Yoma, Chapter 8, Lesson 3

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not to the positive commandment or the prohibition of the Sabbath. Rather, if it were a positive commandment, then it would not be overridden by another positive commandment. If it’s a prohibition, then it is overridden by another positive commandment. Now when there is both a prohibition and a positive commandment, then it is not overridden, because a positive commandment does not override a prohibition together with a positive commandment. Now this example of “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood” is an example of a prohibition that in fact imposes on me a duty to act, right? The opposite of resting on the Sabbath. Resting on the Sabbath is a positive commandment that imposes on me a duty not to act, to refrain, not to do something. Okay? Meaning, in short, we find examples in Jewish law from every direction. There are positive commandments that impose action on me, there are positive commandments that impose on me a duty to refrain from action, what legal language calls an omission. There are prohibitions that forbid me from acting, and there are prohibitions that forbid omission, meaning they obligate me to act. Okay? And of course that strengthens the question all the more: so what on earth is the difference between a prohibition and a positive commandment? Because if I had asked in the simple way, if I had asked you at the beginning of the class, what’s the difference between a prohibition and a positive commandment? The simple conception would be: a positive commandment tells me, get up and do something; you violate it passively, and you fulfill it by positive action, right? That’s a positive commandment. A prohibition imposes on me a duty to refrain, meaning you violate it by positive action, and you fulfill it—or avoid violating it—by passive non-action. But now we’re discovering that this isn’t true. Here: “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood” is a prohibition. How do you fulfill it? By positive action, if you perform an act of rescue. How do you violate it? By passive non-action. So really this is an example of a positive commandment, not a prohibition. So in what sense is it a prohibition? Why is it defined as a prohibition? And conversely, resting on the Sabbath—resting on the Sabbath is a positive commandment. You violate it by positive action, you violate it by positive action; you don’t fulfill it by positive action. You fulfill it passively, by non-action. So in what sense is it a positive commandment? Okay? The same thing with a guardrail: “you shall make a guardrail for your roof, and you shall not place blood in your house.” There too there’s duplication. “You shall not place blood in your house”—how do you fulfill that? By building a guardrail, even though it’s a prohibition. A prohibition was supposed to mean refraining from action, not doing something, right? Same thing—there are many examples of this. Circumcision too. What? What’s there in circumcision? The commandment of circumcision. The commandment of circumcision is a commandment of action—why?

[Speaker C] And if he doesn’t do it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Unless there’s a commandment to be circumcised—that may be a dispute between the Tur and Maimonides. Yes, what?

[Speaker C] And maybe it’s also a prohibition linked to a positive commandment? No, no, no, that’s not a prohibition linked to a positive commandment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You don’t do that—it’s a positive commandment.

[Speaker C] He violates here—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He nullifies a positive commandment; he does not violate a prohibition. When one doesn’t perform a positive commandment, then there is the transgression of nullifying a positive commandment, but it’s not a prohibition. There is no prohibition regarding circumcision.

[Speaker E] Maybe that’s the difference at the level of consciousness.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In what Adir suggested earlier, right? What Adir suggested before. In a moment we’ll get to that. Great minds think alike. In any case, I’ll sharpen this difficulty even more. There is an article by Aharon Shemesh, of blessed memory—he died relatively young here from the Department of Talmud—who once wrote an article in Tarbiz, not in Shema’tin, about the difference between a prohibition and a positive commandment. And he argues that in the earlier layers of the Talmud, in the literature of the Sages, the difference between a prohibition and a positive commandment was a practical one. How so? Something that imposes on me a duty to act is a positive commandment; something that imposes on me to refrain is a prohibition. In later periods, later generations still within the Talmudic period, it became more abstract and was defined linguistically. Meaning, if the Torah is phrased in a form of doing, then it’s a positive commandment, regardless of what it practically imposes on me—to act or to refrain. And conversely, if the Torah is phrased in passive language, then it’s a prohibition, or not to do something, then it’s a prohibition. It doesn’t matter for the moment whether the passive formulation actually imposes on me a duty to act, like “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood.” But even if I accept that analysis—and by the way, it’s true of many analyses in Talmudic scholarship—there is still a question that remains open, and you can’t stop at the wording. That’s what I said before: even if I accept the claim that the difference between a positive commandment and a prohibition is a difference rooted in the Torah’s wording and not in the practical aspect, still it can’t stop at the wording. I ask: why did the Torah formulate this one as a positive commandment and that one as a prohibition? What does this formulation express? After all, the wording is supposed to express something. So if the Torah chose to phrase things differently, that means there is a different idea behind it. And now I’m asking: what is that idea? If that idea is not the practical mode of performance—which he rules out there—then what is it? After all, behind the difference in wording there must be some conceptual difference. So what’s the difference? That’s really the question. Ah, now I’ll formulate what you described earlier—the name I again don’t remember. Yonatan Zilber? Is that you? So wait, I need to learn the names. Remind me of your name? Avichai. Avichai Kagan. Okay. What Avichai pointed out earlier, at the logical level, is strange altogether. A double negation brings us back to the same place. If they told me, “I don’t want you to be without tefillin”—if the Torah were to say, “I don’t want you to be without tefillin”—that would be a prohibition. And if it says to me, “Be with tefillin,” that’s a positive commandment, right? Now the content is the same content. No, there is a difference.

[Speaker I] Why? The positive commandment says that you have to do something—to put on tefillin. The prohibition says that there must not be a situation where you’re without tefillin; if someone else put them on you, that’s also fine, the main thing is that you’re wearing tefillin.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, let’s assume for the sake of his discussion that if someone else put them on me, I also fulfilled the commandment. Okay? For the sake of the discussion. No, then there is no difference in content. No, this is about the state. So what? But in practice it’s exactly the same thing. In the end, what is demanded of you is to put on tefillin. So why is this a prohibition and that a positive commandment? What stands behind that?

[Speaker F] But isn’t that not the same question as putting on tefillin? What? “You’re forbidden to be without tefillin” is not the same question as “put on tefillin.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? It’s a double negation. Not a negation—it’s a double negation, it brings me back to the same place.

[Speaker F] And a double negation too, because of what he said. Double negation means: you’re forbidden not to put on tefillin.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re forbidden? Fine, okay. You’re forbidden not to put on tefillin. What’s the problem? If you’re forbidden not to put on tefillin, that’s a prohibition. And the commandment to put on tefillin is a positive commandment. But if it’s a double negation, then a double negation is a logical equivalence. How can there be a prohibition and a positive commandment that are logically equivalent to one another?

[Speaker H] That would require wearing tefillin all the time.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, “all the time” versus “not all the time” is a different question. By the way, that’s not true, not true at all, not necessarily true. There is no commandment to wear them all the time. Not even every day, by the way. The commandment to put them on every day has no source.

[Speaker H] If the commandment were “it’s forbidden to be without tefillin,” then the commandment would have to be wearing tefillin all the time. Is it forbidden to be without tefillin?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why all the time? Why bring “all the time” into this?

[Speaker F] Because if it’s forbidden for you to be without tefillin—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s forbidden for you, say, once a day, to be in a state where an entire day passed without tefillin, or an entire week without tefillin.

[Speaker D] Who says it’s forbidden to be once a day without tefillin?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? Avichai, “it’s forbidden for you to be without tefillin,” and the measure in the Oral Torah or by derivation comes out to be once a day or once a week or once a year—I don’t care. That’s not a problem; many times we formulate details that way. Look, the point is—I want to clarify something—the point is that at first I thought that was what you meant, Avichai. Avichai, right? It isn’t really a double negation. There are two non-commutative operators here. It’s not really a double negation. Once I say to you, “you’re forbidden to put on tefillin,” the double negation of that is not “it’s true that you’re forbidden to put on tefillin.” And then where does that bring me back to?

[Speaker C] It’s not true that it’s forbidden.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is no commandment to put on tefillin, but rather it’s permitted to put them on. “It’s not true that it’s forbidden.” There is no commandment to put on tefillin, right? It’s permitted to put on tefillin. A commandment is something else. Right? A commandment is exactly that—there is obligation, there is prohibition, and there is a neutral state, what is called permission. By the way, also in philosophy—already in Greek philosophy this began—there are two kinds of negation. There is privative negation and contrary negation. For example, the opposite of light and darkness is not the same as the opposite of cold and heat. It’s not the same kind of opposite. The opposite in cold and heat is contrary negation; the opposite in light and darkness is privative negation. Let me prove it to you.

[Speaker C] Why? Darkness also has meaning.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll prove it to you—in a moment, I’ll explain. Look, let’s take an example, a mathematical analogy. Suppose I have the number 1. Okay? Contrary negation brings me to minus 1. Privative negation brings me to zero. To nullify a thing is to turn it into zero. The opposite of a thing is minus 1. How do I distinguish between them? If I take the inverse element in contrary negation and add it to the original element, I get zero. Right? If I take the inverse element in privative negation and add it to the original element, it does nothing—the result remains 1. One plus zero remains 1. Right? Now take cold and add to it something hot and something cold, put them together—what do you get? Lukewarm. So that means the relation between cold and heat is contrary negation. Put light and darkness together—what do you get? Light. Which means that the relation between light and darkness is privative negation, not contrary negation. Right? Now, prohibition, obligation, and the realm of permission have exactly the same relationships as 1, 0, and minus 1. Meaning, if obligation is 1, prohibition is minus 1, and permission is zero. A prohibition tells me: you are at minus 1. The absence of a commandment tells me: you are at zero. The absence of a commandment, by the way, is the same thing as the absence of a prohibition. On the level of—like the absence of a prohibition—it’s simply a matter of permission; no prohibition, no commandment, nothing, yes, nothing at all. It’s not the same thing on the logical level, because the absence of a prohibition can mean either a commandment or permission, and the absence of a commandment can mean either prohibition or permission. But since a prohibition requires a source, once it says absence of a commandment, the result is simply permission. You can’t derive prohibition from that. When it says absence of prohibition, you won’t derive a commandment from it either, because a commandment also requires a source. What remains is only permission. Okay?

[Speaker C] It’s like boundaries of language, boundaries of communication between people. If we had to come and use the word “rest,” you’d need so many prohibitions and so many pictures of what not to do, and then you’d know that you reach some result that the Torah wants—or that we would do. And when it says “do not do any labor,” there are things you’re forbidden to do, namely labor, and other things where you need to rest. What does it mean to rest? To enter a certain atmosphere.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not other things! Not other things. No, this is talking about refraining from those labors themselves, from the thirty-nine primary categories of labor. No, I don’t think that’s the intuition. No, that’s something that was mentioned from—no, that’s not right, that’s what was mentioned earlier from Nachmanides. You’re talking about the rabbinic prohibition of shevut; I’m not talking about that. I’m talking about the positive commandment to rest on the Sabbath. That commandment forbids doing the thirty-nine primary categories of labor and their derivatives, and that’s it. Nachmanides’ shevut is “a solemn rest,” that’s something else. What you pointed out earlier—that’s something else. In “a day of rest,” perhaps, from shevut, that’s something entirely different. There isn’t even stoning for that; it’s something different. In short, what I want to say is that there is an essential difference between a prohibition and a positive commandment, and here I come to the formulations that were suggested here earlier. Positive commandments and prohibitions are defined in opposite ways. I explain this at much greater length in the article I’ll send you; here I’m doing it really in summary. A positive commandment defines a positive state, a desirable state, a spiritually elevated state—whatever you want to call it—in which the Torah wants us to be. A prohibition defines a negative state in which the Torah wants us not to be. Not “doesn’t want us to be,” but wants us not to be. Okay? When I do labor on the Sabbath, I have done something negative. Why? Because it says, “do not do any labor.” If it had only said to rest on the Sabbath, and I were to do labor, then what happens is that I am not in the positive state of resting on the Sabbath. But my current state is not a negative state; it’s the zero state. Now the Torah expects me to be in the positive state, so that’s not good; it’s nullifying a positive commandment. But the Torah does not define that state as a negative state, because if there were only a positive commandment, there would be no prohibition here. When the Torah imposed a prohibition on this, then it said not only that when you do labor you are not in the positive state of resting on the Sabbath, but that you are in a negative state of doing labor on the Sabbath, and that is what it prohibits—not only that you are not in the state it expects you to be in. This is basically a kind of carrot and stick. When the Torah tells you to rest, it gives you a carrot; it tells you, if you rest you’ll be righteous. When it tells you not to do labor, it tells you: if you do labor, you’ll be wicked. Now someone who wants to be neither wicked nor righteous—a positive commandment alone wouldn’t work for him. He just wouldn’t do it; he could do labor, then he wouldn’t be righteous, but that’s all. That’s why you need the prohibition, because the prohibition says: you don’t want to be righteous, fine—but you also don’t want to be wicked. There is a prohibition: if you do labor, you are wicked. And therefore a prohibition is also imposed, and that means something different. Now we can understand all the practical ramifications—the ramification about spending all one’s money, that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition, all the ramifications of the difference between a prohibition and a positive commandment. Human dignity overrides a Torah prohibition—but no, actually only a rabbinic prohibition; but at the Torah level it’s only a positive commandment. There are a number of consequences of the differences between a positive commandment and a prohibition. But these differences are the result of a different idea. The idea in a prohibition and in a positive commandment is a different idea. I’ll give you an example, just an illustrative one. There is an American Jewish philosopher, Robert Nozick, mainly a philosopher of law, though not only that, and he once asked about a common legal conception that says extortion is forbidden. You’re not allowed to extort a person. Not squeezing fruit on the Sabbath—criminals extorting someone. Extortion is forbidden, but enticement is permitted. If I say to a person, if you do such-and-such, I’ll give you a hundred shekels—you can do it and get a hundred shekels; if you don’t do it, you won’t get a hundred shekels. If I say, if you don’t do such-and-such, I’ll take a hundred shekels from you—that’s forbidden, that’s extortion. Meaning, even if he ends up doing it and I don’t take the hundred shekels from him, what’s the problem? What offense did I commit? I didn’t take a hundred shekels from him; I only threatened to take it. I caused him, motivated him to act; he did something and gave in, he did it. So I didn’t take a hundred shekels from him—I’m not a thief. Why was I in the wrong? That’s called an extortionist, not a thief, because I extorted from him an action he didn’t want to do. Okay? In contrast, enticement is permitted, even though there too I got him to do something; I said to him, if you do something you’ll get a hundred shekels. The gap between the two situations, action and inaction, is a hundred shekels in both cases. So why is this forbidden and that permitted? What’s the difference between enticement and extortion?

[Speaker C] Here—

[Speaker D] He isn’t taking out—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, but still, the gap is: I’m offering him a potential difference of a hundred shekels that motivates him to act.

[Speaker C] In every situation he—

[Speaker E] He can’t lose in any situation, whether he does it or not.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what? And here he can’t gain.

[Speaker E] Fear—extortion involves fear.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And if he’s not fearful—he just does it so as not to lose a hundred shekels, he’s not afraid of anything. He isn’t afraid of anything, and still he’s being extorted. He doesn’t want a hundred shekels; he isn’t afraid. He doesn’t want to lose a hundred shekels; he isn’t afraid emotionally. But he doesn’t want to lose, so he makes a rational calculation.

[Speaker E] Enticement causes him to decide; a threat forces him to decide. Why? Because otherwise they’ll take from him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And what if the enticement—a hundred shekels—is something he doesn’t have, he has nothing to eat, and I say to him: you’ll get a hundred shekels from me if you do this. That forces him—otherwise he dies.

[Speaker C] You aligned with his will, you went along with his will, meaning he—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The difference—I’ll be brief—

[Speaker C] Shortened the path.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously, but the question is obvious, and the question is what the difference is.

[Speaker C] Then every job would be extortion.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] True enough, same thing. What? You have a difference of a hundred shekels motivating a person to act—why is it permitted this way and forbidden that way? You’re right, you’re only broadening the question. Every job offer is like that. The point is very simple. When we talk about differences, we usually assume there is no absolute scale—meaning there is no origin point on these axes; everything is relative. This state as opposed to that state is a difference of a hundred shekels. So what difference does it make whether it’s minus one hundred versus zero, or zero versus one hundred? Right? That’s basically the difference between enticement and extortion. But that’s not true; there is an absolute scale. There is an absolute zero. You’re not allowed to go below zero in one of the two options. If you offer two options, one of which is below zero, you’re a criminal. Even though after he does it you won’t take the hundred shekels from him, you haven’t actually stolen anything from him. But when you make such an offer, in which one of the options is the doing of something negative—you are a criminal. If you offer a proposal in which neither of the two alternatives is negative, only one is less positive than the other, that is permitted so long as you haven’t done something negative. And why? The zero state is the set of rights that a person has. A person has a set of rights—his money belongs to him, no one may take it from him, right? Those are my rights. Once you raise the possibility of violating my rights, even if in the end it doesn’t materialize—because if I give in, you won’t take anything from me—but you raise the possibility of violating my rights, you’re wicked. Not merely not righteous. If you don’t give me a hundred shekels when I don’t do the job, you’re not righteous—but you have the right not to be righteous; you don’t want to give me a hundred shekels. But you’re not allowed to be wicked. Do you understand? That’s the difference between a prohibition and a positive commandment. The difference between a prohibition and a positive commandment is a definition of the state as a state: a prohibition tells you the undesirable state is a negative state. From the point of view of the positive commandment, the undesirable state is a neutral state. You’re not righteous, but it’s a neutral state. From the point of view of the commandment, this is basically, as I said earlier, carrot and stick. When you say positive commandments, that’s the carrot. You’re saying: if you go there, you’ll get a carrot. Okay? If not, you won’t get the carrot. Fine, no one has to give you a carrot. But the stick says: if you do this, you’ll get beaten. Okay? In principle you’re not allowed to beat someone—only a legislator or the Holy One, blessed be He, if you commit a transgression, as it were.

[Speaker E] Does a positive commandment have no value unless there is also a prohibition with it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not that it has no value. It has a different value.

[Speaker E] But if he didn’t do it, then he didn’t do it. He’s not wicked.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But there is a demand to be righteous, and you weren’t righteous. So with respect to that demand—no.

[Speaker E] Fine, but I’m not wicked.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s okay; it doesn’t mean it has no significance. It means it has lesser significance, perhaps.

[Speaker E] And it’s not the same level.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But you said it has no significance. Not the same level—I agree, that’s what I’ve been saying all along.

[Speaker E] It’s getting a bit hard to understand.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but if—

[Speaker E] If you say it’s not the same level, I agree. Obviously, obviously, that’s what I said. Does it follow from this that every positive commandment needs a prohibition alongside it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t need one, no! That conclusion is incorrect. Notice—that’s why I—no, it doesn’t need one! There are positive commandments that have no prohibition alongside them. Not putting on tefillin is not a prohibition. There is no prohibition. And if you don’t put on tefillin, you nullify a positive commandment. That’s a transgression, and it’s the nullification of a positive commandment; it’s not a prohibition. For example, you don’t have to spend all your money on tefillin, unlike in the case of other prohibitions. It’s not that every positive commandment needs a prohibition—that’s exactly the point. If it had no significance at all, then you would be right in your first formulation, then there would always need to be a prohibition. What would be the significance of the positive commandment? But no, it does have significance, just less significance in terms of motivating action, I mean. It motivates action less than a prohibition does. As we said, a carrot motivates less than a stick. If they tell you you’ll get beaten if you don’t do this, or they tell you that if you go there you’ll get a carrot, I assume the first way will motivate you better to act. All of us.

[Speaker C] There is also alignment with his desires here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m talking about when you’re not—if you’re aligned with his desires, you don’t need either stick or carrot; he’ll do it anyway. I’m talking about someone I’m trying to motivate to act when it is not his desire. Do I motivate him by means of a carrot or by means of a stick?

[Speaker G] So in civil law you see this difference, say, between a person who does an action and I don’t pay him—I withhold his wages—and a person whom I force to do an action.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] When you don’t pay him, you’ve violated his rights, because once he has done the work for you, the money is owed to him.

[Speaker G] It’s his money—delaying a worker’s wages.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly, and therefore that’s a transgression, and therefore it’s a prohibition. Delaying a worker’s wages is a prohibition.

[Speaker G] Meaning it’s symmetrical.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s symmetrical after you already owe him. Obviously. After he has already done the work. You’re allowed to offer him a job proposal, but after he accepted the proposal, did the work, and you don’t pay him—that’s extortion, that’s a transgression. Because once he did the work, he raised the zero level to there. Now not to give him the money owed to him is to do something negative, to violate his rights. Okay?

[Speaker C] Jacob says to Laban, “Here, you changed my wages ten times.” He didn’t say that he did something to him or cheated him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He only changed his—

[Speaker C] That’s not evil.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can do it with body language—he only murdered him. Fine, he only murdered him, what’s the big deal. You can say murder that way too. If you say it like that, then it comes out that way, but “you changed my wages” means you took my money.

[Speaker H] Just so I understand for a second: when I don’t commit a prohibition, that’s not because it lowers me to the higher level of fulfilling a positive commandment?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re now talking about the other side. Someone who doesn’t fail in a prohibition is not righteous; he’s merely average. That’s the advantage of the positive commandment. The advantage of the positive commandment is that one who—let’s put it this way: Nachmanides asks in the portion of Yitro—the Nachmanides I mentioned earlier—about “remember” and “observe.” He offers one suggestion that “remember” is a positive commandment and “observe” is a prohibition; “beware,” “lest,” and “do not” indicate a prohibition. What is the difference between a positive commandment and a prohibition? So he says: a positive commandment is love, and a prohibition is fear. And there he speaks very briefly. He asks how it can be that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition. Seemingly a positive commandment is more important. But one is punished for a prohibition and not for a positive commandment. For a prohibition, you must spend all your money, and for a positive commandment you don’t have to, only a fifth, up to a fifth. So seemingly a prohibition is more severe. So his answer, as explained by the Sdei Chemed and Meshekh Chokhmah and others, is very simple. On the side of fulfillment—if you fulfill a positive commandment or avoid failing in a prohibition—obviously fulfilling the positive commandment is much more important. Fulfilling the positive commandment is something of value; avoiding a prohibition just means you remained okay, you remained not wicked. Okay. Obviously the fulfillment of the positive commandment is an act far more significant than avoiding a prohibition. That’s on the side of fulfillment. On the side of nullification, violating a prohibition means being wicked; nullifying a positive commandment means not being righteous. On the side of nullification, the prohibition is much more severe. When they ask me what I must spend all my money on—it’s on not being wicked. To be righteous, up to a fifth of my money; you don’t have to be so intensely righteous. But certainly you must not be wicked. But when they ask me from the side of fulfillment what is more significant, from the side of fulfillment, fulfilling the positive commandment is on a higher level than avoiding a prohibition. I become righteous. Okay? So therefore these are two sides of the same coin; it’s not contradictory. These are two sides of the same coin; by definition it’s like that. Okay?

[Speaker H] What he’s asking there—it doesn’t matter, because if you violate a prohibition or do a positive commandment, you stay in the diamond-shaped place of zero; if you don’t violate a prohibition, you still remain at zero.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The question is what is here. Again: the Torah defines states through prohibitions and positive commandments. So if the Torah defines something as a positive commandment, that means that not doing it is a zero state, and doing it is a one state. If the Torah defines something as a prohibition—wait, wait—if the Torah defines it as a prohibition, then it defines the state of doing it as a negative state. That’s an objective definition; the Torah defines it that way. Okay? Now suppose there had been only a positive commandment to rest on the Sabbath and no prohibition. Then if I were to do labor on the Sabbath, I would be a neutral person—not righteous and not wicked. Right? That is what it would be if the Torah had defined only a positive commandment. If I kept the Sabbath, then I would be righteous. If there were only a prohibition, not a positive commandment, only a prohibition, then if I did labor I would be wicked; if I rested, then I would be okay. Right? Now the Torah put here both a prohibition and a positive commandment. They asked, why the duplication? Very simple. Because the Torah wants to say both things, and you can’t say it either with the prohibition alone or with the positive commandment alone. It wants to say that doing labor is a negative state and that resting is a positive state, not that it’s a neutral state. Both sides exist on the Sabbath. This exists only where there is duplication between the positive commandment and the prohibition. In the case of “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood,” for example, where there is no duplication, then indeed not. “Do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood” means that not rescuing is a negative state. Rescuing is not a positive state.

[Speaker H] It doesn’t make me righteous? Absolutely not.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you didn’t rescue him, you’re wicked.

[Speaker H] Yes, and in the end you arrive at a balanced state in any case.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If the mathematics of a positive commandment overriding a prohibition is a very nice puzzle—on Nachmanides I wrote a whole article about it; if you want, I’ll send it to you. You’re right that this explanation in Nachmanides does not explain why a positive commandment overrides a prohibition. Seemingly it doesn’t explain it.

[Speaker F] If I rescued a person, then I basically didn’t do anything considered special or a merit?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe “love your neighbor as yourself,” but no—you know, there are basket-type commandments. But in terms of the prohibition, there is “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood”; this concrete matter is only a prohibition. Maybe returning lost property—there are those who want to say there is in that, yes, returning life. Returning his body; the Talmud talks about that. Yes, okay, but I’m saying on the principal level: if those things weren’t there, only “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood,” then if you rescued him, you’re not righteous. If you don’t rescue him, then you’re wicked.

[Speaker B] So it’s like fulfilling zero and minus one.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? No, okay. By righteous I mean halakhically; leave me alone with aggadic praise.

[Speaker B] And if I didn’t fulfill a positive commandment? I remain at zero, right? If I didn’t fulfill a positive commandment. Are you punished for such a thing?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, nullifying a positive commandment.

[Speaker B] Why are you punished?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because the Torah expects that at this point you be righteous and not merely average.

[Speaker B] And only a positive commandment, only a positive commandment?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, but the Torah expects you not to remain at zero but to be at one. Yes, exactly. That’s the significance of a positive commandment: here the standard rises. Here you’re not expected merely to be in the zero state; here you’re expected to be in the one state. And still, if you’re not there, that doesn’t mean you’re wicked; it means you’re not righteous.

[Speaker B] But what—the Talmud in Menachot 41a—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Regarding the commandment of tzitzit in a time of wrath, right?

[Speaker B] So a time of wrath is something else. Fine, so that’s exactly the question: are you punished for non-fulfillment of a positive commandment? So it’s that kind of question, that obviously you are punished—you don’t reach the state of—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] First of all, it’s not so simple that you’re punished, because there specifically, if I’m not wearing a four-cornered garment, then there is no positive commandment either. So what does it mean to be punished for a positive commandment? You’re not really being punished for a positive commandment. There is no nullification of a positive commandment here either.

[Speaker D] There is no nullification of a positive commandment because—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because I am not obligated in tzitzit. And about that they say that in a time of wrath, they seize you even for a state in which you are not obligated. Okay? By the way, many people err there too. Tosafot writes—I don’t know what “many people err” means; many halakhic decisors write this—but in the straightforward reading it’s not correct. Tosafot writes that this is only where the regular garments are four-cornered, and then if you don’t wear a four-cornered garment, it’s in order to evade the commandment of tzitzit. That is what they punish in a time of wrath. But today we do not ordinarily wear four-cornered garments. So someone who doesn’t wear a four-cornered garment isn’t doing so in order to evade tzitzit, because it’s not his normal garment. In such a case, even in a time of wrath, there is no punishment. By the way, that’s a bit similar to what I said earlier regarding charity: that a poor person who doesn’t give charity is not stingy. Right? He doesn’t give charity because he doesn’t have anything. Okay? Fine. In any case, maybe one final remark in this context.

[Speaker E] He becomes wicked if he doesn’t murder. He becomes wicked if he doesn’t murder. Well, if he doesn’t murder, then you’ve bought him into the commandments.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then you’re a normal person. No, certainly not. You’re a normal person. Exactly—that’s the point. There is no commandment not to murder. There is a prohibition against murder. If you don’t murder, then you’re a normal person. You’re not wicked. That’s all. No one is going to give you the Chief of Staff’s medal for not murdering.

[Speaker E] There should have been a positive commandment not to murder. Yes, but in the 613 commandments there is “do not murder.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, so that’s a prohibition. A negative commandment.

[Speaker E] So murdering is wickedness.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Murdering is a negative state. Okay? That’s the definition of a prohibition and a positive commandment. By the way, as an aside, if you think about it a little, you see that in fact this difference between a prohibition and a positive commandment parallels the simple commonsense distinction: that a positive commandment is fulfilled through action, and a prohibition is fulfilled passively. Why? Because when we’re not talking about physical action, but there is, say, a positive commandment to rest on the Sabbath, and you didn’t rest—why is that only nullifying a positive commandment and not a prohibition? On the essential level? There is only a positive commandment here. But what’s the idea? The idea is that you did not collide head-on with the Torah’s will. Right? You didn’t fulfill it; you didn’t actively commit a transgression, but only passively. Why? You didn’t do what the Torah said you should do. That is more or less called passive non-action. But it’s passive non-action not because you didn’t perform an action—you did perform an action, after all you did labor on the Sabbath. Rather it’s passive non-action because that action is only a physical matter. Why do I care whether it’s an action or not? From the perspective of colliding with the Torah’s will, it’s a passive collision. Because you merely failed to do what the Torah wanted you to do. The fact that you did something the Torah didn’t want you to do—that is an active collision. And therefore, on the conceptual level, a positive commandment is always fulfilled by positive action and nullified by passive non-action. It’s just that this positive action and passive non-action are conceptual, not physical. Sometimes I perform an action, and the performance of that action is a transgression of passive non-action on the conceptual level. Because basically what you’re doing is failing to be in the state the Torah expects you to be in. Do you understand? Therefore I think that this intuitive conception, which distinguishes between positive commandments and prohibitions through the modes of fulfillment and nullification—doing and not doing—contains something true. It’s not a big mistake. Rather, one needs to understand that the doing and not doing here are not necessarily physical doing and not doing, but rather the question of what form the collision with the Torah’s will takes. It’s a passive collision, and then it’s as though passive non-action in that language. Because you merely didn’t do what the Torah wanted you to do. Now sometimes that doing is refraining—it doesn’t matter. You were not in the positive place the Torah wanted you to be. That is called passive non-action on the conceptual level. It doesn’t matter if this non-action is carried out actively, by means of the action of doing labor on the Sabbath.

[Speaker C] And do they think that their role is to elevate a person to action?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, exactly. Exactly. And therefore I think there is a correct insight here when people distinguish between a positive commandment and a prohibition in terms of passive non-action and positive action. It’s not a complete mistake. You just have to know that the positive commandment and prohibition being discussed here are not positive and negative commandments of physical, practical actions. Rather they are conceptual, logical, value-based positive and negative commandments—not physical ones. By the way, the later authorities wrestle with this—and it already begins with the medieval authorities (Rishonim); Rabbi Elchanan talks about it in Kovetz Divrei Sofrim and elsewhere—regarding human dignity. When human dignity overrides a Torah prohibition through passive non-action—it overrides a Torah prohibition only with respect to “you shall not deviate,” really only rabbinic prohibitions. But at the Torah level? The Talmud in Berakhot says that it also overrides nullifying a positive commandment. Then they discuss there: what does that mean, nullifying a positive commandment? Does nullifying a positive commandment mean nullifying a positive commandment in the halakhic definition, or does it mean any transgression by passive non-action? Where would the practical difference be? For example, someone who did not rescue his fellow. Okay? Someone who didn’t rescue his fellow did not nullify a positive commandment; he violated the prohibition of “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood.” But he violated it through passive non-action. Is such a thing overridden by human dignity or not? It’s beneath my dignity to save him. Whether or not that sounds ugly is beside the point. But on the conceptual level, Rabbi Elchanan talks about it, and there may be a dispute here between the Rosh and Maimonides. The question is whether in every place where they distinguish between positive action and passive non-action, in the language I discussed earlier, the question is really whether this is physical positive action and passive non-action, or conceptual, value-based positive action and passive non-action. That’s really the question in this terminology.

[Speaker G] So why is the prohibition of “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood” written in negative form, as a prohibition, when in practice what is meant is “save your brother”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t mean “save your brother.” No. Why not? It means, say, don’t be in a state where you don’t save him. One of the implications is what Doron said earlier. Now I’m coming back to what you said, and now I am willing to accept what you said. Because earlier it was only technical. What happens if a person doesn’t go on patrols day and night near the sea, and he is a certified lifeguard, and he knows that on a certain beach there is no lifeguard and people are swimming there? He could go patrol there in order to be available, if someone drowns, to save him—but he doesn’t do it. If it were a positive commandment, there would be room to say that there is some point in his going there. But if it’s a prohibition, then it is much more reasonable to say: if you’re there and you didn’t save him, you violated the prohibition; but I am not obligated to take initiatives to go there and place myself into that situation. Now that I’ve defined the prohibition and the positive commandment this way, I’m also willing to accept the distinction you made earlier. Understand? That’s one implication, for example, because this is the zero state versus the negative state—that’s exactly the point. If I’m already there and I didn’t save him, I violated the prohibition. But who said I have to put myself into a situation in which I’ll save myself from violating a prohibition? I just won’t be there, and then that prohibition won’t apply to me, and consequently there is no problem of not violating it. Okay? In contrast, with a positive commandment, there is logic in saying: if it is a positive commandment and you know that people there are in danger and you can save them—I don’t know whether it’s an absolute claim, but there is certainly logic in saying that we expect you, at least in a time of wrath, to go there and do something.

[Speaker G] Isn’t it like that in every commandment? That basically a person is obligated to take actions in order always to fulfill it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not in every commandment. Not in every commandment; it depends on each commandment individually, you have to examine it—that’s exactly the point. A positive obligatory commandment, a positive existential commandment—we’ll still talk about that.

[Speaker G] If it is done by others, then he can’t—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly, but that’s already a different discussion. At the moment I’m speaking on the principled level about positive commandment and prohibition. Positive commandment versus prohibition—there is a categorical difference. Within the positive commandments, there is still room for discussion; not for every positive commandment do you automatically need to go and initiate involvement in such commandments. But at least with positive commandments there is logic in asking whether that is so or not. With prohibitions it is not reasonable at all that there should be such a definition. What, to go in there in order not to fail in a prohibition? If I’m not there, then the prohibition doesn’t apply to me, so what’s the problem? If it’s a positive commandment, then at least in a time of wrath one can say: listen, in a time of wrath they’ll hold you accountable even for not proactively traveling to the beach to save people.

[Speaker G] But why in the first place—why do we define it as a prohibition and not say that the Torah really meant for you to save him?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, so that’s an interpretive question. But assuming that, interpretively, we reached the conclusion that this is the definition in the Torah, then that’s what it means. So there is a rationale behind the distinction between a prohibition and a positive commandment. That’s what I want to say. How do we always know interpretively? So the Sages give us—it’s the formulation. The formulation is the interpretation. “Take heed,” “lest,” “do not”—that’s a prohibition. Commands stated in an active way are a positive commandment. So the interpretive indication is easier. It’s a question of wording. The question is what stands behind the wording—that’s what I asked earlier. The wording is different, but if the wording is different it’s supposed to express something else. What is it expressing? Okay? Good. So now we understand the difference between a prohibition and a positive commandment, and now we also understand the significance of the duplication. The significance of the duplication is that when the Torah tells me—and here I’m going back to Yom Kippur—when the Torah tells me to afflict ourselves on Yom Kippur and also gives a prohibition against eating on Yom Kippur, then it is telling me that eating on Yom Kippur is a negative state. Refraining from food and drink on Yom Kippur is a positive state; it’s not just not being in a negative state. Therefore you need both a prohibition and a positive commandment here. That is, at least, Nachmanides’ view, who says that there is both a prohibition and a positive commandment here. And therefore you can’t derive one from the other; you need a source for each one. Right? Because if there is a prohibition, I don’t automatically say, fine, then there’s also a positive commandment. Certainly not. We do not attach to every prohibition a positive commandment that is its inverse. Certainly not. You need a source for each one. Without a source there is no positive commandment and no prohibition. But here apparently there is a source, at least according to Nachmanides. I said this is problematic and we’ll still get to it, but Nachmanides says there is a positive commandment and there is a prohibition here. Nachmanides found a source, both for the positive commandment and for the prohibition. The same thing with the commandment regarding labor. There too, there is an obligation to cease labor on Yom Kippur and there is a prohibition against doing labor on Yom Kippur. Okay? And again, because ceasing labor on Yom Kippur is a positive state, and doing labor on Yom Kippur is a negative state. If there were only one of them—say there were only a positive commandment—then cessation from labor would be a positive state, and doing labor on Yom Kippur would be a neutral state, because there is no prohibition, only a positive commandment. Or if there were only a prohibition, then doing labor would be a negative state and ceasing on Yom Kippur would be a neutral state. Therefore, when they tell me there is both a prohibition and a positive commandment, there is a halakhic novelty here: that cessation is a positive state with respect to labor, the whole cessation from labor and from enjoyments, and the lack of cessation, violating the cessation, is a negative state. Okay? And that is true both for labor and for enjoyments. Now the big question is where—actually two questions. Now I’m getting to the next two questions. One question is, after all, how is the prohibition defined here? Is there really complete overlap here? In a moment I’ll formulate that better. The second question is: where does it come from? I said there is a positive commandment of affliction and a prohibition regarding cessation from labor. Where do the prohibition regarding affliction and the positive commandment regarding cessation from labor on Yom Kippur come from? They are not explicit in the Torah. The question is where they come from. They already discuss this in the commentaries on Maimonides; we’ll get to that. I’ll start first of all with the first topic. How is the positive commandment of affliction defined? Is it only not eating? Or not eating and not drinking, like the prohibition? There are several ways to understand the definition of the positive commandment, and maybe I’ll preface—I’ll preface the possibilities, since there isn’t much time left already. Look, most of the positive commandments we know are obligatory positive commandments. That means a commandment you are obligated to do, and if you don’t do it, then you have the transgression of neglecting a positive commandment. Again, you are in state zero, but you were required to be in state one. So state zero is a certain kind of transgression, but it is the transgression of neglecting a positive commandment. It is not the transgression of a prohibition. Violating a prohibition means being in state minus one. Okay? But there is another type of commandment in the Torah, and that is a non-obligatory positive commandment. What is a non-obligatory positive commandment? Does anyone know? It is a positive commandment such that if you fulfill it, you have performed a positive commandment, and if not, nothing happened. In contrast to an obligatory positive commandment, where if you don’t fulfill it you transgress by neglecting a positive commandment, in a non-obligatory positive commandment, if you fulfill it you have a commandment, and if you don’t fulfill it, then you didn’t fulfill it—nothing happened. For example, we’ll soon see. For example, settling the Land of Israel—this is Rabbi Moshe Feinstein. That is the only example, by the way, in all of Jewish law, I think, of a commandment that is entirely non-obligatory. And Rabbi Moshe Feinstein argues that settling the Land of Israel is a non-obligatory positive commandment. Therefore he stayed outside the Land of Israel, right? That’s the claim. And Rabbi Avraham Shapira came out against this. He argues—not specifically about settling the Land of Israel—he argues that there is no such thing in Jewish law. There is no such thing as a non-obligatory commandment in Jewish law. Every commandment that exists must be done. What does exist? There are commandments that have a minimum threshold. For example, charity: a third of a shekel a year you have to give in any case. Anything beyond that—if you gave it, you have a commandment; if you didn’t give it, nothing happened. That has a non-obligatory aspect, but not that the whole commandment is non-obligatory. There is a certain threshold that you must do in any case. Rabbi Moshe Feinstein’s novelty is that the commandment of settling the Land of Israel is entirely non-obligatory. A commandment that is wholly voluntary. You can do it, or you can choose not to do it. Rabbi Avraham Shapira argues that this does not exist. There is no such thing. All right? But clearly there are commandments that have non-obligatory dimensions, like charity. Torah study. One chapter in the morning and one chapter in the evening, according to Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai, and you have fulfilled your obligation. Anything beyond that is a non-obligatory commandment. Okay? And so on, other things as well. That’s what is called a non-obligatory commandment. What is the difference between it and an obligatory commandment? An obligatory commandment: if you did it, you have a positive commandment; if you did not do it, you neglected a positive commandment. I’m speaking entirely within positive commandments right now, yes? A non-obligatory commandment: if you did it, you have a positive commandment; if you didn’t do it, nothing happened. You can’t neglect a non-obligatory commandment. You can only fulfill it; you can’t neglect it. Someone here mentioned tzitzit. That’s a common mistake. Tzitzit is not a non-obligatory commandment. By the way, that mistake appears even among later authorities (Acharonim). It’s not correct. The commandment of tzitzit is not a non-obligatory commandment. It is a conditional obligatory commandment. What is the difference between an obligatory commandment—after all, if I don’t wear a four-cornered garment, I’m not obligated to put on tzitzit. So why is that not called non-obligatory?

[Speaker D] Because in the definition of the commandment it isn’t like that…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because think about what a non-obligatory commandment is. A non-obligatory commandment is one that cannot be neglected, right? The commandment of tzitzit can be neglected. If you walk around in a four-cornered garment and don’t put on tzitzit, you have neglected a positive commandment. Meaning, for that positive commandment there is a defined state of neglect. A non-obligatory positive commandment is one for which there is no defined state of neglect. So what is more accurate for tzitzit is to define it as a conditional positive commandment. By the way, Grace after Meals is also a conditional positive commandment. No one would dream of saying that it is a non-obligatory commandment. Because if you ate to the point of satiety, you are obligated in Grace after Meals. If you didn’t eat to the point of satiety, then you are not obligated in the commandment. That does not make it non-obligatory. There are conditions for when you become obligated in the commandment. The same is true of tzitzit. There are conditions: a four-cornered garment obligates you in tzitzit. Those are conditions in the definition of the commandment. It is not a non-obligatory commandment. Therefore, set aside these conditional obligatory commandments. They are just a type of obligatory commandment and nothing more than that. What? Grace after Meals on Sabbath too? The same thing. There is only an obligation to eat, so what? But there is no obligation to bless. True, necessarily you’ll bless… no, necessarily you’ll bless, but there is no obligation to bless. It’s not the same thing. Why on Sabbath and also on a weekday? You can’t live without eating. So by definition, in the end you’ll eat, right?

[Speaker D] But there is no obligation to bless.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Fine, I’m only saying at the level—

[Speaker D] That isn’t called an obligation in the commandment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] An obligation in a commandment means a commandment that you are obligated to do. This commandment—you are not obligated to do it.

[Speaker G] You are obligated to eat, not obligated to bless. It’s just that once you ate, there is an obligation to bless, but there is no obligatory commandment to bless on Sabbath. If you don’t eat, you won’t be obligated to bless. That’s exactly the point. It’s just that you are obligated to eat; the commandment on Sabbath is to eat, not to bless. That’s it. Therefore the commandment of blessing is conditional; it is not obligatory. But you’re saying… let’s say they say…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On the first night—

[Speaker G] You have to repeat Ya’aleh VeYavo.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On the first night in the sukkah. Yes. In short, so far we’ve recognized two types of commandments: an obligatory commandment or a conditional obligatory commandment—if you did it, you have reward or you fulfilled a commandment; if you didn’t do it, you neglected a positive commandment. A non-obligatory commandment—if you did it, you have fulfilled a commandment; if you didn’t do it, nothing happened. Good. According to simple combinatorics, I should expect two more types of commandments. A commandment that can be neglected but cannot be fulfilled. Right? An obligatory commandment is one that can be fulfilled and can be neglected. A non-obligatory commandment is one that can be fulfilled and cannot be neglected. What about a commandment that can be neglected but cannot be fulfilled? Is there such a commandment? One that can only be neglected, but cannot be fulfilled? Why? Of course there is. A prohibition inferred from a positive commandment. A prohibition inferred from a positive commandment is, in Jewish law, treated as a positive commandment. For example, “and the produce of the land shall be for you… for eating,” I don’t remember exactly how it’s phrased, “for eating.” The Sages derive: for eating, and not for commerce. According to most opinions, except for Nachmanides—and even in Nachmanides I don’t think they understand him correctly—there is no commandment to eat Sabbatical-year produce. There is a prohibition against using it for purposes other than eating, for commerce, for example. Okay? Or for medicinal paste, not for commerce, and so on. So what does that mean? This is a positive commandment. “And the produce of the land shall be for you for eating.” There is no “take heed,” “lest,” “do not,” or “not” here; it is formulated in positive language. But this commandment—just a second—this commandment cannot be fulfilled. If you eat Sabbatical-year produce, you have not fulfilled a commandment. But if you trade in Sabbatical-year produce, you have neglected a positive commandment. You did not violate a prohibition; you neglected a positive commandment. A prohibition inferred from a positive commandment—and there are many more—is a positive commandment that can be neglected and cannot be fulfilled. It is the opposite of a non-obligatory positive commandment, which can be fulfilled and cannot be neglected. What?

[Speaker D] Yes, of course. A prohibition inferred from a positive commandment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Huh? Sabbatical produce, “for eating.” No, no—“for eating and not for commerce.” “For eating and not for commerce” is another discussion, because there it is learned from an exposition, so the question is whether to include it in the count of the commandments or not—that is a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim). But there are other commandments that are written explicitly. “You may lend on interest to a foreigner.” In the plain sense, were it not for Maimonides, there is no positive commandment to lend on interest to a foreigner. But if you lend on interest to a Jew, you have neglected the positive commandment of “You may lend on interest to a foreigner.” That is only neglect of a positive commandment. There are many more. What?

[Speaker D] “You may lend on interest to a foreigner”—is that an obligation?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I said—that’s exactly why I say it’s a prohibition inferred from a positive commandment. You do not fulfill a commandment by lending on interest to a foreigner. Lend only to a foreigner. A prohibition inferred from a positive commandment always lacks the word “only.” “And the produce of the land shall be for you for eating”—what does that mean? “And the produce of the land shall be for you only for eating,” and not for commerce. Or “only to a foreigner may you lend on interest,” and not to a Jew. And therefore, there is really no issue that you should eat, and no issue that you should lend to a foreigner on interest; they are coming to teach you what not to do. The missing word “only” is the important thing here. Okay? Now the greatest riddle of all: is there a positive commandment that can neither be fulfilled nor neglected? The fourth type.

[Speaker I] Neither fulfilled nor neglected?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes.

[Speaker C] A third… not a commandment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So you’re saying there isn’t. You’re right; I would have said there isn’t either, if not for Maimonides, who says there is.

[Speaker C] Maimonides—neither fulfilled nor neglected? What does that mean? What commandment is that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll explain. Positive commandment 95 in Maimonides is the commandment to adjudicate annulment of vows. A husband with regard to his wife’s vows—the husband, regarding his wife’s vows, on the day he hears them, if they are vows of self-affliction, the husband annuls his wife’s vows on the day he hears. Maimonides says: know that every time you hear from me, every time you see this type of commandment—or something like that, I don’t remember the exact wording—this commandment imposes on you neither an obligation to do something, nor do you fulfill a commandment when you do it, nor do you commit a transgression if you do not do it. Nothing. It defines a procedure. If the husband wants to annul his wife’s vows, then this is what he must do, and if he did it, the vow is annulled. But if he did it, he has no positive commandment, and if he did not do it, he has not neglected a positive commandment. This commandment can neither be fulfilled nor neglected. It is the definition of a procedure. By the way, commandment 96 right after it: adjudicating impurity. Impurity from a corpse, impurity from creeping creatures, all impurities. There too, priests are forbidden to become impure, but that prohibition is counted separately, the prohibition on a priest becoming impure. The definition of corpse impurity is a positive commandment in Maimonides, positive commandment 96. Moving on. One second. And therefore there Maimonides says this commandment comes to define—again, he repeats the same thing in both 95 and 96—he repeats and explains that this is a commandment that is neither fulfilled nor neglected. Commandment 96, Maimonides says: there is no commandment to become impure, there is no prohibition to become impure, there is no commandment not to become impure, and there is no prohibition not to become impure. Nothing. There is a definition. If you touch a corpse, you become impure; if you are under the same covering as the corpse, you become impure; and if not, then not. This has various halakhic implications: you may not touch terumah, you may not enter the Temple—but each of those has its own separate commandment in the count of the commandments. The very definition of when and how you are impure or not, that itself is a positive commandment according to Maimonides. And that is a commandment that can neither be fulfilled nor neglected. What is the idea? A bill of divorce is something else; in my opinion, a bill of divorce really is a commandment. That’s the usual assumption, that a bill of divorce is the same kind of thing, but regarding divorce I have proof that it is not so. A bill of divorce is a positive commandment to fulfill.

[Speaker G] Maimonides brings proof from himself, as if—why are you calling it a bill of divorce for the woman?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. He reads the Torah that way, or through the Sages, it doesn’t matter, but he doesn’t explain there why he understood it that way. When the religious court compels him, the question is whether that is because of the commandment of divorce or because of the commandment to obey the religious court. I’m not sure. But you can look into it. Look in Sefer HaChinukh, since you’re already asking, in this week’s Torah portion. Look in Sefer HaChinukh at the commandment—the important commandment of divorcing one’s wife with a bill of divorce. In this week’s portion, a very important commandment—Ki Tetzei. Shoftim, sorry, next week, yes. In the portion of Ki Tetzei, the commandment to divorce one’s wife with a bill of divorce. Sefer HaChinukh concludes that one who violates this and divorces his wife not according to the rules has neglected this positive commandment, and his punishment is great. How can one neglect the positive commandment of divorce? If you didn’t do the divorce, then she is not divorced. That’s all. Someone who did not annul his wife’s vows—did he neglect the positive commandment? He didn’t neglect anything; the vow is simply not annulled. That’s a procedure. From there you see that Sefer HaChinukh understood the commandment of divorce as a commandment and not a procedure; it does not belong to this category. And on this I have a lengthy discussion; I once wrote an article about it too. I’ll explain it, but we won’t go into it here. And for our purposes, in short, there is another type of commandment—let’s call them definitional commandments or procedural commandments—which are commandments that impose on me neither obligation nor prohibition, and they can neither be neglected nor fulfilled. In short, all four varieties exist among positive commandments. And it is an interesting riddle why among prohibitions you cannot find all these varieties. Among positive commandments you can. There is an obligatory commandment that can be fulfilled and can be neglected; a non-obligatory commandment that can be fulfilled and cannot be neglected; a prohibition inferred from a positive commandment that can be neglected and cannot be fulfilled; and definitional commandments that can neither be fulfilled nor neglected. Four kinds of positive commandments. The third is—

[Speaker C] a novelty of—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maimonides; the fourth is Maimonides’ novelty.

[Speaker C] What is that even—a commandment?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to Maimonides, I suspect that for him the concept of commandment—what is Sefer HaMitzvot? Sefer HaMitzvot is our law book, right? The basic law code. There are more details, but it is the law book. Now in a law book—open a state law book—in a law book there are also definitional clauses. “A minor for this purpose is one who has reached such-and-such an age,” and so on. That imposes on me neither an obligation nor a prohibition; it only defines who is a minor. Now there are other laws in the law book that say what the law is regarding a minor, what is permitted, what is forbidden, and all sorts of things like that. But that clause is itself a clause in the law book. According to Maimonides, apparently, if I understand correctly, the concept of commandment is simply the halakhic concept that replaces the concept of law, and everything that appears in the law book will appear in Sefer HaMitzvot. Therefore there are commandments that are definitional commandments. It is not a commandment in the sense of an instruction; here “commandment” replaces the concept of law. Right. No, it is a positive commandment in Maimonides’ eyes—that is Maimonides’ novelty. He argues that in the law book there are no things that are not commandments. Either positive commandments or prohibitions. If definitions have to be put in there, they will go into the section of positive commandments—that is what Maimonides claims. But I’m saying these are the four types. Now in light of this distinction—and I see I can’t continue now—in light of this distinction we will have to enter into the positive commandment on Yom Kippur and ask what we are dealing with here. Is it a prohibition inferred from a positive commandment? Does someone who afflicts himself on Yom Kippur fulfill a positive commandment? Maybe it’s only that someone who eats has also neglected the positive commandment of affliction, but there is no fulfillment of the commandment of affliction? You understand? Maybe it is a non-obligatory positive commandment, maybe it is a prohibition inferred from a positive commandment—what is it? How are we to understand this thing? So that will already be for next time. Rabbi, does everyone who divorces his wife fulfill a commandment? Certainly. It is an important commandment to divorce one’s wife with a bill of divorce. An obligatory commandment. Hello Rabbi, everyone is waiting to see you divorce your wife with a bill of divorce. An important commandment.

[Speaker E] To divorce his wife?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Certainly, it is a commandment to divorce one’s wife with a bill of divorce.

[Speaker E] “And he shall send her from his house,” so that’s it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, exactly. Yes. The question is how you send her away. An obligatory commandment. An important commandment to divorce one’s wife if—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] she—no, no, only under certain conditions, a conditional obligatory commandment.