The Laws of Melachot – Lesson 9

Table of Contents

• Unintentional action and its connection to purposeful labor
• Opening the discussion of labor not needed for its own sake, and the example from Chagigah 10
• Defining the labor in the case of digging, and Rashi’s comments
• The source of Rabbi Yehuda’s view on labor not needed for its own sake in Tosafot
• The halakhic status: Rabbi Shimon, Rabbi Yehuda, and comparison to unintentional action
• The severity of the prohibition: Shulchan Arukh HaRav and Pnei Yehoshua
• Saving sacred writings from a fire, and the decree lest one extinguish
• Solutions to the difficulty with the decree: a more severe rabbinic prohibition and a Torah prohibition
• The similarity between the disputes of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon: action versus intention
• Halakhic gaps that prevent complete unification of the laws
• Maimonides’ ruling: permission in unintentional action and liability in labor not needed for its own sake
• Two ways to explain a split ruling, and a note on the authority of the Talmud
• The conceptual question: what is the difference between unintentional action and labor not needed for its own sake
• Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides: inevitable result versus labor not needed for its own sake
• Identifying labor not needed for its own sake with an inevitable but undesirable result, and its dependence on the Arukh
• Arukh HaShulchan: definition, dispute among the halakhic decisors, and the Tabernacle
• Arukh HaShulchan: the purpose of the labor, Rashi’s example, and inevitable result
• Labor of removal in Rashi, and the difficulty from one who digs a pit
• Summary of the lecture and opening tractate Berakhot

Summary

General Overview

The text presents the law of unintentional action as a broad law that exists throughout the Torah, and raises the possibility that on the Sabbath it splits into a separate law, as formulated by Rabbi Chaim and as is already apparent among the medieval authorities (Rishonim). It then opens the topic of labor not needed for its own sake as a law belonging only to the laws of the Sabbath, and therefore naturally connected to the possibility of purposeful labor, though it shows that the connection is not simple. Throughout, the central examples from the Talmud are examined, along with the views of Rashi and Tosafot, the question of its relationship to an inevitable result that is desirable, and the status of the prohibition according to Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda and according to different halakhic decisors—up to the difficulty of ruling like Rabbi Shimon in unintentional action and like Rabbi Yehuda in labor not needed for its own sake, as emerges from Maimonides. Finally, the text presents fundamental suggestions for the basis of the two disputes, discusses the conceptual distinction between unintentional action and labor not needed for its own sake, and raises the possible identification of labor not needed for its own sake with an inevitable but undesirable result, concluding with an opening to the study of the Mishnah in Berakhot.

Unintentional Action and Its Connection to Purposeful Labor

The law of unintentional action is presented as a law that exists throughout the Torah, with the possibility that on the Sabbath it has a different character—to the point of being two different laws, as Rabbi Chaim formulated and as already emerges from the medieval authorities (Rishonim). The distinction found among the medieval authorities (Rishonim), according to which for Rabbi Yehuda on the Sabbath unintentional action is only a rabbinic prohibition, indicates that some see the Sabbath case of unintentional action as a separate law. The difficulty of linking unintentional action to purposeful labor is solved only if one accepts that on the Sabbath there is a different law of unintentional action, and then it can be attributed to the laws of purposeful labor.

Opening the Discussion of Labor Not Needed for Its Own Sake, and the Example from Chagigah 10

Labor not needed for its own sake is presented as a law that belongs only to the laws of the Sabbath and not to the rest of the Torah, and from this it is convenient to connect it to purposeful labor, though that is not conclusive. The Talmud in Chagigah 10 brings the law of one who digs a pit on the Sabbath and needs only its dirt; according to Rabbi Shimon, he is exempt because it is labor not needed for its own sake. The Talmud adds that even according to Rabbi Yehuda one may exempt him in this case because it is a destructive act, unlike one who buries a dead person, which is defined as a constructive act.

Defining the Labor in the Case of Digging, and Rashi’s Comments

The text defines that one who digs a pit in a field falls under the category of plowing, and in a house under the category of building; in either case this is a primary category of labor, except that the act is being done for a different purpose. Rashi explains that digging in a house is building, yet even though the building is standing, he is not liable for building when he only needs to take the dirt. Rashi defines labor not needed for its own sake as a situation in which one has no need for this building itself, and gives as an example one who carries out a dead body in a bed in order to bury it on the Sabbath, where the person carries it out in order to remove the body from the house and not so that the act of carrying out should take place for its own sake. Rashi explains Rabbi Shimon’s exemption by saying that in his desire this should not have come upon him and he had no need for it, and he bases Rabbi Yehuda’s exemption in the case of digging a pit on the damage done to the courtyard, as opposed to the benefit to the dead person through burial.

The Source of Rabbi Yehuda’s View on Labor Not Needed for Its Own Sake in Tosafot

The text states that the Talmud assumes the existence of a tanna who disagrees with Rabbi Shimon and obligates in labor not needed for its own sake, and identifies him with Rabbi Yehuda even though there is no explicit source for that. Tosafot on Sabbath 94 comment that from here we know that everywhere Rabbi Yehuda obligates in labor not needed for its own sake, because presumably the first anonymous tanna against Rabbi Shimon is Rabbi Yehuda, and they bring support from parallels where an anonymous first tanna stands against Rabbi Shimon. One of the Tosafists, the Rash, is cited as saying that a source can be brought from Rabbi Yehuda’s statement regarding one who removes accessories of idolatry, which is labor not needed for its own sake, and the text concludes that there is at least an indirect source for this.

The Halakhic Status: Rabbi Shimon, Rabbi Yehuda, and Comparison to Unintentional Action

According to Rabbi Yehuda, absent the law of destructive act, labor not needed for its own sake creates liability when there is no destruction. According to Rabbi Shimon, there is exemption at the Torah level but a rabbinic prohibition—exempt but forbidden—unlike unintentional action, which according to Rabbi Shimon is completely permitted. The text compares the two and shows that according to some of the medieval authorities (Rishonim), for Rabbi Yehuda unintentional action on the Sabbath is a rabbinic prohibition, whereas labor not needed for its own sake is a Torah-level liability. From this comes an indication that these are two different laws and not the same dispute.

The Severity of the Prohibition: Shulchan Arukh HaRav and Pnei Yehoshua

The text notes that later authorities (Acharonim) discussed whether labor not needed for its own sake is a Torah prohibition or a more severe rabbinic prohibition. Shulchan Arukh HaRav writes that labor not needed for its own sake is more severe than other rabbinic restrictions because on some level, through it, one can arrive at a Torah prohibition when it is done for its own sake, even though in his view it itself remains rabbinic. Pnei Yehoshua is cited as wanting to argue that this is in fact a Torah prohibition with exemption only from a sacrifice—that is, there is no stoning or sin-offering, but there is still a Torah prohibition, somewhat like rabbinic restrictions according to Nachmanides.

Saving Sacred Writings from a Fire, and the Decree Lest One Extinguish

The text brings chapter 16 in tractate Sabbath concerning saving sacred writings from a fire, and the limitation that one may save only food, utensils, and clothing needed for the Sabbath, so that one not come to extinguish the fire. Maimonides is cited as ruling that one may not save everything in one courtyard to another courtyard in the same alleyway, even though they made an eruv, because of a decree lest he extinguish, since a person is frantic over his property. He permits only limited food, utensils, and clothing so that the person will give up on the rest and not extinguish. Kovetz Al Yad asks how this can work if we rule like Rabbi Shimon regarding labor not needed for its own sake and the extinguishing in this rescue case is only rabbinic; seemingly this would create a decree upon a decree.

Solutions to the Difficulty with the Decree: A More Severe Rabbinic Prohibition and a Torah Prohibition

The text offers a first answer: extinguishing in the category of labor not needed for its own sake is a more severe rabbinic prohibition, and therefore they did issue a decree even out of concern for it, as brought in the name of the Maggid Mishneh and proven from the Jerusalem Talmud. A second answer ties the matter to Pnei Yehoshua’s innovation, that labor not needed for its own sake is a Torah prohibition according to everyone, only without stoning and a sin-offering; in that case the decree is a decree lest one come to a Torah prohibition, and not a decree upon a decree. In this context, the text raises a practical wonder: would people really be willing to lose all their property in order not to violate a mere rabbinic prohibition? It also discusses the idea of telling others to act, where they are not frantic over his property, and mentions the Mishnah about a minor who comes to extinguish, where his resting obligation is not incumbent upon the adult.

The Similarity Between the Disputes of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon: Action Versus Intention

The text states that it is hard to ignore the similarity between the dispute of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon over unintentional action and their dispute over labor not needed for its own sake. It explains that later authorities (Acharonim) connected both to the question whether we go by the objective act or by subjective intentions. Rabbi Yehuda is presented as one who obligates based on the act that was done, regardless of intention, while Rabbi Shimon is presented as one who gives decisive weight to intention and purpose, and therefore exempts in cases that are not intended or are not for the sake of the body of the labor. The text also connects this to the image of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai as the man of the hidden dimension, in contrast to Rabbi Yehuda as the man of the revealed dimension, and to the aggadic example in Sabbath 33 about the Romans, where Rabbi Yehuda praises the action and Rabbi Shimon examines the intentions. It also links this to the dispute over whether one expounds the reason of the verse.

Halakhic Gaps That Prevent Complete Unification of the Laws

The text emphasizes that the laws are not identical: according to Rabbi Shimon, unintentional action is completely permitted, whereas labor not needed for its own sake is rabbinically forbidden; and according to Rabbi Yehuda, unintentional action on the Sabbath is rabbinic according to some of the medieval authorities (Rishonim), whereas labor not needed for its own sake creates liability. The text notes a dispute among halakhic decisors in which everyone rules like Rabbi Shimon regarding unintentional action, but some rule like Rabbi Yehuda regarding labor not needed for its own sake, and from this it follows that these are not one identical dispute.

Maimonides’ Ruling: Permission in Unintentional Action and Liability in Labor Not Needed for Its Own Sake

Maimonides, in Laws of Sabbath chapter 1, laws 5–7, is cited as ruling that in a permitted act, where the possible labor is not certain and he does not intend the labor, the act is permitted—for example, dragging a bed or chair without intending to dig a furrow, walking on grass without intending to uproot it, and washing with fruit-dirt without intending to remove hair. Maimonides obligates in the case of an inevitable result, such as cutting off a bird’s head for a child to play with, because it cannot fail to die. Maimonides adds that anyone who performs labor on the Sabbath, even if he does not need it for its own sake, is liable, and he illustrates this with extinguishing a lamp for the sake of the oil, wick, or vessel, and with carrying a thorn four cubits or extinguishing a coal so that the public will not be harmed. The text concludes that Maimonides clearly sees two independent disputes, because he rules like Rabbi Shimon in unintentional action and like Rabbi Yehuda in labor not needed for its own sake.

Two Ways to Explain a Split Ruling, and a Note on the Authority of the Talmud

The text proposes one possibility: that a split ruling reflects differences in degree in the disconnect between action and thought, so that unintentional action is a more significant disconnect and is therefore permitted, while labor not needed for its own sake is a smaller disconnect and therefore liable. It proposes another, more principled possibility: even where there is one consistent dispute between tannaim, halakhic decisors may split the ruling between different cases if the authority of the Talmud is understood as obligating the bottom line and not the conceptual infrastructure and reasoning, so that one is not required to adopt one consistent doctrinal system of a single tanna in all laws. The text defines this as a meta-halakhic note about what exactly binds in halakhic ruling—the decision alone, or also the reasoning—and distinguishes this from expounding the reason of the verse, which does not necessarily require a split ruling.

The Conceptual Question: What Is the Difference Between Unintentional Action and Labor Not Needed for Its Own Sake?

The text points to a difficulty in distinguishing them: one who digs a pit for the sake of its dirt seems similar to dragging a bench that creates a furrow, and both cases seem like doing a permitted action that gives rise to a forbidden action that is not the goal. It presents the claim that labor not needed for its own sake is a single act that cannot be distinguished from ordinary labor except that it is done for a different purpose, whereas in dragging a bench the person intends the dragging and not the furrowing. Still, the text itself admits that it is hard to define a sharp technical difference, and that the gap seems to depend on interpretation.

Rabbi Abraham Son of Maimonides: Inevitable Result Versus Labor Not Needed for Its Own Sake

Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides is cited in Kesef Mishneh on Laws of Sabbath chapter 1, law 7, as distinguishing between an inevitable result and labor not needed for its own sake. He states that in an inevitable result one does not intend the labor at all, but it necessarily happens—for example, closing a door when a deer is inside—whereas in labor not needed for its own sake the person intends the body of the labor but does not intend its purpose. The text notes precisely that he is speaking mainly about the difference between an inevitable result and labor not needed for its own sake, because in labor not needed for its own sake the forbidden result is necessary, and therefore there is a difficulty as to why this is not an inevitable result that would obligate even according to Rabbi Shimon.

Identifying Labor Not Needed for Its Own Sake with an Inevitable but Undesirable Result, and Its Dependence on the Arukh

The text suggests a possibility according to which this is not a separate law at all; rather, labor not needed for its own sake is an inevitable but undesirable result. In that way, the difference between an inevitable result that obligates and labor not needed for its own sake, which exempts or is rabbinically forbidden, becomes understandable. It emphasizes that the Talmud in Chagigah itself hints at the assumption of destructiveness, which strengthens the possibility that in the case of the pit the result is undesirable, and it notes that Tosafot in various places actually identify labor not needed for its own sake with an inevitable but undesirable result. It comments that according to this identification, it follows that for Rabbi Yehuda an inevitable but undesirable result would be liable, just as labor not needed for its own sake is liable, even if unintentional action on the Sabbath was defined by some of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) as rabbinic. It adds that according to the Arukh’s own view, this identification is difficult, because the Arukh permits an inevitable but undesirable result entirely, whereas labor not needed for its own sake is exempt but forbidden.

Arukh HaShulchan: Definition, Dispute Among the Halakhic Decisors, and the Tabernacle

Arukh HaShulchan, section 242, is cited as organizing the disputes over an act not intended and over labor not needed for its own sake as the disputes of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon throughout the Talmud, with the assumption that an unintended matter according to Rabbi Yehuda is rabbinic and according to Rabbi Shimon permitted, while labor not needed for its own sake according to Rabbi Yehuda requires a sin-offering, and according to Rabbi Shimon is exempt at the Torah level and forbidden rabbinically. He attributes Rabbi Shimon’s exemption to the fact that this is not purposeful labor, as in the Tabernacle where labor was done for its intended purpose. He suggests that Rabbi Yehuda considers it purposeful labor because in the Tabernacle there may have been extinguishing so that the spices would not burn too strongly, whereas according to Rabbi Shimon extinguishing there was only in order to make charcoal. Arukh HaShulchan brings the halakhic dispute between many medieval authorities (Rishonim), who ruled like Rabbi Shimon, and Maimonides and what he sees as the Rif’s view, which in his opinion appears to be like Rabbi Yehuda, and explains the pull of the general rule that the Jewish law follows Rabbi Yehuda, as against proofs from Rabbah and from an anonymous Mishnah.

Arukh HaShulchan: The Purpose of the Labor, Rashi’s Example, and Inevitable Result

Arukh HaShulchan defines labor not needed for its own sake as doing the forbidden labor without needing its forbidden purpose—for example, digging a hole for the sake of the dirt, extinguishing a lamp in order to spare the oil or wick or vessel, moving a thorn to prevent damage, and trapping a snake so that it will not bite. He interprets Rashi on a dead body in a bed as reflecting a case where there is no need for the purpose of the labor and there was no desire for it in the first place. He brings the rule that Rabbi Shimon agrees in the case of an inevitable result—“and will it not die?”—and asks how Rabbi Shimon can obligate in an inevitable result if there was no intention. He suggests in the name of Tosafot that liability for an inevitable result depends on our being witnesses that the person is pleased with it, whereas where we are witnesses that he is not pleased with it, that is like labor not needed for its own sake. He adds the Arukh’s view that an inevitable but undesirable result is permitted ab initio, and Rashi’s distinction between a case where one simply does not care and a case where one positively wants the labor not to happen.

Labor of Removal in Rashi, and the Difficulty from One Who Digs a Pit

Rashi is cited as defining labor not needed for its own sake in various places through the phrase “in his desire it did not come to him” and through labor of removal, and the text gives examples from Sabbath 107: trapping a snake so it will not bite him, lancing an abscess to remove pus, and trapping for the sake of healing. The text comments that this definition is hard to reconcile with one who digs a pit and needs only its dirt, which does not look like labor of removal. It suggests that this hints at a more complex definition, or another understanding in which labor of removal is only an example of a situation where one does not need the forbidden purpose, in line with Arukh HaShulchan’s interpretation.

Summary of the Lecture and Opening Tractate Berakhot

The text concludes with stopping the learning and announcing a move to the study of the Mishnah in Berakhot. The text quotes the Mishnah in Berakhot: “From when may one recite the Shema in the evening? From the time the priests enter to eat their terumah, until the end of the first watch; these are the words of Rabbi Eliezer. But the Sages say: until midnight. Rabban Gamliel says: until dawn rises. It once happened that his sons came back from a banquet and said to him: We did not recite the Shema. He said to them: If dawn has not yet risen, you are obligated to recite it. And not only this did they say, but wherever the Sages said ‘until midnight,’ the commandment extends until dawn rises. The burning of the fats and limbs extends until dawn rises. And all things eaten for one day—their commandment extends until dawn rises. If so, why did the Sages say ‘until midnight’? In order to distance a person from transgression.”

Okay, so today unfortunately we’re recording audio only, because the internet on my computer got messed up here. So we’ll start; I still have this, but that’s fine. We were talking about the law of unintentional action, and we saw that it exists throughout the Torah. Maybe it’s actually a different law, as Rabbi Chaim said—that is, two different laws. You can already see this in the medieval authorities (Rishonim): those who say that according to Rabbi Yehuda, on the Sabbath, unintentional action is only a rabbinic prohibition—then it’s pretty clear that they really see the unintentional action of the Sabbath as a separate law. Meaning, Rabbi Chaim was the one who formulated it, but really the idea is already found in the medieval authorities (Rishonim). So either these are two different laws, or it’s one law that exists throughout the Torah.

Today I want to begin with a labor not needed for its own purpose. First of all, a labor not needed for its own purpose is a law that exists only in the laws of the Sabbath, not in all the other laws of the Torah. And that in itself already tells us something about the source of the law. We talked about intentional craftsmanship—that things rooted in intentional craftsmanship are supposed to exist only in the laws of the Sabbath. Therefore, with unintentional action it’s hard to see this as a law of intentional craftsmanship, unless we say that on the Sabbath there is an unintentional-action law different from the unintentional-action law of the rest of the Torah, and then the Sabbath law would come from the laws of intentional craftsmanship. And with a labor not needed for its own purpose, this is a law that exists only on the Sabbath, so it’s tempting to connect it to the law of intentional craftsmanship—but as we’ll see, it’s not certain that that’s right, though it’s at least possible to connect it to the law of intentional craftsmanship.

The example of this appears in Tractate Chagigah 10: “Rabbi Abba said: One who digs a pit on the Sabbath and needs only its dirt is exempt for it.” According to whom? According to Rabbi Shimon, who said: For a labor not needed for its own purpose one is exempt for it. “You could even say according to Rabbi Yehuda: there, he is repairing; here, he is damaging.” So we’re talking about someone who digs a pit in the ground. The rule is that if it’s in a field, then the pit is plowing, and if it’s in a house, then the pit is building. Fine. But it doesn’t matter whether we’re talking about a house or a field; in any case, there is here a primary category of labor. So what’s the issue? The issue is that you are doing that primary labor for a different purpose. You need the sand, not the pit. Meaning, you don’t need the building in the house or the plowing in the field—you need the dirt. Right? So what happens in such a case? According to Rabbi Shimon, exempt, and this is called a labor not needed for its own purpose.

Rabbi Yehuda—the Gemara doesn’t bring Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion here, but it refers to it. It says there is some tanna, Rabbi Yehuda, who disagrees with Rabbi Shimon. This opinion of Rabbi Yehuda—that one is liable for a labor not needed for its own purpose—doesn’t appear explicitly anywhere either, but the Gemara in several places assumes that there is such a Rabbi Yehuda, who disagrees with Rabbi Shimon and says one is liable. And then the Gemara says: in the case of someone who digs a pit and needs only its dirt, it could be that even Rabbi Yehuda exempts. Why? Because he is damaging. Meaning, if you don’t need the thing itself—you are doing it for the dirt—but really you don’t need the plowing in the field or the building in the house, then there is damage here, and therefore you will be exempt not because of the law of a labor not needed for its own purpose, but because of the law of damaging.

So Rashi there writes: “One who digs a pit—it is building,” yes, he assumes this is inside a house, “and if he needs it only to take the dirt, even though the building is built, he is not liable because of building”—rather, he is not liable for building. Meaning, he did perform the act of building, but he won’t be liable for building because he doesn’t need the building; he did it in order to take the dirt.

There’s room to hesitate here. I said “he doesn’t need it,” but it’s not clear that he doesn’t need it. He didn’t do it for the building—but what happens if he does need the building? He didn’t do it for the building; he did it because he needed the dirt. But in practice, very good, he’s also happy that there’s now an addition to the building. What about that? It’s a little reminiscent of the discussion of an inevitable result that is favorable to him, right? Does an inevitable result that is favorable to him basically make it as if he intended it from the outset? We’ll get to that later.

Rashi says: “Not needed for its own purpose—such as this, where he does not need this building.” And Rabbi Shimon said this regarding one who carries out a corpse in a bed in order to bury it on the Sabbath. And Rabbi Shimon said he is exempt for this carrying out, “because ideally this would never have come upon him and he would not have needed it.” Yes, someone has a dead body in the house, and basically he wants to remove it from the house, so he takes it outside. The carrying out was not done so that the corpse would be outside, but rather so that the corpse would not be here. Therefore this is a labor not needed for its own purpose. Rashi says why: according to Rabbi Shimon he is exempt for this carrying out “because ideally this would never have come upon him and he would not have needed it.” He would have preferred that this person not die at all and that none of this happen. But the person is dead—what can you do? I have to take him outside. Here there is already a certain assumption about the definition of a labor not needed for its own purpose—that ideally it would never have come to him. We’ll talk about this more later according to Rashi.

“You could even say according to Rabbi Yehuda, who disagrees with him—he agrees here in the case of digging a pit. For there, one who buries the corpse is repairing it; but this one digging a pit is damaging his courtyard.” In burying the corpse, he is fixing the corpse, and therefore there Rabbi Yehuda obligates. But here, with digging a pit, Rabbi Yehuda basically says he is damaging the courtyard, and therefore even if Rabbi Yehuda does not exempt on the basis of a labor not needed for its own purpose, he would exempt him on the basis of damaging.

I mentioned that there is no real source where we actually see Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion, so Tosafot comments on this in Sabbath 94. Tosafot says: “One who carries out the corpse in a bed is liable.” It appears to Ri that from here we know in every place that Rabbi Yehuda holds that for a labor not needed for its own purpose one is liable, for presumably the anonymous first tanna before Rabbi Shimon is Rabbi Yehuda. Like that case above, ‘this one cannot and this one cannot,’ where the anonymous first tanna before Rabbi Shimon is Rabbi Yehuda, as is proven in the Gemara. And the Rash says one can bring proof from what was taught above: ‘Rabbi Yehuda says: even one who carries out the accessories of idolatry’—which is a labor not needed for its own purpose.” In short, there may be some indirect source for this, that Rabbi Yehuda disagrees with Rabbi Shimon. But right now it doesn’t matter what the source is; it’s clear that there is such a Rabbi Yehuda. The Gemara assumes there is a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, like the dispute between them that we know regarding something done unintentionally. A parallel dispute: Rabbi Shimon exempts both here and there; Rabbi Yehuda obligates both here and there.

Now, what is the practical Jewish-law status of a labor not needed for its own purpose? According to Rabbi Yehuda, one is liable for a labor not needed for its own purpose, assuming it is not damaging. According to Rabbi Shimon, there is a rabbinic prohibition here. You can see Rabbi Shimon’s wording: “Rabbi Shimon exempts.” Exempt—but forbidden. There is a rabbinic prohibition. That is unlike unintentional action, where according to Rabbi Shimon it is entirely permitted. And according to Rabbi Yehuda, in unintentional action on the Sabbath, for some of the medieval authorities (Rishonim), it is a rabbinic prohibition. Unintentional action in the rest of the Torah is prohibited by Torah law; unintentional action on the Sabbath is a rabbinic prohibition. But a labor not needed for its own purpose is a Torah-level prohibition. Meaning, all these are indications that the law of a labor not needed for its own purpose and the law of unintentional action are two different laws. It’s not the same dispute. Even according to Rabbi Shimon it’s not the same law, and even according to Rabbi Yehuda it’s not the same law—at least according to some of the medieval authorities (Rishonim).

The truth is that some later authorities (Acharonim) suggested that a labor not needed for its own purpose is either a Torah prohibition or a more severe rabbinic prohibition. Shulchan Arukh HaRav writes that a labor not needed for its own purpose is more severe than other rabbinic Sabbath restrictions. Why? Because there are situations where if you were to do it for its own purpose, you could arrive at a Torah prohibition, and therefore they were more stringent with the rabbinic prohibition of a labor not needed for its own purpose than with other rabbinic restrictions. But he still holds that it is a rabbinic prohibition. However, there is Pnei Yehoshua—I once tracked it down, I don’t remember where exactly; I’ll bring only a source that quotes it—who wants to claim that there is actually a real Torah prohibition in a labor not needed for its own purpose, only exempt from a sacrifice. Meaning, there is no liability for death and no sin-offering, but it is a Torah prohibition—somewhat like the Torah-level “resting” prohibitions according to Nachmanides that we talked about. There are Torah prohibitions that are not labor prohibitions on the Sabbath, and Pnei Yehoshua wants to claim that a labor not needed for its own purpose is not merely more severe, as Shulchan Arukh HaRav says, than other rabbinic Sabbath restrictions, but is actually a Torah prohibition—only there is no death penalty and no sin-offering.

Where can one see a practical consequence of this? There is a chapter in Tractate Sabbath, chapter 16, about all sacred writings. “All sacred writings are rescued from a fire.” When a fire breaks out on the Sabbath, there is a prohibition against extinguishing the fire, and there is a prohibition against rescuing things from the fire. To rescue my property from the fire—I am supposed to let my house burn, with everything in it, all its contents, on the Sabbath. Why? The Gemara says: “a decree lest he extinguish.” Meaning, he may come to extinguish the fire, and therefore they did not permit him to rescue things. And therefore they prohibited rescuing things. This is how Maimonides rules: “If a fire falls out in a courtyard on the Sabbath, one does not rescue everything in the courtyard to another courtyard in the same alleyway, even though they made an eruv, lest he extinguish the fire in order to rescue, because a person is panicked over his money.” You see, if they didn’t make an eruv, then there is already a rabbinic prohibition in the rescue itself, so there’s nothing to discuss. But if they did make an eruv, then there is no rabbinic prohibition in the rescue itself—yet it is still forbidden to rescue because of the concern that he may come to extinguish.

Yes: “Therefore they decreed that he may rescue only food that he needs for that Sabbath, and utensils that he needs to use on the Sabbath, and clothes that he can wear—so that he gives up on everything else and does not come to extinguishing. And if they did not make an eruv, he may not rescue even his food and utensils.”

About this, Kovetz Al Yad asks: “Even though Rava ruled like Rabbi Shimon regarding a labor not needed for its own purpose”—yes, Rava rules like Rabbi Shimon; that’s how we rule, according to most opinions, that for a labor not needed for its own purpose one is exempt; we rule like Rabbi Shimon. If so, then it’s a rabbinic prohibition. Now according to Maimonides this isn’t difficult, as we’ll see in a moment, because Maimonides rules regarding a labor not needed for its own purpose like Rabbi Yehuda, which is a Torah prohibition. But this law appears in the Gemara—it has nothing to do with Maimonides. So what will all the medieval authorities (Rishonim) who rule like Rabbi Shimon do with this? So he says: one can say that they were more stringent with this rabbinic Sabbath restriction, as the Maggid Mishneh wrote in law 26, and so it is proven in the Jerusalem Talmud, etc. Meaning, this is a more severe rabbinic restriction.

What does that mean? What is the problem here? The problem is this: you are not allowed to rescue things lest you come to extinguish. And if you do come to extinguish, what happens? Suppose you extinguish. But extinguishing is only a rabbinic prohibition. Why? Because it is a labor not needed for its own purpose. You extinguish, but you do not… Usually extinguishing is done in order to produce charcoal. That is a labor needed for its own purpose in extinguishing. If you extinguish for another purpose—not in order to produce charcoal—that is a labor not needed for its own purpose. If so, according to the Jewish law that follows Rabbi Shimon—for most of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) who rule like Rabbi Shimon—this is a rabbinic prohibition. If it’s a rabbinic prohibition, then is this not a decree upon a decree? They prohibit me from rescuing things from the house lest I come to extinguish, and even if I come to extinguish it is only a rabbinic prohibition—so this is a decree upon a decree?

So he says: first of all, this is a more severe rabbinic restriction, and therefore they nevertheless decreed. That’s one possibility. “And see what I wrote”—I don’t know what that abbreviation there refers to—“about what Pnei Yehoshua wanted to innovate, that a labor not needed for its own purpose contains a Torah prohibition according to everyone.” Even Rabbi Shimon says it is a Torah prohibition, and he only says that there is no stoning and no sin-offering, but it is still a Torah prohibition. And if it is a Torah prohibition, then one can decree lest one come to a labor not needed for its own purpose, because then it is not a decree upon a decree—it is a decree lest one come to a Torah prohibition.

Just as an aside—you’re asking… I’ll ask myself: suppose your house catches fire, right? My house. And my entire house is about to go up in flames with all my earthly possessions, okay? I’m about to be left with absolutely nothing. What do you say? I won’t violate a rabbinic prohibition—right?—to extinguish it? I’m not even talking about taking out a few meals’ worth of food. To extinguish the fire? That’s what the Mishnah says in the laws of the Sabbath.

There he discusses this story, and he says: an ignoramus says, “Fine, there’s no choice, I have to do something against Jewish law, otherwise I lose everything.” And a Torah scholar places vessels of water around it. Fine, he uses tricks. But I have no tricks, I have no vessels of water, I have nothing. What do I do in such a situation? Tell others? Telling a non-Jew is also a rabbinic restriction, not a lighter one. But with others there’s no concern they’ll extinguish, because they’re not panicked over his money. Ah, you mean that… I understand. Nice trick, but I don’t know anyone who suggested that.

In principle, it seems forbidden. It even says in the Mishnah there in the chapter “All Sacred Writings”: “If a minor comes to extinguish, we do not tell him ‘extinguish’ or ‘do not extinguish,’ because his Sabbath observance is not your responsibility.” Meaning, that discussion is only about a minor; regarding an adult, apparently it’s forbidden in any case. Was there perhaps some concern of danger to life? No, okay, those are tricks. I’m talking now about a real case: there is no possible danger to life. I live there alone, my house is isolated, no one else will be burned, everything is fine. And now I’m asking a real question: there is a rabbinic prohibition that I am supposed to violate, and then I save all my earthly possessions? Meaning, I am going to become a pauper for the rest of my life after this fire because of a rabbinic prohibition? That’s it?

Do it with a modification, in the form of a labor not needed for its own purpose—what, really, nobody would extinguish? That’s what you want to tell me? I’m puzzled by this. What? For a Torah prohibition? For a Torah prohibition—I don’t know, I think yes, there would be people who would not extinguish. But a rabbinic prohibition? In cases of major loss, violating a rabbinic prohibition was permitted in many places. I even once thought more than that. So the rabbis tell me, yes, but here don’t violate it—this itself is the rabbinic prohibition, not the extinguishing prohibition. This rabbinic prohibition says to you: here, here you must not extinguish. And I’m saying: fine, if I extinguish, what do I violate? Not only the extinguishing—which is a labor not needed for its own purpose—but also this very prohibition itself of not extinguishing, right? So I say fine, I’ll violate that rabbinic prohibition too. It’s still a rabbinic prohibition, right?

There is Tosafot in Sabbath 4. The Gemara there talks about someone who stuck bread to the inside of an oven. Yes, someone stuck bread in the oven, and the bread is about to bake. Now if he removes the bread, he is saved from liability to stoning, right? Because the bread won’t bake. If he leaves the bread there, he is liable to stoning. Now removing the bread is an act of skill, not a prohibited labor. Removing bread and blowing the shofar—an act of skill, not a labor. It’s a rabbinic prohibition. So the Gemara discusses there whether I’m allowed to remove the bread in order to save myself from liability to stoning. Tosafot says: no one will listen to us. It cannot be that we would prohibit this for someone. Would someone really listen to us and not remove the bread and then get stoned? Because he—I mean, he put the bread there in the presence of witnesses and after warning, a real stoning-level prohibition, okay? He won’t listen to us, and therefore clearly it is not forbidden. So I’m asking: here yes? I don’t know, it sounds very strange to me.

In any case, for our purposes, what is written here is that according to Pnei Yehoshua, a labor not needed for its own purpose is a Torah prohibition. Therefore it is more understandable why they decreed not to extinguish, because it is not a decree upon a decree, but a decree lest one come to a Torah prohibition. But the common view is that it is a rabbinic prohibition—maybe a more severe rabbinic prohibition, as Shulchan Arukh HaRav or this fellow here says—but still a rabbinic prohibition.

Now I want to look a little at this dispute, even before we really get into the details, to look at it somewhat from above. We saw that there are two disputes between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon. One dispute is about unintentional action, what we discussed in previous classes, and the second dispute is what we encounter here, about a labor not needed for its own purpose. It’s hard to ignore the similarity between the two disputes. I’ll say more than that: the very fact that the Gemara assumes there is a tanna who disagrees with Rabbi Shimon, and that tanna is Rabbi Yehuda, even though there is no explicit source for this—as Tosafot noted earlier—already says that the Gemara probably understood that if there is a tanna who disagrees with Rabbi Shimon about a labor not needed for its own purpose, it is probably the same tanna who disagrees with him about unintentional action: Rabbi Yehuda. Because these are probably closely related disputes—sister disputes, so to speak. And the question is: what is the common foundation of the two disputes?

There are later authorities (Acharonim) who wanted to claim that in both disputes, the discussion is really about the question whether we follow the act or the intentions—intentions, thoughts, subjective considerations, or objective considerations. According to Rabbi Yehuda, if you performed the act, you are liable. I don’t care whether you intended this or that, whether you wanted it for its own purpose or not for its own purpose. You performed the prohibited action, you are liable. Meaning, Rabbi Yehuda goes by what one does. Rabbi Shimon goes by the thoughts and intentions. If you intended this and not that, then even though you did it, you are exempt. In unintentional action, it is permitted. In a labor not needed for its own purpose, if you did it for this purpose and not that purpose, then you are exempt. So the subjective dimension matters, the dimension in the person’s mind, and not only what the person does.

Some even tie this to the fact that Rabbi Shimon is Rashbi—Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai—the man of the hidden. So he deals with hidden things, not only with visible things. The visible thing is the action. I did the act—that’s what is visible, the act was done. So Rabbi Yehuda, who is supposedly the man of the revealed, goes by what you can see. You can see that you did the labor—you are liable. Rabbi Shimon says no, I also look at the hidden thing—what lies in the intention of the person who did this act.

And what about the law of slaughtering a chicken—there it is exempt according to Rabbi Shimon? Yes, obviously. Only because it is an inevitable result. But in unintentional action, exempt. That is the case of unintentional action. And also there, maybe it is favorable to him or not favorable to him—that depends on the Arukh.

They brought proof for this—I don’t even remember who the source is, but it’s a common idea, many quote it—from the Gemara in Sabbath 33: “Why was he called the leading speaker everywhere?” They were sitting—Rabbi Yehuda, Rabbi Yosei, and Rabbi Shimon—and Yehuda ben Gerim was sitting before them. Rabbi Yehuda began and said: “How beautiful are the deeds of this nation! They established marketplaces, they established bridges, they established bathhouses.” The Romans—what beautiful things they do. Rabbi Yosei was silent. Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai answered and said: “Everything they established, they established only for their own needs. They established marketplaces to place prostitutes in them, bathhouses to pamper themselves in them, bridges in order to collect tolls from them.”

Should one go thank the government for having built Highway 6, or is it really only for the fees, so there’s nothing to thank them for? So Yehuda ben Gerim went and told their words; they were heard by the government. They said: Yehuda, who praised, shall be elevated; Yosei, who was silent, shall be exiled to Tzippori; Shimon, who criticized, shall be killed. And then he fled to the cave—the whole cave story.

Here too, what do we see? Rabbi Yehuda says: what the Romans did was a good deed. What do I care why they did it, what their intentions were? This is what they did. Rabbi Shimon judges them by their intentions—what they really wanted to achieve. Exactly as we see here in the laws of the Sabbath with a labor not needed for its own purpose and unintentional action. There is also the same thing in the dispute whether one expounds the reason of the verse. According to Rabbi Yehuda, one does not expound the reason of the verse; according to Rabbi Shimon, one does. What does Rabbi Yehuda say? What is written is what there is; what I see with my eyes is what there is. Rabbi Shimon says no, let’s look at the reason of the text, what it wants to achieve—teleological interpretation. So once again, Rabbi Yehuda goes by what one sees, while Rabbi Shimon goes by the intention of things, what they are aimed at, not only by what is present before my eyes.

And who determines what the reason of the verse is? Logic? Yes, that’s how I think. What, how do I know? Always my own logic. You can ask: how do I know? The point is that with the reason of the verse, you can’t always know. Why not? Why not? What, you don’t use your head when learning Jewish law? How do you know that it’s right? Fine—those are the tools I have. If the Holy One, blessed be He, isn’t pleased with that, let Him give me better tools. These are the tools I have—what can I do?

All right, I’m not getting now into the question of the reason of the verse. That’s also a question that one could discuss at great length. In any case, if these disputes are really connected to each other, and both really rest on the same point—the question whether you go by the act that was done or whether you also take into account the intentions, purposes, and meanings in the person, in the person’s thought—then I would have expected this to be one dispute, and I would have expected the laws to be the same laws. But we saw that the laws are not the same. Right? According to Rabbi Yehuda, a labor not needed for its own purpose is liable, while unintentional action, according to a large part of the medieval authorities (Rishonim), is only a rabbinic prohibition on the Sabbath. And even according to Rabbi Shimon: unintentional action is entirely permitted, while a labor not needed for its own purpose is a rabbinic prohibition—exempt but forbidden. Meaning, it’s not the same thing, a labor not needed for its own purpose and unintentional action.

More than that: there is a dispute among the halakhic authorities—I already mentioned this. Maimonides and the Yere’im and the Rif, according to some of the medieval authorities (Rishonim)—there is a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) how the Rif ruled—but perhaps the Rif also rules like Rabbi Yehuda regarding a labor not needed for its own purpose. In unintentional action, everyone rules like Rabbi Shimon. But in a labor not needed for its own purpose there are authorities who rule like Rabbi Yehuda. Now if this were the same dispute, then how can Maimonides rule like Rabbi Shimon in unintentional action and like Rabbi Yehuda in a labor not needed for its own purpose? It’s the same dispute. Let him decide: do we go by the act or do we go by the person’s intention?

And look at Maimonides—Maimonides in chapter 1 of the Laws of the Sabbath, laws 5–7: “Things that are permitted to do on the Sabbath, and at the time they are done it is possible that labor will be done because of them and possible that labor will not be done”—meaning, it’s not an inevitable result—“if he did not intend that labor, this is permitted. How so? A person may drag a bed or chair or bench and the like on the Sabbath, provided that he does not intend to make a furrow in the ground while dragging them. Therefore, if the ground was furrowed, he need not be concerned, since he did not intend it. Likewise, a person may walk on grass on the Sabbath, provided that he does not intend to uproot it; therefore, if it was uprooted, he need not be concerned. And one may wash his hands with fruit dust and the like, provided that he does not intend to remove hair; therefore, if hair comes off, he need not be concerned.”

“But if the matter is known that it is impossible that that labor not be done—how so? If one needs the head of a bird to play with for a child, and he cut off its head on the Sabbath, even though his ultimate purpose was not to kill the bird, he is liable, because it is known that it is impossible to cut off the head of a living creature and it live; rather death comes because of it. And so too in every similar case.” Unintentional action—if it is an inevitable result, liable; but without an inevitable result, exempt or permitted. He rules like Rabbi Shimon.

In law 7 he says: “Anyone who performs labor on the Sabbath, even though he does not need the body of the labor itself, is liable for it.” Unintentional action is permitted, but a labor not needed for its own purpose is liable. “How so? If one extinguishes a lamp because he needs the oil or the wick so that it not be lost, or so that it not burn away, or so that the clay vessel of the lamp not crack, he is liable, because extinguishing is labor and he intended to extinguish. And even though he does not need the very act of extinguishing and he extinguished only because of the oil or because of the clay vessel or because of the wick, he is liable. Therefore, one who carries a thorn four cubits in the public domain, or extinguishes a coal so that the public should not be harmed by it, is liable, even though he does not need the actual extinguishing or the actual carrying, but only to remove the danger—he is liable. And so too in every similar case.”

So Maimonides rules regarding unintentional action that it is permitted, like Rabbi Shimon, and regarding a labor not needed for its own purpose that one is liable, like Rabbi Yehuda. So that basically means that Maimonides clearly—and I already said that in the opinions of the tannaim themselves one can see this too—but Maimonides clearly sees these as two different, independent disputes. In one of them he rules like Rabbi Shimon, and in the second he rules like Rabbi Yehuda.

Does that mean that everything I said earlier is wrong—that the two disputes of Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda have one common root? Not necessarily. It can be explained in two ways. One possibility: maybe there are differences of degree here. Meaning, there is a significant disconnect between the action and the person’s thought, and that already truly exempts even according to Maimonides—that is unintentional action. A labor not needed for its own purpose is a less significant disconnect, and there he is liable. Then it turns out that the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon really is about two levels of disconnect—but you can draw the line in the middle, even though it is the same dispute. Meaning, in both disputes the question is whether to take the subjective dimension into account. But that doesn’t mean one must rule the same way in both. It may be that when the subjective dimension goes very far, then it is permitted; and if not, then he is liable to a sin-offering—or liable, not just forbidden, liable. That’s one possibility.

A second possibility—and this is a topic I won’t get into here, you can see it on my website, look later in the summary—is that in general we find in several places that even when there is one dispute between two tannaim, and it is clearly one dispute—not like here, where in the Gemara itself it looks like two different disputes—even in a place where it is clearly one dispute, there are halakhic authorities who will rule like tanna A in the first case and like tanna B in the second case. Even though both tannaim—their reasoning is their reasoning, yes—even though both tannaim say that it is the same dispute. That both say that case A and case B are the same, and still we can split the rulings.

And why is that? That’s what we might call a meta-halakhic remark. The question is: to what do we attribute the authority of the Talmud? When there is a halakhic conclusion in the Gemara or a halakhic position in the Gemara, it is binding. What in it is binding? Is what is binding the ruling, or is what is binding also the conceptual infrastructure of the ruling—that is, the reason why I ruled this way? Now if I understand that the reason why I ruled this way is part of the authority that the Gemara has, then you cannot split rulings, because then you are following no one. You are neither like tanna A nor like tanna B, because both agree that the two cases are the same thing. One says liable, the other says permitted. But both agree it is the same thing. And you, when you rule case A one way and case B another, are saying: it is not the same thing. That goes against both tannaim. You can’t go against both tannaim.

But if you understand that the authority lies in the bottom line—the practical rulings, what was ruled as Jewish law in the Gemara is what binds me—I am not committed to the question of why it was ruled that way, and I am not bound by the reasons the tannaim held; I am bound by their rulings. If so, then as long as I have a tannaitic opinion that supports my leniency or my stringency, that’s fine. Then I have not gone against the authority of the Talmud, because in the end there is a tanna who says permitted in case A and a tanna who says forbidden in case B. True, it’s a different tanna—so what? True, the combined position of case A and B doesn’t fit either of the two tannaim. I’m following no one. Fine. I do not need to adopt the consistent doctrine of a tanna. I don’t. I only need that my halakhic ruling not stand directly against a halakhic ruling of the Gemara—and it doesn’t. So what counts as going against the Gemara? What? Right? Yes. At least in terms of authority.

They can all say there that one expounds the reason of the verse—but for example, you can expound the reason of the verse without getting into split rulings. Suppose I ask what the two tannaim disagree about—say in our case, what Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about—and from that I infer all sorts of conclusions, not in these disputes but in other contexts. I can infer conclusions from it. That too is expounding the reason of the verse, and yet I can still rule like one of them all the way through, so it’s not identical.

Okay, so that’s regarding the essence of the dispute. Now I really want to get into the issue of the distinction. Basically, a labor not needed for its own purpose resembles unintentional action. You do one action that in itself is permitted, and together with it a prohibited action is done that you did not intend. One who digs a pit and needs only its dirt—he removes dirt and digs a pit, but he does not intend the digging of the pit, only the removal of the dirt. So why is this a labor not needed for its own purpose? This is exactly unintentional action. How is this different from dragging a bench and making a furrow? What is the difference between them?

In a labor not needed for its own purpose, you do an action that cannot in any way be distinguished from an ordinary labor, from an ordinary labor. And with dragging a bench, no? I mean, there you can see he is doing something else, and this happens incidentally to what he is doing. It isn’t really something he is doing. Why not? I am making a furrow by means of the bench. What do you mean? Yes, but you are dragging a bench. You are not making a furrow. And here I am removing sand—what’s the difference? That’s the point. Removing sand is the labor. Dragging a bench is also the labor. You can plow not with a bench. So what? But here, in this specific case, the bench is not the labor. The bench happens to do something else. No, I am making a furrow with a bench—that’s the labor I’m engaged in. I’m not doing that, I’m dragging a bench. No, I am making a furrow with a bench. No, I don’t see it that way. Ask the person, “What are you doing?” He’ll say, “I’m dragging a bench.” And if you ask him here, “What are you doing?” he’ll say, “I’m removing dirt.” But here, ask him, “Are you digging?” He’ll say, “Yes, I’m digging. Why am I digging? I have other reasons.” It’s strange. Then here too he’ll say, “I’m making a furrow.” Why not? What’s the difference? Because he knows he’s not making a furrow. No, here too, again, there’s a difference between what he needs and what he does. What he needs—obviously in both cases he needs the permitted thing. But when you ask, “Are you making a furrow?” certainly I am making a furrow. What do you mean? I am making a furrow using the bench. Here he does a prohibited action and intends to do that action; he just has different purposes. And with the bench he does not intend the prohibited action at all, it’s just that he has no way to do this without that also happening. But here too I don’t intend to dig at all, I only want the sand. I have no way to remove sand without creating a hole. What can I do? No, that’s just hair-splitting. He wants to dig. No, he doesn’t want to dig, he wants to remove sand. It’s just that the reason he wants to dig is not to make a pit. Fine, we’re repeating ourselves. I don’t see the difference sharply. In a moment we’ll see that this is probably what some of the medieval and later authorities say. But it’s difficult. That’s the technical difference before one starts giving interpretations, supposedly. No, no—I think technically there is no difference here. It’s only interpretation, in my opinion. But in a minute we’ll see.

So basically we need to make a distinction between these two things. Up to now I spoke in broad terms: from the Gemara it seems these are two different disputes. Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion in general—it isn’t even clear where exactly it appears. But two different disputes. Is it possible that there’s a connection between them? That’s what I discussed until now. But when you look at the content of the disputes, it really demands explanation. In what sense are they different? Why is this not the same thing? Why are there even two such concepts—a labor not needed for its own purpose and unintentional action? They seem, on the face of it, to be the same thing.

So Rabbi Avraham son of Maimonides is quoted in the Kesef Mishneh on law 7 there in Maimonides that we read, and he says as follows: “The difference between a labor not needed for its own purpose and an inevitable result and it not die is that with an inevitable result, he is not aiming at the labor at all, only that it is necessarily done—for example, when he closed the door of his house and there was a deer inside; he did not intend to guard the deer, to trap it, but the labor is necessarily done. But a labor not needed for its own purpose means that he intends the very body of the labor, but he does not intend its purpose.” From the teaching of the Rabbi, Rabbi Avraham the Pious.

So here it is very similar to your formulation. He basically says that with unintentional action you are actually doing two different actions. You do one action, and in parallel another action is done. In an inevitable result it is done necessarily; when it is not an inevitable result, not necessarily—but another action is still done. In the case of a labor not needed for its own purpose, you are doing one labor, not two, only the results are different results. And in another formulation I’d say this: it seems to me, at least, that what is written here, and also in the Magen Avraham, is that in unintentional action there are really two labors, each with a result. You are both plowing and dragging a bench. The result of plowing is that there is a furrow in the ground; the result of dragging the bench is that the bench moved location. Okay? Those are two actions, each with a result. I do the permitted action, and together with it the prohibited action is done—whether necessarily or not necessarily, that’s the question of inevitable result.

In a labor not needed for its own purpose, these are not two actions; this is one action that has two results. But I did the prohibited action—only I did it not for the sake of the prohibited result, the “needed for its own purpose” result, yes, the hole in the ground, but for the sake of a permitted result—I needed the sand, the dirt. So the difference is whether it is two actions, each with a result, or one action with two results.

But within his words I want to sharpen a few points. First of all, he is not asking what the difference is between unintentional action and a labor not needed for its own purpose. He asks what the difference is between unintentional action in a case of an inevitable result and a labor not needed for its own purpose. Why? Because unintentional action without an inevitable result—there he already knows the difference between that and a labor not needed for its own purpose. What’s the difference? That it’s not an inevitable result. When you drag a bench, we are talking about a type of ground where it is not certain a furrow will be made, right? Because if it were certain a furrow would be made, that would be an inevitable result and it would be forbidden. The dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda is when you drag a bench on a kind of ground where it is not certain a furrow will be created. It’s not an inevitable result. There the dispute exists: according to Rabbi Yehuda you are liable, according to Rabbi Shimon it is permitted—or forbidden or liable, that’s a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim)—and according to Rabbi Shimon it is permitted.

In the case of one who digs a pit and needs only its dirt, when you remove the dirt a hole is necessarily created. There is no kind of ground where if you remove the dirt a hole won’t be created. No such thing. Removing the dirt necessarily means making a furrow or creating a pit. Okay? What does that mean? First of all, there is a basic difference between unintentional action and a labor not needed for its own purpose: a labor not needed for its own purpose always involves the prohibited result in an inevitable-result way. So from the perspective of unintentional action, this should have been liable—as Rabbi Shimon concedes in inevitable-result cases. Now the question is: fine, so these are still two different concepts—unintentional action in an inevitable-result case and a labor not needed for its own purpose are two different concepts. What is the difference between them? And the proof is that in unintentional action with an inevitable result, according to Rabbi Shimon one is liable, while in a labor not needed for its own purpose, according to Rabbi Shimon it is only a rabbinic prohibition.

He really hints at the reason this is lighter—which seems against logic, why is a labor not needed for its own purpose lighter? He says, roughly, that in the formulation of a labor not needed for its own purpose, there is already damage in the labor itself. Meaning, the person is already doing things that undermine our way of making him liable, so it is something else. Where do you see that? In Rabbi Avraham son of Maimonides? Yes. Where is the damage here? When he says that a labor not needed for its own purpose means he intends the body of the labor but not its purpose—that already kind of undermines the labor there, whereas over there we don’t need to relate to the person at all because he’s not part of that picture; it’s something else. Fine, but the question is still why. I mean, here I have some undermining element, here it’s something that breaks it apart, I… What is “here”? I’m saying: define the case. No, before the explanations, I’m asking what the difference is between the cases. Why are these two different cases? Only afterward will I look for explanations why one is lighter and one is stricter.

So notice, first of all, this is a primary difference: he assumes that unintentional action is not an inevitable result. In a labor not needed for its own purpose it is always an inevitable result. But of course that raises another question: if it is an inevitable result, then why isn’t one liable? Rabbi Shimon concedes in inevitable-result cases. What do you want to say—that a labor not needed for its own purpose is simply unintentional action with an inevitable result? But in unintentional action with an inevitable result Rabbi Shimon says one is liable, whereas a labor not needed for its own purpose is only a rabbinic prohibition. Therefore he asks not what the difference is between unintentional action and a labor not needed for its own purpose, but what the difference is between an inevitable result and a labor not needed for its own purpose. Okay?

Now if that’s so, then another possibility opens up here for explanation, before I get to his explanation. We remember the Arukh and the medieval authorities (Rishonim) who go in his direction, that an inevitable result that is unfavorable to him really is exempt. Right? So perhaps the difference is simply that in a labor not needed for its own purpose, it is unfavorable to him. In inevitable-result cases of unintentional action where you are liable, it’s only when it is favorable to you. Then it comes out like this: basically there is only unintentional action in the Torah. There is no such separate category of a labor not needed for its own purpose. When it’s an inevitable result—if it’s not an inevitable result, there is a dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda. We follow Rabbi Shimon, that it is permitted. But if it is an inevitable result, then it depends: if it is favorable to him, then Rabbi Shimon concedes in inevitable-result cases and says liable; and if it is unfavorable to him, that is what is called a labor not needed for its own purpose. An inevitable result that is unfavorable to him—that is simply what “a labor not needed for its own purpose” means.

Now what does he want with the dirt that came out? It’s not written that he wants the dirt that came out. First of all, according to Rashi we saw a dispute between Rashi and Tosafot regarding “he doesn’t care.” It could be that “he doesn’t care” also counts as “unfavorable to him.” So for now, since I’m just looking for a possibility, not saying that according to everyone this is so—that’s enough for me. But beyond that, you could say that then we would make the case specification that we’re talking about a case where he doesn’t want the pit. But that seems like the main point is missing from the text—as if the most important part isn’t written, namely that it must be unfavorable to him.

But look—I’ll show you the Gemara again. Look at the Gemara in Chagigah with which we began. You see? “You could even say according to Rabbi Yehuda: there, he repairs; here, he damages.” Here, in the case of one who digs a pit and needs only its dirt, even Rabbi Yehuda agrees. Why? Because he is damaging. Okay? Meaning, the assumption is probably that in reality this really counts as damage from his point of view. Because if it were not damage, then why assume that he wants it only for the dirt? He probably wants it also for the pit—certainly according to Tosafot’s “we are all witnesses,” remember?—that the very satisfaction basically creates an “we are all witnesses” that he probably intended it. So one could say: once it’s unfavorable to him, he probably didn’t intend it. No, but that’s a rejection; what do you mean, not here… No, but why does the Gemara reject? The Gemara rejects because it assumes here that the pit is unfavorable to him. Why does it assume that? This case also applies when it is favorable to him. Apparently the Gemara assumes we’re talking about a case where it is not good for him. So I say: if so, I can reject what you are saying in exactly the same way—that the inevitable result in one who digs a pit and needs only its dirt is speaking in a case where he doesn’t want the pit, where the pit is a kind of damage for him. That’s possible.

Because the whole idea of a labor not needed for its own purpose, of this dispute, was that it’s unfavorable to him. Right—that’s what is written. The claim is: one digs a pit and needs only its dirt. What does that mean? He doesn’t need the pit. The pit is damage. What, do people need pits in the house? Obviously that’s damage. So why is he doing it if he is merely damaging? Because he needs the dirt. So he said: even though he made a pit here, since this is damage, it’s unfavorable to him, and therefore he isn’t liable. Damaging is completely… We’ll get there. The question of damaging versus not needed for its own purpose depends on this. If it’s damaging, then we need… We’ll still get to the relation between damaging and “unfavorable to him.”

It seems perhaps a bit like the plain sense of Tosafot… What again? The plain sense… about the issue, when you do a purpose that is unfavorable and damaging. Right, and therefore? Then exempt? Exempt… I’m saying, but is that because of damaging or because of a labor not needed for its own purpose? We are trying to explain it from the side of a labor not needed for its own purpose. And the claim is that a labor not needed for its own purpose is simply an inevitable result that is unfavorable to him.

Incidentally, there are quite a few medieval authorities (Rishonim)—Tosafot in several places writes that an inevitable result that is unfavorable to him is a labor not needed for its own purpose. They identify these two things. So according to those approaches, we don’t need Rabbi Avraham son of Maimonides. According to those approaches, a labor not needed for its own purpose belongs under the heading of unintentional action. Unintentional action—when it is not an inevitable result, dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda. When it is an inevitable result, then if it is favorable to him, Rabbi Shimon says liable; if it is unfavorable to him, that is a labor not needed for its own purpose. Fine?

According to this, of course, what happens according to Rabbi Yehuda in a labor not needed for its own purpose? After all, according to Rabbi Yehuda one is liable. So it turns out that according to Rabbi Yehuda, an inevitable result that is unfavorable to him is liable. Even though in ordinary unintentional action, for a large part of the medieval authorities (Rishonim), on the Sabbath it is only a rabbinic prohibition. Yes. According to Rabbi Shimon, completely permitted. According to Rabbi Yehuda, on the Sabbath it is a rabbinic prohibition according to a large part of the medieval authorities (Rishonim). Unintentional action on the Sabbath is a rabbinic prohibition according to a large part of the medieval authorities (Rishonim). Now what happens with unintentional action that is an inevitable result and unfavorable to him? Does that take me back to ordinary unintentional action? That’s what I would have thought. Here we see that it doesn’t. According to Rabbi Yehuda, this is liable. No, not ordinary unintentional action. On the Sabbath itself, according to a large part of the medieval authorities (Rishonim), that is only a rabbinic prohibition; in the rest of the Torah it is liable. Now, simply speaking, I would have said that an inevitable result that is unfavorable to him takes me back to a case of not intending, and whatever you say there you should say here too. But according to those who identify this with a labor not needed for its own purpose, something interesting comes out here: with unintentional action Rabbi Yehuda says it is a rabbinic prohibition, according to those medieval authorities (Rishonim) who say this. But with an inevitable result that is unfavorable to him—which is basically a labor not needed for its own purpose—Rabbi Yehuda says one is liable, really liable, not just a rabbinic prohibition. Okay? That’s fine, it’s not terrible; one just has to notice that this is what happens.

In any case, Rabbi Avraham son of Maimonides does not accept this. He does not connect it to favorability. He asks: what is the difference between an inevitable result and a labor not needed for its own purpose? And to that he answers that with an inevitable result, you are doing two actions, one of which necessarily comes from the other—but still, you are doing two actions. In a labor not needed for its own purpose, you are doing one action that has two results, for the sake of two purposes or two results. Okay? And that is the difference between them.

So basically, in his view, a labor not needed for its own purpose does not belong within the discussion of unintentional action. It is a different topic. What I suggested earlier would mean that a labor not needed for its own purpose is simply one of the branches on the tree of unintentional action. If it’s not an inevitable result—dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda. If it is an inevitable result, then it depends: if it is favorable to him, then Rabbi Shimon concedes that one is liable; if it is unfavorable to him, that is a labor not needed for its own purpose. So a labor not needed for its own purpose is simply one branch on this tree of unintentional action, according to the earlier explanation I gave, according to the Arukh. According to Rabbi Avraham son of Maimonides, that is not so. He probably does not understand it that way, and he is looking for an essential distinction. He claims that a labor not needed for its own purpose is another tree. It’s not a branch on the tree of unintentional action. A labor not needed for its own purpose is not an inevitable result that is unfavorable to him; it is something else. Why? Because in an inevitable result the difference is not favorable versus unfavorable, but rather that in an inevitable result it is still two actions—only one necessarily follows from the other, so you are liable. In a labor not needed for its own purpose it is one action with two results, one of which you want and the other you do not want. And there you are exempt. Okay?

So in his view, a labor not needed for its own purpose and unintentional action really are two different topics. According to the view of the Arukh, or those in the Arukh’s camp, that is not so. According to the Arukh’s camp, a labor not needed for its own purpose is one branch on the possibility-tree of unintentional action. Why do I say “the Arukh’s camp”? Because according to the Arukh himself this is not plausible. The Arukh himself says that an inevitable result that is unfavorable to him is permitted. It is really just ordinary unintentional action, entirely permitted. Whereas a labor not needed for its own purpose is exempt—that is, there is a rabbinic prohibition—even according to Rabbi Shimon. But why couldn’t it be that because you said there is reason to be stricter specifically here, they decreed more strictly here? But why? In his view there is no difference. No, it’s the same thing. Again: according to the approach I suggested here, a labor not needed for its own purpose is unintentional action; it’s the same thing. It’s not two situations. It is simply the name for an inevitable result that is unfavorable to him. What you are saying is true—I have no problem saying that the Arukh could agree that in practice, because there is a labor not needed for its own purpose of that type, they may have been stricter. There is no reason he couldn’t agree to that—if you are someone who thinks there is reason to make decrees because people can get confused. But when did they decree and when not? A labor not needed for its own purpose and an inevitable result that is unfavorable to him are the same thing. The Arukh can agree that that distinction is legitimate; he just doesn’t need it. It could still be true in itself.

No, again, leave that aside—you are adding him in here. I am speaking according to the possibility that we do not follow Rabbi Avraham son of Maimonides. Then the difference is simply whether it is favorable to me or unfavorable to me. Okay? That’s the difference. So I don’t need Rabbi Avraham son of Maimonides’ distinctions, since this lies on the tree of unintentional action. Rabbi Avraham son of Maimonides does not go in that direction, so he looks for other distinctions. But according to the view that says a labor not needed for its own purpose belongs on the tree of unintentional action, this does not work with the Arukh. Because the Arukh says that an inevitable result that is unfavorable to him is permitted—it is really just unintentional action. And if you identify that with a labor not needed for its own purpose, it should have been a rabbinic prohibition. Okay? So in any case, fine, but among those in the Arukh’s camp this definitely can work.

Let’s see a bit from Arukh HaShulchan in section 242—some important points come up there. “It has already been explained that unintentional action and a labor not needed for its own purpose are a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon throughout the Talmud. Rabbi Yehuda holds that unintentional action is rabbinically forbidden, and a labor not needed for its own purpose is liable to a sin-offering, for it is complete labor.” Yes, he assumes that unintentional action on the Sabbath is a rabbinic prohibition according to Rabbi Yehuda, not a Torah prohibition; that’s a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim), we saw that.

“And Rabbi Shimon holds that unintentional action is permitted from the outset, and a labor not needed for its own purpose is exempt by Torah law, since it is not intentional craftsmanship as in the Tabernacle, for in the Tabernacle when they did labor, they needed the body of the labor and its purpose. But it is rabbinically forbidden. Rabbi Yehuda considers it intentional craftsmanship. And one can explain his reasoning: certainly in the Tabernacle there was also extinguishing so that the excess fire would not ruin the spices, and that is a labor not needed for its own purpose. And Rabbi Shimon holds that in the Tabernacle they were certainly careful not to increase the fire too much, as Tosafot wrote on page 94, and extinguishing there was only for making coals. And that is labor needed for its own purpose.” So the dispute is over what happened in the Tabernacle. Did they do labors in the Tabernacle also not for their own purpose, or only labors needed for their own purpose?

Now on the face of it, there is an internal contradiction in his words. Because I ask: what defines a need as “the need of the labor’s own purpose”? At first glance I would have said: what happened in the Tabernacle. Meaning, the purpose for which they did that labor in the Tabernacle is what is called “needed for its own purpose.” And if you do it for some other purpose, then it is not for its own purpose. But in Arukh HaShulchan, that seems to be what he says, but it isn’t right. It can’t be right. Why? Because Arukh HaShulchan wants to claim that according to Rabbi Yehuda, in the Tabernacle they also did labors not for their own purpose. But if they did it in the Tabernacle, then that counts as “for its own purpose,” doesn’t it? After all, the definition of “for its own purpose” is what happened in the Tabernacle. So how can one say that in the Tabernacle there were labors that were done not for their own purpose? What is the definition of “for its own purpose” or “not for its own purpose”? What happened in the Tabernacle, no? Well, then if they did it in the Tabernacle, it is for its own purpose. So how can there be labor that is not for its own purpose but happened in the Tabernacle?

You see that according to Arukh HaShulchan, “for its own purpose” and “not for its own purpose” are not determined by the question of what happened in the Tabernacle. So by what are they determined? Maybe, for example, by the normal way of doing the labor. Not necessarily in the Tabernacle—in general. Suppose I extinguish a fire. Usually one does that in order to produce charcoal, for the sake of argument. Okay? In the Tabernacle, according to Rabbi Yehuda, they also did it for other purposes, and therefore one would also be liable for a labor not needed for its own purpose. But the definition of what counts as needed for its own purpose and what counts as not needed for its own purpose is not determined by the Tabernacle. It is determined by how this labor is generally done. Right? That’s what Tosafot on 49 says—what does the other side against Tosafot on 49 say? Wait, we’ll get there in a moment.

So maybe he does agree with you. It’s just that the formulation “a labor not needed for its own purpose” is the accepted formulation, and perhaps he really thinks that according to Rabbi Yehuda this is considered labor needed for its own purpose. No, he says it. What do you mean? He says that in the Tabernacle they did labors not for their own purpose—labors that Rabbi Shimon calls not for their own purpose. Fine, so maybe that is just a terminological issue, the names of those labors. There isn’t another accepted category to call them. I think then you are basically saying there was a factual dispute about what happened in the Tabernacle. I don’t think it’s a factual dispute, but yes, you could explain it that way. No, exactly—that’s the point. If it is not a factual dispute, then that isn’t it. So what is? There is some definition of what counts as “for its own purpose.” It’s the normal way the labor is done, the purpose for which this labor is usually performed. Now there is a question: in the Tabernacle, did they also do things for other purposes, purposes that are not the usual purpose of the labor? According to Rabbi Shimon, that doesn’t matter. One is still exempt, because it is not the usual purpose.

No, you are exempt not because it wasn’t in the Tabernacle. You are exempt because even if it was in the Tabernacle, a labor not needed for its own purpose is not intentional craftsmanship—or is it? You are exempt for it. According to Rabbi Yehuda, it was in the Tabernacle, and therefore I don’t care that it’s not for its own purpose. It really is not for its own purpose, but I don’t care. Because what matters to me is what was in the Tabernacle. Why should I care whether it’s for its own purpose or not? Okay? If so, then it really is not a factual dispute but a halakhic dispute.

But there’s a hint here—according to Rabbi Shimon, “they were careful.” He doesn’t say… That is what is written, what Tosafot said: “so that the excess fire would not ruin the spices.” He says Rabbi Shimon holds they were careful not to increase the fire too much. So you’re saying there really is a factual dispute about what happened in the Tabernacle, meaning that Rabbi Shimon also agrees that if it happened in the Tabernacle, then a labor not needed for its own purpose would not be a problem. The logic would be to say it wouldn’t be called a labor not needed for its own purpose. As you suggested—I don’t see a contradiction in what you suggested to what he actually says. It’s just his terminology. No, that’s a problem. Meaning, if your precision is right, then he really explains that Rabbi Shimon disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda factually, not halakhically. Meaning, he claims that in the Tabernacle these labors were not done for those purposes, while Rabbi Yehuda says they were. Which implies that if in the Tabernacle they had also been done for purposes not their own, then there would be no exemption of a labor not needed for its own purpose. But the definition of what counts as “its own purpose” and “not its own purpose” would still be the question of how the labor is usually done. Okay? The only question is whether there is this exemption of a labor not needed for its own purpose, and that depends on what was done in the Tabernacle.

Maybe they think that these things are necessarily equivalent, that both agree it cannot be that they did in the Tabernacle something not defined as normal. They say it is necessarily equivalent. The reasoning of what… The question still is what is binding, what the relevant parameter is. The fact that they go together—fine. Because if you assume as an initial assumption that it is liable… I think it goes together, I think the reasoning has to be that there is some underlying logic that these things cannot contradict each other. According to Rabbi Shimon. Because according to Rabbi Yehuda they can. No, according to Rabbi Yehuda they can. Rabbi Yehuda said they did this in the Tabernacle. Yes, but I think what he means is that this is not, as you said, a labor not needed for its own purpose. Fine. So then his terminology becomes hollow from within… No, the terminology is a bit weak simply because he is trying to talk about something very specific. No, so I’m saying, I think the simpler explanation is no: the terminology means what he actually writes, that “needed for its own purpose” and “not needed for its own purpose” are not determined by the Tabernacle. Fine?

Maybe if something came out not for its own purpose? What? Maybe if it came out not for… they wanted it for its own purpose. Maybe if it came out not for its own purpose? No, the question is why they did it—what do you mean? What was their purpose when they did it? He needed flutes, he also needed the earth. Okay, he didn’t intend charcoal, that’s incidental. He extinguished for the charcoal. Well, if he extinguished for the charcoal, then it is needed for its own purpose. Right, charcoal, coal, fire. Why should I care what happened afterward? So it happened—so what? He extinguished for the charcoal; if so, he is liable. Yes, but if along with that something else happened that wasn’t… meaning, something else happened that wasn’t… the charcoal didn’t come out? The charcoal came out. Well then that’s it—he’s liable. Why should I care if something else happened too?

So basically the question whether a labor is defined as needed or not needed for its own purpose—what I would have thought at first glance, and there is Tosafot in several places that says this—is that it is determined by what happened in the Tabernacle. In Arukh HaShulchan it doesn’t seem that way. In Arukh HaShulchan it seems that although the Tabernacle apparently determines it—because Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda do in fact dispute what happened in the Tabernacle—still that is not the definition of “needed for its own purpose.” The definition of “needed for its own purpose” is, for example—this is my suggestion, it’s not explicitly written here—the normal way this labor is done. Carrying out is what is done normally with this labor. Writing two letters—that is according to what was done in the Tabernacle. No, obviously the definitions of the labors are according to what was done in the Tabernacle; that is clear. The only question is, specifically with a labor not needed for its own purpose, does this rule too emerge from what was done in the Tabernacle, or is it a broader rule? Only with this specific law of a labor not needed for its own purpose, yes. That the definitions of the categories of labor come from the Tabernacle, that’s obvious. But specifically this rule, this exemption of a labor not needed for its own purpose—why is it? Because there is a general exemption of a labor not needed for its own purpose, or because it’s just part of the definition of the labor—what was not in the Tabernacle was not prohibited, and a labor not needed for its own purpose was not in the Tabernacle, so it is not prohibited. Fine? You understand that if I tie everything to whether it was “for its own purpose” or “not for its own purpose” in the Tabernacle, then this has no real significance. In the end, there is no real exemption called a labor not needed for its own purpose. Whatever was in the Tabernacle is liable, whatever was not in the Tabernacle is not liable—that’s all. The fact that we call it “a labor not needed for its own purpose”—so what? It doesn’t change anything.

You can say there is still some novelty here: if they did it in the Tabernacle for one purpose, and I do it for another purpose, still the action itself was done in the Tabernacle—extinguishing was done in the Tabernacle too. The fact that I do it to save the oil and not to produce charcoal, one could still have thought to make me liable, even though this purpose was not in the Tabernacle. Why? Because extinguishing itself was in the Tabernacle, even if not for this purpose. So in terms of defining the labor, the labor itself fits what was in the Tabernacle, and the question is whether the purposes are part of the very definition of the labor. Meaning, there is still some novelty here. But after that novelty, in the final analysis, why am I exempt? I’m exempt not because there is some separate exemption called a labor not needed for its own purpose, but because this was not in the Tabernacle, that’s all—it simply isn’t one of the prohibited labors.

Of course, one can now ask: then why is this not a secondary derivative? After all, secondary derivatives were also not in the Tabernacle, yet derivatives similar to the primary categories are also prohibited because of their similarity to the primary categories. So why not define a labor not needed for its own purpose as a derivative of labor needed for its own purpose? After all, here I did extinguishing and there I did extinguishing—here for one purpose and there for another. It may be that a difference in purposes is significant; meaning, a difference in purposes prevents me from defining one thing as a derivative of another. There has to be similarity in purposes too for them to be derivative-related. Fine? Okay, maybe.

There is another definition in the medieval authorities (Rishonim) regarding a labor not needed for its own purpose. What defines “needed for its own purpose” and “not needed for its own purpose”? So far I mentioned two possibilities. One possibility: what was in the Tabernacle—that is “for its own purpose”; other purposes are “not for its own purpose.” A second possibility: the normal way of doing the labor. Right.

The same Rashi: “Not needed for its own purpose, such as this, where he does not need this building.” And Rabbi Shimon said this regarding one who carries out the corpse in a bed to bury it on the Sabbath. “And Rabbi Shimon said he is exempt for this carrying out because ideally this would never have come upon him and he would not have needed it.” What does that mean? “Ideally it would never have come upon him” appears in several places in Rashi, and this is an additional definition of a labor not needed for its own purpose. This is a labor of removal. What does that mean? I am taking out the corpse not because I need the corpse to be outside, but because I want it not to be here. Like “for the sake of its place” in the laws of set-aside objects. Fine? Meaning, I need it not to be here; I do not need it there. I would like to do this without doing the labor. Yes—if there were no corpse here, then I also wouldn’t need to remove it, because I would have the space even without removing it. Okay? “Ideally this would never have come to him” means: the best thing for me would be if there were no corpse. If there is a corpse, I remove it so that I have room here. But really this is just a labor of removal—it solves a problem for me, or removes a danger.

“Ideally this would not have come upon him”—does that refer to the corpse or to the labor, to the carrying out? It sounds like Rashi means that ideally he would prefer to get rid of the corpse somehow—to burn it, to make it disappear—without carrying it out. No, I mean, fine, it doesn’t matter. The point is: if there were no corpse here, there would be no problem. But if you could make it disappear in some other way, what difference does it make? In the end, he wants to separate what he is doing from the labor. He wants to do this without doing the carrying out. Yes, but it doesn’t matter whether there were no corpse or whether I could make it disappear another way. Bottom line: taking out the corpse is not being done so that the corpse should be outside. For me, if there were no corpse at all, that would be much better. Okay?

I’m not doing this for the sake of the corpse; I’m doing it to remove a problem that I have here. Another example of this, and there it’s almost explicit, is in Sabbath 107. The one who traps? Yes, traps, exactly. “One who traps a snake,” etc. “Who is the tanna? Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: it is Rabbi Shimon, who said that a labor not needed for its own purpose one is exempt for.” There are those who taught it on this: if you trap for a need—if you trap not for a need, then that’s a labor not needed for its own purpose.

There are those who taught it on this: “One who lances an abscess on the Sabbath—if to make for it an opening, liable; if to remove the pus from it, exempt. Who is the tanna? Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: it is Rabbi Shimon, who said that a labor not needed for its own purpose one is exempt for.” And there are those who taught it on this: “One who traps a snake on the Sabbath—if he busied himself with it so that it should not bite him, exempt; if for medicinal use, liable. Who is the tanna? Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: it is Rabbi Shimon, who said that a labor not needed for its own purpose one is exempt for.”

Meaning, if you trap something so that it won’t harm you—not because you need it. You don’t need it. You are only removing a danger. You are afraid it may harm you, bite you or something like that, and therefore you trap it. You are not trapping it because you need it. So this is a labor of removal. “Ideally this would not have come upon him”—if there were no snake here, that would be best. Fine? If I need this snake for my own purposes, then yes, I do want there to be a snake here, and I trap it because I want the snake. Killing a mosquito? Killing a mosquito, yes, similarly: whenever you trap or kill an animal so that it won’t harm you, that is a labor not needed for its own purpose.

Now all these cases are really a labor of removal, right? You are basically doing the action, but you are doing it not in order that the animal be dead or in order to trap it so that you have the animal, but so that it will not threaten you—to remove some danger expected to come your way. Now according to this definition, notice again, to define “for its own purpose” or “not for its own purpose” we don’t need the Tabernacle now. Right? Earlier I said that from Arukh HaShulchan it seems that the Tabernacle does not define what counts as “for its own purpose” or “not for its own purpose.” So I asked: what does define it? I suggested one possibility from reasoning—the normal way this labor is done is what counts as “for its own purpose”; if you do it for another purpose, it is “not for its own purpose.” Here there is another proposal: if you do it in order to remove danger or solve a problem, that is called a labor not needed for its own purpose. Again, notice, this has nothing to do with the Tabernacle at all. Nothing to do with the Tabernacle. Theoretically, they might also have done this in the Tabernacle, okay? It’s possible they also trapped snakes in the Tabernacle so they shouldn’t bite me. Yet I would still be exempt. Why would I be exempt? Not because this wasn’t in the Tabernacle. I would be exempt because a labor of removal is a labor not needed for its own purpose; it is not intentional craftsmanship.

How does that fit with removal… Right, exactly. I was just about to point that out. This definition, which appears repeatedly in Rashi in several places, is not simple. There are situations where it’s hard to force this definition in. For example: one who digs a pit and needs only its dirt. When I dig the pit, obviously I’m not doing this in order to remove something, to remove some problem or danger. I’m taking the sand and creating a pit. Okay? Therefore in that case it is very hard to force in Rashi’s definition that this is about removing danger, that ideally this would never have come to him. What, if I had sand in the house and didn’t need to dig it out, then I wouldn’t dig? That’s true of all Sabbath labors. If I had a deer in the house, I wouldn’t go trap a deer. What do you mean by damage? No, the opposite—Rashi says it’s not damage; it’s removal of danger. It’s a repair, but not in the object itself; it only removes a danger.

So I’m saying: there are situations, or examples, of a labor not needed for its own purpose where it is very hard to force in Rashi’s definition of a labor of removal. And that begins to open the door—and maybe we’ll still talk about it later—to the possibility that the definition is more complex. In places where it brings us back to your remark at the beginning, or basically the plain meaning of Rabbi Avraham son of Maimonides: in places where it is clear that I did the act of digging, then the issue there is not removal, but rather what purpose I performed the act for. Because I did here an act of digging.

But if I am removing the snake now—I trap the snake so that it not be here—there the situation could be… actually there maybe it works less well. Say, extinguishing in order to make charcoal. Okay? When I extinguish in order to make charcoal, then there the extinguishing itself, in order to produce the charcoal, is actually only to remove a problem. Right? Because in the end, the fire itself does not bother me; only as long as the fire is there I can’t use the charcoal. So I remove the fire, extinguish the fire, in order to… But there the labor is not lacking in purpose—what he wants is the charcoal; he doesn’t want the removal. But he extinguishes the fire. Why? That’s exactly the opposite of a labor not… No, he extinguishes the fire. He wants to remove the fire in order to use the charcoal. He isn’t removing the charcoal, he is removing the fire. The goal of the fire is to produce charcoal. But I remove the fire so I can use the charcoal. Why? I definitely need it. He only needs there to be charcoal. No—I need the fire to go away because I can’t use the charcoal without that. But the fire… when the fire is burning there is charcoal in it. I don’t need to remove the fire in order for there to be charcoal; I need to remove the fire in order to be able to use the charcoal. Those are two different things. He extinguishes the fire for the charcoal; it’s not each one separately. What do you mean? Meaning that the act of extinguishing the fire is for the sake of the charcoal—whether for producing it or for making it accessible. On the face of it that is just action itself. Obviously.

Also in one who digs a pit and needs only its dirt, in no case can you separate them. We said that a labor not needed for its own purpose is always an inevitable result. There is no way to separate the two results from one another, okay? Therefore I’m saying: there is a hint here that Rashi’s definition of a labor of removal, or that “ideally this would not have come upon him,” may not be a full definition. And in one who digs a pit and needs only its dirt, this is not a labor of removal, and still it is defined as a labor not needed for its own purpose. Why? Maybe because there there really are two clear results. In removing the snake, maybe that is the definition. When I removed the snake, there are not two results. I have a snake in my hand. I trapped it, or killed it, doesn’t matter. That is the only result there is. The fact that I am no longer under threat is not a result. I can’t point now to some result in the world and say: look, there is now no threat to me. That is a negative state, a negative condition. Okay? The result that is positively before us is only a dead snake or a trapped snake.

Maybe that itself is the definition. Maybe “removal” is just a better way of saying it. We are not talking specifically about removing damage. If I have some goal that is negative—a negative-state goal—which I cannot point to… No, but in one who digs a pit and needs only its dirt there are two positive results—that’s exactly the problem. The same problem, but I’m saying: what you called removing danger can perhaps be broadened and said to refer in general to a negative-type purpose. Maybe that’s what Rashi means there. Yes, certainly. So I’m saying, that is called removal, “ideally this would not have come to him,” removal of danger. But the question is why one who digs a pit and needs only its dirt is also a labor not needed for its own purpose. There it is not removal. I’m saying: because there there are two results. One result exists and another result… actually both results exist. I got both the pit and the dirt. It’s not that I didn’t get the pit; I just don’t want it. Fine? So maybe that is a labor not needed for its own purpose without any connection to removal.

In cases of removal-labors, what happens? There I trapped the snake and the result existing in the world is a trapped snake. There is no additional result in the world. “I am no longer threatened” exists, but that is not a result; it’s something negative. So there is a trapped snake. About that you have to explain to me why I’m not liable. I trapped it and the result is that the snake is trapped, and there is no other result to cast this onto. So I say: fine, there the problem is that this is a labor of removal. In one who digs a pit and needs only its dirt, although it is not removal, it is still a labor not needed for its own purpose, because there really are two results and I have a permitted-result issue. I have the dirt. There is also the prohibited result, and I have a permitted result. So I can say: listen, I did this for the permitted result. With the snake I have no permitted result that I can say I did it for. There is no such thing. There is only the result of the trapped snake. Therefore I have to say: fine, this is a labor of removal.

Let’s continue with Arukh HaShulchan. “As to practical law…” What? In a place where you have only one result in the action, for example the trapped snake. Okay. So in such a place, you can’t say I wanted the permitted result and a prohibited result also happened. There is no permitted result in the world. Well then, you should be liable. So Rashi says no: since the one result that exists before you was only done for the sake of removal, that is called a labor not needed for its own purpose. In one who digs a pit and needs only its dirt, there are two results in the world—there is a pit and there is dirt. So in that state, even if this is not a labor of removal, it is still a labor not needed for its own purpose, because I can say: what do you want from me? I removed dirt. I didn’t dig a pit. True, there is also a pit here, but there is dirt in front of my eyes. In a place where there is no permitted result in front of my eyes, then somehow you need to negate the prohibited result—why doesn’t it obligate me? Fine.

“As to practical law: regarding unintentional action, the Talmud explicitly rules like Rabbi Shimon, and nowadays, since we hold like Rabbi Shimon, it is permitted even from the outset. But regarding a labor not needed for its own purpose, the law was not explicitly decided. Our teachers the Tosafot, the Ra’avad, Nachmanides, Rashba all ruled like Rabbi Shimon also regarding a labor not needed for its own purpose—first, because Rava in the beginning of the chapter Notel holds like Rabbi Shimon, and also at the end of Sabbath,” etc.

“And the opinion of the Rif also appears so.” He means that the opinion of the Rif appears, like Maimonides, that for a labor not needed for its own purpose one is liable. I already mentioned that regarding the Rif there is dispute—Baal HaMaor and Nachmanides, Maggid Mishneh—but he says the Rif’s opinion also seems to be that way. “And their reasoning is according to the rules of the Talmud: in a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, the law follows Rabbi Yehuda. And although Rava holds like Rabbi Shimon, nevertheless there are amoraim who hold like Rabbi Yehuda.” Rav holds like Rabbi Yehuda in several places. So because there are amoraim who hold like Rabbi Yehuda, the fact that Rava holds like Rabbi Shimon doesn’t settle it. “And moreover, in the Mishnah our holy teacher fixed the law that one who carries out the corpse in a bed is liable, like Rabbi Yehuda, and stated it anonymously in the plural. And what they said that throughout Sabbath the law follows Rabbi Shimon—that applies only in matters of set-aside objects, and do not project that onto matters of a labor not needed for its own purpose.”

“And what is a labor not needed for its own purpose?” Arukh HaShulchan says: “For example, when one does the prohibited labor and does not need it for the purpose of the prohibition, but for some other purpose. Such as one who digs a pit—the prohibition is the digging—and he does not need the pit at all, but needs the dirt. Labor needed for its own purpose is when he needs the pit in order to store something in it or use it. Similarly, one who extinguishes a lamp—the labor is the extinguishing—and if he needs the purpose of the extinguishing, namely to make charcoal, that is called needed for its own purpose. But if he does not need the charcoal, and only wants to spare the oil or the wick or the vessel, that is called not needed for its own purpose. Likewise one who carries a thorn four cubits in the public domain”—etc.—“but removes it from its place so that the public not be harmed by it, or extinguishes a coal so that the public not be harmed by it—that is not needed for its own purpose. Likewise one who traps a snake so that it not bite a person—the labor is the trapping, and he has no need for the trapping at all. And so too in all such cases. And in the Tabernacle, when they did labor, they needed the purpose of the labor.”

What does he mean here? Again, one could hesitate. Because what he said until now is that I do not need the labor for the purpose of the labor. Who determines what “the purpose of the labor” is? When I dig a pit and need only its dirt, you say I don’t need the purpose of the labor because I don’t need the pit, I need the dirt. Maybe the purpose of the labor is the dirt? Why did you decide the purpose of the labor is the pit? The Tabernacle? What determines that the purpose of digging is specifically the pit and not the dirt? There isn’t a labor category—you can’t from the pit… the labor of digging. How do you know that taking out dirt is not one of the primary categories of labor? How was that determined? After all, that’s exactly what we’re discussing. The point is that the prohibition—what we know beforehand—is that there is a prohibition of building, making a pit. Therefore if I don’t do the prohibition, then it’s not for its purpose. But the question is why. After all, I’m saying that if I remove dirt from the ground, then I also dug—I just dug for the dirt. You say to me: yes, but that’s not for the purpose of the labor, because the purpose of the labor is the pit. There are thirty-nine categories of labor. But I ask: where did the list of the thirty-nine categories of labor come from? I’m asking about that—don’t bring me proofs from the thirty-nine categories. You tell me because among the thirty-nine it says “digging”; why doesn’t it say “removing dirt”? Because it wasn’t in the Tabernacle? Maybe, I don’t know. Maybe the definitions of the labors are what was in the Tabernacle. Again he brings in the Tabernacle, after all—that’s what he says: “And in the Tabernacle, when they did labor, they needed the purpose of the labor.” So what? Is the Tabernacle the definition? Are the purposes of the labor defined by the purposes for which it was done in the Tabernacle? Or not?

This is a factual claim. The purposes of the labor are what we said above: the purposes for which one usually does this labor. And with the Tabernacle, he has a factual assumption that in the Tabernacle it always happened for that purpose. That’s another assumption. But not that the Tabernacle itself defines what the purpose of the labor is, as we inferred in the first law, law 28. There too I inferred the same thing. So here too one can say that. “And Rashi also holds so, and when he wrote in the Mishnah about the corpse in a bed”—and this is his language—“that a labor not needed except to remove it from upon him, and ideally it would not have come to him”—yes, this is only an explanation, meaning that he does not need the purpose of the labor and did not want this. Meaning, Rashi does not mean to say that the definition of a labor not needed for its own purpose is removal. This is only a particular explanation for a case where you don’t do it for the prohibited purpose. In my opinion that is not the plain meaning of Rashi, but that is what he says.

What probably drove him to this is the difficulty you asked earlier. Because if I say that according to Rashi the definition is a labor of removal, then indeed with one who digs a pit and needs only its dirt, it is not clear why this is a labor not needed for its own purpose according to Rashi. There it is not removal. Therefore Arukh HaShulchan says: apparently Rashi too does not mean that the definition of a labor not needed for its own purpose is a labor of removal; rather, labor of removal is only an example. It is an example of labor not performed for its prohibited purpose. And what defines the prohibited purpose? Apparently not the Tabernacle, if he says this may have happened in the Tabernacle itself. So then what does? The normal way of doing the labor—what I suggested above.

“And know that it is famous throughout the Talmud that even though unintentional action, even according to Rabbi Yehuda, is only a rabbinic prohibition, and according to Rabbi Shimon is permitted from the outset—and so the Jewish law is, as we wrote—nevertheless this is only in a matter where it is possible that the labor will be done and possible that it will not be done. But in a matter where it is necessary that the labor be done, even Rabbi Shimon agrees that one is liable by Torah law.” That’s the inevitable result. “And so they said in the Talmud in several places: Rabbi Shimon concedes in an inevitable result and it not die.” And this is Maimonides’ language in chapter 1—he now brings the quotation from Maimonides that we already saw.

“And there is a great question here: how can one be liable according to Rabbi Shimon in an inevitable result, since he does not intend it? Obviously he does not need its purpose, and if so, at the very least this should be a labor not needed for its own purpose.” Basically Rabbi Avraham son of Maimonides’ question. So he says: “From the words of our teachers the Tosafot in Sabbath it appears that the explanation is this: every inevitable result where it is obvious to us that it is favorable to him is liable, even though he did not intend it. Perforce, it is as if he intended it. And every case where it is obvious to us that it is not favorable to him in this—meaning, it makes no difference to him—is like a labor not needed for its own purpose. And according to the Arukh, every inevitable result that is unfavorable to him is permitted even from the outset—see there.” He hints to the fact that according to the Arukh this doesn’t work.

“But Rashi, may his memory be blessed, explicitly wrote that Rabbi Shimon concedes in a matter where he does not care whether it happens or not, unless he specifically wants the opposite, that this labor not be done—see there.” What does that mean? He says like this. Here appears the explanation I gave above, on Rabbi Avraham son of Maimonides’ question: what is the difference between an inevitable result and a labor not needed for its own purpose? So Rabbi Avraham son of Maimonides says that—Arukh HaShulchan brings him in law 33 here. He brings Rabbi Avraham son of Maimonides. But here what did he say earlier? He said what I suggested earlier: that perhaps according to the medieval authorities (Rishonim) who go in the direction of the Arukh, Rabbi Avraham son of Maimonides’ question doesn’t arise. Because the difference between an inevitable result and a labor not needed for its own purpose is simply that one is favorable to him and one is unfavorable to him, that’s all. This is just a branch on the tree of unintentional action.

Therefore here he brings that as an answer to Rabbi Avraham son of Maimonides’ question. I said that in his own approach he himself notes that according to the Arukh himself it does not work. Because according to the Arukh himself, an inevitable result that is unfavorable to him is entirely permitted. And if you identify that with a labor not needed for its own purpose, it should be rabbinically forbidden. In Maimonides’ approach it certainly doesn’t work, because he rules regarding a labor not needed for its own purpose like Rabbi Yehuda, that one is liable, and regarding an inevitable result that is unfavorable to him you want to tell me one is exempt. Fine? Therefore in the Arukh’s own approach it doesn’t work, but it does work among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) who go in his direction—those who go in his direction and say that an inevitable result that is unfavorable to him is indeed not liable, but is rabbinically forbidden. They could identify it with a labor not needed for its own purpose. Then the difference between an inevitable result and a labor not needed for its own purpose is just whether it is favorable or unfavorable. That’s all. And indeed in several Tosafot in several places they define a labor not needed for its own purpose as an inevitable result that is unfavorable to him—they are the same thing.

And the second possibility he brings is in law 33: “And behold, we found that his son…”—Maimonides’ son was asked about this, and then he brings Rabbi Avraham son of Maimonides’ answer, where he says that the difference is whether this is one action or two actions, what we discussed above. Okay?

Fine, there is one more law of Arukh HaShulchan in law 34 that we want to see, but we already need to stop. So we’ll stop here and continue next time. Are you learning this with Rabbi Shapira? Yes? I learned it a long time ago, maybe five years… What? Also the removal idea that basically… So I’m not sure about that. As I said before, I think… obviously that is the accepted reading of Rashi. But then the question is: what about one who digs a pit and needs only its dirt? I argue that this doesn’t have to be just a particular case. There there are two results before us. Where there are two results before us, that is definitely a labor not needed for its own purpose. In a place where there is only one result before us and the other is negative, there you need the framework of removal.

It’s not clear that this is such a different approach the way you stressed a different place, but in terms of the Torah, it’s like saying this is another case or saying there is a special category of things that are not that, in the sense that they are removal. But in the end the conclusion will always be the same. Yes, but I’m saying: what does “particular case” mean? These are really two different categories. The question is whether before us there are two results or one result, and the definition is different in each of them. But everything you said, and then you said, but in the one-result case I define it as if it is really like two results, and that’s how I solve it. So basically, all we said was that in Rashi I need to read that in as if it were two results. Obviously I need to read into Rashi the facts of the Gemara. But I still think this is a different definition. It’s a matter of emphasis—where you place the emphasis. Do you want the emphasis to be on the place where there aren’t two results, or on the place where there are two results? If you say the main story is a place where there are two results, then you say: fine, removal is just a sub-case. And if you say no, the main case of a labor not needed for its own purpose is where there aren’t two results… If I ask: what is the classical case of a labor not needed for its own purpose—when I have two results, or when I don’t? If you say that it is when I don’t have two results… What does “particular case” mean? That removal is a particular case? So what is the general definition? Exactly—if you start from the idea that a labor not needed for its own purpose is labor with two results, then your explanation of removal I will automatically understand to mean that this too is called two results, that a negative result is also a result. And if I understand that the main case… then why do you need to get to removal? Just say there are two results, everything is fine, it has nothing to do with removal.

No, but you explain why this is called a result. As I said, there is a difficulty there: I’m missing the physical result there. I don’t see it in front of me. So you say: no, removal. No—then you say that “ideally this would not have come to him” means two results. Rashi links it to that because that is the defining feature of a labor not needed for its own purpose. You say the opposite. You say that according to Rashi, even though there is only one result here, it still counts as two. Depending on how you arrange… It depends mainly on how you arranged the sugya. If you assume that the classic labor not needed for its own purpose is one who digs a pit and there are two results, then you will explain removal as a particular case of that, with all these reasonings, and you will still say that is called… If you hold that the pure labor not needed for its own purpose is specifically the case where I have no two results but only removal… then why is the two-result case a particular case of that? No, then in that case you would say, like yourself, that the two-result case is another… it’s a matter of how you arranged it.

Fine, but these are still two things. I don’t think it’s really a practical difference, a real difference; it’s more just… that’s why it seems to me that according to Rashi it comes out sounding this way, because when he focuses on that case, it sounds as if the sugya starts there, and in any event removal is the… is really the reason I exempt you. I claim that there really are two categories. When there is one result, then the definition is: if it is removal, it is a labor not needed for its own purpose. If there are two results, the definition is that you don’t want this one, only the permitted result—that is a labor not needed for its own purpose. Neither one is a particular case of the other.

Yes, I understand, but one can always say: okay, but basically you’re saying that this is a case of two results. Regarding removal, in the end you can always ask: why is this not called two results? No, I don’t want to say it’s two results. No, but why is it different? I mean, first of all as a definition: this is one result, but because the result is removal, it is a labor not needed for its own purpose even though there isn’t a second result. And why isn’t it two results? I mean, what, because you have an initial assumption that this has to be one result? If it were two results, you wouldn’t need to get to the idea that it is removal. Ah, there—that’s it—so you have an initial assumption that it has to be one result. No, that this case is one result, not that it has to be. It simply is one result—that’s a fact. Because you’re actually beginning the discussion from this case, you say: okay, no no, I need to assume that there is something special about removal. Again, we’re circling around the same point. If you say that the reasoning of removal does not come, as you say, then it is not coming to explain why I am exempt from a labor not needed for its own purpose. On the contrary: according to you, the removal idea comes to explain why the “non-result” is also a result. But why am I exempt? I’m exempt because there is an exemption of a labor not needed for its own purpose. In Rashi, in all those places, it says because this is removal, therefore I am exempt. The reasoning of removal comes to explain what exempts me, because I performed the action for the sake of removal. I don’t know if it’s because on the face of it, the reasoning that removal is a purpose and that I’m exempt—it’s really the same reasoning, not that I hold… No, it’s really not. The question is whether you want to explain to me that there are two results here—that is the purpose for which you bring in the removal reasoning—or whether you want to tell me: no, obviously there are two results here, but because this result is removal, I relate to that result and not this one, because this one doesn’t count; it’s removal. Then the basis of the exemption is explained by removal, not that removal comes to tell me there are two results, but that is what explains why a labor not needed for its own purpose is exempt—because it is removal.

I think the basis of the exemption will be removal even if I hold it’s two results, because in the end the second result is the reason for exemption. Obviously—and that has nothing to do with removal. In one who digs a pit and needs only its dirt, what exempts me is not that I removed something. I didn’t remove anything. No, that’s true, but removal is just not really… because I don’t really see a reason to say this isn’t all just another way of saying that there are two results. It’s just that if you focus on this case, then you say I need to give some assumption that there is something unique in removal. Again: if the reasoning of removal doesn’t come there, then according to you it doesn’t come to explain why I am exempt from a labor not needed for its own purpose; it comes to explain why this resembles one who digs a pit—why this too counts as having two results, one being the removal and the other the trapping of the snake. And why is this exempt? Like one who digs a pit, that’s all. But Rashi doesn’t sound that way. In Rashi it sounds like he is exempt because he is removing. The reasoning of removal comes to explain why this is what exempts him—because the action was done for the sake of removal. I’m not sure if there is some practical difference one could find here. A practical difference would require thought; I don’t know. But the definition is a different definition.

Last time we talked about a doubtful inevitable result—that is, a doubt whether there will be an inevitable result. Yes, with flies. Right, what happens in a labor not needed for its own purpose? Because then in a labor not needed for its own purpose, something unclear will always be… What—if I trap a snake and I’m not sure I’ll be saved from it or something? What? Not sure I’ll succeed in trapping it. So then apparently the doubt always comes first—not sure I’ll succeed in trapping it. I always have… my hidden goal is that I want to permit killing a mosquito on the Sabbath. So I want to say this is a labor not needed for its own purpose, but it’s also a doubtful case without an inevitable result, because again, who says you’ll catch it? You won’t always succeed in catching it. And if you are certain you’ll catch it, then it’s forbidden? Yes—a labor not needed for its own purpose. No, what? Of course not. Why? What, if someone traps a snake and he is certain he will succeed in trapping it, then according to Rabbi Shimon he is liable? Of course not. What do you mean liable? Forbidden. Liable? No, in any case forbidden. After all, this is a labor not needed for its own purpose. A labor not needed for its own purpose is forbidden according to Rabbi Shimon in any case, right? So now, if it’s not certain he’ll succeed in trapping it, what do we have there? That’s what I’m asking. It’s the same thing. The question is whether it’s the same thing or whether it’s like that doubtful case before an inevitable result that we had. No, no, it has nothing to do with that. Because here the whole category of inevitable result is irrelevant in a labor not needed for its own purpose. Even if it is an inevitable result, you are exempt. There’s no relevance here to the doubt. After all, there the question was whether the doubt takes you out of the category of inevitable result or not. But here whether it takes you out of inevitable result or not makes no difference. Inevitable result doesn’t operate in the field of a labor not needed for its own purpose.

After all, seemingly a labor not needed for its own purpose has to be definite. Meaning, if it’s doubtful… No, what do you mean it has to be definite? It is exempt even if it is definite. If it is not definite, then certainly it will be exempt. So is that permitted? That’s on the rabbinic level, it doesn’t matter to me now. Fine, it’s not the main point. But on the conceptual level, the exemption of a labor not needed for its own purpose exists in any case. Whether the rabbis decreed or not—that one can debate. Incidentally, with trapping a snake, there are five or six cases where it is exempt and permitted, the Gemara says on page 3. No, because of danger. I’m asking about flies, or a mosquito, where there is no danger. Fine, that’s on the rabbinic level; the world needs some trick for that.

Now I understand. Shalom. Are you teaching here now or not? I just finished now. You just taught now. Okay, because they want—there’s Rabbi Berkowitz’s group—so they want some arrangement. Your Sunday class, does it continue in semester two? Halakhah in format? It will continue. Halakhah in format? Yes. Okay, I’ll bring things.

Yes, yes. With a good sign and congratulations, we are beginning to learn Mishnah Berakhot. “From when does one recite the Shema in the evening? From the time the priests enter to eat their terumah, until the end of the first watch—these are the words of Rabbi Eliezer. And the Sages say: until midnight. Rabban Gamliel says: until dawn rises. An incident occurred in which his sons came from a banquet and said to him: We did not recite the Shema. He said to them: If dawn has not yet risen, you are obligated to recite. And not only this did they say, but wherever the Sages said ‘until midnight,’ the commandment remains until dawn rises. The burning of the fats and limbs—their commandment remains until dawn rises. And all things eaten for one day—their commandment remains until dawn rises. If so, why did the Sages say ‘until midnight’? In order to distance a person from transgression.”