Simplicity, Lecture 9

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Only the wording. But in terms of the content, it doesn’t seem that there’s a definition here; it’s just wording. There is… for example, there are prohibitions, like “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood.” You see someone drowning in a river—don’t leave him to drown, save him. That’s a prohibition, “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood,” but it imposes on you an obligation to act. You have to save him. It’s not a commandment of refraining; it’s a commandment of action. Okay? There are many more examples. Most examples are not like that, but there are quite a few examples in both directions. Positive commandments that command you to refrain, like resting on the Sabbath, and prohibitions that command you to act, like “do not place bloodguilt in your house,” “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood,” and things like that. If that’s really so, then in what sense is this a positive commandment and that a prohibition? Because when we were—if I had asked you at the beginning how you define the difference between a positive commandment and a prohibition—the obvious answer is, and this is also what they would usually say in yeshivot: active versus passive. Right? Meaning, a positive commandment is something that requires you to do something, to act, and a prohibition is something that requires you not to act—what in legal language is called an omission. Meaning, a positive commandment is fulfilled through positive action, through an act, and it is neglected through omission, through passive inaction. A prohibition is the opposite: it is fulfilled through omission and violated through action, right? Passive inaction and positive action. That’s the simple definition of the difference between a positive commandment and a prohibition. But as we’ve just seen, that doesn’t stand up to the facts. Meaning, in Jewish law there are quite a few positive commandments that specifically require me not to act, that are fulfilled through omission and violated through action—and the reverse: there are prohibitions that are fulfilled through action and violated through omission. So that’s not the criterion for the difference between positive commandments and prohibitions. So what is? Okay, that’s really the question.

Now, there’s an article by someone who was in Talmud at Bar-Ilan, Aharon Shemesh, who died young a few years ago, an article of his in Tarbiz. And there he already noticed this point, and he says—and this connects to my opening remarks—he says that initially, among the Amoraim in the earlier generations, the distinction between positive commandments and prohibitions was practical. A commandment that imposes on you an obligation to act is a positive commandment; a commandment that imposes on you an obligation to refrain, meaning passive inaction, is a prohibition. That was what I said before—that really was the definition in the earlier generations. In later generations, a different definition began to emerge, a more abstract one. And that’s why this is part of the example of the process I described earlier: over the generations, we basically become more and more abstract. Once things were more concrete, and as history progresses we become more abstract. That continues even beyond the Talmud throughout history, you could say.

So Aharon Shemesh in his article asks himself: so then what, after all, distinguishes a positive commandment from a prohibition? So he says: a linguistic criterion. In the early generations it was a practical criterion, of what it imposes on me; in the later generations it became a linguistic criterion. If the Torah says the word “do not”—“do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood”—then it’s a prohibition, even though it imposes on you an obligation to act. If the Torah commands you in an active imperative, in positive language, then it’s a positive commandment, even though it commands you to rest, meaning not to do labor. And so, basically, he says that we moved from the practical criterion to the linguistic criterion. Okay?

Now, he’s right on the descriptive level, the phenomenological level—that’s true. But it’s obvious that this doesn’t answer the question. Because when I ask myself why the Torah uses positive language for a positive commandment like resting, why doesn’t it just say “do not do labor”? So after the Torah says it positively, I understand that it means this is a positive commandment. But I ask myself—that’s not an answer. I’m asking: why did the Torah formulate it that way? Apparently because there is still something different here. If there were nothing different about it, then why didn’t it suffice to say there is a prohibition: “do not do any labor”? Therefore behind the linguistic criterion there must also be some substantive explanation. It can’t be that the language is the bottom line of the explanation. The language is an indication that this is a positive commandment and that is a prohibition. But behind that indication we have to find some explanation, something that tells me what the real difference is, what makes this thing a positive commandment even though what it imposes on me is non-action. And then after I understand that, I understand why the Torah formulated it in positive language. But the fact that the Torah formulated it that way is only an indication that it’s a positive commandment; it’s not an explanation. And I’m asking what the explanation is. Okay?

[Speaker H] The Talmud writes “to assign a prohibition,” for example, in certain matters. Meaning, that the Torah wanted to assign a prohibition to it so that either he gets lashes or so that it also has a prohibition attached to it? What does the Talmud mean there?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously there’s an explanation behind that. Otherwise why indeed are lashes given? The Torah wants me to get lashes, okay—but why? There’s something here that apparently warrants lashes. We need to understand why.

[Speaker I] Because the term “prohibition” appears many times in the Talmud, right? As a heading of… right. Meaning, for example, “do not place bloodguilt in your house”—that’s some commandment they wanted to phrase in the negative.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The question is why. After all, what it commands me in substance is really: go save your fellow. So say, “go save your fellow.” In terms of content, that’s simply a positive commandment. Why does the Torah choose negative phrasing? So it’s obvious to me that there is some explanation behind this; I just need to find it. The fact that it was phrased negatively is only an indication that it’s a prohibition. It’s a sign, not a cause. Okay?

[Speaker B] Yosef Shemesh pointed to the linguistic principle. And you keep going beyond that. Did he go further?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he stopped there.

[Speaker B] Oh, he stopped there? And that gave him an article? What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s it? On the contrary, on the contrary—no. And that’s why I wrote an article on it.

[Speaker F] You didn’t write things like that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I also got an article out of it, because I wrote an article on his article. And I wrote that Talmud scholars make an article out of this; that’s what I wrote my article about. My article basically says—not critically, but really that this is their role. Meaning, as scholars, they’re supposed to focus on the facts. The facts are that this is a practical criterion and that is a linguistic criterion. I, as a non-academic learner, ask myself: okay, but what is the explanation? What lies behind the fact?

[Speaker C] Where do we get to the spiritual criterion?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, let’s put it that way. I don’t know if spiritual or not, but yes, there has to be some explanation behind it. And of course here he would already be taking a risk, because as an academic this is speculation—he can’t prove it. All he can do is focus on the facts and show that these are the facts. And in that sense he did his job properly. Is that the critique? Yes—speculation. But I’m saying: that’s not really his role.

I once wrote in Makor Rishon about this, in that controversy around Rozenak at the Hebrew University. There was some article there in Makor Rishon and responses and all kinds of things. There was a very big controversy there, because when Avinoam Rozenak taught Jewish thought at the Hebrew University—his father was also a lecturer at the Hebrew University—he got into existential layers: what does this mean to us, and what do you think, and what does he think, and it turned it into a study hall. But this is a university. So his colleagues in the department, the faculty members in the department, opposed him. They said: you don’t do that in an academic department. In an academic department you teach philology, you examine what is and what isn’t and where it came from—not what you think and what it means to you. That’s what they do in yeshivot, not in academia.

And then everyone came out against these “fossils” from the university who spoke in favor of Rozenak. In the newspaper certainly, but also within academia—Shalom Rosenberg supported him, and other definitely important figures in that field. And I actually wrote an article against him. Against his approach, not against him personally, God forbid, but in favor of the approach of the fossils. Because I claim that the university has a role, and it should deal with objective matters, things you can demonstrate, support with facts, and make claims about like science—to whatever extent the humanities are science. But to try to do research.

Yes, exactly. Explanations—explanations, anyone can come up with explanations. What does it mean to me, what does it mean to me? In the bathroom I’ll think about it and I’ll come to conclusions about what it means to me. What does that have to do with academic research? Can you validate what it means to you? Can you put it to a falsifiability test, what it means to you? It means something to you—fine; to someone else it means something else. That is not academia’s business. I’m not saying that isn’t important work. It could be very important work, but it’s not academia’s business. Therefore in that sense I say the same thing here. Yosef Shemesh did excellent academic work. He analyzed the generations, he showed how the conception develops, indications, he brought evidence for it. That’s academic work. But of course that’s only the infrastructure, after which you have to come from outside academia and ask: okay, what does it mean? The facts have been laid before us. What do those facts mean? Why is it really like that? The “why” questions are really not his mandate. Okay. That’s what I wrote the article about.

[Speaker E] The theoretical physics department is part of academia, and they propose explanations; they don’t just do research.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—only explanations that are open to falsification. I’m not talking about those kinds of things; those are scientific. I’m talking about explanations of the type: what is the idea behind this? What is this trying to achieve? Someone who explains what the idea of gravitational force is won’t be able to publish that in any physics journal. “Masses are drawn to one another in essence, therefore they come closer.” Fine. Write that in an ethics book between five and seven.

[Speaker E] This whole issue of string theory and so on—is that something that stands a falsifiability test?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course, of course, of course it is. Again—and if not, then more work is needed—but the aspiration is to arrive at something that says things, not “what does this mean to me” in the existentialist sense. That’s irrelevant.

[Speaker D] No, it doesn’t stand the test, it hasn’t stood a falsifiability test, he says, but it builds—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A theory that will stand a falsifiability test—

[Speaker D] It’s supposed to be refutable, there has to be an option to refute it. Fine, so that’s what he means.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. In short, back to our issue. So afterward, when I began asking this question, I walked around with this question, asked people, and they told me: “Well, there are various practical differences. For a positive commandment, you spend only up to one-fifth of your assets to fulfill it. For a prohibition, you spend all your assets in order not to violate it. You get lashes for prohibitions; for positive commandments there is no punishment.” There are all kinds of implications. When the Torah wanted lashes, it wrote it in the language of a prohibition; when it wanted there to be no lashes, it wrote it in the language of a positive commandment—or in terms of implications.

I said that doesn’t satisfy me. It doesn’t satisfy me because implications are always implications of something. When the Torah wants me to get lashes for something, so it writes it as a prohibition—but why does it want me to get lashes for that? Because there is something in it that merits lashes. I’m asking: what is that something? Why does the Torah formulate it in negative language? You can’t explain that through the implications, because the implications are implications of something.

Like I once asked another question in another context: Rabbi Yosei the Galilean says that offerings of lesser sanctity are the owner’s property. Okay? I asked the guys: what does “the owner’s property” mean? In what sense? After all, it’s sacred property. What does it mean that it’s the owner’s property? They said: it means that you can betroth a woman with it. That answers nothing. The fact that you can betroth a woman with it is a result of the fact that it is the owner’s property. But why is it the owner’s property? After all, it is designated for sacrifice and consumption and everything that needs to be done with a sacrifice. So in what sense is it the owner’s property? The implications don’t help at all. The implications are a result of the fact that it is the owner’s property; but explain to me in what sense it is the owner’s property, and after you explain that I’ll understand that you can betroth a woman with it. Okay, and here it’s the same thing.

[Speaker C] Implications are not an explanation of anything. Implications are an indication that behind them there is some explanation of which these are the implications. I’m asking what that explanation is. Maybe with a prohibition it’s something that harms you. Harms your character traits. Since when you do it, it harms you, and because of that—why was it given because of the punishment? The fact that it needs to be flogged is a sign that something here is not right in you.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I agree, but I’ll put it more broadly than you’re saying. Harmful—but not in you. You’ll see in a moment. I’ll get to that in just a second.

[Speaker C] In another second I’ll get there.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s really the puzzle. That’s what I needed—that’s the question I’m looking to solve. Now, the claim I want to make is the following. A positive commandment is a commandment that points to a positive state. Meaning, if you do what is written here, you are righteous—let’s put it simply.

[Speaker C] It doesn’t point to it, it creates it.

[Speaker J] No, it—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It requires you to be in a state; it points to that state; it tells you, “This is a positive state; I want you to be there.” In that sense it points to it—in the sense that it’s not a neutral description, not a descriptive pointing; it’s prescriptive, meaning it tells you to do something. A prohibition points to a negative state and warns you: don’t be there. Okay? Now notice that this formulation is not equivalent to the practical formulation. It could be, for example, the commandment of resting on the Sabbath. When the Torah gives a positive commandment to rest on the Sabbath, I asked why it is a positive commandment and not a prohibition. After all, all it requires of me is not to do labor. The answer is no. This commandment tells me that it wants me to be in a state of rest. The state of rest is a positive state.

Let me put it differently. Suppose I do labor. Am I a wicked person? A transgressor? The answer is no; I’m just not righteous. Because one who rests is in a positive state—he is righteous. If I did labor, I didn’t rest, meaning I’m not righteous. That is called a positive commandment. That’s why it’s also called neglect of a positive commandment. When I do labor on the Sabbath, in terms of the positive commandment it’s only neglect of a positive commandment. The prohibition of the Sabbath tells me: if you do labor, you are wicked. It’s the same thing: to repair means to bring about a positive state, and to damage means to prevent a state…

[Speaker C] No, that’s not repair.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what I mean. What? What?

[Speaker B] I’m saying that what you’re saying is a tautology on the positive side. What? What? Because you’re saying that because it says to do it, then you’re in a positive state. Not because—on the contrary. Why?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It says to do it because it’s a positive state, to reverse your argument.

[Speaker B] But because it says to do it, it’s a positive state.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not because—on the contrary. What? Because it is a positive state, it says to do it. The Holy One, blessed be He, knows; He says that resting on the Sabbath is something proper, something good. Whoever does it is righteous, therefore He wrote in the Torah that you shall rest on the Sabbath. We, of course, don’t know that independently; we learn it from what is written in the Torah. But when the Holy One, blessed be He, wrote the Torah, from His perspective the order was the reverse: He understood that this is a positive state and therefore He wrote it in the Torah as a positive commandment. Do you understand? What? Wait, in a second. So first of all, the definition I’m proposing is this: a positive commandment is a commandment that points to a positive state and asks me to be in it, requires me to be in it. A prohibition is a commandment that points to a negative state and requires me to avoid it, not to be in it. Okay? That’s the definition. And the positive state or the negative state can be a state of action or a state of omission, and that makes no difference at all. Notice—this is completely independent of action and omission.

For example, if resting on the Sabbath is an omission, then why is it defined as a positive commandment? Because the omission is not avoidance of a negative state of doing labor. The omission is a positive state: that you rest on the Sabbath—that is what the Torah wants. Therefore it defines it as a positive commandment. If it were defined only as a prohibition, then resting on the Sabbath would contain nothing positive; you would merely be careful not to be in the negative state of doing labor on the Sabbath. Therefore the Torah also added a positive commandment. It wanted to tell you that on the Sabbath there are two things: first, doing labor is a negative thing. Second, resting or refraining from labor is a positive thing.

There are places where there is no such duality. For example—just a second—“do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood.” There there is no duality; there is only a prohibition. And that prohibition requires me to do something, right? To save my fellow who is drowning in the river. But when it says “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood,” it means that rescue is not a positive action. Failure to rescue is a negative state. We require you not to be in the negative state of someone who is indifferent to his fellow’s suffering. To rescue, from a halakhic standpoint—I’m not making a moral statement at the moment—from a halakhic standpoint rescue is not a positive action; it is only avoidance of a negative state. Therefore it is defined as a prohibition and not as a positive commandment, even though that prohibition requires me to act. It should have been a positive commandment.

[Speaker E] I’ll translate that onto the number line. What you’re basically telling me is that a positive commandment is a positive number; when you violate a prohibition you’ve produced a negative number. Therefore if you fail to do a positive commandment you go back to zero, and so you don’t need to get punished. But if, by contrast, you violate a prohibition, you’re in a minus state and therefore you get punished. That’s what you’re saying.

[Speaker B] Right, exactly. And that perhaps explains why Maimonides counts it as two commandments.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. That’s where I started.

[Speaker E] So according to that, why is a positive commandment ever made into a prohibition? Wait, wait—like Robin Hood, no—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If I get there, I’ll touch on that. Wait, slowly. Look, in ancient philosophy they distinguished between two types of opposites or negations. There is privative negation and contrary negation. Let’s say privative negation is like one versus zero. I negate the one and I’m left with zero. Exactly. Contrary negation means that from one I move to minus one, its opposite, not its nullification. Okay? Ancient philosophers really loved playing around with questions of which opposites are contraries and which are privations. For example, light and darkness, or cold and heat, and things like that—are these privative opposites or contrary opposites? It seems to me the answers are very simple. Light and darkness are privative opposites, that’s obvious. Why? Simple—because of the model Shmuel suggested earlier. Privative opposites are one versus zero; contrary opposites are one versus minus one.

Now if you add light to darkness, you get light; there’s no cancellation, right? So that means it’s one and zero. If you add cold to heat—hot water and cold water—that cancels out, right? You’ll get… something lukewarm. That means it’s one and minus one, contrary opposites. Okay? So we have a tool, through this kind of mathematical toy model, and we can examine various pairs of opposites: are they privative opposites or contrary opposites? Okay? Now I return to the system of commandments.

[Speaker C] Yes, with that analogy, why actually not—why isn’t this a positive commandment, why isn’t it a prohibition?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know, good question. But from the halakhic standpoint they don’t require from you the positive act; they tell you: don’t be in the negative state. Good question why they left it that way. It’s a little similar perhaps—perhaps you’ve drawn me in, so I’ll say something about it after all.

There is the law called “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood,” okay? There was a big debate in the Knesset whether to pass that law or not. Now it was clear to everyone what the debate was about. The debate was simply over whether a biblical verse would enter the law books. The supporters supported the law because of that, and the opponents opposed it because of that. Nobody was interested in the content of the law—whether there was reason to enact this law or not. That was the issue.

When the law passed, all the religious people burst out in joy and jubilation, as if they were the only ones to whom helping people in distress mattered. They burst out in joy because they had inserted a verse into the law book. By the way, the opponents—look at the Knesset records, the protocols of the committee discussions—the opposition was because of that. Because they didn’t want to bring Jewish law and Torah and biblical verses into the law book; this is a secular state. Yossi Beilin was there and others. That was the story.

But there is a real substantive debate behind this. The real debate—if you go somewhere else where they don’t care about Jewish law or anti-Jewish law, for example abroad—there they have the same debates. There it’s called the Good Samaritan law. It’s their version of “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood,” the same thing. So what was the debate about? The debate was whether it is proper to include such a law in the law books. Why? Because that you should save someone—that’s obvious. But the question is whether, if you fail to save him, we should impose sanctions on you. You didn’t do anything to him; you simply were not righteous. You don’t deserve a sanction.

Now in law, the rule in the legal world is that there is no law whose violation has no sanction attached to it. Meaning, law means that if you don’t do it, a sanction will be imposed on you. And the substantive opponents, forget the religious and anti-religious people, the substantive opposition to this law stems from that. People argued that such a law should not be in the law books, even though it’s obvious to us that one should do this and that it is a moral virtue and that he should get a commendation from the President of the State if he does it—very good. But that doesn’t belong in the law books. That was the argument.

Now, ironically, what happened as a result was this: why were the religious people so jubilant? Because after it entered, they said: here, we’ve brought Hebrew law into the law books. Now why is that nonsense? Because until they put this law in, Israeli law completely matched Jewish law. After they put this law into the law books, that’s where we departed from Jewish law. Because from the standpoint of Jewish law there is no sanction on someone who fails to save. And that was also the situation before the law was enacted: everyone understood that it is moral to save, but there was no sanction. When they enacted the law, what did they do? They said: now whoever doesn’t save will be punished. That is exactly what Jewish law says not to do. So in fact putting this law into the law books caused the law books to deviate from Jewish law. No, that’s just an anecdote. Why?

[Speaker E] But “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood”—yes, isn’t that one of the prohibitions?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, it is one of the prohibitions. There are no lashes for it. What? It’s a prohibition without an act; there are no lashes for it. There’s no punishment. So the point now is: what lies behind that? What lies behind it is exactly what I said before. A prohibition is something that points to a negative state. And what does “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood” say? It doesn’t say that there is an obligation to save. It says that there is a prohibition against not saving. Right? That’s what the prohibition says. Now what they did by putting it into the law books was basically to turn it into a positive commandment—a positive commandment with a sanction. But now there is an obligation to save, not a prohibition against not saving. Okay? Therefore in that sense this is actually a deviation from Jewish law.

[Speaker B] But that law doesn’t really matter, if you lie to yourself, don’t lie to yourself…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, leave that now. There’s a lot—many references in case law and interpretation: when it applies, when it doesn’t apply, when there is justification, when there isn’t. We won’t get into that now. That’s a whole topic in itself. It’s just an example for me.

So look, I return to us. Basically my definition, the definition I’m proposing, is the following: what lies behind the linguistic definition—what Shemesh called it—what lies behind that is what I’m claiming here. When the Torah wants to point to a positive state, it formulates it as a positive commandment. When it wants to point to a negative state, it formulates it as a prohibition. And now there is no problem at all. There can be a positive commandment that requires me not to act, because the non-action is a positive state—the Sabbath rest. There can be a prohibition that requires me to act, like “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood,” like “and you shall make a parapet,” “do not place bloodguilt in your house.” Why? Because there indeed the action has no positive value. Only the failure to act has negative value, even though it is only inaction, omission, refraining. But that refraining is something problematic. It’s not that you are merely not righteous if you refrain; you are wicked if you refrain. Therefore it is defined as a prohibition.

[Speaker E] And if there is something that is either one or minus one, then it is both a positive commandment and a prohibition?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. That’s the Sabbath. Exactly. On the Sabbath, why is there this duality? The whole sixth root of Maimonides. Because the Torah wants to say that both aspects exist here. Resting is a positive state, and doing labor is a negative state. To say such a thing, you must state two commandments. You can’t say it in one. If there were only a prohibition—if I counted the two commandments but both of them as prohibitions—then I wouldn’t know that resting is a positive state. That is exactly why Maimonides says: the prohibition is counted among the prohibitions and the positive commandment among the positive commandments. And that too is a novelty. But that is exactly what is written there.

Now here is precisely where the question of the difference comes in. The difference is that if, say, I rested on the Sabbath and there were only a prohibition—if there were only a prohibition, sorry—if I did not rest on the Sabbath, I did labor, and there is only a prohibition, then I am wicked. Right? If I did labor on the Sabbath but there were only a positive commandment—suppose there were only a positive commandment—then I am not wicked; I am only not righteous. Okay? Once you have both, then you have both. So if I do labor, I am wicked, and if I do not do labor, not only am I not wicked, I am also righteous.

[Speaker E] If there were only a prohibition, then if you don’t do the labor you are not righteous—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But you are also not wicked. Exactly. Now from this all the implications follow. Why are there no punishments for positive commandments? Now I return to what Yehudit said earlier. Why is there no punishment for positive commandments? Because you don’t punish someone for not being righteous. It has nothing to do with action and non-action at all. Someone who is not righteous is not punished. And that was the debate over the law of “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood.” The person who did not save was simply not righteous. So why do you want to punish him?

[Speaker E] You’re not in a negative state; you’re in a non-positive state.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You punish someone for being in a negative state, not for not being in a positive state. Therefore there is punishment—lashes—for a prohibition, because you are in a negative state, you are wicked. But there is no punishment for someone who is not righteous. Therefore one must spend all one’s money in order not to fail regarding a prohibition. Why? Because in order not to be wicked, that is elementary—you must spend all your money. To be righteous is a virtue; spend one-fifth of your assets. But you don’t need to spend all your money. At worst, you just won’t be righteous. So all the implications exist, but they are implications. The basic definition from which the implications emerge is the question whether this is a positive state or a negative state. Okay? Yes.

[Speaker J] For “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood,” do you have to spend all your money? What? For “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, certainly you must, because it is a negative state, even though I do it passively. The passivity here is a negative state. Therefore I must spend all my money in order not to be passive here. That’s exactly the point.

[Speaker K] Isn’t this here between the positive commandment and the prohibition?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course. I said it’s a dual case. But there’s no sanction. So it’s passive but there’s no sanction, obviously. I said they wanted to formulate it as a positive commandment with a sanction. By the way, I claim that in secular law there are no positive commandments. I had some argument with Alon Harel from the Hebrew University; he’s a jurist.

[Speaker B] So how do you explain that there is punishment? What? For a prohibition that has…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s a completely different story. What? A prohibition without an act does not receive lashes for some reason.

[Speaker D] Yes, but what does that mean?

[Speaker B] You need to justify that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. And in fact they do justify it. Why do you need a justification, and why don’t you need a justification for the fact that there is no punishment for neglect of a positive commandment? Because it is obvious that neglect of a positive commandment gets no punishment. Here this really is a negative state, so why shouldn’t there be punishment? So there is some novelty here saying that a passive negative state nevertheless is not punished, even though it is negative. Fine—that’s a definition from the laws of punishment. But on the principled level, yes, there should have been punishment here.

The point is… why do I say that in secular law there are no positive commandments? I asked people, tell me, are there positive commandments in law? They say of course there are positive commandments. Paying taxes. I said: incorrect. There is a sanction. Obviously. For every such thing, if you don’t do it, there is a sanction. Therefore I claim that when the law says to pay taxes, what it means is that there is a prohibition against not paying taxes. In halakhic terminology, I mean. In halakhic terminology it is correct to classify this as a prohibition, not as a positive commandment. There are no positive commandments in law. Because if there were positive commandments in law, there would be things that if I didn’t do them, nothing would happen. If I did them, I’d get a commendation from some Labor Party foundation.

[Speaker E] But there’s no such thing in law. Even the wording is like that. They don’t say, “you are not fulfilling the law”; they say, “you are violating the law.” Right. That means it’s negative. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are defining commandments that are not about being righteous, like impurity and annulment of vows… no, that’s a completely different discussion. That’s a question of what such things are doing among positive commandments at all, but let’s leave that—that’s another question. Let’s talk about regular, standard positive commandments.

So what I’m basically saying is, look, because there is a zero state between one and minus one—

[Speaker C] Something that… so is this the answer according to which this is repair? This makes a repair and that makes an anti-repair.

[Speaker E] No, it defines.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t do anything—that’s his question. These are defining commandments. It’s not positive to be in this state or negative not to be in this state; it only defines, defines who is impure, who is pure. Yes, but there is no prohibition against being impure, only a definition. Fine, that’s another discussion; we’ve set it aside here.

So the claim is that we have—

[Speaker B] Basically, meaning that once again, when you do an act that places you on the right side, then you improve yourself?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. What? It’s wholly good.

[Speaker B] So that’s—

[Speaker C] It repairs, improves the world.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, maybe it improves the world, doesn’t matter—you improve something, you repair, and here you spoil. I said, just not necessarily in you. But I accept that this is repair and that is corruption or damage. Yes, that really is the explanation.

[Speaker C] Now—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think there is a parallel here to the model Shmuel mentioned earlier with one, minus one, and zero. Minus one is a negative state, one is a positive state, and zero is a neutral state, middling, average—average, righteous and wicked. That is basically the definition of positive commandments and prohibitions. A positive commandment sets zero against one; a prohibition sets zero against minus one. Okay? Now for zero you receive nothing—neither punishment nor reward. For one you receive reward; for minus one you receive punishment. That is the scale, and it makes no difference at all whether we’re talking about action or non-action in the principled sense. Okay?

Now where does this come from? It’s not trivial. In that same debate with Mr. Harel he gave me a nice example. There’s an American Jewish philosopher, Robert Nozick, a philosopher of law and more generally, and he once asked: what is the difference between an inducement and extortion? Because inducement is permitted by law and extortion is forbidden. Very timely.

So inducement: suppose I say to someone, look, if you do this job for me, you’ll get a thousand shekels. I induced him to do this job; there’s no problem. If he agrees and I offer him that, everything is fine; it’s allowed, right? It is allowed to induce a person to do things. I’m not talking about seduction in the negative sense of tempting someone who has no ability to resist, but rather inducing a person—I offer him a bonus, and if he wants, let him do it.

In extortion I say to him, look, if you don’t do it, I’ll take a thousand shekels from you. And that is forbidden, right? Now Robert Nozick asked: what’s the difference? You’re simply telling the person: look, you are placing before him a potential difference of a thousand shekels. There is a difference between two states whose gap is a thousand shekels, and you’re telling him: look, it’s worth doing this because then you’ll be in a state with a thousand shekels more than if you don’t do it. And that is true both for inducement and for extortion, so what’s the difference?

[Speaker E] In extortion you take something that is negative.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what?

[Speaker E] What do you mean, so what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s a difference of a thousand shekels between this state and that state—

[Speaker E] It’s the same difference, but you’re not the owner—what are you taking?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What you’re basically saying is that the law’s definition doesn’t consider only the potential gap, but also the absolute state in which you are. It’s not the same, zero versus one, as minus one versus zero. Right? When I offer a person an inducement, I tell him: look, either you’ll get a thousand shekels or you won’t get it. Now I’m allowed to give him a thousand shekels and I’m also allowed not to give him; both options are legal. So if I offer him two options both of which are legal, what’s the problem?

But in extortion, I offer him one legal option—that I won’t take anything from him, which of course I’m allowed to do—but I offer him another option, to take a thousand shekels from him, which is illegal. To offer him two possibilities, one of which is illegal—even though he has the option to do it and then I won’t take from him—what’s the problem? He brought it on himself that I took it; why didn’t he do it? If he had done it, I wouldn’t have taken it. No. If you threaten him with an illegal option, that’s called extortion, not inducement, and it is forbidden.

What lies behind this is that the definition is not only about differences; the absolute place where you are matters. There is some absolute zero. Anything below that means you are violating a person’s rights, and that is forbidden. You can add to his rights; you can refrain from violating his rights; you may not take away his rights. What is the difference between a state that is my right and a state that is a bonus for me—not my right, but if someone gives it, fine? The zero state. That means there is an absolute zero state. Okay? That is exactly what happens in Jewish law. The zero state is what defines the difference between a positive commandment and a prohibition. The prohibition says—the prohibition parallels extortion: either you are at minus one or at zero. The positive commandment parallels inducement: either zero or one. Therefore, for example, a positive commandment is basically a carrot; it’s an inducement. They entice me to do it; they promise me reward, right? You’ll get reward if you do the commandment. In a prohibition, it’s extortion: if you don’t avoid this, you’ll get punished. Why? Because it’s a negative state. That’s exactly the difference between inducement and extortion. Okay?

[Speaker B] No, but for example, the serpent induced Eve to eat the apple, so that’s not extortion.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course, but that—

[Speaker B] Was negative, it was against—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Extortion is forbidden because it is extortion. Inducement is not forbidden because it is inducement. But sometimes inducements can also be forbidden—not because I induced, but because of the content of the inducement. I induced him to do something illegal, so that is forbidden not because it was inducement, but because it is illegal.

[Speaker D] I induced him to do—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m talking about the definition itself of inducement and extortion, regardless of content. Okay? So Maimonides adds: the difference essentially between positive commandments and prohibitions is whether the Torah is enticing me to do something or coercively threatening me not to do it. Fine? In this definition, that is basically the carrot and the stick. Therefore there is reward for positive commandments and punishment for prohibitions, because it’s carrot and stick. Okay?

Nachmanides, for example, in Kiddushin, in the passage I mentioned earlier on page 34, the Talmud brings there a whole list of commandments that are positive commandments not dependent on time, and therefore women are obligated in them. The discussion there is which commandments women are obligated in and which they are not obligated in, and the Talmud says: women are exempt from time-bound positive commandments; women are obligated in positive commandments not dependent on time. Which are positive commandments not dependent on time? A parapet, returning lost property, sending away the mother bird, and things like that.

Now it seems to me that all of us—maybe all except one—there are four or five examples there, and they are very problematic examples. Tosafot there and the medieval authorities there already ask this. Because all these examples also have a prohibition alongside the positive commandment. In returning lost property, in sending away the mother bird, in parapet—in all these commandments there is also a prohibition. So even if it were time-dependent, women would still be obligated. They would be obligated because of the prohibition in it, not because of the positive commandment. So why give me such an unsuccessful example? Such an example—true, it’s not time-dependent, but even if these examples were time-dependent, women would be obligated, because there is also a prohibition together with the positive commandment. Only from a pure positive commandment are women exempt. So what kind of examples are these? That’s what Tosafot asks, and gives whatever answer it gives—an interesting Tosafot, we won’t get into it right now.

Nachmanides there says something very interesting. He says regarding parapet, for example, that in the commandment of parapet the prohibition is a prohibition whose purpose is to support the positive commandment. That is the whole point of the prohibition. Meaning, there is a positive commandment, “and you shall make a parapet for your roof,” and the prohibition “do not place bloodguilt in your house” comes only to ensure that you fulfill your positive commandment. Nachmanides says that according to this, if these commandments were time-bound, women would be exempt even though there is a prohibition here. Because they are exempt from the positive commandment, since it is a time-bound positive commandment, and therefore they would also be exempt from the prohibition, because the entire function of the prohibition is to ensure that the positive commandment is fulfilled. And one who is exempt from the positive commandment would also not have the prohibition. Meaning, Nachmanides says that in commandments of this sort, where the prohibition attached to the positive commandment exists only to ensure fulfillment of the positive commandment, then if it were time-bound women would be exempt. And therefore the Talmud brings that example.

[Speaker B] But you could say the reverse: that the positive commandment comes to support the prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How do you decide the direction? Nachmanides argues, interpretively—you can debate it—that here the prohibition supports the positive commandment, not that the positive commandment supports the prohibition.

[Speaker C] The positive commandment is the main thing, and the prohibition supports it. But how can you say the positive commandment is more important than the prohibition?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A parapet, versus “that there not be blood in your house.”

[Speaker C] What do you mean?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] As if that’s more important than the positive commandment. What does “more important” mean? In terms of what is required of me, what is required of me is to build the parapet. The goal is that there not be bloodshed. But what is required of me as a commandment is to build the parapet.

[Speaker B] But the parapet is only an example; the principle is not to have bloodshed in your house. The principle is more important than the example of the act you have to do. In the halakhic sense, in the halakhic sense, what matters is what is incumbent on me.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What is incumbent on me? What is incumbent on me is to arrange the house so that there won’t be hazards. The purpose of that is so that there won’t be bloodshed there. But those are goals; Jewish law doesn’t deal with goals, Jewish law deals with what is incumbent on me. And in the sense of what is incumbent on me, this is a positive commandment. I need to do things so that there won’t be blood in my house. Okay? But can’t one say what’s more important and what’s less important? No—halakhically important: what is halakhically incumbent on me is this. Okay? So that’s what he means… that’s a halakhic definition.

[Speaker B] It’s a practical commandment, that’s all, but it’s not the main thing like you’re saying.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Doesn’t matter. In the halakhic sense, that’s what matters. In the halakhic sense, what matters is what is incumbent on me. The philosophy of this Jewish law—they teach that from five-thirty to six, okay? Jewish thought. We’re talking about Jewish law. Jewish law deals with what is incumbent on me.

[Speaker B] But Jewish law also says that if I fulfill Jewish law but I don’t intend to fulfill Jewish law, and I do it for other reasons, that’s a sign that this does matter.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] With prohibitions you don’t need intention; with prohibitions you don’t need intention. There’s some barber shop in Bnei Brak—I once told you about this—a barber shop in Bnei Brak that I went into for a haircut, and there was a sign there saying that anyone who enters here should intend to fulfill the following commandments: “Do not keep a worker’s wages overnight,” and “Do not round off the corners of your head.” To have intention for prohibitions—that’s an interesting novelty. In the teachings of the Arizal there’s something like that, but plainly speaking it makes no sense; there’s nothing to intend for with prohibitions. You have intention only for positive commandments.

[Speaker E] In any case, there’s another practical difference between a prohibition and a positive commandment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, another practical difference between a prohibition and a positive commandment is that for a positive commandment you need intention, and for a prohibition you don’t, because a prohibition means you need to avoid a problematic situation; it’s not a question of action, right? That’s the… So therefore the point is that Nachmanides says that in a place where the prohibition comes to support the positive commandment, then if that system is time-dependent, women will be exempt from both the prohibition and the positive commandment. By the way, the later authorities… What?

[Speaker G] Different from Sabbath.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Different from Sabbath, because there each one stands on its own.

[Speaker G] No, the… no, because there it’s the positive commandment and the prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He says, no—in Sabbath it could be that each one stands on its own; neither one supports the other. It’s not necessarily the case that the positive commandment supports the prohibition; it could be that both stand independently. And that is a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim). That’s the Tosafot I mentioned earlier in Kiddushin, from which it seemingly emerges that there is a dispute on the matter. “Whoever is included in ‘observe’ is included in ‘remember’”—the question is whether that is said about every doubled prohibition and positive commandment, or whether it is a specific juxtaposition between the first tablets and the second tablets, where “remember” and “observe” are linked, but there is no sweeping rule that whenever there is a prohibition and a positive commandment, women will also be obligated in the positive commandment. No. When there is a prohibition and a positive commandment, women will be exempt from the positive commandment and obligated in the prohibition. Specifically for Sabbath there is the juxtaposition of “remember” and “observe,” that’s all. And then that says that the positive commandment does not support the prohibition, because otherwise women would also be obligated in the positive commandment, not only in the prohibition. So that certainly depends; these are two different things.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So the point is: what stands behind Nachmanides’ words? What does it mean that the positive commandment is the one that the prohibition comes to support? In what sense does it support the positive commandment? The Torah says, “You shall make a parapet for your roof.” You need to make a parapet. Now suppose I don’t feel like making a parapet. You say, ah, yes, but there’s also a prohibition. If I don’t feel like doing the positive commandment, then I also don’t feel like doing the prohibition. What does the prohibition add? Why does it strengthen the positive commandment? In what sense?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] More than that: here there isn’t even any punishment. If there were a punishment, then you could tell me, fine, there’s a punishment for the prohibition, so that would strengthen the positive commandment because you’d be afraid of the punishment. Here there is no punishment. Someone who doesn’t put up a parapet in his house—that’s a prohibition with no action involved, so he doesn’t get lashes. There’s no punishment. So in what sense does it strengthen? The answer is: it strengthens in the conceptual sense. Because if I decide not to make a parapet and there were only a positive commandment, then I’ve decided to be mediocre. I won’t be righteous, but that’s okay. Okay? The Torah says no: if you don’t put up a parapet, then you’re wicked—not just not righteous. Wicked, I don’t want to be. Regardless of punishment, this is conceptual motivation, not motivation because of punishment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s motivation because there may be someone who, from Heaven’s perspective, allows himself not to be righteous—fine, a person settles for being mediocre. But very few people will agree to be wicked. And the Torah says: look, if you don’t put up a parapet, then you will be wicked—not merely not righteous. For that, it needs to add a prohibition; it’s not enough just to have the positive commandment. Okay?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Therefore, in these words of Nachmanides you can see an expression of what I said earlier. In what sense does the prohibition strengthen the positive commandment when there is no punishment? In the sense I mentioned before. Because the prohibition is the stick alongside the carrot. If I try to pull you with a carrot and you don’t come, what do I do? I use the stick, right? The stick will motivate you to come. The carrot doesn’t draw you, so the stick will motivate you. That’s what’s being done here. I give you a carrot: there’s a positive commandment, you’ll receive reward, put up a parapet, wonderful. I don’t want reward—neither them nor their reward. Fine? I don’t want reward. I don’t want to be wicked; I’m mediocre. The Torah says no, no—there’s also a stick, not just a carrot. You’ll be wicked. You won’t be mediocre. Okay?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] All right, I’ll stop here. We’ll continue with this a bit next time, because I still haven’t gotten to the abstraction. Now we need to explain where the abstraction is here.