The Rules of the Melachot – Lesson 11

This is an English translation (via GPT-5.4). Read the original Hebrew version.

This transcription was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

🔗 Link to the original lecture

🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI

General overview.
Approaches to defining a labor not needed for its own purpose
Digging a pit when one only needs the dirt, and improvement in the pit itself
Page 103: improving the ground, an inevitable result, and another person’s land
The Arukh versus Tosafot: an inevitable result that one does not want
Additional proofs: Zevachim, myrtle in the stolen lulav, and flaying the Passover offering
The Ritva: rejecting the identification between an unwanted inevitable result and a labor not needed for its own purpose
The Ritva: the role of intention only in an act that is not intrinsically significant
Purposeful labor and the passage in Chagigah: Tosafot versus Rashi
Destructive action: Sabbath 106b and wounding / kindling
Rashi and Rashbam: linking destructive action to a labor not needed for its own purpose
Tosafot in Sabbath: distinguishing the exemption of destructive action from the exemption of a labor not needed for its own purpose
Tosafot: fully destructive action that can still be needed for its own purpose
An attempt to explain Rashi through the Ran and Kehillot Yaakov

Summary

General overview.

The text lays out three approaches to understanding melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa: Rashi’s approach, as a labor done to remove harm; Tosafot’s approach, as depending on resemblance to the labor of the Tabernacle; and a third approach that identifies it as doing a labor for a purpose other than that labor’s normal purpose. It examines practical implications, such as digging a pit for its dirt when there is also some improvement in the pit, and goes deeply into the issue of pesik reisha where one does not want the result, through the Arukh, Tosafot, and the Ritva. Later it connects destructive action, purposeful labor, and wounding / kindling, and shows how Tosafot distinguishes between the exemption of melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa and the exemption of destructive action, whereas according to Rashi one has to explain how the two exemptions apply or do not apply in different cases.

Approaches to defining a labor not needed for its own purpose

The text presents three basic definitions of melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa: Rashi defines it as a labor done to remove harm, and Tosafot defines it as a labor done for a purpose that did not exist in the Tabernacle. The text adds a third possibility, according to which the labor is done not for that labor’s normal purpose, even without tying it specifically to the Tabernacle, and it later connects this to the issue of destructive action.

Digging a pit when one only needs the dirt, and improvement in the pit itself

The text presents a dispute among medieval authorities (Rishonim) in a case where someone digs for the sake of the dirt, but there is also some repair or improvement in the pit itself: Rashba and Ritva in Eruvin obligate, while the Maggid Mishneh and Maimonides exempt. It ties this to the definitional dispute: according to Tosafot, the key factor is resemblance to the Tabernacle, so incidental improvement in the pit does not matter if the purpose of the digging is not like the Tabernacle labor; by contrast, according to a line like Rashi’s, if there is benefit in the pit itself then this is not merely a labor of removal, and so there is room to obligate.

Page 103: improving the ground, an inevitable result, and another person’s land

The text brings the baraita about one who weeds, trims, or prunes, with different measures depending on whether the purpose is food, animal feed, fuel, or improving the ground, where for improving the ground any amount suffices. It asks why “improving the ground” has to be mentioned, if in every case the ground is improved anyway. It presents the Talmud’s answers: Rabbah and Rav Yosef explain the case as one involving marshland where he has no interest in improving it, while Abaye explains it as a field where he does not intend to improve the ground. The Talmud then objects on the basis of pesik reisha, an inevitable result, and answers that the case is where he is doing it on another person’s land.

The Arukh versus Tosafot: an inevitable result that one does not want

The text presents the Arukh’s interpretation that pesik reisha where one does not want the result is permitted, and explains it through the example of another person’s land, specifically “someone he does not like.” It adds proofs from cutting off a leprous spot during circumcision, and from the case of a barrel plugged with flax where removing the plug causes squeezing, yet was permitted because he does not benefit and the wine falls to the ground. It then presents Tosafot’s disagreement, holding that this is not fully permitted; rather, “that only means he is not liable to bring a sin-offering, but there is still a prohibition.” Tosafot proves this from the case of lancing an abscess and from a hand-needle used to remove a thorn, which were only permitted because of bodily pain, even though there is no benefit in forming the opening. It explains that according to Tosafot, pesik reisha where one does not want the result is identified with melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa, and therefore it does not revert to the category of an unintended act, which is completely permitted, but remains rabbinically prohibited.

Additional proofs: Zevachim, myrtle in the stolen lulav, and flaying the Passover offering

The text cites the Talmud in Zevachim about one who voluntarily brings wine and pours it over the fire-offerings, and the objection, “But he is extinguishing,” with the answer that it follows Rabbi Shimon, who permits an unintended act. It suggests that this is a case of pesik reisha where one does not want the result outside the laws of Sabbath. It brings Tosafot’s possibility that this is not pesik reisha, because he pours it in very fine drops or onto the limbs. It also brings the issue of reducing the berries on a myrtle branch, and the answer “for example, where he picked them for eating,” together with the case where “he has another hosha‘na branch,” and the understanding that this seems to support the Arukh’s interpretation. It ends with Tosafot’s resolution that this is only a minor correction, prohibited rabbinically, and the Sages did not decree in a case where he gets no benefit.

The Ritva: rejecting the identification between an unwanted inevitable result and a labor not needed for its own purpose

The text presents the Ritva, who explains “he did it on another person’s land” as a case where “he does not care to improve it,” and notes that proofs were brought from the Geonim, from the Arukh, and from Tosafot that Rabbi Shimon only prohibits pesik reisha when one wants the result. It then brings the Ritva’s astonishment that according to the Talmud’s reasoning—“since the labor cannot fail to be done, it is as though he intended it”—there should be no difference between wanting and not wanting the result, and he concludes that one should seemingly be liable. He rejects the claim that not wanting the result turns it into melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa, arguing that “it certainly is needed for its own purpose,” and illustrates with plowing done only to tire out one’s animals: that does not exempt, because in the end the ground was plowed.

The Ritva: the role of intention only in an act that is not intrinsically significant

The text presents the Ritva’s novel suggestion, introduced with “were I not afraid,” that sometimes the leniency of not caring about the result applies only to something that, in itself, is not a significant enough act to count as a labor. In that case, when the person does not care, it returns to its basic character as something that is not a significant labor. He applies this to improving the ground in any tiny amount, which is not intrinsically a labor unless there is a need that gives it importance, and to removing berries from myrtle, where the correction becomes significant because of the need for the commandment; when he does not care and has no intention, the act is not considered significant. This creates a scale in which human intention matters only where the action is borderline in significance, while in a significant act the question of whether one wants the result makes no difference.

Purposeful labor and the passage in Chagigah: Tosafot versus Rashi

The text returns to the passage in Chagigah where melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa is described as “mountains hanging by a hair” on the basis of “the Torah prohibited purposeful labor,” and asks how this fits with Tosafot, who defines melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa by the Tabernacle and not as a broad exemption under the rule of purposeful labor. It suggests that for Tosafot the Mishnah there is speaking according to Rabbi Yehudah, and in the case of digging a pit and needing only the dirt, the exemption is because of destructive action—“there he repairs, here he is destructive”—so “purposeful labor” there refers to the law of destructive action, not to the exemption of melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa. It presents Tosafot’s view that melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa is an exemption built into the definition of the labor by the model of the Tabernacle, not a general rule of purposeful labor, unlike Rashi.

Destructive action: Sabbath 106b and wounding / kindling

The text cites the Talmud in Sabbath: “All destructive acts are exempt except for wounding and kindling,” and Rashi, who proves liability for wounding a person and kindling a stack from the general rule in Bava Kamma that one is “exempt from payment because he is judged with his life.” It brings Rabbi Yohanan’s response, “Go teach that outside,” and the Talmud’s explanation that the case is “one who wounds because he needs the blood for his dog, and one who kindles because he needs the ash,” followed by the Talmud’s distinction: “Our Mishnah is Rabbi Yehudah; the baraita is Rabbi Shimon.” It presents Rabbi Shimon’s reasons from the need for a verse to permit circumcision and from the prohibition of kindling in the case of a priest’s daughter, and Rabbi Yehudah’s answer that there the act is corrective—“as Rav Ashi said”—comparing commandment-related corrections to repairing a utensil or improving a cooking process.

Rashi and Rashbam: linking destructive action to a labor not needed for its own purpose

The text presents an explanation of Rashi and Rashbam that links the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehudah about the exemption for destructive action to the discussion of melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa. It explains that “he needs it for his dog / for its ash” is treated as melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa according to Rabbi Shimon, and so there would have been room to exempt were it not for the special teaching that there is no exemption of destructive action in the cases of wounding and kindling. It presents the logic that in wounding and kindling there is damage to the object itself together with some external need, and the tension between that and the definition of melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa sharpens the link between the two concepts for these commentators.

Tosafot in Sabbath: distinguishing the exemption of destructive action from the exemption of a labor not needed for its own purpose

The text brings Tosafot, who asks how Rabbi Abbahu can obligate in cases of wounding and kindling when one does not need the blood for his dog or the ash, since that would be melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa. Tosafot answers that even though Rabbi Shimon obligates destructive wounding, he still “requires that it be needed for its own purpose.” From this the text proves that melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa is not identical with the exemption of destructive action and does not depend on it, and concludes that according to Tosafot the exemption of melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa is not derived from the rule of purposeful labor in the same way destructive action is. It adds proof from the Talmud in Sanhedrin, which raises the issue of melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa even where destructive wounding is liable, and understands this as evidence against Rashi, who also treats melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa as an exemption based on purposeful labor.

Tosafot: fully destructive action that can still be needed for its own purpose

The text quotes Tosafot: “It can be said that even in a fully destructive act, one can still find a case where it is needed for its own purpose,” and gives the example of wounding or kindling involving property from which no benefit may be derived, where he thought he could feed it to his dog or cook a pot, so from his standpoint this is a need for the act itself even though the actual outcome is destructive. It presents Tosafot’s question why “he needs it for his dog / for its ash” counts as needed for its own purpose, and what the difference is from digging a pit when one only needs the dirt. It answers that in wounding, the need is for the taking of life itself, because “the blood is the life,” so use of the blood is the very body of the labor; and in kindling, the burning is the way of producing ash, just as one kindles to cook. It concludes that in digging a pit, one benefits from the dirt, but the pit is made only incidentally and he does not benefit from it, and therefore it is melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa.

An attempt to explain Rashi through the Ran and Kehillot Yaakov

The text cites Kehillot Yaakov in Ketubot, section 4, in the name of the Ran, explaining Rashi’s view as distinguishing between lack of need for the labor and a different positive need, and comparing that to the distinction between lack of intention and opposite intention. It presents that according to this line, even if there is no exemption of destructive action in wounding and kindling, there can still be an exemption of melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa when there is another positive purpose, whereas circumcision is viewed as destructive action with no “other purpose,” only the need of a commandment, which is not considered a repair. It concludes that the text sees this as strengthening the comparison earlier mentioned from Arukh HaShulchan between opposite intention and absence of intention, and thereby establishes a systematic difference between Tosafot and Rashi regarding the nature of the exemption of melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa.

Full Transcript

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, we’re in the topic of melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa, a labor not needed for its own purpose. We saw that, in principle, there are three approaches to defining what it means for a labor to be needed for its own purpose. One approach is Rashi’s: it’s a labor that comes to remove harm. Tosafot’s approach is that it’s a labor done for a purpose that apparently was not present in the Tabernacle. Or there’s a third approach, which maybe can also fit into Tosafot in at least some places, namely that it’s done not for the normal purpose for which that labor is usually done—not necessarily the Tabernacle, but the normal purpose.

[Speaker B] We’ll get to that today in a moment; that already touches a bit more on the question of destructive action. We’ll talk about that soon.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So, a few implications I want to focus on—sources and implications. We have, first of all, the case of someone digging a pit and only needing its dirt, which is the case usually brought as melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa. What happens if there is also some improvement in the pit? He’s doing it for the dirt, but the existence of the pit itself creates some sort of improvement. So here, in fact, there’s a dispute among medieval authorities (Rishonim) in a number of places. There are quite a few Rishonim—Rashba and Ritva in Eruvin and others—who say that in such a case he would be liable. The Maggid Mishneh and Rashbam say that he is exempt. It could be that this depends on the very dispute we’ve been discussing. According to Tosafot, where everything depends on resemblance to the Tabernacle, if I dug for the sake of the sand or dirt, then it’s not like what they did in the Tabernacle; in the Tabernacle they dug for the sake of the pit. The fact that it also produces some improvement in the pit doesn’t matter. If I dug for another purpose, then it’s not the purpose for which they dug in the Tabernacle. But if you understand that you have to benefit from what you are doing—that it’s not merely a labor of removal, but there is benefit in the pit itself—then, like Rashi for example, he would be liable even in such a case. There’s a passage on page 103 that I want to bring. The Talmud there says—I already mentioned this passage—the one who weeds, trims, and prunes. “The Sages taught: one who plucks endives and one who prunes twigs—if it is for eating, the measure is a dried fig; if for animal feed, enough for a kid’s mouthful; if for fuel, enough to cook a light egg; and if for improving the ground, any amount.” Right—even the tiniest amount, no set measure. “What, are not all of these for improving the ground?” Rabbah and Rav Yosef both said: it was taught regarding marshland. We’re talking about ground that I have no interest in improving—it’s marshland, not a field, not a courtyard, nothing like that. Abaye said: you can even say it’s a field, not marshland, where he does have an interest in improving the ground, but where he did not intend it. He didn’t intend that. But didn’t Abaye and Rava both say that Rabbi Shimon agrees in a case of pesik reisha velo yamut—an inevitable result? Here the ground is necessarily improved, so why should he be exempt? The Talmud says: it’s needed only for a case where he did it on another person’s land. Right? So Tosafot there writes as follows: “It is needed only for a case where he did it on another person’s land. The Arukh explained that in the case of pesik reisha where one does not want the result, such as when he does it on another person’s land, and in the case of someone else whom he does not love…” We’re talking about someone he doesn’t like. Why? Because if it were someone he does like, then what difference does it make that it’s another person’s land? In the end, he’s improving the land. “And one who cuts off a leprous spot at the time of circumcision, where he gets no benefit, is permitted from the outset—even a rabbinic prohibition does not apply. And Rabbenu Chananel permitted a barrel that was plugged with flax to remove the plug and draw wine from it on the Sabbath, even though it is impossible that some squeezing not occur when he removes the plug, since he gets no benefit from that squeezing, as the wine falls to the ground.” So up to this point, the Arukh has brought proof that pesik reisha where one does not want the result is permitted. Right? Normally they agree that according to Rabbi Shimon, a case of pesik reisha is prohibited, but only if the result is desirable to him. If it’s not desirable to him, or he doesn’t care—we saw that there’s a dispute here—if it’s not desirable, then it’s permitted; it goes back to being an unintended act. That’s the Arukh. This is all the Arukh, yes. Then Tosafot says: “And this does not seem correct.” Now this is Tosafot. “For lancing an abscess in order to remove pus from it would have been prohibited were it not for bodily pain.” Someone lances an abscess to remove pus from it—that would have been prohibited; the only reason they permitted it is because of bodily pain. Prohibited means rabbinically prohibited, yes. They permitted it only because of bodily pain, even though he gets no benefit at all from constructing the opening, and has no intention whatsoever to construct the opening, only to make a hole. And Rashba also brought proof from the case of a hand-needle used to remove a thorn, which is explained in tractate Sanhedrin according to Rabbi Shimon, who says that for a labor not needed for its own purpose one is exempt, and it is permitted because of pain, even though he gets no benefit.” Meaning: there is a rabbinic prohibition, and only because of pain did they permit it. Why? According to the Arukh, this should have been completely permitted, since it’s an unintended act. “And when it says that the case is another person’s land, that only means he is not liable to bring a sin-offering, but there is still a prohibition.” Here Tosafot disagrees with the Arukh and argues that this is not completely permitted; it is rabbinically prohibited. But where did you get a rabbinic prohibition from? Either way: if you tell me that this is pesik reisha and desirability is irrelevant, then it should be Torah-prohibited, since Rabbi Shimon agrees in a case of pesik reisha velo yamut. And if you agree with the Arukh, then it should be completely permitted. So where did you invent a rabbinic prohibition from? Here we get to what I already mentioned: according to Tosafot, pesik reisha where one does not want the result is essentially melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa. The difference between melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa and pesik reisha lies in the question of whether the result is desirable. If it’s not desirable to him, that is exactly what is called melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa. And until this point we hadn’t actually been dealing with melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa at all—we were dealing with pesik reisha and an unintended act. Now the issue of melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa enters. Tosafot, unlike the Arukh—the Arukh says that if it’s not desirable, then it goes back to being an unintended act and is completely permitted. Tosafot says no, no: it doesn’t go back to being an unintended act; it is melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa, and that is rabbinically prohibited.

[Speaker D] But that’s not Tosafot’s approach, no? According to Tosafot, an unintended act is where the labor does not resemble what they did in the Tabernacle. Okay, this is simply called a labor that does resemble what they did in the Tabernacle.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. In other words, Tosafot says this is pesik reisha where one does not want the result. What does “does not want the result” mean? It means the forbidden labor that they did in the Tabernacle is not what I want. I want to do this for another purpose, one they did not have in the Tabernacle, and therefore it is melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa.

[Speaker E] Why is an unintended act a rabbinic prohibition?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? No. Melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa is rabbinically prohibited. An unintended act is completely permitted. If there is pesik reisha, then he is liable to bring a sin-offering—but only if it is desirable to him. If it is not desirable, then this is not in the category of unintended acts at all; it’s in the category of melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa, and that is rabbinically prohibited. That’s what I said: according to Tosafot there is really no difference between an unintended act and the definition of melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa; the whole question is whether it is desirable or not. It is not a substantive distinction, unlike Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides and other approaches. Right, that’s what he says: “And when it says it is another person’s land, that only means he is not liable to bring a sin-offering, but there is still a prohibition.” There is a rabbinic prohibition here because it is melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa. “And what it says at the end of ‘All that is more frequent,’ that one who volunteers wine brings it and sprinkles it over the fire-offerings…” We brought that Talmud in Zevachim, yes? Someone sprinkles wine over the fire-offerings, and the Gemara asks: “But he is extinguishing!” After all, by sprinkling wine on the fire-offerings you are extinguishing the fire on the altar, and it says, “It shall burn on the altar; it shall not be extinguished.” This is not about Sabbath, but about the prohibition on extinguishing the altar fire. And they explain it according to Rabbi Shimon, who says that an unintended act is permitted. So what do we see there? We’re dealing here with pesik reisha, but one where he does not want the result, right? So seemingly it should be rabbinically prohibited. Why is it permitted? This is a rabbinic prohibition. So he says: this is interesting, because it’s not in the laws of Sabbath at all. What? Why would he want the wine to extinguish the fire on the altar? He wants to sprinkle wine; he doesn’t want the fire to go out. He has no interest in that. But notice: if this really is melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa, then what does that have to do with it? There we are not talking about Sabbath law, but about the law of extinguishing the altar fire. Okay. So he assumes that perhaps the concept exists—that is, pesik reisha where one does not want the result, outside Sabbath law, would be like melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa; but in the rest of the Torah there is no such exemption of melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa. Maybe he says there is, maybe yes, because after all it comes out of the category of unintended acts, and unintended acts apply throughout the Torah. Fine. We’ll see. “Maybe it’s not pesik reisha, because he sprinkles it in thin drops. Or alternatively, onto the limbs, where it is possible that the fire will not go out. And in the chapter ‘The Stolen Lulav,’ regarding ‘One may not reduce it on a holiday,’ in the name of Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon they said: one may reduce it—meaning remove berries from the myrtle. And it asks: but he is repairing a utensil!” Yes, when you remove the berries from the myrtle, you are fixing the myrtle itself. “And it answers: for example, where he picked them for eating.” He picks them for eating, not to fix the myrtle. “And an unintended act is permitted. And it asks: but didn’t Abaye and Rava both say that Rabbi Shimon agrees in a case of pesik reisha velo yamut?” If he plucks the berries, then it is an inevitable result that the myrtle gets fixed.

[Speaker C] Right, that’s on Sabbath.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s detached. “And it answers: no, it is needed only for a case where he has another hosha‘na branch.” He already has a myrtle branch; he doesn’t need this one. That’s like another person’s land, right? “This implies like the Arukh’s interpretation, that when he gets no benefit it is permitted even though it is pesik reisha. And one cannot say that since he has another hosha‘na branch in reserve, he is fixing nothing at all, because if so, why does it say there that it follows the one who says an unintended act is permitted?” If he’s fixing nothing, then it has nothing to do with unintended acts. “However, one can say that such a minor repair, like reducing berries, is only rabbinically prohibited, and the Sages did not decree where he gets no benefit.” In any case, for our purposes what Tosafot says is that pesik reisha where one does not want the result is melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa. Now the Ritva there says: “Are not all of them for improving the land?” Meaning, after all the land improves on its own. And we answer: where he does not want it. And it asks: didn’t Abaye and Rava say that Rabbi Shimon agrees in a case of pesik reisha velo yamut? And we answer: no, it is needed only where it is on another person’s land. Meaning: he does not care about improving it. What does ‘he does not care about improving it’ mean? We are not talking about someone else whom he does not love. It simply isn’t his, so he does not care whether it improves. Meaning… “And from here they brought some proof from the Geonim, and so it is written in the Arukh, and Tosafot also agreed, that Rabbi Shimon only prohibited an unintended act when it is a case of pesik reisha velo yamut where he wants that act done automatically. And they brought another proof from what we say in the chapter ‘The Stolen Lulav’ regarding myrtle…” yes, what we saw, “and also from what they said later in the chapter ‘All Sacred Writings,’ that they flay the Passover offering on the 14th when it falls on the Sabbath, where he does not intend to flay it. And it asks: but it is pesik reisha. And it answers: for example, where he takes it in strips.” Meaning, he punctures and flays it, and he does not care about preserving the hide through proper flaying. “And they found this difficult…” yes, that’s up to Tosafot. “And they found it difficult from what we say later in the chapter ‘Eight Creeping Things’: this stopper of a wine barrel is forbidden to tighten.” This is that rag he pushes into the barrel, and then he squeezes the wine. We also saw that in Tosafot; not important right now. “Still, the matter is very puzzling. Where it is pesik reisha velo yamut, for what reason would Rabbi Shimon permit it because he does not want it? The reason the Talmud gives that Rabbi Shimon agrees in a case of pesik reisha velo yamut is that since it cannot be avoided that a labor be done, it is as though he intended it—it is purposeful labor. If so, what difference does it make whether he wants it or does not want it?” After all, it’s still pesik reisha; why should I care whether it’s convenient for him or not? In other words, the Ritva claims not that it should be permitted, but that he should actually be liable. Right? So he’s arguing against both the Arukh and Tosafot. “And one cannot say that when he does not want it, it is melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa, because it certainly is needed for its own purpose.” He says you can’t say, like Tosafot, that pesik reisha where one does not want the result is a definition of melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa. Why not? Because it is needed for its own purpose. In the end, the improvement is being carried out. Why should I care that it’s another person’s land? It’s complete improvement of the land and complete squeezing; he just doesn’t need it. So what? “Likewise, if he plowed a field with an animal and intended only to tire out his animals, would he be exempt?” In the end, he plowed the land. Why should I care that his subjective intention was only to tire out the animals? Tosafot… Tosafot’s comment that it is talking about someone he hates—another person’s land, someone he hates—that is, someone else, of course, not specifically a ‘friend’ in the sense we’re using here.

[Speaker E] He’s basically asking about melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa—is he asking whether here he would be exempt? But his whole claim is that melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa should be prohibited, not that he should be liable. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, so—right, the wording is a bit odd. Why? He says: Tosafot, you say this is melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa, right? And then it’s rabbinically prohibited. And the Arukh says it’s completely permitted. The Ritva says: what do you mean? He should be liable! Not exempt and not permitted—liable.

[Speaker C] Right, because this is…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] …not melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa. Here he intends this and he is doing an improvement; everything is taking place. According to Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehudah—what do you mean exempt? What do you mean?

[Speaker C] There is a case, there is a case of a labor not…

[Speaker E] …needed for its own purpose.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? Someone digging a pit and only needing the dirt. No—but that is melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa. He’s doing it for the dirt, not for the pit. In the case of improving the land, the land was improved. Absolutely, so what?

[Speaker C] So obviously he should be liable.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t understand.

[Speaker C] What’s the distinction? Wait a second.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here he says that from the standpoint of…

[Speaker C] It seems to me he’s saying that from the standpoint of…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, in these cases where it’s another person’s land. In that case, where it’s another person’s land, he says it doesn’t matter—the land was improved. What difference does it make that it’s another person’s land? That’s it. What’s the difference between that and someone digging a pit and only needing the dirt? The claim there is that it simply was not improved. It didn’t happen; the result didn’t occur. It’s not because of the subjective dimension. Meaning, that is exactly what the Ritva wants to argue. The Ritva wants to say that the definition of melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa is not determined by the subjective purposes of the actor, of the person. It’s in the object itself, in the question of what happened. If what happened is not the kind of benefit that existed in the Tabernacle, then it is melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa. It doesn’t matter why you did it; what matters is what happened in practice. Therefore, another person’s land is irrelevant. Another person’s land is only a question of why you did it, but I’m asking: what happened in practice? Was the land improved here? If the land was improved here, then why should I care that it’s another person’s land? That’s what he’s asking. But then why…

[Speaker E] In the previous case too, here the land was improved?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t understand.

[Speaker E] But maybe there too the land was improved, meaning…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, is it fit for plowing? No, no, it wasn’t improved.

[Speaker E] He…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] …is doing it for the sand.

[Speaker E] No, but the land was improved.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it wasn’t improved.

[Speaker E] Here no—no, no, this is marshland.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Marshland. Right, right. If the land really was improved, then I already said at the beginning of the lecture: if the pit itself really constitutes some sort of improvement in its own right, then indeed there are Rishonim who say he would be liable. Then you don’t have the exemption of… And then the question always becomes: so how is that different from destructive action? We’ll see; we’ll still talk about that. “And were I not afraid of the great authorities,” says the Ritva, “I would have said that the Talmud only said that when he does not care, Rabbi Shimon permits it only in a matter that in itself is not considered a significant act or a labor. Therefore, whenever he does not care, it returns to its essential nature, in which there is no labor and no significant act.” For example, here: strictly speaking, improving the ground by any tiny amount is not considered a labor. Improving the ground just a little is not called a labor, unless you attribute significance to it because of some need. Unless you have some substantial need in it, then even a seemingly trivial thing—like a little pit in the ground—can be considered needed for its own purpose, a significant act. “And likewise, reducing berries from detached myrtle—the need of the commandment, for its correction, is what makes it a correction and gives it significance. But when he does not care and does not intend it at all, then it is insignificant and not considered.” Meaning, the motives of the person acting are a second level. First of all, the act itself has to be something intrinsically minor. If the act is not minor, I don’t care about your motives. If the act itself is minor, then it depends: if it is desirable to you and you are doing it because you genuinely need it, then even though the act itself is not important, I will still see it as a repair. But if the act itself is important, then your motives make no difference to me. Okay? That’s basically what he’s saying. Right, only for acts that are not significant. What you were saying—the act of fixing the myrtle by removing the berries from it…

[Speaker E] The rules the Talmud gave about minimum measures for labors, they’re all this kind of after-the-fact thing—they’re just a minimum that only counts because he gives them significance. All those measures the Talmud gave.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The measures for labors are just part of the definition of the labor in general; it has nothing to do with melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa.

[Speaker E] No, here he’s arguing against the whole idea that the measure defines the labor. He says no—the measure is not really what makes it a labor. No, he’s not talking about the measure.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He’s talking about the person’s intention.

[Speaker E] Why? Because every measure already makes it significant. Right? He says no, it’s… yes, but not connected to the measure.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He’s not dealing specifically with the measures, but with the person’s intentions. There are measures there; the measures are a condition in defining the labor. What he’s saying is that the person’s intentions are relevant in a place where the labor, in and of itself, is not significant.

[Speaker E] And then if the person himself wants it, fine.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The measures are the objective standard. I’m saying the labor is not really important…

[Speaker E] Not connected to the measures, not because of the measures.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He says there are certain labors, irrespective of measures, that are not significant. Only if you assign significance to them can it be that you would be liable. Not every act of building—but digging a hole in the ground, for example, is not something significant.

[Speaker E] That’s the measure the Talmud gave. Meaning, the Talmud said this is the measure that itself gives it the status of a labor.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t understand. Every…

[Speaker E] All the measures the Talmud gave for the labors are what gives them significance. Less than that isn’t considered a labor; more than that…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Below that, regardless of his motivation, nothing happens. Once the measure is met, the labor as such is significant. And still, even when the measure exists, there can be a situation where it’s still not significant.

[Speaker E] If he builds an entire building, then it doesn’t matter what significance… what he intended. When the Talmud gave a minimum measure, it didn’t mean that this is the measure that itself gives it the status of a labor, but only a condition such that if he really intended it, that gives it significance.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no. I’m saying it depends. He says first of all there is the minimum measure. Without the minimum measure, you won’t be liable. Whether you intended it or not, nothing matters. Wait, wait, wait. Exactly, exactly. Meaning, first of all there is the minimum measure. Once the minimum measure exists, then we can start talking to you. Below that measure, you are not liable in any case, regardless of your motivation and why you did it. Once the measure exists, it still depends. It could be that even in this case—there’s no measure in digging in the ground, but never mind. So that is the minimum condition for building or plowing, okay? Even then, even if that exists, there are cases where the labor is not significant. Then it depends: if you intended it, you will be liable even though the labor is not significant. If you did not intend it, you won’t be liable. But all of that is only if you are above the threshold of the minimum measure. If you are not at that threshold, then there is nothing to discuss at all; it has nothing to do with your intentions.

[Speaker E] So this condition the Talmud gave is a condition that is not… it is not enough to give significance. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s a necessary condition, but not a sufficient one. Below the measure there is nothing to discuss. After the measure is met, there will still be labors that are not sufficiently important in themselves, and then your intention is needed.

[Speaker E] Can I say that this condition the Talmud mentions is really not a condition that gives significance? It’s just a condition the Talmud states, we call…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can call that significance or lack of significance. On the face of it, the measure determines significance. But the claim is that this determination is necessary and not sufficient. That’s the Ritva’s claim. Meaning, even if the condition of the measure is met, it is still not certain that the labor is significant in the sense that you would be objectively liable for it. There are more significant situations that are…

[Speaker E] Because it’s…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not about measures; it depends on intention.

[Speaker E] No, there are cases where intention will no longer be relevant.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, exactly. The Talmud didn’t give that measure here. Right. You look and see whether the resulting thing is significant or not significant. Right, the Or HaChaim really says this explicitly: the lowly character of the labor in itself, and the good intention. Exactly. Only where the labor itself is not significant—there you can discuss…

[Speaker D] Yes, but…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For our purposes, basically…

[Speaker D] What? That’s not the Or HaChaim’s reasoning. He doesn’t disagree—on the contrary, he goes against Nachmanides.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He goes against Nachmanides, yes. So in the end, the claim is basically this: first of all, Tosafot identifies pesik reisha where one does not want the result with melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa. The Ritva does not identify them. Beyond that, the Ritva also explains why not: because the person’s intentions are not relevant. Whether the result is desirable or not speaks about the person, but he argues that the definition is a definition in the labor itself. It may be that the person’s intentions have significance, because after all there are Talmudic passages that show this: in fixing myrtle, in sprinkling wine onto the fire-offerings. There are passages where we see that the person’s intention matters. But that is only where the labors are not significant in themselves; then if the person gives them significance, it may be that he would still be liable. Another implication that I already spoke about is with regard to purposeful labor. If the dispute between Rashi and Tosafot in Chagigah is whether I do or do not learn melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa from the rule of purposeful labor, but rather from some general principle—then if it is not learned from purposeful labor, you have to say that it basically depends on what was in the Tabernacle. Then it is an exemption in the very definition of the labor itself: what was in the Tabernacle is what defines the labor. According to Rashi, it has nothing to do with the way it was done in the Tabernacle; rather, there is a general definition. Once it’s a labor of removal or something like that, then this is not a significant labor. We already discussed this, and I also mentioned that there, apparently, it is written explicitly in the Talmud in Chagigah that the exemption for melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa is learned from the law of purposeful labor. I already mentioned this—I’m repeating it here—but what would Tosafot say about that? After all, the Talmud itself says that melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa is an exemption under the laws of purposeful labor. Tosafot will say—let me remind you—that the Talmud there says this is one of the ‘mountains hanging by a hair’: someone digging a pit and only needing the dirt is one of those ‘mountains hanging by a hair.’ According to whom? According to Rabbi Shimon, who says that for melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa one is exempt. The Talmud says: you can even say it is according to Rabbi Yehudah; there he repairs, here he is destructive. Meaning, in the case of digging a pit and only needing the dirt, he is in fact being destructive, and therefore he is exempt. So Rabbi Yehudah also agrees. It doesn’t only work according to Rabbi Shimon; when the Talmud says he is exempt, Rabbi Yehudah also agrees because he is destructive. The Talmud asks: why is this called ‘mountains hanging by a hair’? Because ‘the Torah prohibited purposeful labor,’ but that phrase is not written explicitly. On the face of it, that refers to melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa. But according to Tosafot, apparently one has to say that this is according to Rabbi Yehudah. Because according to Rabbi Yehudah, the exemption here is not melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa, since Rabbi Yehudah holds one liable for that. So why does Rabbi Yehudah exempt here? Because it is destructive action. And about that the Mishnah says this is ‘like mountains hanging by a hair.’ And the law of destructive action really does come from the law of purposeful labor—that is why it is ‘like mountains hanging by a hair.’ Melakha she’eina tzerikha legufa, according to Tosafot, has nothing to do with purposeful labor. It is simply the definition of the labor: what was in the Tabernacle is the prohibited labor; what was not in the Tabernacle is not. Not because of the law of purposeful labor, which is a broad, general law. We already discussed this. Good. Now I want to get into the issues of destructive action and pouring…

[Speaker E] …onto the back of the altar. I didn’t understand. So your question is basically whether destructive action is…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] …not supposed to be…

[Speaker E] …the issue of destructive action when he pours?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, because that’s only in the laws of the Sabbath, where there is the rule of intentional, constructive labor. I already pointed out that according to Tosafot it’s not clear why labor not needed for its own sake is said only in the laws of the Sabbath and not throughout all of the Torah. But now, in light of what we’ve just seen—and I already noted this back when I spoke about intentional labor—in light of what we’ve now seen, it could actually be that it does apply more broadly. Because according to Tosafot, labor not needed for its own sake is not a separate exemption from unintentional action; it’s simply an inevitable result that one does not want. So in every case, like pouring wine on top of the fire, then it could be that this really would apply throughout the Torah. Destructive action would not apply throughout the Torah, because destructive action comes out of the rule of intentional labor. Intentional labor is said only regarding the laws of the Sabbath. The Talmud in tractate Shabbat on page 106 says this. We want to talk a bit about destructive action and return to the connection between destructive action and labor not needed for its own sake. “And all destructive acts are exempt”—that’s what it says in the Mishnah. The Talmud says: Rabbi Abbahu taught before Rabbi Yohanan: all destructive acts are exempt except for wounding and kindling. Of the thirty-nine primary categories of labor, in all of them if he did it in a destructive way he is exempt, except for two primary labors: wounding and kindling. In wounding and kindling, even though it is destructive, he would still be liable. So the Talmud says: what does it mean, “except for wounding”? Rashi says—sorry—one who wounds a person, and it is destructive, is nevertheless liable. As we learned in Bava Kamma: one who wounds his fellow on the Sabbath is exempt from payment because he is judged with his life. In Bava Kamma it says that someone who wounds his fellow on the Sabbath is exempt because he is judged with his life—he receives the greater punishment. So what do we see? That in terms of the laws of the Sabbath he is liable, and that’s why he is liable to death, and therefore exempt from monetary payment under the rule that the greater punishment takes precedence. So under the laws of the Sabbath he is liable. Why is he liable? After all, this is destructive. Why is he liable? We see that with wounding there is no exemption of destructive action. Regarding kindling, Rashi says: one who burns a stack of grain—it is destructive, and yet he is liable, as we learned in Bava Kamma, and one who lit the stack is exempt from payment because he is judged with his life. Again, he is liable under the laws of the Sabbath, and exempt because he is judged with his life. So what do we see? In terms of the laws, he is exempt from payment, so under the laws of the Sabbath he is liable. Why is he liable? After all, he is merely acting destructively. So we see that in kindling too there is no exemption of destructive action. So the Talmud challenges this: he said to him, “Go teach that outside”—wounding and kindling is not a valid teaching. After all, there is a baraita that says that wounding and kindling is not a valid teaching; it’s not true. With wounding and kindling too, if it is destructive he is exempt. And if you want to say—what will you say, that he is liable? Those two sources that Rashi brought are speaking of one who wounds because he needs it for his dog, and one who kindles because he needs the ash. Like someone who wounds a person because he needs that person’s blood for his dog, and one who kindles because he needs the ash. Why? To cover blood or something like that—he needs the ash.

[Speaker E] So basically, when it says that “wounding and kindling is not a valid teaching,” does that mean exempt in the case of kindling?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, “wounding and kindling is not a valid teaching” means that what you told me—that destructive action in wounding and kindling is different—is not correct. In wounding and kindling too, destructive action is exempt. You said above that there is an exemption of destructive action in all labors except for wounding and kindling. Not true. In wounding and kindling too there is an exemption of destructive action. They are not exceptional labors; they are like all the other labors. If one did them in a destructive way, he is exempt. So it says: and if you say that it is a valid teaching—in other words, that there really is no exemption in wounding and kindling, no exemption when it is destructive—then it says: when is that? When he needs it for his dog, and when he kindles because he needs the ash. It’s a bit not…

[Speaker E] It’s not clear what the two possibilities are. What does that mean?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s a little unclear. So the claim is that we’re talking here about a case where he actually improved something—when he needs it for his dog or for the ash. So the Talmud says: but didn’t we learn, “all destructive acts are exempt,” including wounding and kindling? So it says: the Mishnah follows Rabbi Yehuda; the baraita follows Rabbi Shimon. The rule that all destructive acts are exempt—that’s the Mishnah—follows Rabbi Yehuda. The baraita that says “except for wounding and kindling” follows Rabbi Shimon. And there is a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon whether there is an exemption of destructive action in wounding and kindling. According to Rabbi Yehuda yes; according to Rabbi Shimon no. What is Rabbi Shimon’s reason? Why does Rabbi Shimon hold that in wounding and kindling there is no exemption of destructive action? Because a verse was needed to permit circumcision—so ordinary wounding must be liable. And because the Merciful One forbade burning in the case of a priest’s daughter, we learn from here that ordinary kindling is liable. Rabbi Shimon says: how do I know that in wounding and kindling there is no exemption of destructive action? Because I see that the verse had to permit it, which implies that without that permission it would have been forbidden. What kind of destructive action? So you see there is no exemption of destructive action, right? Here the verse specifically permitted it, but in principle there is no exemption of destructive action. And Rabbi Yehuda says: there it is constructive, as Rav Ashi explained, for Rav Ashi said: what difference is there between correcting circumcision, correcting a vessel, cooking a wick, and cooking dyes? So there it is talking about a constructive act. Truly destructive action would be exempt even in wounding and kindling, and the reason a verse was needed there is because there it is a constructive act. So how does Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda come in here? Who are this Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda being referred to? Rashi claims that the dispute is the dispute about labor not needed for its own sake. Labor not needed for its own sake—what does that mean? That when you wound or kindle, you are in fact producing a constructive result, yes, but this flips based on their basic dispute. According to Rabbi Yehuda, labor not needed for its own sake is liable. So now what? Now you tell me: you suddenly see a verse permitting wounding and kindling, and then you say: why do I need a verse to permit it? In any case it is destructive, right? In any case it is destructive. So according to Rabbi Shimon that really is a good question: why do I need a verse to permit it, if in any case it is destructive? But according to Rabbi Yehuda that is not a good question, because it is not true that it is necessarily destructive; here we have labor not needed for its own sake, and Rabbi Yehuda obligates in labor not needed for its own sake. Say, in a case of wounding where he needs it for his dog, or kindling where he needs the ash—according to Rabbi Shimon he is exempt, because it is labor not needed for its own sake. He needs it for his dog; he doesn’t need the act itself. That is called labor not needed for its own sake.

[Speaker B] He doesn’t…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] need the act itself. He needs that blood for his dog—not that the blood itself is the constructive result; he needs that blood for his dog, or the ash. So then—why do I need a verse to exempt it? We see that there is no exemption in wounding and kindling. According to Rabbi Yehuda there is no question why a verse is needed. A verse is needed because otherwise I would have imposed liability. Why would I have imposed liability? Because according to Rabbi Yehuda one is liable even for labor not needed for its own sake. So there was reason to impose liability here, and therefore there is no question why a verse is needed to exempt, because without the verse I would have imposed liability, since it was labor not needed for its own sake. According to Rabbi Shimon there is a question why a verse is needed to exempt, because in any case I would have exempted it, since for labor not needed for its own sake you are exempt. So why is a verse needed? Evidently, without the verse he really would have been liable even though it is destructive. Okay? So we see that according to Rabbi Shimon, destructive action does not apply to wounding and kindling, and according to Rabbi Yehuda, destructive action does apply to wounding and kindling—to all labors. I didn’t understand. In wounding and kindling you are always destructive, always destructive. It’s only according to Rabbi Yehuda that it can be that even though you are destructive here, you still need it for some other purpose. According to Rabbi Shimon it doesn’t help that you need it for some other purpose, because labor not needed for its own sake is exempt; but according to Rabbi Yehuda labor not needed for its own sake is liable. So in principle there is no question why a verse is needed to exempt. Obviously, according to Rabbi Yehuda, without the verse I would have imposed liability because labor not needed for its own sake is liable. According to Rabbi Shimon, even without the verse I would have exempted, because for labor not needed for its own sake you are exempt. So why is a verse needed? We are forced to say that in wounding and kindling there is no exemption for destructive action. Clear?

[Speaker D] The discussion is about the verses—why the Torah needs…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] to teach me that in wounding and kindling this is permitted. Which implies that without the Torah’s permission it would have been forbidden. Right? Why would it have been forbidden? According to Rabbi Shimon, after all—Rabbi Shimon says—it’s destructive, so why should it be forbidden? Because there is no exemption of destructive action in wounding and kindling. According to Rabbi Yehuda the question doesn’t arise. What do you mean destructive? It is destructive—the act of burning itself is destructive—but if you need the ash, then it is labor not needed for its own sake, and according to Rabbi Yehuda labor not needed for its own sake is liable, so I would say that you are liable were it not for the Torah’s permission. Therefore the Torah’s permission is needed. So it turns out that if you are truly destructive, then destructive action is exempt even in wounding and kindling according to Rabbi Yehuda. Okay? That is how Rashi learns. Tosafot there bring several approaches for understanding this Talmudic passage. Rabbeinu Shmuel explained—the Rashbam, right?—that Rabbi Abbahu held like Rabbi Shimon, who says that destructive action in wounding is liable. And Rabbi Yohanan held like Rabbi Yehuda, who says that destructive action in wounding and kindling is exempt. And when he needs it for his dog or for the ash, that is not considered destructive, and he is liable even according to Rabbi Yehuda. Why is it not considered destructive? Because he holds that one is liable for labor not needed for its own sake. Fine? According to Rabbi Shimon, he holds that labor not needed for its own sake is exempt, therefore needing it for his dog or for the ash is called destructive. Because the fact that you need it for some other purpose is labor not needed for its own sake—that doesn’t matter. And this itself is a destructive act. You see that according to Rashi and Rashbam there is a connection between destructive action and labor not needed for its own sake. Once you damage the thing, but you have some other need, yes?—then that is labor not needed for its own sake. You damage something, but you have another need, and there you are not damaging—there you do need it. So that is labor not needed for its own sake. For example, one who digs a hole and needs only the dirt. Why is that called labor not needed for its own sake? Because the hole as such is destructive. He is not doing it for the sake of the hole; as far as he is concerned the hole is damage. He is doing it for the dirt, right? So that is defined as labor not needed for its own sake, because the need for the act itself—the need for the hole—is destructive. So what need do you have? Another need. So that is labor not needed for its own sake. Right. At least according to Rashi and Rashbam, it appears that destructive action and labor not needed for its own sake are two sides of the same coin. Whenever the purpose for which you are damaging has no real…

[Speaker E] Only…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] where you don’t have some other need, and truly…

[Speaker E] So everywhere that you would state the exemption of destructive action, necessarily there would also be…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I dig a hole not for the dirt, fine? For the hole itself. And the hole is destructive, so I am exempt. Why am I exempt? Because I damaged.

[Speaker E] It’s not connected…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] to labor not needed for its own sake.

[Speaker E] But if there’s any interest that makes it labor not needed for its own sake, it always just comes up that if there’s some constructive aspect in it—without taking his own opinion into account—right? I didn’t understand. Meaning, one who digs a hole and needs only the dirt—still, if we’re not talking about the dirt, then it is a constructive act.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why is that constructive? If it damages the ground, then it’s damage. He digs for the hole, damaging the ground. He wants to damage the ground, I don’t know.

[Speaker E] No, but if someone wants a hole in the ground, then for him it’s a constructive act.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course. Then he isn’t damaging; he is improving. If it’s a field that you are plowing, then it’s an improvement.

[Speaker E] No, so in such a case again it’s labor not needed for its own sake—it’s not that there’s no destructive action… Why? It’s labor needed for its own sake.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You are digging in a field so that there will be a hole there in order to plow the field—what do you mean? That’s labor needed for its own sake. And plowing, no?

[Speaker E] Plowing. If in every case of one who digs a hole and needs only the dirt… digging is for the dirt.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you dig for the dirt, then it is labor not needed for its own sake.

[Speaker E] So there is still such a thing as destructive action that isn’t like that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? There is. If I dig the hole in a place where I am causing damage, but I do it for the hole, not for the dirt—and this is damage. I’m damaging my own ground. Not because I need the dirt; I dig there in order to damage the ground. I feel like damaging. Tearing in anger, I don’t know exactly what. I dig and I damage, and I have no need for the dirt, then it will be the exemption of destructive action, not of labor not needed for its own sake. Labor not needed for its own sake is when I do the labor for some other need—for the dirt.

[Speaker E] And if he dug intentionally and he wants it—he wants to widen the ground, change the size…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then he is not damaging.

[Speaker E] Right, so that means it depends only on his intention, so it’s always…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, why? Why is it connected to his intention? Is it destructive or not? Does it objectively ruin things for him or not? Look there and see—is it ruining things for him or not?

[Speaker E] He wants it; for him it is…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what if he wants it? It still ruins things for him.

[Speaker E] If he wants—if he wants the ground to have that shape.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then that’s something else; then he’s not ruining it.

[Speaker E] So that means it all depends on what he wants.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it depends on his interests, not his wants. Again, it’s not connected to the subjective dimension. Anyone looking at it can see it. If he digs in this ground and there is no benefit at all from this digging—no benefit—but he does it for the hole. Why? Just because. I don’t know why. Then it’s destructive, no? He will be exempt because of destructive action. If he digs in water…

[Speaker E] But…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] if he digs for the sand, then he will be exempt because of labor not needed for its own sake, not because of destructive action. No—digging in a house, because it improves the house for him.

[Speaker E] Even if it isn’t written that it has to be…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course it does. If it doesn’t improve, then it’s destructive.

[Speaker E] As long as it is something he intends, it’s constructive, because from what you are doing…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no, no. It’s destructive. The fact that he intended to dig and not for the sand means that it is needed for its own sake, but it doesn’t mean that it isn’t destructive.

[Speaker E] Meaning, that’s not what the Talmud meant by “any amount,” that in your house “any amount” and only destruction… no, not connected.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Any amount” is in a place where it creates some kind of improvement. If it creates some kind of improvement in the house, then even for “any amount” you are liable. It’s not connected; the minimum measure is not connected to the issue. The measure is “any amount,” but there still has to be some benefit to the house from it. But if you dig for… again, there are several cases here. If you dig the hole and your purpose is the sand—you’re doing it for the sand—the hole itself is worthless to you, you don’t need the hole, then that is labor not needed for its own sake. If you dig it for the hole itself, then it is labor needed for its own sake, but we still have to ask: if this hole that you made is an improvement, then you are liable; but if it doesn’t create any improvement—if it is just plain destructive—then it is labor needed for its own sake and you will be exempt because it is destructive. It seems to me…

[Speaker E] a bit difficult, because with land it’s very problematic. If he tears—tears some cloth—the only way to know the difference between tearing in order to sew and not tearing in order to sew, or tearing not in order to sew, is purely by his intention. Meaning, destructive action will always be labor not needed for its own sake.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but…

[Speaker E] intention and interest are different things.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, if I knew that this person had in fact designated this cloth for sewing, fine? But right now he isn’t doing it for sewing, though I know this kind of cloth is useful to him—he sews, that’s his profession, fine? He isn’t doing it for that. In principle, this thing is an improvement. It doesn’t necessarily depend on the dispute we saw above between the Ritva and Tosafot—whether intention is a subjective matter or whether intention is an objective matter.

[Speaker E] So every time I say “destructive,” I’ll say: this is definitely destructive and not labor not needed for its own sake, because for someone else it’s constructive—because objectively it doesn’t matter at all what your intention is, you created here a utensil or something from which something can be made. Right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to the Ritva, that really would be considered constructive.

[Speaker E] There is no case of destructive action that would not be labor not needed for its own sake. Such a possibility doesn’t exist.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? If I do it for that very purpose and it is destructive. I don’t have some other purpose—then it isn’t labor not needed for its own sake.

[Speaker E] Can you see a case like that where you tear…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I tear in order to tear, not in order to sew.

[Speaker E] Obviously you tear in order to tear—without that it’s not even…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not in order to sew.

[Speaker E] I want it to be labor not needed for its own sake.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand.

[Speaker E] I’m saying that in every case of destructive action, obviously you don’t intend to improve, but every case you say a person is exempt because of destructive action—that will be labor not needed for its own sake.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, why? If you have no other purpose, it’s not labor not needed for its own sake.

[Speaker E] We said here that…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] it doesn’t matter what the person’s purpose is. No—why? First of all, according to Tosafot, the person’s purpose does matter. According to the Ritva, it doesn’t matter; what matters is only the objective improvement. Okay. What matters is the objective result.

[Speaker E] that there is no situation of destructive action.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Are you speaking now according to the Ritva? So according to the Ritva, we say that what determines it is whether an improvement was created in the thing itself, regardless of the person’s intentions. It could be that according to the Ritva… let’s think about it. One who digs a hole and needs only the dirt.

[Speaker E] Digging a hole is a problem, because you can say—you gave an interpretation like that—that there is a situation where it cannot be constructive, where it is only destructive. I’m not sure that’s true at all, because I think that if he intended it, he would certainly be liable.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no! He intended no other purpose at all except to make a hole, but this hole is of no use whatsoever.

[Speaker E] If he wants this hole…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He doesn’t want this hole—again.

[Speaker E] I’m saying: if it were a situation where he did want the hole, then suddenly you would say that this is building? That this is beneficial? Right. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the Ritva would say no—the Ritva would say that this stems from the fact that objectively there is an improvement here. The fact that he wants it is only an indication according to the Ritva. That’s not the main point.

[Speaker E] So why not say that in every case? Because if someone were suddenly to want it, it would be called improvement—so in every case it’s labor not needed for its own sake?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not true. He can want it and there still be no improvement at all. He can want it simply in order to vent his frustration.

[Speaker E] There’s no…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] improvement in it.

[Speaker E] What is that case where a person wants that form…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—he doesn’t want that form. He digs, I don’t know why; he digs absentmindedly, he digs just because he feels like digging. But that digging improves nothing.

[Speaker E] But I want to know whether there is a case—whether there is a case…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Digging in a lake. Say, digging in a lake.

[Speaker E] And he wants that shape in the lake.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, in the lake. But it doesn’t help him at all. Nothing. It’s not his field, he’s not going to plow there, he’s not building there, nothing. He would be exempt. In a house it is building; in a field it is plowing; in a lake it is nothing. Like someone else’s land, basically.

[Speaker E] Even if he wants that shape and that’s his plan, and he’s going to build a pool there?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he’s not going to build a pool there. That’s exactly the point. Then you’ve turned it into a house. No. He wants to dig—not for the sand—but he has no plan for what to do with this excavation. None. It’s a bit reminiscent of…

[Speaker E] But if he intends it, then he would be liable, meaning again, labor not needed for its own sake.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, if he intends it he would be liable?

[Speaker E] No, he is destructive. There is some… no, but if I… if he were to think, actually this could be a storage place or whatever, then suddenly it would be constructive. So according to the Ritva it’s labor not needed for its own sake, because what the person thinks is not supposed to matter to us…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it does matter—that’s what I’m saying. Very often, what the person… if the person is planning after all to do something with this hole in the lake, then the Ritva will say: okay, so that means the hole really does have some benefit. And then his thought is not what creates liability; it is only an indication. It only tells you that some kind of improvement really has been created here. So that means there is no…

[Speaker E] room, basically, for a case where even with the thought he would not be liable.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there is room. I’ll go back again.

[Speaker E] But you said there wasn’t—that if he… that there isn’t…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he wants to do something with it. If he wants to dig, but has no plan what to do with the excavation.

[Speaker E] Is there a case where if he wants to do something with it…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] he would still be exempt? Yes. No—if he wants to do something with it that has some result? No.

[Speaker E] So then it will always be labor not needed for its own sake, because here it depends only on what he wants?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not true. According to the Ritva, it doesn’t matter. If he wants to dig but not for any purpose, he has no purpose for what to do with the excavation—but… what he wants is to dig. He doesn’t want the sand.

[Speaker E] Yes, but according to the Ritva his views are not supposed to matter, so that means…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? In the law of destructive action, then it will be destructive.

[Speaker E] And according to the Ritva, regarding labor not needed for its own sake, no—it doesn’t matter at all; his views are not supposed to matter.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly, precisely! And therefore this is labor needed for its own sake, because it is not “not needed for its own sake” in that sense—there is no other purpose here. But there is damage here; it is still destructive.

[Speaker E] But every destructive act is supposed to be…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, we keep coming back to the same point. No, no, no. Labor not needed for its own sake requires another purpose. There has to be some other purpose for the digging—you want the sand. Another result, call it another result rather than another purpose.

[Speaker E] But the Ritva said that every time it is labor needed for its own sake, he would be liable, and that’s what…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but if it is destructive, then he would not be liable, because he is exempt under the rule of destructive action.

[Speaker E] But that’s my question. The Ritva said that it doesn’t matter at all what he thinks, but surely the Ritva agrees that if he set it up as his purpose, then suddenly he would be liable. So now you’re saying that he would be exempt because he forgot to intend it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, we look at the question whether there is benefit in the thing. Why? What does forgetting have to do with it? If there is benefit in the thing, sometimes the ability to know whether there is benefit depends on the question of what he plans to do with it. There is benefit in the thing if a person…

[Speaker E] agrees that no matter what he does—even the craziest thing he does in his field—if he plans it, yes, then he would be liable. So apparently according to the Ritva that means it will always be labor needed for its own sake… it can’t be destructive action. The exemption of destructive action can never operate. Because according to the Ritva, the exemption of destructive action does depend on his intention.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? Labor not needed for its own sake depends on whether there is improvement or no improvement. But the exemption of destructive action depends on his intention. Okay,

[Speaker E] and how, apparently, once I have labor not needed for its own sake, doesn’t that bypass the exemption of destructive action? Meaning, does it override the exemption of destructive action?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It means that even if you are not destructive, you will still be exempt.

[Speaker E] No, I’m saying that according to the Ritva, it’s not that there is such a thing—there is no such thing, basically, as labor not needed for its own sake; what we call labor not needed for its own sake is labor needed for its own sake. Meaning, the person’s intentions are not what determine…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] whether it is needed or not needed for its own sake. The question is whether an improvement was created in the thing.

[Speaker E] If an improvement was created in something else, then…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] it could be not needed for its own sake, because an improvement was created in something else—not because of his intentions, but because an improvement was created in something else. Yes.

[Speaker E] Okay. And once an improvement is created in the thing he is doing itself, okay, then according to the Ritva it immediately pushes aside the exemption of destructive action. It can’t be destructive if it is labor needed for its own sake; you can’t call that destructive.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] All right, come on—we’re going in circles, I’m not following. Fine. So therefore… he first brings the Rashbam, who says that the dispute between Rabbi Abbahu and Rabbi Yohanan is like the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda. Then he says: that is difficult, because if so, why did he say to him, “Go teach that outside”? If that comes from the fact that he holds like Rabbi Yehuda—if someone taught like Rabbi Shimon, would we silence him? We ask similarly in the first chapter of Hullin. “Go teach that outside”—if we are arguing about a tannaitic dispute, then what do you want? You bring me another tanna? I hold like this tanna, and you bring another tanna against me—why should that matter? Therefore he says: so we must say, therefore it appears that Rabbi Abbahu and Rabbi Yohanan disagree within Rabbi Shimon’s view. Meaning, the dispute between Rabbi Abbahu and Rabbi Yohanan is a dispute within Rabbi Shimon himself, not connected to Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Abbahu holds that for Rabbi Shimon, wounding and kindling—even if he does not need it for his dog or for the ash—still make him liable, because he derives this from circumcision and the burning of a priest’s daughter. What we saw, yes? According to Rabbi Shimon, Rabbi Abbahu holds that wounding and kindling have no exemption of destructive action, even if he needs it for his dog or for the ash—sorry, even if he does not need it for his dog or for the ash—meaning, he is acting destructively, and still he would be liable, because he derives it from circumcision and the burning of a priest’s daughter. And Rabbi Yohanan holds that even Rabbi Shimon imposes liability only if there is some slight improvement, such as where he needs it for his dog or for the ash. Because in circumcision and burning there is some slight improvement, namely the need of the commandment. Rabbi Abbahu holds that for Rabbi Shimon, wounding and kindling—even if he does not need it for his dog or for the ash—still make him liable. Not needing it for his dog or for the ash means there is damage here, right? Because he derives it from circumcision and the burning of a priest’s daughter. So up to here, that’s what we saw. And Rabbi Yohanan holds that even Rabbi Shimon does not impose liability unless there is some slight improvement, such as when he needs it for his dog or for the ash. Well, that’s what we said before—that’s what Rabbi Abbahu also said—that if he doesn’t need it for his dog or for the ash then he is liable—sorry, and he holds that he must need it for his dog or for the ash in order to be liable. If he does not need it for his dog or for the ash, he is exempt. Above he said that even if he does not need it for his dog or for the ash he is liable, because there is no exemption of destructive action. He says no—you need him to need it for his dog or for the ash, meaning there must be some slight improvement. Not improvement in the object itself, but also some improvement in something else—for the dog or for the ash. Some tiny bit of improvement is needed. But according to Rabbi Yehuda, even if he needs it for the ash or for his dog, he is exempt, because that is not considered a significant improvement. Since it is not normal to wound one’s fellow in order to feed one’s dog, or to burn a stack of grain for the sake of its ash, even though every slaughtering act is destructive, as we say in the first chapter of Hullin. Is that an exemption because of destructive action, or an exemption because it is not the normal manner? For Rabbi Yehuda he says that even if he needs it for his dog or for the ash, he is exempt—why? Because it is not a significant improvement. Yes, it’s exempt because of destructive action. Is it not exempt because it isn’t the normal manner? Meaning, there is also an exemption on the Sabbath for doing something unusually, no? No, no—here it’s a question of the significance of the improvement, how meaningful that improvement is, not whether it is the normal way or not. According to this, Rabbi Yehuda turns out to be more lenient. Yes, in any case Rabbi Yehuda turns out to be more lenient. Fine? Rabbi Yehuda says that all destructive acts are exempt, including wounding and kindling. So he says that even if he needs it for his dog or for the ash, he is exempt. Why is he exempt? Because it is destructive. Why is it destructive? After all, he needs it for his dog or for the ash. Because that improvement is not significant. An insignificant improvement is still called destructive. After all, you are damaging it—when you kindle, you are damaging the wood, right? And the fact that you need the ash is not significant enough to save the situation. I think the meaning is that he is still exempt. “Needs it for his dog or for the ash,” I assume, means that he is burning for that purpose—for the ash. Still, he says, that is not a significant improvement; such a thing is destructive. Because it is not normal to wound one’s fellow in order to feed one’s dog, or to burn a stack of grain for the ash.

[Speaker E] Yes, when you burn, you burn a stack of grain,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] and a stack of grain is something significant. You don’t just burn something valuable for the ash; you burn…

[Speaker E] pieces of wood that have no value at all—you burn them for the ash.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But to burn a stack of grain for the ash—that’s destructive. Even if you intend that, it’s destructive. So that’s not the point.

[Speaker G] And Rabbeinu Tam explains…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that the reason Rabbi Yehuda considers it destructive when he needs it for his dog or for the ash is because the improvement does not come at that same moment. Meaning, what is the destructive element here? Not because the improvement is not significant enough, but because the improvement comes later. Your final product is not more improved at that point. You wounded the person—in that stage you caused damage. Later you take the blood and give it to your dog, at a later stage. So you don’t actually have improvement…

[Speaker E] in the thing itself right now. There is no improvement happening at the moment. Okay?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Therefore this thing is destructive. In other words, the timeline is what matters here, not the degree of significance. Because if you wound an animal, that is not considered damaging it. An animal is meant for use. Just as you slaughter it in order to eat its meat—that is not destructive. The whole animal is intended for use. I injure the animal because I want to use its blood. The whole animal is meant for use. But when you injure a person in order to use his blood, that is destructive; a person is not intended for use. Okay? I assume that’s the meaning. You injured your enemy? No, that’s something else. If you injure your enemy, it’s not because you need the blood, but because you want him injured. So that’s fine. I’m talking about a situation where the thing itself is not meant for injury—you do it in order to use the blood. So this is mainly with a person, not with an animal. Yes, so he says: rather, only afterward—after the wound has been made does the blood come, and after the burning has finished does the ash come. But in slaughtering, at the very moment of the damaging act, the improvement comes to him, because it removes the animal from the category of a limb from a living animal and the like. Yes, that is exactly what you said before about an animal.

[Speaker C] Meaning, injuring the animal—it is intended for your use. If you…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] turn it into something fit for use, that is called improvement. And tearing in order to impose fear on the members of his household is also considered by Rabbi Yehuda to be an improvement, because at the moment of the damaging act the improvement comes to him. Like one who tears in anger in order…

[Speaker C] to show anger…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] to the members of the household, yes—to instill fear in them. Then the improvement comes at that very moment. Since the improvement comes at that very moment, it is called improvement and not damage. And in the later part of the ruling he says that one who tears in order to sew, even though at the time of the damaging act the improvement does not…

[Speaker C] come…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] at that moment,

[Speaker C] still at the time of the damaging act…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] it is called improvement more strongly, and in the end… yes, I think the meaning is that because this is normally how you sew—you tear in order to sew afterward—therefore it is not considered something that comes only later. The act of tearing itself is already perceived as preparation for sewing. So true, you only sew afterward, but you already see the tearing itself as a kind of improvement. This is true in all those labors that are always defined as “in order to,” like demolishing in order to build, tearing in order to sew. There is a whole series of labors whose whole point is really preparation for something future, so the improvement now is a present improvement. Usually when you see why someone is tearing or demolishing, you understand—the context tells you—that it is being done for a future purpose, but you already see that now. When I draw blood, nobody says, “Ah, obviously, blood is drawn in order to feed dogs.” What are you talking about? A person…

[Speaker E] doesn’t just draw blood from other…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] people.

[Speaker E] That specific person wants this blood in order to give it later to his dog, but when a person from the side looks at what…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] he is doing, he does not see it as an act that improves anything; the improvement comes later. But when a person tears—you see a person who sews, that’s his profession, he sews, yes, and now he cuts cloth—you completely understand that he is not damaging, he is improving. You already see it now as improvement and not as future improvement. You understand that this is how sewing is done. And like in the Tabernacle, where they dyed in order to… possibly, yes. It’s like the enhancement—meaning, the fact that he is now tearing this…

[Speaker E] piece of cloth—its value has gone up. Because if you injure the person, that doesn’t…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes indeed, that’s the same form. There are labors where the context shows you that even though you’ll only see the result in the future, the context already now shows you that you’re really doing this for that purpose, so it’s already considered a constructive act now. Objectively constructive. Why objectively? Because you understand that one tears in order to sew, so you’ve already improved something now. Fine. The next Tosafot says this, and he connects it to our case: regarding one who wounds and needs it for his dog, and so on, and if you say: but Rabbi Abbahu holds one is liable even when he does not need it for his dog. Yes, now the question is whether this is Rabbi Abbahu or only Rabbi Shimon; that’s not important right now. But Rabbi Abbahu certainly holds this way. Is this also Rabbi Shimon’s view? So he says: one is liable even when he does not need it for his dog, since he has no need for it at all, it is a labor not needed for its own sake. What? Isn’t he liable because of the verse? What does that mean? Because the verse permitted it, that implies it is otherwise forbidden. The verse permitted it, meaning that without the verse it would have been forbidden. Right. So now, if you wound a person and you do not need it for your dog, you should really exempt him, right? You should exempt him because it is destructive. So he says: but there is no exemption for destructive action in the case of wounding, right? According to Rabbi Abbahu and Rabbi Shimon, there is no exemption for destructive action in kindling and wounding. Tosafot says: but it still needs to be needed for its own sake in order for one to be liable. Meaning, the exemption of destructive action does not apply in wounding and kindling, but the exemption of a labor not needed for its own sake does apply here. Here I come to the point about the relationship between destructive action and a labor not needed for its own sake. Notice, this is the important point here. He says: yes, Rabbi Abbahu, who holds one liable even when he does not need it for his dog, since he has no need for it at all, it is a labor not needed for its own sake. Even though Rabbi Shimon holds one liable for destructive wounding, nevertheless he requires that it be needed for its own sake, and here there will be an exemption for not being needed for its own sake even though there is no exemption for destructive action. What happens when someone wounds a person and does not need it for his dog? So it is destructive, right? But in wounding there is no exemption for destructive action according to Rabbi Abbahu and Rabbi Shimon. He should have been liable. He says no, he will still be exempt. Why will he be exempt? You say this about one who wounds and needs it for his dog, right? What does it mean, one who wounds and needs it for his dog? Why? But in wounding there is no exemption for destructive action, so why should there be an exemption for a labor not needed for its own sake? What lies behind this? If you say that a labor not needed for its own sake is a matter of purposive labor, then just like destructive action, so too a labor not needed for its own sake should not have that exemption in wounding, right? We have no exemptions of purposive labor in wounding, because if there is no exemption of destructive action there, then why should there be an exemption there for a labor not needed for its own sake? He says no, the exemption for a labor not needed for its own sake does apply in wounding; the exemption for destructive action does not. Why not? Because according to Tosafot, as we saw in Tosafot in Chagigah, unlike Rashi, a labor not needed for its own sake is not derived from the rule of purposive labor; it is a law unto itself. Therefore that law does apply in wounding even though the law of destructive action does not. According to Rashi—according to Rashi, really not. Rashi holds that a labor not needed for its own sake is an exemption under the rubric of purposive labor, so if you tell me that destructive wounding is liable, that there is indeed no exemption of destructive action in wounding, then there also should not be an exemption of a labor not needed for its own sake in wounding. Same thing, right? Then it would come out that one who wounds without needing it for his dog should be liable, should be liable even though it is both destructive and a labor not needed for its own sake—it makes no difference. Both are from the laws of purposive labor, and if wounding and kindling are not required to be purposive labor, then the exemption of a labor not needed for its own sake should not apply there either. Tosafot says no: there is no exemption for destructive action there, but there is an exemption for a labor not needed for its own sake there. Why? Because Tosafot is consistent with his own view and says that a labor not needed for its own sake is not an exemption of purposive labor; it is a different exemption, as we saw in Chagigah. And that is what he says: nevertheless it must be needed for its own sake, as we say at the beginning of “Those Who Are Strangled”: who have you heard saying that destructive wounding is liable? Rabbi Shimon. But doesn’t he say that one is exempt for a labor not needed for its own sake? What is the connection? If destructive wounding is liable, then a labor not needed for its own sake in wounding should also be liable, because both are exemptions of purposive labor. So if the exemptions of purposive labor were not stated regarding wounding, then just as destructive action is liable, so too a labor not needed for its own sake should be liable. Why does the Talmud say otherwise? The Talmud there says: Rabbi Shimon says destructive wounding is liable, but still this is a labor not needed for its own sake—the Talmud asks that. Tosafot says: what are you talking about? What does that have to do with anything? If destructive wounding is liable, then a labor not needed for its own sake in wounding should also be liable. What is the Talmud asking? And on this Tosafot says: the Talmud in tractate Sanhedrin says this. Rabbi Shimon says destructive wounding is liable, right? Rabbi Yehudah says one is exempt, but Rabbi Shimon says one is liable. Right? The Talmud asks: fine, I understand that destructive wounding is liable, but on the grounds of a labor not needed for its own sake one should still be exempt. That is the Talmud’s question. Forget destructive action; that really does not trouble him in wounding. But a labor not needed for its own sake is still present here. Tosafot says that according to Rashi, what kind of question is that in Sanhedrin? A labor not needed for its own sake is also an exemption of purposive labor, just like destructive action. Wherever the exemption of destructive action does not apply, the exemption of a labor not needed for its own sake also should not apply, because the exemptions of purposive labor were not said there. From here Tosafot proves against Rashi that a labor not needed for its own sake is not an exemption of purposive labor; it is another exemption. Therefore even in wounding, where there are no exemptions of purposive labor and destructive wounding is liable, the exemption of a labor not needed for its own sake should still be there—against Rashi. Okay? And this also appears in the chapter Kelal Gadol regarding the chilazon, and in the chapter Kol Kitvei regarding the stopper, and at the end of the chapter Safek Akhal Helev. And one can say—yes, that is what he says—you see in all those places that even though the exemption of destructive action does not apply in wounding, the exemption of a labor not needed for its own sake does apply in wounding, in one who wounds. What does that mean? That the exemption of a labor not needed for its own sake is not an exemption under the laws of purposive labor; it is something else. And this is connected to what we discussed earlier, that there can be a situation where from the standpoint of destructive action you would be liable, but you would still be exempt under the rule of a labor not needed for its own sake. And one can say that even in a fully destructive act, you can find a case where it is needed for its own sake. That’s what you asked: how can there be a situation where something is destructive and still needed for its own sake? Right? Now notice, of course the one speaking here is Tosafot, not the Ritva. Tosafot disagrees with the Ritva, and Tosafot argues that this is a subjective matter, so according to his approach your question was not difficult. But this is what Tosafot is really saying: there can indeed be a case where it is fully destructive and still a labor needed for its own sake. The exemption of destructive action and the exemption of a labor not needed for its own sake are not the same exemption. That is what Tosafot says. There can be a case where you are entirely destructive and yet there will not be an exemption of a labor not needed for its own sake; it will be a labor needed for its own sake. Where would this make a practical difference? In one who wounds. In wounding, you could be completely destructive; there would be the issue of destructive action, but it would still be a labor needed for its own sake. So you would have to exempt him because it is destructive, because you would not be able to exempt him on the ground of a labor not needed for its own sake. In that respect it would count as liable. He says: how can there be such a case? And one can say that even a fully destructive case can be found where it is needed for its own sake—for example, one who wounds or kindles with items from which benefit is prohibited, and he thought he could give it to his dog or cook a pot with it. Yes, so on one hand it is fully destructive, but it is still needed for its own sake. Why is it fully destructive? What? He cannot do anything with it. But there will not be an exemption of a labor not needed for its own sake here, because he is doing it for the sake of its own very substance. For according to Rabbi Abbahu, even though a commandment-purpose is not considered constructive, nevertheless it is considered needed for its own sake. Yes, meaning when you pluck the grapes, say, from the myrtle branch, the commandment-purpose is that the myrtle be fit, okay? A commandment-purpose is not a significant constructive act, so it is still considered destructive. Fine? It is considered destructive. But from the standpoint of being needed for its own sake, it is needed for its own sake. It is considered a labor needed for its own sake, only that it is destructive. Fine? Now in the case of the myrtle branch, of course there is an exemption for destructive action, because this is not wounding or kindling; it is another labor. Okay? Reaping, or whatever we want to call it. But there can be a case where a labor is destructive because a commandment-purpose is still destructive—it is not considered constructive—but it is nevertheless considered needed for its own sake. And if you say: when he needs it for his dog or for its ashes, how is that considered needed for its own sake? How is this different from one who digs a pit and needs only its earth? When you need it for your dog or for the ashes, you say that it is needed for its own sake. Why is that needed for its own sake? It is for a different purpose, just like one who digs a pit and needs only its earth. You do not need the wounding itself; you need the blood that comes out of it. That is exactly like one who digs a pit and needs only its earth. So why is that considered there to be a labor needed for its own sake? And he argues, yes, that this is a labor needed for its own sake, whereas one who digs a pit and needs only its earth is not. And one can say that it is not comparable, because here he needs the taking of life-force in order to give it to his dog, namely the blood, because the blood is the life. And his argument is that when one wounds, what is the prohibition of wounding? The prohibition of wounding is because of taking life-force. There is a question whether it is because of blood or because of taking life-force; he says it is because of taking life-force. If it is because of taking life-force, then what is taking life-force? You are removing the blood; the blood is the life. Taking life-force means taking the blood. So the need—the use you make of the blood—is use of the very thing involved in the labor itself. Taking life-force is the very thing you need in order to give your dog the blood. So that is called needed for its own sake. But in one who digs a pit and needs only its earth, the labor is making the pit; it is not removing the earth. In taking life-force, the labor is removing the blood—that is the very body of the labor. And when you have a need for the blood, that is called needed for its own sake. Okay? Taking life-force. It may be that whether one needs it for his dog or does not need it for his dog is already a question of whether it is destructive or not destructive; that is a different discussion. But it is needed for its own sake. In one who digs a pit and needs only its earth, that is a labor not needed for its own sake, because the labor is digging the pit; it is not removing the earth. And the fact that you have a use for the earth does not make the labor one needed for its own sake; it is not needed for its own sake. Yes, and likewise in kindling, he needs the burning in order to make the ashes, just as one kindles in order to cook a pot. But in one who digs a pit, the pit comes into being on its own, and he derives no benefit from it at all. Here it is already a bit more subtle. In short, what Tosafot argues is that the exemption of a labor not needed for its own sake and the exemption of destructive action are two different exemptions. The exemption of a labor not needed for its own sake is not from the laws of purposive labor, while the exemption of destructive action is from the laws of purposive labor. The practical difference is that in wounding and kindling, where the exemptions of purposive labor were not stated, destructive action will not be exempt there according to Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Abbahu, but the exemption of a labor not needed for its own sake is still there. Okay? Now he proves this from Talmudic passages, like the passage in Sanhedrin that we saw there, yes, that according to Rabbi Shimon, even though there is no exemption for destructive action, it still has to be needed for its own sake. What would Rashi answer to that? Rashi holds that a labor not needed for its own sake is an exemption by law. So what is the Talmud in Sanhedrin asking? Well, here there is the Kehillot Yaakov—I did not bring it here—there is a Kehillot Yaakov in Ketubot, section 4. He explains Rashi, Rashi’s approach; he is really quoting the Ran. He argues that a labor not needed for its own sake is not a situation where you do not need the labor, but rather where you have some other positive need. A situation where you do not need the labor is one thing; a situation where you have another positive need is something else. All the exemptions in the liabilities for wounding and kindling apply even when you have no need for the thing itself. There is no exemption for destructive action because you have no need for the thing itself. But if it is done for the sake of something else, then there too Rashi would agree that there is an exemption, because we saw this in the matter of intent and opposite intent. So how did you define the intent? This is something that happens in wounding and kindling: he wanted to hurt someone; he has another purpose. Therefore he says that there will be an exemption of a labor not needed for its own sake, even though the exemption of destructive action is not there. Yes, yes. Meaning, he says that the exemption of labor—we saw this in the Arukh HaShulchan, if you remember—who compares opposite intent with absence of intent. The Ran really explains Rashi’s approach in exactly that way. If you have absence of intent—and this is somewhat related to the pit that I mentioned to you earlier—if you have absence of intent, then it is destructive action, and in wounding and kindling there is no exemption for destructive action. In wounding and kindling, you are in fact liable even though you are acting destructively. But if you have another positive intent, an opposite one, then you will be exempt even in wounding and kindling. And that is what the Talmud in Sanhedrin says. The Talmud in Sanhedrin says: fine, according to Rabbi Shimon, who holds one liable for destructive wounding and kindling—but here this is a labor not needed for its own sake, so he should have exempted him. Why? Because here there is a different objective. And I think this greatly strengthens what we saw in the Arukh HaShulchan, which really does compare a case where you have absence of intent with a case where you have opposite intent, and a labor not needed for its own sake is when you have opposite intent. Okay? That is really the principle. He says: the Ran explains Rashi accordingly, that everywhere regarding wounding and kindling we say that although in destructive action you are liable, still if it is a labor not needed for its own sake you are exempt, according to Rashi

[Speaker C] How is that

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] possible?

[Speaker E] So he

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] says, everything we say

[Speaker E] that not

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] all the laws of purposive labor—let me put it this way in short.

[Speaker F] It’s true that a labor not needed for its own sake and destructive action are both derived from the laws of purposive labor, but

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] in wounding and kindling, when I say that the law of destructive action—the exemption of destructive action—was not stated, that does not mean that all the laws of purposive labor do not exist there. The law of destructive action does not exist there, but a labor not needed for its own sake—even though that too comes from the laws of purposive labor—does exist there. Why? Because, for example, in circumcision you are doing an act of wounding, and you have no other objective, and a commandment is not considered constructive. Yes, we saw this in Rabbi Shimon’s view: the commandment of circumcision is not a constructive act. So why does the Torah permit it? What would have been the initial thought to prohibit it? Apparently because destructive wounding is liable. Yes, when you perform circumcision you are acting destructively, and even though you are acting destructively you are liable. What about someone who wounds and needs the blood for his dog? No—that would be exempt even according to Rashi. Why? But weren’t the exemptions of purposive labor not stated in wounding? The exemptions of purposive labor were not stated when there is no intent, but when you have opposite intent, then of course there will be an exemption. Okay? There will be an exemption under the rule of a labor not needed for its own sake, not under the rule of destructive action. And therefore the laws of purposive labor are not a package deal. Even if you say that in wounding the exemption of destructive action was not stated, that does not mean that the exemption of a labor not

[Speaker E] needed for its own sake,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] even though both come from the laws of purposive labor. The exemption of a labor not needed for its own sake does apply even in destructive action. In circumcision it is not an exemption, because there it is ordinary destructive action, also in wounding—sorry, in circumcision, why… why did circumcision need to be permitted? As if without that it would have been forbidden. Why would it have been forbidden? Because circumcision is destructive action. The commandment is not a significant constructive act, so when you look at it, you are just damaging the baby’s flesh, right? But destructive action was not said in circumcision, in wounding, and therefore you would say that he is liable were it not for the Torah’s permission. But a labor not needed for its own sake is when you have another positive intent, and that exempts even in circumcision. And there is no difficulty as to why the Torah needed to permit circumcision, because in circumcision it is not a labor not needed for its own sake; it is a labor needed for its own sake. There is only a problem of destructive action. And this brings me back to what I told you earlier, the difference as to when there can be a labor not needed for its own sake that is destructive. A labor not needed for its own sake where there will not be an exemption of destructive action but there will be an exemption of a labor not needed for its own sake—in circumcision, because in circumcision it is not a labor not needed for its own sake, because there is no other need, but it is destructive. There is no other need, but my need here is not considered a need; a commandment is not a need, like the principle that commandments were not given for benefit, or something like that—a commandment is not considered a need. So if you ask me whether it is destructive, the answer is yes, even though there is no other objective. I am doing it for this objective; there is no other objective, therefore it is not a labor not needed for its own sake, but it is still destructive, because the need for which I am doing it is a commandment-purpose, and a commandment is not considered a need.

[Speaker D] Okay, let’s stop here. Welcome, peace be upon you.

The Rules of the Melachot – Lesson 11

Table of Contents

Summary

General overview.

Approaches to defining a labor not needed for its own purpose

Digging a pit when one only needs the dirt, and improvement in the pit itself

Page 103: improving the ground, an inevitable result, and another person’s land

The Arukh versus Tosafot: an inevitable result that one does not want

Additional proofs: Zevachim, myrtle in the stolen lulav, and flaying the Passover offering

The Ritva: rejecting the identification between an unwanted inevitable result and a labor not needed for its own purpose

The Ritva: the role of intention only in an act that is not intrinsically significant

Purposeful labor and the passage in Chagigah: Tosafot versus Rashi

Destructive action: Sabbath 106b and wounding / kindling

Rashi and Rashbam: linking destructive action to a labor not needed for its own purpose

Tosafot in Sabbath: distinguishing the exemption of destructive action from the exemption of a labor not needed for its own purpose

Tosafot: fully destructive action that can still be needed for its own purpose

An attempt to explain Rashi through the Ran and Kehillot Yaakov

Full Transcript

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Table of Contents

Summary

General overview.

Approaches to defining a labor not needed for its own purpose

Digging a pit when one only needs the dirt, and improvement in the pit itself

Page 103: improving the ground, an inevitable result, and another person’s land

The Arukh versus Tosafot: an inevitable result that one does not want

Additional proofs: Zevachim, myrtle in the stolen lulav, and flaying the Passover offering

The Ritva: rejecting the identification between an unwanted inevitable result and a labor not needed for its own purpose

The Ritva: the role of intention only in an act that is not intrinsically significant

Purposeful labor and the passage in Chagigah: Tosafot versus Rashi

Destructive action: Sabbath 106b and wounding / kindling

Rashi and Rashbam: linking destructive action to a labor not needed for its own purpose

Tosafot in Sabbath: distinguishing the exemption of destructive action from the exemption of a labor not needed for its own purpose

Tosafot: fully destructive action that can still be needed for its own purpose

An attempt to explain Rashi through the Ran and Kehillot Yaakov

Full Transcript

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