The Meaning of Scripture – Lesson 1
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Table of Contents
- Maimonides’ fifth root and the counting of the commandments
- Reasons for the commandments in the Guide for the Perplexed and the claim against denying reasons
- A verse, divine decree, and “why do I need a verse? It’s logical”
- The stubborn and rebellious son, Meiri, and a reason that can be understood yet still requires a verse
- Why Maimonides deals specifically with a reason written in the Torah
- The appearance of prohibitions, counting separately, and the claim that counting the reason and the prohibition collapses into one
- The dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon over deriving “the reason of the verse”
- Criticism of the explanation that we do not derive “the reason of the verse” because of fear of error
- “He shall not multiply wives for himself”: the passage in Sanhedrin and the reversal of positions
- Maimonides’ ruling: Jewish law follows neither Rabbi Yehuda nor Rabbi Shimon
- Nachmanides’ critique of the fifth root and the meaning of verses that give reasons
- Maimonides’ position: we do not derive “the reason of the verse” even when the reason is written explicitly
- Returning to the counting of the commandments: why a reason is not counted separately
Summary
General Overview
In the fifth root among Maimonides’ fourteen roots, he establishes that the reason for a commandment should not be counted as a commandment in its own right. Therefore, when the Torah attaches a rationale in language that resembles a prohibition, it should not be counted in the tally of the commandments as an additional prohibition. The discussion connects this principle to the broader question of reasons for the commandments and to the dispute among the Tannaim over whether one derives law from “the reason of the verse,” and it presents a position according to which, even when there is an explicit verse, there is still a reason standing behind the command. From the passages about a king multiplying wives and about “you shall not take a widow’s garment as collateral,” it emerges that a written reason is not necessarily a mechanism for changing the Jewish law, and Maimonides in practice even rules in a way that follows neither Rabbi Yehuda nor Rabbi Shimon, but rather the first Tanna, grounding a view according to which there is no need to derive “the reason of the verse,” because the reason is supposed to coincide with the wording of the command itself.
Maimonides’ Fifth Root and the Counting of the Commandments
In the fifth root, Maimonides writes that the reason for a commandment should not be counted as a commandment in its own right, and therefore a verse that explains why a commandment is done is not included in the tally of the commandments. The example is “He shall not multiply wives for himself, lest his heart turn away,” where the reason “so that his heart not turn away” is not counted, even though it appears in the form of a prohibition, because in this context it comes to explain, not to command. Maimonides warns against a situation in which reasons for commandments are written in the Torah in wording that resembles a prohibition, so that one might think they are merely “the appearance of prohibitions” and should be counted “separately” as an additional prohibition.
Reasons for the Commandments in the Guide for the Perplexed and the Claim Against Denying Reasons
In the Guide for the Perplexed, Maimonides describes people who think one should not give reasons for the commandments, lest they become merely human matters and lose their divine content. Maimonides calls this a major error and presents it as turning the Holy One, blessed be He, into something worse than His creatures, since human beings act for reasons and with logic, and it cannot be that the commands of the Holy One, blessed be He, would be without reason. Maimonides distinguishes between the very existence of a reason behind a command and the question whether human beings can know that reason, and he maintains that there must be some reason behind the commands even if we do not know it.
A Verse, Divine Decree, and “Why Do I Need a Verse? It’s Logical”
A common tendency is mentioned: to think that if there is an explicit verse commanding something, then there is no reason behind it, because of the principle “why do I need a verse? It’s logical.” But it is argued that this is incorrect: even when there is a verse, there still ought to be a reason. One explanation offered is that sometimes the reason would not be seen as strong enough on its own to act upon, and the Torah tells us that one may rely on it and act accordingly. Another explanation is that sometimes the reason conflicts with other halakhic principles and therefore requires a verse, such as the principle that “a litigant’s admission is like one hundred witnesses” alongside the rule that a person is disqualified from testimony because he is an interested party.
The Stubborn and Rebellious Son, Meiri, and a Reason That Can Be Understood Yet Still Requires a Verse
In the passage about the stubborn and rebellious son, the exposition “a son and not a daughter” is cited, and Meiri writes that this law is not applied to a daughter because it is not her way to be drawn into robbery and banditry, in line with the explanation that the son is judged based on his likely future. Meiri asks why the Sages call this a divine decree if the reason can be understood, and he answers that even divine decrees have reasons, and those reasons can sometimes be understood. The explanation is that even if the reason is intelligible, a verse is still needed to determine that the reason is significant enough to rely on and derive law from, since one might otherwise imagine additional exceptions on similar logical grounds, and it is not self-evident where the Torah accepts such exceptions.
Why Maimonides Deals Specifically with a Reason Written in the Torah
It is argued that when the reason is not written in the Torah but only inferred or conjectured, there is no reason even to entertain counting it among the commandments, because according to Maimonides only matters that actually appear in the Torah are counted, not things derived through exposition. Maimonides is speaking about cases in which the Torah itself writes the reason, and then the reason appears in the Torah and might be mistaken for an additional commandment. Therefore he rules that it is not counted. Maimonides brings biblical examples in which a prohibition is attached to a rationale: “and you shall not bring sin upon the land” after “her first husband… may not take her back,” “and the land shall not become promiscuous” after “do not profane your daughter by making her a prostitute,” and “you shall not pollute the land” after “you shall not take ransom for the life of a murderer.”
The Appearance of Prohibitions, Counting Separately, and the Claim That Counting the Reason and the Prohibition Collapses into One
Maimonides explains that the confusion arises when the wording of the reason resembles a prohibition, and one may then think there are two separate prohibitions that should be counted “separately.” A claim is raised that sometimes there is no practical difference between counting the reason or counting the prohibition when the reason is not written explicitly, because the reason merely clarifies what result one is not supposed to reach, and the prohibition is the means to that end. An analogy is brought from tort law: the verse speaks about an ox, but it is obvious that the underlying principle is a person’s responsibility for his damaging property, and therefore the liability naturally extends to a dog and the like as well.
The Dispute Between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon over Deriving “The Reason of the Verse”
The well-known dispute is presented: Rabbi Shimon derives “the reason of the verse,” while Rabbi Yehuda does not derive “the reason of the verse”—that is, whether one draws halakhic conclusions through purposive interpretation based on the rationale. The example given is “you shall not take a widow’s garment as collateral,” where according to Rabbi Shimon it is permitted to take collateral from a wealthy widow, whereas according to Rabbi Yehuda it is prohibited whether she is poor or wealthy. A common connection is mentioned between the refusal to derive “the reason of the verse” and the Talmudic statement about King Solomon and the two verses whose reasons were revealed and in which he stumbled, but it is argued that the Talmud there explains why the Torah did not write reasons, not necessarily why the Sages do not derive law from “the reason of the verse.”
Criticism of the Explanation That We Do Not Derive “The Reason of the Verse” Because of Fear of Error
It is argued that if one does not derive “the reason of the verse,” the chance of error may actually be greater, because refraining from sensible interpretation does not eliminate risk; it merely replaces it with another decision that has its own costs. It is claimed that every halakhic ruling has a price, and at times stringency on one side is leniency on another. A story is cited about Rabbi Chaim, who permitted travel on the Sabbath to save a son from the Czarist cantonist decree, phrasing it as a “stringency in the laws of saving life.” It is also argued that when the reason is written explicitly in the Torah, there is no danger of error in interpreting the reason itself, and therefore one might have expected “the reason of the verse” to be derived there—but in practice there are cases where even then it is not derived.
“He Shall Not Multiply Wives for Himself”: the Passage in Sanhedrin and the Reversal of Positions
The Mishnah and baraita in Sanhedrin are presented: the first Tanna rules, “He shall not multiply wives for himself—no more than eighteen”; Rabbi Yehuda says he may multiply them, provided they do not turn his heart away; Rabbi Shimon says that even one woman who turns his heart away is forbidden, and if so, why does Scripture say “he shall not multiply”? To teach that even women like Abigail are included. The Talmud asks whether this implies that Rabbi Yehuda derives “the reason of the verse” and Rabbi Shimon does not, even though in the case of “you shall not take a widow’s garment as collateral” it seems to be the opposite. It answers that “here it is different, because the reason of the verse is stated explicitly,” and therefore Rabbi Yehuda relies on the reason when it is explicit. The Talmud presents Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning: since generally we derive “the reason of the verse,” Scripture could simply have written “He shall not multiply wives for himself” and stopped there; the addition of “lest his heart turn away” teaches him an additional prohibition—against women who turn the heart away, even just one.
Maimonides’ Ruling: Jewish Law Follows Neither Rabbi Yehuda nor Rabbi Shimon
In his commentary on the Mishnah, Maimonides explicitly says that Jewish law follows neither Rabbi Yehuda nor Rabbi Shimon, and in the Mishneh Torah he rules that it is forbidden to have more than eighteen wives, regardless of whether they are righteous or wicked. The proposed explanation is that Maimonides reads the Mishnah as presenting three views, not as a heading followed by a dispute, and therefore rules like the first Tanna, who limits the king to eighteen in every case. According to this reading, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon each dispute the first Tanna in his own direction, and Maimonides decides in accordance with the first Tannaitic opinion.
Nachmanides’ Critique of the Fifth Root and the Meaning of Verses That Give Reasons
Nachmanides comments on Maimonides’ fifth root and argues that every verse in the Torah that states a reason comes to introduce halakhic significance, and therefore Maimonides’ root is not correct and is even unnecessary, because otherwise the verse would be superfluous. Nachmanides writes that we have not seen our rabbis treat Torah prohibitions as redundant merely because they are only the reason for a preceding prohibition, unless some novel law is learned from the reason, either to add or to subtract. He presents “He shall not multiply wives for himself, lest his heart turn away” as a verse in which the reason serves a halakhic reading of the prohibition, in a way that fits Rabbi Yehuda—who permits multiplying wives provided his heart does not turn away—whereas Rabbi Shimon turns “lest his heart turn away” into a prohibition in its own right.
Maimonides’ Position: We Do Not Derive “The Reason of the Verse” Even When the Reason Is Written Explicitly
It is argued that according to Maimonides and the first Tanna, we do not derive “the reason of the verse” even when the reason is written explicitly—not only because of fear of error, but because there is no need. The claim is that if purposive interpretation yields a conclusion different from the literal interpretation, that is an indication that the reason has not been understood correctly, because the Torah is worded precisely, and the reason is supposed to coincide with the command. Accordingly, even though it says “lest his heart turn away,” one should not infer permission to multiply righteous wives, because it can be understood that even multiplying righteous wives will in practice turn the king’s heart away, and therefore the limit of eighteen remains intact.
Returning to the Counting of the Commandments: Why a Reason Is Not Counted Separately
The practical conclusion applied to the fifth root is that when the reason is written together with the prohibition, it should not be counted separately as an additional commandment, because it explains the prohibition rather than adding an independent command. An initial thought is presented that sometimes one might have wanted to count specifically the wording of the reason, because it reveals what the Torah really wants to forbid, but Maimonides rules that since the reason and the prohibition coincide, there is no point in counting them as two separate commandments. The discussion ends with a normative claim derived from this position: if a conclusion such as a prohibition on an “iPhone” emerges only from the reason and not from the wording of the verse, that is evidence that the reason has been misunderstood, and one should not infer from it a Torah-level prohibition.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the fifth root of Maimonides—there are fourteen roots, I’ve already mentioned this more than once—in which he lays down the rules for counting the commandments: what gets counted, what does not get counted, and how you count them. In the fifth root he writes: the fifth root is that it is not proper to count the reason for a commandment as a commandment in its own right. So when there is a verse that explains the reason for the commandment, why it is done, that is not counted in the tally of the commandments.
[Speaker B] You mean the reason?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The reason, yes. For example: “He shall not multiply wives for himself, lest his heart turn away.” So the king is forbidden to take many wives, and the reason is so that his heart not turn away. So the reason is not a commandment, even though “lest his heart turn away”—the word “not” is in the category of “guard yourself,” “lest,” “do not”; the Talmud says that is a prohibition. But in this context, of course, it is a prohibition that comes to explain, not to command. Therefore it is not counted among the commandments. Many times people connect this claim of Maimonides to the question whether there are reasons for commandments at all. Meaning, Maimonides writes in the Guide for the Perplexed that there are those who think that one should not give reasons for the commandments, because then the commandments become some simple human thing that any person would basically do, and their divine content would disappear; nothing special would remain in them beyond the human sphere. And Maimonides says that this is a great mistake—“the sect of fools,” I don’t remember exactly how he calls them there—because they turn the Holy One, blessed be He, into something worse than His creatures. Meaning, if human beings do things for sensible reasons, and the Holy One, blessed be He, does things for no reason at all—that makes no sense. This is not connected to the question whether we can know the reason, but there has to be some reason behind the commands. Whether we can know it or not—that really is a question. I think I once spoke about this, I spoke about divine decree, so I’m almost certain I discussed it. It’s commonly thought that if there is a verse commanding us something, then there is no reason. It’s a divine decree, because if there were a reason, then “why do I need a verse? It’s logical.” So there is a tendency to think that if there’s a verse, then there’s no reason. But that’s not true. Even if there is a verse, there is still supposed to be some reason, as Maimonides says. So why do we really need the verse? “Why do I need a verse? It’s logical.” Very often the reason, let’s say, is not strong enough, or at least we wouldn’t have thought it was strong enough to act on, and the Torah says: it’s okay. Meaning, you can rely on this reason and act on it. An example: in the chapter about the stubborn and rebellious son—it seems to me that at some point somewhere I spoke about this, I don’t remember anymore. In the case of the stubborn and rebellious son, there is an exposition: “a son and not a daughter.” Meaning, the law of the stubborn and rebellious son is not applied to a daughter. And Meiri writes there that this is because it is not the way of a daughter to be drawn after such things and rob people. After all, the Talmud explains there why the stubborn and rebellious son is judged—the Mishnah, actually—that he is judged based on his future, because in the end he will rob people. So Meiri says: girls are not generally like that. And then Meiri himself asks: in the Jerusalem Talmud it says explicitly—and in the Babylonian Talmud it’s also fairly clear—that this is a divine decree: “a son and not a daughter.” So Meiri asks: if this is a divine decree, and there is such a reason, then why do the Sages treat it as a divine decree? So he says: that doesn’t mean anything, divine decrees also have reasons—and not only do they have reasons, we can sometimes even understand them. Because if there were a reason but we couldn’t understand it, then obviously we need the verse; we need the verse to tell me the reason. But Meiri says: here we can even state it ourselves—look, I just told you the reason—and still the verse was needed. Why was the verse needed? Well, you could imagine the following logic: I could equally have said that if there is some child with a wonderful personality and everything is fine, but he stole a certain amount of meat and drank a log of wine, then I would not apply to him the law of the stubborn and rebellious son, because he will not go on to rob people later in life. That is a reasonable consideration. Someone might have said that. Maybe yes, maybe no. If there is a group of children with some characteristic such that the assessment is that they will not end up becoming highway robbers later in life, then maybe we shouldn’t apply to them the law of the stubborn and rebellious son. Maybe yes, maybe no. And the same thing with girls as a group. True, girls in general may be less likely to rob people later on, but it is not obvious that because of that I would conclude that the law of the stubborn and rebellious son does not apply to a daughter, because overall the Torah works by rules, and when there are exceptions, there are exceptions. So therefore, even though I understand the reason, I still need a verse. The verse tells me that the reason is significant enough that I can rely on it and act accordingly. Another explanation for why a verse is needed even though I understand the reason is this: sometimes the reason conflicts with other halakhic principles. The reason is completely strong and clear, and I would follow it, but in terms of other halakhic principles I should not have followed it. For example—I don’t know—a person’s own admission. A litigant’s admission—logic says we should believe him; a person does not incriminate himself for no reason, okay? So “a litigant’s admission is like one hundred witnesses”—that is very logical. So why do we need that formulation? Why do we need the verse? Because the rule in the Talmud is that a person is disqualified from testimony. A person is related to himself; he is an interested party. So once there is a halakhic rule saying that you cannot accept testimony from an interested party, then it does not matter that reason says his admission is very trustworthy. Relatives are also very trustworthy, and yet the Torah forbids accepting their testimony, and that is called a divine decree for that reason. Meaning, even though they are trustworthy and there is no concern that they are lying—“a person does not sin when there is no benefit for him”—still we do not accept their testimony. So what does that mean? That even in the case of a litigant’s admission, although I completely understand the reasoning and I think it is strong enough that I would have acted on it, nevertheless the Torah saw fit to write it because it conflicts with another halakhic rule: that an interested party is disqualified from testimony. So that means that behind the verses there are reasons. But Maimonides is not talking about that. Because with reasons that are not written in the Torah, but rather are things we derive, there is no point in saying that we do not count those in the tally of the commandments. Because Maimonides’ position—and I already spoke about this in the past—is that in the tally of the commandments you count only things that appear in the Torah. Not even something derived through exposition, certainly not something that is not written in the Torah at all. Therefore, if the reason is not written in the Torah, then obviously it never even occurs to us to count the reason as a commandment. Maimonides is talking about situations where the Torah itself writes the reason. When the Torah itself writes the reason, then the reason appears in the Torah. And then, says Maimonides, one might have said that we should count the reason among the commandments, and in this root he says no—we do not count the reason among the commandments. That is what he says: reasons will appear among the reasons for commandments in a form resembling prohibitions, and one may think that they are among those things that should be counted separately. Meaning, sometimes reasons for commandments appear in the Torah, and the wording looks very much like a prohibition, as in “He shall not multiply wives for himself, lest his heart turn away.” I might have thought this is a prohibition against the turning away of the heart. So that is “the appearance of prohibitions.” And one may think that they are among those things that should be counted separately—what does “separately” mean? It means on their own. In other words: “He shall not multiply wives for himself,” and “lest his heart turn away”—two prohibitions. Okay? That’s what “separately” means. Because if I count only the reason and not the commandment itself, that has no meaning. Why is it meaningless? Because it’s the same thing. Think, for example, if I were to say: “He shall not multiply wives for himself,” and I would think that the reason is so that his heart should not turn away, but it’s not written in the Torah. Then people tell me: maybe I would count the turning away of the heart and not the multiplying of wives as the prohibition. But either way, what difference does it make? After all, that really is the prohibition—the prohibition is on the turning away of the heart; how does one get to that? By multiplying wives. So therefore, in a context where the reason is not written in the Torah, there is no initial thought to count the reason in the tally of the commandments. But even if there were, it would not really matter, because counting the reason and counting the commandment is the same thing. Meaning, the reason just tells me what, in the end, I am not supposed to arrive at.
[Speaker B] But it could be that an iPhone also makes your heart turn away. Right? An iPhone can also make your heart turn away, and you’d want to say it’s a Torah-level prohibition.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Either way—so what? Who says it isn’t?
[Speaker B] And if it had said “your heart shall not turn away,” then, you know, things like that, all those things.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but even if I count “he shall not multiply wives for himself,” I would still prohibit an iPhone. What’s the difference? After all, “he shall not multiply wives for himself” is ultimately—it’s
[Speaker B] a means,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly, it’s a means so as not to arrive at the turning away of the heart. So now I understand that an iPhone is also forbidden. For example, it says: “If one man’s ox gores another man’s ox,” and therefore he has to pay. What about a dog? If my dog bit someone else, I also have to pay. Why? It says “ox.” Because it’s obvious. Because behind the matter there really stands a person’s responsibility for his damaging property. So what difference does it make whether I count the obligation to pay when my ox caused damage, or I count the obligation to pay when my property caused damage—my responsibility for my property? It’s basically the same thing. So therefore, yes.
[Speaker B] Is that “you shall not stray”? What?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And what about “you shall not stray after your hearts and after your eyes”? What about that?
[Speaker B] It resembles “lest his heart turn away” in a context of reason.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “You shall not stray” is a verse written explicitly; there it is obvious—everyone who counts the commandments counts it.
[Speaker B] But that’s an independent commandment?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course, yes.
[Speaker C] The discussion in Maimonides’ root is a methodological discussion—what gets counted and what doesn’t get counted. It’s not a matter of halakhic ruling. Right. But it’s not that there is no discussion here.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I already spoke about this: that Maimonides’ roots often don’t really have a direct halakhic implication, at least not directly. In the course of the discussion, sometimes an implication emerges.
[Speaker C] Regarding whether there is a reason or there isn’t a reason, or whether that reason matters here or not, whether it’s here…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll get to that in a moment.
[Speaker B] And it at least has the implication that if something is counted as a prohibition, then one is punished for it, and what… for example lashes—where there is no prohibition, there are no lashes either.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but there is a prohibition. If I count the prohibition or count the reason, in any case
[Speaker B] there is
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] a prohibition on everything, including the iPhone.
[Speaker B] Because the iPhone falls under the prohibition of “he shall not multiply wives for himself” and “lest his heart turn away.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And do I count “his heart turning away” as an additional prohibition? No, no—as an additional prohibition I haven’t gotten there yet, wait, we’ll get to that in a moment. Right now I’m talking about when the reason is not written. When the reason is not written, and we merely infer what the reason is, then there is no point in writing that one should not count the reason. First, because there is no initial assumption to do so—it’s not written in the Torah. And second, because it doesn’t matter; even if I did count the reason, counting the reason and counting the prohibition is the same thing. What Maimonides is talking about…
[Speaker B] No, I mean there’s a halakhic implication.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, so wait, now I’m explaining. When Maimonides speaks about situations where the reason is written in the Torah: “He shall not multiply wives for himself, lest his heart turn away.” Now here he says that the initial thought against which he is arguing is to count both things as two prohibitions: “he shall not multiply wives for himself,” and also “lest his heart turn away.” And then there is also a halakhic implication—whether one gets lashes, and all sorts of things like that. We’ll see that in a moment.
[Speaker B] Maimonides’ roots here are exactly the move against Shimon. Right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m just getting there, just getting there.
[Speaker B] So Maimonides’ goal is to define how he counts the commandments against others who count the commandments? Yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so Maimonides says that if the reason is written explicitly, we do not count both things. We do not count it separately. What does that mean? You can count it by itself if you want. Because counting it by itself really makes no difference, whether you count the prohibition or the reason. But not separately—that is, not to see here two prohibitions. And he brings examples. This is like the verse: “Her former husband who sent her away may not take her again… and you shall not bring sin upon the land.” Again, a prohibition and a reason. He says: “and you shall not bring sin upon the land” is the reason for the prohibition stated earlier, before it. As though it says: if you do this, you will increase corruption in the land. And similarly: “Do not profane your daughter by making her a prostitute, and the land shall not become promiscuous,” where “and the land shall not become promiscuous” is the reason. As though it says that the reason for this prohibition is so that the land not become promiscuous. And similarly: “You shall not take ransom for the life of a murderer… and you shall not pollute the land,” and other things of this kind. So the principle Maimonides establishes here is that the reason, when it appears in the Torah, we do not count it as—we do not count it as a commandment. Now, the question that arises here is that there is a dispute, a dispute among the Tannaim, between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, on the question whether or not we derive “the reason of the verse.” Right, this is well known. Rabbi Shimon derives “the reason of the verse,” and Rabbi Yehuda does not derive “the reason of the verse.” Now, just to be clear, neither of them—so it seems to me—is trying to claim that there is no reason for the verse. But the question is whether to use purposive interpretation, so to speak—that is, through the reason—in order to draw halakhic conclusions. Rabbi Shimon says yes, Rabbi Yehuda says no. For example, it says: “You shall not take a widow’s garment as collateral.” Rabbi Shimon says: in the case of a wealthy widow, it is permitted. Because with a wealthy widow there isn’t the problem of—“you shall not take a widow’s garment as collateral” means taking security for a loan. I lent money and I want to take collateral. So with a wealthy widow there isn’t the problem, and therefore you can take collateral; with a poor widow it is forbidden. And Rabbi Yehuda says: we do not derive “the reason of the verse.” Meaning, we do not ask why it is forbidden to take collateral—whether because she is miserable, or various things like that, we’ll see in a minute that that’s not exactly the issue—but if it says “you shall not take a widow’s garment as collateral,” then you do not take a widow’s garment as collateral. Period. We do not derive “the reason of the verse.” Now, why really should we not derive “the reason of the verse”? One possibility says that if you do derive “the reason of the verse”—the Talmud itself later there brings… it seems to me it says here…
[Speaker D] “I will multiply and I will not turn aside, I will multiply and I will not turn aside…”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That seems to be about Solomon. And that’s in the rabbinic discussion, but there is the case of King Solomon, which I think is here: “He shall not multiply wives for himself.” “Two verses had their reasons revealed, and the greatest man in the world stumbled because of them.” Rabbi Yitzhak said: Why were the reasons of the Torah not revealed? Because two verses had their reasons revealed, and the greatest man in the world stumbled because of them. It is written: “He shall not multiply wives for himself,” and Solomon said: I will multiply and I will not turn away. And it is written: “And when Solomon was old, his wives turned away his heart.” And it is written: “He shall not multiply horses for himself,” and Solomon said: I will multiply and I will not send them back. And it is written: “And a chariot went up and went out of Egypt for six hundred…” meaning, he went back to Egypt. So usually—even though this is actually a page after the discussion of “the reason of the verse”—already among the medieval authorities (Rishonim), and even more among the later authorities (Acharonim), people connect these things and say that the reason we do not derive “the reason of the verse” is the concern that people will stumble. Why? Because if—sorry, yes—meaning, there the Talmud explains why the reason is not written; it does not explain why we do not derive it. Why is the reason not written? It is not written so that we should not get confused. Okay, but as a result I say that if that is so, then obviously it would also not be correct to derive “the reason of the verse.” Now it is not written—so should I write it myself? If I write it myself, what have I gained? I will arrive at the same confusions they were worried about. And that is indeed the common explanation for why we do not derive “the reason of the verse.”
[Speaker B] There, are we deriving it when it is not written in the Torah?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes—that we can make a mistake. Since we can make a mistake, we’ll get into problematic things. The problem with this explanation, as I see it, is two main problems. One problem is that if we do not derive “the reason of the verse,” then the chance that we will make a mistake is greater. Because say: “You shall not take a widow’s garment as collateral,” okay? Now I say this is because she is miserable. Then someone else tells me: who knows? Maybe that’s not the reason; maybe it’s some other reason. So now I have two possibilities: either it’s because she is miserable, or it isn’t—there is some other reason that I don’t know, nobody knows, but maybe something else. Now, if I’m right that the reason is because she is miserable, then with a wealthy widow you may take collateral. If I’m not right, then it is forbidden. So people tell me: don’t derive “the reason of the verse.” But “don’t derive the reason of the verse” means behave in the less logical way when you have the option of interpreting it in the more logical way. Why would you do such a thing? There is no fear of error here. Because if I interpret it in the less logical way, then the chance that I’m wrong is even greater. After all, the first way is the logical one. “Logical” means it is likely that this is in fact the reason the prohibition was said. You tell me: right, that’s plausible, but it isn’t certain. What do you mean? It’s only seventy percent, not one hundred. Okay—and the option you are offering is thirty percent. Is that better? That won’t lead to error?
[Speaker B] No, it’s better because I’m refraining—it’s like taking a risk.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, refraining is also a decision. Refraining is also a decision.
[Speaker B] You won’t violate a prohibition.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not? Of course I’ll violate a prohibition.
[Speaker B] Which one? What do you mean? Suppose the reason really is such that with the wealthy widow you may take collateral, and you don’t take collateral.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean you don’t take collateral?
[Speaker B] You don’t take collateral—did you violate a prohibition?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, of course—you harmed my rights. I want my loan back. By the way, it’s not only here; there are places where this could be an actual prohibition. But I’m saying: I want what is mine. I lent this widow money; I want the money. Why am I taking collateral? Not just to be cruel. I’m taking collateral because I want my money. Now that is my right; it is my money. If you don’t allow me, you are harming my rights, and a prohibition can involve harming rights. There is a price to everything. Every halakhic decision has costs. And therefore, by the way, sometimes it is literally a prohibition. I don’t think this asymmetry is correct.
[Speaker B] Maybe because of this people also won’t lend.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe because of this people also won’t lend—so certainly there would be a prohibition, right. That is why they instituted the prozbul, so that people would continue to lend. So this feeling that “you might make a mistake”—you can make a mistake in every direction. Meaning, every decision is a decision that does one thing and does not do something else, and it may have costs here. Like the famous story about Rabbi Chaim: a woman came to him whose son had been taken into the army—the cantonist decree, yes—they took her son into the army, and she asked him whether she could travel to Saint Petersburg on the Sabbath in order to try to get him released. So he said: certainly, certainly, it’s a great commandment, travel on the Sabbath. They said to him: how can you be so lenient in the laws of the Sabbath? He told them: no, I’m stringent in the laws of saving life. Meaning, this is not a joke, by the way—it is completely true. When you think about it, it is completely true. Meaning that in dilemmas of this kind there are two sides. Very often we tend to see only one side. But there are two sides, and every decision we make has a price. Meaning, every decision is lenient on one side and stringent on the other. So that’s one problem on the level of reasoning. But the more difficult problem is what Maimonides writes here. Because according to that… if we really see the reason written in the Torah, then yes, we do derive “the reason of the verse,” right? Then we won’t get confused, right? That’s obvious, because the Torah itself said it. Meaning, if we are guessing, inferring what the reason is, then you can tell me maybe you’re confused. Who says you are right? But if the reason is written explicitly in the Torah, then the Torah has said what the reason is, so there is no concern that I’ll get confused. So there certainly I should derive “the reason of the verse.” Fine, I’m not talking now about Maimonides’ question whether to count it as a commandment in its own right or not, but certainly there I should derive “the reason of the verse.”
[Speaker B] For example, that’s what he himself brings—that there are two claims here. Why? It looks as if we don’t derive it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, but then he says there is something else going on here, not that we are mistaken in interpretation. No, the concern is that you’ll slide from it. No, it’s not that we don’t derive it. He explains why the Torah did not write the reason, not why we do not derive it. That is a big difference. The Torah did not write the reason because even if the reason were correct, what Solomon did was not because he misunderstood the interpretation; he had an evil inclination. But when people apply this to deriving “the reason of the verse,” they are talking about a mistake in interpretation. Meaning, maybe you’ll be mistaken. If the Torah wrote it, then this is not interpretation—the Torah itself wrote it. So for example—one second—if it says: “He shall not multiply wives for himself, lest his heart turn away,” then here we should derive “the reason of the verse.” The Torah itself wrote the reason. I’m not deriving “the reason of the verse”; I’m simply reading the reason of the verse. And what should I conclude? That if, for example, there are righteous women who will not turn my heart—the king’s heart—away, then he may multiply wives for himself. Right? Because they are righteous. What’s the problem? The whole issue is only women who turn his heart away. And here the reason is also written explicitly, unlike “you shall not take a widow’s garment as collateral.” So if that is so, then here certainly one should derive “the reason of the verse.” Now Maimonides rules in the Mishneh Torah that even righteous women it is forbidden to multiply. And the source of this is a passage in tractate… did you want to comment?
[Speaker C] Is it not connected to whether this is Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda as a doubt in interpreting the reason, or whether even when it’s certain, do I take it into account or not?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s exactly what I’m talking about now. Usually the explanations are that the problem is the doubt—that maybe you will make a mistake in interpretation. And I’m now claiming that this doesn’t seem plausible to me. First, because you’ll make more mistakes in interpretation if you don’t follow the reason. And second, because of what I’m saying now: that even when the reason is written explicitly in the Torah, even then we do not derive “the reason of the verse.” And there there is no concern that you will make a mistake or that there is doubt in interpretation. The Talmud in Sanhedrin 21a, on the page before what I quoted earlier, says this. The Mishnah says: “He shall not multiply wives for himself”—only eighteen. Poor fellow, he can’t have more than eighteen, nothing to do, divine decree. Rabbi Yehuda says: he may multiply them, provided they do not turn his heart away. Rabbi Yehuda says he can take even more than eighteen as long as they do not turn his heart away—righteous women.
[Speaker F] Doesn’t this Rabbi Yehuda derive “the reason of the verse”? In a moment, yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbi Shimon says: even one who turns his heart away—he may not marry her. Meaning, above it said: Rabbi Yehuda says he may multiply them provided they do not turn his heart away. Rabbi Shimon says no, what are you talking about? You do not multiply them even if they are righteous. And if they are wicked, then even one is forbidden. Okay? Why then does Scripture say “he shall not multiply wives for himself”? To teach that even like Abigail. Meaning, even righteous women he may not multiply for himself. On this the Talmud asks exactly your question. The Talmud says: does this mean that Rabbi Yehuda derives “the reason of the verse,” and Rabbi Shimon does not derive “the reason of the verse”? Behold, we see from here that Rabbi Yehuda derives “the reason of the verse,” and Rabbi Shimon does not. But haven’t we heard the opposite? For it was taught: whether a widow is poor or wealthy, one may not take collateral from her, as it says “You shall not take a widow’s garment as collateral”—these are the words of Rabbi Yehuda. Whether poor or wealthy—Rabbi Yehuda does not derive “the reason of the verse.” Rabbi Shimon says: from a wealthy widow one may take collateral; from a poor widow one may not take collateral, because you are obligated to return it to her, and thereby you give her a bad name among her neighbors. What does that mean? What I said earlier—that it is not because they are miserable or not miserable, but the problem is that if she is a poor widow you must return it to her, because she has no other garment. For example, night clothing. So you come to her at night and return her blankets and pillows, and people around will start whispering: what is this man doing with the widow at night with blankets and pillows? Right? So because of that they tell him no, you do not take collateral from her, because you’ll have to return it to her at night and the whole business won’t work… So actually the reason is a technical one, not whether she is pitiable or not. Meaning, the difference between poor and rich is not that one is pitiable and the other is not, but simply that a practical problem comes up here. Of course, in the background that concern is still there, because there was another option: take the collateral and don’t return it. Why not take collateral as with
[Speaker F] the poor person?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. So clearly there is concern here for someone who is vulnerable. It’s not that it isn’t present in the background. But still, that distinction. So this shows that Rabbi Yehuda does not derive “the reason of the verse,” and Rabbi Shimon does derive “the reason of the verse”? Here we indeed see that the situation is the reverse: Rabbi Shimon derives “the reason of the verse,” and Rabbi Yehuda does not. So why in our Mishnah, regarding the king, is Rabbi Yehuda the one who does derive it and Rabbi Shimon does not? The Talmud answers: generally Rabbi Yehuda does not derive “the reason of the verse,” but here it is different, because the reason of the verse is stated explicitly. What is the reason for “he shall not multiply wives for himself”? Because “his heart should not turn away.” Exactly what we said earlier. Meaning, Rabbi Yehuda does not derive “the reason of the verse” when the reason is not written. But here it is written: “He shall not multiply wives for himself, lest his heart turn away.” In a place where the reason is written, this is not deriving “the reason of the verse”; it is simply reading the verse. So that Rabbi Yehuda does do. On the other side—yes, sorry—that is Rabbi Yehuda. And Rabbi Shimon? He would say to you: since generally we do derive “the reason of the verse,” if so, let the verse write only “He shall not multiply wives for himself” and be silent, and I would say on my own: what is the reason he should not multiply wives? Because his heart might turn away. So why do I need “lest his heart turn away”? Even one woman who turns his heart away—he may not marry her. Meaning, Rabbi Shimon, precisely because he derives “the reason of the verse,” asks himself: so why does the verse bother writing “lest his heart turn away,” “He shall not multiply wives for himself, lest his heart turn away”? It’s unnecessary, because I would know that on my own—I derive “the reason of the verse.” If the verse wrote it, that means the verse is coming to tell me not a reason but a prohibition, because the reason I already know myself. So that means “lest his heart turn away” is an independent prohibition. About what? That he may not marry women who turn the heart away, even just one. Not about multiplying wives.
[Speaker B] Why is he forbidden to multiply them?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean? You see? Check them out. Investigate them, ask about the family.
[Speaker B] Yes. So that means that according to Rabbi Shimon, he is forbidden to
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] take a hundred righteous women.
[Speaker B] Wait,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, now moving on: rather, how do I understand “he shall not multiply [wives]”? Even like Abigail. Why? Because the verse says two things. It says, “He shall not multiply wives for himself,” and it says, “lest his heart turn away.” Now, if it had written only “he shall not multiply wives for himself,” I would also have known that the problem is the turning away of the heart. So why did it write “lest his heart turn away”? In order to add another prohibition. So now there are two prohibitions: there is the prohibition of “he shall not multiply wives for himself,” and there is the prohibition of “lest his heart turn away.” “Lest his heart turn away” means only wicked women, and it has nothing to do with multiplying wives; it applies to anything. And “he shall not multiply wives for himself” is a prohibition on the multiplication itself, even if they do not turn his heart away, because otherwise it would be redundant.
[Speaker B] So he’s basically saying this isn’t a reason at all?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, he’s simply saying it’s a prohibition and not a reason. Why? He says there’s a substantive statement here: any verse that brings a reason is not a reason according to Rabbi Shimon, because you don’t need verses to give reasons; I know that on my own. So this really is a principled statement, not just a local argument. Okay, so now Maimonides, in his Commentary on the Mishnah—I didn’t bring the Mishneh Torah here; there it says the same thing—but in the Commentary on the Mishnah he says something short and surprising. Yes, and the Jewish law does not follow Rabbi Yehuda and not Rabbi Shimon. The Jewish law follows me, in short. The Jewish law is not like Rabbi Yehuda and not like Rabbi Shimon; I do what I want. That’s what Maimonides says. And when you look in Sefer HaMitzvot, you really do see that Maimonides rules unlike either of them. In the Mishneh Torah—sorry—Maimonides writes in the Mishneh Torah that it is forbidden to multiply wives beyond eighteen, no matter who they are, wicked or not wicked. Meaning, not like either one—not like Rabbi Yehuda and not like Rabbi Shimon. So how can that be? He even lays his cards on the table; he says there is no Jewish law like either of them. Do it quietly—it’s awkward. So it’s pretty clear that when Maimonides… yes, Nachmanides comments on this against him in that fifth root. Because Nachmanides disagrees with Maimonides and argues that every verse in the Torah that writes a reason really comes to introduce a prohibition, and therefore Maimonides’ principle is not correct. Not correct, and also redundant, because otherwise this verse would be redundant. The Torah does not come only to teach me ideas—which is a very interesting assumption, especially coming from Nachmanides as a commentator on the Bible. But he says it can’t be; these verses are all commanding verses. And the example he brings, one of the examples he brings… so he says like this: “And I say that in this the main point is what the sages say. At first glance it seems to support him, but when you examine it properly, it is not so. For we have not seen our rabbis in the Talmud treat the Torah’s prohibitions as redundant, merely because they are a reason for the prohibition that preceded them.” We have not heard in the words of the sages that they read these verses as redundant verses, that are only a reason for the prohibition before them, unless they come to add or subtract—meaning that we learn some new law from that reason. What does that mean? Nachmanides is not denying that the verse of the reason really comes to give a reason, but he says that the Torah writes the reason so that you will expound the reason of the verse. That’s why it writes the reason. Meaning, when you interpret “he shall not multiply wives for himself,” use the reason “lest his heart turn away,” because here you are meant to expound the reason of the verse. Since ordinarily we do not expound the reason of the verse—as a matter of Jewish law we rule like Rabbi Yehuda, that we do not expound the reason of the verse—the Torah sometimes writes the reason in order to tell me: here, yes, do expound it.
[Speaker B] And Nachmanides doesn’t mean like Rabbi Shimon in both directions?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Like Rabbi Shimon. Like Rabbi Shimon in both directions? No, no, you do like Rabbi Yehuda. Like Rabbi Shimon ordinarily, but here do it also according to Rabbi Yehuda.
[Speaker B] And in both directions he can take a hundred righteous women and not one wicked one?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, not simply. On the plain meaning, it means he is forbidden to take—to multiply wives for himself—only if they turn his heart away.
[Speaker B] And one wicked woman he’s allowed to take?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One wicked woman, maybe yes,
[Speaker B] I don’t know, but that’s “his heart will turn away.” What?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s according to Rabbi Yehuda, where that’s the reason, not a prohibition. That’s why I’m saying Nachmanides does not accept that “lest his heart turn away” is a prohibition. Maimonides claims—and Nachmanides also agrees—that it’s a reason, only he says the reason comes to explain to you how to read the prohibition. Now, in the prohibition it says “he shall not multiply wives for himself”; the reason is “lest his heart turn away.” So I say multiplying wives who are righteous women is no problem; only multiplying wicked wives is forbidden. One wife who is wicked—that is already expounding the reason of the verse, and we do not do that. So that’s… yes.
[Speaker C] Just a question—I think Maimonides in the root doesn’t bring the example of the king. No, he brings all kinds of examples like “lest the land vomit,” “lest the land become immoral,” and so on. So first, he apparently excludes this example…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not necessarily, there are many other examples too; he brought a few.
[Speaker C] Nachmanides wasn’t precise from what he brought from “lest the land vomit.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You could argue that, I don’t know, we’d have to think about it, but this is what he determines here. That in essence such a thing is said only so that… only so that you derive some halakhic conclusion from it. I don’t know; we’d have to think what that thing teaches us in halakhic terms. In any case, this is what Nachmanides says: that here, the second prohibition is certainly a reason for the earlier restriction against multiplying wives. Okay? “And nevertheless the sages of Israel disagreed about it, for Rabbi Yehuda expounds: what is the reason for ‘he shall not multiply’? Because of ‘lest his heart turn away,’ and this teaches that he may multiply wives, provided they do not turn his heart away”—meaning that they should be established as righteous. And one wicked woman is permitted according to Rabbi Yehuda? And that is the Jewish law, because the Jewish law follows Rabbi Yehuda. But Rabbi Shimon interprets it as a prohibition in its own right”—“the Jewish law” meaning in the general dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda, not specifically here; here we’ll soon see. “And Rabbi Shimon interprets it as a prohibition in its own right, saying: even one woman who turns his heart away, he may not marry her.” That’s Rabbi Shimon. But Rabbi Yehuda, who expounds the reason of the verse, says no. Rabbi Shimon, who ordinarily expounds the reason of the verse, here does not expound the reason of the verse. So he says “lest his heart turn away” is a separate prohibition. And that is a prohibition even on one. One who turns his heart away. And “lest his heart turn away” is… and “he shall not multiply wives for himself” means don’t take more than eighteen, and of course righteous women you can take, because he expounds the reason of the verse. Meaning, you can take righteous women. So Nachmanides says: if so, Maimonides doesn’t really fit either Rabbi Yehuda or Rabbi Shimon, because according to both of them it comes out that the verse giving the reason does have some halakhic significance—either it modifies the prohibition or it adds another prohibition. So decide: do you want Rabbi Shimon, do you want Rabbi Yehuda? Fine, but pick one of them. What you’re saying fits neither of them. Okay? It seems to me that what Maimonides means to say here is this. Let’s read the Mishnah again. “He shall not multiply wives for himself—only eighteen. Rabbi Yehuda says: he may multiply them, provided they do not turn his heart away. Rabbi Shimon says: even one who turns his heart away, he may not marry her. If so, why is it said ‘he shall not multiply wives for himself’? Even like Abigail.” I just read it with a different intonation. Notice how I read it. What does “he shall not multiply wives for himself—only eighteen” mean? Maimonides reads that as a heading: “He shall not multiply wives for himself—only eighteen.” And now Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree on how to set that up—righteous women, wicked women, all those things, right? Maimonides does not read it that way. That is the opinion of the anonymous first tanna; it is not a heading. There are three tannaim in the Mishnah. “He shall not multiply wives for himself—only eighteen.” That is the first opinion, the anonymous first tanna. A plain anonymous Mishnah. Okay? Meaning righteous women. Righteous women, wicked women, it doesn’t matter. Eighteen is the line. One wicked woman—is he allowed to take her? Twenty righteous women—he is forbidden to take them. Eighteen.
[Speaker B] Where does he get the eighteen from?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s not important; I’m not getting into that right now. It’s funny, this idea of limiting the king. So the anonymous first tanna says: eighteen, period. It doesn’t matter whether they’re righteous or wicked. Now Rabbi Yehuda comes and says, “He may multiply them, provided they do not turn his heart away.” And if they are righteous, then let him take even thirty—no problem. He disagrees with the anonymous first tanna. And Rabbi Shimon also disagrees with the anonymous first tanna; he says, “Even one who turns his heart away is forbidden. And eighteen? Right, from eighteen and up it’s forbidden in any case. But one who turns his heart away is forbidden.” So if that’s the case, there are three opinions in the Mishnah. And Maimonides rules like the anonymous first tanna. When he says, “The Jewish law is not like Rabbi Yehuda and not like Rabbi Shimon,” he means the Jewish law follows the anonymous first tanna. And that is indeed what is written in the Mishneh Torah. What is written there is that it is forbidden to multiply wives beyond eighteen, regardless of whether they are righteous or wicked. Now the interesting question is—and here I return to the point I started from—why really? After all, if the reason is written in the Torah, and Maimonides agrees that this is the reason, right? He only says, “We do not count it in the enumeration of the commandments,” but why not expound the reason of the verse? Why not count it as a separate commandment? That I understand from what is written here: not to count it as a separate commandment, because it is the same commandment. It is forbidden to multiply more than eighteen wives. The reason plus the prohibition together are the Jewish law; they are the commandment under discussion. So of course you do not need to count two commandments here, yes, that’s clear. But the question is: why not expound the reason of the verse in a case where the reason is written? That’s not clear. After all, if what is written is what the concern is, will you get confused? You won’t get confused; it’s written there.
[Speaker B] But exactly the opposite—the Talmud itself points out that Solomon did get confused.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying, he didn’t get confused; his impulse carried him away. The Talmud explains why the Torah did not write the reason of the verse, not why I should not expound the reason of the verse.
[Speaker B] What does it mean to expound the reason of the verse? To expound the reason of the verse means to issue a different halakhic ruling in a case where I bring the reason in. No, what are you talking about?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On the contrary. If the sages were to say—if the sages were to say, sitting in the Sanhedrin, not kings and not anything else and not personally involved, they are the council of Torah sages, they’re not in the Knesset, they’re making clean decisions, okay? So they sit in judgment and say: we expound the reason of the verse. Eighteen is permitted if they are righteous; more than that too, and if not then even one is not permitted. Okay? What is the concern—that they’ll get confused? There’s no concern at all. Here, now they’ve determined it, and now King Solomon knows exactly. On the contrary: precisely because they did not expound the reason of the verse, Solomon says: fine, then I’ll get confused. The opposite—do it on your own responsibility. The point the Talmud explains on page 2b is not why we do not expound the reason of the verse; that is the expansion of the medieval authorities (Rishonim). The Talmud explains why the Torah did not write the reason. That is something else. But when the sages establish the reason and establish the boundary, on the contrary, that can prevent Solomon’s mistake. Therefore, when the medieval authorities apply what is written on page 2b also to explain why we do not expound the reason of the verse, in my view that is problematic. Both because you can make a mistake even if you do not expound the reason of the verse, and because in a case where the reason is explicitly written there is no reason you should make a mistake. Make a mistake in interpretation? Everyone has impulses. But there is no reason to make a mistake in interpretation. On the contrary, it is more likely that you won’t make a mistake in interpretation if you take the reason into account than if you don’t take the reason into account. So why not expound the reason of the verse? And if the reason is written explicitly in the verse, then obviously you won’t make a mistake. So now you certainly should expound the reason of the verse. So why not? According to Maimonides—understand—according to Maimonides, the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon is whether one expounds or does not expound the reason of the verse. What does the anonymous first tanna hold in that dispute? Because according to Maimonides there are three opinions here, not two. So one says we expound the reason of the verse, and one says we do not expound the reason of the verse. What does the anonymous first tanna hold? How does he differ from Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon at the principled level, not in the argument about the king? He claims that we do not expound the reason of the verse even when it is written. That is his position. Meaning, Rabbi Yehuda does expound the reason of the verse when it is written, right? We saw that. Rabbi Yehuda, who ordinarily does not expound the reason of the verse—if it is written, then he does expound it. Because with Rabbi Yehuda it could indeed be that the reason we do not expound the reason of the verse is because of the concern that maybe you’ll make a mistake. So if it is written, you won’t make a mistake, so why not expound it? But the anonymous first tanna does not expound it even when it is written. And Maimonides rules like the anonymous first tanna, not like Rabbi Yehuda. People think Maimonides rules like Rabbi Yehuda because he rules that we do not expound the reason of the verse. Not true. Maimonides rules like the anonymous first tanna, not like Rabbi Yehuda. The anonymous first tanna also says that we do not expound the reason of the verse, and his reason is different. Not Rabbi Yehuda’s reason—that because of the concern you may err or get confused—but because one does not expound the reason of the verse even when it is written, even when you won’t get confused. Why really not? It seems to me that what is written in Maimonides is that we do not expound the reason of the verse because there is no need. Because either way: if the interpretation of the reason—if the purposive interpretation, going by the reason, is placed against the literal interpretation, yes, in lawyers’ language. So there is a literal interpretation and a purposive interpretation. Now what they are basically telling us is that we do not do purposive interpretation, only literal interpretation. So Maimonides tells us this: if the purposive interpretation leads you to… a different conclusion from the literal interpretation, then you simply made a mistake. Because how can it be that the reason leads you somewhere different from the prohibition? What, the Torah does not formulate itself precisely? The Holy One, blessed be He, is presumed to know how to formulate things precisely. So if the verse leads you to one conclusion and the reason leads you to another conclusion, that means you simply erred in the reason. And if the reason does not lead you to another conclusion, then go ahead, expound the reason of the verse—then there is no issue—follow the reason, no problem, it’s the same thing. That is called not expounding the reason of the verse. And that is what Maimonides says: even in a place where the Torah writes the reason, there is no point in expounding the reason of the verse. Why? Because if it turns out that when the Torah writes the reason you get a different conclusion from what is written in the verse, then unlike what Nachmanides says—who goes with Rabbi Yehuda—yes, that it is basically coming to tell you to read the verse differently, Maimonides says no: it comes to give a reason. And what does it mean to give a reason? It means there cannot be a difference between them; otherwise it isn’t that reason. So what happened? Presumably you erred in interpreting the verse of the reason, not the verse of the commandment. Let’s look at the example here with the king.
[Speaker B] So just a second,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I just want to illustrate. Let’s look at the king example. With the king it says, “He shall not multiply wives for himself,” and “lest his heart turn away.” So what are you suggesting—that I expound the reason of the verse? Because it’s written here; here I won’t make a mistake, right? It says “he shall not multiply,” so what, I’ll take thirty righteous women—that’s permitted for me. Right? Because I expound the reason of the verse. Maimonides says—or the anonymous first tanna says, and Maimonides rules like him—that thirty righteous women will also turn your heart away. You’ll spend all your time with your wives instead of with the important things. So people think that if the reason is written, then there is no danger that we’ll make a mistake. There is a danger that we will make a mistake in interpreting the reason, not in interpreting the verse. Meaning, the reason is “lest his heart turn away,” that is true. But what does that mean in practice? Does it mean that one may take thirty righteous women or not? So we would think yes, one may take thirty righteous women because they will not turn my heart away. Not true. Even thirty righteous women will turn your heart away. And therefore it is forbidden to take any woman, righteous or wicked, beyond eighteen.
[Speaker G] And maybe that was Solomon’s mistake.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And maybe that was Solomon’s mistake—if it was an interpretive mistake and not a mistake of impulse.
[Speaker G] According to Maimonides, why is the reason written in all those places? Again—why is the reason written?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Only in order to explain it to you.
[Speaker G] But I can already know the reason.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, we do not expound the reason of the verse. According to Maimonides… we do not expound the reason of the verse. Maimonides rules like Rabbi Yehuda—not like Rabbi Yehuda, but like the opinion that we do not expound the reason of the verse. So why is the reason written? The reason is written to reveal the reason to you—for what purpose? Not in order to introduce a halakhic ruling for you. That is exactly what the anonymous first tanna says. The reason comes to teach you what stands behind the prohibition. Does it have halakhic conclusions? Yes, but in terms of halakhic conclusions there is nothing to derive, because the reason does not come to tell you halakhic conclusions. On the contrary, the assumption is that the Torah’s formulation is precise. So if a conclusion comes out of the reason that does not come out of the formulation of the prohibition, that means you probably did not understand the reason.
[Speaker G] No, but if I… if I… where the reason isn’t written, and I understand the reason for the prohibition… we don’t expound it. And it comes out like what is written. No problem, then go with… so I can understand, okay, now in a case like this it doesn’t apply.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, then that has more force than the verse, because otherwise from the verse itself you could already have said that in that case it doesn’t apply. If that comes out only from the reason and not from the verse, that means the reason does not coincide with the verse. So why the reason? To teach you.
[Speaker G] Where the reason isn’t written… where the reason isn’t written, yes. If I say okay, in a case like this, I go with…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What would you say without the purposive interpretation? From the literal interpretation, what would you say—that it applies to that case or does not apply to that case? If you would say that it does apply to that case, and now when you do purposive interpretation it comes out that it does not, then that means your reason does not fit the verse, because the verse is formulated precisely. If it also came out of the literal formulation, no problem—expound the reason of the verse. That is not called expounding the reason of the verse; it is simply taking the literal interpretation, because it is the same thing. Therefore, either way, Maimonides says that we do not expound the reason of the verse because there is no need, not because one might err, but because there is no reason to. The reason is supposed to coincide with the prohibition. Okay, and therefore we do not expound the reason of the verse. Now it is also clear why we do not count the verse and the reason as two commandments separately, as two distinct commandments, because it really is the same thing. One tells you the prohibition and the other only explains the prohibition. So it’s not only that the second is not a prohibition and therefore there is nothing to count; it is simply duplicative. Even if you counted it, it would be exactly the same thing as the first one. There is no reason to count it, even if it were understood as a prohibition. Just a second, one more sentence. What would have been the initial thought to count the reason? Because really, if I understand like Maimonides that the second verse does not come to add a halakhic detail, but rather to reveal to me what the reason for the prohibition against multiplying wives really is—namely, that his heart not turn away—then logic would have said to write not a prohibition against multiplying wives, but a prohibition against turning the heart away, even though the verse is the verse of the reason. Because the verse of the reason basically tells you what the Torah really wants to prohibit to you. So true, the verse comes only to give a reason, but at the conceptual level, what you should count—if you count one verse at all—I would count only the verse of the reason, not only the verse of the prohibition. Okay, so there is logic to counting the reason. But Maimonides says… Maimonides says that where the reason is written together with the verse, then in any case it coincides. Count the reason, count the prohibition—just don’t count them separately. That’s what he says. Don’t count them separately. Count one of them; it makes no difference at all which one you count, because it is the same thing.
[Speaker B] What? No. No. No.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is exactly what I’m saying. No. Because the claim is that if the iPhone does not come out of the meaning of the verse but does come out of the reason, then that means you erred in the reason. There is no iPhone prohibition. That is exactly the point. Only the turning away of the heart because of women is forbidden.
[Speaker D] Are there two commandments here? The…?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, because even someone who does not rule like Maimonides and thinks there are only two tannaim rules like Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Yehuda also does not count this as two commandments. And the Jewish law in the dispute over whether we expound the reason of the verse or do not expound the reason of the verse follows Rabbi Yehuda. People—in most cases, I’ve hardly seen anyone notice this—that actually…