Ketubot, Chapter 2, Lesson 45

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And “I am pure”? The “the same mouth that prohibited”? The second one is coming in just a moment. So those are the two laws written in the Mishnah. Okay? There’s just one more side point here in parentheses: we don’t worry about… collusion. Right? That they’ll make a deal? Exactly—that each one will testify for the other. After all, they know they can’t testify about themselves, so they make an arrangement: you testify for me, I’ll testify for you, and everything will be fine. So there’s room to suspect that in a situation where each one testifies for the other, maybe we shouldn’t accept that testimony. The Mishnah teaches us that we are not concerned about that. So that’s just a side novelty; at the moment it doesn’t interest us. For us, what matters is the basic credibility—that’s our topic in this class. So in terms of credibility itself, let’s leave aside the concern for collusion. What’s written in the Mishnah is two laws: a woman is not believed about herself to say that she is pure, but a woman is believed to say about another woman that she is pure. What about testimony about impurity? So if you want, you can work it out yourselves. If she testifies about herself that she is impure? Right—that doesn’t require credibility; that is self-imposed prohibition, so of course she is believed, right? If she testifies about the other woman that she is impure? Of course that does help. The question is what the other woman says. If the other woman says she is pure, that’s a different matter; we’ll see that in a moment. But if the other woman says nothing—just one woman comes and says, this woman was taken captive and she is impure—that doesn’t help. She cannot testify about someone else that she is impure. You need two witnesses for that. All the leniency of accepting one witness, or an invalid witness, or a woman, and so on, is only where she comes to declare another woman pure. If she comes to declare another woman impure, we remain with the basic law: for that you need two witnesses. Okay? So in principle she is not believed. Except that in fact we don’t need her testimony. As long as we have no proof that the woman is pure, we treat her as impure anyway, even without the testimony of the other woman. If Rachel comes and says Leah became impure, okay? I asked whether she is believed. I said that in principle she is not believed, because you need two witnesses, okay? But it doesn’t matter, because even without any testimony at all, as long as I don’t have proof that Leah is pure, I will regard her as impure, right? That’s the rabbinic stringency—they imposed a higher standard regarding lineage: if she was taken captive, the assumption is that she is impure unless it is proven that she is pure. So if there is one witness about her—wait, there is one witness about her—that she became impure, then it doesn’t matter that this witness says she became impure; we have no witness saying she is pure, and that is enough to leave her with the presumption of impurity. Okay? Yes, Yael, what did you want?

[Speaker D] I’m asking—so in that case, if that’s so, why does it matter? I asked that it’s a presumption that every woman who was taken captive is impure?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not a presumption; it’s a rabbinic stringency. You asked whether there’s a majority here, and then it would be the basic law. I’m saying there is no majority.

[Speaker D] And what is the stringency based on?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Sages were concerned—it’s a doubt. Sometimes the Sages were stringent and took even a minority possibility into account.

[Speaker F] But does her legal presumption actually change, or does she remain under a presumption of purity and they were just stringent and require her to bring proof?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For what issue? She is forbidden to marry a kohen without proof.

[Speaker F] I mean, but is she now under a presumption of impurity? Yes? What do you mean?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The only practical difference of the presumption is whether she can marry a kohen. The Sages turned her into someone under a presumption of impurity, meaning that she cannot marry a kohen until she brings proof. You’re asking what would happen in a case of two against two? If there are two witnesses against two witnesses whether she became impure or not—then the question is whether there is a presumption, what the presumption would be here.

[Speaker F] In my head I just had all the classes in order, like…

[Speaker C] But wait, Rabbi, before this we said she had a presumption of purity when there is “the same mouth that prohibited,” right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If there is “the same mouth that prohibited,” then it’s not about a presumption; rather, we believe her.

[Speaker C] But before this we said that the captive woman, until she was taken captive, had a presumption of purity.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, she does not have a presumption of purity.

[Speaker C] I’m asking whether she has a presumption of impurity because there was a witness who testified about her?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no, no—mixed up, mixed up, mixed up. Let me go through it again. A captive woman, under the basic law, has a presumption of purity, because she has an original presumption that she was pure before she was taken captive. Therefore under the basic law you would need proof in order to render her impure. Then the Sages came and said: we are changing the law. She is under a presumption of impurity, and you need proof to render her pure. But all of that is a rabbinic stringency. If she has “the same mouth that prohibited,” then that proof is enough to remove her from the rabbinic presumption of impurity. Clear?

[Speaker E] And when a woman says, “My friend is impure,” that neither adds nor subtracts anything.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. That’s why I’m saying that on the principled level it doesn’t matter, because her statement does not have the status of testimony. To render someone impure you need two witnesses; there is no rabbinic leniency that one witness is enough to render someone impure.

[Speaker C] Right, right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I don’t need that, because even without it, as long as there is no proof that she is pure, she remains under a presumption of impurity—that is, rabbinically forbidden to marry a kohen. Okay? Good. Now we really get into the question of “the same mouth that prohibited.” From the language of the Mishnah, it seems apparently that they have it.

[Speaker D] What? She is rabbinically forbidden to marry a kohen, but biblically permitted? Is that what you mean? Yes, yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] She has a presumption of purity, and in principle under the basic law she would be permitted to marry a kohen, but the Rabbis were stringent and forbade it. Now, is there “the same mouth that prohibited” here? From the language of the Mishnah it seems that there is. It says: two women were taken captive. Meaning: I was taken captive and I am pure. What does “I was taken captive and I am pure” mean? It sounds as though she is the one testifying that she…

[Speaker D] was taken captive.

[Speaker E] She prohibited herself.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes.

[Speaker D] You could read the Mishnah as saying that there was prior information—”two women were taken captive”—that’s the prior information. No, no.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, slowly. Right, I completely agree. It says: two women were taken captive. On the simple reading of the Mishnah, there is no “the same mouth that prohibited” here. “Two women were taken captive” means that this is known to us. The second one says: true, I was taken captive, but I am pure. Not that she is the source of the ruling that she was taken captive. Otherwise it should have said: two women—meaning, this one says, “I was taken captive and I am pure,” and that one says, “I was taken captive and I am pure”—they are not believed. What does “two women were taken captive” mean? How do we know that they were taken captive? Apparently this tells us that we already have testimony that they were taken captive. Okay?

[Speaker D] That’s actually how Rashi understands it; that’s Rashi’s explanation.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, right.

[Speaker E] And even if there were no “the same mouth that prohibited,” that would explain why they are not believed. And we also discussed captive women with “the same mouth that prohibited” in the previous passage. So what is novel here if there is no “the same mouth that prohibited”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, that’s the Mishnah.

[Speaker C] But why not say that there is testimony because they are not believed? So from that the Mishnah shows us that there is testimony about them, and that’s not surprising. I didn’t understand. From the fact that the Mishnah says they are not believed, that itself is evidence from the Mishnah that there is testimony about them. That’s no problem.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, exactly. If…

[Speaker C] But that’s clearer than “two women.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s proof from the law. First I want to show that this is the law. You’re right. If there were “the same mouth that prohibited,” and each one said, “I was taken captive and I am pure,” then obviously the law should be that she is believed—that is the previous Mishnah. The previous Mishnah tells us that if a woman comes and says, “I was taken captive and I am pure,” she is believed. So why does it say here that they are not believed? Therefore it is clear from the law as well—you are right—that there is no “the same mouth that prohibited” here. But how do we read that in the Mishnah? It says, she says, “I was taken captive and I am pure.” The answer is: no. Rather, two women were taken captive. We know they were taken captive. One of them says, “I was taken captive”—you’re right—but “I am pure.” Not that she is now informing me that she was taken captive; I know she was taken captive. She is only saying: I admit, I was taken captive, but I am pure. What do you want? Okay? And indeed Rashi writes that we have testimony that they were taken captive, precisely because of this issue. Tosafot indeed did not have the reading…

[Speaker D] If they had learned Torah, they would know to testify for each other instead of each one testifying for herself.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s exactly the question of whether we are concerned about collusion—that’s what is written here.

[Speaker D] Yes. So if—then they didn’t learn.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What’s the connection? If they had learned… if they had learned, then they also would not be believed even if they testified for each other. No, that’s obvious. Meaning, it’s clear that the reason we are not concerned about collusion… or at least it seems clear to me… is partly because women did not know these laws. In that society… maybe through miggo?

[Speaker E] They knew a Torah scholar, and he knew how to get out of it. I can’t hear. With miggo we always say: he knew a Torah scholar, and he knew how to get out of it. He’ll make a weaker claim, and that way the law will come out in his favor.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, okay—that’s the standard question with miggo. So what about here?

[Speaker E] So same thing here. There we don’t worry about a Torah scholar, but here we should worry about learned women.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, worry about learned women? On the contrary—we are not worried.

[Speaker E] Not worried

[Speaker C] that they are learned.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] With miggo, as we already said, the point is that even an ignoramus will go to a Torah scholar and consult him, and therefore even an ignoramus has miggo. Okay? But here, this concern of collusion among women does not exist. I assume that in a society where there are women who know these laws, perhaps the law would change. I don’t know—each case on its own terms.

[Speaker C] But last time we saw that the daughters of Shmuel… yes… knew exactly what they were doing and played tricks, and still they were permitted.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, that really is… that really is a question. Although there it again goes in the opposite direction: there it’s “the same mouth that prohibited,” here it’s collusion. Fine. But I said—in the end I decided not to get into this whole issue of legal tricks. I wanted to give a whole class on legal tricks. It could have been nice.

[Speaker E] Send us something…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I don’t have anything written right now. I’d have to prepare it. But yes, it is an interesting topic. I don’t know—fine, we’ll see, maybe next time we’ll do something. We’ll see. Okay, so Tosafot says as follows: “Two women who were taken captive”—the Ri says: we do not have the text, “this one says: I was taken captive and I am pure,” rather, “this one says: I am pure.” For the case is speaking where there are witnesses that they were taken captive. Tosafot agrees with Rashi that we are dealing with a case where there were witnesses, but he has difficulty with the wording of the Mishnah. So he says apparently we should not read the words “I was taken captive.” But he says, the text can still be maintained, because the case is that they themselves did not know that there were witnesses, and it teaches us that even so they are not believed. It could be that there really were witnesses, and we don’t need to delete the word “I was taken captive.” In fact the woman comes on her own initiative and says, “I was taken captive and I am pure.” She simply did not know that the court already had witnesses that she had been taken captive. She thought she was introducing that information to the court.

[Speaker C] Okay, and the novelty is that she is not believed in such a case.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? Why indeed is she not believed?

[Speaker C] What do you mean—not from her mouth? It isn’t from her mouth.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So here the Kovetz Shiurim says the following: “And in Tosafot above on page 23, the Ri says etc., that the case is where they did not know that there were witnesses, and it teaches us that even so they are not believed.” End quote. I’m reading here from the Kovetz Shiurim. “Now if miggo is based on the idea of ‘we are as certain as if we had witnessed it,’ it is hard to understand: why are they not believed in this case?” If miggo is just the reasoning of “why would I lie,” what’s called anan sahadei, this clarifying logic, then what’s the problem? After all, if they didn’t know about the witnesses, then they really did have a miggo—they could have said they had not been taken captive at all, from their own standpoint. Again, that would not actually have helped, because we have witnesses. But from the calculation they themselves made, the fact that they didn’t say that is proof they are not lying.

[Speaker D] They had miggo, but they didn’t have “the same mouth that prohibited,” basically.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In a moment we’ll see, in a moment we’ll see—that’s already a somewhat different formulation. Then he says: we see from here that miggo has another dimension beyond “why would I lie,” what we called argumentative force or force of credibility. Okay? This appears in the Kovetz Shiurim, which I mentioned before too: he proves from various places that miggo contains something beyond just “why would I lie.” And one of his proofs is from this Tosafot. Okay? Then he says: you see that if miggo is a force of credibility derived from the other claim she could have made, then since in reality there are witnesses, they do not actually possess that force of credibility. Since miggo contains something more than just “why would I lie,” it also contains legal force, and here that legal force is absent. Because force of credibility is a legal mechanism, not just some calculation of “why would I lie.” And the legal mechanism says: I grant them the force they would have had had they made that other claim. But if they had made that other claim, it would not have helped them, because we have witnesses. Okay? So they do not really have the legal power to make the alternative claim. The logic of “why would I lie” does exist in this case. But the legal force of the claim does not exist in this case. Okay, good.

Now, what Ayala noted earlier—I want to add something to his words. It may be that he is not right. I can reject his proof. Miggo is only “why would I lie”; there is no force of credibility in miggo. So why doesn’t it help here? Because here miggo does not help; only “the same mouth that prohibited” helps. And here it is only miggo, not “the same mouth that prohibited.” Therefore it does not help. That’s what I’m saying. Meaning, I could say that miggo contains only the logic of “why would I lie” and not this force of credibility. That’s all it has. Now fine—here, after all, that logic is present. The logic that if she had wanted to lie, she would never have said she had been taken captive in the first place—that logic exists. Because from her point of view she did not know that there were witnesses. Right? So what is the problem? She has a wonderful miggo here, nothing is lacking, because I say that there is nothing in miggo beyond that logic. And I say: true, nothing is lacking here—except that even a perfect miggo does not help in such a situation. Only “the same mouth that prohibited” helps, not miggo. “The same mouth that prohibited” is stronger.

[Speaker G] For example, in these cases, is there something upgraded here, so that when two of them contradict each other they invalidate the proof or the statement that testifies that she was taken captive?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What I’m saying is that the practical difference is that now I can say—not like the Kovetz Shiurim—that there is no proof from here that miggo contains anything beyond “why would I lie.” And elsewhere we saw that there are practical differences. Yes, and elsewhere it could be, like… no, what I’m saying is that from here you cannot prove that miggo contains anything beyond the logic of “why would I lie.” Understood. Since here we are talking about “the same mouth that prohibited,” and with “the same mouth that prohibited” it is clear that there is something beyond the logic. For example, what we discussed in the class about “the same mouth that prohibited”—I said: don’t use the information I give you against me. But I am not using the information you gave me, because I got it from the witnesses that you were taken captive. Therefore there certainly is no “the same mouth that prohibited” here; at most there is miggo. And what works to declare a woman pure—we saw in the previous Mishnah—is only when she has “the same mouth that prohibited,” when she says, “I was taken captive and I am pure.” If she merely has a standard miggo, that will not help. Therefore there is no proof for what the Kovetz Shiurim claims—unless one says that “the same mouth that prohibited” is basically miggo, the same thing, just a stronger miggo. Then he is right. But if I say that “the same mouth that prohibited” contains something beyond miggo, then the proof of the Kovetz Shiurim is incorrect.

Another note—I saw that they brought this up. By the way, afterwards I looked for it in the responsum of the Rosh עצמו and didn’t find it, but I saw a reference to a responsum of the Rosh, section 66, where he writes: what happens if there are invalid witnesses that she was taken captive—not valid witnesses, but invalid ones. They are not believed to say that she was taken captive, because they are invalid witnesses. But now she comes and says, “I was taken captive and I am pure.”

[Speaker C] So the Rosh says she does not have “the same mouth that prohibited.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because after all there is some other source of information here; the information is not coming only from her. True, that source consists of invalid witnesses, but you still can’t say that she alone originated this whole matter, that some information became known to us solely through her.

[Speaker D] Suppose we listened to them, and only afterwards discovered that they were invalid. It’s like when a judge says, “Strike that from the record.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He says, “Strike that from the record,” but he remembers very well what was said. And that, by the way, is why lawyers say it even though they know the judge will tell them to strike it. Because they know everyone will strike it—but after being told to strike it, everyone will remember it even better. The very thing that was struck, everyone remembers. It’s like trying not to think of a pink elephant. Yes, Noam.

[Speaker E] But it’s still problematic legally—you can’t take testimony from someone invalid, just like…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—again, I do not believe those witnesses that she was taken captive; they are invalid witnesses. But what she says no longer counts as “the same mouth that prohibited,” that’s all. Maybe even a rumor would have the same effect, yes. If a rumor spread about her that she had been taken captive—sorry—that would not be “the same mouth that prohibited,” very plausibly, according to the Rosh.

[Speaker F] But according to Rashi it’s not only “the same mouth that prohibited”; according to Tosafot she could have remained silent and not said, “I was taken captive and I am pure.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One could connect this to the dispute between Rashi and Tosafot. I’m not sure that’s right. It could be that even according to Tosafot it’s problematic. Because a miggo of “if she wanted, she could have remained silent” applies when I could have remained silent and nothing would happen. But here, if she remains silent, she still leaves a rumor hanging in the air because of those two people. Fine, they’re invalid witnesses—certainly if they’re merely relatives and not disqualified because they are liars, but only formally disqualified. Still, there are two respectable people saying this woman was taken captive.

[Speaker F] Would you be willing for that kind of reputation to spread about you in the street and stay silent? Just leave it there without responding? But also, in the case of the prior possessor, he says, “Don’t take my father’s land,” and he stays silent…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, because the prior possessor is an interested party; nobody will believe him—he wants the land. But here two independent witnesses come. True, they are legally invalid, but two independent people come and say this woman was taken captive. Would you be willing for that kind of reputation to spread about you in the street and stay silent? Just leave it there, not respond? Fine, it has no legal status. It may be that even according to Tosafot this is not called a miggo of “if she wanted, she could have remained silent.” That kind of miggo is when it is very easy for me to remain silent. True, she can remain silent, but it’s not easy to remain silent. It is not the natural course to remain silent. So if you ask me, “Then if you were lying, why didn’t you stay silent?” I have a good answer to why she didn’t remain silent. She didn’t remain silent because she wanted to deny their testimony, not because she is some great truth-teller. And therefore even according to Tosafot this weakens the force of the miggo somewhat. That makes sense; it’s not far-fetched.

[Speaker E] But what would the Rosh say if her mother-in-law and co-wife came and testified that she was taken captive?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then maybe it would not be—I don’t know.

[Speaker E] Is there a gradation among invalid witnesses?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe. I don’t know. I haven’t seen this Rosh inside, so I don’t know what he says. But conceptually there is room

[Speaker C] to distinguish, yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Like the case of the prior possessor, what Noam mentioned earlier—that the prior possessor does not prevent me from invoking “the same mouth that prohibited,” according to Tosafot.

[Speaker C] I wanted to ask something on this issue: were all Holocaust survivors forbidden to marry kohanim?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? Because they were taken captive?

[Speaker C] Just—it’s

[Speaker B] not exactly being taken captive.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They were in camps or things like that; those are groups. It’s not some lone captive woman found with a few non-Jews somewhere and nobody knows what happened.

[Speaker D] Anything is possible.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Anything is possible. Anything is possible. I’m only saying that an ordinary survivor—I don’t think you can simply assume that this is what happened. Everything is possible; anything is possible.

[Speaker D] There are many invalid lineages among the Jewish people today, because many kohanim married women who had been…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But regarding invalid lineages, once it became absorbed, it became absorbed. Meaning, once we do not know about it, it does not exist.

[Speaker D] What do you mean?

[Speaker E] Is a kohen allowed to marry a woman who was never married before but had…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but not with a non-Jew. So that’s the issue of having become impure here. What is the issue of becoming impure here?

[Speaker C] That she had relations with a non-Jew, and therefore she is forbidden to marry a kohen.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, let’s continue. The Gemara there brings a baraita: “The Rabbis taught: ‘I am impure and my friend is pure’—she is believed. ‘I am pure and my friend is impure’—she is not believed. ‘I and my friend are impure’—she is believed about herself and is not believed about her friend. ‘I and my friend are pure’—she is believed about her friend and is not believed about herself.’” Basically, to summarize briefly, the whole thing is quite simple. These are the same laws we saw in the Mishnah, except for two additional laws regarding impurity. Regarding her own impurity, it is self-imposed prohibition, so she is believed. Regarding the other woman’s impurity, in principle she is not believed. Okay? She is not believed about her friend that she is impure—but of course that is only where her friend contradicts her, or where someone else contradicts her. Otherwise the friend remains impure even without her saying so, right? Because there is a rabbinic stringency to suspect impurity if we know she was taken captive. Okay, so those are basically the laws in the baraita.

From here the Gemara begins to clarify exactly what case is being discussed. What are the circumstances? If there are no witnesses about herself, why is she not believed? She says, “I was taken captive and I am pure.” So clearly there must be witnesses. But then look at the middle clause: “I and my friend…” In short, there are some contradictions here, so they say: the first and last clauses are where there are witnesses, and the middle clause is where there are no witnesses. Okay?

[Speaker D] There’s the case where she said, “I am pure” and “I am impure,” and then they ask, “What are the circumstances?” and then the conclusion is that we’re dealing with a case where there are witnesses, right? Now what I said to myself was that she is not believed to permit herself, but she is never believed to render herself impure… the Gemara’s conclusion there is that she is not believed to say about the other woman that she is impure, but… no, but the question is: if the other one, her friend, has a presumption of impurity, what difference does it make whether she is believed or not believed to say that about her?

[Speaker E] It makes no difference. Exactly. It neither adds nor subtracts anything if she says her friend is impure. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Her testimony has no weight.

[Speaker D] So this whole case—there are all the combinations here of pure and impure for both of them, right? So the cases where she says the friend is impure are really irrelevant; there’s no need to mention them from that perspective.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I didn’t understand. Why? If the friend is impure and there are witnesses that she was taken captive. Okay? There are witnesses that the friend… that’s what the Gemara says. Look. “Clearly there are witnesses.” Okay? Then it says: the middle clause: “I and my friend are impure—she is believed about herself and not believed about her friend.” And if there are witnesses, why is she not believed?

[Speaker C] What do you mean, why is she not believed?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There—why is she not believed about her friend? About herself she is believed.

[Speaker D] I think her testimony about her friend is irrelevant if the friend also has a presumption of impurity.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is exactly the question. If there are witnesses, that’s the Gemara’s calculation. If there are witnesses that her friend was taken captive, then when I say she is impure, why am I not believed? Again, what does “believed” mean? It does not mean I render her impure by my own force. Rather, she is impure because there are witnesses that she was taken captive. She herself cannot say she is pure, and I say she is impure. But if there are no witnesses, and the friend says about herself, “I am pure,” and I say about her that she is impure, then I am not believed, because she has “the same mouth that prohibited” regarding herself, to declare herself pure, and against her “the same mouth that prohibited” I cannot say she is impure. So “believed” here of course does not mean that by my own power the friend becomes impure. She is impure because she was a captive. Okay?

[Speaker D] No, I didn’t understand the…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again. Suppose one woman, Rachel, testifies about Leah that she became impure. If there are witnesses that Leah was taken captive, and Leah says, “I was taken captive and I am pure.” Okay? And Rachel says about her: no, she became impure. What is the law in that situation?

[Speaker D] She is not believed.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rachel is believed.

[Speaker D] She became impure? Since when is she believed to say about the other one that she is impure?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s not the point. “Believed” in the sense that Leah is impure—believed in the sense that Leah is impure. So is that a false formulation? Again: believed in the sense that Leah is impure. True, Leah was impure even without her. Even without Rachel saying she is impure, Leah would have been impure. That’s what “believed” means here.

[Speaker B] Believed

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning that she remains impure despite the fact that she is shouting, “I am pure.” But if there are no witnesses—if there are no witnesses—then there is “the same mouth that prohibited,” and therefore she is pure. And the other woman who testifies about her that she is impure is not believed

[Speaker B] to remove her from “the same mouth that prohibited.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what the Gemara said.

[Speaker B] But doesn’t her friend in that case have a presumption of purity? Purity? Why?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] She doesn’t, if there are witnesses that she was taken captive.

[Speaker B] But if there are no witnesses?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If there are no witnesses, then she is pure,

[Speaker B] because she has “the same mouth that prohibited.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If there are no witnesses then she is pure. She has “the same mouth that prohibited,” and the other woman cannot render her impure.

[Speaker B] The first one has “the same mouth that prohibited,” and the second has a presumption?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The second cannot render her impure—that’s not because of a presumption. The first has “the same mouth that prohibited,” and the second cannot render her impure. “The same mouth that prohibited” is like two witnesses.

[Speaker C] Is the baraita talking about a case of captivity?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I can’t hear.

[Speaker C] Is the baraita talking about a case of captivity, or just general testimony about impurity and purity?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—captivity, captivity. Pure and impure in the context of captivity. Pure and impure regarding eligibility to marry a kohen.

[Speaker C] So the moment Leah said about her “impure,” it’s as though she also said that she knows she was taken captive, and then she doesn’t have “the same mouth that prohibited”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, she still has “the same mouth that prohibited.” So what if you know she was taken captive? If one woman, who is one witness and an invalid witness, says that the woman was taken captive—what does that mean? It means nothing.

[Speaker D] It’s only a leniency that one invalid witness can be brought.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe you mean to challenge according to the Rosh—assuming that source really exists—the Rosh I cited earlier, who says that if there are two invalid witnesses saying she was taken captive, then for the second woman that is not “the same mouth that prohibited.” From the Gemara here we see that when those two invalid witnesses are just one woman, then there is “the same mouth that prohibited.” In any case, that is what we see in the Gemara. Apparently the Rosh would say that only in a case of two invalid witnesses.

[Speaker D] Fine? What difference does it make if it’s one or two? If there is a rumor, we said that if there is a rumor, it removes it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The question is what creates a rumor. If the captive woman comes and another captive woman says, “She was taken captive” as well—who says that creates a rumor? If two witnesses who are unrelated to the story come and say, “She was taken captive,” maybe that creates a rumor. I don’t know. Again, it’s a matter of evaluating reality. But maybe that’s what the Rosh means. We’d have to see it inside. Okay? Good.

Rav Pappa said: the entire baraita is where there are witnesses, and there is one witness who contradicts. Yes—there are two witnesses about the captivity, and there is one witness who goes against whatever the woman says. Each time he says the opposite of what she says. She says one thing, he says the opposite. She says one thing, he says the opposite. Okay? I’m joking, of course—it’s not that the witness is stubborn. It’s simply four different cases. In all four cases, the woman says one thing, one witness argues against her, and there are two witnesses about the captivity. And now they begin making all the calculations involving self-imposed prohibition.

[Speaker D] What does the other witness say? About what she says? Again? I didn’t understand. What is opposite?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let’s see. Why guess? For example, the case—when there are two…

[Speaker D] witnesses about the captivity and one witness says the opposite of what was said. What does the second witness say? Does he say what the woman says, or do we not care what he says?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, let’s see—why guess? She says: “I am impure and my friend is pure,” okay? She says: “I am impure and my friend is pure,” and one witness says to her: “You are pure and your friend is impure.” The opposite. Okay? That’s one witness. What? One witness. The whole thing is one witness.

[Speaker D] What about the second witness?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is no second witness. There are two witnesses that they were taken captive, finished; they’ve left the picture. They’re gone. They’ve gone. This is not about whether they became impure or not; that has nothing to do with those witnesses. The two witnesses are only about the fact that they were taken captive, so that there should not be “the same mouth that prohibited.” Now there is no “the same mouth that prohibited,” and now testimony begins. So the woman says: “I am impure and my friend is pure.” What should the law have been without the first witness—the witness opposing her? About herself: self-imposed prohibition, right? About herself she is believed, and about her friend she is also believed, right? She should have been believed. Now one witness comes and says the opposite: “You are pure and your friend is impure.” What happens there? About herself—she herself is subject to self-imposed prohibition, so the fact that one witness contradicts her doesn’t matter. Right? And her friend—what happens?

[Speaker D] Still pure? Why? She has one witness—it can’t be…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because the woman who says her friend is pure is considered like two, remember the previous passage? Anywhere the Torah believed one witness, he is like two. Of course here it is not the Torah but the Rabbis who believed one witness, but you remember the Tosafot that said this is only after a court ruling, if it is testimony where one witness is believed only rabbinically. If it is the sotah case, where one witness is believed biblically, then the testimony itself is like two witnesses. If it is rabbinic, then it is only after a court ruling. And here too the Ran writes the same thing—you saw the Ran. In any case, what the Gemara says is that if I say about my friend that she is pure, in principle I am considered like two witnesses. Because anywhere the Torah believed one witness, he is like two. And against me there is one witness who says she became impure, and one witness’s statement in the face of two is nothing. Therefore she remains pure. So that works out, okay?

Now the Ran here writes—I brought you the Ran—that the case is where the court already ruled based on her statement, and only then did the witness arrive and contradict her statement. Why does the Ran need to say that? Because of what we saw in the previous passage, right? What we saw there is that “anywhere the Torah believed one witness, he is like two” applies where the Torah believed one witness, as in the sotah case. But in something like testimony about a woman, which is only rabbinic, or testimony about a captive woman, which is entirely rabbinic, there the Rabbis accepted one witness, not the Torah. Who says that makes him like two? There are medieval authorities who say that even in such a case he is like two, and that is obviously the plain sense of the previous passage. But what Tosafot said there was that in such a case this is only after a court ruling. Once the court has ruled on the basis of that one witness, then even where one witness is believed only rabbinically, it becomes like a ruling based on two witnesses. And now if one witness comes against it, he will not be believed. The Ran says: that is what is happening here. Since here the credibility of one witness is only rabbinic, if one witness had arrived against her before a ruling, she would not have been believed. Why would she not have been believed? Because there is one witness contradicting her.

[Speaker E] One witness

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] one witness in contradiction. And the Rabbis believed one witness when there is one witness. But if that one witness is contradicted, then there is not even one witness here, so why should the Rabbis believe him? So no—she is not believed. If the court ruled in accordance with her, then it is a court ruling on the basis of her testimony, which is like a ruling based on two witnesses. And now if one witness comes and testifies against that, then it is one witness against two and he is not believed. Okay, that’s the Ran.

What does Maimonides hold? The Ran himself brings that Maimonides does not hold this way. What does Maimonides hold? Maimonides claims that even without a court ruling, even when the one witness is contradicted, the Sages still gave that witness the status of two. You don’t need a court ruling; he does not make Tosafot’s distinction from the previous passage. Okay? The Ran here goes like Tosafot in the previous passage; Maimonides disagrees with them. Maimonides claims that even for one witness who is believed only rabbinically, he has the status of two from the moment he testifies. You don’t need the court to rule on his basis. Okay?

Now there is the second case: “I am pure and my friend is impure,” and one witness says to her, “You are impure and your friend is pure.” Again he says exactly the opposite. So let’s see what the law should have been before the witness. Remember, all this is with witnesses—I remind you—all this is with witnesses to the captivity, wait, wait, all this is with witnesses to the captivity and there is no “the same mouth that prohibited.” Right, that’s clear; that’s Rav Pappa’s setup. Now let’s see.

[Speaker C] When she says, “I am pure”—no, she is not believed.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “My friend is impure”—she is believed. Believed. There are witnesses to the captivity, and it will not help if her friend screams that she is pure, because there are witnesses to the captivity. Therefore when I say she is impure, I am believed. Again, what does “believed” mean? She would be impure even without my saying it, as we saw earlier. Now comes…

[Speaker D] It’s not that she is believed; it’s that she has no power to change the… wait, wait, again… it’s not that she is believed; it’s only that she has no power to change the reality.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] To change it—she has no power. Not she—the friend is not trying to change it. She is saying the friend is impure, which is indeed the law. So that is what should have been. Now there is a witness against her, and he says, “You are impure and your friend is pure.”

[Speaker C] What happens now?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So he says as follows: as for her, since there are witnesses, she has no power—so she cannot say about herself that she is pure, because there are witnesses; there is no “the same mouth that prohibited.” And the witness says she is impure. Of course we don’t need the witness at all. She was impure even without him, so she remains impure. Regarding the friend, the witness says she is pure. One witness is believed to declare her pure, and this woman who says she is impure is only one witness, while the witness opposing her is like two. To this the Ran raises a very strong difficulty. He says: after all, we said that the witness arrived after the court ruled on the basis of the woman’s testimony. Right?

[Speaker C] What

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] did the court rule on the basis of the woman’s testimony? That the friend is impure. Now the witness comes and says the friend is pure.

[Speaker F] What’s the problem?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is a court ruling, equivalent to two witnesses, that she is impure.

[Speaker F] After the upgrade of one witness into two? But which two?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A court ruling.

[Speaker F] But a court ruling is only given when… so what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But once there is a court ruling, one witness has no credibility to come and oppose it.

[Speaker F] But that’s the leniency in the case of a captive woman, no?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not against a court ruling.

[Speaker F] One witness

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] can lead to a court ruling—that’s the leniency. But once the court has ruled, that has the status of something accepted on the basis of two witnesses. If one witness now comes to contradict it, it won’t help him at all.

[Speaker C] Maybe in such a case the court wouldn’t rule?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the court would rule, obviously it would rule. I didn’t understand. The court doesn’t rule in a matter…

[Speaker F] I mean, what do you mean? It will always be like this.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it won’t always be like this. If that witness arrives before the court rules… after all, we said they would put her under a presumption of impurity. If the court rules only after the witness arrives, then what? On what basis will it rule?

[Speaker F] It will rule that she is pure. Obviously.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly—that’s the leniency. Not obviously—that’s the leniency.

[Speaker F] There is one witness that

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] she is pure, and the court will accept that.

[Speaker F] That’s the leniency.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But if the court has already ruled that she is impure, and now one witness comes saying she is pure, it won’t help. There is already a court ruling; that is like two witnesses.

[Speaker C] But maybe the witness arrived before the ruling?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the Ran explained earlier that the witness came afterward. Because if the witness came before, then this isn’t a case of one witness against another.

[Speaker C] Then obviously they would rule that she is pure.

[Speaker F] But he explained that only when we say about… when we basically accept the status of her testimony—the woman’s testimony about her friend. Only then he says, okay, I have one witness standing alone, he counts as two after the court ruling, and then another one comes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He is not trying to solve only that problem. Here too there is the same problem. There is one witness against one witness. Can we believe this witness who says “pure”? He is contradicted. There is one woman witness saying she is impure.

[Speaker F] But she is impure because of the second ruling… no.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is one witness saying she is impure. Not because of anything else.

[Speaker F] Now you need to produce two witnesses in order to declare her pure.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but the witness who declares her pure is a contradicted witness. There is a witness against him. Once again, we didn’t need the woman in order to render the second woman impure. But here there is testimony from one witness about the fact that the second woman is impure. Now a witness comes and says the second woman is pure. But that witness is contradicted by the first woman. Who says we accept a lone witness when he is contradicted?

[Speaker F] But who says we accept her testimony? No,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Her testimony is not accepted. Once again. The testimony of the witness could have been accepted…

[Speaker F] I understand, but that means we do accept her testimony, as if the testimony

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] hers is considered…

[Speaker F] not accepted, rather she

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] contradicts that witness, so it’s one witness against one witness.

[Speaker F] She is impure because of the witnesses that she was taken captive.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. She is impure because there are witnesses who testified that she was taken captive, and she has the presumption of being impure. It’s just that one witness comes to declare her pure. Very good, but he is contradicted by the woman who says she is impure.

[Speaker C] And a woman can contradict a man? Yes. And in this case they accepted the woman’s testimony.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Everywhere they accepted one witness, they also accepted a disqualified witness. So you’ll say, fine, but here they accepted the testimony only to declare pure, not to declare impure. For declaring impure there is no credibility for one witness. To that the Ran says: true, but only after a ruling by the religious court. Because after all, here they accepted one witness only rabbinically. So as long as the religious court has not ruled, the one witness has the status of one witness, not of two. Right? Well then, if that witness arrived before the court ruling, then that witness is contradicted. How can the religious court accept his testimony and rule that she is pure? He is contradicted. The Ran says there is no choice but to say that the witness came first, and the woman testified after the court ruling. That’s forced, very forced in the Talmud. And in the Talmud it’s the opposite: “I am pure and my friend is impure,” and one witness said to her, “You are impure and your friend…”

[Speaker C] pure.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The witness came after her. The Ran says: there is no choice according to my approach, we have to say that this is just a conventional turn of phrase, but in fact the witness was here first, the religious court ruled, and then the woman said what she said. He himself says this is forced.

[Speaker D] So then in the Mishnah and in the Talmud? Again? That wasn’t included in what we saw.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s very forced, very forced.

[Speaker F] And this really is—that is, she says one thing, after all there is such a thing in testimony that if they say—if there is testimony stated as one unit, then if one part is not true, then

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] in general, if part of it is void then all of it is void. If part is void, all is void. So what then?

[Speaker F] So what? So that means that if so, then all of the woman’s testimony is void.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, so you can ask that about this whole passage here. That’s a good question in itself. Why—why, when we don’t accept part of the testimony, how can we say regarding a woman that for this she is believed and for that she is not believed? After all, if part is void then all is void. So that’s just a question on the passage itself, unrelated to everything I’m saying here.

[Speaker F] Why not? But in all the cases either we accept both…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s not right. There are cases where she is pure regarding this… she is believed regarding this and not believed regarding that.

[Speaker F] Ah, right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So actually I think that’s a good question, by the way. I think what Idit said earlier is the answer. Why indeed do we invalidate part of her testimony? So if we invalidate her testimony about herself, then there’s no problem, because we split the statement. Right? If her testimony about the other woman is invalidated and her testimony about herself is accepted, then here it’s simply because of self-imposed prohibition, so the rule “if part is void then all is void” does not apply. Because a woman’s testimony about herself is accepted only when she says “I am impure,” not when she says “I am pure.” And when she says “I am impure,” that is not accepting testimony; that is self-imposed prohibition. Therefore the rule “if part is void then all is void” does not apply here.

[Speaker C] all of it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Therefore the rule “if part is void then all is void” does not apply here. Otherwise this whole passage would really be very difficult. Okay?

[Speaker F] But in this case she says “pure” and the friend says “pure,” so what? So here… regarding herself they don’t accept her because there are witnesses that she became impure.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Regarding herself they don’t accept her, they don’t accept her because it is testimony about herself. So there we split it. So the testimony about herself we erase, and the testimony about the other woman we can accept. And if her testimony about herself is that she is impure…

[Speaker F] But I want to say that they shouldn’t accept any of it—why can’t we set it up that way?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because we split it. When a person testifies about himself, what he testified about himself is erased and the rest is accepted. Ah, only what he testified about himself under splitting the statement?

[Speaker F] That’s the splitting. If someone says, “So-and-so lent me money with interest,” then the part that I am the borrower is erased, and the part that he lent with interest is accepted.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No,

[Speaker F] but by the rule that if part is void then all is void…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The opposite: there is no rule here that if part is void then all is void. Here we split it. “If part is void then all is void” applies, for example, when part of the testimony is void because I am a relative. I testify about two people; regarding one of them I am a relative and regarding the other I am not. Part of my testimony is void, so the entire testimony is void. But if the part that is void is void because I am testifying about myself, not about a relative, then that is testimony of a litigant. The testimony of a litigant is that he is a litigant, not a witness. Therefore it is simply erased altogether; it is not testimony that became void. It is testimony that was erased. That is how the Ritva explained it in Makkot, where we saw it there in the passage about splitting the statement. Okay? Therefore I think that here this whole issue of “if part is void then all is void” does not arise at all. So in any case, for our purposes, since the Ran here was forced into a strained reading, I say that the straightforward meaning of the Talmud is really proof for Maimonides’ approach against the Ran and against Tosafot from the previous passage, who say that the rule “wherever the Torah believed one witness, he is like two” was said only where the Torah believed one witness. But if the rabbis believed one witness, then a ruling by the religious court is needed in order for him to become like two. From this passage it seems not so. The Ran is forced, but the plain meaning of the passage indicates otherwise. Okay. The third case: “I and my friend are impure”—overall the same idea. “I and my friend are impure,” and one witness says to her, “You and your friend are pure”—well, she has imposed a prohibition on herself, right? Nothing will help; she has established herself in a presumption of prohibition. And her friend is permitted on the basis of the witness. Okay? The Talmud asks: why do I need this? It’s the same as the first clause. Fine, I would have thought that really both of them are pure, and the reason she said that was “let me die with the Philistines”—never mind, she wants to bring everyone down if she herself has gone down. And the fourth explanation: “I and my friend are pure,” and one witness says to her, “You and your friend are impure.” Since there are witnesses, she has no power, right? She does not have “the mouth that prohibited.” And her friend is permitted on the basis of her statement. Because she is testifying as two witnesses, and the witness testifies against her and that’s it; therefore she is believed. And again, there is duplication here, so we are concerned about a case where she validates herself, and then perhaps she is not believed.

[Speaker D] But in this case both of them testify to the same testimony.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, both of them are not testifying to the same testimony. Only one woman is testifying. She testifies about both of them that they are pure.

[Speaker D] And the second is silent?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, let’s say for the sake of discussion. Or at least she says about herself that she is pure, which carries absolutely no weight.

[Speaker D] But suppose both of them said the same thing, that both are pure?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then that is like the latter clause of the Mishnah, where I say “my friend is pure” and my friend says “I am pure”—that is fine.

[Speaker D] Then both are permitted?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, that is the latter clause of the Mishnah.

[Speaker D] We are not concerned about collusion. Yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is the latter clause of the Mishnah. Okay? Now, in Rashi there is a different version of the Talmud’s answer here: “You might have said that she is believed only against a disqualified witness, for example where the witness who contradicts her was a woman, but not against a qualified witness. Therefore the Mishnah teaches an extra case, that even against a qualified witness.” That is why there is duplication there; that is why the duplication was needed. But that is an interesting initial assumption. What is the interesting initial assumption here? That the witness… there was an initial assumption to say that if the witness opposite me is a disqualified witness, then fine. But if the witness opposite me is a qualified witness, then even though I testify that my friend is pure and he testifies that my friend is disqualified, the friend would be disqualified. Because there is an advantage to a male witness even if he is only one, over a woman. A qualified witness is better than a disqualified witness even in a place where one witness is accepted.

[Speaker G] And it teaches us that not so.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is the initial assumption.

[Speaker G] Where can Rashi get that from? Because there is no hint of it in the Talmud.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What—I didn’t understand?

[Speaker G] I didn’t understand where Rashi… where he gets this text from—it’s a textual variant. Oh, he reads the Talmud this way?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes, it says there—he says, “this is the correct text.” Ah, I understand. So this point is an interesting point, because the rule is as follows: in testimony about prohibitions, one witness is believed. Once one witness is believed, then it doesn’t matter who he is. He can be disqualified, he can be a woman, he can be anything. The accepted understanding is that even if there is contradiction between a disqualified witness and a qualified witness, it is one against one; there is no advantage to the qualified witness. Because in the area of prohibitions, all the rules of testimony do not apply. Again, if of course there is a witness suspected of lying, then he is not believed even regarding prohibitions. But formal disqualifications of witnesses do not exist in testimony about prohibitions. In a place where formal disqualifications do not exist, the testimony of a woman and the testimony of a man are the same thing. It makes no difference. There is no advantage.

[Speaker E] What is the difference between testimony and credibility?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s why I’m giving this introduction. It’s an introduction to the second part of the class, which I see I’m already not going to get to. The point is this, look: for example, regarding an oath, one witness is believed to obligate an oath in monetary law, right? That’s not prohibitions; that’s Torah law. What happens if there is a disqualified witness against him? Is the defendant obligated in an oath or not? Yes—Reuven claims against Shimon that he owes him money. Reuven brings one witness with him that Shimon really owes him money. Shimon brings a disqualified witness in his favor. He says, after all, wherever one witness matters, qualified or disqualified doesn’t matter. So I’ll bring a disqualified witness against your witness. One against one. You can’t obligate me in an oath. That doesn’t work. Why doesn’t it work? Because in monetary law, even where one witness is required, all the laws of testimony still exist; this is testimony. It is just that regarding an oath they suffice with a single witness. But it is testimony in every respect. All the laws of qualification and disqualification were said about it. In prohibitions that is not so. In prohibitions it is not testimony law at all. When we say…

[Speaker D] Clarifying reality, basically.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. It is a clarification of reality, and therefore there are no formal limitations. If you are convinced, then you are convinced. So why should I care whether this witness is disqualified or qualified? As long as there is no concern that he is lying, of course, because then I’m simply not convinced. But formal disqualifications do not exist. Okay? So pay close attention. In testimony about prohibitions, this is not even called testimony. They call it “one witness is believed regarding prohibitions,” but it is not testimony. It is just evidence, and therefore I don’t care who the witness is; and even if it is one against one, it makes no difference—disqualified, qualified, none of that changes anything. In the case of one witness for an oath, that is full-fledged testimony. The fact that they suffice with one witness is because Torah law says that for an oath one witness is enough. But it is testimony in every respect. A disqualified witness won’t help there; a disqualified witness will not obligate an oath, and a disqualified witness will not be able to contradict a witness who comes and obligates an oath. The big question is what happens in our case. In testimony regarding a woman who was taken captive—is that testimony in the sense of “one witness is believed regarding prohibitions,” or is it testimony of one witness like in the case of an oath? Because after all this is personal status, personal status is Even HaEzer, it is adjudication, and the laws of testimony seemingly belong there. Right? So the fact that they sufficed with one witness—there is room to say that this will be like one witness in the case of an oath, not like one witness regarding prohibitions, and then there really would be an advantage to a qualified witness over a disqualified witness. On the other hand, after all we know that they validated disqualified witnesses here too. Right? They also validated disqualified witnesses. In that sense it is not like one witness for an oath; a disqualified witness would not obligate an oath. So seemingly that hints that it is indeed similar to “one witness is believed regarding prohibitions,” not to one witness for an oath. That is the give-and-take in Rashi, in the Talmud according to Rashi. In the initial assumption we thought that a qualified witness would override a disqualified witness. Why? Because we thought that the one witness accepted here falls under the laws of testimony. And under the laws of testimony there is certainly an advantage to a qualified witness over a disqualified witness, even where one witness is enough. It teaches us that this is testimony about prohibitions, and in testimony about prohibitions, if the reason one witness was enough is not because of testimony law but because one witness is evidence, then I don’t care whether he is disqualified or qualified; it is equivalent. And that is the initial assumption and the conclusion according to Rashi. And that is an excellent opening to the second part of the passage, which I won’t manage to get to now, and that is the part about the…

[Speaker F] And all this is only to declare pure, not to declare impure. Right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] To declare impure, one witness is not enough in any case. Yes. Yes. So the claim, basically what emerges here, is that there is some dilemma here that is apparently decided according to Rashi: how should we relate to this testimony regarding a captive woman? Is this testimony regarding a captive woman simply a case of one witness being believed regarding prohibitions? Is that what the sages said? Or did the sages say: no, this is testimony law, but we are lenient and accept even one witness and even a disqualified witness, yet it is still testimony law like one witness for an oath. Okay?

[Speaker E] And if it’s testimony law, then really there is preference for the qualified witness. I didn’t understand—if it’s testimony law, then really there is preference for the qualified witness.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. And that was the initial assumption here in Rashi. By the way, even according to the conclusion, where they said there is no preference for the qualified witness, that still does not necessarily contradict the fact that this is a matter of testimony law. Because after all we know that, whichever way you look at it, even if this is testimony law, the sages certainly validated disqualified witnesses here. That is a fact. They validated both a woman and a disqualified witness, right? So if so, it could be that here, unlike one witness for an oath, even though this is testimony law, there is no advantage for a qualified witness over a disqualified witness, because in fact they also validated a disqualified witness as a one witness. Not because this is like one witness regarding prohibitions, but because here they validated a disqualified witness too, so they said: fine, then the status of a disqualified witness and the status of a qualified witness are the same status. Okay? This is an excellent opening to the next part of the passage, and I see that I’ll do that next time. How far did you get in the preparation sheet? You said it was long.

[Speaker B] I got as far as Tosafot, the fifth one.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Shema’tata and Rabbi Chaim, did you see them? Not yet. Fine. So that’s where we’ll start next time. Okay? I just want to remind you once again to fill in the attendance—whoever can fill it in right now, immediately, should make sure everything is filled in there, because for whoever reaches the appropriate attendance percentage, the scholarship will already be transferred directly, so it would be a shame for it to be delayed by a month. Whoever also needs next time, then it will probably be delayed by a month; there’s nothing to do. Okay? The… as I told you, toward the end of the week I’ll send you the assignment, and I ask that within two weeks, let’s say by Saturday night a week after next—that is, in another two weeks and two days—you submit it, okay? Thank you.

[Speaker B] Okay. All right. Thank you very much. Thank you all. Sabbath peace.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Goodbye, Sabbath peace.

[Speaker B] Good evening. We are in the fourth class of the course “Topics in Medical Ethics and Jewish Law.” The topic we will deal with today, as appears in the syllabus, is organ transplantation and the definition of the moment of death. I’ll begin by saying that this subject is a very broad one; it includes many, many halakhic, moral, and social aspects. In the next two classes, today and the next class, we will try to touch on the main points and understand the processes that the world of Jewish law and the world of medicine have gone through on this issue. First of all, when we talk about organ transplants, we need to distinguish between two kinds of donations. There is donation from a living person, and there is donation from the dead. Within donation from a living person, there are organs a person can live without—say, a kidney or a lobe of the liver—and there are organs that of course one cannot live without. When we look at the history of organ transplantation, the first successful transplant was a skin transplant around the year 1870, but the great breakthrough, the big leap, was in the 1960s. In 1967 the first heart transplant took place, performed by Dr. Christiaan Barnard in South Africa. From the halakhic perspective, this subject raises several fundamental questions. The first question is from the side of the recipient: is it permitted to use an organ from another person in order to save a life? Is there a problem here of deriving benefit from the dead, desecration of the dead, or neglect of the commandment of burial? The second question is from the side of the donor: is a person allowed to endanger himself in order to save another person? And if we are speaking about a donor who is dead, when exactly is he considered dead? Let’s begin with the subject of donation from a living person. The most common case today is kidney donation. Here the central halakhic question is the balance between the duty to rescue, “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood,” and the prohibition against a person endangering himself. The Talmud in tractate Sanhedrin discusses this, and the halakhic decisors disagreed: is a person obligated to donate a kidney, or is this only in the category of an act of piety? Most halakhic decisors today, such as Rabbi Ovadia Yosef and Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, see this as a very great commandment, since the risk to the donor is very small in relation to the definite rescue of the recipient. The more complex subject is donation from the dead, and especially heart transplants. Why is a heart transplant so complex? Because in order for the heart to be suitable for transplantation, it has to be harvested while it is still beating, or immediately adjacent to the cessation of its activity. That brings us to the most critical question: what is the moment of death? Is death the cessation of breathing and pulse, as was accepted throughout the generations, or, in light of medicine’s ability to keep the body beating by means of machines, can what is called brain death be defined as death in every respect, even if the heart is still beating?