Secular and Sacred — Rabbi Michael Avraham — Lesson 1

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, even so, the question is not how this is derived from a sotah. The question is why Tosafot says here that if it is to prohibit her to her husband, then it is not impurity. After all, the entire source for the law of doubtful impurity in the public domain and in the private domain is learned from the prohibition of a woman to her husband. That is how he asks it, and it is a good question. So he brings—he brings that he heard in the name of his great-uncle, the Sochatchover, who says that impurity applies only where there is holiness. Here, I am bringing this idea. Here. Very יפה—very nice, I enjoyed that insight. Meaning, impurity belongs only in a place where there is holiness. He brings it in the name of the Kuzari, never mind, or maybe it is just an obvious idea. Meaning, with a gentile, impurity does not really apply so much, because holiness does not apply there. Many have already discussed this, even though there are forms of impurity that do apply to a gentile, but never mind, that is of course more subtle. Right now I am speaking in general terms: impurity is the antithesis of holiness. And wherever holiness applies, impurity applies; and wherever holiness does not apply, impurity also does not apply. There may be prohibition and permission, but not impurity. Impurity is the antithesis of holiness. So wherever holiness is relevant, impurity is relevant; wherever it is not, it is not. Meaning, in the ordinary, non-sacred world there is no impurity. In the ordinary world there is the ordinary, there is prohibition, there is permission, there is obligation—but not holiness and not impurity. Holiness and impurity are a separate category. I am expanding what I said earlier: if holiness is the opposite of commandment—or not the opposite, but rather a different category from commandment—then within the category of holiness, the opposite of holiness is the category of impurity. It too belongs to that conceptual world of holiness. The opposite of holiness, the minus one of holiness, is impurity.

And then he says like this: a woman is consecrated to her husband. The language of kiddushin, betrothal, says that there is holiness there—specifically there, but not with every commandment. In the relationship between a woman and her husband there is holiness. How do we know that? The Talmud already says in Kiddushin 7b. The Talmud says there: “The leg of this one is an עולה…” Someone who consecrates half a woman—she is not betrothed. The Talmud asks: but didn’t we learn, “The leg of this one is a burnt offering”—at least if it is a limb on which life depends; never mind, afterward the Talmud adjusts it—then holiness spreads to the whole of it. With an animal, if I consecrate only the leg of the animal, or the heart—you need a limb on which life depends—if I consecrate the animal’s heart, meaning that it will be holy, then the whole animal becomes holy. Holiness spreads through all of it. If it is just an ordinary limb, then no. But if it is a limb on which life depends, then the holiness extends throughout the whole thing. The Talmud says that the same should be true of a woman. If someone betroths half a woman, or certain limbs of the woman, the holiness should spread to all of her. So you see that the Talmud views the concept of kiddushin as parallel to the concept of consecration. So kiddushin does not use the language of holiness for nothing. There is holiness there.

Tosafot there says even more than that. Tosafot—Rabbi Gustman has a very nice introductory lecture to Kiddushin, long in his usual way, terribly long, but he writes very clearly, so you can move through it quickly. He explains there—he brings this Tosafot on 6b; Tosafot is on 6a. Tosafot on 6b says that basically there are three formulations of kiddushin: “Behold, you are consecrated to me,” “Behold, you are betrothed to me,” and “Behold, you are to me as a wife,” or something like that there—the Talmud brings these three options several times regarding kiddushin. So he says that each of these formulations works in a different way. “Behold, you are consecrated to me” contains holiness. “Behold, you are betrothed to me” creates some kind of bond between the man and the woman, and the holiness is only a result. Once the bond is formed, holiness takes effect there. But “Behold, you are consecrated to me”—I am consecrating her—that is a mechanism of holiness. And “Behold, you are to me as a wife” is yet a third thing.

And then Tosafot says there is a practical difference: what happens if I say, “Behold, half of you is consecrated”?

[Speaker C] In kiddushin, that is not a distinction—isn’t it holiness? No, no, that’s what I’m saying.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Talmud there does see it as the same thing. The fact that the Talmud applies “holiness spread to all of it,” saying the same thing should apply to a woman’s betrothal—the Talmud understands a woman’s betrothal as like consecration. And Tosafot says more than that. Tosafot says: all of this is if you said to the woman using the formula “Behold, you are consecrated to me.” Tosafot says it here. But if you said, “Behold, half of you is betrothed to me,” not “half of you is consecrated to me,” but “half of you is betrothed to me,” then she is not betrothed in any case. Why? Because “betrothed” does not work through a mechanism of holiness, so it makes no sense to derive it from “holiness spread to all of it” in the case of sacrificial offerings. The holiness comes after the betrothal. If the betrothal takes effect, then holiness will take effect too. But already at the stage of betrothal, you do not manage to make it take effect, because to betroth half a woman does not work. In contrast, if you consecrate half a woman, then holiness spreads to all of her and she is entirely consecrated. So here there is a practical difference, that is what Tosafot says. There is a practical difference between saying “Behold, you are consecrated” and saying “Behold, you are betrothed.” So this sharpens even further the fact that when I marry a woman through kiddushin, it is like consecrating something. The relation to kiddushin is like holiness.

Now the Avnei Nezer says: if a woman is a sotah, why is she forbidden to her husband? It says, “for she has committed a trespass against her husband.” She is forbidden to her husband and to the adulterer because she committed a trespass against him. What is me’ilah, trespass? Me’ilah is harm done to holiness, right? Me’ilah is when I misuse something holy. In unwitting me’ilah it goes out to the ordinary sphere, never mind—but me’ilah is damage to holiness. And what the Torah says is, “she has committed a trespass against her husband.” Meaning, why is the woman forbidden to her husband? Because she damaged the holiness of the bond between them. Kiddushin is like holiness, and when the woman harms that holiness—yes—then she becomes forbidden to her husband. Therefore, says the Avnei Nezer, this is impurity, because it is damage to holiness. The result is a prohibition of the woman to her husband, but it begins with the question whether she became impure or did not become impure, or whether that act of trespass took her out of holiness and made her impure or not impure. Because “she became defiled while under your husband”—the Torah itself uses the language of impurity, as someone here mentioned earlier. So all of that is true for sotah.

But what happens with a woman after childbirth? A woman after childbirth is like a menstruant. It has nothing at all to do with her husband. It is just ordinary impurity. Meaning, let us say someone has relations with a woman who is not his wife and she is menstruating, or she has given birth—then he transgresses a prohibition. It has nothing at all to do with “my wife.” A woman in that state is simply forbidden for intercourse. There is a prohibition. It has nothing to do with the holiness of kiddushin; it is completely unrelated. It is not because of damage to the bond of kiddushin between us. It is a prohibition. Therefore, Tosafot says here, when we are talking about the impurity of a woman after childbirth and her prohibition to her husband, that is not a prohibition to her husband—it is a prohibition to the whole world. It is true that if she has a husband, only her husband could be with her, but in terms of the impurity of a woman after childbirth, if she were to get divorced while still in that state of impurity, everyone would be forbidden to have relations with her, not only her husband. Like a menstruant, like a zavah. Right? Meaning, it is not a prohibition connected to kiddushin at all. Therefore, this prohibition is not in the category of impurity. That is what Tosafot means. “We learned it for the purpose of prohibiting her to her husband”—the whole discussion here is about prohibiting her to her husband, and therefore the category here is a category of prohibition, not a category of impurity.

The Avnei Nezer asked: but after all, the whole law of doubtful impurity in the public domain and in the private domain is learned from sotah, and there too it is a prohibition to her husband. No—because there it really is a prohibition only to the husband, not to the whole world. Because there the prohibition is fundamentally rooted in damage to the bond of kiddushin. So a prohibition of that kind, which is damage to holiness—that is impurity, not just prohibition. The prohibition to be with her is the result of the fact that she became defiled. Defiled in the sense that she no longer bears the holiness of marriage. That is impurity. A sotah, for example, if she touches something, she does not render it impure. A woman after childbirth does, because this is not impurity in the sense we are used to in the regular laws of impurity. The impurity of a sotah means damage to the bond of kiddushin she had with her husband. When she strayed, she harmed the holiness of the bond, and therefore she enters the category of impurity. And then there is a difference between the private domain and the public domain, because it all falls under the laws of impurity. And once you decide that she is impure, she is automatically also forbidden to her husband, because the entire practical consequence of her impurity is only the prohibition to her husband. There is no impurity there in the ordinary sense—entry into the Temple and things of that sort. The impurity there is only prohibition to her husband; that is the whole impurity. Therefore, the concept of impurity there is not the ordinary concept. So why do they use it? Because it is the opposite of holiness. Damage to holiness is therefore called impurity, even though it is not impurity in its ordinary legal definitions.

In contrast, the prohibition of a woman after childbirth and of a menstruant is not a prohibition that has anything to do with damage to holiness. What damage to holiness happened here? A woman gives birth, she fulfilled “be fruitful and multiply,” she helped her husband fulfill “be fruitful and multiply,” she violated no prohibition, she damaged no holiness. It has nothing to do with that. Her prohibition is because she is impure, and therefore intercourse with her is forbidden—not only to her husband, but to everyone. That is already much closer to the ordinary concepts of impurity—first degree of impurity, second degree of impurity—and a woman after childbirth is one of the forms of impurity, menstruant, woman after childbirth, all of these are ordinary impurities. But if so, then there the prohibition to the husband is a completely different law. It is not connected at all to impurity, because it is not really a prohibition to the husband specifically; it is a prohibition to the whole world. So there it is not because of damage to holiness. There, Tosafot says, these are the rules of doubtful prohibition, not doubtful impurity. Therefore here he says, “we learned it for prohibiting her to her husband,” and that is really under the category of doubtful prohibition. And with doubtful prohibition there is a difference between a single doubt and a double doubt: an ordinary doubt is ruled stringently, while a double doubt is treated leniently. Those are the rules for prohibition. With impurity, there really is no difference between a single doubt and a double doubt: if it is in the private domain, both are impure; if it is in the public domain, both are pure.

To my mind that is a brilliant answer. I do not know whether Tosafot intended it, but on the other hand Tosafot really is difficult here—this is a very difficult question. I do not know another answer to Tosafot. A number of later authorities said this, and I do not know a good alternative answer to this Tosafot. It is a bit of pilpul, because none of this is in Tosafot; there is not even a hint of it in Tosafot’s words. So I would not stake my life on saying that this is what Tosafot intended. But the explanation itself is undoubtedly brilliant. We once talked about pilpul—what is pilpul? This explanation is brilliant and correct; I just do not know whether it fits into Tosafot, whether this is what Tosafot meant.

[Speaker A] Tosafot would accept it, yes, that’s it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Once Tosafot hears it, I’m sure he’ll agree. I do not know if that is what he meant, but if Tosafot had thought of it, he would certainly have agreed.

So what is relevant for us? What do we learn from here? What we learn from here is that the category of holiness expands. Meaning, the category of the antithesis—impurity—also really belongs to the world in which holiness belongs; where holiness belongs, impurity belongs too. Transgressions are not impurity. “To prohibit her to her husband,” as Tosafot says, is doubtful prohibition, not doubtful impurity. So once again, just as we saw in the Talmud in Megillah regarding burial and throwing away, here too we see the same thing: these are two categories that do not speak to one another. They are independent. There are categories of commandments and prohibitions, and there are categories of holiness and impurity. They have different consequences—for example in the laws of uncertainty. There is a difference between a doubt and a double doubt; with impurity there is no difference, but with prohibition there is. Okay. This is another sharpening of the point that we are dealing here with two independent categories.

Now let us begin moving a bit toward the question of what this means. So there is a passage in Nedarim. The Mishnah says as follows at the beginning of tractate Nedarim, the first Mishnah: “All substitute terms for vows are like vows, and for dedications are like dedications, and for oaths are like oaths, and for naziriteship are like naziriteship.” Meaning, when you make a vow using language that is not the standard language of a vow—these are called substitute terms, and handles and substitute terms; there are various ways of making a vow that are not the usual formulation of a vow or a dedication or something like that. So the Talmud says that someone who vows using a substitute term, it is also a vow, meaning the vow takes effect.

And on that the Talmud asks: “All substitute terms for vows are like vows”—what is different about Nazir that it does not teach all of them there, and what is different here in Nedarim that it does teach all of them? It adds dedications and oaths and naziriteship. The Mishnah in Nazir, the first Mishnah in Nazir, also speaks about substitute terms for naziriteship, but there it does not expand into oaths and vows and all the other things. So why are they all brought here and not there? The Talmud answers: because vow and oath are written together, it teaches two; and since it teaches two, it teaches all of them. Vow and oath are written together, and when it brings the law regarding vows, it already brings oaths. And once it has already brought oaths, it also brings all the rest. In Nazir, not so.

Now the Talmud continues: then let it teach substitute terms for oaths right after vows. And the Talmud says: “All substitute terms for vows are like vows, and dedications are like dedications, and oaths are like oaths.” If the motivation was that once I bring vows, oaths should come immediately after, because vows and oaths always come together, and afterward I add all the rest, then the order in the Mishnah is not like that. In the Mishnah it should have been vows, then oaths, then dedications. But in the Mishnah it is not like that. First vows, then dedications, and only afterward oaths. Why?

The Talmud says: since it taught vows, which prohibit the object upon him, it also taught dedications, which prohibit the object upon him, excluding an oath, where he prohibits himself with regard to the object. What is it saying? What is the difference between an oath and a vow? An oath is a situation in which I prohibit myself with respect to the object. I prohibit myself from doing some action. A vow is when I prohibit the object to myself. For example, if I swear not to travel to Jerusalem— is that a vow or an oath? Even in the language of the Talmud they sometimes say “oath” and mean vow, or say “vow” and mean oath. The Talmud switches between these terms, and the medieval authorities (Rishonim) note that the Talmud switches the terminology. But in principle, when I prohibit myself from traveling to Jerusalem tomorrow, that is by definition an oath and not a vow, because I prohibited myself from doing an action. There is no particular object here that I turned into an object of prohibition. I prohibited myself from the act of traveling to Jerusalem, so by definition that is an oath. Even if I use the language of a vow, according to most of the medieval authorities (Rishonim), it is really an oath, not a vow. There are some medieval authorities (Rishonim) who claim that it would not take effect at all, because it should have been an oath and you expressed it in the language of a vow, so in effect you did nothing. But the Ran and other medieval authorities (Rishonim) at the beginning of the tractate here argue that no—if you said it that way, it is essentially considered like a substitute term or something like that for an oath, and it will count as an oath.

In contrast, if I prohibit, say, a loaf of bread to myself, that is a vow. Because the bread itself becomes an object of prohibition, like pork. Okay? That is the definition of a vow. So the Talmud says: why—after all, we asked why they inserted dedications after vows and before oaths. Really it should have been vows, oaths, and afterward dedications, because vows and oaths always come together—that was the whole idea—and only after that did they add dedications and the rest and naziriteship. So why do dedications cut in between vows and oaths? The Talmud says because dedications are also a law of prohibiting the object upon him, some type of vow. Therefore it says: substitute terms for vows are like vows, substitute terms for dedications are like dedications, and only then it goes on to oaths. Because oaths are a different category: oaths are to prohibit myself with respect to the object. Basically, vows are about the object, and oaths are about the person. Okay?

Now, both in the Talmud and in the medieval authorities (Rishonim), this was expanded even more. It is clear that the fundamental Torah law that takes effect on an object is holiness. A vow is basically a secondary law. Therefore, for example, one can analogically impose vows from something holy. There are two ways to make a vow. One way is to say, “Konam, this is upon me,” applying a vow to this loaf of bread, for example. Another possibility is to take something that was vowed, or something that was consecrated and is holy, and say, “This should be like that,” meaning to transfer the holiness that exists, or the prohibition that exists, in that object onto the other object. This is called comparison by analogy. I analogically transfer the prohibition from here to there.

Now, to what can one make such an analogy? To something that is vow-generated. What does that mean? A sacrifice is also something vow-generated. If one vows and consecrates something as a sacrifice, that is called something vow-generated, and it is something whose prohibition is in human hands. And not only is its prohibition in human hands, it is also a prohibition on the object. The object itself has a prohibition upon it, so naturally you can take the prohibition that exists on that object and transfer it to another object and generate a prohibition on that second object. But something that is simply prohibited rather than vow-generated—for example pork—with pork I cannot make such an analogy. I cannot say about this thing, “let it be like that,” if that other thing is pork. Because pork is not something vow-generated; it is something prohibited. And only with something vow-generated can one make the analogy.

Now here there are some disputes, but several of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) write: why? Because with a vow the prohibition is a prohibition on the object. And when you want to analogically impose it, you basically have to take an existing reality of prohibition and transfer it to the second object. But with pork, this is not a prohibition on the object. Only vow and holiness are prohibitions on the object. Nazir is a prohibition… pork is a prohibition on the person. I am forbidden to eat pork; the pork in itself does not have a legal status of prohibition resting on it. And therefore one cannot analogically impose using pork. There may be others who disagree—a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim).

[Speaker D] But it says about pork that it is impure. What? I mean, it says there are pure animals and impure animals.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You mean, is it forbidden to make use of it?

[Speaker A] Is it permitted to use pigskin? What? Is it permitted nowadays to use pigskin?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, it is only a prohibition of eating. You can even make use of the meat. It is only a prohibition of eating; there is no prohibition of benefit with pork. The distinction needs…

[Speaker H] It seems to me maybe differently: with something vow-generated, the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permits. Meaning, I am the one who vowed it, so now I transfer it to the other side.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, to transfer does not mean to remove it from there and move it here.

[Speaker H] Ah, it stays there?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It stays there, yes. “Transfer” means it applies to this as well, like in temurah, where “it and its substitute shall be holy.” In temurah too, when I make a substitute, the sacrifice remains—

[Speaker H] holy, and I can do that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not just vow directly? There are two ways. You can vow in this way, and you can vow in that way. There are apparently certain differences; sometimes these are disputes among the medieval authorities (Rishonim). But in principle, why not? These are just two ways of making a vow.

[Speaker D] In Noah’s time, he brought into the ark pure animals and impure animals. Yes. Now, at that stage neither prohibition nor permission was relevant, so I’m saying, what remains? Only holiness and impurity, no? I understand. Meaning, there was a reality of impurity and purity in Noah’s ark, but a reality of prohibition and permission with respect to animals did not seem to exist.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Impure animal” there means an animal that is forbidden to eat, where impurity exists in an extended, borrowed sense. There is no impurity there really in any ordinary sense, in the regular laws of impurity and purity. There it is used in a borrowed sense. It is actually an interesting question: there are places where the concept of impurity apparently, at least as I understand it, is used only in a borrowed sense. It does not really represent actual impurity.

[Speaker E] So then what was the difference? Why bring this one in and not bring that one in? What? Why bring this into the ark and not that, if prohibition and permission do not apply there?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He brought in both of them, there was just a difference in number. In number? Why bring that? I don’t know, they wanted… pure animals are generally animals used by people, so they brought in more. Maybe that, I don’t know. Symbolic? No, it was not so that the ark would not be made impure by an impure animal. An impure animal does not impart impurity to anything. It is not… it is not…

[Speaker E] There was such a category as pure animal and impure animal. What? In that period, at that time, there was not such a category.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There was no prohibition yet.

[Speaker E] There was no prohibition,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] and therefore they used the language of impure animal and pure animal, but not because there really was impurity and purity there. And this is actually foreshadowing—with a tet, yes?—foreshadowing the later period when there would already be a prohibition. This is Maimonides in his commentary on the Mishnah on the sciatic nerve. I mentioned it once. Maimonides brings that there is a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages in Chullin, in chapter seven. There is a dispute over to what the prohibition of the sciatic nerve applies. Rabbi Yehuda says it also applies to an impure animal. Rabbi Yehuda says it applies only to a pure animal, I think—I do not remember exactly at the moment. And the Sages argue against him… no, Rabbi Yehuda brings proof that it applies even to an impure animal. Rabbi Yehuda says that the prohibition of the sciatic nerve also applies to an impure animal. So if you eat the sciatic nerve of an impure animal, you have violated two prohibitions: you also ate an impure animal and you also ate the sciatic nerve. And the Sages say it applies only to a pure animal.

So Rabbi Yehuda argues against the Sages: after all, the prohibition of the sciatic nerve was said to Jacob, that was before the giving of the Torah. At that stage there was no difference between pure animals and impure animals. So if the sciatic nerve was already prohibited then, there is no reason at all to assume that it would be prohibited only in a pure animal—there was no such distinction yet. So the Sages say that it was said to Jacob, but it was repeated at Sinai. And we observe it only… Maimonides explains there in his commentary on the Mishnah—there is a very fundamental Maimonides there—that everything we observe is not because of what happened to the sons of Jacob, but because of the command at Sinai. But there you really do see, at least in Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion, that the concept of impure and pure did apply even earlier; only the practical consequences did not yet apply. At least that is how I understand his statements. And in that sense it really does resemble this terminology in the Noah story, and maybe that actually explains what Rabbi Yehuda says. The term impure animal and pure animal is used there precisely because the prohibition of eating did not yet exist. So if the prohibition of eating did not yet exist, you cannot say “forbidden animal” and “permitted animal.” How are you going to make the categorical distinction? So they make the distinction in language that speaks about the things themselves. And when we speak about the things themselves, we speak in terms of holy and pure and impure. I think holy and impure speak about the things themselves.

[Speaker H] Noah—

[Speaker E] offered sacrifices when he came out of the ark, from the pure animals only. Okay, so there is a practical consequence.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, he did that, but who says he was obligated to do that?

[Speaker E] There was no difference then. Also for him, what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is what I am saying: there was a difference even though the prohibition did not yet exist. So therefore they mark that difference using the language of impurity and purity. Because if you want to tell me a difference of prohibition, then you say forbidden and permitted, forbidden animal and permitted animal. But if there is not yet prohibition and permission—all these animals are permitted—then how are you going to indicate the difference between a pig and a cow? So you say impure and pure, because impure and pure is language that refers to the objects themselves, not to the person in relation to the objects, but to the objects themselves. Now you want to make the distinction…

Maybe—I just thought of this possibility now—maybe that is the explanation for why borrowed language of impure and not impure is used when in fact it is not really speaking about the category of impurity. It is true that the Torah itself uses this language even after the giving of the Torah—“and these shall be impure for you”—because the Torah itself speaks about impure animals and pure animals. Fine, maybe that is just a residue from what existed before the giving of the Torah. I do not know, but it looks like borrowed usage in the Torah. “Impure for you” means that you are supposed to keep away from them.

In any case, in the Talmud here in Nedarim they make a distinction between a vow and an oath: a vow is a prohibition of the object upon me, while an oath is a prohibition on me to do an action, or a prohibition of myself with respect to the object. Therefore, for example, the Talmud on page 15—several medieval authorities (Rishonim)—the Talmud on page 15 in Nedarim makes… actually the Mishnah makes a distinction between someone who swears not to sit in a sukkah and someone who prohibits the sukkah to himself. Someone who swears not to sit in a sukkah—the oath does not take effect, because he is already sworn from Mount Sinai to sit in a sukkah. But someone who prohibits the sukkah to himself—the sukkah was not sworn from Mount Sinai to be my sukkah, the sukkah is not obligated in anything. So if I turn the sukkah into an object of prohibition, which is what a vow does, then it becomes an object of prohibition. And now I am stuck: I have a commandment from Mount Sinai to sit in a sukkah, but on the other hand the vow took effect and I cannot use the sukkah. So now the question is what to do in such a case, but the vow does take effect. An oath regarding a sukkah does not take effect. And the Ritva there on page 15, and other medieval authorities (Rishonim), explain that the difference is exactly because of what the Talmud says here on page 2: vows are a prohibition of the object upon me, and an oath is a prohibition of me with respect to the object. One can make a vow not to sit in a sukkah—any sukkah—or in my sukkah.

[Speaker A] No, you can make a vow regarding a specific sukkah. No, I can make a vow not to sit in all the sukkot in the world.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you make a vow, if you prohibit something to yourself, you can prohibit even something that isn’t yours. That’s in a vow. No, I mean: if you prohibit something to yourself, you can prohibit even objects that aren’t yours. In principle, a person can’t prohibit an object that isn’t his—I can’t prohibit your object to you—but I can prohibit your object to myself. For example: “Konam, I am forbidden from deriving benefit from you.” I prohibit to myself any benefit from you in general. No problem—that works. As long as I’m dealing with myself, I can do that. And then when I do that, I’m actually prohibiting the object—that’s because it’s a vow. I can of course swear not to sit in a sukkah, and that means prohibiting myself from the sukkah, not prohibiting the sukkah to myself. Okay, so are you already bound by oath from Mount Sinai? Right—bound by oath. It takes effect? Therefore with regard to sukkah that won’t help, because regarding sukkah I’m already under oath. But if I prohibit myself from, I don’t know, going into various houses, fine, then that’s prohibited to me. Okay? In the specific case of sukkah, because I’m already bound by oath from Mount Sinai, such an oath won’t take effect. So why, in my view, might the vow also perhaps not take effect if it applies to all sukkot in the whole world? It takes effect on the sukkot themselves. Now I’m stuck, because I don’t actually have any sukkah to sit in, okay? But the sukkah does become prohibited, because it doesn’t clash head-on with my commandment to sit in a sukkah; it creates a clash only indirectly. Once the sukkah itself becomes prohibited—and there’s no barrier to prohibiting the sukkah, because the sukkah isn’t obligated in commandments, I am obligated in commandments—so the sukkah becomes prohibited. And now that the sukkah is prohibited, I’m stuck because I can’t sit in it. And when you say “konam,” do you have to point, as if… I can point to all sukkot in the world—what’s the problem? “Konam, all the breads in the world are prohibited to me”—no problem, anything in front of you. You just have to define the objects you’re talking about. If you say, “Konam, this is upon me,” then it’s by pointing. “Konam, this is upon me,” not “konam, all breads” or “the bread.” Fine, but if you say “the breads of the world,” fine, that also works.

So what does that actually mean? It gives us an initial opening for understanding this concept called holiness, because in the simple and basic explanation of the difference between a vow and an oath—that a vow applies to the object and an oath applies to the person—the claim is really an ontological one. Ontology is the study of being. Meaning, when I say that I vow benefit from something, “konam, this thing is upon me,” or when I consecrate something, I have actually created a new reality that didn’t exist before. A person has the ability to create a reality of prohibitions. Okay? By contrast, if I swear, then I haven’t created any reality; I’ve only prohibited certain actions to myself, but I haven’t introduced any new reality. A prohibition on the object means a reality in the object, so the fact that I’m prohibited from eating the object is only a result of the fact that the object is an object of prohibition. By contrast, in an oath there is no reality in the object at all; the prohibition is on me. It is not the result of any reality. It’s simply forbidden for me to eat—I prohibited an action to myself. That’s the difference.

So if that’s so, it means that holiness—and here we see that a vow joins this issue as well—is distinguished from other things, or from an oath; let’s leave other prohibitions aside for a moment—it is distinguished from an oath in that it creates reality. Holiness is a kind of reality. But a prohibition or a commandment or at least an oath is not a reality; it applies only to the person: you’re forbidden to do this, you’re obligated to do this, you’re permitted to do this. But that has nothing to do with the objects themselves—they are nothing, okay? In holiness and in a vow, it is in the object itself.

True, what I’m saying now depends on a dispute among medieval authorities (Rishonim). There’s a Kehillot Yaakov on tractate Nedarim, section 15; he brings disputes there following this Talmudic passage here on page 2. The Talmud says that vows are a prohibition on the object and oaths are a prohibition on the person. What about pork? What about the other Torah prohibitions? The accepted view is that the other Torah prohibitions are prohibitions on the object. All Torah prohibitions are prohibitions on the object. By contrast, rabbinic prohibitions—let’s say—there are some later authorities (Acharonim) who argue that rabbinic prohibitions are prohibitions on the person, whereas Torah prohibitions are prohibitions on the object. Pork is an object of prohibition.

The way I presented it earlier—that’s not correct. The way I presented it earlier, really only vows and holiness are in the object; the rest of the Torah prohibitions are prohibitions on the person, like oaths. And in fact the Kehillot Yaakov brings a dispute among medieval authorities (Rishonim) on this matter. There are medieval authorities (Rishonim) who claim that the distinction the Talmud makes here between vows and oaths means that vows are the exception. So vows are in the object, and holiness of course is like a vow—they are the exceptions; they are in the object. All the other Torah prohibitions, including oaths, are on the person. So vows are the exception. And there are medieval authorities (Rishonim) who say the opposite: oaths are the exception. Meaning, vows, holiness, and all Torah prohibitions are in the object; oaths are unique in that they are on the person. So the question is: which one is special? Are vows the special case, or are oaths the special case? That is a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim).

Now if I say, like the first camp of medieval authorities (Rishonim), that all Torah prohibitions are prohibitions on the person except for vows and holiness, then we already have a good definition of what distinguishes the concept of holiness from commandments. Holiness is a kind of reality, and the halakhic consequences are consequences of that reality. The fact that I’m forbidden to make use of a sacrifice is not because there is a prohibition of use upon me, but because the sacrifice is prohibited for use. Naturally that means I’m forbidden to use it, but it starts with the object. By contrast, with pork there’s nothing in the pork itself. I’m forbidden to eat pork—according to those medieval authorities (Rishonim), I’m saying. It’s like an oath.

But there are medieval authorities (Rishonim) who don’t say that. There are medieval authorities (Rishonim) who claim that all Torah prohibitions are prohibitions on the object, and only oaths are prohibitions on the person. So then there’s nothing unique about vows and consecrated objects. So how do we explain it there? Here you have to pay close attention. In Avnei Nezer, and also Rabbi Shimon Shkop in his novellae on tractate Nedarim—Chiddushei Rabbi Shimon Yehuda on Nedarim—and also the Avnei Nezer, I don’t remember in which responsum; if you want, maybe I wrote it down somewhere, I’ll find it—they both explain the difference between a prohibition on the object and a prohibition on the person differently.

They say that a prohibition on the object means a prohibition for the sake of the object—that the purpose of the prohibition is to protect the object. And a prohibition on the person is a prohibition whose purpose is to protect the person, to prevent damage to the person. Let’s give an example. When I’m prohibited from eating pork, why am I forbidden to eat pork? Because we’re concerned for the sanctity of the pig, and therefore I may not eat it? No. Obviously, somehow, in some sense, it harms me, defiles my soul, causes some spiritual damage—I don’t know exactly what. Okay. But the concern is concern for the person eating, and therefore it’s called a prohibition on the person. By contrast, in holiness, when I’m forbidden to make use of a sacred object, is that because I’ll be harmed by this use? No. It’s because of the object—it is an injury to the sacred object. The purpose of the prohibition is the object, not me. That’s called a prohibition on the object.

And the Avnei Nezer and Rabbi Shimon Shkop do not explain this in the ontic sense the way I did earlier—that a prohibition on the object means it exists in reality, while a prohibition on the person does not exist in reality but is only a prohibition on the person himself. No. They say it may be that everything is on the person, or everything is on the object—I don’t know—but the distinction the Talmud makes between a prohibition on the object and a prohibition on the person concerns the reason for the verse: why was this done? Was it done in order to protect the object? That is called a prohibition on the object. Or was it done in order to protect the person? Then it is a prohibition on the person. In other words, it’s a question of how one understands the essence of the prohibition. It has nothing to do with its character—whether there is some reality here or no reality here. Okay? That’s not the accepted explanation, neither among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) nor among the later authorities (Acharonim). But that’s what the Avnei Nezer and Rabbi Shimon Shkop say.

So now there is already room to discuss it. Meaning, the topic here is not dealing at all with the question of what happens in the object itself. It may be, according to their view, that all Torah prohibitions really are prohibitions on the person because they are intended to protect the person or prevent harm to the person. And prohibitions of vows are prohibitions on the object, or prohibitions of holiness are prohibitions on the object, because they are intended to protect the object. Okay? But it could still be that from the standpoint of reality, maybe in all of them there is a reality of prohibition—or the opposite, in none of them is there any reality. In other words, the topic here is not dealing with the question of which prohibitions are grounded in reality and which prohibitions are only on the person. The topic here is dealing only with the question of what the purpose of the prohibition is. And therefore one cannot learn anything from this topic here. I’m saying that according to the other medieval authorities (Rishonim), or according to other explanations, I can understand the essence of holiness. Holiness is basically some kind of reality from which the prohibitions are derived. By contrast, an ordinary prohibition has nothing to do with reality at all. It’s just a prohibition.

That sharpens even more what I said earlier about why animals were called impure and pure. Because before there was a prohibition on me, how would you mark the difference between the animals? If you want to speak about the animals themselves, then you use the language of holy and impure, or pure, holy, and impure, because that is the language used to deal with objects themselves. The language of prohibition and commandment is language that speaks about me, about the person. Okay? So that sharpens what I’m saying now even more. Meaning, the essence of holiness—and also of a vow, as the Talmud says here—is really that there is a reality. And that is the difference between holiness and commandments. Commandments are a matter of definition; they are not in the thing itself.

Again I say: it could be that when I eat pork, there is something in the pork that causes problems for me. That is not called a prohibition on the object. A prohibition on the object means that a legal prohibition takes effect on the pork—not that the pork causes spiritual problems, but that a prohibition takes effect on the pork. My not eating the pork is a consequence of the fact that a prohibition has taken effect on it. So it’s something abstract like that. Okay? By contrast, a prohibition on the person means that no prohibition takes effect on the thing; rather, I am forbidden to do the act, or I am forbidden to eat the thing, or whatever it may be. It could be, according to Rabbi Shimon Shkop and the Avnei Nezer, that this distinction is still correct; it’s just that the topic here is not dealing with it. Okay? And therefore I want to use this definition.

So basically, that is the difference between holiness and prohibition. Holiness is grounded in reality. Prohibition is grounded in the person—they tell you: forbidden. It’s a law. A prohibition is a law. A prohibition or a commandment is a law: what you need to do, what you are forbidden to do, what you are permitted to do. It speaks to me; it has nothing to do with the world. Okay? Holiness, by contrast, is grounded in the world. And the great novelty in a vow is that a vow too acquires a meaning like holiness, in that when a person makes a vow he actually creates a reality. It isn’t really holy, but he creates a reality, and therefore they compare it to holy objects. Not because a vow actually has holiness—in a vow there is no holiness. At bottom it is a prohibition. In that sense it has nothing to do with holiness. It resembles holiness only in the sense that in a vow too, the prohibition is grounded in a reality in the object, exactly like the reality of holiness.

And that’s an interesting point, because the Mishneh LaMelekh asks—and maybe I once spoke about the guilt-offering, I surely spoke at some point about the meaning of the guilt-offering, I spoke about doubts, I don’t remember, maybe I’ll mention it later on—the Mishneh LaMelekh asks: the Talmud says that there is misuse of consecrated property with konamot. Meaning, someone who violates a vow has to bring a guilt-offering, a guilt-offering for misuse of consecrated property. There is no source for this—not a verse, not an exposition, nothing. I’m not such a great expert; the Mishneh LaMelekh was a great expert. And he says there is no source at all; he doesn’t understand where this comes from. It seems to me that it comes from here, from the fact that the Talmud compares a vow, which is a prohibition on the object, to holiness. What it is really saying is that in a vow, as in holiness, there is a reality in the thing itself—not a reality of holiness, but a reality in the thing itself.

And there is such a principle regarding guilt-offerings: the essence of a guilt-offering is when you intrude into a place that is other, that lies outside your domain—when you enter into a realm that is in a different reality, where there is some kind of different reality there. In that sense, a vow is like holiness. It isn’t holy in the sense of being more connected to the Holy One, blessed be He, than other things are—not in the sense of closeness to the Holy One, blessed be He. But it is holy in the sense that I am supposed to be separated from it. What Rashi says on “You shall be holy”—sorry, not Nachmanides. Rashi there, not Nachmanides. Rashi there says: “You shall be holy”—holiness means separation. And you have to separate from the thing. Not holiness in the sense that the thing is close to the Holy One, blessed be He, but rather that you must separate. What does it mean that you must separate? That it is something defined in such a way that its very definition entails that I must separate from it. As distinct from pork, from which I also have to separate, but that is not because of something in the pork itself; rather, I myself have a prohibition against eating pork. In that sense, a vow is like holiness. Okay? Meaning, it begins in reality itself, and that depends on how one understands the guilt-offerings. Maybe I’ll talk about that later.

So that is basically the definition I’m proposing here for the concept of holiness: that the concept of holiness at its root begins with some sort of reality, and the prohibitions derived from it are consequences or offshoots of that reality. As opposed to ordinary prohibitions, which are just prohibitions; in reality itself there is nothing. I may go back to the point with which I opened, so you can see why these things also connect to practice. For now this has been a pretty purely abstract discussion of the essence of prohibitions and the like.

When people see holiness in things, they’re not merely saying that I have obligations to do something with those things, or that I’m forbidden to do something with those things. They are saying something beyond that. They’re saying that the object itself is a different kind of object. There is some divine manifestation in it, a manifestation of holiness; something of the Holy One, blessed be He, is there. That is why this comes very close to idolatry if it isn’t done properly. If you say about something that is not holy that it is holy, there is a problem here of idolatry, or something bordering on idolatry. If you say there is a prohibition where there is no prohibition, or there is a commandment where there is no commandment, that is a halakhic mistake—“do not add” and “do not subtract,” fine. But it is not idolatry. It is not inserting divinity where there is no divinity.

And many times you can see practical expressions of this—in reality it appears differently. Meaning, when I attribute holiness to things that are not holy, it appears with completely different intensity in reality than when I say there is some obligation to do something even though there is no obligation. Fine—there is an obligation, there isn’t an obligation, you can say I’m mistaken. But the ecstasy that attaches to the concept of holiness does not appear in the context of commandments. Ecstasy—yes, now I’m already talking about the psychological implications, the emotional implications. Ecstasy appears when we encounter holiness. It does not appear when we encounter a commandment or a prohibition, because there there is some feeling that I am meeting the Holy One, blessed be He. Meaning, there is something different in the air. It activates me.

If all this is psychological explanation, I’m trying to clarify why indeed in reality—and we’ll see, I’ll bring examples of this, and I once spoke here about the flag dance, I don’t remember in what context anymore—the flag dance on Jerusalem Day, where they dance there and all that, I got a fever when I saw it once and never went near it again. It was really idolatry in my eyes. Like Haredim say “idolatry” about flags and so on—that’s nonsense, I don’t mean that. But there, it really was a kind of ecstatic nationalist idolatry—not holiness in the usual sense, but the flag as an alternative to the Holy One, blessed be He. No, they see the Holy One, blessed be He, in the flag. But it’s a kind of seeing holiness in something mundane. I’ll come back to this; I’m only trying to explain why this abstract discussion I’m having here is important: holiness is a kind of reality, while a prohibition or a commandment is only a matter of what one should do, what is permitted, and what is forbidden. These are norms; they have nothing to do with reality. Holiness means that the Holy One, blessed be He, is moving around here. When the Holy One, blessed be He, is moving around here, we have to walk either on tiptoe or I don’t know what—our whole soul reacts differently to divine presence. And therefore it is much more dangerous to attribute holiness to something that is not holy than to call something permitted forbidden, or something forbidden permitted, or a commandment—because the ecstasy that accompanies this takes us very close to idolatry.

[Speaker A] There’s also ecstasy, meaning if I say, “I prohibit myself from eating bread,” which is an oath, and if I say—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “The bread is konam to me”—with the bread. Here there’s ecstasy and here there isn’t ecstasy? What? In a vow you won’t find that. That’s why I’m talking about holiness, not about a vow. In a vow there is a legal effect of prohibition. But I’m saying that this legal effect of prohibition is not an expression of God, not an expression of the Holy One, blessed be He. There is a reality of prohibition, so it resembles holiness, but it is not actually holiness. When I spoke earlier, I was speaking about holiness—only holiness. Not everything that has some reality. This different reality is basically some manifestation of the Holy One, blessed be He, in that place. That is what is called holiness, and the prohibitions or commandments are an outgrowth of the fact that the Holy One, blessed be He, is present there. Now we have to discuss where He is present, where He is not present, what kinds of holiness there are, where He is present more and where less. Those are already discussions one can have afterward. But first of all, this is the basic definition of the concept of holiness. The basic definition of the concept of holiness is that it begins with reality and the prohibitions are a consequence. And the concept of commandment—and we saw that these are two completely separate categories, there is no connection—holiness and commandment are two categories that do not speak to one another at all. Okay? It has nothing to do with divine manifestation. It’s a question of what you need to do, what is permitted or forbidden, that’s all. Okay? That’s the summary up to here, in short.