). The Shev Shma’tata in the first discussion talks about this, the Pnei Yehoshua, everyone shouts about it. If according to Maimonides a Torah-level doubt requiring stringency is only rabbinic, then how do you bring a provisional guilt-offering? There is no prohibition. Let’s see. There is no prohibition. According to Maimonides the prohibition is only rabbinic. Meaning, the obligation to be stringent in cases of doubt is a rabbinic obligation. If you did not do so, you only transgressed a rabbinic prohibition. So how can that be? Fine, it’s karet. No—that is what they add; it is not written in Maimonides. The question is how according to Maimonides there can be liability for a provisional guilt-offering. After all, if you transgressed a prohibition in doubt, then you transgressed only a rabbinic prohibition. So how can that be? This is unconsecrated slaughter in the Temple courtyard. So they invent—just look in the first discussion of the Shev Shma’tata, look in Pnei Yehoshua, everyone, and I think also the Minchat Chinukh—that Maimonides said his words only regarding things whose intentional violation is not punishable by karet and whose inadvertent violation does not require a sin-offering, namely the things for which there is liability for a guilt-offering. And also that it must be the core prohibition—never mind, there are other conditions for when you are liable for a guilt-offering. In all the places where one is liable for a guilt-offering, they say, that is where a Torah-level doubt requiring stringency is itself Torah law. And then they plant this sentence into Maimonides with no basis whatsoever. It is simply not true. The pressure to insert this sentence is exactly this problem, because otherwise how can there be a provisional guilt-offering? How can there be a provisional guilt-offering if there is no prohibition here at all? But according to what I have said until now, it is clear that this is not true. There is an obligation of a guilt-offering even where there is no prohibition. We find that in many places. That is the essence of the obligation of a guilt-offering. So what is happening? In doubtful prohibitions, the later authorities discuss how to understand prohibitions of doubt. One can understand them in two ways. Say there is a piece of meat that is possibly pork and possibly kosher meat, okay? I don’t know. Why am I forbidden to eat it? Am I forbidden to eat it because it is an offshoot of the prohibition of pork, and because I don’t know I still have to be stringent because it may be pork? Therefore, if in the end I discover that it really was pork, then I transgressed the prohibition of pork and I cannot say that I was under coercion or merely inadvertent. Rather, no—I was in doubt and I should have been stringent because of the pork prohibition. But that is only if in the end I find that it was pork. After all, if in the end I find that it was beef, then what is the problem? I transgressed no prohibition. Initially I need to be careful, right? I can’t claim I was under coercion. That is the meaning of the obligation to be stringent in doubtful cases: I can’t claim coercion. A second approach says: the prohibition—this is what Rabbi Shimon Shkop argues in Sha’arei Yosher, gate 1—the prohibition is entering the house of doubt. Doubt itself is the prohibition. Even if in the end you discover that it was beef, you still transgressed a prohibition, because the prohibition is taking upon yourself the halakhic risk. There is here what he calls entry into the house of doubt. You can hear the metaphor. Meaning, you enter a forbidden territory. The doubt creates here some place that you are forbidden to enter. For that one brings a provisional guilt-offering. And a provisional guilt-offering is entry into a territory. It is not the prohibition. The prohibition, according to Maimonides, is rabbinic. According to Maimonides, in Torah-level doubts the Torah is lenient and the rabbis require stringency. By Torah law it is lenient; there is no prohibition, whether with Sabbaths, forbidden relations, or anywhere else. He writes this explicitly. He says: “But all doubts, whether in impurity, forbidden foods, forbidden relations, or Sabbaths”—that is Maimonides’ own language. The next sentence they add—“Nevertheless, in a matter whose intentional violation is punished by karet, its doubtful case is forbidden by Torah law”—what about Sabbaths and forbidden relations? Maimonides writes explicitly that not so. This is simply a corrupted text. They inserted some sentence there that does not belong at all. Why? Because they made a mistake. They thought a guilt-offering requires a prohibition. A guilt-offering does not require a prohibition. As long as you entered a forbidden territory—there is a house of doubt here—this is further proof for Rabbi Shimon Shkop that this is indeed the correct conception of doubtful prohibitions: that the prohibition is entry into the forbidden territory. Therefore there is a provisional guilt-offering. There is no prohibition. It is rabbinic, exactly like blessings before enjoyment and so on. Yes. Two short questions. First of all, didn’t the Pnei Yehoshua already derive from the guilt-offering of the designated maidservant to explain that there is a guilt-offering where there is no prohibition? No, he didn’t explain it. He stated it, yes. But you said that the reason they stumbled is because… He apparently didn’t understand that this is a general consequence for guilt-offerings. That is how I understand it. There is an explicit doubt in the Mishnah. Right. So okay. Fine. Secondly, I still didn’t quite understand. If entering the house of prohibition itself generates the obligation of the guilt-offering, then why is that specifically rabbinic and not Torah law? What by Torah law? A Torah-level doubt requiring stringency is rabbinic… Rabbinic prohibitions are on the person. Rabbinic prohibitions are on the person, and in doubtful cases you do not need to be stringent at all. Not only is there no Torah prohibition; there is no Torah obligation to be stringent. Rabbinic prohibitions are on the person. Once they are on the person, no territory is created into which you are forbidden to enter. That is exactly the explanation of why a rabbinic doubt is treated leniently. And that is a sweeping rule—that all rabbinic prohibitions are on the person? Yes. Even Torah law, according to Netivot and many later authorities (Acharonim), can sometimes be understood that way. True, there are those who disagree. Fine. There are also those who explain Maimonides differently, or explain him incorrectly. Maybe one last point and I want to finish. I said I would get to this at the end. There are three different sections—and this is on the Torah itself—in which the story appears of “Say, please, that you are my sister.” Two of them with Abraham and one with Isaac. There are subtle differences between the three sections. The first is with Abraham: “And it came to pass when he came near to enter Egypt, he said to Sarai his wife: Behold now, I know that you are a woman beautiful in appearance. And it will be, when the Egyptians see you and say: This is his wife—they will kill me and let you live. Say, please, that you are my sister, that it may go well with me because of you, and that my life may be spared for your sake.” That is the plan. “And it came to pass when Abram entered Egypt, the Egyptians saw the woman, that she was very beautiful. And Pharaoh’s princes saw her and praised her to Pharaoh, and the woman was taken to Pharaoh’s house.” They don’t ask; he doesn’t answer “sister” or “not sister”; nothing is described at all. They simply take her. “And to Abram he did well because of her, and he had sheep and cattle…” “And the Lord struck Pharaoh and his house with great plagues because of Sarai, Abram’s wife.” Pharaoh gets hit immediately. Immediately gets hit—there’s no sophistication here. And then “Pharaoh called Abram and said, What is this you have done to me?” Suddenly he starts playing games as though he had thought she was his sister. It doesn’t say he asked, and it doesn’t say Abraham answered. That’s the first section, in Lech Lecha. In Vayera, again, Abraham and Avimelekh appear, this time not Pharaoh. They don’t learn from history. “And Abraham journeyed from there to the land of the Negev and dwelt between Kadesh and Shur and sojourned in Gerar. And Abraham said of Sarah his wife, She is my sister”—they shorten it already because we readers know the story—“and Avimelekh king of Gerar sent and took Sarah.” Here it already says, “And Abraham said of Sarah his wife, She is my sister.” Very brief, but it says it. Abraham said something and then Avimelekh sent and took Sarah. Said to Sarah or to Avimelekh? So as I understand it, he said it to Avimelekh, because it appears here in the same verse: “And Abraham said of Sarah his wife, She is my sister, and Avimelekh king of Gerar sent and took Sarah.” Here he doesn’t get struck immediately, right? Not struck immediately. The Holy One, blessed be He, appears to him in a dream at night. Why? Put the plagues in immediately as you did with Pharaoh. No—He appears to him at night and says, “Behold, you are a dead man because of the woman you have taken, for she is a married woman.” And Avimelekh had not come near her. Meaning, the Holy One, blessed be He, catches him before the sin. And he says, “Lord, will You slay even a righteous nation? Did he not say to me, She is my sister?” So we see that Abraham said to him, “She is my sister.” He apologizes before the Holy One, blessed be He, and says: “Look, I did not intend to sin, okay? And she too said, He is my brother. In the innocence of my heart…” “I too kept you from sinning against Me.” Sin. Why? You were not acting intentionally, as Pharaoh was at first. You were acting inadvertently. But inadvertence has an element of negligence in it; it is not coercion. He said, “She is my sister,” and you should have understood that this was because of fear. Fine. And then indeed he repents, immediately returns her, and in the end he did not actually commit the sin; he only intended to. Fine? And that concern is a concern of a sin-offering. Look at the third version. Later on, still in that same section: “And Avimelekh called Abraham and said to him, What have you done to us? And how have I sinned against you, that you have brought upon me and my kingdom a great sin?” “Against Me,” “a great sin”—all language of sin-offering. The first section mentions nothing, because there it is intentional. There are no offerings, nothing. It is intentional—you are immediately liable for the punishment. The second section is sin-offering. The third section says this: “And Isaac dwelt in Gerar. And the men of the place asked him about his wife, and he said, She is my sister.” Here it is as explicit as can be. They come, inquire, want to know for matchmaking. What is the problem? They ask whether it’s okay or not, whether she is your sister or your wife, and he says “my sister.” “For he feared to say, my wife, lest the men of the place kill me on her account.” “And it came to pass, when he had been there a long time, that Avimelekh king of the Philistines looked out through the window, and saw—and behold, Isaac was jesting with Rebecca his wife.” Here the Holy One, blessed be He, does not even appear. Avimelekh looks through the window and says, wait a second, these people are married. So he himself immediately repents; he is completely righteous. He asked, he inquired, they deceived him. The moment he himself, without warning from the Holy One, blessed be He, without threats, sees that he made a mistake, he immediately returns her and says: have you gone crazy? What are you doing to me? He comes to Isaac and says to him, why did you say “my sister”? “And Isaac said to him, Because I said, lest I die because of her.” “And Avimelekh said, What is this you have done to us? Soon one of the people might have lain with your wife, and you would have brought guilt upon us.” Guilt. Here it is guilt. Why is it guilt? Because where you are not guilty at all, then it is not a sin-offering. A sin-offering is when you are inadvertent. If you are intentional, you are immediately liable for punishment, right? When you are not guilty at all, then there is no sin at all, neither inadvertent nor intentional. But if it really had happened, then certainly there would have been guilt here, because the result would have been—you would, in the end, have slept with a married woman. You are not guilty and not anything, like the Meiri, yes? In practice, you harmed the family unit—that is guilt. Now I want to argue—I said this is from verses. I don’t know whether one can derive new laws from verses, but I am arguing that if someone commits adultery with a married woman under total coercion, coercion, not inadvertence but total coercion, he is liable for a guilt-offering. When he commits adultery with a married woman inadvertently or intentionally, he brings either a sin-offering or is liable to death, and that swallows up the guilt-offering. There is also a liability for a guilt-offering on the result. But that gets swallowed up. With the designated maidservant, where there is no punishment or transgression, then there is nothing to swallow up the guilt-offering, so there is liability for a guilt-offering. I think with coercion it is like that too; it emerges from the verse here. And why does the sin-offering swallow up the guilt-offering? Why does the sin-offering swallow up the guilt-offering? Because apparently one does not bring two things, or some principle like that. I don’t have a really good explanation, but that is apparently what you see there, okay? Like “he receives only the greater penalty.” Yes. There is never both a guilt-offering and a sin-offering in the guilt-offerings for sin. There is never both a guilt-offering and a sin-offering together. For the leper there is both a guilt-offering and a sin-offering, and for the Nazirite. Okay.