Rules of the Labors – Lesson 12

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This transcription was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

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The dependence of the definition of a labor not needed for its own sake on the nature of the labor
Tosafot versus Nachmanides: the Tabernacle versus the “meaning of the labor”
Wounding, circumcision, and first intercourse with a virgin in Ketubot 5 and their implications for “need”
The Kehillot Yaakov’s question: why is blood different from dirt in digging a pit?
Nachmanides’ novel idea: “separation” labors versus an action on a single body
Comments on inevitable result, intention, and the example of carrying out
Maimonides on lancing an abscess and trapping dangerous creatures, and the difficulty from the Talmud
Shmuel: “exempt and permitted” in three places, and Tosafot in the name of the Behag
Rabbi Chaim: classifying the cases as “an unintended act” and an inevitable but undesired result
Two laws in unintended action: a general Torah rule versus melechet machshevet on the Sabbath
Reconciling Shmuel and Maimonides with Rav: why the Talmud ties it to a labor not needed for its own sake
Critique of the move: identifying unintended action with a labor not needed for its own sake
Rabbi Avraham son of Maimonides: two acts versus one act with two results
The Kehillot Yaakov: one’s stance on unintended action determines whether this category exists here at all
The Kehillot Yaakov and defining the very name of the labor: when there is no intention, there is no “labor” at all
Conclusion and presenting trapping as a case easier to fit into the definition of “he did not perform a labor”

Summary

General Overview

The text presents the topic of a labor not needed for its own sake by comparing medieval authorities (Rishonim) and setting up cases in the Talmud, showing that the definition of “needed for its own sake” may change according to the essential nature of the labor itself, rather than being a uniform rule. Disputes are presented between Tosafot and Nachmanides regarding shearing / cutting nails and hair, and proofs are brought from Ketubot 5 about wounding, circumcision, and first intercourse with a virgin in order to clarify what counts as “need” in the labor of wounding. The text then examines Maimonides’ view regarding lancing an abscess and trapping dangerous creatures, together with the difficulty raised by the Maggid Mishneh, and Rabbi Chaim’s explanation that Maimonides understands the permission there as an “unintended act” (in particular, an inevitable but undesired result) rather than as a labor not needed for its own sake. It then presents a move from the Kehillot Yaakov that links one’s position on unintended acts to the very classification of the act as a labor not needed for its own sake, and even to the very definition of the labor’s category.

The dependence of the definition of a labor not needed for its own sake on the nature of the labor

The text argues that the medieval authorities imply that a labor not needed for its own sake depends on the definition of the labor, such that what would count as a labor not needed for its own sake in one labor will not necessarily count that way in another. The Talmud in Shabbat 94b about one who removes his nails and hair by hand or with a tool is brought as a place where Tosafot explain that liability with a tool depends on the view of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds one liable for a labor not needed for its own sake. Nachmanides on page 106 disagrees and argues that even according to Rabbi Shimon there is liability, because in removing hair and nails “the removal itself is the labor,” and therefore whether it is for improving the body or for the sake of the hair and shearing itself, all of it is a labor needed for its own sake.

Tosafot versus Nachmanides: the Tabernacle versus the “meaning of the labor”

The text raises the possibility that according to Tosafot, the criterion for “for its own sake” is determined by the need that existed in the Tabernacle, and therefore use for another purpose is defined as a labor not needed for its own sake and depends on the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda. The text suggests that according to Nachmanides one might have understood that a labor not needed for its own sake is connected to the inferiority / lack of significance of the labor and not to the question of the Tabernacle, so that as long as the action is significant and useful it is “needed for its own sake,” even if the benefit is not the same as in the Tabernacle. Later it notes that when one looks at Nachmanides more broadly, it becomes clear that his precise explanation goes in a different direction.

Wounding, circumcision, and first intercourse with a virgin in Ketubot 5 and their implications for “need”

The text brings Tosafot in Ketubot 5, who clarify the basis of the labor of wounding and reject an interpretation that taking a life in wounding means merely “weakening,” because intercourse is not done in order to weaken the woman. Tosafot bring proof from circumcision, for which the Sabbath is desecrated, and conclude that if wounding were because of weakening, there would be no desecration of the Sabbath, because that would be a labor not needed for its own sake, “since there is no need to weaken the baby.” The text notes parenthetically that we saw that wounding and kindling may be exceptions within melechet machshevet and that one is liable for destructive action in them, but emphasizes that Tosafot, consistent with their view, hold that even in wounding one is exempt for a labor not needed for its own sake.

The Kehillot Yaakov’s question: why is blood different from dirt in digging a pit?

The text quotes the Kehillot Yaakov (section 3), who asks why according to Tosafot drawing blood for the sake of the blood is considered “for its own sake,” whereas “one who digs a pit and needs only its dirt” is defined as a labor not needed for its own sake, even though this too is the removal of something from another body. Nachmanides is brought as the explanation: circumcision is certainly a labor needed for its own sake, because one needs “this person to be circumcised,” and similarly one who cuts his nails and mustache with a tool is liable as a derivative of shearing even though he has no need for the body of the hair itself, and all these are called “a labor needed for its own sake.” Nachmanides distinguishes between cases in which “the wound here is the blood itself, which he needs,” and one who digs a pit, where “the building in the ground is what is called the labor.”

Nachmanides’ novel idea: “separation” labors versus an action on a single body

The text suggests an explanation of Nachmanides according to which there are labors whose essence is an act of “separation” between two bodies (blood and body, wool and sheep), and therefore there is no single “body” in which the benefit must be located. Consequently, whether the benefit is in the thing separated or in the body from which it was separated, it is still “needed for its own sake.” The text contrasts this with one who digs a pit, where the action is understood as an act on the ground, and therefore if the benefit is in the dirt and not in improving the ground, it is a labor not needed for its own sake. From this it follows that the classification of “needed for its own sake” is not universal, but depends on understanding the nature of the labor before even checking where the benefit lies.

Comments on inevitable result, intention, and the example of carrying out

The text raises the question of how first intercourse with a virgin and circumcision relate to an inevitable result and to intention to draw blood, and clarifies that Nachmanides is understood as distinguishing between acts of separation and acts performed on a single object. The discussion also touches on carrying out, with the comment that carrying out is an “inferior labor” and hard to define, and an example is brought of “carrying out a corpse” as the kind of case in which the action is on the corpse while the benefit is in removing it from the place. This illustrates the rule: “if the benefit is in the thing on which the action is done, that is needed for its own sake; if the benefit is in something else, it is not needed for its own sake.” The text sums up a working rule of a double examination: on what is the action performed, and in what does the benefit lie, adding that in labors of separation the body on which the action is done is both sides together.

Maimonides on lancing an abscess and trapping dangerous creatures, and the difficulty from the Talmud

The text presents Maimonides (Laws of Sabbath, chapter 10, law 17), who obligates one who lances a boil in order “to widen the mouth of the wound,” but permits it when his purpose is “to remove the fluid in it.” Maimonides (law 25) permits trapping harmful creatures “provided he intends to save himself from their bite” by bending a vessel over them or enclosing them. The Maggid Mishneh objects from the Talmud in Shabbat 107, which ties both lancing an abscess and trapping a snake to the dispute: “according to Rabbi Shimon, who says one is exempt for a labor not needed for its own sake,” while Maimonides rules like Rabbi Yehuda that one is liable for such a labor, and therefore he should have ruled stringently rather than permit.

Shmuel: “exempt and permitted” in three places, and Tosafot in the name of the Behag

The text cites Shmuel in Shabbat 3, that “all Sabbath exemptions mean exempt but forbidden,” except for three cases that are “exempt and permitted”: trapping a deer, trapping a snake, and lancing an abscess. Tosafot in the name of the Behag ask that Shmuel himself rules on page 42 that one is liable for a labor not needed for its own sake, so how could he permit lancing an abscess and trapping a snake “because of pain”? The text emphasizes that from Maimonides’ wording it does not sound as though the permission depends on pain, but rather that the permission stems from the very intention “to save oneself,” which classifies the act as one involving no prohibition.

Rabbi Chaim: classifying the cases as “an unintended act” and an inevitable but undesired result

The text presents Rabbi Chaim’s move, according to which lancing an abscess to remove fluid and trapping a snake for protection are really cases of “an unintended act,” and even though they are an inevitable result, this is an inevitable but undesired result, which according to the Arukh is permitted. Rabbi Chaim struggles with how the Talmud can tie this to a labor not needed for its own sake, and brings the passage in Keritot 20 about one who extinguishes coals, where Tosafot explain that it is a case of inevitable result and liability depends on a labor not needed for its own sake. Rabbi Chaim notes that Maimonides in the Laws of Errors rules in accordance with the simple meaning of the Talmud there, that this is a case of an unintended act, and therefore when they ignited on their own he is not liable for two sin-offerings.

Two laws in unintended action: a general Torah rule versus melechet machshevet on the Sabbath

The text brings Rabbi Chaim’s distinction that there are two laws: the law of unintended action found throughout the Torah, where the main factor depends on will and intention, and the law of melechet machshevet on the Sabbath, where the main factor depends on awareness and thought regarding the occurrence of the labor. According to this, in a case of inevitable result, the very knowledge itself makes the act a “thoughtful labor,” regardless of whether one wants the result, whereas whether one wants the result matters within the framework of the general Torah law of intention. The text concludes that according to Rabbi Yehuda, in an inevitable but undesired result there is liability, while according to Rabbi Shimon one can be exempt, and in this way the passage in Keritot is reconciled according to Maimonides.

Reconciling Shmuel and Maimonides with Rav: why the Talmud ties it to a labor not needed for its own sake

The text explains that according to Rabbi Chaim, Shmuel and Maimonides follow the direction in which lancing an abscess and trapping a snake are unintended acts involving an inevitable but undesired result and are therefore permitted, whereas the Talmud in Shabbat 107 tied this to a labor not needed for its own sake because it was stated according to the position of Rav, who holds that “an unintended act is forbidden,” and therefore he cannot exempt on the grounds of unintended action and needs the exemption of a labor not needed for its own sake. The text formulates that these situations can be both unintended action and a labor not needed for its own sake, and the ruling depends on which exemption the halakhic decisor accepts.

Critique of the move: identifying unintended action with a labor not needed for its own sake

The text comments that the approach under which one case is defined both as unintended action and as a labor not needed for its own sake creates conceptual awkwardness, as though there were no essential difference between the categories. The text compares this to an approach attributed to Tosafot in which the difference between an inevitable but undesired result and other situations lies in the question of desirability, so that the case remains the same case and the classification changes according to what one wants.

Rabbi Avraham son of Maimonides: two acts versus one act with two results

The text presents another approach, attributed to Rabbi Avraham son of Maimonides, according to which unintended action is a case of two acts, whereas a labor not needed for its own sake is one action that has two results. The text emphasizes that this distinction creates difficulty in determining when something belongs in each category, but it rules out the possibility of defining the very same case as belonging to both categories at once.

The Kehillot Yaakov: one’s stance on unintended action determines whether this category exists here at all

The text suggests a move from the Kehillot Yaakov according to which one who holds a person liable for unintended action (like Rabbi Yehuda or Rav) will tend to see the two actions as one action, and therefore the case will be defined as a labor not needed for its own sake. By contrast, one who exempts in unintended action (like Shmuel and Maimonides) sees the situation as two different actions, and therefore it does not even enter the category of a labor not needed for its own sake at all; the permission comes from unintended action and not from a labor not needed for its own sake. The text lists four approaches: Rabbi Shimon, who exempts in both; Rabbi Yehuda, who obligates in both; Rav, who exempts in a labor not needed for its own sake but obligates in unintended action; and Shmuel, who obligates in a labor not needed for its own sake but exempts in unintended action, and places Maimonides with Shmuel’s view.

The Kehillot Yaakov and defining the very name of the labor: when there is no intention, there is no “labor” at all

The text adds a nuance that the Kehillot Yaakov also has a direction according to which, in certain labors, when there is no particular intention, the act does not enter the category of that labor at all, and is not merely exempt because of some external reason. The text gives an example from the Maggid Mishneh on extinguishing a metal coal according to Maimonides, where one is liable only if he does it for the sake of tempering, and explains that if it is not for tempering, “this is not called extinguishing at all,” rather than being an exemption of a labor not needed for its own sake. The text connects this to lancing an abscess in the Shitah Mekubetzet on Ketubot: according to this direction, removing fluid is not “making an opening” at all. It expands this to trapping as well, suggesting that if one closed a door not in order to trap, then “you simply did not perform an act of trapping at all.”

Conclusion and presenting trapping as a case easier to fit into the definition of “he did not perform a labor”

The text concludes with the comment that in trapping it is easier to argue that the act never entered the category of the labor, because sometimes there is no direct contact with the animal and one is “just closing a door,” so the person’s intention becomes central in defining the act. The text stops after setting out that these distinctions return to the question of how one defines labor, how one assigns benefit to an action, and how the relationship between unintended action and a labor not needed for its own sake affects the classification of the act and its permissibility.

Full Transcript

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’re in the topic of a labor not needed for its own sake. We basically still have two more lectures: this lecture, and one more next week, and then the semester is over. So we’re going to finish the topic of a labor not needed for its own sake, also with a few comments about an unintended act, and at the end I’ll get to some kind of surprise regarding a labor not needed for its own sake — that’ll be next week. So first of all I want to talk about the definition of a labor not needed for its own sake, which up to now we’ve discussed in a general way, but in the medieval authorities (Rishonim) you can find several places from which it emerges that this depends on the definition of the labor. Meaning, in certain labors, a certain mode will be considered a labor not needed for its own sake, while in other labors it won’t. In other words, it can depend on the question of what the character of the labor in question is. So let’s look, for example, at the passage on 94b. The Talmud there says in the Mishnah: “One who removes his nails with each other or with his teeth, and likewise his hair, and likewise his mustache, and likewise his beard, and likewise a woman who braids, and applies eye paint, and parts her hair — Rabbi Eliezer obligates, and the Sages forbid as a rabbinic restriction” — as a rabbinic restriction. On that the Talmud says: Rabbi Elazar said, the dispute is when it’s done by hand, but with a tool he is liable. What does it mean, “but with a tool he is liable”? Tosafot say there: “with a tool he is liable,” that is, according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds one liable for a labor not needed for its own sake. Right? If you do it with a tool, then you’re liable because this is a labor not needed for its own sake, and according to Rabbi Shimon he would be exempt, according to Rabbi Yehuda he would be liable. Nachmanides on page 106 discusses this, this Mishnah about removing one’s hair and nails, and he claims that even according to Rabbi Shimon one would be liable in such a case. Anyone who removes his hair and his nails, whether to fix up his body and make himself look better, or for the sake of the hair and the shearing itself — meaning he needs what he is cutting off — all of them are a labor needed for its own sake, because it is all one thing, and the removal itself is the labor. Right? When you remove those things, that itself is the labor, and it doesn’t matter whether you remove them in order to improve the body from which you removed them, or because you need the things themselves. So according to Tosafot this is a labor not needed for its own sake, and therefore it will depend on the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda. According to Nachmanides it doesn’t depend on that dispute; everyone would obligate in such a case. This is not a labor not needed for its own sake; it is a labor needed for its own sake. On the face of it, one could have said that the dispute is really what we already saw. After all, we saw in Tosafot — we asked what “needed for its own sake” means. What defines a labor as being for its own sake? So according to Tosafot, we saw that the determining need is the need that existed in the Tabernacle. Therefore Tosafot say: if it is done for another purpose, that is a labor not needed for its own sake. Right? So if in the Tabernacle, when they sheared, they needed it for the sake of the thing being shorn, then if you do it for the sake of the body, that is a labor not needed for its own sake, and vice versa, okay? But maybe Nachmanides learns that a labor not needed for its own sake is an exemption because of some deficiency in the labor. When you do it for such a purpose, it’s not a significant labor. It has nothing to do with the Tabernacle. For Tosafot it has nothing to do with deficiency. What was done in the Tabernacle counts, and what was not done in the Tabernacle does not. According to Nachmanides, it could be that it depends on whether the labor is a significant labor. And if so, then what difference does it make whether you do it for the sake of the thing shorn, because you need the wool, or whether you do it for the sake of the body that you’re improving — the body that’s being shorn — right, that you are improving. As long as the labor is significant and useful, then it is a labor needed for its own sake. When you look at Nachmanides more broadly, we’ll see in a moment that apparently this is not what he means. But in any event, at least one could have suggested hanging the dispute on that as well. There is another source in the Talmud in Ketubot 5. The Talmud there discusses what happens with intercourse, first intercourse with a virgin that causes blood to come out, and there is an issue there of prohibition because of wounding, because of threshing. There are disputes there about what exactly the prohibition is. So, taking life and things like that. Tosafot discuss there the question of why… what is the meaning of the labor of wounding? Is it because of taking life, or because you are doing something to the body, or because you need the thing that you are extracting? So Tosafot say like this: “Or taking life — it cannot be explained that the reason is because of weakening, that one weakens him and takes away a bit of his life.” Taking life basically means that you draw blood, so you weaken the body a little, because the blood is the life-force, you are taking the life-force out of the body and therefore the body is weakened, and then one could have said that taking life, the basis of the labor, is this weakening of the body. “For here there is no need for weakening the woman.” When one has intercourse with a virgin, obviously he does not do it in order to weaken her body. Even if her body is weakened because blood came out of it, that is a result, but that is not really the purpose for which he performed the action. Then, on the face of it, this should have meant — that is, the Talmud says that basically this thing is prohibited on a Torah level. Right? If it is a Torah prohibition, what does that mean? It apparently means it’s not because of weakening. Taking life is not because of weakening, correct? Because if it were because of weakening, then it should not have been a Torah prohibition. What would it be? I don’t know — maybe a labor not needed for its own sake or something like that; we’ll see in a moment. “However, the prohibition stated here can be said to be rabbinic.” Fine, you can say that the prohibition violated by one who has intercourse with the woman is only rabbinic and not a Torah prohibition, and then there is no clear proof here, because even if it is a labor not needed for its own sake there is still a rabbinic prohibition here. Okay? Tosafot then say: “But with regard to circumcision, it seems that there is a Torah prohibition in drawing blood, for we say in the chapter Rabbi Eliezer: that circumciser who does not suck the blood is dangerous, and we remove him.” Right? Someone who does not suction the blood — that is dangerous, and we remove him, meaning we dismiss him from being a circumciser, and so on. The Talmud says: “Obviously — since we desecrate the Sabbath for it. You might have said that the blood is merely deposited there; it therefore teaches us that it is connected.” “And if it were because of weakening, there would be no desecration of the Sabbath, because that would be a labor not needed for its own sake, for there is no need to weaken the baby.” Exactly like the intercourse with the woman — and here Tosafot say explicitly what above I only suggested as an interpretive possibility. Tosafot say: when you circumcise the baby, you draw blood from him. In principle that is prohibited; that’s why a verse was needed to permit circumcision on the Sabbath. Now why is it prohibited? After all, you’re not really doing it in order to weaken the baby. If wounding were actually a prohibition because of weakening the baby, then here it should have been a labor not needed for its own sake. So why do you need a verse to permit it? At least according to Rabbi Shimon. Therefore it’s pretty clear that the prohibition in wounding is not because of weakening the body that you wound, or taking life. That’s what Tosafot say. I’ll just remind you in parentheses that we saw that regarding wounding in general, it may be that not all these rules apply. Because wounding and kindling — both may be cases where even if this is not melechet machshevet, you would still be liable; even destructive action may incur liability, and maybe even a labor not needed for its own sake. Tosafot, true to their own view — and we saw that this is Tosafot’s position — say that yes, here too, for a labor not needed for its own sake one would be exempt even in wounding. So if that’s the case, Tosafot’s proof is this: Tosafot say that from intercourse and circumcision we see that the basis of taking life or of wounding is not the weakening of the body that is being wounded. What emerges from Tosafot, then, is that we have two possibilities for what counts as “for the sake of the body.” Either it is done to improve the person being wounded — right, when I wound someone — or I need the blood. In both of those cases it is considered for its own sake. And on this the Kehillot Yaakov asks, in section 3: why is this different from one who digs a pit and needs only its dirt? Just like extracting blood from the body, I am extracting dirt from the ground, from the pit, and seemingly this too should have been a labor needed for its own sake, exactly as we see here. So his claim — he brings Nachmanides. Nachmanides on 106, this is the Nachmanides from whom I brought a passage above — Nachmanides says as follows: “And I do not say so, for circumcision is certainly a labor needed for its own sake, because he needs this person to be circumcised. And what is similar to this? One who cuts his nails with a tool, and likewise his mustache, for which he is liable as a derivative of shearing — and even though he has no need for the body of the nails and hair, it is called a labor needed for its own sake.” That is called a labor needed for its own sake. “And likewise winnowing and selecting, and one who removes lice from a cloak — all of them are similar to circumcision. And the kindling of the daughter of a priest as well — also, for example, doesn’t matter — the kindling of the daughter of a priest also has a verse, similar to one who lights a fire to warm himself by it, and one who lights a lamp to use its light. And we have not heard of a labor not needed for its own sake in kindling at all, only in extinguishing.” Certainly — meaning, in kindling, there is no such thing as a labor not needed for its own sake. Every act of kindling is a labor needed for its own sake; right now it doesn’t matter what the need is. In extinguishing, yes — extinguishing for the sake of charcoal is for its own sake; extinguishing for another purpose is not for its own sake. “Rather, certainly both of them are labors needed for their own sake, except that the need itself is called destruction in his body, for the circumcised person remains wounded and ill. And the kindling for the daughter of a priest, since no person derives benefit from it, is only like a destructive act on the wood. Yet the person still needs this very labor, because there is a benefit that is not from the body of the labor itself, namely the fulfillment of the commandment. And for Rabbi Shimon that benefit is nothing.” Rabbi Shimon says that with the kindling of the daughter of a priest, you don’t need the verse to permit it. “And therefore according to Rabbi Shimon, any labor not needed for its own sake, whether because of destruction or because of repair, one is exempt for it.” We already saw this as a dispute among medieval authorities (Rishonim) in the previous lecture — the question whether a labor not needed for its own sake is basically a case of destructive action. If you do it not for its own sake, that means that the “for its own sake” element is basically destructive. So according to Rabbi Shimon it’s not because of destruction and not because of repair, “and even in wounding and kindling — and that is one who removes his thorn and wounds himself, a total destructive act and he needs nothing — that is a labor not needed for its own sake and one is exempt for it. And therefore Rabbi Shimon requires one who wounds and needs it for his dog, one who kindles and needs its ashes, so that it be a labor needed for its own sake, not because he requires any repair.” “And this is what Rabbi Yochanan said: in wounding and kindling, the Mishnah speaks of becoming liable in a destructive manner,” and he goes on there to explain the dispute. “And if you should say,” sorry, “And if you say, but even so this is a labor not needed for its own sake, similar to one who digs a pit and needs only its dirt.” In the end, what’s the difference between that — one who digs a pit and needs only its dirt — and someone who draws blood because he needs the blood? Blood, and he needs it for his dog — one who wounds and needs it for his dog. So he says: don’t make that mistake, because the wound here is the blood itself, which he needs. “And I have already compared this to one who cuts and removes his hair and nails,” what we saw above, “whether to fix up his body and beautify himself or for the sake of the hair and the shearing, all of them are a labor needed for its own sake, because it is all one thing, and the removal itself is the labor.” “Which is not the case with one who digs a pit, where the building in the ground is what is called the labor, and likewise kindling for the sake of ashes is needed for its own sake.” Here, in the end, it’s not entirely clear what he’s saying. What is the difference between one who digs a pit and needs only its dirt, which is a labor not needed for its own sake, and one who draws blood because he needs the blood? In the case of one who draws blood because he needs the blood — not because he needs something in the body of the one being wounded — that is a labor that is for its own sake. Why? What’s the difference? For his dog — he needs it for his dog. No, he needs it for his dog — he needs the blood.

[Speaker B] Because it seems that there — you also said this in what

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] you brought

[Speaker B] above — it seems that according to Nachmanides this is something new that we haven’t seen up to now, that he wants to say that basically there are labors where the action itself is already enough, and then as long as you have some proper reason to do it, as if there are special kinds of labors.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, right, I’ll get to that in just a second, correct. I think what Nachmanides probably wants to say is that in the case of one who digs a pit and needs only its dirt, when you look at the action he is doing, it’s an action on the ground. Once you perform an action on the ground, but the thing you need is actually the dirt, not the improvement of the ground, that is a labor not needed for its own sake. But actions like shearing, or like wounding in circumcision, drawing blood and the like — he probably understands them as actions of separation. These are not actions done to the body on which I am acting; rather, these are actions of separating the blood from the thing, or in shearing, separating the wool from the sheep, or something like that. Once the action is an act of separation, there is no one body here in which the benefit has to be located, so if the benefit is in the other body, that is not a labor not needed for its own sake. The action is the separation of the two bodies — that is the definition of the action. And therefore, whether the benefit is in the blood or whether the benefit is in the body of the thing, in both cases this is called needed for its own sake. Now, exactly how one defines or understands when this is an act of separation and when it is an act on the thing itself — I don’t know, I don’t have a general definition — but that’s basically what he is claiming. I think that when you look at the dirt and the pit, it’s not that I need the dirt — meaning, it’s not that I’m doing a separation of the dirt from the earth, right? It’s not an act of separation. I don’t think that’s the simple way to look at the action I’m doing there. Rather, I am acting on the ground and I need the dirt. Okay? So when I look at the action, it is an action on the ground, and therefore it is for its own sake only if I needed the result that occurs in the ground. But if I need the dirt that came out and I performed the action on the ground, that is a labor not needed for its own sake. But there are labors whose definition is not a definition in terms of the body on which one performs the labor. From the outset, it is a definition of separation between two things: blood and body, wool and sheep, and so on. In labors of separation, it doesn’t matter whether the benefit is in this thing or in that thing — it will always be for its own sake. So we discover here that the definition of a labor not needed for its own sake is not necessarily universal, because it depends very much on how I understand the labor itself even before the question of whether it is or is not for its own sake. What is the essence of the labor? Is it a labor on a particular body, or is it not? Is it a labor that separates two bodies from one another and is therefore really a labor on both of them?

[Speaker C] We found in the Talmud that intercourse with a virgin is not intended to draw blood at all. He’s doing his thing, and here there’s something that is an inevitable result, and that’s not exactly the goal.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, with a virgin he doesn’t need the blood. With a virgin, on the contrary, he needs the improvement in the woman’s body — that is what he needs.

[Speaker C] Exactly. Same thing with circumcision. So what?

[Speaker B] Since he doesn’t intend to wound — because maybe it could be done without wounding — it’s only an inevitable result. What do you mean, an inevitable result?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it can be done without wounding, then it’s

[Speaker B] not necessarily — maybe it always can be

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] done that way, then it’s not an inevitable result.

[Speaker B] It can be separated, meaning it’s not necessarily the same action, as it were, and it’s more similar to an inevitable result.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think that unless you do it, unless you draw the blood, it isn’t called wounding. Wounding is only when you draw blood.

[Speaker B] But the action a person is doing — there’s no intention here? The question is whether there’s intention here. Apparently in the Talmud the person really intends to draw the blood.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In circumcision you’re even obligated — in circumcision there is suction, meaning you…

[Speaker B] Yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And therefore I think what he means is to distinguish between actions that are acts of separation and actions that are actions upon the thing on which I am acting, except that something else comes out, and it could be that I specifically want that, and then it would be a labor not needed for its own sake. But if the action is an act of separation, then it doesn’t matter whether the benefit is in this thing or in that thing — in any case it is called needed for its own sake. Okay? Carrying out—

[Speaker B] It says in the Talmud that it can be a labor not needed for its own sake if he carries out a chamber pot or something like that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand.

[Speaker B] Carrying out is also, seemingly, not something that I act upon — it’s just…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Carrying out is an inferior labor, so it’s very hard to define it — meaning what exactly it acts upon. That’s at the stage where you have to jump in and say that.

[Speaker B] No, but in carrying out, what improvement can there be in the thing?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what would count as for its own sake in carrying out? Every carrying out is a labor not needed for its own sake. As

[Speaker B] it says, you’re exempt if you carry something out just in order to get rid of it, okay? Not in order to transfer it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You don’t need to carry it out — it’s not because of the improvement in the domain from which you are taking it.

[Speaker B] You should have said that improvement right away, because you’re not improving anything — it’s just moving things around. So you have to say it immediately.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here there is an improvement, I didn’t understand. He’s talking about a case where there is an improvement, but the improvement is not in the thing that was acted on.

[Speaker B] Right, the problem there is not that there’s no improvement. Meaning, there is some benefit, some improvement; it’s just a labor not needed for its own sake because the improvement is not in the thing that… you didn’t want the object to be there, rather you wanted it not to be here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But there, on the face of it, I think it’s not a labor not needed for its own sake. The chamber pot case is not a labor not needed for its own sake. It’s not — it’s simply not carrying out. I don’t think so, at any rate I don’t remember. When he carried out a corpse, huh? Carrying out a corpse is something else, not a chamber pot. Okay, fine. Yes, same thing.

[Speaker B] That’s supposed to be exactly the place where we’d say, okay, this shouldn’t matter, it shouldn’t have to be a labor not needed for its own sake. What difference does the intention make? What benefit is he getting out of it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And there, what are you performing the action on? On the corpse. But your benefit is not in the corpse, so it’s a labor not needed for its own sake.

[Speaker B] It’s like nails — your benefit isn’t in the nails, but…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the opposite. It’s exactly like one who digs a pit and needs only its dirt, not like nails. With nails, you perform the action on the body, not on the nail. You separate the nail from the body. The action is an action on the body, and therefore there was room to think that if you need the nails, then it would be a labor not needed for its own sake, because you are performing an action on the body but your benefit is in the nail. And then he says no — this is an act of separation, not an action on the body. Once the action is an act of separation, whether the benefit is in the body or in the nail, this is called needed for its own sake.

[Speaker B] But isn’t shearing a labor that’s on the nail?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no — in plucking wool. Right, taking wool from the sheep.

[Speaker B] But the improvement is in the wool?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no. The act of shearing, says Nachmanides, is an act of separating the wool from the sheep. You can’t define on whom the action is performed. The action is performed on both things — to separate them. But for what purpose is he

[Speaker B] shearing? Ordinary shearing, the ordinary improvement, the ordinary benefit, is that the wool will be usable.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Sometimes. Sometimes not. Sometimes you shear in order to make it easier for the sheep in the summer.

[Speaker B] If not for Nachmanides’ approach, then according to everyone shearing as a labor means taking wool and improving the wool. Nachmanides is introducing the idea that maybe it’s not that, that maybe it’s something else — but in general shearing is a labor involving the wool.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well, and therefore what?

[Speaker B] And Nachmanides says, but no — because shearing, as you said, is some kind of action, it’s a labor that mainly looks at the act of separation or whatever it is. I look at the action and I’m not interested in what it’s on, so even if you improve the body and don’t improve the wool—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] it is called needed for its own sake.

[Speaker B] And when you carry out the body of a corpse, usually the action—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, with the body of a corpse this is not an act of separation; it is an action on the corpse. So if you need something in the corpse itself, then it would be for its own sake. But if all you are improving is that the corpse won’t be there, that is not for its own sake.

[Speaker B] But you are improving the body that comes from it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there’s no object here. You’re not performing an action on the object. With shearing, that’s an action on the object. Removing a corpse is not an action on the domain; it’s an action on the corpse. The benefit, yes, but not the action. That’s exactly the point. If the benefit is in the thing on which the action is performed, then it is a labor needed for its own substance. If the benefit is in something other than the thing on which the action is performed, then it is not a labor needed for its own substance. So now you always have to check two things in order to know: first, on what is the action performed; second, where is the benefit for us. If it’s in the same thing, then it is a labor needed for its own substance. That means that once the action is an act of separation, then the object on which the action is performed is the two things together. Therefore, whether the benefit is in this one or in that one, it is a labor needed for its own substance. But when you remove a corpse from a place, that’s not an action on the place; it’s an action on the corpse. You take the corpse and remove it. No, that’s not separation; it’s an action on the corpse. Good, so that’s the first remark. We’ll come back to this point later, that there are certain labors that have a different definition, and from that we’ll also have to define differently what it means for them to be needed for their own substance. I want to go into this for a moment—I already mentioned Rav Chaim, and now I want to look at him a bit more closely. Rav Chaim starts from Maimonides in chapter 10, halakhah 17, Laws of the Sabbath. Rav Chaim says as follows. “One who lances a boil on the Sabbath”—that’s Maimonides’ language, yes? Chapter 10, halakhah 17, Laws of the Sabbath—“in order to widen the opening of the wound, in the manner that physicians do when they intend medically to widen the opening of the wound, he is liable,” and so on. “But if he lanced it in order to remove the moisture in it, it is permitted.” Meaning, if your intention is to make the opening itself, then it is forbidden—liable, not just forbidden. But if you don’t want the opening itself, and it is only a means to remove the moisture from inside, then it is permitted. He doesn’t write why it is permitted. A labor not needed for its own substance? An unintended act? We can guess. Why can we guess? Because Maimonides rules like Rabbi Yehudah regarding a labor not needed for its own substance. Right? So if he said it is permitted, apparently that is because it is an unintended act. Right? Not because it is a labor not needed for its own substance, because regarding that Maimonides rules like Rabbi Yehudah. And in halakhah 25 this is his wording: “One who traps dangerous creatures, such as snakes and scorpions and the like, is permitted to trap them on the Sabbath, provided that he intends to protect himself from their bite. How does he do so? He places a vessel over them, or surrounds them, or ties them up so that they will not cause harm.” Yes, so if your intention is to protect yourself from their bite and not to trap them—for example, you put a vessel over them—then it is permitted. The Maggid Mishneh there asked from what is stated in Sabbath 107: “Some teach this on that case: one who lances an abscess on the Sabbath—if to make for it an opening, he is liable; if to remove moisture from it, he is exempt. Who is the tanna” —who is the tanna who says this?—“Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav: Rabbi Shimon, who says that for a labor not needed for its own substance one is exempt.” Meaning, one who lances an abscess on the Sabbath—what is that? That is a labor not needed for its own substance, right? Therefore he is exempt if he does it in order to remove the moisture. You understand that this is already difficult against what Maimonides writes at the beginning, because Maimonides writes that in such a case it is permitted. Why permitted? Maimonides rules like Rabbi Yehudah regarding a labor not needed for its own substance, so that is already problematic in itself. Therefore we inferred that what makes it permitted is probably the law of an unintended act, not the law of a labor not needed for its own substance. But the Gemara says that it is a labor not needed for its own substance. No—Rav Yehudah says that statement there according to Rabbi Shimon. Why? Because Rabbi Yehudah would obligate in such a case, since it is a labor not needed for its own substance. So Maimonides, who rules like Rabbi Yehudah, should rule that one is liable. “And some teach this on that case: one who traps a snake on the Sabbath—if he is merely occupied with it so that it will not bite him, he is exempt; if for medical use, he is liable. Who is the tanna? Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav: Rabbi Shimon, who says that for a labor not needed for its own substance one is exempt.” Again the same thing. Also regarding halakhah 25, there too the Gemara says this is a labor not needed for its own substance. And how does Maimonides rule? That it is permitted if he intends only to save himself and not to trap. Why? Maimonides rules that a labor not needed for its own substance is liable, like Rabbi Yehudah. Right? In these two halakhot, these are really two cases about which the Gemara says that they are a labor not needed for its own substance, and Maimonides rules that they are permitted—implying that he probably understood them as an unintended act, not as a labor not needed for its own substance. Because regarding an unintended act, Maimonides rules like Rabbi Shimon, that it is permitted. Regarding a labor not needed for its own substance, he rules like Rabbi Yehudah. “And if so, Maimonides, who ruled there in chapter 1 that one is liable for a labor not needed for its own substance—if so, how did he rule in these two cases, lancing an abscess and trapping a snake, that it is permitted when he does not intend to make an opening or to trap?” See there in the Maggid Mishneh’s comments. Now, in Sabbath 3, Shmuel says: “All exemptions of the Sabbath mean exempt but forbidden, except for these three, where exempt means exempt and permitted, and these are: trapping a deer, trapping a snake, and lancing an abscess.” Yes, everywhere it says “exempt,” it means exempt but forbidden. But there are three places where when it says “exempt,” it means exempt and permitted—completely permitted. So trapping a snake and lancing an abscess are exactly the two cases we were discussing. Okay? And Tosafot there already asked in the name of the Behag: Shmuel himself rules on page 42 there that one is liable for a labor not needed for its own substance. Shmuel rules like Rabbi Yehudah, that one is liable for a labor not needed for its own substance. So how can he permit lancing an abscess and trapping a snake because of suffering, since this is a full Torah prohibition? Shmuel basically rules like Rabbi Yehudah that one is liable for a labor not needed for its own substance, and he himself says regarding trapping a snake and lancing an abscess that they permitted it, even though according to his own position this should have been a Torah prohibition. Tosafot also assumed that they permitted it because of suffering. What does “because of suffering” mean? Basically, there is a rabbinic prohibition here which they permitted because of suffering. You don’t want it to bite you, or it hurts—lancing an abscess and the like—so because of the suffering they permitted it. If it were a Torah prohibition, they would not have permitted it because of suffering. Since it is a rabbinic prohibition, they permit it because of suffering. What rabbinic prohibition is it? A rabbinic prohibition of a labor not needed for its own substance. Right? Because with an unintended act there is no rabbinic prohibition; it is completely permitted. You don’t need the “because of suffering” in order to permit it. If you need suffering in order to permit it, that implies that ordinarily, without suffering, it would have been rabbinically forbidden. Why? Apparently because of a labor not needed for its own substance. But Shmuel holds that for a labor not needed for its own substance one is liable—that’s Torah law. So even in a case of suffering they could not permit such a thing. I’ll say parenthetically—we’ll see this in a moment—that in Maimonides it does not sound like it is because of suffering. Maimonides says: “Dangerous creeping creatures, such as snakes and scorpions and the like,” what is written here, “it is permitted to trap them on the Sabbath, provided he intends to save himself from their bite. How does he do this? He places a vessel,” and so on. Notice—it’s easy to read this that way, but I think it’s not correct to read it the way Tosafot does. “Provided he intends to save himself from their bite”—why is that? Because then you have suffering, you want to escape the bite, so they permitted this rabbinic prohibition for you. But that does not sound like Maimonides. In Maimonides it sounds like this is permitted from the outset. When you do not intend to trap them, but only to save yourself from their bite, then it is an unintended act, or a labor not needed for its own substance, no matter, but then it is permitted. With that intention there is no prohibition. No—he does not say that they permitted it because of the suffering. Rather, his requirement that one intend to save himself from their bite is not a requirement that there be suffering here so that I can permit it; it is a requirement in order for this to be an unintended act, or a labor not needed for its own substance, and then it is indeed completely permitted, unrelated to suffering. Maimonides did not write that they permitted it because of his suffering; rather, if you intend to save yourself and not to trap, there is no prohibition, because the intention is a different intention. So this is not like Tosafot, where Tosafot assumes that they permitted it because of suffering. In principle, it is a rabbinic prohibition, and they permitted it because of suffering. This is another indication that according to Maimonides this is not a case of a labor not needed for its own substance, but of an unintended act. Because with a labor not needed for its own substance, first of all Maimonides rules that one is liable; but even if for some reason Maimonides here were to go like Rabbi Shimon—sorry, no. According to Rabbi Yehudah, a labor not needed for its own substance is liable. And even if you go like Tosafot’s view in several places, that on the Sabbath a labor not needed for its own substance is only a rabbinic prohibition—even according to Rabbi Yehudah it is only rabbinic—still, the permission would have to be based on the fact that it is because of suffering. But if you permit it not because of the suffering, but because of the very fact that you do not intend to do anything but save yourself and not catch them, that means the permission is based on an unintended act, not on a labor not needed for its own substance. Okay? Therefore I am saying that in Maimonides’ wording too, it appears that he treats this as an unintended act, not as a labor not needed for its own substance. Then the difficulty is not only the question of how Maimonides can permit this, since he rules like Rabbi Yehudah that for a labor not needed for its own substance one is liable. To that I have an answer. Maimonides thinks this is not a labor not needed for its own substance; it is an unintended act. But the question is that the Gemara says it is a labor not needed for its own substance. How can Maimonides disagree with the Gemara on this? The Gemara says that such a thing is a labor not needed for its own substance; it ties it to the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehudah. So how can Maimonides view it as an unintended act and permit it? Okay? What Tosafot wanted to say is that the permission comes from—Tosafot says—

[Speaker B] “Because of suffering” — he isn’t saying that as a condition, but as the motivation for why here they decreed this way or didn’t decree this way. It’s a different angle. Right, that’s what I’m saying.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying Tosafot doesn’t—

[Speaker B] speak in terms of conditions, and Maimonides doesn’t speak about motivations for why they decreed this way. It could be that Maimonides simply… Right, that’s what I said.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I understood Tosafot to mean that you need to want to save yourself not only in order to make it into a labor not needed for its own substance, but because if you want to save yourself, then you are in suffering. If you have suffering, then that motivation permits you to do it even though it involves a prohibition. Tosafot said: if you want to save yourself, then it’s a labor not needed for its own substance. Right, exactly. And if it were not a labor not needed for its own substance, the suffering would not permit it. Saving yourself—that is the suffering. Someone who wants to save himself—that itself is the suffering. He wants to save himself from the suffering that it might bite him. Is Tosafot saying that the suffering is the basis of the permission, or that in a case of suffering they did not decree here, but you still have to intend to save yourself? It must be a labor not needed for its own substance, because otherwise, if it were a Torah prohibition, they would not permit it because of suffering. So why do you need the suffering? “Provided that he intends to save himself,” without—this is something Maimonides maybe doesn’t need to say, because Maimonides only wants to state the condition for why this is a labor not needed for its own substance. But he doesn’t mention anything about the fact that they permitted it because of suffering? He should have said it.

[Speaker B] If I am not in suffering, is it still permitted for me to do it? Because they also permitted it in cases where you don’t really have suffering yet. Exactly. These are cases that might—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s not something Maimonides necessarily has to write—

[Speaker B] I didn’t fully understand.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So we’re back to the same thing; that’s what I said. I said that the fact that Maimonides doesn’t mention the matter of suffering here is because—

[Speaker B] it is permitted even regardless of suffering. It is permitted because there is no prohibition here. Even according to Tosafot, do you not need there to be suffering? The desire to save yourself from the bite is suffering.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is suffering? Yes, according to Tosafot that is the suffering. That’s the suffering being discussed here.

[Speaker B] What Tosafot said—that the desire to save oneself from the bite—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What else? When you’re talking about harmful creatures like snakes and scorpions, they haven’t yet caused you suffering; they threaten to do so. Yes.

[Speaker B] What Tosafot wrote is that the rabbinic decree regarding a labor not needed for its own substance was apparently not decreed in places close to that kind of threat. Right, so that’s what is being discussed. But it’s not that he is saying what the condition is in order for this to be a labor not needed for its own substance—you need suffering. A labor not needed for its own substance is enough even if you have no suffering. No—a labor not needed for its own substance is a rabbinic prohibition. Since it is a rabbinic prohibition, you need a reason why they permitted it. The reason they permitted it is because of the suffering, preventing the bite. That’s all. But in Maimonides this is double. He does not intend to give a reason why they permitted it. Right, that’s what I’m pointing out, so we’re back for the third time. That’s what I’m pointing out. No, I’m saying something different from you. I want to say that maybe Maimonides agrees with Tosafot, and he says “intends to save himself” only in order to explain why this is at all a labor not needed for its own substance. But that cannot work in any case, because according to Maimonides one is liable for a labor not needed for its own substance. In short, I think there are various indications here that Maimonides understands this as an unintended act and not as a labor not needed for its own substance. The big question is that this doesn’t fit with the Gemara, because the Gemara says it is a labor not needed for its own substance. Okay, so within Maimonides himself there is no contradiction in Maimonides. He understands it as an unintended act, so there is no question—after all, you obligate a labor not needed for its own substance. The question, however, is how he can say such a thing when the Gemara says that this is a labor not needed for its own substance. And that is really a question on the Gemara according to Maimonides. Because Tosafot holds that the Gemara says this is permitted because it is a labor not needed for its own substance. Okay. Rav Chaim basically says that this is really a difficulty on Shmuel in the Gemara. Shmuel himself rules on page 42 that one is liable for a labor not needed for its own substance, and on the other hand they permitted lancing an abscess and trapping a snake because of suffering, meaning that it is only a rabbinic prohibition and not a Torah prohibition. And it seems one can say as follows: in truth, in the case of lancing an abscess, the permission is when one does not intend to make an opening, but only to remove the moisture from it, as indeed the Mishnah states explicitly: if to make an opening, he is liable; only if his intention is solely to remove the moisture from it is it permitted. If so, it turns out that this is really an unintended act, which is exempt on the Sabbath according to everyone. If you simply look at someone making an opening in an abscess in order to remove the moisture, plainly he really does not intend to make the opening itself. So here, simply by looking at the case, you have an unintended act. True, the Gemara says it is a labor not needed for its own substance, but really, when you look at it, it is an unintended act. And even though it is an inevitable result—true, it is an inevitable result, because you can’t remove the moisture without in effect making the opening. The opening is made. So he says: indeed, the Arukh holds that an inevitable result that is not desirable to him is permitted, and Tosafot brings this in Sabbath 103. And likewise in the case of trapping a snake, according to what is explained in Maimonides’ words, where he wrote that it is permitted to trap them on the Sabbath provided that he intends to save himself from their bite—if so, it turns out that he has no intention at all to trap, only to save himself. If so, this is an unintended act involving an inevitable result that is not desirable to him, which is exempt on the Sabbath according to everyone according to the Arukh. But according to this, the sugya needs analysis, because it relates these cases to the law of a labor not needed for its own substance, whereas this is an unintended act, which on the Sabbath is permitted by Torah law according to everyone, and this requires analysis. He says: first of all, I need to understand the Gemara itself before I challenge Maimonides and contradictions and all that. How does the Gemara say that this is a labor not needed for its own substance? Here we have an unintended act.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And an unintended act should be completely permitted, and if it is completely permitted, then if so you can—

[Speaker B] permit it even not in a place of suffering; you don’t need reasons why to permit it—it is permitted from the outset.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] At least according to the Arukh—

[Speaker B] who says that an inevitable result that is not desirable to him is permitted.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That itself is a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim). He says: “Now in Keritot 20, the rabbis taught: one who stirs coals on the Sabbath is liable for a sin-offering.”

[Speaker B] Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of Elazar son of—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] son of Rabbi Tzadok: “He is liable twice, because he extinguishes the upper ones and kindles the lower ones.”

[Speaker B] Rav Ashi said: this is a case where he intended to extinguish, and they became kindled by themselves.

[Speaker B] And the first tanna holds like Rabbi Shimon—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] who says that an unintended act is exempt, while Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Tzadok holds like Rabbi Yehudah, who says that an unintended act is liable.

[Speaker B] Someone intended to extinguish, and somehow it came out that they also became kindled on their own, and then there is a dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehudah because this thing is an unintended act.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to Rabbi—

[Speaker B] Shimon he is exempt, and according to Rabbi Yehudah he is liable. But an unintended act should really be permitted, not merely exempt. And they answered—so wait—Tosafot there asked: but the fact that an unintended act is forbidden on the Sabbath is only rabbinic, so how can it say here that he is liable twice? His assumption is that when it says concerning an unintended act, according to Rabbi Yehudah, that one is liable on the Sabbath, that is only rabbinic, not Torah law.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the rest of the Torah, an unintended act is liable. On the Sabbath, an unintended act is only a rabbinic prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So why did they say here “liable twice”?

[Speaker B] And they answered that this is speaking in a case where it is an inevitable result. And if it were only because of an unintended act, he really would be liable here for kindling according to everyone, because Rabbi Shimon agrees that in a case of an inevitable result one is liable.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And if it is an inevitable result, then Rabbi Shimon also agrees that one is liable. And this is speaking about an inevitable result: he tried to extinguish the upper coals and the lower ones became kindled. Basically, that was an inevitable result. In a case of an inevitable result there is no dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehudah; Rabbi Shimon too would obligate. But since he does not need the kindling, it is a labor not needed for its own substance, and it depends on the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehudah over whether one is liable for a labor not needed for its own substance. We have already seen in Tosafot the approach of Tosafot that an inevitable result that is not desirable to him—

[Speaker B] is a labor not needed for its own substance. Therefore Tosafot says here that in fact, although there is an inevitable result here—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But that isn’t desirable to him, because he’s not comfortable with the burning of the lower ones, and if so this is a labor not needed for its own purpose, and that depends on the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda whether one is liable for it or not. According to this, it turns out that the Talmud here did not use specifically the expression “an unintended act.” The Talmud says this is the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda about an unintended act. And he explains: no, no, this is a labor not needed for its own purpose; it’s not an unintended act. So the Talmud’s language, “unintended act,” is not precise. What it really means is a labor not needed for its own purpose. And that really is its explanation. Indeed, we saw that an inevitable result that is not desirable to him, according to Tosafot, is a labor not needed for its own purpose. So an unintended act and a labor not needed for its own purpose are not really different situations. A labor not needed for its own purpose is a certain kind of unintended act, when it is an inevitable result that is not desirable to him. Indeed, look there in Maimonides, chapter 7 of Hilkhot Shegagot, where he rules regarding one who stirs coals on the Sabbath that only if he intended both to extinguish and to ignite is he liable for two. But if they ignited on their own, he is liable only for one. Now even though Maimonides rules that one is liable for a labor not needed for its own purpose, then why only one? For a labor not needed for its own purpose he should be liable. And we saw that here we are dealing with a labor not needed for its own purpose, not with an unintended act. So it follows that he explains the passage in its plain sense, that it depends on the dispute about an unintended act, not on a labor not needed for its own purpose. According to Maimonides, it comes out that he did not learn like Tosafot, that this is a labor not needed for its own purpose. The passage in its plain sense says “unintended act,” and it means an unintended act. And since we hold that an unintended act is permitted, that is why Maimonides ruled that he is liable for two only if he intended both to extinguish and to ignite. According to this, Tosafot’s question returns to its place. According to Maimonides, it turns out that this is talking about an unintended act, not about an inevitable result. We return to Tosafot’s question. Tosafot asked: after all, an unintended act on the Sabbath is only rabbinically forbidden, so why does it say he is liable for two? And it seems one should say as follows: this rule that an unintended act is forbidden only rabbinically regarding the Sabbath, according to everyone, as explained in Tosafot on Yoma 34. It is not true that this is according to everyone—and that’s how Tosafot understood it. And in several other places as well. And the reason is that regarding the Sabbath it says “thoughtful labor,” and when it is unintended it is not considered thoughtful labor. But the core dispute about an unintended act throughout the entire Torah, whether it is permitted or forbidden, is really at the Torah-law level. Rabbi Yehuda, regarding an unintended act, really obligates; he obligates on the Torah level. The fact that on the Sabbath it is only rabbinically prohibited is because of the rule of thoughtful labor, not because of unintended action. We saw that there are two types of unintended act: the unintended act of the entire Torah, and the unintended act of the Sabbath. I brought this from Rabbi Chaim. And the one who forbids an unintended act holds that it is forbidden by Torah law, as is explicitly explained in Sabbath 133 regarding cutting off a skin affliction—that was also the proof we brought—that according to the one who says an unintended act is forbidden, it is forbidden by Torah law, as the passage bases it on a verse. See there, where a verse is needed to permit cutting off the skin affliction. The verse permits it because without the verse it would have been forbidden by Torah law. Meaning: an unintended act according to Rabbi Yehuda is forbidden by Torah law. Except that regarding the Sabbath, its prohibition is only rabbinic for another reason, because it is not thoughtful labor. And these are two separate laws. The law of unintended act in the whole Torah, and the law of thoughtful labor. Meaning, there are two laws of unintended act. There is the unintended act of the whole Torah, where according to Rabbi Shimon it is permitted and according to Rabbi Yehuda one is liable. And there is the unintended act of the Sabbath, which is really from the laws of thoughtful labor. That is not the same as the unintended act of the whole Torah; there, according to Rabbi Yehuda it is rabbinically forbidden and according to Rabbi Shimon it is permitted. Okay, that is his claim. And then he says this is the first distinction. After that he continues and says this: “And these are two laws indeed. And it seems that these two laws differ from each other in their very basis. There is a difference between them. In the law of unintended act, the main thing depends on his intention and desire. And even if he certainly knows that the act will be done, and he does the act knowingly, nevertheless it depends on his intention—whether he intends this or not.” As is explicitly explained in Pesachim: “If benefit comes to a person against his will, Abaye says it is permitted and Rava says it is forbidden,” and so on. Fine, there is a proof from Pesachim; I’m not going into that passage right now. So what do we see? That in the context of unintended act in the whole Torah, the focus is on a person’s will, not on his knowledge. Right? And therefore the law of unintended act depends on his comfort with it and on his intention, and as we see that even though he certainly receives the benefit, so long as he does not intend the benefit, it falls under the category of unintended act. But in the law of thoughtful labor, the basis of the law does not depend at all on intention and desire, but rather on awareness that he is doing the labor. And this is the core basis of the law of thoughtful labor: that he performs the labor with awareness and thought. As we find in Keritot 19, that one who is occupied without awareness on the Sabbath is exempt because “the Torah forbade thoughtful labor,” and in Bava Kamma, etc. So what is he really saying? The unintended act of the whole Torah is an unintended act that depends on intention and desire—what you wanted in this action. The unintended act of the Sabbath depends on knowledge, not on intention or desire—whether you know that this is going to happen. The practical difference is an inevitable result. That’s what an inevitable result does; we talked about this. What does an inevitable result do? It makes you someone who knows. Right? If it will definitely happen, then you can’t say you didn’t know. You knew it would happen because it was certain to happen. Therefore you will be liable whether it is desirable to you or not. It doesn’t matter. Because bottom line, you knew. Whether it is desirable is relevant only to the unintended act of the whole Torah. Because in the unintended act of the whole Torah, what matters is your will. And if it is not desirable to you, then you did not want it. Okay. Therefore he says: “According to this, regarding an inevitable result, where the Talmud explains that Rabbi Shimon concedes and says one is liable, the view of the Arukh is that this is specifically when it is desirable to him.” In this, the law of thoughtful labor differs from the law of unintended act. Thoughtful labor is the unintended act of the Sabbath. For in the law of unintended act of the whole Torah, whose essence is that this should be his will and intention, there it depends on whether it is desirable to him. Where desire and intention matter—in the unintended act of the whole Torah—then desirability is very important. If it is desirable to you, then you wanted it; if not, then not. “And if not, then although it is an inevitable result and the prohibition will definitely occur, nevertheless, so long as it is not desirable to him, it is not considered intended. And it remains within the category of unintended act, which is permitted. But in the law of thoughtful labor, where we do not require his will or intention at all, only that the labor be done with his awareness and thought, then its law depends not at all on whether it is desirable to him, but rather whenever it is an inevitable result and the labor is known to him as necessarily going to occur, it is called labor done with his awareness and falls under the category of thoughtful labor.” In other words, the whole novelty of the Arukh—that an inevitable result that is not desirable to him is permitted or exempt—that was said only about the unintended act of the whole Torah. But regarding the unintended act of the Sabbath, if it is an inevitable result, you are liable because you knew. What do I care whether it is desirable to you or not? That is basically the claim. I said that in the Arukh itself this is not forced, because the Arukh himself said this also about the Sabbath. And according to this it follows that in an inevitable result not desirable to him, according to the Arukh, the Sabbath too is judged like the whole Torah. What happens with an inevitable result not desirable to him on the Sabbath? On the one hand, from the laws of the Sabbath, you are liable. It’s an inevitable result, right? And I don’t care whether it is desirable or not. But the Sabbath is also a specific case of the unintended act of the whole Torah. There is an unintended act of the whole Torah that is exempt in all Torah laws and specifically also in the laws of the Sabbath. So from the side of the unintended act of the whole Torah, you would be exempt here even on the Sabbath. Not from the side of thoughtful labor, the unintended act of the Sabbath. Okay? So he says: “And according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that an unintended act is forbidden by Torah law throughout the Torah, on the Sabbath too it is forbidden and one is liable for it, since it falls under thoughtful labor, and only the law of unintended act applies to it.” Now notice what comes out. In an inevitable result not desirable to him, okay? On the Sabbath—someone who rules like Rabbi Yehuda—what does he hold? That one is liable, because desirability plays no role. And the exemption of unintended act according to Rabbi Yehuda doesn’t exist—the unintended act of the whole Torah. And I have no problem from thoughtful labor in such a case, right? So it comes out that in an inevitable result not desirable to him, according to Rabbi Yehuda, there will be Torah-level liability even on the Sabbath. By contrast, in ordinary unintended action according to Rabbi Yehuda, we saw that on the Sabbath it is only rabbinically forbidden, right? But in unintended action with an inevitable result not desirable to him—where ostensibly “not desirable” just returns me to being an ordinary unintended act—so we would have expected that Rabbi Yehuda too, who obligates in such a case, would say that on the Sabbath it is only rabbinic? He says no. An inevitable result not desirable to him does not go back to being like ordinary unintended action. Because ordinary unintended action without an inevitable result—you don’t know that it will happen. So fine, there is no issue of unintended act, because according to Rabbi Yehuda even unintended act is liable, but there is still the issue of thoughtful labor. But if it is an inevitable result, then even if it is not desirable to him, I don’t care—but it is still an inevitable result. The moment it is an inevitable result, one is fully liable on the Sabbath according to Rabbi Yehuda. So an inevitable result not desirable to him and ordinary unintended action are not the same thing on the Sabbath. Right? Even though we are usually used to saying that an inevitable result not desirable to him returns me to ordinary unintended action without an inevitable result. That “not desirable” cancels the inevitable result? He says no. Ordinary unintended action is only rabbinically forbidden on the Sabbath, as Tosafot say according to Rabbi Yehuda. According to Rabbi Shimon it is completely permitted; according to Rabbi Yehuda it is rabbinically forbidden. But what happens in unintended action with an inevitable result? Whether desirable or not desirable makes no difference: Torah-level, right? Both according to Rabbi Shimon and according to Rabbi Yehuda. What happens in an inevitable result not desirable to him? According to Rabbi Shimon, what is it? It goes back to being unintended action, and therefore it is permitted. Why is it permitted? Because according to Rabbi Shimon it is unintended action; I don’t care that there is an inevitable result, it is still unintended action, because the lack of desirability cancels it. But according to Rabbi Yehuda, who has no exemption of unintended act in the whole Torah, and only on the Sabbath has the exemption of thoughtful labor that lowers the prohibition to the rabbinic level—but when there is an inevitable result there is no Sabbath exemption—then it goes back to being the unintended act of the whole Torah, right? Because with an inevitable result there is no problem of thoughtful labor. The problem of thoughtful labor is that you don’t know. But in an inevitable result, you do know. So the exemption of thoughtful labor is gone. What remains? Unintended act. But according to Rabbi Yehuda there is no exemption of unintended act. The exemption of thoughtful labor he accepts; therefore according to his view this is only rabbinic on the Sabbath. Exactly—it is treated like the whole Torah. And then he says that in fact an inevitable result not desirable to him, according to Rabbi Yehuda on the Sabbath, will be Torah-level. One will be fully liable. Even though ordinary unintended action is only rabbinically forbidden. And that is essentially his claim. Okay? “And now the passage in Keritot about one who intended to extinguish while a log was lying on them is well resolved, where it says there that Rabbi Yehuda, who says an unintended act is forbidden, imposes liability.” Why does he impose liability? Because it is an inevitable result not desirable to him. An inevitable result not desirable to him is full liability. Tosafot asked: if this is unintended action, then even according to Rabbi Yehuda it is only rabbinically forbidden, so how can they say he is liable for two? No. An inevitable result not desirable to him is not like ordinary unintended action. According to Rabbi Yehuda, an inevitable result not desirable to him brings full liability. That is why they said there that according to Rabbi Yehuda he is liable for two. “And there is no longer any difficulty from the fact that on the Sabbath an unintended act, even according to Rabbi Yehuda, is only rabbinically forbidden, because here it is different, since it is an inevitable result.” And this is why the Talmud ties it to the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon: Rabbi Yehuda, who says an unintended act is forbidden, also imposes liability; only Rabbi Shimon exempts. “And the view of Maimonides too is resolved, for he ruled that when one intended to extinguish and it ignited, he is exempt, even though for a labor not needed for its own purpose he imposes liability.” What he said here—“and the view of Maimonides too is resolved, for he ruled that when one intended to extinguish and it ignited, he is exempt, even though for a labor not needed for its own purpose he imposes liability”—that is exactly Tosafot’s question. After all, Maimonides rules that a labor not needed for its own purpose incurs liability. Not difficult. This is not a labor not needed for its own purpose; this is unintended action. It is unintended action in the form of an inevitable result not desirable to him, and regarding unintended action Maimonides rules like Rabbi Shimon. According to Rabbi Yehuda he is fully liable. So it is perfectly fine that the Talmud says he is liable. No, this is not a labor not needed for its own purpose; it is unintended action. Why is he liable? Because according to Rabbi Yehuda an inevitable result not desirable to him incurs liability. But Maimonides, regarding a labor not needed for its own purpose, really rules like Rabbi Yehuda; but regarding unintended action he rules like Rabbi Shimon, and therefore he said it is permitted. That solves all the problems. “Because here it is not a labor not needed for its own purpose, but rather it is unintended action, as in the passage in Keritot, and in unintended action we hold like Rabbi Shimon, who permits, as explained in Sabbath 93b—and certainly he exempts.” And according to this—the last paragraph—“according to this, what Samuel permits in lancing an abscess and trapping a snake is also very well explained, as we wrote above, because it falls entirely under the category of unintended action, since the inevitable result there is not desirable to him. And Samuel is consistent with his own view, for he holds in Zevachim that unintended action, even in the whole Torah, is permitted.” And Samuel rules like Rabbi Yehuda regarding a labor not needed for its own purpose—that was the difficulty above—but regarding unintended action he rules like Rabbi Shimon. Maimonides basically follows Samuel. Regarding unintended action he rules that it is permitted, and regarding a labor not needed for its own purpose he rules that one is liable. So what we answered about Samuel we can explain in Maimonides as well. Maimonides simply follows Samuel. And that is what he says: the fact that the passage in Sabbath 107 makes it depend on the rule of labor not needed for its own purpose—one who traps a snake or lances an abscess—so they make it depend on labor not needed for its own purpose. That is not difficult. “That is because there it is Rav who says it”—the speaker there is Rav, not Samuel—“and Rav holds in Sabbath 42 that unintended action is forbidden, and therefore in an inevitable result not desirable to him there is also liability on the Sabbath, as explained in the passage in Keritot that we brought, and one is exempt only because it is a labor not needed for its own purpose.” But for Maimonides it is exactly the opposite of Rav. Maimonides goes like Samuel, that with a labor not needed for its own purpose one is indeed liable, but here there is also unintended action, and from the side of unintended action he is exempt. Is this an inevitable result? An inevitable result not desirable to him. Exactly. One hundred eighty degrees from Samuel. Exactly like that. And Rav holds that a labor not needed for its own purpose is exempt, but unintended action is liable. Samuel—and Maimonides—yes, exactly. Okay, and Maimonides rules like Samuel. So the fact that the Talmud on 107 explained it as labor not needed for its own purpose is because it went according to Rav’s view, okay? And according to Rav there is no exemption of unintended action, so there the exemption is from the side of labor not needed for its own purpose. But Maimonides rules that there is an exemption of unintended action, so what do I care that labor not needed for its own purpose is liable? Let it follow that he should be exempt because it also contains unintended action; so he will be exempt from the side of unintended action. And this is also the resolution of the difficulty on Samuel in the Talmud. Maimonides and Samuel are the same position. That is what comes out, yes. What? Here it comes out an opposite position: he imposes liability in an inevitable result that is unintended, and exempts in a labor not needed for its own purpose. He has to make a distinction; he can’t identify labor not needed for its own purpose with an inevitable result not desirable to him, the way Tosafot do. The distinction here comes out exactly the opposite, as though even more so—he has to make the distinction in the opposite direction. Usually you make the distinction by saying that an inevitable result not desirable to him is less similar to actual labor; labor not needed for its own purpose is more so. No, but don’t forget that here you are speaking in terms of different tannaitic positions. Regarding unintended action with an inevitable result not desirable to him he rules like Rabbi Shimon. He rules like—Rabbi Yehuda. Rav, sorry. Rav holds regarding unintended action that it is forbidden, and regarding a labor not needed for its own purpose he permits. Rav. Not Maimonides and Samuel. So you are speaking in terms of different tannaitic positions; you’re comparing the cases, but he rules according to different tannaitic positions. Within each tanna… No, I’m talking about Rav. It’s just that the explanation of Rav’s position here has to be very surprising, because usually a labor not needed for its own purpose is more severe than unintended action. No—and with an inevitable result not desirable to him there are those who identify it with labor not needed for its own purpose, Tosafot. Right, and then here you would have to do more than identify it with that; it becomes a level beyond, where labor not needed for its own purpose would be exempt and this would be forbidden—liable, yes. So that is… fine, that is what comes out, yes. It is very surprising because it is hard to explain how that happens. I don’t see why that hierarchy is necessary. So Rav holds that way—fine. Now here there is really Rabbi Chaim’s claim. Rabbi Chaim’s claim in practice is that these cases of lancing an abscess and trapping a snake are both unintended action and labor not needed for its own purpose at the same time. Meaning, there can be cases that are both this and that. And now the whole law will depend on what you hold about unintended action and what you hold about labor not needed for its own purpose. It is enough that in one of them you exempt, for this case to be exempt. That is very strange, because it basically comes out that there is no difference between unintended action and labor not needed for its own purpose. He says: the very same case itself can be defined both as unintended action and as labor not needed for its own purpose. In principle both exemptions exist; now we just have to discuss whether those exemptions apply. But it is the same case itself. You exempt it for two different reasons, but the case is the same case. Say, one who digs a pit but needs only the dirt—in principle that is both unintended action and labor not needed for its own purpose. Except that the exemption is because of labor not needed for its own purpose, not because of unintended action—maybe because there there is an inevitable result. So there would not be an exemption of unintended action, but there would be an exemption of labor not needed for its own purpose. But that does not mean that this case is defined as labor not needed for its own purpose and not as unintended action. The case itself is both labor not needed for its own purpose and unintended action. This claim is a bit odd. True, according to Tosafot too, who identify an inevitable result not desirable to him with labor not needed for its own purpose, the whole approach really goes in this direction. Right? We saw that according to Tosafot the difference between labor not needed for its own purpose and unintended action is only the question of desirability. The case is the same case; in both cases you do not intend it, in both cases there is an inevitable result. If it is desirable to you, it is unintended action. If it is not desirable to you, it is labor not needed for its own purpose. Okay? So in terms of the case itself, it is the same dragging of a bench with the same furrow. The only difference is what you want—what is desirable to you. So that is really the idea behind Rabbi Chaim’s approach too. He is basically saying: you will not be able to look at a case and point and say this is unintended action and that is labor not needed for its own purpose. In the very same case both exemptions can exist. The question is only whose view you follow. And neither Rav nor Samuel accept both exemptions. Rav accepts the exemption of labor not needed for its own purpose but not that of unintended action, and Samuel the opposite. Okay? But on the conceptual level, if I were Rabbi Shimon, for example, who says both exemptions, then he would exempt for both reasons: both because of labor not needed for its own purpose and because of unintended action. And by the way, according to this it turns out that for labor not needed for its own purpose it is not entirely clear… oh no, according to Rabbi Shimon it really comes out, yes, according to Rabbi Shimon it really comes out that both in labor not needed for its own purpose and in unintended action it should be completely permitted, not just rabbinically forbidden. Because let it follow from the side of unintended action that it would be permitted. Even if from the side of labor not needed for its own purpose there is a rabbinic prohibition here. Unless we say that the Sages decreed that in cases of labor not needed for its own purpose they still leave a rabbinic prohibition on the level of rabbinic decrees—I don’t know. This whole story is a bit odd. Was there something special in those situations, those three situations that the Talmud—and basically Samuel—mentions, lancing an abscess and trapping… Not necessarily exactly the same in all three, but there is a common line. In lancing an abscess, first of all, we always say labor needed for its own purpose because you don’t see—and the basic reasoning to forbid it is simply that you don’t see the difference between this and a normal labor act. You just… you have to start discussing the person’s intentions, and we say no, we ignore the person’s intentions. If the act is identical, then we’re no longer interested in the intentions. The point is that in things like—for example—a surgeon doing it, the Chazon Ish emphasizes this—doctors do this—things that require expertise. If someone makes an opening here, and you say this looks exactly like the opening made for medical treatment, the doctor will tell you no, there’s no connection, it’s not the same thing. Even if it looks similar, that’s not a medical procedure. I’ll get to that in a moment; I think the Kehillot Yaakov says something along those lines. With trapping a deer, that is separate, because trapping is such a severe labor that you are not really treating the object—you are not touching the animal—so there are some labors where this will be defined from the very definition of the labor, not as an external exemption. I’ll get to that in a moment. In any case, what comes out of here is that there can be cases—and maybe even all the cases—that are both unintended action and labor not needed for its own purpose. We saw that Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides does not go in that direction. Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides basically understands that we are dealing here with two different types of cases, although admittedly the distinction is not so simple—when do we say it is this and when do we say it is that—but his claim is that if you do two actions, that is unintended action; if you do one action that has two results, that is labor not needed for its own purpose. Yes, that is basically the claim. And then you can’t speak in Rabbi Chaim’s terms and say that the same case itself is both unintended action and labor not needed for its own purpose, and the question is from which side you exempt it. No: if this case is unintended action, then it is not labor not needed for its own purpose, and vice versa. But here enters the Kehillot Yaakov’s approach. Kehillot Yaakov in Ketubot, section 3, takes a somewhat different approach in this context and basically wants to claim that if you impose liability for unintended action—say, Rav, because Rav imposes liability for unintended action—then from his perspective those two actions are one. Because he doesn’t care whether you intended this or intended that—dragging the bench and making the furrow. So Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides says these are two different actions, not one action with two results; these are two actions, right? And all of that is true according to Rabbi Shimon, who exempts in the case of dragging a bench and making a furrow as unintended action. But according to Rabbi Yehuda, who imposes liability, you can’t see dragging the bench and making the furrow as two separate actions, because for him it doesn’t matter—they stick together. Okay? Even without an inevitable result. According to Rabbi Shimon this happens with an inevitable result, but according to Rabbi Yehuda even without an inevitable result, because he has no exemption for unintended action. The moment there is no exemption for unintended action, then this action itself will be labor not needed for its own purpose. And the Kehillot Yaakov, I think, really assumes what Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides says. He is basically arguing: if the difference between unintended action and labor not needed for its own purpose is whether there are two actions or one action with two results, then according to Rabbi Yehuda, where you ignore the fact that these are two actions—“I don’t care that they are two actions”—then from your perspective it is one action. If it is one action, then it has become labor not needed for its own purpose. Precisely because you impose liability for unintended action, you will define this action as labor not needed for its own purpose. Okay? And think, for example, about one who digs a pit and needs only the dirt. Fine? One could have said that these are two actions. And Rabbi Yehuda still imposes liability, even though they are two actions, because unintended action does not exempt according to Rabbi Yehuda, right? So what does that mean? That digging the pit and taking out the dirt are, from his perspective, not two actions but one action. He is not willing to distinguish between the two… But if this is one action, that is exactly the definition of labor not needed for its own purpose: one action with two results, the dirt and the pit. Meaning that a connection is created between your position on unintended action and your position on labor not needed for its own purpose. If you impose liability for unintended action, then these cases will be labor not needed for its own purpose. Now according to Rabbi Yehuda it doesn’t matter so much, because Rabbi Yehuda imposes liability both for unintended action and for labor not needed for its own purpose. And according to Rabbi Shimon too it doesn’t matter, because Rabbi Shimon exempts both for labor not needed for its own purpose and for unintended action. It will matter for Rav and Samuel. Because Rav and Samuel have those diagonal positions that say—take Samuel. Samuel says that unintended action is permitted, but labor not needed for its own purpose incurs liability—sorry. Okay? And Rav says: for unintended action you are liable, but for labor not needed for its own purpose you are exempt. So according to Rav, every case of unintended action and inevitable result, if there is lack of desirability, then it basically turns into labor not needed for its own purpose. Because Rav imposes liability in unintended action, right? So if Rav imposes liability in unintended action, that means the two actions are one from his perspective. So there is one action with two results. That is the case of labor not needed for its own purpose. Therefore on page 107, where the Talmud brings it in Rav’s name, it relates to lancing an abscess and trapping a snake as labor not needed for its own purpose. Why? Because in Rav’s view there is no exemption of unintended action. If there is no exemption of unintended action, then these two actions are one action. But then there still remains the exemption of labor not needed for its own purpose, and according to Rav this is a case of labor not needed for its own purpose. By contrast, if I permit unintended action, then it won’t be relevant to speak there of labor not needed for its own purpose. Why not? Because the exemption is from the side of unintended action, since there are two distinct actions here. Once there are two distinct actions here, not only am I exempt, but my exemption is because of unintended action, not because of labor not needed for its own purpose, because it cannot be treated as labor not needed for its own purpose. Labor not needed for its own purpose has to be one action with two results. And if you exempt for unintended action, then you see such situations as two actions and not as one action. So labor not needed for its own purpose won’t apply here. Okay? Therefore Maimonides—the practical difference will now be in Maimonides and Samuel. Maimonides follows Samuel. Let me start with Rav again. The Talmud on page 107 goes according to Rav’s view. What does Rav say? Rav says he imposes liability for unintended action and exempts labor not needed for its own purpose, right? What will happen with lancing an abscess? Since Rav imposes liability for unintended action, then from Rav’s perspective creating the opening and releasing the pus is one action. Because he refuses to recognize this as two actions; it is not unintended action. I am going here according to Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides, that unintended action means two actions. From his perspective there is no exemption of unintended action. If there is no exemption of unintended action, then from my perspective this is the action you did, and it is one action. Right, but there are still two results here: an opening is created and the pus comes out. Right? And Rav does accept the exemption of labor not needed for its own purpose. Therefore he treats lancing an abscess and trapping a snake as labor not needed for its own purpose, and therefore he exempts them. Precisely because unintended action is liable. What will happen according to Samuel? Samuel says that unintended action is permitted. So from his perspective these are two distinct actions. If they are two distinct actions, then not only is it permitted, but if you ask me why it is permitted, it is not because of labor not needed for its own purpose. This is not a case of labor not needed for its own purpose; it is a case of unintended action. It does not belong to the category of labor not needed for its own purpose, because there are two actions here and not one. So one who permits unintended action will not see this as labor not needed for its own purpose—not that he does not permit it because of labor not needed for its own purpose, but rather it is not a case of labor not needed for its own purpose at all. That is what the Kehillot Yaakov claims. And unlike Rabbi Chaim, who says that the very same case can be both unintended action and labor not needed for its own purpose, the Kehillot Yaakov claims no: your view on the exemption of unintended action will determine whether labor not needed for its own purpose exists here. Then of course we still have to discuss whether you exempt or not. Meaning, one who imposes liability for unintended action will see these cases as labor not needed for its own purpose. If he holds like Rabbi Yehuda, he will impose liability; if he holds like Rabbi Shimon on labor not needed for its own purpose, he will exempt. But first of all, it will be a case of labor not needed for its own purpose. But if you hold like Rabbi Shimon regarding unintended action, then this case does not belong to the category of labor not needed for its own purpose at all, so I don’t care how you rule there. Even Maimonides, who rules that one is liable for labor not needed for its own purpose, will permit it here. Why will he permit it here? Because this is unintended action. And therefore there is no question on Maimonides: how can you classify this as unintended action when the Talmud itself on page 107 calls it labor not needed for its own purpose? Because the Talmud there was speaking according to Rav, and Maimonides rules like Samuel. And in fact the Avi Mishneh writes exactly this. Avi Mishneh, the commentary on Maimonides, writes exactly this. I don’t know it. There are basically four positions: Rabbi Shimon’s position, who exempts in both; Rabbi Yehuda’s position, who imposes liability in both; Rav’s position, who exempts labor not needed for its own purpose and imposes liability in unintended action; and Samuel’s position, who imposes liability in labor not needed for its own purpose and exempts in unintended action. Maimonides rules like Samuel. Each one of them will say something else about lancing an abscess and trapping a snake.

[Speaker C] According to Rabbi Shimon this is

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] not a case of labor not needed for its own purpose at all. True, he also exempts labor not needed for its own purpose, but he doesn’t need to get there. This is not a case of labor not needed for its own purpose. It is a case of unintended action. He exempts because unintended action is also exempt. Hey, but it’s an inevitable result—an inevitable result not desirable to him—so exempt. Okay? That is Rabbi Shimon. According to Rabbi Yehuda, he imposes liability for unintended action. If he imposes liability for unintended action, then this is basically a case of labor not needed for its own purpose. Except that Rabbi Yehuda also imposes liability for labor not needed for its own purpose, so there is no practical difference. Right? So that is Rabbi Yehuda’s position. According to Rav—so Rav rules like Rabbi Yehuda regarding unintended action, and therefore from his perspective trapping a snake and lancing an abscess are cases of labor not needed for its own purpose. Except that here he does not rule like Rabbi Yehuda. According to his view there is a permission or exemption in labor not needed for its own purpose, so indeed he says that trapping a snake and lancing an abscess are labor not needed for its own purpose, for which one is exempt. And Samuel is the opposite, contrary view. Samuel says: I go like Rabbi Shimon regarding unintended action, and therefore this case is a case of unintended action; it is not at all a case of labor not needed for its own purpose. So even though I myself impose liability for labor not needed for its own purpose, says Samuel, it doesn’t matter because this is not a case of labor not needed for its own purpose. And that is Maimonides. Okay? That is basically the claim. Now, the Kehillot Yaakov there continues. He basically wants to claim—what I just said is really my own approach. The Kehillot Yaakov differs in one nuance, and from here I get to what I told you earlier. The Kehillot Yaakov basically wants to say that one who holds like Rabbi Shimon, that labor not needed for its own purpose—that unintended action is exempt—then there will be certain labors such that if you did not intend them, it does not even enter the definition of the labor at all. Not an exemption of unintended action; it does not even enter the definition of the labor. By contrast, Rabbi Yehuda, who imposes liability for unintended action, will also differ from Rabbi Shimon in the very definition of the labor, because from his perspective unintended and intended

[Speaker E] are the same thing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Therefore he says—for example—the Maggid Mishneh in Hilkhot Sabbath chapter 12: Maimonides says there that one who extinguishes a metal ember is liable only if he does so for the purpose of refining the metal. So the Maggid Mishneh points out that Maimonides rules that one is liable for labor not needed for its own purpose, so what difference does it make whether he does it for refining? If he did not do it for refining—sorry—he should still be liable; it is labor not needed for its own purpose. So he says no: because where, if you are not doing it for refining, this is not even called extinguishing at all.

[Speaker D] In other words, extinguishing the metal ember—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] its purpose, the refining, is part of the definition of the action. There is no labor of extinguishing here at all if you are not

[Speaker B] doing it for refining.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The exemption is not because of labor not needed for its own purpose.

[Speaker B] The exemption is because of the very definition of the labor.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is somewhat like what you wanted to say earlier. And therefore he

[Speaker B] says that even Maimonides,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] who imposes liability for labor

[Speaker B] not needed for its own purpose, in such a case

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] would not impose liability, because

[Speaker B] this is not an exemption of labor not needed for its own purpose,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] it is an exemption because you do not enter the category of the labor at all. And there is a whole list of such things. For example, in lancing an abscess, in Shitah Mekubetzet on Ketubot, it says that if you lance an abscess in order to release pus—what you said about doctors—if you do it in order to release pus, then basically this is not even called making an opening. You released pus, so this is not an exemption of labor not needed for its own purpose; even Maimonides,

[Speaker B] who imposes liability for labor not needed for its own purpose, here would exempt.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is another answer to what we said regarding Maimonides—that Maimonides says lancing an abscess is permitted. Why? After all, he holds one is liable for labor not needed for its own purpose.

[Speaker B] He says no, because with lancing an abscess, if you do it not for the opening but in order to release the abscess,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] then you did not make an opening at all.

[Speaker B] It is not called making an opening at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It is not that you made an opening for another purpose; sometimes the purpose is part of the definition of the action itself. And that would also resolve Maimonides. After all, we asked about Maimonides: why with lancing an abscess does he not impose liability—after all, labor not needed for its own purpose is liable? Why does Maimonides see this as unintended action? So he says: he does not see it as unintended action; he sees it as someone who did not make an opening at all. But the Kehillot Yaakov adds: if you go with Rabbi Shimon, who imposes liability for unintended action, then you cannot say that you did not make an opening at all, because from his perspective making the opening and releasing the pus are basically the same thing. So you did make an opening. In other words, he argues that the dispute about unintended action between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda also projects onto the question of how we define the labor itself. Because one who sees those two things as two aspects of the same action cannot say that if I make an opening in order to release pus, that is not an opening at all, because for him releasing pus and making an opening go together; there is no exemption of unintended action. If there is no exemption of unintended action, then even in the definition of the labor you cannot make the purpose part of the definition of the labor itself. And this is the connection he makes between the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda about unintended action and the definition of the labor—even though the exemption is not from the law of unintended action or from the law of labor not needed for its own purpose, nevertheless, even though the exemption is not from those laws, it will still depend on the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda. The law in lancing an abscess? What? Rabbi Yehuda’s exemption in lancing an abscess? If it is unintended action then it seems… oh no, no, the exemption from the side of labor not needed for its own purpose. Ah, but according to Rabbi Yehuda there is no exemption.

[Speaker E] According to Rabbi Yehuda there is no

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] exemption for labor not needed for its own purpose. What? If it is unintended action then he is exempt from the side of labor not needed for its own purpose. But according to Rabbi Yehuda there is no exemption. According to Rabbi Yehuda there is no exemption for labor not needed for its own purpose. According to Rabbi Shimon it is rabbinic. Yes. In short, that is the direction of the Kehillot Yaakov. I’ll stop here. Why does he say trapping here? What do you mean? In trapping you do not have that element—that it could be part of the definition of the labor—so he has to give a somewhat different reasoning. It is not like lancing an abscess. If you closed the door not in order to trap the deer, then you did not perform an act of trapping at all. Not that you trapped it for another purpose. That applies both to trapping a deer and to trapping a snake—they are both the same. Right. So in that case it is not like lancing an abscess, where you say… why? He can say the same thing there too. If you trap the snake not in order to use it, then it is not an exemption of labor not needed for its own purpose—it is not trapping at all. In trapping a deer it is easier, because you are just closing a door. What is that, really? The fact that there is a deer inside—

[Speaker C] it is hard to see that as an act of trapping.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So because the labor there is so weakly defined—you are not touching the deer, you are not

[Speaker B] touching the snake. Quite so; therefore it is easier to define it that way. It is just a matter of referring to the person’s intention, that he didn’t do anything.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, that is just an added explanation of the same definition. Yes. Okay, we’ll stop here.

Rules of the Labors – Lesson 12

Table of Contents

Summary

General Overview

The dependence of the definition of a labor not needed for its own sake on the nature of the labor

Tosafot versus Nachmanides: the Tabernacle versus the “meaning of the labor”

Wounding, circumcision, and first intercourse with a virgin in Ketubot 5 and their implications for “need”

The Kehillot Yaakov’s question: why is blood different from dirt in digging a pit?

Nachmanides’ novel idea: “separation” labors versus an action on a single body

Comments on inevitable result, intention, and the example of carrying out

Maimonides on lancing an abscess and trapping dangerous creatures, and the difficulty from the Talmud

Shmuel: “exempt and permitted” in three places, and Tosafot in the name of the Behag

Rabbi Chaim: classifying the cases as “an unintended act” and an inevitable but undesired result

Two laws in unintended action: a general Torah rule versus melechet machshevet on the Sabbath

Reconciling Shmuel and Maimonides with Rav: why the Talmud ties it to a labor not needed for its own sake

Critique of the move: identifying unintended action with a labor not needed for its own sake

Rabbi Avraham son of Maimonides: two acts versus one act with two results

The Kehillot Yaakov: one’s stance on unintended action determines whether this category exists here at all

The Kehillot Yaakov and defining the very name of the labor: when there is no intention, there is no “labor” at all

Conclusion and presenting trapping as a case easier to fit into the definition of “he did not perform a labor”

Full Transcript

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Table of Contents

Summary

General Overview

The dependence of the definition of a labor not needed for its own sake on the nature of the labor

Tosafot versus Nachmanides: the Tabernacle versus the “meaning of the labor”

Wounding, circumcision, and first intercourse with a virgin in Ketubot 5 and their implications for “need”

The Kehillot Yaakov’s question: why is blood different from dirt in digging a pit?

Nachmanides’ novel idea: “separation” labors versus an action on a single body

Comments on inevitable result, intention, and the example of carrying out

Maimonides on lancing an abscess and trapping dangerous creatures, and the difficulty from the Talmud

Shmuel: “exempt and permitted” in three places, and Tosafot in the name of the Behag

Rabbi Chaim: classifying the cases as “an unintended act” and an inevitable but undesired result

Two laws in unintended action: a general Torah rule versus melechet machshevet on the Sabbath

Reconciling Shmuel and Maimonides with Rav: why the Talmud ties it to a labor not needed for its own sake

Critique of the move: identifying unintended action with a labor not needed for its own sake

Rabbi Avraham son of Maimonides: two acts versus one act with two results

The Kehillot Yaakov: one’s stance on unintended action determines whether this category exists here at all

The Kehillot Yaakov and defining the very name of the labor: when there is no intention, there is no “labor” at all

Conclusion and presenting trapping as a case easier to fit into the definition of “he did not perform a labor”

Full Transcript

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