Innovation, Conservatism, and Tradition – Lesson 9

Table of Contents

• The question of authority and halakhic change
• Midrashic conservatism as a sociological basis for the different movements
• Haredism: anti-Zionism and anti-modernity, and the distinctions that follow from that
• Defining Modern Orthodoxy through its attitude toward modernity
• The example of “do not form separate factions” as a factual change accepted even by conservatives
• Meiri and the change in attitude toward gentiles: facts versus values
• Patterns of opposition to Meiri: authority, denial of change, and essentialism
• The sages as determiners of facts, authority, and norms, and a critique of denying facts
• Essentialism, anti-essentialism, and political correctness
• Democracy as a value-based rather than factual idea, and the distinction from “follow the majority”
• Adopting modern values and concealing them by turning them into “internal Torah values”
• A map of conservatism: plain, midrashic, modern and non-modern, lucid and fossilized
• The American “Modern Orthodox” and the gap from the definition being proposed

Summary

General overview

The text presents the question of authority as a constant backdrop to any attempt to justify halakhic change within a framework committed to Jewish law, and sharpens the point that the more acute difficulty appears when the change stems from a change in values rather than from a change in factual circumstances. It defines Modern Orthodoxy through a willingness to construct a conservative midrashic reading on the basis of values external to the world of Torah, and distinguishes that from non-modern midrashic conservatism, which is satisfied with factual change. It analyzes objections to changes of the Meiri type, describes essentialist views that see the determinations of the sages as eternal factual determinations, and presents a position in favor of examining facts and opposing their denial in the name of faith or political correctness. It concludes with a conceptual map of plain conservatism, modern and non-modern midrashic conservatism, and sub-distinctions between lucid and fossilized forms, and with the claim that the American Modern Orthodox model associated with Yeshiva University does not necessarily fit the definition being proposed.

The question of authority and halakhic change

The question of authority remains a possible barrier even when change seems necessary and midrashically legitimate, because something established by a formal count requires another formal count to permit it, and in rabbinic law, nullification requires a religious court greater in wisdom and number. Change on the basis of changed circumstances is seen as an adjusted application of the same Jewish law, not as rebellion against earlier generations, and therefore it is easier and is not tied to the principle that when the reason lapses the enactment does not lapse. Change on the basis of changed values is seen as going against the existing Jewish law, and therefore brings the discussion fully into questions of authority. The text argues that even in value-based change one can bypass or solve authority problems in various ways, and notes that sometimes opposition in the form of an authority argument conceals opposition to the change itself.

Midrashic conservatism as a sociological basis for the different movements

Three sociological movements fall under midrashic conservatism: Haredism, Modern Orthodoxy, and Conservatism. The Haredim live with the ethos of plain conservatism, but their actual practice is midrashic conservatism, and the Modern Orthodox are certainly midrashic conservatives. The text states that there is no principled difference between Conservatives and Modern Orthodox except for degree and how far they are willing to go with midrashic conservatism.

Haredism: anti-Zionism and anti-modernity, and the distinctions that follow from that

Haredism includes two conceptions that are, in principle, independent: opposition to Zionism on religious grounds and opposition to modernity. Since among most Haredim the two characteristics come together, the positions opposed to Haredism divide into those that oppose one of these characteristics separately or both together. Hardal is identified as a position that does not oppose Zionism but does oppose modernity, and therefore it is Haredi in the aspect of opposition to modernity, though not in the anti-Zionist aspect. There is also the possibility of a position that does not oppose modernity but does oppose Zionism, and the text mentions marginal shades such as continuations of Torah im Derekh Eretz or “Poalei Agudat Israel types” as a possible group.

Defining Modern Orthodoxy through its attitude toward modernity

Modern Orthodoxy is defined in its essence through its attitude toward modernity, and the text breaks this down into two cumulative points. A Modern Orthodox person is willing to use a conservative midrashic reading even when it is based on a change in values and not only on a factual change, unlike a non-modern midrashic conservative, who is willing to use conservative midrash only on the basis of changed factual circumstances. A Modern Orthodox person also assumes that new values may consciously be drawn from the external modern world and not from Torah, and treats that as a legitimate stance. Non-modern Orthodoxy relates negatively to outside values that are not found in Torah, and therefore usually will not be inclined to use a conservative midrashic reading on that basis, even if in principle it would be willing to make a value-based midrash grounded in values internal to Torah.

The example of “do not form separate factions” as a factual change accepted even by conservatives

The text gives as an example Maimonides’ ruling, following Abaye, that one should not establish two religious courts in one city or two synagogues in one city, and notes that today everybody does this, including Haredim. The proposed explanation is a change in the concept of a “city” and in its geographic meaning in a dynamic world, so that local custom becomes ancestral custom or communal custom, and the definition of “do not form separate factions” becomes non-geographic. From this follows an intuitive legitimacy for establishing different synagogues in one city according to different communities of origin, and the text notes that establishing two synagogues of the same community requires a harder justification. The example is meant to show that conservative midrash based on factual change characterizes even non-modern midrashic conservatives and is not unique to the Modern Orthodox.

Meiri and the change in attitude toward gentiles: facts versus values

Meiri’s claim is presented as a change made necessary because the gentiles of today are not the gentiles of the past, and the text defines this as a factual change, not a modern value change. Meiri adopts the same values as the sages and the accepted Jewish law, and seeks a different application because of different factual circumstances; therefore his claim is not Modern Orthodox. The Modern Orthodox position appears when one proposes changing the attitude toward gentiles not because of a change in their behavior but because “it just isn’t fitting” to treat human beings that way—in other words, a change on the basis of the external modern value of non-discrimination. The text uses this to sharpen the point that both the Modern Orthodox and the non-modern Orthodox can fall under midrashic conservatism; the difference is whether one accepts an external value change as a basis.

Patterns of opposition to Meiri: authority, denial of change, and essentialism

One objection to Meiri relies on the claim that there is no authority to change laws established in the Talmud without a Sanhedrin, and the text presents this as an internal dispute within the non-modern wing of conservatism. Another objection claims that Meiri is simply not factually correct and that there has been no real change in gentiles, and the text almost entirely rejects the version claiming there is no visible change. The main version that remains relies on an essentialist determination: if the sages or Scripture characterized gentiles in a certain way, then that is a characterization that cannot change, and therefore even if different behavior appears, it is only a facade. The text uses Maimonides’ parable of the cat and the mouse to describe the claim that gentiles are “trained cats” who, in the moment of truth, will show themselves to be what they always were, and explains that the confidence in this comes from an a priori assumption that rabbinic sources are eternally correct even on the factual plane.

The sages as determiners of facts, authority, and norms, and a critique of denying facts

The text argues that authority exists only with regard to norms, whereas the opponents treat statements of the sages as necessarily correct determinations even on the factual plane. It gives as an example the phrase, “their flesh is the flesh of donkeys and their emission the emission of horses,” as a source from which one allegedly derives an eternal factual determination about gentiles, and presents a parallel but opposite conception regarding Jews, according to which even someone who behaves cruelly still carries a lofty inner “Jewish point.” The text marks this approach as an intellectual problem: ignoring observation and positing an inner reality that cannot be tested. It adds that carelessness in justifying a position that leads to a different attitude toward a group can turn the intellectual mistake into a moral problem as well.

Essentialism, anti-essentialism, and political correctness

The text makes clear that it does not see essentialism as a dirty word in principle, and argues that it is a factual claim that should be tested on the basis of facts. It criticizes both essentialist assumptions that are unwilling to stand the test of factual examination and the anti-essentialism of political correctness, which denies facts in the name of an a priori assumption that an essential characteristic simply cannot exist. It gives the example of separate chess leagues for women and men and argues that there are statistical facts about averages, whereas politically correct discourse assumes in advance that such a thing “cannot be true.” It connects this to the question of funding research into differences in IQ between peoples and races, and answers that he would support funding proper research in order to know the truth, while distinguishing between facts and the justification of rights and moral treatment.

Democracy as a value-based rather than factual idea, and the distinction from “follow the majority”

The text argues that democracy is not justified as a promise of more successful management of the state, but as a value assumption that each person has an equal right to influence his own fate, even if he may be mistaken. It raises Plato’s question about rule by philosophers and proposals to weight voting according to IQ, and rejects the basic assumption that the discussion is about the most efficient system. It distinguishes between majority rule in democracy, which is based on rights, and majority rule in a religious court, whose aim is to reach the most correct decision, and notes that there are halakhic decisors who argue that a religious court should follow a minority of wiser judges rather than a majority of less wise ones. It argues that there is no essential connection between democratic majority and “follow the majority,” and mentions Menachem Elon as having noted that the medieval authorities (Rishonim) who base communal decisions on majority rule add the reasoning that “otherwise it is impossible to function,” in order to prevent a minority veto, which shows that this is not learned straightforwardly from the verse.

Adopting modern values and concealing them by turning them into “internal Torah values”

The text describes a phenomenon in which people adopt modern values but present them as values already found in Torah, so as not to admit that these are external values. It calls this an attempt to “keep the fruits” of Modern Orthodoxy without admitting modernity, and describes it as a facade of non-modern conservatism. Democracy is given as a central example, including the apologetic claim that “we invented democracy,” which he describes as “nonsense in tomato juice.” The text also describes this as a theological difficulty: acknowledging binding values that have no clear source in Torah or in the words of the sages.

A map of conservatism: plain, midrashic, modern and non-modern, lucid and fossilized

The text presents a diagram dividing the field between plain conservatism, midrashic conservatism, and Reform, and places the discussion under midrashic conservatism. Non-modern midrashic conservatism accepts conservative midrash only on a factual basis, while modern midrashic conservatism accepts value-based change as well. Within non-modern midrashic conservatism there is a division between lucid conservatism, which recognizes factual changes, like Meiri, and fossilized conservatism, which does not recognize factual changes either for essentialist reasons or because it sees the laws as scriptural decrees that do not allow for the reasoning of the verse. The text argues that in practice it sometimes looks as though there are only two options—”they make changes” versus “they don’t make changes”—but analysis of the rationales reveals multiple patterns that explain why certain figures may permit some changes while opposing others.

The American “Modern Orthodox” and the gap from the definition being proposed

The text argues that the term Modern Orthodox is imported from the United States and identified there with Yeshiva University, but that the classic American model does not fit the definition proposed here. It describes an experience at the founding conference of “the Orthodox Forum,” where he spoke about the question of secular courts as a value-based argument for changing the application of Jewish law, and recounts that almost the entire audience objected and demanded source-based grounding and analysis—something that, in his view, characterizes lucid non-modern midrashic conservatism. He adds that there too one finds types who adopt modern values but justify them as rooted in the sources, whereas the open stance that simply puts modern values on the table is identified there as Conservatism. He concludes by breaking off the discussion before two additional comments and with closing blessings of “Shabbat shalom” and thanks.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, let’s begin. Last time I finished the discussion of the question of authority, because in the background of all the discussions about legitimate and illegitimate change, and how one can justify change within the framework of commitment to Jewish law—what I called conservatism in this context—there is still always, in the background, the question of authority. Meaning, even if there is some change that is called for, legitimate, I have a conservative interpretive move that can justify it, and so on, in the background there can still be a barrier because I don’t have the authority to do it. We talked about the principle that something established by formal count requires another formal count to permit it; something of rabbinic origin, a rabbinic law, in order to repeal it you even need a religious court greater in wisdom and number. So the question of authority is always there in the background. And I’ll sharpen what I think I said: this question arises mainly when we’re talking about change driven by a change in values. Because if we’re talking about change driven by a change in circumstances, then the situation is easier, because in essence it’s not really change. We’re not really disagreeing with the earlier generations, with those who established that Jewish law, but only applying it in a way suited to current circumstances. And I explained why this is unrelated to the question of whether when the reason lapses the enactment does not lapse, because here I’m not trying to repeal the enactment, but to apply it to present reality, and that sometimes requires a different mode of application. But where I’m talking about change because of a change in values—that is, because there are different values to which I, and the world I live in, am committed or in which I believe, with which I identify—then this really is a departure against existing Jewish law, and that brings us into all the considerations of authority.

That’s regarding authority, and I explained why even in the context of value-based change there is still room to make such changes, not only on the theoretical level, which I discussed in previous sessions, but also on the practical level. Because even questions of authority can ultimately be solved or bypassed in various ways. And I’ll return to that, because very often when you see someone or some group opposing a proposal for change because of the issue of authority, usually they also oppose the proposed change itself. So someone who accepts the proposed change can solve the authority problem. There is the freezing of laws, there are all sorts of things one can do even without formal authority, but I won’t get into that now; that requires a discussion I already held in one of the earlier series.

Then, toward the end of last time, I began trying to define the concept of modern Orthodoxy. I said that the problem at the base of the matter is that on the map I sketched, under the concept of interpretive conservatism there fall three sociological currents: Haredi Judaism, modern Orthodoxy, and Conservatism. These three currents are all, in effect, interpretive conservatives. The Haredim live with the ethos of plain conservatism, but their practice is interpretive conservatism. Modern Orthodox are certainly interpretive conservatives, and so are the Conservatives, about whom I said there is really no principled difference between them and the modern Orthodox, perhaps aside from degree or how far they take interpretive conservatism—maybe I’ll comment on that later.

I began the discussion by saying that when we talk about Haredi Judaism, or non-modern conservatism, Haredi Judaism is really a label that includes under it two conceptions, one might say independent of one another: opposition to Zionism—Haredi in the sense of non-Zionist, for religious reasons of course, not non-Zionist for some other reasons—and conceptions opposed to modernity. In other words, Haredi Judaism opposes both Zionism and modernity. These two ideas are, in principle, independent. That is, you can of course oppose Zionism without opposing modernity, and vice versa. The fact is that among the Haredim, in most… among most Haredim, these two characteristics come together. And therefore the conceptions opposed to Haredi Judaism are themselves divided into two—not “themselves” exactly, but divided into two groups: those opposed to the first characteristic and those opposed to the second. Of course there can be people opposed to both, but in principle one can oppose the first without the second, or the second without the first.

For example, conceptions that do not oppose modernity but do oppose Zionism, and conceptions that do not oppose Zionism but do oppose modernity. A conception that does not oppose Zionism but does oppose modernity is what one can identify today with Hardal. Yes, that’s basically national Haredi-ism, which in principle means that in their fundamental outlook they are Haredi, except that they are Zionist Haredim. So in what sense are they Haredi? If Haredi means anti-Zionist, then it’s just an oxymoron. No—they’re Haredi in the second aspect, in the aspect of opposition to modernity and not in the aspect of opposition to Zionism.

And there are conceptions that do not oppose modernity but do oppose Zionism—more marginal or less clearly defined conceptions. There are wings within Haredi Judaism that may oppose Zionism, but are, say, continuations of Torah im Derekh Eretz, certain shades of Poalei Agudat Yisrael types, which was once an extinct species. These are people who can identify with the values of modernity, Torah im Derekh Eretz, and still oppose Zionism, at least certain shades of it. In any case, that’s certainly an option that exists on the map. Who exactly populates it and how large the groups are—I’m not getting into that; that’s a sociological question.

So when I want to define a modern Orthodox person, notice: I have to define him not only against Haredi Judaism but also against Zionist Haredi Judaism, Hardal. In other words, when I speak of modern Orthodoxy versus non-modern Orthodoxy, non-modern Orthodoxy has a Zionist component and a Haredi component, but both are conservatives opposed to modernity. And the modern Orthodox, in this sense, stands opposite both of them.

Now I want to move a bit further. All this I discussed at the end of the previous class. I want to move a bit further in defining the modern Orthodox; this point really brings us almost to the definition itself. Modern Orthodoxy in essence—the core of the matter—is the attitude toward modernity. That’s basically the definition of a modern Orthodox person: the attitude toward modernity. Now, the attitude toward modernity itself, it seems to me, is composed of a combination of two points. There is a connection between them, but it’s important for me to separate them.

The first point is that modern conservatism is willing to use conservative interpretive moves—and notice, Haredim also use conservative interpretive moves, so that does not define a modern Orthodox person. Modern conservatism, or modern Orthodox—I’m treating those for now as synonymous terms—so modern Orthodox or modern conservatism is willing to use a conservative interpretive move when its basis is value changes and not factual changes. That’s an important point. That’s why the whole discussion I held in the previous sessions was important: conservative interpretive moves based on changed factual circumstances, versus conservative interpretive moves based on changed value circumstances, not factual ones.

The non-modern interpretive conservative will make conservative interpretive moves on a factual basis. He applies the same principles to new circumstances and understands that they must be applied differently. But that still isn’t called modernity—again, in the language I’m trying to define here. It is a change, or an application, of existing principles to new circumstances. I gave examples of this; I’ll just mention one so you can see that this certainly does not uniquely characterize modern Orthodox conservatism. “Do not form factions”—I brought this example based on a dispute in the Talmud, but that is also how Maimonides rules in Jewish law. In this case, by the way, he rules like Abaye: that one does not establish two religious courts in one city, or two synagogues in one city. Nobody does that today. Meaning, everybody does that today—everybody establishes two synagogues in one city today, including Haredim. In fact, the Haredim do this even more than others. How is that possible? It’s against a Talmudic law that Maimonides codified in Jewish law. How do we allow ourselves to ignore a Torah-level law without batting an eye?

The answer, at least I think, and notice that there is very little discussion of this—do a search and you’ll see, there isn’t much treatment of these things—this is some kind of change that happened somehow without… without making waves. It sort of happened on its own, without halakhic decisors bothering to justify it, point it out, or discuss it. It’s one of those things that just happens quietly and calmly. Why? The explanation I at least propose is that the concept of “city” has changed. There’s been a change in the factual circumstances. We live in a world in which a city in the geographic sense is no longer a meaningful thing. The concepts of city today are not based geographically but rather on ethnic origin, community, whatever you want to call it. Of course, at a later stage it may even be based virtually as well—yes, a website as a place—but I’m talking even before the internet era.

Since the world is much more dynamic, geographic place no longer has much significance; we move from place to place much more. So somehow customs also shifted: instead of local customs, they became ancestral customs or community customs. And the definition of “do not form factions” also became, in effect, non-geographic. So you can establish two synagogues in one city if one is Ashkenazi and one Sephardi, or one Yemenite and one Jerusalem rite, or whatever it may be. Why? Because in the sense of communities, these are different cities. That is, even though they are in the same geographic location, the conception—again, intuitively, almost nobody writes this I think—but intuitively it’s obvious to everyone that establishing two synagogues in one city poses no problem in the geographic sense.

If two Ashkenazi synagogues are established in one city, that already requires more justification. And I think here it really is harder to justify, unless there’s no room, so you build another synagogue so there will be room. But it’s not always built on the basis of lack of room, and here the question is not easy to justify. How, really, is it permitted to establish two such synagogues? But the breach first began to open because synagogues were simply established based on different customs of different communities, and once that boundary was broken, as usually happens, the breach expanded to include establishing more synagogues of the same community as well.

But leaving aside the analysis of that issue, I’m showing you an example of something accepted in the most conservative circles imaginable. And the reason is that what’s involved here is not a change in a halakhic value, but an application of that same value that always existed to new circumstances. A conservative interpretive move that takes factual changes into account—that is interpretive conservatism, but not necessarily modern. It characterizes non-modern interpretive conservatives as well. By contrast, claims that require change on the basis of a value change, not a factual change—those are already modern values, and that is basically the modern Orthodox person in the essential sense. I’ll later get to those who oppose even changes of the first type, but for now, changes of the first type are accepted even by major conservatives, and therefore they do not belong to modernity. The changes that characterize modern Orthodox are changes whose basis is value change and not factual change.

Now, this brings me to another point. I said there are two points here, a combination of two points. The source of the new values in this conservative interpretive move—when I speak of a conservative interpretive move, I’m saying: interpretation—the values of the past were such and such, and therefore Jewish law was determined in such and such a way; today the values I believe in are different, and therefore Jewish law should be determined differently. That is a conservative interpretive move, but its basis is value-based and not factual.

Now here, notice, the assumption in the subtext is that I can draw values from the modern world, not from the Torah, and that’s legitimate—I’m putting that on the table. In other words, this is why I say these are not two independent points; they are two points that come together. Basically, the values on the basis of which I make the conservative interpretive move can consciously come from outside. That is, without embarrassment I say: there are values here; I don’t… I don’t necessarily find them in the Torah, but it is clear to me that I am committed to the value of democracy, or whatever it may be, and therefore for me this is something that has to be taken into account when I shape Jewish law for our time.

So first, I can build the conservative interpretive move on the basis of value change and not only factual change. Second, the values I’m talking about—I spoke about changes based on value considerations of “it just isn’t right” as a value, but where the values are internal Torah values. Then that is not modern Orthodox. But a sense of “it just isn’t right” whose values are external values, contemporary values, modern values—that is modern Orthodox. So again: a conservative interpretive move on a value basis, where the values serving as the basis for that interpretation are values drawn from the outside world, not necessarily from the Torah—that seems to me, in essence, to be the definition I’m proposing for modern Orthodoxy.

Now, non-modern conservatism or non-modern Orthodoxy usually relates negatively to the values of the modern world. It says: if these values aren’t found in the Torah, if they are taken from somewhere else, then they are probably incorrect values. That is basically the assumption. Consequently, they of course don’t even wrestle with the question whether one can make a conservative interpretive move on a value basis or on the basis of external values. It just doesn’t arise. That is, on the principled level they might be willing to make a conservative interpretive move on a value basis and not only a factual basis, but values drawn from outside are not legitimate in their eyes, so they have no motivation to make a conservative interpretive move on such a basis.

If, for example, there are values not drawn from outside—like I spoke about civil courts nowadays, non-Jewish legal forums, where the value is internal to Torah, that there not be legal anarchy, or not invalidating betrothals, I think I mentioned that example too; if not, I’ll get to it in a moment—there too the basis is internal Torah values. Therefore there they can make some sort of conservative interpretive move on a value basis, and that will not be modern Orthodoxy, because the values on which I am relying are internal Torah values, values accepted in Jewish law from time immemorial, not values drawn from the modern world, values taken from outside. Therefore that is not modern Orthodoxy.

In principle—and here one more note—there can be another kind of non-modern conservatism, or opposition to modern conservatism, based on considerations of authority. Meaning, I say: look, in principle I may be modern Orthodox, I think democracy is an important value, and I would be happy to make a value change, a change in Jewish law on the basis of these new values drawn from outside, but what can I do—we have no Sanhedrin. The authority considerations I discussed in the previous class hold things up. So on the principled level I identify with it, but I do not recognize the possibility of doing it because of a technical problem: there are authority considerations. This is basically a view that conceptually is modern Orthodox—if there were a Sanhedrin today, then they would do it. But what can you do, we are stuck because of the limitations of authority; we have no Sanhedrin today. So de facto they behave like non-modern conservatives, but only because of technical problems, not because of substantive conceptions.

As I mentioned before, usually when you meet such a person, it doesn’t really happen. Meaning, he raises the authority problem perhaps according to your own view, to say that even according to your own position it isn’t possible, but he himself opposes your proposal as such. Usually the two go together. That is, factually it usually goes together. Someone who believes in the necessity of these changes very often also manages to find ways around the technical authority problem. So such a niche exists in principle, but practically it is quite rare.

Okay, now let’s take an example in order to sharpen things. Again, an example I already discussed, so I won’t expand, but the example of Meiri regarding the changed attitude toward non-Jews, yes? So Meiri’s original claim is that the change in attitude toward non-Jews is required because the non-Jews of today are not the non-Jews of the past. Yes? The change, as I said earlier, is sort of a change in the moral behavior of the non-Jews, but it is a factual change. Therefore Meiri’s claim is not a modern Orthodox claim, but rather a claim that says the application of halakhic values in the new circumstances requires change because of a factual change. I adopt the same values as before, not new values. I’m not doing this because of modern values. On the contrary—I’m going with the values of the Sages and of accepted Jewish law; I’m simply saying, fine, but the factual circumstances are now different, and therefore a different application is required. Okay?

Now one can oppose Meiri’s claim for several reasons, but that claim is not a modern Orthodox claim. It is a claim of interpretive conservatism, which could certainly also exist within non-modern Orthodoxy. Where could this come to expression in modern Orthodoxy? If someone came along and raised Meiri’s claim, but not because today’s non-Jews behave nicely, rather because today it just isn’t acceptable to give such treatment to human beings—that would be a modern Orthodox discussion. Because here I’m saying: I take an external value, a value that says you need to treat all human beings equally regardless of their worldview or moral level or whatever, that you cannot discriminate among people in your moral conceptions, and on that basis you want to change the laws relating to non-Jews. That is a claim—regardless now of whether it is correct or not, I’m not discussing whether I agree with it—but it is a modern Orthodox claim. Because it is a claim based on values taken from outside, contemporary values, modern values, and it wants to argue that on their basis our halakhic conduct should change. That is not Meiri. Meiri is a claim of interpretive conservatism, but not modern Orthodox.

So this is a good example for sharpening how interpretive conservatism can include both modern Orthodox and non-modern Orthodox; both are interpretive conservatives. But someone who accepts only factual changes as a basis for conservative interpretation is a non-modern conservative, non-modern Orthodoxy. Someone who accepts value changes as well as a basis for conservative interpretation—that is modern Orthodox.

Now how do those who oppose the change Meiri proposes wave it off as “that’s Reform” or all sorts of things like that? Those are slogans. What are the actual arguments? Let’s try to look at the arguments, not the classifications and labels. What arguments are raised there? There are several kinds. One argument that can be raised is: maybe Meiri is right, but we don’t have the authority. Considerations of authority—we have no Sanhedrin, what can you do. Laws established in the Talmud cannot be changed without some Sanhedrin or whatever. I said that this is not necessarily so, but for many people that is the argument they raise. How should one relate to that kind of argument? What is the disagreement between that position and Meiri’s approach? Neither of them is dealing with modern conservatism—not Meiri, and certainly not the opponents. But on the other hand, not only the opponents are non-modern conservatives; Meiri too is a non-modern conservative. The dispute is within the non-modern wing of conservatism, of Orthodoxy. The question is the question of authority. That is one type of opponent.

Another type of opponent consists of those who argue that Meiri is simply factually wrong: today’s non-Jews are no different from the non-Jews of the past. Now here one has to distinguish between two shades. One shade doesn’t exist, and the second is basically the only one that remains. One hypothetical shade would say: look, I look around me and I don’t see any change. Non-Jews today behave the way they behaved then. There is no difference in the moral-human level of the average non-Jew today compared to what there was in the time of the Sages or in the Bible. Okay? I think that species does not exist. Someone who says that is probably blind; that is, either he’s not looking at his surroundings. Sometimes he says it, but he doesn’t mean it.

What does he mean? He means a claim that is really fed by the sources of the Sages even with respect to facts. In other words, he wants to argue that if the Sages—or the Torah, it doesn’t matter—diagnosed non-Jews in a certain way, that diagnosis is essentialist. It cannot change. So even if today you see, and you cannot deny that you see, different behavior among non-Jews, that is only superficial—like the pig stretching out its hooves and saying, “See how pure I am,” yes, all sorts of such rabbinic sayings. Deep down, in truth—like the well-known parable, they tell it about Maimonides, though I’ve seen it told about others too—that he had a dispute with the sages in the king’s court, the physicians or wise men, the king’s advisers, who were jealous of him and of his standing with the sultan. They decided to hold a competition among themselves, and they wanted to display their great wisdom. So they announced that in one year they would come with a trained cat that would serve, would be a waiter at a banquet where they would gather. The cats would be the waiters; they would carry platters on their paws skillfully like human beings. That is, those royal advisers would show their wisdom by succeeding in training cats to function as human waiters.

Okay, so Maimonides said, fine, let’s see. A year later everyone gathers for the banquet at the sultan’s court. The cats arrive carrying the trays. Maimonides takes a mouse out of his pocket, throws it on the floor, and all the cats drop the trays and start chasing the mouse. Now this story, which of course never happened, is made up—but never mind. The story expresses the conception I described earlier. Basically what they are saying is: leave it alone, non-Jews are cats; the non-Jews of today are trained cats. Throw a mouse on the floor and you’ll see the real cat come out of them. That is basically the argument.

Now you don’t really see this very much, so they always bring the extreme examples, of course. There are Nazis, and this and that, and suddenly all non-Jews become Nazis—it doesn’t matter, they bring extreme examples. But the argument is that these extreme examples are simply cases where the mouse appeared, where the mouse was thrown and the real cat emerged. But the non-Jews of today are the same non-Jews as before, just with some external drippings, sublimations, but inwardly they are the very same non-Jews. How do you know that? If it never comes out anywhere, then how does this person know—by what divine inspiration—that inwardly non-Jews are not what they present outwardly, that what they present outwardly is merely a façade? He knows it from the Sages. Because once the Sages, or the Bible, say that “their flesh is the flesh of donkeys and their issue is the issue of horses,” as the verse says and as the Talmud cites, then obviously today’s non-Jews are also like that. This is an a priori assumption, not an observational conclusion. Rather, if the Sages and the Bible say it, then it must be true factually even today.

Notice: this is a factual claim, not a value claim. The claim is that the factual change Meiri identifies is not real; it’s superficial, inwardly everything is the same. By the way, the opposite is true regarding Jews. With Jews they have exactly the same twisted diagnoses. They can see a Jew behaving like a Nazi—and there are such people—with insane cruelty, really doing terrible things. But no: inwardly he has a very, very lofty Jewish spark; it’s all just an external façade. In other words, everything is determined by what is somehow happening deep inside, where no one can see it even with an electron microscope, but it is obvious that it is there. Why is it obvious? Because the assumption is that everything the Sages or the Bible said is essentialist. It must be so and cannot change.

Or in other words, this is a conception that sees the statements of the Sages as statements—I don’t know if binding, but necessarily true—even on the factual plane, not only on the normative plane. And we discussed authority: authority exists only regarding norms. They understand the statements of the Sages as statements—again, I’m not necessarily saying binding—but true statements on the factual plane, and necessarily so. Every statement of the Sages regarding non-Jews, regarding women, regarding whatever category it may be, is necessarily always true, forever; it cannot change. The Sages had some kind of divine inspiration, and when they penetrated to the depth of the human soul they saw the idea of the person, not the person himself. Therefore all human beings in all generations, of every type and kind—if they are women, that is their characteristic; if they are non-Jews, that is their characteristic; if they are Jews, that is their characteristic. It cannot change. A kind of fossilized conception on the factual level—what today is called, though today it’s a dirty word, essentialism.

This is basically some kind of conception of a person, or a person’s characteristics, as something essential that cannot be changed. By the way, I do not see essentialism as a derogatory term. Today if someone says you are an essentialist, there’s no need to add another word. The next stage is to shoot you. That is, it’s considered the strongest condemnation possible. I don’t see it that way. It may well be that people have essential characteristics, and I have no a priori objection to that at all. I only claim that it requires observation: look and see. It may be that there are essential characteristics—fine, if you show me that there are, I’ll accept it. And if you show me that it has changed, then I object to clinging to essence against the facts—that is what I object to.

In other words, if you see that factually certain characteristics do not exist or have changed, to cling to essentialism just because it must be so—that, in my view, is an invalid approach. Intellectually invalid, not only morally, because you are denying the facts. You see different facts, and you have some hypothesis that deep down it must be otherwise, and on that basis you are willing to ignore the facts and cling to some reality you invented for yourself because you are attached to some rabbinic sayings or biblical sayings of one kind or another, and in their name you deny the facts. You are unwilling to accept the facts. In that sense I oppose essentialism: in the sense that essentialism denies facts.

The opposition to essentialism today is not like that—on the contrary. Say, for example, if you see… I once was at some seminar at Tel Aviv University, in the department of mathematics—computer science, mathematics—and afterward at lunch we were talking there. I remember one of them raised the question: why is there a separate chess league for women and men? Chess does not require physical abilities in which, say, men have a built-in advantage over women. So why is there also a separate league there for women and men in chess?

Now, you can offer all sorts of answers, but first of all there are facts. The facts are that women are basically less good at chess. Right? On average. Of course there are women who are excellent at chess, but on average women are less good at chess than men. Even today. Now, one can find all sorts of explanations for that. But first of all, those are the facts. Now, what does politically correct discourse say? What do you mean? That can’t be true. There is exclusion, there are limitations, it’s harder for women, it doesn’t matter—their role in the family, the expectations placed on them, all sorts of things. All of that may be true, perhaps. But they assume it is necessarily true. In other words, in the name of rejecting essentialism, there is here an inverse essentialism. That is, you deny facts in the name of some a priori assumption of yours that there cannot be an essential characteristic. There cannot be an essential characteristic—and that itself is an essentialist assumption. In its name you deny facts.

That kind of essentialism—or anti-essentialism—is in my opinion invalid, because it is itself a form of essentialism. In that sense it is essentialism, because it denies facts in the name of an a priori assumption. And I am not willing to deny facts in the name of an a priori assumption. I am willing not to be certain about the facts. I am willing to accept the explanation that perhaps women are less good at chess for other reasons—that may be. But it may also be that not. In other words, the claim that it cannot be otherwise, that anyone who says there is a difference between women and men is a racist or an essentialist or whatever—that is a stupid approach. It is not an enlightened approach; it is a stupid approach.

I do agree with the more moderate formulation that says that even if there are differences, that still doesn’t mean they are essential. It may be that they are differences induced by one or another circumstantial difference, and that they can be changed. That may very well be. But the burden of proof is on you. Come show me that it can be changed.

[Speaker B] Can I ask something, Rabbi?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I can’t hear.

[Speaker B] Can I ask something? Yes, yes. Suppose the Rabbi were on the research committee at Bar-Ilan University or Tel Aviv University, and someone came proposing some study that wanted to test statistically significant IQ differences between different races, different peoples… would the Rabbi support giving research funding for that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Definitely. It’s not that the Rabbi… because I think the point about essentialism—the problem is not because it isn’t factually true; after all, they’re not stupid enough to think the facts are different. They don’t want to believe it. No, because there is a matter of faith here, really faith, since we do not want to believe that people are different, we want to give…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But what you don’t want to believe is your business; the facts don’t ask you anything. Maimonides says…

[Speaker B] Maimonides comes and says that every person can be righteous like Moses our teacher or wicked like Jeroboam. Okay, he never met Moses our teacher and he never met Jeroboam around him, and he says that every person around us whom we now see in the street or at the university—each one can be Moses our teacher. Where did he get that from? Where did he pull that idea from? Maimonides wants to believe it. So I’ll say: there is a matter of faith here, not only a matter of science and essentialism.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’ll answer you. I too never met Maimonides. If I had met him, I would have told him that he was talking nonsense. That’s it. Because how does he know? Exactly—that’s what I would have said to him.

[Speaker B] But that’s what he writes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ad hominem—so Maimonides said it, so what if he said it?

[Speaker B] But Maimonides—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —is baseless.

[Speaker B] No, all I want to say is that essentialism, I don’t think it comes from an ontological point. It doesn’t come from our having examined the facts. Rather it comes from—and we as Jews, as people of faith, need to believe in the human being and not seek out ways to find some defects or some unchangeable facts. I don’t know what you think we as Jews should do; I think—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —that we as Jews should seek the truth. And if the truth is that there is a difference—

[Speaker B] —between peoples or between women and men, then I want to know that truth. And if the truth is that there is a difference, then I also want to know that truth. But basically, Rabbi, Rabbi, I want to ask: Rabbi, in your opinion, all of democracy basically collapses, because if that’s so then there is no logic in giving the same voting right to people of different levels, with different potential. We’ll give them IQ tests, we’ll give racial tests.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] All I understand is that those arguments are part of the politically correct silencing that I despise. And I’ll explain to you why I despise it. Because if you believe in the value of democracy, the way to achieve that is not to lie to yourself and to me as you’re trying to do, and hide the facts or avoid checking the facts. Rather, the way is to say: even if there is a person less talented than you, he has the same vote as you in a democracy. And that can easily be justified—I even wrote articles about it. It’s not a difficult question at all to justify. And therefore, the people liable to be misled as a result of these things are probably stupid people with low IQ.

[Speaker B] Rabbi, when a person—if a person came from another planet, and they told him, look, the Jewish people paid in the last seventy years with six million victims innocent of any crime. And all this in the name of an all-powerful God who could have prevented it, and this people still continues to believe in Him, and to believe that He is the ultimate good—any person would say that you are acting against common sense. Look, it cannot be that He exists, and if He does exist then He is utterly wicked. And yet we continue to believe in Him because we are Jews, and we believe in God, and we believe in human beings.