Study and Halachic Ruling – Lesson 6

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, let’s begin. In the last few lectures I spoke a bit about legal theory, the law of the kingdom, monetary law in general, and I brought all that as an example of a distinction that’s been accompanying us over the last few lectures, between Jewish law and Torah. Meaning, the claim is that there are certain areas that are part of halakhic ruling, they’re important for halakhic ruling, but you can’t call them Torah. So for example I gave the example of the laws of acquisition. The laws of acquisition—Rabbi Shimon Shkop argues that they’re basically a pre-halakhic domain, right, meta-halakhic or pre-halakhic, because the prohibition “do not steal” presupposes that there already are definitions of what counts as whose property, how one buys, how one sells, the laws of acquisition. After we define the laws of acquisition, we know what belongs to whom. Then comes the prohibition “do not steal” and says that if I take something that is yours, then I have violated the prohibition of “do not steal.” But the determination of what is yours and what is mine is a legal determination, not a halakhic one. It precedes Jewish law; Jewish law gives it its stamp of approval. When the Sages define the modes of acquisition—possession, document, pulling, lifting, and the like—the Sages are really acting as legislators of the Jewish social collective. They are not acting as bearers of halakhic authority. And this same function can be performed among non-Jews too; they do it through their own legislators. And therefore when I study these things, I’m not really studying Torah. I’m studying a domain that is very important for halakhic ruling—you have to know whose property something is, or how things are acquired. But in principle, if we had established different forms of acquisition, then those would be the laws of acquisition. For example, situmta, commercial custom, right? The Talmud says that it is also valid: whatever merchants determine among themselves will constitute a legitimate acquisition for them, or a valid one for them, Jewish law recognizes that. Right? People always give the example of “mazal and blessing” among diamond dealers: they shake hands and say “mazal and blessing,” and that there is considered an acquisition. It doesn’t meet the standards of the ordinary halakhic modes of acquisition, but Jewish law recognizes it because in the legal world what determines things are the rules of the guild. And if the guild decided that such a thing is a valid acquisition, then Jewish law also recognizes it as a valid acquisition. Which means that basically the laws of acquisition are not Torah. It’s not some idea connected to Torah ideas, that achieves the Torah’s purposes, that is based on Torah thinking—no. It’s simply a social agreement. In the case of Jewish society, the legislating body is the Sages, the Sanhedrin. But here they are not operating as Torah scholars; they are operating as legislators of this group. Other legislators could have come along. For us today, for example, that’s the Knesset. It does exactly the same job that the Sanhedrin did back then, and it is neither less holy nor more holy—it is not holy at all. Just as what the Sanhedrin did back then was not holy at all. It is very important for halakhic ruling. I’m saying: if I want to issue a halakhic ruling, I need to know the laws of the Knesset, because Jewish law recognizes them as the relevant laws in this area, and therefore studying them is very important in order to rule Jewish law—but it is not considered part of Torah, it is not Torah study. I’ll sharpen that a bit later on, but that’s what we spoke about previously. I just want to add another point here. In that discussion I said that the laws of acquisition are basically the foundation of the legal layer of Jewish law, right, monetary law. And in the background I said that it’s customary to divide Jewish law—the Tur and after him the Shulchan Arukh divided Jewish law into four sections: Even HaEzer, Yoreh De’ah, Choshen Mishpat, and Orach Chayim. There’s a secondary division of those four sections into sections of ritual law and sections of adjudication. Right? Ritual law is Orach Chayim and Yoreh De’ah, and mainly Yoreh De’ah is considered ritual law, but I mean Orach Chayim and Yoreh De’ah—in other words, the entire non-legal realm of Jewish law. And Even HaEzer and Choshen Mishpat are adjudication, right? Today’s jargon is that this is what they study for ordination, and that is what they study for judgeship. It’s interesting to see, just as we saw regarding monetary law, that the Sages have special powers there: “what the court declares ownerless is ownerless.” The king has authority, custom has authority, and the Sages too have the power of “what the court declares ownerless is ownerless.” Why? So I explained that monetary law basically depends on social convention, on social agreement, and when society agrees that these and these will be the laws of acquisition, then those are the operative laws of acquisition. Therefore, once I say that ownership of property is basically—how should I put it—a social status, society recognizes you as the owner of the property, then I said that in a place where society, for example, does not establish monetary law or does not recognize monetary law, then there truly will be no ownership. And I brought up, right, the ghetto for example, where monetary law had no meaning at all—I mentioned Rabbi Gibraltar. So the claim is that halakhically there really is no monetary law there; there will be no theft and nothing of that sort, because the infrastructure required for the prohibition of theft is missing, the infrastructure of the laws of acquisition. Because the laws of acquisition are constituted by society. And if society did not constitute laws of acquisition, then there are no laws of acquisition. Now, when a religious court declares property ownerless, it’s the same expression. When a religious court declares property ownerless, why is “what the court declares ownerless is ownerless”? Since when can a religious court change monetary law? Can a religious court permit theft? Why can’t they permit the prohibition of pork? Why can a religious court permit the prohibition of theft? And the answer is that the court here serves as representative of the public, as legislators. And if the public does not recognize you as the owner of the property, then you are not the owner of the property, because the concept of ownership is a social concept. Meaning, if society does not recognize you as the owner, then you are not the owner. Therefore, when a religious court declares the property ownerless, what it is really saying is: society—or we as its representatives—do not recognize you as the owner of this property; consequently you really will not be the owner, because society does not recognize you as the owner. In other words, what we saw regarding the ghetto—that because monetary law was not operative there, there really was no monetary law, there was no ownership—that is also the basis of the well-known rule that what the court declares ownerless is ownerless, where in certain cases the court declares someone’s property ownerless. That basically means that society does not recognize your ownership of the property, and therefore you really are not the owner. I’m not going back into it again—Menachem, you asked whether this contradicts Platonism. It doesn’t contradict it, and I spoke about that at length last time. Maybe it was on Friday, Friday two weeks ago, I don’t even remember anymore—in the previous lecture, or one of the Friday lectures, or this lecture.

[Speaker C] No, no, we talked about it in the previous lecture, that’s where we talked about it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so I spoke about it at length, I’m not going to go back to it again. Rabbi?

[Speaker D] Yes. Is it correct to say this also regarding prohibitions, that this is something that precedes the law? Because Rabbi Shimon Shkop writes in several places—and the Rabbi also brings this in The Platonic Character of the Talmud—that prohibitions are a reality in the object, and the law is added on top of that, like a warning and a forbidden act: there is the reality, and on top of that the halakhic law is added?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, that’s unrelated. That’s the Platonism of the halakhot, where Rabbi Shimon is basically claiming that the law begins from some kind of reality in the object, and the law uses that reality and determines its normative implications. Okay. But that reality is not determined by social agreement; that’s not like monetary law. That reality was determined by the Torah. What is unique about monetary law is not just that there is some reality upon which the halakhic layer is built, but that this reality is not determined by the Torah, rather it is determined by social agreement. That is the point that distinguishes monetary law, and it is not true in the context of other prohibitions. Therefore “what the court declares ownerless is ownerless,” but a religious court cannot permit the prohibition of pork, because the court did not determine that reality that exists in pork, and therefore it cannot…

[Speaker D] Rabbi, and there too the distinction between reality and prohibition still holds, that the prohibition comes afterward, that the reality precedes the prohibition. Even if the reality was determined by the Torah. Yes, right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s regarding monetary law. What the rabbi…

[Speaker E] Rabbi, Rabbi! This halakhic ruling of Rabbi Gibraltar about the Holocaust—then also in Sodom, if Sodom decided that theft is permitted and there are no monetary laws at all and everyone just takes, would the Torah accept that? After all, that’s the whole idea of laws for the descendants of Noah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That question came up in the previous lecture, I think from you, and I answered it.

[Speaker E] I wasn’t there.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think—but it came up in the previous lecture. Sorry. And what I answered was that in Sodom there really were no monetary laws. And the claim against Sodom was precisely that. The fact that there are no monetary laws does not mean that it’s okay that there are no monetary laws. It only means that in practice there are no monetary laws.

[Speaker E] So how did Rabbi Gibraltar accept that and say okay, if the Nazis decided on Sodom, we’ll go along with it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A society that does not establish monetary law is an evil society, but still, in practice there is no monetary law. That does not mean there is no claim against the society—because there are no monetary laws, so what do you want from us? That’s exactly what I want from you. How did you create a situation with no legal system?

[Speaker E] So how did Rabbi Gibraltar—here—submit to that? No…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t understand. What does it mean, submit to it?

[Speaker E] There’s no monetary law.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not that… so do what you can.

[Speaker E] I can’t do what I can; there’s no monetary law.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There isn’t. That’s part of the society.

[Speaker E] So if Rabbi Gibraltar had been in Sodom with some small Jewish community that managed to survive there in his house, then they would have gone along with the lawlessness? Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Obviously. There’s no monetary law. Sodom—what do you mean, if he had been in Sodom? He was in Sodom.

[Speaker E] No, not that Rabbi Gibraltar was in Sodom, I meant…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbi Gibraltar was in Sodom. Correct. The Kovno Ghetto was Sodom.

[Speaker E] And therefore I disagree with him. I think that the fact that he went along with the Nazis’ normativity was wrong. You have to say: we do what we can. We can’t fix the whole world. The whole world is a bit like Sodom, but there are islands of morality and islands of law.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Islands of morality don’t help you. There is no monetary ownership. Period. Fact. There isn’t. What do you mean, go along? You can invent whatever you like, but you can’t create something out of nothing. There is no ownership of property. It’s not a question of going along or not going along; it’s a question of recognizing reality. I really don’t like it when fire burns me, but if I’m inside it, it will burn me.

[Speaker E] Rabbi, if we zoomed out over all of humanity before—I don’t know—then would you say that most of humanity three thousand years ago had no laws, they were all thieves and robbers stealing from one another? So let’s just go along with that reality? No. The Jewish people, or any decent society, did maintain ownership and morality.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So we need to submit… They maintained ownership that was constituted within their own society’s monetary laws. But if you live in another society in which there is no monetary law, then it’s not a question of going along or not going along. There is no monetary law. There isn’t.

[Speaker E] So don’t submit to it. You don’t have to submit to a norm that entangles you. In your own community—after all, Nazis didn’t ask him, Jews asked him—he could have said: in our community we continue to live with the consciousness of the Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can invent whatever you want. You can also take LSD. But there are no monetary laws. Period. This is not a question of submitting or not submitting. There aren’t any, in reality. This is just mixing categories. You can absolutely mourn the situation. You are of course obligated to try to influence it. As a resident of Sodom, you need to try to make Sodom not be Sodom, so that there will be monetary laws there. But if you have no influence and you didn’t succeed in doing that, then in practice there is no monetary law. Period. That’s it. That’s a reality. But we already talked about this in the previous lecture, so it’s not worth going back. But the Rabbi did say, though…

[Speaker C] The Rabbi did say that if we believe ownership really exists, then there would still be a moral problem even if I live in a society like Sodom.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying, a moral problem is something one can discuss. I’m willing to agree that there may be a moral problem. A legal problem, in the concept of ownership—there isn’t. Okay? I’m not sure. The question I’m torn about is: since there is no ownership, is it even morally right to do this? Because ideally, for the matter to be moral, you need the concept of ownership. For example, I’ll give an example from stealing from a non-Jew. We talked about that. Rabbi Shimon says that stealing from a non-Jew is prohibited even according to the one who says there is no prohibition of “do not steal” in the case of stealing from a non-Jew. Right, a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim). But according to the medieval authorities (Rishonim) who say that stealing from a non-Jew is not prohibited by Torah law, only rabbinically, Rabbi Shimon Shkop says: but there is still a legal prohibition of “do not steal.” Now there, why is that? Because the concept of ownership exists for a non-Jew as well. It’s just that the prohibition of “do not steal” doesn’t apply there. So there you can talk about the idea that harming ownership involves a moral problem even if it’s not a problem of “do not steal,” not a halakhic problem. But if there is no ownership at all—not that there is no “do not steal,” but no ownership—then “do not steal” is not relevant either. In such a situation I’m not even sure there is a moral issue. What do you mean moral? There’s no ownership. There just isn’t. You’re living in a crazy world. There’s no ownership.

[Speaker B] If all the Jews in the ghetto had…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] …maintained among themselves courts and ownership, then there is a moral value in preserving ownership if it exists. But I’m not sure there is a moral value in inventing fictional ownership when there is no ownership.

[Speaker C] If it exists in the ideal, ownership that exists there, maybe even then there’s no point.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m unsure whether there is some point in preserving it when in actual concrete reality there is no law. It exists in the Platonic world, but in reality there are no ownerships, no ownership laws here. So the question is whether there is even a moral interest in preserving it. Maybe yes, maybe no—I don’t know. Regarding stealing from a non-Jew it’s different, because there the concept of ownership definitely exists; it’s just that the Torah did not impose the prohibition of “do not steal” on that. But the concept of ownership does exist, so there it’s clear that morally stealing is forbidden, because you are harming the concept of ownership, and ownership exists in that case—it’s not a corrupt society. It’s a different society, in which the halakhic prohibition of “do not steal” does not apply. So that is regarding monetary matters. Regarding Even HaEzer, I wanted to add something there too: we see a similar phenomenon in Even HaEzer. In Even HaEzer too there is a very unique authority given to the Sages to annul kiddushin. “Whoever betroths, betroths subject to the Rabbis,” which is very similar to “what the court declares ownerless is ownerless.” And this exists in Even HaEzer, “whoever betroths…” “What the court declares ownerless is ownerless” is Choshen Mishpat. In Yoreh De’ah and Orach Chayim there are no such powers of the Sages. They cannot permit prohibitions, or cancel the obligation of prayer, or I don’t know exactly, something like that, or the prohibitions of the Sabbath. Okay? There are no such powers in Yoreh De’ah and Orach Chayim. What?

[Speaker D] Why not say that in passive nonperformance they can? That they can do.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but they cannot cancel the prohibition. They can tell you, through passive nonperformance, not to fulfill it. They are not changing the halakhic state itself.

[Speaker D] Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman in Kovetz Shiurim presents this as an option. I didn’t understand? In Kovetz Shiurim, siman 3, Rabbi Elchanan in the third inquiry there at the beginning writes that this is an uncertainty: whether they merely tell you that you are not obligated to do it, or whether the commandment itself is uprooted from reality and no longer exists.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I don’t accept that. Obviously it still exists; they are just telling the person, don’t do it. Otherwise this would literally be “do not add” or “do not subtract.” But in Choshen Mishpat and Even HaEzer, the kiddushin does not exist. It’s not that they tell you to violate the prohibition of a married woman; the kiddushin does not exist when the Sages annul it. Or in “what the court declares ownerless is ownerless,” your ownership evaporates. There is no ownership. It’s not that they say: even though there is ownership, theft is permitted. No. There is no ownership. And this works differently in Even HaEzer and Choshen Mishpat than in Orach Chayim and Yoreh De’ah. And by the way, there it can even be through positive action in Even HaEzer and Choshen Mishpat. There is no such definition that this only works through passive nonperformance and not through positive action. It does not belong to the category of the Sages uprooting something from the Torah, even though the medieval authorities (Rishonim) already wrote that there is also positive action in extreme cases, but we won’t get into that here. In any case, what does this actually mean? That Even HaEzer and Choshen Mishpat both basically constitute the legal sphere of Jewish law. And I said that the legal sphere is basically an expression of social determinations, of your social status. Ownership is basically a social status: society recognizes ownership, so there is ownership. Kiddushin, couplehood—that too is a social status. And therefore only because society recognizes you as a married couple are you married, or betrothed. If society does not recognize you as betrothed, then you are not betrothed. And therefore when the Sages annul kiddushin—“whoever betroths, betroths subject to the Rabbis”—when the Sages annul kiddushin, it is exactly the same thing as annulling property. They are not functioning here as Torah sages; they are functioning here as legislators of Jewish society. And the moment the representatives of Jewish society say, “we do not recognize this kiddushin,” then there is no kiddushin. Therefore I want to argue on that basis—and later authorities (Acharonim) pointed this out in very rare places, and with much hesitation and so on—about prospective annulment of kiddushin. Usually we understand annulment of kiddushin as working backward. We uproot the kiddushin that happened there, and therefore she is not a married woman. But the uprooting is done retroactively. And then they explain it as something like a mechanism of stipulation: “whoever betroths, betroths subject to the Rabbis,” and once the Sages do not agree, it is as though the condition was not fulfilled, and therefore the kiddushin is null from the outset—there never was kiddushin to begin with. But there are certain places—I’m not getting into the details now, I’m just making a note—there are certain places where you can see that there is prospective annulment. The kiddushin is null from now on, going forward—not backward. Until now she was a married woman; from now on, once the Sages annulled it, if they annulled it, she ceases to be a married woman, without a get. She ceases to be a married woman. Now that’s something that seems unthinkable. How can such a thing be? I don’t even remember anymore how it can be; someone told me I wrote a column about it. I don’t remember anymore. How can such a thing be? My claim is that this is not an annulment of the act of kiddushin. It is an annulment of the state of kiddushin. Just as when the Sages declare property ownerless, they are not uprooting the act of acquisition you performed when you acquired the property. They are saying: from now on we do not recognize you as the owner of the property. You are not the owner of the property; we no longer recognize that. So you cease to be the owner, because public recognition is the very meaning of ownership—without it, ownership has no meaning. Ownership means that the public recognizes you as the owner, and therefore someone else may not take it, and so on. The same thing happens regarding kiddushin—just a second—the same thing happens regarding kiddushin. When the Sages say, “we no longer recognize you as a married couple,” society does not see you as a married couple, then you are not a married couple. Without a get. And that is not because the act was uprooted retroactively—we did not uproot the act of kiddushin. We uprooted the state of kiddushin. You are no longer betrothed because society does not recognize you as betrothed. By the way, I think there is a hint in Pnei Yehoshua that this is the meaning of witnesses for the validity of the matter. Why do you need witnesses for the validity of the matter in kiddushin? The witnesses for the validity of the matter are basically some sort of representatives—like a court, but representatives of the public—who say: the public recognizes this act as an act of kiddushin; the public recognizes you as a married couple. Because without that—therefore in kiddushin these are witnesses for the validity of the matter; this is constitutive testimony. It’s not testimony that serves as proof of something; it constitutes the kiddushin. Why? Because public recognition constitutes the kiddushin. After all, if there is no public recognition, there will be no kiddushin. That is the meaning of witnesses for the validity of the matter. So therefore the Sages can annul kiddushin, because if public recognition is a condition for kiddushin to take effect, then the moment there is no public recognition, there is no kiddushin.

[Speaker G] So the Rabbi has found a great solution to all the problems of agunot? You hear? You found a solution to all the agunah problems. So too indeed.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A conceptual solution is possible; we can discuss whether we are really prepared to annul these marriages or not, but that is a different discussion. There are, you know, questions that Tosafot already raised on the issue of annulment of marriage. With annulment of marriage, for example, if someone sends an agent to divorce his wife and then cancels the agent not in her presence, the Sages annulled the marriage. Because otherwise the agent will give her the bill of divorce, but he is no longer an agent at all, so the bill of divorce is invalid, she remains a married woman, but she does not know that. She will think she is divorced, marry someone else, he will have relations with her, there will be illegitimate children, a whole mess. So what do the Sages do because of that concern? They annulled the marriage. Tosafot asks: if so, then anyone could cover for his niece. My niece committed adultery; she is married to me and she committed adultery. Now since she is my niece, I have some sentimental attachment to her despite the fact that she betrayed me. Okay? So I want to save her from the death penalty, because as a married woman she is liable to death. What do I do? She is still my wife, so I send her a bill of divorce through an agent and cancel the agent not in her presence. Then what happens? The Sages retroactively annul the marriage, and it turns out that the marriage I made back then was never a valid marriage, and therefore when she cheated on me a week earlier she was already not a married woman. So everything is fine, she is no longer liable to death. Tosafot already asks why we would not do that. Or rather, what do you mean why would we not do it? Obviously we would not do it. But why would a person not use this annulment of marriage that the Sages created in order to cover for his niece? So there are situations in which the Sages do not use their authority to annul a marriage. Tosafot says that there the marriage would not be annulled. Because in a case like that the Sages did not annul marriages if you do it with malicious intent, meaning in order to escape the law. Okay? In other words, we see that the Sages do not always use this power they have to annul, meaning to annul marriages. Now here they do not use it because he acted improperly. He is trying to pull tricks. But the Sages also did not use it elsewhere. For example, in the period when the Sages were able to annul marriages, when the great court functioned, Rav Ashi and Rav Ami and so on, then why did they not actually permit chained women in this way? There was a chained woman, she could come to the court of Rav Ami and Rav Ashi and have them annul her husband’s marriage—what is the problem? Permit chained women, everything is wonderful, why did they not do that? Apparently there was a policy among the Sages that they do not use the power they have except in very, very specific places. Even in places where there is need, such as permitting a chained woman, and not someone pulling a trick to escape the law, but truly to save the chained woman—and we have an interest in saving the chained woman—they still do not use this “whoever marries, marries subject to the Sages” in order to save chained women. The Sages had a policy about when to use this thing and when not to. So at the conceptual level one could have used “whoever marries” and annulment of marriage in order to permit chained women, but as a matter of policy the Sages apparently did not think it was right to do so. In principle it could have been done.

[Speaker C] So what is the simple meaning according to the Rabbi? The Rabbi’s simple meaning also resolves very well the Tosafot there in the Talmud in tractate Ketubot, on: “Granted, if he betrothed her with money, but if he betrothed her through intercourse, then what can be said?” There, if you do not say it this way, it is really hard to explain Tosafot’s straightforward meaning, but I did not quite understand, because—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, that is probably the article you meant, whoever wrote to me earlier.

[Speaker C] I do not know, yes. I just learned this topic, I just learned this topic and heard what the Rabbi says about property, and I thought maybe we could say the same thing with marriage as personal status, but I—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I explain that passage in Ketubot step by step: what the initial assumption is, what the conclusion is, what the difference is. There are lots of difficulties in that Talmudic passage, and in the article, precisely in light of what I said here, I explain the entire progression of the passage.

[Speaker C] But then, from what I learned, I did not understand. This reasoning, to say that personal status is really a kind of social definition—apparently that slightly contradicts, it is kind of against—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I did not finish. What I want to say is this—let me say it, and then ask if you still have a question, okay? Okay. There is a similarity between Even HaEzer and Choshen Mishpat in the sense that in both contexts the Sages have authority to change the law, to nullify the law, to change the law. But there is also a difference between them. And this is connected to the question asked earlier about prohibitions. Because in monetary law, if the Sages nullify—meaning, why can the Sages declare property ownerless? Because in essence the Sages are also the foundation of the very fact that there is ownership of property. Ownership of property is the result of social agreement. Society determines the laws of acquisition: when you will be an owner, how you will be an owner, and so on. That is not what happens in Even HaEzer. The concept of marriage was established by the Torah; it did not exist before the Torah established it. If society wants to establish such a convention on its own, that interests no one. The Torah established that there is such a concept as marriage. But the Torah made it dependent on agreement or public recognition. So the second part is similar to monetary law, in that it depends on public recognition, but the first part is not the same. In monetary law, society is the one that established the laws of acquisition, not the Torah.

[Speaker C] Yes, so fine, then that makes sense. What the Rabbi—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In Even HaEzer it was not society that established it, the Torah established it. It only depends on society’s recognition. But society cannot decide that marriage is effected by standing on one foot. The Torah said—

[Speaker C] what marriage is.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And does the Rabbi have, as it were, solid proofs that this really shows that the Torah placed it in the hands of society’s definition? Apparently this is a huge novelty, to say such a thing—where have we seen anything like this besides “a religious court may declare property ownerless”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] About personal status? For personal status, no—there society does not determine it.

[Speaker C] Not society, yes, but that the Torah wanted the recognition to be recognition by society, and recognition is social recognition. Where do we see that, Rabbi?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I make that claim because we are talking here about a legal layer, and that is how I explain the principle that “whoever marries, marries subject to the Sages.”

[Speaker C] What do you mean, we are talking about a legal layer?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Even HaEzer and Choshen Mishpat are the legal part of Jewish law. And I said that the legal part, as distinct from the non-legal part—Orach Chayim and Yoreh De’ah—what is the difference between them? The legal part of Jewish law is basically the legal system of Jewish law. Now, every legal system in the world contains personal status law—that is Even HaEzer—and monetary law, civil law—that is Choshen Mishpat. The claim is that a legal system as such is basically a system run by society. Society determines it, society recognizes it, and in other worlds society also legislates it—not in Jewish law. Okay? That is what characterizes a legal system. Therefore my claim is that just as everywhere in the world personal status law, like the laws of acquisition, is determined by society, so too in Jewish law, in its legal parts, it is a legal system. And like every legal system, it depends on social recognition and social determination. Recognition—for both. Determination—only for Choshen Mishpat and not for Even HaEzer. Orach Chayim and Yoreh De’ah, no. Orach Chayim and Yoreh De’ah are not a legal system; they are Jewish law that is not law in the legal sense.

[Speaker F] Rabbi, we found this, we found this in Yoreh De’ah too, in Moed Katan—I think at the beginning pages, I do not remember exactly where—and in the Talmud in Chagigah page 8 I think too, where the concept of the intermediate days of a festival is brought, and even though it is from the Torah, the Torah gave the power to the Sages. Yes, it is the same idea. It is the same idea, no?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not exactly. Why? Because there the Torah hands over to the Sages the authority to determine which labors are forbidden on the intermediate days of a festival.

[Speaker F] What do you mean, the Sages? The Sages are the representatives of the people; it is the same idea.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not exactly. Because there they determine the definitions of the law. In marriage, the Sages cannot determine the definitions of the law. A woman is acquired by money, document, or intercourse. The Sages do not determine that, and the public does not determine it.

[Speaker F] Why not? According to the Rabbi, the Sages determine that too, because after all this is interpretation of the verse; the interpretation of the verse is something the Sages explained.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They determine it as interpreters, but not in the sense that they decide whatever they want. They think that is what is written in the Torah; it is unrelated, not the same thing. So there is a distinction here. The intermediate days of a festival are not based on interpretation. There the Sages say what seems to them to be significant labor, and that is what is forbidden on the intermediate days of a festival.

[Speaker F] Yes, but that is interpretive.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They interpret the—

[Speaker F] That too—they interpret what “labor” means, they interpret it as a verse, it is interpretation.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They are not interpreting; they are determining what counts. The Torah tells them: whatever you determine, I recognize that. In marriage, the Torah itself says money, document, and intercourse, only the Sages derive through midrash that the Torah said this. They did not determine it from their own reasoning; the Sages derived it through exegesis.

[Speaker F] Okay, so in the first part, let us say, in figuring out what exactly the Torah meant, in that part it is true that it is different—that the intermediate days of a festival are one way and marriage—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No.

[Speaker F] But in the second part it is similar. In the second part of marriage, let us say, they determine exactly how marriage will work, when it is annulled and when it is not. And on the intermediate days of a festival it is the same idea: they determine and they derive it, they decide what counts as labor and what does not count as labor.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, they are not annulling anything. They determined what is permitted and what is forbidden. What does that have to do with annulment? They have authority to determine the definitions of what is permitted and forbidden on the intermediate days of a festival.

[Speaker F] Yes, but they can—for example, because they understood that labor has changed with the generations, and they understood that labor now is not what people understood two hundred years ago, so they can revoke what they had permitted.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] As with every rabbinic enactment, the Sages who enacted it can also change it. That is obvious.

[Speaker F] So in the end why is it not similar? I am trying to understand.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is a schematic similarity, but it is not the same, not the same idea. There they determine the parameters of the law. In marriage the Torah determined the parameters of the law, not the Sages. So what if the Sages interpreted the Torah? They interpreted it, but the Torah determined it; the Sages are just the ones who found it in the Torah. On the intermediate days of a festival, the Torah did not determine it; the Torah left it open: whatever the Sages determine, that is what I say.

[Speaker F] Okay, but again, it is true that there is a difference, but in the end both can, both can annul something and arrange it differently. They have the same power.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, that is true, okay.

[Speaker F] Fine, so we found that also with the intermediate days of a festival, this concept too. So we found this concept in Orach Chayim as well.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is already a semantic question. There is, obviously, some sort of similarity between these two contexts. But the Sages can also annul a vow.

[Speaker F] Okay, here is another example then, another example, fine, no problem.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Release a vow, yes. So fine, you can find that kind of similarity in other places too, but this is not that mechanism; it is not the same mechanism. Okay.

[Speaker F] On the contrary, apparently it is the same mechanism, just not the same example. That is what it looks like—it is the same mechanism of annulment, just different examples.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, the Sages can annul both here and there, but the concept is a different concept. Here the recognition of the Sages is required for it to be valid, but the Torah determined what and how one marries a woman. It is only that the Torah says: if society does not recognize the marriage, then there simply will not be a marriage. But that does not mean society can determine how one marries, or what counts and what does not count as marriage.

[Speaker F] Right, and also with the intermediate days of a festival.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On the intermediate days of a festival, the Torah did not determine what is forbidden and what is permitted; the Sages determine it.

[Speaker F] No, I meant that in the end—fine, so I said these are different examples—but the same mechanism of annulment exists here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, we can argue whether that similarity is significant or not significant; I do not see how we are going to advance with this.

[Speaker B] There is a side of similarity and a side of dissimilarity. Fine. Does the wording “whoever marries, marries subject to the Sages” not mislead us? It sounds like there is some issue here of intention or consent, but not because society has some principled power.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is the common mistake—even among the medieval authorities, in my opinion, with all due respect. Usually people tend to think that it is talking there about a stipulation.

[Speaker B] Why should I care about his intent, according to what you are saying? It is not his intent that matters to me; society is what determines it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Whose intent?

[Speaker B] The intent of the man effecting the marriage. That is not what determines it; society is what determines it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] My grandmother could not care less.

[Speaker B] So why does it say “whoever marries, marries subject to the Sages”? What is that phrase trying to say?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It means that if he marries, he marries subject to the Sages. Why? Because the Torah said that your marriage is subject to the Sages, not because you determined that.

[Speaker B] And even if he is not subject to the Sages, and even if he did not intend that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, and what you intended does not interest me either. That is the mistake. People think this is a stipulation made by the man marrying, that he makes a condition: I marry on condition that the Sages agree, subject to the Sages. No, mistake. The Torah determined that your marriage is subject to the Sages, not you. So for example, when the Sages annul a marriage—what is the proof? A simple proof. What happens when the Sages annul a marriage where he married her against her will? Yes? He coerced and married. He coerced and she was married. So he acted improperly, and we respond in kind and annul his marriage. You understand that there he did not marry subject to the Sages’ will. After all, he went against the Sages’ will and wanted to do it by force, against them. So did he stipulate that he was making the marriage conditional on the Sages agreeing? On the contrary, he did not want them interfering with him. So how can one annul a marriage there? That is a simple proof that it cannot be a stipulation of the husband. Again, I say: most of the medieval and later authorities learned it that way, but in my opinion it cannot be correct. It is a stipulation of the Torah—“the heart of the court stipulates”—or the Torah itself stipulated it, not the husband. But that is the article I wrote; look at it. I really explain it step by step through the Talmud in Ketubot. It resolves all the difficulties much better than the way everyone gets tangled up there. Once you understand it this way—the initial assumption, the conclusion, step by step in the Talmud in Ketubot—it all settles beautifully. By the way, there is just another interesting point. I never noticed this until I saw it in Berakhyahu Lifshitz—you know, the jurist from Jerusalem. I am in touch with him. In any case, he has some proposal to solve the problem of chained women by having the state confiscate the marriage money. Because the king, after all, can confiscate property. That has nothing to do with the Sages, right? No, no, I was not in touch with him—that was someone else. Another professor of law. He is older than me. Well, he too is older than me, but by only two years. In any case, his claim is that the king can certainly confiscate property. It is only a novelty that the Sages can confiscate property. Why can the Sages confiscate property? Then you need the highest court of the generation, because the highest court of the generation is basically a kind of governmental authority. But a king can certainly confiscate property—that is the whole idea of a king. His power is to confiscate property, confiscate land. A king can certainly confiscate ownership, as in every legal system in the world, by the way, where the government can confiscate property. So he says: what is the problem? You can confiscate the money of the marriage. So I said to him: wait, what do you mean confiscate the marriage money? The marriage took place ten years ago. Now the husband is pulling all kinds of tricks and not giving his wife a bill of divorce. So you are proposing that the Knesset confiscate his property? “A religious court may declare property ownerless.” But what does that mean? The property was his back then, and he married her ten years ago, and now you want to annul the marriage? How are you going to confiscate the property from ten years ago? It is no longer in the world. When he married her, it was his. Are you confiscating it retroactively? So he says to me: what do you want? The Talmud says exactly that—I never noticed this—the Talmud itself says it. After all, when the court declares property ownerless, it declares the property ownerless retroactively. It does not confiscate the property now. It says the property ten years ago was not yours. That is an operation that is unimaginable. How can a court do such a thing? What does that mean—how can you confiscate your ownership of the property from ten years ago? Not now. If now I take the property away from you, no problem. But “Granted, if he betrothed her with money,” yes, because “a religious court may declare property ownerless,” so you confiscate the property—that is what the Talmud at first thought, at least. You confiscate the property and therefore the marriage dissolves. Okay? But you are confiscating property from ten years ago?

[Speaker E] That suggestion—is it some kind of stipulation hanging in the air, that it can always apply retroactively?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not yet talking about a stipulation. A stipulation is the next stage of the Talmudic discussion. First there is “whoever marries, marries subject to the Sages.” At first they said, “Granted, if he betrothed her with money; but if he betrothed her through intercourse, what can be said?” And then they brought in the stipulation, “whoever marries.” But initially, before the stipulation, they understood that with money it is fine. Why? Because “a religious court may declare property ownerless.” And that is not because of a stipulation; it is only by virtue of “a religious court may declare property ownerless.” Now how can “a religious court may declare property ownerless” mean that you confiscate what belonged then? It reminds me—there is a Rashi in Bava Metzia about the axe. How does it say there? “Who has committed misuse?” There is some discussion there in the Talmud—who committed misuse with the axe? Did the woman commit misuse? Did the husband? Maybe the court committed misuse? I do not remember the context there. Rashi there explains that when a court confiscates property, it is not the court of the Talmud or of the Sanhedrin that established this law that is now confiscating my property. They died long ago. The one who confiscates the property is the court that is alive now, only it does so according to the instruction of the earlier court. That is how Rashi explains it. It is in Bava Metzia, maybe 97—I do not remember, I do not remember the page. You need to look there, “who has committed misuse?” You have to search for that Talmudic passage there. So that is also interesting, because it is the opposite direction of what I am saying now, the opposite direction on the timeline. The earlier court cannot confiscate property a thousand years in the future. It is not alive now; it cannot confiscate property. By the same token, a court now cannot confiscate property from a thousand years ago. When you confiscate property, you confiscate present ownership of the property. So Berakhyahu says to me: you see, that is not true. Here in “a religious court may declare property ownerless,” the confiscation made the property ownerless then, in the past. So the Knesset, which confiscates property now, can also confiscate it retroactively. That was his answer to me. On the face of it, he is right. I claim he is not right. You cannot confiscate property retroactively. That was the initial assumption of the Talmud, and in the initial assumption the Talmud really thought that they confiscate the property now. But in the conclusion, in the conclusion that really falls away, and it does not work by virtue of “a religious court may declare property ownerless.” But this—well, I have already gone too far afield. Anyway, returning to our matter, what I just wanted was to complete the picture and say—

[Speaker C] So what? So the Rabbi says that in the end it is also not like Tosafot, according to the Rabbi’s conclusion?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It is also not like Tosafot?

[Speaker C] What do you mean, which Tosafot? Tosafot on “he betrothed her with money,” “granted.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That it is a condition?

[Speaker C] That the money-case is based on “a religious court may declare property ownerless”—at least in the initial assumption.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the initial assumption, yes. That falls away in the conclusion.

[Speaker C] Ah, so the Rabbi—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] says: what happens there? The initial assumption is “granted, if he betrothed her with money,” and then they say, what about betrothal through intercourse? So the Talmud says with intercourse it is “whoever marries, marries subject to the Sages”—

[Speaker C] —and the Sages annulled his marriage.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Once they said “whoever marries,” does that now go back and explain betrothal with money as well, or does betrothal with money remain based on “a religious court may declare property ownerless,” and this is only an explanation for betrothal by intercourse? So if I remember correctly, there is a dispute among the medieval authorities as to whether, in the conclusion, even “a religious court may declare property ownerless” falls away, because “whoever marries” works for betrothal by money just as it works for betrothal by intercourse. You do not need to confiscate the money in order to annul the marriage. In the conclusion, that falls away; it is only an initial assumption. Anyway, returning to our topic. So the claim, basically—and now I am summarizing—is that there are areas that are very important for determining Jewish law, but they are not Torah. For example, the laws of acquisition, in my opinion: to study the Talmudic discussions about lifting, pulling, and so on—that is not Torah study. It is study of Jewish law. Meaning, you need to study it in order to know what the law is. But it is not Torah study in the essential sense, because those are determinations of the Sages; they could have determined different laws of acquisition—or not even the Sages, just state law determined them. For example, today when there are different laws of acquisition because the law established the rules of acquisition, then what determines the halakhic reality is the law, not the Talmud on the laws of acquisition—the law. But obviously studying law school is not Torah study; you do not recite the blessing over Torah study for it. So I claim that even when the law did not determine it but the Sages determined the laws of acquisition, they acted in their capacity as legislators, not in their capacity as Sages. They were simply the legislators of the old days. There was no Knesset; the legislators were the Sages. So they acted in their role as legislators, not in their role as Sages. Consequently, the laws they established in the laws of acquisition are not Torah study.

[Speaker D] So the Rabbi does not accept the distinctions between Torah-level acquisition and rabbinic acquisition—whether rabbinic acquisition works on the Torah level?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I spoke about this in the previous lecture. Obviously a rabbinic acquisition works on the Torah level. There is nothing to discuss there at all.

[Speaker D] So why does the Torah need to establish its own acquisitions at all?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It has things it wants to establish, I do not know. There are very few acquisitions the Torah established. I said that tractate Bava Batra is considered a tractate without verses.

[Speaker D] Because acquisitions are generally—and to study Torah-level acquisitions, is that considered Torah study? What? And to study acquisitions that are of Torah origin, laws of acquisition that are of Torah origin, is that considered? Certainly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. That is why the Torah established them; that is why the Torah wrote them, because it is Torah. It exists irrespective of the Sages’ determination. They can uproot it, but in principle that thing is eternally true, and therefore it is Torah. What the Sages established, they established—fine—based on their own considerations, and of course it is binding in Jewish law, but there is no Torah idea behind it. It is the reasoning of the Sages; they thought this way or that way, they established what they established like a legislator. What the legislator establishes also determines the halakhic result, but studying it is not called studying Torah. I said the same thing about communal ordinances; I brought several examples of this.

[Speaker C] And what is the root of the Sages’ disputes in these things, Rabbi?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, what do you mean?

[Speaker C] What is the root of the Sages’ disputes in the laws of acquisition? Is it just whatever society wants to be the case?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How to establish it—just like there are disputes in the Knesset. By contrast, I made a comparison to Even HaEzer: to study the three ways of effecting marriage—money, document, and intercourse—that is certainly Torah. Because money, document, and intercourse, unlike the laws of acquisition generally, the acquisition of a woman—that the Torah established. It is similar to acquisitions in monetary law that are written in the Torah. Fine? That is Torah. It is not similar to acquisitions determined in the legal system, because in Even HaEzer, in marriage, the three forms of acquiring a woman are established by the Torah, not by the Sages. The Sages’ or society’s recognition is needed, but the one who established it is the Torah. That is the proper way to effect marriage: money, document, and intercourse. You cannot touch that; you cannot marry in any other way. Therefore studying this is Torah study; it is studying what the Torah said. It is true that recognition is needed for it to be valid, both in Even HaEzer and in Choshen Mishpat. But there is a difference: in Choshen Mishpat the determinations themselves are determinations of a legislator, while in Even HaEzer the determinations are determinations of the Torah. The Torah determined that one effects marriage through money, document, and intercourse. Okay? Fine. What? There are a few more contexts where I can make this distinction, or a similar distinction. For example, in the question of morality. I will not go into it again—I already gave series on this, I think two series of lectures on Jewish law and morality. I will summarize my conclusions from those series. I argued that Jewish law and morality are two independent categories. Jewish law does not deal with morality, and morality is not Jewish law. They do not overlap. Okay? Even the parts of Jewish law that are morally oriented laws do not deal with morality; they deal with Jewish law. When the Torah says “do not murder,” it is not establishing a moral principle that one must not murder. The moral principle that one must not murder existed before it. I said: they came with complaints against Cain—“the voice of your brother’s blood cries out to Me from the ground”—long before the Torah commanded about murder. Because it was obvious that it is immoral to murder; everyone is supposed to understand that even without a command. “Whoever sheds human blood”—that too was even before. So why does the Torah write “do not murder”? Because it wanted to impose on it also a religious prohibition, not only a moral prohibition. Then the Torah says that when you murder, you have not only committed a moral wrong, you have also committed a halakhic wrong. Therefore the prohibition “do not murder” is not a moral prohibition. The so-called rational commandments and heard commandments, however people divide them—no, they do not come from Jewish moral reasoning, at least not from moral reasoning. They come from religious reasoning. Okay? Therefore also in—in the aspect of—yes, in short, even the moral laws do not really express morality. And even anti-moral laws—there is no problem with the fact that they contradict morality, because they are not saying that morality is incorrect. They are only saying that halakhically one must act in an immoral way. There is a halakhic reason obligating me to act that way. That resolves many problems—not that it matters, it is true regardless of the fact that it resolves problems. It is clear to me that it is true. In any case, if that is the assumption, I do not—

[Speaker C] But that—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] still does contradict in the end—

[Speaker C] what I am doing, no? What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It does somewhat contradict—

[Speaker C] I mean, also in the sense of—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It does not contradict; it only puts me into conflicts. It puts me into a kind of maze. It puts you into conflicts. A conflict is not a contradiction.

[Speaker C] Also saving a life and Sabbath is a conflict. It is not a contradiction; you just have to decide which overrides which.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but here it is different, because with saving a life and Sabbath they tell you: Sabbath is on the religious side, and on the religious side too they tell you to desecrate it. Never mind, but you still have a conflict. You encounter saving a life versus Sabbath—what do you do? I do not know; you have to think which overrides which. So why should I care? In a conflict between morality and Jewish law, that too is a conflict, and you have to decide which prevails. So what? Sometimes maybe I will not know what to do, so I have a problem, but the system as such does not contain a contradiction. There is no contradiction here, no problem in the system. The problems of Jewish law and morality are usually presented as a bug in the system. There is a contradiction in the system—after all, this law is immoral. I claim no, that is not a bug in the system. It is a conflict where I do not know whether morality prevails or Jewish law prevails, and that needs discussion. But it is not a contradiction; a conflict is not a contradiction. Yes, the chocolate example. Chocolate is worth eating because it is tasty, and not worth eating because it is fattening. Right? Who is right? They are both right. It is both tasty and fattening. Yet on the practical level, what do you do—eat it or not eat it? I am in a conflict. But is there some logical problem here? Some principled problem? No. The chocolate is both tasty and fattening.

[Speaker F] Is the chocolate example the Rabbi’s own example, or did he get it from somewhere?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, it is mine. Why?

[Speaker F] Just curious.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. I am fond of it, I use it a lot, but yes, as far as I remember, I think it is mine. In any case, I say the same thing about Jewish law and morality. You tell me, I do not know, a priest’s wife who was raped has to separate from her husband. Everyone always gets upset that this is really not moral—after all the trauma she went through, and now she has to go through another trauma. The answer is: correct, it is not moral. And there is a religious value that obligates them to separate, because otherwise it would damage the holiness of the priesthood. So what does that mean? That the act is an immoral act but one that is halakhically required. Like chocolate: tasty but fattening. Okay?

[Speaker C] But does that not mean that at that moment God said to you—the Holy One, blessed be He—follow Jewish law and not morality?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is another issue; we will not get into it now. I spoke about it at great length. Not necessarily. No. Sometimes morality prevails.

[Speaker D] Rabbi, maybe this is strengthened by the fact that we say prohibitions are a reality, and therefore reality does not care about the morality that stands against it? For example, a priest’s wife who was raped—now it is really like fire and a hand.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It does not matter whether morality is a reality—yes, if you are an ethical realist, a moral realist. I am not sure; I do not know how relevant that would be. In any case, if I say that morality and Jewish law are two independent categories, then what does that actually mean? It means that when, for example, it says “and you shall do what is upright and good”—yes? To behave in a straight and decent way. Okay? The famous Nachmanides on “and you shall do what is upright and good.” No compiler of the commandments counts this among the commandments. Why not? It is a commandment—“and you shall do what is upright and good,” no? No. Because everyone understands that this is a moral expectation. There is no reason to put it into the count of the commandments, because the count of the commandments deals with Jewish law. Morality and Jewish law are two categories. But on the other hand it is clear that morality—but I elaborated on this and I will not go into it again—but my claim is that morality cannot have validity unless it is the will of God. That is, unless it comes from the Holy One, blessed be He, from God. In an atheistic world, morality has no validity. Yes, “if there is no God in this place, they will kill me”—but not in the sense that people who do not believe in God are not moral. That is not factually true. Rather, people who do not believe in God—their morality is not consistent. Because there is no valid morality. The fact that they think morality is valid means they are mistaken.

[Speaker F] Rabbi, in the book he brought an example, he brought an example regarding morality from the fact that the Holy One, blessed be He, has attributes, and it is written that He is vengeful. So if we had to know morality from that, then we too should be vengeful. That is a sign that morality is something we already have in our heads. But someone spoke to me about this, and when I thought about it, it is not such a strong proof. Because the fact that “do not take revenge” is written explicitly to us means we never had any basis for doing something opposite to the Torah. It says “do not take revenge,” so if it is written that among God’s attributes He is vengeful, obviously it did not mean that we should be vengeful.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I will answer you on two levels. First: what would happen if “do not take revenge and do not bear a grudge” had not been written?

[Speaker F] What do you mean, what would happen? We would be obligated in it. What do you mean?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—so what, we would be supposed to do what the Holy One, blessed be He, does and be vengeful?

[Speaker F] No, obviously not. That claim, obviously not. Fine. But on the other hand, the Rabbi brought a certain proof. He said that from the fact that God’s attributes are written, we see there was some side that—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The assumption underlying the proof is that even regardless of “do not take revenge,” we would have acted that way. Fine, but that is an assumption.

[Speaker F] Right. Fine. But that is not a proof from the attributes of the Holy One. That assumption that we—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It is still a proof. Every proof is based on assumptions. There is an assumption here. If you accept that assumption, it is a proof; if you do not accept the assumption, it is not a proof.

[Speaker F] No, but you do not need to get to that assumption. I mean, even without that assumption we would know that revenge is a problem because it says “do not take revenge,” so obviously we would not say that. In other words, the Rabbi’s assumption is—I accept it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] My assumption is that it exists even without it being written. And therefore we would act that way even without it being written, and that is an indication that morality apparently has its foundation within us and not in command. Correct. And one can argue about that if one does not accept that assumption.

[Speaker F] No, I accept the assumption completely. But I am saying, to bring it as an argument that is a proof—it is not such a proof in that sense, because you could also say someone who does not—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I say—and I will repeat again—every proof is based on assumptions.

[Speaker F] I am not arguing—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] with the Rabbi about that structure. So that is the basis of the proof. If you do not accept the assumption, then correct, there is no proof. That is one thing. Second, beyond that—

[Speaker F] Why do you obey this and not that? Fine.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, what? There is a definition of “do not take revenge” and “do not bear a grudge.”

[Speaker F] Okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What happens if you are outside the range that is defined as the prohibition of “do not take revenge”? Okay. There, is it good to be vengeful because one should cleave to His attributes?

[Speaker F] Is there such a thing—what really is outside that definition? Is there such a broad category outside the definition of “do not take revenge”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I do not know—“do not take revenge and do not bear a grudge against the children of your people,” yes? Meaning, what about gentiles?

[Speaker F] Is that said about “the children of your people”? Who says it is said about “the children of your people”? Is there such a definition?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Listen, “do not take revenge and do not—”

[Speaker F] “bear a grudge” is said only about the people of Israel.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] All commandments between one person and another apply to one who is “with you in Torah and commandments.” Okay. Correct. Now, if I want to take revenge on a gentile, there is no prohibition of “do not take revenge” and “do not bear a grudge.” So there is no prohibition, so it is permitted. Am I obligated to take revenge?

[Speaker F] Okay, I understand.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Good.

[Speaker E] Rabbi, Rabbi, I completely agree with—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] These are simple things, this is not—

[Speaker E] Rabbi, Rabbi, if we agree completely with the Rabbi’s assumption that the basis of morality must come from God, then in the end, if the Rabbi makes this split between Jewish law and morality, then the Holy One, blessed be He—if we could ask Him directly—would be in some kind of split personality. I have Jewish law and I have the will of—fine, you have a conflict like everyone else, but in the end you want one thing. So why make this split at all? That the Holy One, blessed be He, wants Jewish law and He wants morality. There is the will of God, and the will of God is—there is no need to give this separate headings at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What difference does it make whether it is Jewish law or morality? That is the fact. There are these two categories. What does it mean, why make it?

[Speaker E] But it is artificial. If in the end it is all the will of God, then we just artificially created this category.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] These are two kinds of will. Different kinds. They have different definitions. It does not work in the same way. Sometimes this prevails, sometimes that prevails. It is not the same system. You cannot put everything into the same system. It is intentionally left outside.

[Speaker E] But why create the two separate categories when in the end it is all the will of God, and the will of God is—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why create a category of going beyond the letter of the law, a measure of piety? Just say everything is obligatory and that is all.

[Speaker E] No, there is a basis for that, we can relate to it, one can explain it. Here it is just—when I come before the Holy One, blessed be He, if I were sitting there, “the righteous sit with their crowns on their heads,” and ask the Holy One, blessed be He, what He wants, would He say: it depends; there is my will within the category of Jewish law, and my will within the category of morality? It sounds artificial. Really very artificial.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are two aspects. I am telling you: from a halakhic perspective it is important to do this; from a moral perspective it is important to do that. Now you have a conflict, and the conflict needs to be decided. If I could ask the Holy One, blessed be He, He would probably tell me how to decide, and I cannot ask Him—“it is not in heaven.” So I have to decide, okay. He does not need to be confused, and He also does not need to be in conflict. He might simply be able to tell me which overrides which.

[Speaker E] Fine, but why should I create—point by point there are conflicts in every act, but in general to say we have a division of Jewish law and a division of morality, when in the end both are based on the will of God—that sounds terribly artificial.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I do not know why that is artificial. These are two different categories. Why make them into one category?

[Speaker E] Because they are simply different in essence. Both draw their validity only from the will of God.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But—

[Speaker E] Morality—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] is imposed even on the Holy One, blessed be He, and that does not contradict the fact that it draws its validity from the will of God—on that too.

[Speaker E] And Jewish law is not imposed on the Holy One, blessed be He?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No.

[Speaker E] That is a very fundamental distinction the Rabbi is making now. See article 457.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Got it. But again, I don’t want to get too deep into these discussions; we already went through them at length in the past. What I do want to say is how I relate to the realm of morality. The realm of morality also clearly guides me in what to do and what not to do in practical life, but it does not belong to Jewish law. It’s an extra-halakhic realm. Now here there’s an interesting point, because morality, unlike the laws of the state or property law or legal theory or everything I discussed before, morality in this sense is actually similar to Even HaEzer. It is Torah, but not Jewish law. The law of the kingdom and legal theory are Jewish law but not Torah; morality is Torah but not Jewish law. Because morality is ultimately an interpretation of “and you shall do what is right and good”; it is a decoding of the will of the Torah, of God’s will through the Torah. True, I don’t decode it by interpretation in the textual sense; I decode it out of what I understand. But still, when I understand that this is what is right and good, then it is included in the verse that tells me, “and you shall do what is right and good.” So it is Torah, and engaging in it is Torah. Maybe Torah in the person, maybe there’s room to discuss that a bit, but it is not Jewish law. So this is the reverse of what we saw with the law of the kingdom and legal theory, where it was Jewish law but not Torah. Because behind morality there is substance, there is an idea, and it is a true idea, an idea of the Torah. Behind property law there are no ideas; there are social conventions. This is how acquisition works, this is how it doesn’t work—that’s not, there’s no special will of the Torah here. Okay? I’ll illustrate this more with rabbinic laws, because there it comes out perhaps in the sharpest way. But before that I’ll say: morality, for example, is one category. Going beyond the letter of the law, pious conduct, “so that you may walk in the way of good people,” and that whole family of concepts—that too is some kind of extra-halakhic principle, but clearly the Torah expects us to behave accordingly. What happens when it contradicts Jewish law? That’s a different discussion. But when there is no contradiction, the Torah expects us to behave in that way, but it is not Jewish law. In the topic of “we compel against the trait of Sodom” in Bava Batra chapter 1, there the Sages take certain moral principles and establish them as a halakhic obligation. “We compel against the trait of Sodom,” or “this one benefits and that one does not lose,” which Tosafot ties to the trait of Sodom, and so on. There the Sages basically, by a kind of rabbinic enactment, determined that this moral law would also become a halakhic obligation, and apparently a rabbinic obligation and not a Torah-level one. Because on the level of Jewish law there is no Torah-level obligation; it is a moral obligation, not a halakhic one. Sometimes the Sages think it should also be anchored halakhically, so they establish it as rabbinic law.

[Speaker C] But doesn’t the Rabbi say that this is Torah then? I can’t hear. So doesn’t the Rabbi say that this is Torah—that the moral command, the moral will, is also considered Torah, just not Jewish law?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. I said, it’s the reverse of legal theory, which is Jewish law but not Torah; morality is Torah but not Jewish law.

[Speaker C] Yes, so the practical difference there is only if I make a fundamental distinction between Jewish law and Torah. So what practical difference does it make?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now I’m making the distinction in both directions.

[Speaker C] And what practical difference would it make, for example?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Whether you recite the blessing over Torah study, I don’t know—for example.

[Speaker C] If I recite the blessing over Torah study on anything that is Torah and not only on Jewish law. No, the opposite. And on something that is Jewish law but not Torah, not to recite the blessing over Torah study.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes—so on Jewish law that is not Torah, you don’t recite the blessing over Torah study?

[Speaker C] What?

[Speaker D] But Rabbi—

[Speaker C] You did say that the core of Torah is Jewish law, Jewish law not in the sense of civil law.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s how the whole line of argument went. I said first of all that the core of Torah is Jewish law. Now I said: correct, but there are laws that are Jewish law and yet are not Torah. The core of Torah is what the Torah says in the halakhic realm. And that is of course Torah that is also Jewish law. But within Jewish law there are also other branches, other categories, that are only Jewish law but not Torah. Because the Torah itself didn’t say them. The Torah only uses them, like legal theory or things like that.

[Speaker D] And according to this, in ethics studies one would recite the blessing over Torah study because it is Torah but not Jewish law?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Seemingly, yes.

[Speaker D] Interesting.

[Speaker B] Wait, but in legal theory too we were already obligated even before the Torah, so where exactly is the difference? In both cases, before the Torah I would already have been obligated, and the Torah adds a verse to both of them: “do not steal” and “and you shall do what is right and good.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, because in legal theory it is the result of convention.

[Speaker B] There’s no truth behind it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They could have established acquisition this way, they could have established acquisition differently—whatever they establish, that’s what it is…

[Speaker B] Right, I’m saying: the defining event is indeed convention, but in the end it’s still an obligation that stands on its own. Meaning, we are obligated to law even before the Torah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, and that is of course Jewish law. But for something to be Torah, it’s not enough that it be binding. There are many binding things. Torah is supposed to be some idea whose source is in the Torah. There is some inner truth that is represented there.

[Speaker B] No, the moral idea that once there is a convention I am also bound by it—that is the moral idea here, the legal idea.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, but the convention itself is not Torah, as I said. Studying the contours of the law of the kingdom is Torah study. But studying the king’s laws themselves is not Torah study.

[Speaker B] And then by analogy to morality: what harms another person is not itself Torah, but once I’ve harmed another person, the fact that this is forbidden—that already is Torah?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Clarifying the facts of what harms and what doesn’t—that’s psychology. Okay. So that’s regarding going beyond the letter of the law, morality, and so on. So I said that the Sages sometimes take certain elements that belong to morality—which is something extra-halakhic—and put a halakhic stamp on them. They turn it into rabbinic law. And later I’ll discuss the fact that rabbinic laws too are apparently not Torah according to my definition. But that will come later. There may be one more point I want to bring up in this context; this has taken me too long. Yes, maybe I’ll say two more things in this context. There is the phrase “you shall be holy,” where Nachmanides says there not to be a scoundrel with the permission of the Torah, at the beginning of Parashat Kedoshim. When you look at the commandments that Nachmanides adds to Maimonides’ Book of the Commandments—after all, at the end of the Book of the Commandments there are Nachmanides’ additions and subtractions. Meaning, Nachmanides removes some of Maimonides’ commandments—he disagrees with him—and in their place inserts other commandments, because altogether there have to be 613, positive commandments and prohibitions. You will not find there the commandment of “you shall be holy.” Now according to Maimonides, the commandment of “you shall be holy” does not appear there; he writes in the fourth root that it is a commandment that includes the entire Torah, one of the all-inclusive commandments. In other words, “you shall be holy” simply means: do the commandments. Fine—doing the commandments, we were already commanded in the commandments themselves; there is no need to count the commandment that tells me to do the commandments. That’s how Maimonides explains why we don’t count it. But Nachmanides, at the beginning of Parashat Kedoshim, explains that “you shall be holy” does not mean doing the commandments—it’s the opposite. It means fulfilling things that are not included in the system of commandments. So why isn’t that counted as a commandment? It’s no longer a commandment that includes the whole Torah, like Maimonides says. And Nachmanides does not add this commandment to Maimonides’ positive commandments. So the answer—I’ve spoken about this—is the paradox of the scoundrel. If they had added it to the count of the commandments, then someone who violated it would not be a scoundrel with the permission of the Torah; he would be a scoundrel without the permission of the Torah, because he would have neglected a positive commandment. They would be turning it into Jewish law. Right? If we counted it among the commandments, then it would become Jewish law. So someone who, say, overindulged in sex and food—all the examples Nachmanides gives there—would in effect be neglecting the positive commandment of “you shall be holy.” So that would not be called a scoundrel with the permission of the Torah; it would be a scoundrel without the permission of the Torah—you violated Jewish law. But the Torah wanted to leave him as a scoundrel with the permission of the Torah; it deliberately did not want to establish a halakhic prohibition on this. And therefore “you shall be holy” cannot be counted among the commandments. So here is an example of a category that by definition remains outside Jewish law. But I didn’t understand, I didn’t understand—

[Speaker C] Who said that, who innovated that? Nachmanides? Maybe the Torah does want that to be Jewish law. I didn’t understand. Maybe the Torah did want the halakhah to be that he should not be a scoundrel.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not be a scoundrel in what sense?

[Speaker C] That he should not be a scoundrel—even not a scoundrel, meaning that if he is a scoundrel, then it’s not with the permission of the Torah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And then what? To establish it as a positive commandment?

[Speaker C] Yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re saying there is a prohibition against eating too much?

[Speaker C] Yes, things like that. Who says Nachmanides is right that this is not so? But that’s what Nachmanides says.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Nachmanides understood that “you shall be holy,” like morality, apparently fit what I said earlier—that morality by definition is not supposed to enter into Jewish law. It has to remain a separate, external category. And therefore he understands that “you shall be holy” too—even though “you shall be holy” is not exactly morality. “You shall be holy” is personal morality; it’s not harming another. It’s personal self-work. Not eating too much is not like “and you shall do what is right and good.” “And you shall do what is right and good” is morality in the ordinary sense—not harming another, helping another. “You shall be holy” means going beyond the letter of the law, beyond what strict law says, in the personal sense, not in the sense of harming someone else. But still, Nachmanides’ view is that this needs to remain outside Jewish law. That reminds me of something else: there’s a question from Rabbi Chaim Vital. Rabbi Chaim Vital asks why the Torah does not command work on one’s character traits. In Sha’arei Kedushah he asks this. His answer is well known, and so is Rav Kook’s answer—various answers. Rabbi Chaim Vital says that the Torah does not command this because the Torah speaks to human beings; if someone is not a human being, there’s nothing to talk to him about. And Rav Kook says even more than that. Rav Kook says that the Torah did not want to command this because in moral matters, greater is one who acts without being commanded than one who acts because he was commanded. If the Torah had commanded it, it would have ruined it, because then I would do it as someone who is commanded and obeys. But either way, what comes out is that the Torah has an interest in leaving character development outside Jewish law. And so the question of where Nachmanides got the idea that “you shall be holy” is not a positive commandment, that it remains outside Jewish law—from here. The idea that, just like morality needs to remain an extra-halakhic category, so too personal morality, work on the person himself, not harming—

[Speaker D] another person—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that too must remain outside Jewish law.

[Speaker D] Because these are moral matters that I am supposed—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] to do not by virtue of command. Rabbi, but harming another person—isn’t that also harming the holiness of myself? I didn’t understand. Harming another person—isn’t that also harming my own holiness? In the fact that I damage, that I steal, that I harm?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe also, but that’s not the point in itself—the harming of another. One last point: a transgression for the sake of Heaven. The Talmud in Nazir says that a transgression for the sake of Heaven is greater than a commandment done not for its own sake. Like Yael, the wife of Chever the Kenite, who was with Sisera—she slept with Sisera, and in fact she was a married woman, so she violated the prohibition of forbidden sexual relations. Even for the sake of saving life one may not transgress that, and nevertheless it is considered a transgression for the sake of Heaven, and the Talmud praises her for this. Yael, the wife of Chever the Kenite—she was the wife of Chever the Kenite, she was a married woman. So there too, the later authorities, because they are very alarmed by this topic, tend to understand this law of a transgression for the sake of Heaven as some kind of internal halakhic overriding principle, like a positive commandment overriding a prohibition or something of that sort. There are such overriding principles within Jewish law, where there are situations in which a prohibition is overridden by them, and this would be an internal halakhic overriding principle. But that is certainly not the case; it’s obvious that’s not correct. It is clear that the principle of a transgression for the sake of Heaven is an extra-halakhic principle.

[Speaker F] Does the Rabbi have places, proofs from the Talmud, where you can see that this doesn’t belong to the pre-halakhic realm, that it’s something extra-halakhic?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Look at the expression itself—what does “a transgression for the sake of Heaven” mean?

[Speaker F] I understand that once it’s called that, then that’s the meaning. But has the Rabbi seen other places in the Talmud from which one could bring proof? Places where you could say: look, they use this in other places too?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know what kind of proof. I can bring you more examples, but with those too you could ask who says they’re really like this.

[Speaker F] Rabbi Yitzhak—someone who sees—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that his inclination is overcoming him should go to another place, wear black, and do what his heart desires.

[Speaker F] Okay, aside from Leibowitz’s example, a regular example. What is a regular example?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A regular halakhic example? Then it’s halakhic. By definition these examples are not regular.

[Speaker F] The medieval authorities already dealt with it. And they rejected it. I’m talking about things that remained and can be used, things that are still within halakhic definitions.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t understand what the medieval authorities rejected—rejected what? I don’t understand the claim.

[Speaker F] The Rif rejected what Rabbi Ilai said, that he should go and wear black and go to a distant place.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He ruled it—so what?

[Speaker F] But nobody treats it seriously. Do they treat it seriously?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There you are—those are the examples. It could be that there’s an example about which there is disagreement. So what?

[Speaker F] No, I mean when the Rabbi brought a halakhic example, like a regular norm, a normal halakhic norm that people use.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But it’s not halakhic, for heaven’s sake!

[Speaker F] No, sorry, I meant something people actually use—they use this example with this claim in a normal halakhic context. Aside from the claim about wearing black, another place. What do they use?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] An example of what exactly do you want?

[Speaker F] Of what the Rabbi brought up, the extra-halakhic. What do you mean, of what? An example of where they use this in Jewish law. Use what? “From acting not for its own sake one comes to acting for its own sake.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand. A transgression for the sake of Heaven.

[Speaker F] A transgression for the sake of Heaven? Yes. Ah, you don’t mean other topics. What examples are there of a transgression for the sake of Heaven?

[Speaker E] No, and of course the Rabbi can explain it before that, before the Rabbi started explaining what exactly the whole issue of a transgression for the sake of Heaven is.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A transgression for the sake of Heaven is an instruction that is not within the framework of Jewish law. Because it is a transgression. When you do it, it is still a transgression. And still, you are expected to do it. So you cannot say that the determination here is a halakhic determination. If Yael, the wife of Chever the Kenite, had come to ask a question, would we have instructed her halakhically? No. It’s like “it is the law, but we do not instruct so,” or one who has relations with an Aramean woman, and things of that sort. The halakhic answer she would receive would be: it is forbidden for you—if she is asking a halakhic question from a halakhic expert. If she asks what the Holy One, blessed be He, expects you to do—He expects you to do it, even though it is a transgression. But that is not a halakhic determination; it is an extra-halakhic determination. Because on the halakhic level it is defined as a transgression. So here is another example of the distinction between Jewish law and Torah. Okay? Here you have Torah that is outside Jewish law. Not a halakhic determination, like morality. Okay? Rabbi Ilai is the same. Rabbi Ilai too—this instruction to go to a distant place and do what his heart desires is not a halakhic instruction. Jewish law cannot give you an instruction to commit transgressions.

[Speaker D] Rabbi, but the Rabbi argues that wherever it’s a Torah-level law, then Jewish law always defeats morality, right? So here you have the opposite example.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What?

[Speaker D] Rabbi, I heard the Rabbi once say that where there is a Torah-level law against morality, certainly Jewish law prevails over morality. A Torah-level law?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That where there is a Torah-level law—

[Speaker D] against morality, certainly the Torah-level law prevails.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Where the Torah established a halakhah that inherently contradicts morality. Not just any case. The Torah established Sabbath observance, okay? That does not inherently contradict morality. Say “and live by them,” or saving life—suppose saving life were a moral principle, fine? Now, once the Torah commands me to keep the Sabbath, that does not contradict the law of preserving life. Situations can arise in which there will be a contradiction—

[Speaker B] where on the Sabbath there will be—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] a sick person, and therefore there it is not necessarily the case that Sabbath observance will prevail over morality. Sabbath observance prevails over morality in the case of Amalek, for example. Why? Because in killing Amalek, by definition, every time you kill Amalek it is murder.

[Speaker D] So self-sacrifice regarding forbidden sexual relations is the same thing too. What? That the moral principle of human life, and the halakhic principle of—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And there the Torah itself said exactly that—it said that this overrides the moral aspect too, the Torah did.

[Speaker D] Yes, so why shouldn’t we say here too that the moral principle of saving the people of Israel should be pushed aside because of the Torah-level law where the Torah said one must give up one’s life?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t understand.

[Speaker D] The Rabbi explains, argues, that the moral principle—God’s will—prevailed here over the Torah law concerning a married woman. That is what a transgression for the sake of Heaven is, basically. But seemingly we have here a case of a substantive Torah law that is telling us to violate the moral principle because of Torah law—so why doesn’t it prevail here?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In such exceptional circumstances, where I don’t know, the entire people of Israel are in danger—there is no halakhic permission, nowhere does a halakhic permission appear, and what its parameters are, and from what verse it is learned. Yael, the wife of Chever the Kenite, is a story in the Prophets. Where is the source for this in the Torah? There isn’t one. In the case of a married woman, it is “be killed rather than transgress.” There is no qualification to that on the halakhic level. And nevertheless Yael, the wife of Chever the Kenite, decided on her own initiative—not by asking a halakhic authority—to do it, and after the fact the Sages endorse it and say: correct, you did well.

[Speaker D] So then even the rule the Rabbi formulated—that a Torah-level law always prevails over morality where it is inherently against morality—even that has exceptions?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t understand. No—what do you mean it has exceptions?

[Speaker D] But here there is an exception. A case like this is exceptional, so because of that one departs from the Torah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean exceptional? Therefore it isn’t inherent. Because the contradiction was not with danger to the entire people of Israel. Facing danger to the entire people of Israel is usually not the case. Okay. In ethics it is usually danger to your values—be killed rather than transgress. Danger to the entire people of Israel is something else, I don’t know. But there is no halakhic permission. I’m saying, I think one should not do that, because it’s exceptional. Let’s call it inherent, I don’t know; I don’t think this example is probably not inherent. Yes, there is the case of a wife of a kohen who was raped—they have to separate. There they have to separate, even though it is not moral to separate them. Why? Because the instruction to separate is always not moral. That is built in. It’s not incidental. If it usually wouldn’t happen, and it just so happened that here it was also not moral, then there would be room to hesitate—it would not be clear what overrides what. But this really takes me into the other series, and I don’t want to go there. Here I brought it only as an example of a category that is outside Jewish law, but still belongs to Torah. So the distinction between Jewish law and Torah goes in both directions. There is Jewish law that is not Torah, and there is Torah that is not Jewish law. Okay, let’s stop here.

[Speaker C] So I just didn’t understand one thing the Rabbi said on this issue of morality—what he said. The Rabbi gave the earlier example of the raped wife of a kohen.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand.

[Speaker C] What the Rabbi brought before, about a woman who was raped while married to a kohen, and seemingly this is not moral. So I said to the Rabbi: does that mean the Torah tells you to follow Jewish law and not morality? And the Rabbi told me: not necessarily.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I didn’t say not necessarily. Here, in this specific place, when the Torah says—when the Torah says to separate them, and that separation is always a moral wrong in an inherent way—in such cases the Torah says that Jewish law prevails. Because the Torah itself took into account that there is a moral problem here and nevertheless commanded it. But only in such cases, not everywhere the Torah said something. If the Torah said something but it is not inherent, like saving life on the Sabbath, then no. Okay?

[Speaker C] Thank you very much, Rabbi. Thank you very much.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Thank you very much. Sabbath peace.