Essential Explanations and Examples – Lesson 6

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] This is to wrap up this matter of principles without a clear source in Jewish thought. Last time I talked about sanctifying God’s name, right, exactly—someone who dies because he is Jewish, does he sanctify God’s name or not. We talked a bit about the unique spiritual quality of Israel. I mentioned a few other things like the Jewish law following Beit Shammai in the future, that after all six thousand years the world is supposed to be destroyed. All kinds of sayings like that which are common among the public and people think they’re something that came down from Sinai, but actually it’s not entirely clear where they come from. The thing I wanted to deal with today is actually something a bit more subtle, and that’s the question whether there will be another exile or there won’t be another exile. As if the third Temple will not be destroyed. That too is another one of those accepted principles, and there it’s actually a bit better grounded than the others, though even there there’s room to hesitate. I don’t know, you asked to talk a little here about harming innocent people. So I don’t know whether to devote some time to that or not. However you want. I can talk about that too, but I assume it’ll take at least part of the time. So what do you say? Okay. Fine, so I’ll start with that one. You know what? Let’s start with this. We’ll start with this, and whatever time remains, we’ll devote to the issue of harming innocent people. Let’s start here so we can finish our line of thought. The principle that there won’t be another exile—I know it from a story about Rabbi Herzog. People always attribute this principle to Rabbi Herzog.

[Speaker E] The question is whether this is already the redemption? I don’t know, it starts from an assumption like that. If we’re already in the third Temple?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, or—so then it would have to be—the question is whether it depends on the Temple or doesn’t depend on the Temple. One second. So the story itself, this story is very nice because it reflects something much more fundamental than just this question of this mysterious tradition. They say that during the War of Independence a rumor spread that the rabbi of Brisk was about to flee Jerusalem. There was war there and it wasn’t a simple story, and that rumor spread. And yes, Jews—I told this one?

[Speaker E] I don’t know in which lecture I said it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They’re shooting, they’re shooting, yes, exactly. So that’s where I know it from. That Rabbi Herzog came and said to him, listen, we have a tradition that the third Temple will not be destroyed. He said, I have a tradition from my father that when people are shooting, you have to run away. And by the way, it’s nice that it’s a tradition from his father. Meaning, this is strict preservation of tradition, it’s not just some gut intuition. Those are Briskers, of course. But this story reflects something—maybe by now I already also spoke a little about the other aspects, I assume—about the question how seriously these principles are really treated, or whether one looks more pragmatically, or sees everything through the ideological prism. The question of what we are supposed to do, versus what is right to do in the simple view. But really that’s a different discussion. Maybe we can get to it later. But really the tradition itself—that Rabbi Herzog is basically claiming that the third Temple will not be destroyed. Of course that doesn’t mean it isn’t dangerous here. Of course it doesn’t mean that one person or another cannot be killed. But the assumption is that somehow we probably won’t lose this war entirely, or something like that. And the question is where the source for this comes from, what the basis for it is. So here I mentioned that I once saw an article by Rabbi Shevat, Ari Yitzhak Shevat. He’s a student of Mercaz HaRav, at least that’s how he presents himself. He did a doctorate, something maybe in history, Jewish thought, I don’t know exactly, something like that. He teaches at Orot College and other places. So he has an article published in Tzohar—that’s why I remembered it, because I read it once—on this issue: there will not be another exile, regarding Rabbi Herzog’s statement. And he asks himself why everyone attributes this specifically to Rabbi Herzog. It seems there’s no earlier source for it. That, by the way, is why this claim entered my list of those principles without a source, because the fact is that everyone attributes it to Rabbi Herzog, and that only says there isn’t any earlier source. Yes, that—you sent me—there was some letter by Rabbi Lior that was published not long ago saying that the defense minister has permission to flatten all of Gaza and all sorts of things of that kind. Never mind, I won’t say now what I think about that nonsense, but—I still haven’t said it, believe me, I still haven’t said it. But anyway, he opens the letter by saying that the Torah guides us in all our ways of life. That’s more or less the opening sentence, or maybe the second sentence. And of course that immediately reminds me of Ikveta DeMeshicha by Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman and all kinds of ideological pamphlets that always begin that way. And what characterizes those pamphlets is that they have no source whatsoever for what they say. It’s always like that. Just do a search sometime—I’m convinced, I haven’t done it, but I’m convinced. Every time a sentence appears like “the Torah guides us in all our ways of life,” it’s always an introduction to something that has no source at all. Because if it has a source, you cite a verse, Maimonides, a Talmudic text, and you’re done—why are you telling me that the Torah guides us in all our ways of life? I know that if you bring me the Shulchan Arukh, then that’s the Jewish law—why do I need pompous declarations at the beginning? When you start with declarations like that, it means you don’t really know how to justify it. Likewise all this “Torah authority” and things like that—it’s always an introduction to why I should listen to what you’re saying even though you’re not actually presenting sources. Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman is the same. Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman says that sentence every two lines. And he really does also bring verses and so on, even though the interpretation there is highly questionable, but he extracts from the Torah very precise instructions on how to relate to Zionism, and to settling the land, and all these things, the various isms, communism, socialism, Nazism, and so on. And all of it, of course, comes from the Torah, because the Torah guides us in all our ways of life. And once you see a sentence like that, you already understand that something here has no real sources. So I return to our issue. Here too, the fact that these things are always attributed to Rabbi Herzog—Rabbi Lior, in that letter, in the end did bring a source. It was the Maharal’s interpretation of Parashat Vayishlach, about the sons of Jacob there with Simeon and Levi, which really is a source many people use, even though it’s only an interpretation of the Torah. But this really is a topic where we don’t have many halakhic sources, so people use that too. But after saying “the Torah guides us in all our ways of life,” to bring some Maharal on the sons of Jacob there and what they did in Shechem—that is Torah interpretation, with all due respect. If I disagree with that, am I disagreeing with the Torah? With what the Holy One said at Sinai? The Maharal thought that’s how the verses should be interpreted. Not to mention that Maimonides himself interprets those verses differently in the Mishneh Torah—not in a Torah commentary, in a halakhic book—he interprets those verses differently. In short, there is a lot, a lot to discuss on this issue. But the introduction is always that the Torah guides us in all our ways of life, because when you don’t bring sources, you have to give it some declarative backing. So here, on this matter, the fact that people always attribute it to Rabbi Herzog seems to indicate that there is no earlier source. And that is really the purpose of Rabbi Shevat’s article: to argue that this is not true. And the fact that it’s attributed to Rabbi Herzog is a mistake; there are sources for it, very clear sources. And he brings—and this is a very interesting point that I think I also mentioned once, and maybe I saw it in his piece when I read it, I don’t know, but this always sits in my head. It says in Pirkei Avot: Shmuel HaKatan says, “Do not rejoice when your enemy falls.” That’s it—that’s what he said? It’s a verse. “Do not rejoice when your enemy falls” is a verse. And in all the other places, “Shimon HaTzaddik used to say,” so he said all sorts of things, but here it says “Shmuel HaKatan used to say: Do not rejoice when your enemy falls.” So the medieval authorities explain there that this was simply habitual on Shmuel HaKatan’s lips, margala befumei, right, he was used to saying this verse, it was fluent on his tongue, so it was known that this was the verse Shmuel HaKatan would often say.

[Speaker E] Like “love your fellow as yourself” for Rabbi Akiva.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. No, but Rabbi Akiva added that it’s a great principle of the Torah, so there there’s already an addition, because the verse by itself doesn’t say that. But what he—Rabbi Shevat is basically claiming that this was what was habitual on Rabbi Herzog’s lips. Meaning, Rabbi Herzog often used to say this idea, that there would not be another exile, but he wasn’t really the source of it. The source is earlier; he was just used to saying it often, and he actually shows that in several places. There are actually several different stories about this, and it could be that there really were several stories and not one, meaning not just different versions of the same story. They say that once he said it—I don’t remember to whom anymore—maybe to Eisenhower, I don’t remember, to one of the presidents of the United States, and afterwards to a lord, the British foreign secretary, never mind, Halifax, something like that. There are various versions. Rabbi Herzog had been the rabbi of Dublin, of Ireland, so of course he was connected to the British government. Anyway, his claim is that there are early sources for this tradition, and Rabbi Herzog was simply someone who used to say it a lot. So he says as follows. First of all, he brings a whole list of rabbis, sages from around the time of the Chafetz Chaim, the Netziv and so on, who said that the current return to Zion really is the beginning of redemption. That’s his first source. To me that already seems much less strong, because all it says is that this was their assessment, but that still isn’t enough to create a tradition. Yeshuot Malko, Malbim, Torah Temimah, Rabbi Kook, Rabbi Herzog, Uziel, Auerbach, Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, and so on. In any case, Rabbi Weinberg. So this, I don’t know if—meaning this too has some weight, I still think. Meaning, if there’s a whole list of sages who assess that the words of the prophets about the end of days, redemption and so on, are being fulfilled today, fine, that has some weight. Meaning, it’s not that they invented this tradition. It’s a historical identification of something that is already clearly known from the prophets. Meaning, the claim that there will be redemption or ingathering of exiles—that is a clear tradition, I’m not talking about that. The question is: is that what is happening now? So all this means is that there is a respectable list of important Jews who identify this situation in our time, so that really does have some weight. Of course that still doesn’t mean it won’t be destroyed, it only means this is the process of the beginning of the third redemption. Now beyond that, he asks: how did they know? What is the source of their certainty? Sometimes there are declarations—declarations meant for the purpose of strengthening the spirit of the people and so forth, not necessarily declarations that amount to a historical claim, a factual claim. Perhaps in the opposite direction I’ll bring—maybe I mentioned this once, I don’t remember anymore. There were—I heard this about three important Jews. Once I heard it about the Tzemach Tzedek, and about Rabbi Aharon Kotler, and one more, I no longer remember who the third was. I heard it about three Jews who swore that in their days the messiah would not come. They stood on the platform in the synagogue, banged on the platform, and said: I swear that in my days the messiah will not come. That’s what they said there. And it was a reaction to some troubling messianic outburst in their time, where the concern was that once it didn’t materialize, people would fall apart. Like what? Yes, Shabbetai Tzvi, all the well-known traumas. By the way, such a phenomenon definitely did happen. Shulamit Lapid describes it in Kheres HaNishbar, for those who know. There was a phenomenon of what—missionary activity? Conversion—there was mass conversion to Christianity in the old Jewish community of Jerusalem at the beginning of the twentieth century. There was widespread conversion because there was some kind of messianic spirit there; rumors spread that the messiah was about to arrive. WhatsApp rumors, what? Yes, without WhatsApp; that’s why it stopped there, by the way. If there had been WhatsApp, apparently none of us would be here today, I mean everyone would have converted. But there were such rumors, and in the end, I think it was around World War I maybe, I don’t remember anymore, there was some crisis where people realized it wasn’t going to happen, and then people there collapsed in droves.

[Speaker B] According to a report by the British medical corps, immediately after the conquest of Jerusalem in World War I, the sanitary and social condition of the Jews was extremely poor. Their report is very, very unflattering; it appears in a book published by the University of Haifa Press.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well, that’s known, because there was terrible famine there, daughters sold themselves—

[Speaker B] To Armenians, according to Friedman—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] During World War I there was terrible famine there, people were on the verge of starving to death, there was no food. Now I assume the balance of power between Jews and Arabs was in the Arabs’ favor, and I assume there wasn’t fair distribution of resources there, and maybe that’s why the Arabs’ situation was better, though I haven’t checked and can only guess. In any event, there was also a problem because—well—anyway, sometimes there are such declarations that are not meant to say something, to make a factual claim, but to achieve a spiritual or social goal, like—

[Speaker B] Like when they said in Gush Katif that it wouldn’t happen.

[Speaker C] “It won’t happen.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. No, but there I don’t know, maybe the claim was also factual, I don’t know what Rabbi Eliyahu meant. In the end it turned out not to be true, but I don’t know what he intended. I’m saying there are sometimes situations where from the outset you don’t even mean it that way, meaning you just say it. Now it’s an interesting question why. Some attribute it to “the righteous decrees and the Holy One fulfills,” meaning that you swear and then rely on the Holy One not to break your word because the righteous decrees and the Holy One fulfills. I think that—

[Speaker B] So then they delayed the coming of the messiah?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, that’s it, they delayed it, because otherwise the other side would have had a heavier price. But I don’t think you need to get to that. They were willing to swear falsely—what’s the problem? They were willing to swear falsely precisely because they understood the consequences of what would happen; and if the messiah comes, then he came, so everything is fine, what difference does it make? No one will convert to Christianity because the messiah really did come, right? Exactly, so he was mistaken. There’s a Talmudic passage in tractate Shevuot 26. Rav Ami and Rav Asi heard something from Rav, and they argued about what Rav had said—they were his students—and each one swore to what he claimed. Meaning, they swore two opposite things, so one of them swore falsely. So they came to Rav to ask him, first of all, what did you say? So he told them, and the Gemara doesn’t say who was right because that would be evil speech, so it says that he told them what he had said, and it turned out that one was right and one was wrong, and then the second one asked him: so what happens with my oath? And he said, “a person in an oath”—excluding one under compulsion. “Anything a person utters in an oath”—that’s a verse—excluding one under compulsion. If you were sure it was really true and you swore, then you were under compulsion, fine, what’s the problem? Fine, it’s not—okay, so here too they were under compulsion in the sense that they had—

[Speaker B] Yossi Mzagan, does the Rabbi know? Knows, knows, he knows everything. The air conditioner here in the house was off and I closed the door and now it got hot in here. When I came in it was still perfectly fine—

[Speaker C] They were studying here, so apparently—I came in and it was still—

[Speaker B] It was fine—

[Speaker C] —perfectly fine, then they closed it and it heated up here. That’s true.

[Speaker B] Do you know the story of Rabbi Michael Abraham explaining why—

[Speaker C] —he thinks he’s a bad engineer?

[Speaker B] He says he designed something and in the end they planned to take it straight to the trash, so he said it doesn’t work. Doesn’t work.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No comment, I don’t know, maybe it’s disconnected there at the main switch. Okay, so anyway, back to him. So the claim—yes—here on the one hand maybe in this direction, those who say yes, this is the redemption, specifically messianic phenomena ought to restrain statements of this kind. You do need to be careful with statements like that. That’s what he argues: if so, one should take it more seriously, because they were probably really sure. Fine, so what’s the source for this?

[Speaker F] So he says here it’s because here it’s something that—well, it depends on which period. In the time of the Chafetz Chaim it was plausible that this would be erased, and then it could—never mind.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He brings several sources for this matter. For example Midrash Tanchuma on Parashat Shoftim, Yalkut Shimoni, “and the third shall remain in it”—that’s a verse in Zechariah—that they settle in their land. He brings several sources for this. For example in Midrash Tanchuma on Parashat Shoftim, Yalkut Shimoni: “and the third shall remain in it,” a verse in Zechariah, that they settle in their land only in the third redemption. The first redemption is the redemption from Egypt, the second redemption is the redemption of Ezra, the third has no interruption. That’s the language of the midrash, and indeed it apparently means that the third redemption does not cease anymore, what happened to the first two will not happen to it.

[Speaker G] But excuse me, Rabbi, but in that period Chabad, Munkatch, Satmar objected—they said that this was—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, they’re mistaken. What—just because someone is mistaken, does that count as contrary evidence? What—does every true thing have to be agreed upon by everyone? If I bring proofs for what I say—

[Speaker G] There are surely very few things on which there is consensus in the Jewish people, right? Okay. But if every—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If in your eyes anything that doesn’t have consensus isn’t true, then I think almost nothing remains. If you bring proofs, then fine. The fact that others see it differently—then they’re mistaken, what can you do. Fine? The question is what kind of proofs these are. I’m saying, the fact that there are dissenters doesn’t scare me, it doesn’t seem to me something that should—Rabbi, “He will not exile you again”?

[Speaker H] Huh? “He will not exile you again”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, in a second I’ll bring another source, I don’t remember anymore, we’ll see. You have to remember, by the way, that the opposition can often be interpreted, as I said earlier, as meant to avoid a collapse if this thing doesn’t work out. Or in Satmar’s case, very clearly, a fear of what would happen once the entire religious public joined this secular move, so that even if it were true, one can understand why people would still come out against it in order to prevent the problematic consequences they thought could come from it. So in short, this can be explained in many ways, why people argue. Besides the possibility that they are mistaken. It is also said in the Sifrei on Deuteronomy: “to give to them”—these are those who came into the land; “and to their descendants”—these are those who came up from Babylonia; “after them”—these are the days of the messiah. What does that mean? Why is that a proof? Apparently the claim is that there wasn’t—meaning that the third is the days of the messiah. Meaning, there is no third, fourth, fifth. The messiah is certainly something that doesn’t reverse. So once there is one, two, and after that the messiah, it means the third is apparently the last.

[Speaker E] Why is the messiah something that doesn’t reverse?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know, that already somehow seems pretty—yes—it does seem to me more established. Maybe it would be worth thinking about and looking into it sometime, but that already seems clearer to me. In the Book of Lamentations too it says, “Your iniquity is ended, daughter of Zion; He will not exile you again. He has punished your iniquity, daughter of Edom; He has uncovered your sins.” And Rashi writes there: “He will not exile you again”—from the exile of Edom; from the exile of Edom and onward, no more. Fine? So basically here—this is really already the sages, but the sages don’t connect it specifically to the exile of Edom; rather they say this is the final time. But Rashi says it’s the exile of Edom, that is Rome, right, the third exile, so that too is a source. But again, okay. In Sefer HaIkkarim, Rabbi Yosef Albo: what Jeremiah mentioned in the Book of Lamentations, “Your iniquity is ended, daughter of Zion; He will not exile you again…”

[Speaker H] Is that Patach Eliyahu? I didn’t know that was—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It cannot be interpreted except regarding this last exile, which is the exile after the second Temple. Fine? So he too says the same thing. And likewise Radak: “He has punished your iniquity, daughter of Edom; He has uncovered your sins,” meaning that when the land of the Kittim is destroyed, Israel will leave this exile and will no longer go into exile. And also Radak in the Book of Hosea, and Metzudat David—

[Speaker F] Why does that last Radak specifically—regarding this it doesn’t really say something that fits our time, meaning it’s specifically when the land—is speaking about a redemption that comes out of the destruction of Rome or something of—fine.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That hasn’t happened now. Why? The exile of Edom is ending now. When did the exile of Edom end? It’s true that Rome no longer exists. I don’t know, Rome is no longer relevant, it isn’t here, but the exile of Edom is this exile. What does this statement mean, “and when the land of—”

[Speaker F] —the Kittim is destroyed, they won’t return to exile?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Edom, Christians he says here, Kittim. Do you know what Kittim are? Not yet. Right, slowly slowly. No, I’m saying, this is the beginning of—

[Speaker C] The claim is that this is the beginning of the process—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] This is the end of the exile of Edom.

[Speaker C] All of Europe, all of Europe will be Muslim in another twenty years.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The whole West.

[Speaker C] We still have the United States. Christianity isn’t over, it ended in a bubble. Look at—against all Muslim Europe including the countries, Pakistan, all the “stans.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Do you know what Einstein said?

[Speaker G] Einstein said that World War IV would be fought with stones and sticks.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know what World War III will be fought with, he said, but World War IV will be fought with sticks.

[Speaker G] And how did Leibowitz say it? I’m not a futurist, I’m a criminal. Nice.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In any case, there’s also Metzudat David and Nachmanides, Rabbenu Bahya, and so on. In short, that’s more or less it. Now, what does this actually mean? It seems to me that if we set aside the interpretations of the medieval authorities one way or the other, I don’t know if I would make a tradition out of this. The medieval authorities interpret verses one way or another; after all, we know that there were quite a few calculations of the end throughout history—even in Maimonides there is some calculation of the end even though he says it’s forbidden to do it—and those calculations were disproved every time. Meaning, the fact that certain medieval authorities interpret a verse about one period or another, I don’t think that is something solid enough to build a tradition on. What we do have is the sages—what he says at the beginning there, there’s that statement of the sages here and there, “and the third shall remain in it,” those verses, so there is some kind of source for it. To tell you that I would build some kind of factual claim on that—I don’t know. The Torah also says “an eye for an eye.” Fine, money. Okay, the Torah says many things. Once it doesn’t happen, we’ll find an explanation. Meaning, the moment that if something doesn’t happen we can find an explanation, then I’m no longer prepared to see it as something that—if it’s not falsifiable, then it also doesn’t say very much.

[Speaker I] No, if everyone says it, then apropos of what you spoke about in previous lectures, then there’s a tradition. What? If all the sages say it in several places, and Metzudat David—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m saying—

[Speaker I] Tradition is really a question of what you call tradition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Clearly there is tradition in the sense that this is what is accepted, but the question is whether to treat this thing—when I spoke about tradition, what I meant was that this information came down from Sinai and was passed to us through the generations.

[Speaker I] Why? Tradition—what you talked about, built up over generations—well, here it is, built up over generations.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, what I said there was something else. I claimed that something came down from Sinai, and after that the generations each relate to the generations before them, but everything starts at Sinai. If it didn’t start at Sinai—if something started in the Second Temple period and from there each generation then dealt with what its predecessors did—you can call that tradition too, but there’s a difference. In Kedmat HaEmek by the Netziv, in his introduction to HaEmek She’elah, his commentary on the She’iltot, he brings a dispute there between Rashi and Maimonides about the question of what “it is learned by tradition” means. The Talmud says in several places: what is the source of a certain Jewish law? “It is learned by tradition,” as if to say that’s how we learned it. Rashi says in all those places: a law given to Moses at Sinai. Meaning, “it is learned by tradition” means a law given to Moses at Sinai. Maimonides, consistently—so claims the Netziv there, I no longer remember his proofs, but that’s what he claims there—Maimonides interprets it differently. “It is learned by tradition” means that we have a tradition in the sense you were talking about, meaning tradition in the sense that earlier sages derived this law somehow—I don’t know how—but I received it; I know that they derived this law in some way. But it is not that it was a law given to Moses at Sinai. Now tradition in the second sense is indeed a bit more problematic. True, things somehow become current, enter the track, and become part of it, but the question is how much I can build on such a thing. If I ask whether this is the Jewish law, then fine—I say if it entered the track and was accepted by sages and so on, then that is the binding Jewish law. But here I am talking about a factual claim. I’m not talking about what the law is. The question is whether this fact is true or not, and that is hard to decide just because several good Jews thought so. And what about prophets?

[Speaker E] Isn’t that also from Moses at Sinai?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Some kind of divine inspiration—

[Speaker E] Different levels of prophecy, I don’t know. If I have some indication that this is divine inspiration, then fine, I’m saying, everything that—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In short, your indication for prophecy is—no, with prophecy the Torah says there are prophets, you have to listen to them; the Torah says there will be prophets.

[Speaker E] So you’re saying, who told us there is divine inspiration?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. Who said that divine inspiration rests with so-and-so who said that? I don’t know whether there is or isn’t divine inspiration, but who says it rests with him? After all, you don’t know who this person is who’s speaking in the name of divine inspiration. I don’t have divine inspiration, so I don’t know how to test him. By the way, about divine inspiration—the Raavad in several places writes, “Divine inspiration appeared in our study hall,” when he disagrees with Maimonides. And then Rabbi Margaliot, in his introduction to Responsa from Heaven—do you know that work? One of the Tosafists, Rabbi Yaakov of Marvege or Troyes, something like that. Troyes is Rashi’s city. So he wrote Responsa from Heaven, meaning questions he asked in dream-questions in heaven, halakhic questions. He writes there what they answered him. And on the face of it, “It is not in heaven” makes this a problematic text from a halakhic standpoint. So there’s an edition by Rabbi Margaliot with a very long and interesting introduction about the status of this whole matter, and he says there—he explains this Raavad, “Divine inspiration appeared in our study hall,” to mean: it seemed completely clear to us. That’s what is meant by divine inspiration. It seemed terribly clear to us, as though there were full agreement, as though there were a feeling of certainty in the air.

[Speaker B] Which is what a prophet also has, though—that it seems terribly clear to us.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe, maybe. That’s the evidence for what he said.

[Speaker B] He can’t say more than that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he can’t say more than that.

[Speaker B] If someone sees in a dream a solution to something, huh?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If someone sees in a dream a solution to something.

[Speaker B] No, no, it’s… that’s just the context. The idea came to him from there, in a dream, and afterward…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, so that’s what they say about Elijah the Tishbite resolving difficulties and problems—that’s what they say. Because on the face of it, “It is not in heaven,” so how will Elijah explain Jewish laws to us, innovate new laws for us? So they say no—Elijah will show us why that’s the correct law, with reasons. But once you have reasons, who cares that it came from Elijah? In philosophy of science they distinguish between the context of discovery and the context of justification. Meaning, a theory can come to you in a dream, your grandmother appeared to you at night and told you—I don’t know—that the equation should look like this. Fine. If afterward you test it against the facts and it yields good predictions that stand up in the laboratory, then what difference does it make? That’s the context of discovery, and that’s the context of justification. If there’s some justification, then good—who cares about the discovery? Okay? So I also say again: as long as it comes from above, then fine, I accept it. How do you know it came from above? You have to think each time. But I’m saying in principle, a factual claim like that, for me to accept it as something solid, has to come from above. Meaning, it doesn’t help me that smart people said this or that, or maybe many smart people think this way. So maybe it’s worth thinking about again—why they said it, or why they inferred it—because after all, they are smart people. If I’m looking for a source of information for a factual claim, then it should come from above, or from Sinai, or prophets, or I don’t know, something—that is, tradition in the sense I’m looking for here. Now, to tell you that this verse in Zechariah together with the Sages’ interpretation is enough to produce—say, if someone had come to me during the War of Independence and I thought I needed to flee, and he told me: look, there’s a verse in Zechariah with this teaching of the Sages that says we won’t be destroyed the third time. I’d say, fine—and my father says that when it’s dangerous, you run away. That’s what I would have answered. It could be that I wouldn’t have run away because you have to hold out, and not only because of those promises—not because of those promises I wouldn’t run away. That’s the point.

[Speaker H] The promises are certainly true. The only question is whether this is the right timing. Whether to attach it to this, that’s all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Messiah, the Messiah—I said before—the Messiah will probably create a situation in which you’re not supposed to go back into exile. Maimonides writes, after all, that if there is someone who wins the wars and so on and so forth, then he will be the Messiah, in the end. So that’s not what we’re talking about—that’s what I’m saying. So therefore I say, clearly in the end yes, but the question is how do I know that right now. I don’t know if in the end; maybe there will be such an event. If by “in the end” you mean if it turns out that way in reality. Okay, if it turns out that way in reality, then that’s the end. Exactly. That’s the claim. The question is—my daughter wrote a paper with that Shabbat fellow, he was her lecturer. She wrote a paper on messianism in history. Messianism. And I also told her—I suggested the topic—I said, check whether Religious Zionism is a messianic movement. A very interesting question. Huh? I don’t know. A messianic movement usually has a negative connotation. A messianic movement in the sense of a movement that wants the Messiah or works to bring him—that’s not a messianic movement. “Messianic movement” is terminology with a connotation… yes, exactly. It’s something with a negative connotation. Now, this really is an interesting point, because there aren’t clear criteria for what a messianic movement is, it’s not—

[Speaker E] A halakhic concept.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Like what a cult is. Yes, exactly. It doesn’t have clear criteria, it’s a sociological concept, not a halakhic one. Mostly a demagogic concept.

[Speaker E] Maybe.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the Messiah—ultimately, when he is disproven, then we know he isn’t the Messiah. Even that still doesn’t mean that the movement that accompanied the process was a messianic movement. Because I think at least—and I tried to check a bit in sources, in Yaakov Emden and various interesting references—it seems to me that usually a messianic movement is something characterized not by the historical verification of what happened in the end. Shabbetai Tzvi, for example, in the end was disproven—not because of that was it a messianic movement. Molcho was also disproven in the end. And Molcho, among many Jews, is considered a righteous Jew who gave his life for sanctifying God’s name.

[Speaker G] Rabbi Shlomo Molcho. The Shulchan Aruch values him very highly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, נכון, many people value him very highly. Even though his end was—he wasn’t the Messiah in the end. Yes, he died for sanctifying— they killed him.

[Speaker G] But he didn’t claim messiahship. He claimed messiahship.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, there was definitely a messianic movement there. Yes.

[Speaker B] And Bar Kokhba too, in the end.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Bar Kokhba and so on. Now, I don’t think, I don’t think—

[Speaker B] That we still don’t know whether the Lubavitcher Rebbe was or not.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Waiting for him to die.

[Speaker B] But he once got up in synagogue and said that the Lubavitcher Rebbe is not it; in our generation the Messiah will not come.

[Speaker G] Rabbi Shach did that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbi Shach did that. No, he didn’t say that in our generation the Messiah won’t come; he said that the Lubavitcher Rebbe isn’t it. But never mind. In any case,

[Speaker B] the concept—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] of a messianic movement, it seems to me, characterizes more the mode of conduct of the movement than its ultimate verification. Meaning, if its mode of conduct involves deviating from Jewish law, acting unrealistically in the sense of realpolitik—yes? Meaning, not behaving in a sensible way—then it seems to me people see that as a messianic movement. Being disproven in the end is not an important criterion. Maybe it’s part of it, but it’s not the main thing.

[Speaker B] Chabad doesn’t deviate from Jewish law at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, but first of all, it’s not really agreed that that’s a messianic movement in the sense of Shabbetai Tzvi. Meaning, right, a false messiah—yes. He isn’t the Messiah in the end. But a messianic movement is something else. A messianic movement is something that—again, it’s sociological, not halakhic—but the claim is that it’s something that’s already not—you know—you don’t count him for a minyan anymore. But didn’t Shabbetai Tzvi cancel some commandments? So he wasn’t a messianic movement?

[Speaker B] No, I think not.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he hadn’t converted to Islam in the end. He did convert to Islam in the end, didn’t he? It’s not only cancellation of commandments.

[Speaker B] He converted to Islam—they forced him to convert.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not exactly. It became part of the ideology, and in the end there is—

[Speaker B] That’s an ideology that arose afterward—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but he could have escaped it.

[Speaker B] He couldn’t have escaped; he could have died.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he chose to convert to Islam and go along. After he converted to Islam, he lived there happily enough after converting. I don’t—

[Speaker B] know all the—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, I checked a bit around that paper.

[Speaker B] He converted to Islam under threat of execution.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, but apparently he converted out of full identification and called on his followers—there was a whole conversion movement there that seems to have been intentional from the outset. And of course there was also the abandonment of commandments even before the conversion, and various other things that were there.

[Speaker G] Out of a good intention—that the Messiah would come, that the end of days would arrive through sin. Yes, right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] By the way, there is a bit of that in Hasidism too. Never mind, there are little grains of that in many places. What?

[Speaker C] Through sin the Messiah will come?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That there is something, yes, something in the shattering of the vessels and everything being permitted.

[Speaker C] And that continued into the 19th century, the Frankists.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Frankists, yes.

[Speaker C] Fine, there are many phenomena.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said, among—

[Speaker C] Among the Frankists, wasn’t everything open? Everything free?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There were many such phenomena. But I’m saying, the view of Religious Zionism—it seems to me that a lot of times when people ask, not a lot of times, people don’t ask it all that often. It’s just a question that isn’t asked very much. Is this a messianic movement? So the tendency is always to tie it to the question of what will happen at the end. Will it turn out they were right or not. I think that’s not the criterion. Meaning, if ultimately you assess that this is the current situation, then that’s what you assess. What’s the problem? What’s wrong with that? You’re allowed to assess that that’s the situation, even if in the end it turns out to be false. The question is what you do with what you assess. And here, here there are various indications of what you’re supposed to do with what you assess. There is, yes, deviation from Jewish law—that’s one possibility, one aspect. By the way, Haredi views that opposed Zionism criticized Religious Zionism partly for that reason: that it deviates from Jewish law. Why? Not necessarily in the personal sense that they don’t keep kosher, but in the sense of cooperation with secular people, secular courts, and various things of that kind, where it’s not a simple question whether these things are possible within the halakhic framework. Meaning, there are such aspects here. There are aspects of irrational activity—irrational in the sense of provoking the nations. Meaning, doing things that are not realpolitik because you know that the Holy One, blessed be He, is with you, and therefore you go for it. That’s another aspect. That’s the Three Oaths, for example, of the Satmar Rebbe, and there too they attached various things like that. But really most of the discussion was about whether they were right. Meaning, whether in the end it would indeed turn out that this is the coming of the Messiah or not. And I don’t think that’s the right measure. The right measure—and in my view, by the way, the point where I do see certain dimensions of a messianic movement in Religious Zionism—is דווקא the third dimension. It’s the dimension that says that we make decisions in our political and personal lives based on metaphysical considerations: what stage of redemption we are in. It seems to me that’s a certain indication of a messianic movement.

[Speaker G] Eitan Pincin, it’s very prominent there.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Eitan Pincin? Eitan?

[Speaker G] Eitan, yes, I’ve heard his lectures, it’s—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. I’m saying he’s not the only one. I think this is very widespread in the Religious Zionist movement. People say it openly; they don’t agree with what I’m saying now. It’s not that I exposed some hidden shame of theirs. This is my opinion; others disagree. They argue that yes, one can take these metaphysical considerations into account even in personal decision-making. I think that here there are certain dimensions of messianism.

[Speaker B] How is that different from the claim that they make considerations that are not realpolitik?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, because I’m not talking right now about realpolitik. The question is—it may be that the things they do are not suicidal. Meaning, it’s not something forbidden from the standpoint of political considerations. But why are you deciding to do it? Because of the metaphysics. Now, that’s much softer, of course, than the examples of Shabbetai Tzvi and the like—there’s no comparison at all. This is certainly within the legitimate range, no question, that’s perfectly clear. I’m not trying to compare them at all on those planes. I’m saying that I do see certain dimensions of messianism here. I have criticism of it; personally I don’t agree with it. But fine, I understand that people think otherwise. I really don’t think it should take part in the process. We need to do our work; we’re not supposed to realize God’s dreams. Meaning, that shouldn’t be part of our decision-making process—that’s the point. Even if, again, even if we are conducting ourselves in the realpolitik sense.

[Speaker H] And is that really a consideration, or do they make all the calculations and then add another layer on top?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are many different nuances; each person does it in different proportions.

[Speaker B] What? Of Binyamin—and this is connected to Rabbi Medan as opposed to Yoel Bin Nun, he has a book now.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, that’s what I was hinting at when I—

[Speaker B] realization of the dream. Someone who studied under both of them knows that’s where the whole argument over the underground stands.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Jewish Underground, as it’s called. Okay, in any event, that’s what I was hinting at when I spoke about realizing God’s dreams.

[Speaker F] In any case, at the base of this—meaning if what? If you know something about the redemptive processes or something like that.

[Speaker B] You don’t know; you estimate.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying, first of all the question is whether you know. And maybe part of my skepticism about your ability to know is expressed in this. And I think this very much characterizes our tradition, it seems to me: we don’t make these calculations. We don’t make decisions based on the question of what direction the redemption will take if I behave this way or another. Of course I keep commandments more, I try to be God-fearing, to pray—but I don’t do actions because this way the Messiah will come more, and that way less. That isn’t supposed to be a consideration in my practical life.

[Speaker F] Why not?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know—that’s the tradition. I’m saying that part of it is because we don’t know.

[Speaker I] Nachmanides? No, clearly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Their debate there is over Nachmanides.

[Speaker F] Where? Traditionally there were Jews who accepted—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There were Jews, and they all were, it seems to me, on the edge. Meaning—

[Speaker C] Is there a Messiah in the Torah itself? What? Messiah in the Torah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not explicitly. “Until Shiloh comes,” yes. “Until I come to my lord in Seir”—there are all sorts of hints, homiletic readings, but not really; it doesn’t appear there.

[Speaker C] One of the Thirteen Principles is to believe forever and always in the coming of the Messiah. Fine, we already spoke about that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not about messianism. Yoel, could it be that we should speak—

[Speaker H] about—

[Speaker C] the Thirteen Principles?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, the Thirteen Principles? Messianism is an interesting topic, but… according to Leibowitz and according to Ben-Gurion?

[Speaker C] According to Leibowitz he will never come. If he comes, then you can’t believe in him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He’ll always come in the future, right, always. Okay, in any case… yes, so taking into account this consideration that the Temple wasn’t destroyed the third time, or we don’t go into exile the third time—he emphasizes here that he doesn’t mean the Temple, because in order to assume that the Temple won’t be destroyed, you’d have to assume that the redemption is already complete and doesn’t reverse, and nobody claims it’s finished. He says there won’t be a third exile in the sense that there is already a significant ingathering of exiles, so the process will no longer go backward. That’s the claim. Now I’m saying, it’s a combination of two things. What Ari said earlier—my skepticism regarding the factual truth of this—of course also projects onto my view that one mustn’t take such things into account when making decisions on the realistic plane. Say, if I had a prophet here who told me this with certainty, I assume I would relate differently to someone who takes it into account in his considerations. But it still sounds to me—even though it has sources and fairly broad agreement, by the way, including a large part of the Haredi rabbis. It doesn’t matter that they oppose cooperation or the State of Israel as it is today, but it seems to me many of them agree that… so maybe it has some weight. But I really think it’s not enough to see this as a factual claim. Meaning, in this matter, I still haven’t been convinced, even though I think there are sources here. Meaning, it’s not like, say, the other statements I brought up—that in the future the law will follow Beit Shammai, or that the world is destroyed for all six thousand years—there’s some midrash like that, but there really, to derive from that—

[Speaker E] What haven’t you been convinced of? That it’s the beginning of redemption, or that it won’t stop? That it won’t stop.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Or that it’s the beginning of redemption, yes?

[Speaker E] I don’t know—what have you been convinced of?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Neither of the two. Ah, yes. It could be the beginning of redemption and still stop. Independently of each one, I haven’t been convinced. Meaning, because clearly once it stops—Rabbi Kalner writes in his book on fanaticism and pluralism, yes—he says there that if the State of Israel is destroyed, that’s the end of Judaism. I once brought this up—and he brings it here, that’s why I read it—because someone once told me he heard in a lecture by Rabbi Kalner that he’d take off his kippah if the State of Israel were destroyed. As if that would mean Judaism is not true. Someone from Har Hamor and its offshoots. Ah, so why would he take off his kippah? Because it would mean Judaism isn’t true.

[Speaker D] That’s exactly the problem you mentioned with the Haredi—that the God he believes in is a God he denies. Right, fine, granted.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And I’m saying, here they take these things, this tradition we’re talking about here, as a binding factual claim, an article of faith, I don’t know exactly what to call it—even the principles of faith I’m not sure what their status is, but we won’t have time to get to that—as some kind of factual claim such that if it falls, the whole structure falls with it. Meaning, that’s really the significance of the matter. Now, I don’t know. So many things that are written far more clearly in the Torah, we take them out of their plain meaning, we give this answer and that answer; so this little hint that you find in Zechariah together with some interpretation by the Sages or some medieval authorities, to make that into a factual claim on whose fulfillment you place your faith on trial—that sounds very far-reaching to me.

[Speaker I] No, but it’s “you, mountains of Israel, shall yield your fruit,” and the ingathering of exiles and all that. He says, if everything I see with my own eyes is something that didn’t happen over the course of two thousand years—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but that doesn’t collapse anything. “The mountains of Israel shall yield their fruit” can also happen in the future, when the Messiah comes. Right now they yielded their fruit, and now we went backward. What contradiction is there? It doesn’t contradict the prophecy at all. You have to assume that this time, when it happens, it won’t go backward. That this is the first and last time it will happen. That’s a historical interpretation. That’s what I’m saying. And on that interpretation he puts his faith on trial. So I say, fine, with all due respect to that interpretation, the question is how seriously you take it. You’ve turned it into some kind of claim that is a touchstone for your faith. So I say, listen, we’ve made far more far-reaching interpretations of verses much more explicit in the Torah—not in the Prophets and not elsewhere. Fine. So believe me, I also don’t think he’ll take off his kippah if the State of Israel is destroyed. He’ll find ten explanations for why it happened and didn’t happen, and really it was expected in advance; if you look at equidistant-letter sequences in the writings of Rabbi Kook you’ll find that too. We’ll find explanations for anything. But once you can find explanations for anything, you can’t treat it as—this is exactly the point—when something is not falsifiable, you can’t relate to it as some statement on which you build something. Meaning, it’s obvious that if it doesn’t happen, you’ll find explanations—so leave it alone.

[Speaker E] But you can still be sufficiently sure of it. What? You can be sufficiently sure of it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] True, there are things—

[Speaker E] that you’re sufficiently sure of.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] True. The question is on what basis he is so sure of this—that’s what I’m asking.

[Speaker E] I don’t understand—why?

[Speaker I] Historical evidence, like Rav Ami and Rav Assi when things improved.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But is the historical evidence really so unequivocal? I don’t understand that. Yes, I understand that’s what he thinks, but I don’t understand why. I disagree with him. No, of course that’s the historical evidence. Of course that’s what he thinks.

[Speaker J] Jews didn’t come to the land, and now—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] they came; now they’ll go back, and for another two thousand years they won’t come to the land, and then they’ll come again, and in the end the Messiah will come too.

[Speaker J] And compared to 200 years ago, the situation now is better. Who said that now is the stage from which there is only ascent and there won’t be decline?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying, of course that’s what he thinks. I’m not claiming he’s lying. Of course that’s what he thinks—that that’s the interpretation. I’m only saying that to turn a perspective of that kind into a touchstone, into something so binding, so fundamental, sounds a bit exaggerated to me.

[Speaker H] What religious interest is there in this? What religious interest is there in dealing with this at all?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There isn’t any at all.

[Speaker H] I think there’s such a question someone sent to Maimonides. Maimonides writes in the Mishneh Torah—he said to him, what difference does it make to you at all whether he comes or—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] or doesn’t come, and how it will all work out—nobody knows until it happens. And there’s no point in dealing with it, and the Sages already forbade calculating the end-times.

[Speaker H] “May the spirit of those who calculate the end-times expire,” right? Maimonides started with three—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think that this question—the point, the fundamental point in my eyes, again this really is just expressing a personal position—the point, the fundamental point in my eyes on this subject is that really the subject isn’t interesting. I don’t understand why it matters at all. Meaning, if Satmar thinks it’s—I don’t know—the Other Side, the footsteps of the Messiah, and these people say it’s the beginning of redemption—why is that interesting at all? Why is it important? Who cares? Meaning, in the end, maybe it interests me historically, not that it doesn’t interest me—it interests my curiosity. But it’s not relevant to anything.

[Speaker E] The idea of establishing a state, fighting wars—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I do it because I want independence, period.

[Speaker I] Not because I want the Messiah. There is no practical significance here. What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Whether to fast on the Ninth of Av, or the Seventeenth of Tammuz, and the Tenth of Tevet? And whether to say “Comfort” in the prayer text?

[Speaker I] That has nothing to do with redemption.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It has nothing to do with redemption. If you think the Jewish people are in a good state, then don’t say “Comfort.” What does that have to do with redemption? And then if in another hundred years we discover—then we’ll have to say “Comfort”? Why? Jerusalem is flourishing, we’re here, everything is fine. What is there to say “Comfort” about? If it gets destroyed in another hundred years, we’ll talk. And in the Second Temple period they really didn’t say it. In the Second Temple period they cancelled the fasts. Megillat Ta’anit was annulled in the Second Temple period. The Second Temple was established and afterward it fell, and they still annulled Megillat Ta’anit.

[Speaker G] Does the Rabbi agree that as long as there won’t be a theological consensus about the cause of the Holocaust, yes? As long as we don’t understand what happened, yes? Then nothing is certain, and we have to keep trying—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, nothing is certain regardless of understanding the Holocaust. No, his claim is not that he can predict everything and explain everything. No, he didn’t say that. What he did say is that these events he can predict.

[Speaker G] That’s how I—no, that’s how I get the impression; that’s how they look at history—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, they say these elements in history are the realization of the prophetic vision. That’s a legitimate claim. I’m not sure they’re right, but the claim is not that they know how to explain and predict every event in history in advance. That’s a different claim. There wasn’t a prophecy about the Holocaust in the Prophets, at least not something clear, so they didn’t predict that. What’s the problem? But this they did predict.

[Speaker G] To my mind that lowers the self-confidence.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but that’s not—I don’t think that’s an argument.

[Speaker G] You see, I once asked you about—

[Speaker B] the Tosafot in Rosh Hashanah that says prophets don’t prophesy what will be, but what ought to be. Yes, the Tosafot there.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What the Shelah writes, yes. In any event—

[Speaker B] That’s Jonah son of Amittai, isn’t it? Fine, so why is it so interesting in the Prophets, why did the Prophets transmit so much information to us?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe to comfort us? To tell us that in the end things will be good, that there will be hope? Listen, if they wanted to give us some usable information, they did it in the worst possible way I can imagine. Because they wrote it so vaguely and so open to interpretation that that’s not the way to do it. If you want to give me usable information, say exactly what you mean; don’t tell me stories.

[Speaker E] You could say that about most of the Torah too. Right, so apparently there’s some reason; I don’t know.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But still—then I can no longer ask, so why did the Prophets say it? I don’t know. But it doesn’t seem to me they said it in order to give me practical information.

[Speaker G] That’s what Maimonides says—since it isn’t—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] clear, and not explicit, and no one can know how it will be until it is, and it doesn’t add love of God and fear of God, therefore one shouldn’t deal with it at all. And the Sages already—

[Speaker G] Love and awe. Love and awe.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, fine, but the intention is love and awe.

[Speaker E] By the same arguments, listen also to those who ask you why you need to investigate the reality of God and God’s modes of conduct and philosophical thought at all?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not clear, not unequivocal, it’s dangerous. No, that’s something else.

[Speaker E] Someone who is interested in metaphysics—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] should deal with it. I have no problem with that. When I say it isn’t interesting, I didn’t mean it isn’t intellectually interesting. If someone is interested in metaphysics, then it interests him. But the question is whether this thing is relevant to our decision-making in life. That’s what I mean by not interesting. Not interesting means not relevant. If it’s true, then of course it’s relevant. Why? What practical difference could come out of it? When the Messiah comes, the Messiah comes. Because you want to advance the process. Look, I already told you—that’s the initial assumption. If I were convinced it’s true, maybe—

[Speaker E] then I’d also be willing to accept its relevance, but fine, granted. So in that case, is it relevant to be convinced whether it’s true?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but I haven’t been convinced, and it doesn’t seem to me—

[Speaker E] that it’s relevant. It seems to me that it’s—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. So consequently, all the debates around this matter and turning it into some kind of principle on which you draw today’s ideological map of Haredim, Religious Zionists, and so on—after all, this is what they’re split over; these are today’s ideological boundaries in religious society. About what? About a subject that is irrelevant. That isn’t agreed upon and has no unequivocal proofs, fine—and it’s not, what are you going to do with such a thing? He himself afterward writes with a hundred qualifications—I won’t get into that now. He writes with a hundred apologies. There is a response here by Ariel Finkelstein, who wrote about Torat HaMelekh, so he wrote in Tzohar 21 of Rabbi Shvad; in Tzohar 24 he wrote that it’s problematic because it weakens, it can sap morale and so on, never mind, and there’s a reply in the same issue by Rabbi Shvad. A reply—I won’t get into all of that. There the discussion really becomes practical: whether it’s worthwhile to deal with it, and that really concerns us less here.

[Speaker F] Suppose even if I accept that it’s not a certain thing—why can’t the possibility that it’s a messianic process also be a consideration?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t say it can’t. I said that the accepted tradition, it seems to me, is that we don’t make such calculations in practical decision-making.

[Speaker F] Could it be simply because it was less relevant, maybe?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said that someone who thinks otherwise is legitimate. I know there are people who—for two thousand—

[Speaker E] years had nothing on which to make such—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, a tradition of two thousand years? There was nothing? They did all the—

[Speaker E] discussions of Abaye and Rava; it was all—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] active. No, that is not—

[Speaker E] right. Active-passivism is an invention—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] of Nachmanides, so no medieval authority writes that. Malbim writes it in his Torah commentary.

[Speaker E] Stop saying—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that claim. Nobody thought that the commandments he performs are active-passivism—

[Speaker E] they really didn’t—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] feel that was true—what nonsense. But I’m saying, the tradition—people made end-time calculations all the time, and they were criticized for it. They were criticized not just for making calculations, period, but for making calculations and drawing practical conclusions from them. That’s what it means to calculate the end-times. Did they think it wasn’t true?

[Speaker E] What? Did they think it wasn’t true? If they thought it was true, they would have gone along with their calculation.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But once again I return to the same point: I agree, but essentially it isn’t correct.

[Speaker E] I’m using tradition as an argument—we have two thousand years in which there wasn’t something true.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So each of them could have said—each of those who calculated the end-times could have said: look, the previous ones were wrong, but I’m telling you, in my case it’s clear. Do you know what proofs Shabbetai Tzvi brought for his claims from the Torah, from the Prophets, and from the Writings?

[Speaker E] No problem, and from the Zohar. And someone who argued with him didn’t need to tell him we have no tradition about this, because there simply wasn’t anything like that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m saying—the fact that there is no tradition about it, I think, reflects the point that even someone who thinks he knows what’s going on there is mistaken. Essentially, it’s impossible to know what’s going on there. That’s the point. And therefore someone who says, okay, they didn’t know but I do know—fine, there were ten people like that before you. Fine, all of them brought proofs for what they said. When you look at the writings of all sorts of false messiahs, you’ll see that each one brought proofs for his claims from the Torah, the Prophets, the Writings, the words of the Sages, and the Zohar—clear proofs. This was the period; they identified that emperor with that figure the prophet speaks about. There were very detailed identifications.

[Speaker F] Not only false messiahs, also rabbis. And also false messiahs, and also—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, I’m not referring to false messiahs—

[Speaker F] I mean those who said that in such-and-such years the Messiah would come—why?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying, that’s also mistaken messiah-talk, messianic error. Yes, never mind—not a false messiah in the sense of Shabbetai Tzvi, but all those who were wrong about messianism, meaning all those who made these end-time calculations and were disproven in the end. There is Nachmanides, there is Maimonides, there are many—there is Ibn Ezra—various people did it, Jews who are considered good Jews to this day, and we still study their writings.

[Speaker G] Also the disciples of the Vilna Gaon—is that unrelated?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The disciples of the Vilna Gaon also made all sorts of calculations like that, yes. About the Vilna Gaon himself, it’s known that he had a calculation that in ’48 the Jewish people would rise to their feet. He writes—Rabbi Kasher brings this—

[Speaker G] in The Great Era, Kol HaTor.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So he says that in ’48 the Jewish people would rise to their feet, in 5708. The Jewish people would rise to their feet—he makes a calculation based on Adam, when Adam stood on his feet on the sixth day of the six days of creation. And according to the parallel between the six days of creation and the 6,000 years of the world, we’re now in the sixth millennium. Okay? Adam stood on his feet at the parallel point corresponding to 1948 on the sixth day, and the Vilna Gaon says that then the Jewish people would rise to their feet. An amazing prediction, by the way.

[Speaker K] Does he write that calculation himself?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s how Rabbi Kasher brings it. I haven’t seen the original source, but that’s how he brings it.

[Speaker K] But 1948 is—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] from the creation of—

[Speaker D] the world?

[Speaker K] No, 5708.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, I wanted to stop here, and I’ll do this in outline form. It seems to me the framework of the discussion—I mean harming innocents—the framework of the discussion is basically a collision between two principles that on their face seem contradictory. On the one hand, there is “be killed rather than transgress” with respect to murder. Of the three severe transgressions: if they threaten me to commit them, I have to die rather than transgress. One of them is murder. If they tell me, kill someone else or we’ll kill you, I’m forbidden to kill him; I have to die. Why? Because “Who says your blood is redder?” Your blood is no redder than his. What happens, in contrast, that’s one law. The second law is the law of the pursuer. The law of the pursuer says that when Reuven is pursuing Shimon to kill him, then Shimon or anyone else may kill Reuven in order to save Shimon. On the face of it, there is a contradiction between these two laws, because essentially we kill Reuven in order to save Shimon—implying that Shimon’s blood is redder than Reuven’s blood.

[Speaker C] He’s a pursuer; the other one isn’t a pursuer.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but still, here you—

[Speaker C] more red—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] you are harming one person’s blood in order to save the other, and that contradicts what the principle in the Talmud in Pesachim says there: “Who says?” You are forbidden to kill one in order to save the other. So what’s the answer? That’s the law, so obviously it’s true. But what’s the difference? There are various explanations for it. It seems to me Rashi says that in killing the pursuer, we also save him from the transgression of murder. Meaning, there is a tiebreaker here: his life and the other’s life are indeed equal, but he also gains by being spared the transgression of murder, and therefore I kill him. That’s one explanation. Another explanation is of course what seems to me simpler—or really there is a second explanation before the simpler one. There is a second explanation that says this is a kind of punishment. There are several proofs for this. For the pursuer—after all, if he kills the pursued, he will be liable to death. So essentially they tell me: look, instead of waiting until he kills him and then bringing him to a religious court so they can execute him, don’t be an idiot—kill him now, at least the other one will be saved.

[Speaker B] Administrative detention.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. But killing him now means I’m acting here as a judge; in other words, I’m essentially applying the death penalty to him. One of the practical implications, for example, is that when he breaks utensils—the Mishnah in tractate Sanhedrin, yes—a pursuer who broke utensils while running is exempt. Since he is liable to death, the rule of “he receives the greater punishment” applies, so if he is liable to death he is exempt from monetary payment. Now what does “liable to death” mean? After all, the permission to kill him is not a death sentence; it is in order to save the one being pursued. You see from the Mishnah that no—it is a death sentence. I kill him because there is a death penalty upon him. What?

[Speaker F] Is he also liable to death for the act? I didn’t understand.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he hasn’t killed yet; he’s a pursuer, and I’m killing him now. But of course this explanation is problematic, for example with a minor who is a pursuer—what do you do then? A minor is not liable to punishment. So if this is a punishment, then even if the minor kills, he is not liable to death. But a minor who is a pursuer is also a pursuer—there is a dispute among Amoraim in the Talmud about it—but a minor pursuer is also a pursuer, and we kill him too. So what follows? The claim is that the moment you created the situation—you, the pursuer, created the situation—you can’t now say: listen, why are you killing me in order to protect him? His blood is no redder than mine. Don’t create that equation and then tell me how to solve it. In other words, if you created the equation, you can’t use this argument—that my blood is no less red than his—in order to save yourself. That’s absurd. You create here the equation of either you or him, and now you want to rely on the fact that his blood is no redder than yours.

[Speaker D] It’s a defense claim in his mouth, but…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course. I’m saying—I’m the one putting it in his mouth—but I’m saying that’s the halakhic move. The halakhic move says there is no defense claim in favor of the pursuer, because he is the one who created the situation that forces me into these kinds of defense arguments. And once that is his argument, then once he created the situation, those defense arguments don’t stand for him. That is one of the practical implications of this way of understanding it. I’m not going into that issue now—cities near the border, there’s an interesting Magen Avraham—but I’m not… These are the two principles facing one another.

[Speaker B] Is there a difference between a Jew and a non-Jew?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think not. Rabbi Yisraeli also, in a responsum about the Qibya operation—a very famous responsum—writes that there isn’t. The prohibition against killing a gentile is a prohibition at a lower level than the prohibition against killing a Jew. The prohibition against killing a Jew is “you shall not murder,” and one is liable to death for it. The prohibition against killing a gentile is a Torah-level prohibition—“Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed”—but one is not liable to death for it; that is the Jewish law. But regarding these considerations, Rabbi Yisraeli says, there is no difference between a Jew and a gentile. In other words, I’ll try to explain perhaps why.

[Speaker H] But there’s no equality here. What? But there’s no equality.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean there’s no equality?

[Speaker H] His blood is in fact redder than yours.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, so he says—I think he, it seems to me that he also argues no, there isn’t—this isn’t a matter of his blood being less red. What do you mean?

[Speaker E] His blood is less red—what do you mean? Surely I matter more to myself; I come first to myself on the most basic level.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] An old person and a young person?

[Speaker E] Your relative and someone who isn’t related? Right, right. You’re not punishing, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Passive omission is passive omission, and passive omission is preferable.

[Speaker B] Is there a difference between a relative and a Jew—between a Jew and a Jew who isn’t a relative?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Come on, let’s move on for a moment. I just can’t get into all these corners; I’m trying to do this in a few minutes. Now, what happens here? When they tell me, kill someone in order to save yourself—that is forbidden. But if that person is pursuing me, and in that way I save myself by killing him, then it is permitted, right? In other words, the question is whether that person whom I am killing, or someone else is killing, is a pursuer or is a means of rescue. For example, King David in the passage in tractate Bava Kamma 60a—King David asks the Sanhedrin, yes, that midrash there about the mighty men, about bringing him water from Bethlehem—that is a halakhic question to the Sanhedrin: is a person allowed to save himself with another person’s property? Fine. So it says there that it is forbidden, and for King David it was permitted because he was king, but for an ordinary person it is forbidden to save himself with another person’s property. Rashi’s view is that this is literal; the other medieval authorities (Rishonim) say no, he just has to pay, but the principle is that this is actually parallel to the issue of “be killed rather than transgress,” not to the law of the pursuer. Meaning, if to save myself from a pursuer I need to damage his property, then certainly that is permitted; I’m even allowed to kill him, so certainly to damage his property. King David’s whole question is in a situation where the property is my way of saving myself, but the property is not the property of the one pursuing me. For example, if there are—what was the case there? There were stacks of grain, of Philistines—grain stacks, sorry, not necessarily Philistines, that’s the dispute there in the Talmud—behind which Philistines were hiding, fighting David. Now David wanted to burn the stack in order to eliminate the Philistines, or so they would not be able to hide behind it, and so on. The question is whether he was allowed to do that. Now the stack belonged to someone uninvolved, what today they would call non-combatant. Okay? The question is whether you are allowed to save yourself in a life-threatening situation. That’s really the question. Now there it is property; I’m not getting into property now, that’s more delicate. But in matters of life, that is the situation in which it is indeed forbidden. Meaning, if someone is uninvolved, I am forbidden to harm him, even if the price is my own life. And Rabbi Yisraeli writes more than that: he argues that this also applies to a gentile. If the other person, the uninvolved one, is a gentile, this also applies. Not only does it also apply—it may be even more forbidden. Why? Because with a Jew there is also the law of mutual responsibility; that is, he has an obligation to save me—not at the price of his own life, but he has an obligation to save me. A gentile does not even have that obligation. Regarding a gentile, I am not even allowed to damage his property in order to save myself, according to those medieval authorities (Rishonim) who say that regarding a Jew’s property it is permitted to damage it because the Jew is in fact obligated to expend his property in order to save me. He is subject to “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood.” But the gentile owes me nothing. That’s what he argues in his responsum on the Qibya operation.

[Speaker E] On the other hand, I owe him less. What? On the other hand, I owe him less.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So he argues that this is not—the question of owing him less—I can’t get into that now. The fact that you owe him less is not part of the equation here at all, in my opinion. But that would need separate explanation. In any case, what happens now with harming innocents? With harming innocents, on the face of it, that is completely forbidden. No matter what mortal danger threatens us, if you harm someone uninvolved, then this is “be killed rather than transgress”; one may not save oneself through another person’s life. This is the law of a pursuer: if someone threatens me, I am allowed to kill him under the law of a pursuer. If it is an uninvolved party, then this is exactly the second situation of “be killed rather than transgress.” You cannot harm someone who is not threatening you just because by harming him you will be saved. That is no justification. Your blood is no redder than his. Therefore, in principle, by law, this is “be killed rather than transgress”: it is forbidden to harm innocents. Now Rabbi Yisraeli argues there—again, he is speaking about the Qibya operation—he argues there that nevertheless it was permitted to do so because this is a matter of the laws of war. The laws of war are the rabbit people always pull out of the hat when they don’t know what to say. Meaning, when there is something that seems terribly reasonable—unreasonable that it should be forbidden; I mean, clearly, clearly it ought to be permitted—then the rabbit is always the laws of war: the laws of war are something else, and there you’re allowed to do whatever you want. I don’t know; it seems to me like something where I agree that in war there are different standards, and we need to know exactly how to formulate that, but on the other hand, no. The innocent Palestinian in this case—am I unable to defend myself, with all due respect, because of “be killed rather than transgress”? So what am I supposed to do—are all of us supposed to die for the sanctity of the Palestinian’s life? That doesn’t sound reasonable.

[Speaker E] There’s also here—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Doubt, you—

[Speaker E] Are you talking here about certain death or doubt?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They don’t want to kill him. No, I’m not talking right now about doubt, about certainty. Let’s talk right now about certainty for the sake of the discussion. Is a king allowed? That’s what I’m saying. Same thing. Same question. Same question—I don’t know. Their king? Their king is certainly allowed. Our king—I don’t know; it’s like the question of the laws of war. That’s exactly the point. Now, there are laws of war, but they are not defined anywhere. That’s why I always feel that it’s some kind of rabbit pulled out of a hat when people don’t know how to understand whether something is halakhic. I think that here it actually can be defined in a halakhic way. I want to finish. I think that here it really can be defined in a halakhic way, and that is the point I wanted only to reach. I’m doing this only schematically. It seems to me—and I think perhaps we spoke about this when I talked about collectives—that if I really see the one standing opposite me as a collective and not as a collection of private individuals, and I said—I think I said—that this is generally a right-wing perspective as opposed to a left-wing perspective. A left-wing perspective is to see the individual before you, and the collective is a kind of fiction. A legal fiction, one sort or another, yes, of course. I relate to nations in legal discourse, but I do not see the nation as some kind of entity, meaning apart from people. From that perspective, it is forbidden to harm innocents, and that is quite true. It is no wonder that the left, supposedly, is linked to questions of morality and harm to innocents. Left is an economic conception or a political conception, but what does that have to do with questions of morality? Why are those same disputes also present in moral questions? Because it really comes from the same root. If you see the one standing opposite you as a collection of individuals, then Jewish law too says that it is forbidden to harm innocents; this is “be killed rather than transgress”; you cannot save yourself through another person’s life. But if you say, from the right-wing perspective, yes?—the perspective is that what stands opposite me is actually a collective. And once what stands opposite me is a collective, that means that this whole collective is, at this moment, pursuing me or threatening me. And therefore I am allowed to harm it in order to save myself. This perspective basically says that the uninvolved person in this case, or the innocent one, is part of the pursuing collective. Since he is part of the pursuing collective, I am allowed to harm him, because this is under the law of a pursuer; it is not under the law of “be killed rather than transgress.” It belongs to the second law, not the first. In other words, the metaphysical perspective on who stands opposite me—whether these are collectives or individuals—casts light on the question of whether we have here the law of a pursuer or the law of saving oneself through another person’s life, of “be killed rather than transgress.” Therefore, it seems to me that on this the whole matter depends. Now we need to know—just, I want to finish so that no misunderstandings come out—obviously even under the law of a pursuer, in a place where I do not need to kill the pursuer in order to save myself, it is forbidden to harm him, right? If he can be saved by injuring one of his limbs. So therefore, for example, if I can save myself without harming the uninvolved person, then certainly it is forbidden to kill him, even though the law of pursuer applies to him. Not because he is not a pursuer—he is a pursuer—but even regarding a pursuer, if you can save the victim without killing the pursuer—rather by shooting him in the leg, or shooting the one holding the rifle and not the uninvolved person standing next to him—then certainly that is what you must do. Here I am talking only about a situation where you cannot save yourself without harming the uninvolved person. Now here, of course, now begin—all the considerations of proportionality begin, which is where everyone always starts the discussion. I think that’s the end of the discussion, not the beginning of the discussion. The framework of the discussion is the framework I have given until now. From here on, this does not give a simple answer to every question, because listen, everyone—it doesn’t matter—common sense says that in a place where there is a doubtful danger to a soldier that I can prevent at the cost of flattening a neighborhood with ten thousand people inside it, that is not justified. With all due respect and sorrow for our soldiers, there is something about proportion that says this cannot be. Such a thing cannot be done. Okay?

[Speaker F] And even according to what the Rabbi just said—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Seemingly, yes, that would justify it. Right, and therefore I’m saying that this framework of the discussion gives some sort of framework, but it does not replace everything people always talk about—proportionality and proportion and so on. What troubles me in the ordinary discourse is that all you have there are concepts like proportionality and proportion; you don’t have the framework. Meaning, first of all tell me what the principles are—what is permitted, what is forbidden, when is it permitted, when is it forbidden. After that I can begin to see: okay, now let’s talk about weights.

[Speaker E] Are you sure this helped? Because it brought us back to plain common sense—use your head, when does it seem reasonable to you?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but still—

[Speaker E] Because you arrived at something metaphysical that I don’t know is any better grounded than some laws of war.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I can ground it in a completely clear way.

[Speaker E] What? That there is such an entity? And then there is no longer such a thing as an individual?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t say there is no such thing.

[Speaker E] In that entity there already isn’t, because you erased them.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’ll repeat again: I didn’t say there is no such thing. In the lesson on collectives I spoke about this in quite a bit of detail, and I said that every person—were you there?—every person has an individual hat and a hat as an organ within a collective, and the attitude toward him is a weighting of those two things, and that too contributes to this calculation. But I can’t get into all those details now. The claim is that I think it is very important to establish some kind of framework of what the principles are that are involved here in this field, in this discussion. After that we can begin to think. It does not exempt us from weighing considerations of proportionality and logic and common sense. No computer will be able to produce an answer to every such question; it’s too complicated. I just think that once we speak only in terms of this is not proportionate, this is proportionate, and so on, without first defining what the principles are, according to what we are deciding, that means you’re just operating from the gut. And I think there is great advantage in establishing some kind of framework, even if it does not give the final answer in every situation.

[Speaker J] Okay, that’s it for now.