Study and Halachic Rulings – Lesson 7

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’re in a series on learning and issuing halakhic rulings, and at the beginning I dealt a bit with the status of Jewish law within the framework of Torah, and I argued that it’s the core of the concept of Torah. Then later I said something that seems, at least on the face of it, to contradict that: if I say that Jewish law is the core of the concept of Torah, that means that Torah is basically Jewish law plus a few other peripheral things. In other words, Jewish law is wholly contained within Torah, and then there are all sorts of other things besides Jewish law. And then suddenly I said the opposite: that actually Jewish law is a concept broader than the concept of Torah—not contained within Torah, but the other way around. In the sense that there are things connected to Jewish law that still don’t really have the status of Torah. I talked about *dina de-malkhuta*, about Choshen Mishpat, about all these lines of argument, which I’m not going to repeat here. Toward the end of last time I started getting into the status of rabbinic laws. And my claim was—and I already gave this as a headline, now I want to spell it out—but as a headline I said that rabbinic laws are somewhat similar to *dina de-malkhuta*, or to vows and oaths, customs, all kinds of general categories like that, which basically say: you are obligated to fulfill whatever is defined in a certain way. For example, with a vow: if you vow something, then you have to fulfill it. Now the question is: what exactly will you vow? That’s up to you. Vow this way, vow that way—but whatever you vow, you have to fulfill. So in the context of vows, for example, it’s pretty clear that starting to clarify exactly what a person vowed—that’s not Torah; that’s fact-finding. The Torah tells me what to do after I know that he vowed such-and-such. Then the Torah tells me that he has to fulfill what he vowed. But clarifying the content of the vow itself is not Torah. Same thing with *dina de-malkhuta*. The determination that *dina de-malkhuta* has valid force—that is, that it obligates—that is Torah. But clarifying what *dina de-malkhuta* says, what the king established and what he didn’t establish, that’s not Torah study. Or take Israeli law. In monetary law, Israeli law is basically what binds, so halakhically I need to know what Israeli law says, but that doesn’t mean that when I study law I’m thereby studying Torah. So all these examples—I now want to take them in the direction of rabbinic law and say the same thing about rabbinic law. Meaning: basically, with rabbinic law they tell me that I have to fulfill what the Sages said, but clarifying what they said is not necessarily Torah. I just need to clarify it, because without that I can’t fulfill the commandments of “according to what they instruct you” or “do not turn aside,” and therefore I need to determine what they said. But that’s exactly like clarifying what a person vowed in order to know what is forbidden to him and what is permitted to him. So the fact that it’s forbidden or permitted to him—that’s Torah. But clarifying what he vowed—those are facts needed in order to keep the Jewish law, but no one would say that that clarification is itself Torah. My claim is that rabbinic laws have a similar status. Meaning, clarifying what is included in a rabbinic law and what is not included in a rabbinic law is simply a clarification that in some respects is factual clarification. You just need to understand what the Sages forbade. Once I clarify what the Sages forbade, the Torah comes and says: you also have to obey. In other words, it is incumbent upon you; it is an obligation. You have to fulfill what the Sages established, forbade, required, and so on. But clarifying what they forbade is like clarifying what a person vowed. And therefore the claim I want to make—and it’s a novel claim, I think a lot of people won’t like it when they hear it, or didn’t like it already when they heard it; there’s a column about this on my website—is that studying rabbinic laws is actually not Torah study. It’s study with value, because I need to study them in order to know what I am obligated to observe, but Torah study it is not. And that I want to elaborate on a little. That’s the framework I want to get to. Ultimately I want to argue that learning rabbinic laws is like learning what a person vowed, or what the king decreed, or what Israeli law determines. But not when it comes to the ways the Torah is expounded. The ways the Torah is expounded—meaning, even if

[Speaker B] Maimonides calls that *divrei soferim*, then that too doesn’t fall into the category the Rabbi is talking about now?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand. Again.

[Speaker B] Can you hear?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now I hear. I hope.

[Speaker B] I’m saying: the derashot through which the Torah is expounded. Those derashot too—even according to Maimonides—are *divrei soferim*. Right? So does that also enter the category the Rabbi is describing now? Or not?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. After I explain why I think this about rabbinic laws, I’ll need to elaborate more. If you remember to come back to this question, I’ll answer it in more detail. Okay? So we’ll see. In any case, I want to start maybe with some kind of introduction regarding rabbinic laws. So, first of all, the first introduction is: what is rabbinic law altogether? What is defined as rabbinic law? And for the moment I’m ignoring Maimonides and his *divrei soferim* regarding derashot—let’s set that aside for now. Usually people think that the distinction between rabbinic law and Torah law is chronological. Meaning, what existed at Mount Sinai is Torah law, and what came into being later over the generations is rabbinic law. That is not correct, or at least not precise. There can be rabbinic laws that existed at the time the Torah was given, and there can be Torah laws that are created today. Chronology is neither a necessary condition nor a sufficient condition for the distinction between Torah law and rabbinic law. The distinction between Torah law and rabbinic law lies in the question of what kind of action the Sages are performing. The Sages basically do two kinds of things: acts of legislation and acts of interpretation. Legislation means establishing new laws. Yes—whatever seemed right to them to prohibit, they prohibit; or to obligate—Hanukkah candles, reading the Megillah, the prohibition of poultry with milk—whatever seemed to them right to prohibit or require, they have the authority to do so, and after they determine it, it really is binding. That’s legislation. Interpretation is when the Sages interpret what is written in the Torah. What is written in the Torah is ambiguous or open to several possible understandings, and the Sages determine that this is the correct interpretation of the verse. Here the Sages are acting as interpreters, not as legislators. Why? Because what they’re doing here is not adding a law because it seems right to them, but interpreting what the verse says. Once they have interpreted it and I accept their interpretation, then as far as I’m concerned, the verse said it—not the Sages. The Sages are only the ones who revealed to me that this is what the verse says. But after they revealed it to me, and they have the authority to determine that, then as far as I’m concerned this is what the verse says. Therefore this is not legislation by the Sages; it’s legislation by the Torah—only the Sages helped me understand what the Torah legislates. Okay? So that is the Sages acting as interpreters rather than as legislators. Now when the Sages act as legislators, that is rabbinic law. When the Sages act as interpreters, that is Torah law. Because once they have interpreted it, as far as I’m concerned that is what is written in the Torah, and if it is written in the Torah, then it is Torah law. When the Sages legislate, even after they legislate some law, they have not shown that it is written in the Torah; they have not performed an interpretive act, but established a new law. They created a new law because that is how it seemed right to them, and they have authority and one must obey them; therefore that law is valid. But it is not a law that they extracted from the Torah, neither through interpretation nor in any other way. They created a new law; they legislated. And therefore that law is rabbinic law, law from the words of the Sages. I’ll note parenthetically that Maimonides’ position is that derashot too have the status of teachings of the Sages. That’s what he writes in the second principle. There are of course disputes, as is well known—interpretive disputes over what exactly Maimonides means. Does he mean that these are rabbinic laws, or does he mean these are Torah laws, but since the Sages were involved in their creation he calls them teachings of the Sages? I think quite clearly that the first possibility is the correct one, as Nachmanides understood Maimonides. He means actual rabbinic laws—not just some statement that the Sages were involved but it is still Torah law. But on the other hand—and again, I won’t get into all the details here—the claim is that even so, this is still not rabbinic law like laws produced by ordinary legislation. Suppose the Sages legislated not to eat poultry with milk. Okay? That’s legislation with no root at all in the Torah. It has nothing to do with the Torah. The Sages decided that this is the right thing to do, that’s what they established, and it obligates; the Sages have authority. But when the Sages make a derashah—“You shall fear the Lord your God,” including Torah scholars—the word “et” comes to include something. So reverence for Torah scholars is created by the Sages, but it is not created because they thought that was the right thing; it is created because they understood that this is what the verse hints at. That the word “et” in the verse comes to include not only fearing God, but also fearing Torah scholars. So the Sages here, in a certain sense, drew an additional law out of the verse. This is not an act of legislation. And therefore, most medieval authorities (Rishonim) indeed argue that this is Torah law, a law that emerges from derashah. Why does Maimonides argue otherwise? Because Maimonides argues that when I make a derashah, the derashah does not expose something that is inside the verse; rather, the derashah expands what the verse says. The spirit of the verse, if you will. The verse says to fear the Holy One, blessed be He; it does not say to fear Torah scholars. But the word “et” tells me: include additional things that fit the spirit of the text. Once I determined that one must also fear Torah scholars, I am not claiming that reverence for Torah scholars was actually latent inside the verse and the Sages merely pulled it out or showed me that inside this verse there is also reverence for Torah scholars. No. The verse does not include reverence for Torah scholars; reverence for Torah scholars is not inside the verse, not even in the depth of the verse. No—it isn’t there. It is outside the verse. But it is an expansion of the spirit of the matter. Just as one fears the Holy One, blessed be He, so too one should, in some analogous way, fear Torah scholars. That is an expansion. And for Maimonides, Torah laws are only laws that are in the Torah, whether I see them directly or whether the Sages help me discover that they are there. And therefore plain interpretation, according to Maimonides, is indeed Torah law, since plain interpretation simply reveals what the verse itself says. So if the verse says it, then it is Torah law. But derashah, according to Maimonides, is not exposure of some additional thing that the verse says. The verse says only to fear the Holy One, blessed be He, not Torah scholars. Derashah creates an expansion—like branches emerging from roots, as Maimonides describes it in the second principle—and therefore there is something here that is not written in the verse, and therefore it is rabbinic law. But on the other hand, it is not legislation. It is basically an intermediate case between legislation and interpretation. Why? Because legislation has no connection at all to a verse. Legislation is whatever the Sages decided was right, so they establish a new law. Interpretation is that the Sages expose something that is in the verse; they show me what is written in the verse. Derashah is something in the middle. The Sages are basically telling me: we are extending the idea in the verse to something beyond what is written in the verse. So their fundamental motivation is not because they think one ought to fear Torah scholars. They may not have thought that at all. They may have thought there was no logic at all in fearing Torah scholars; maybe that’s even idolatry—one should fear the Holy One, blessed be He; where did fearing human beings come from? But what can you do? There’s the word “et” in the verse, and the word “et” obligates me to include something. So now the Sages ask themselves: what should be included? Fine—if we’re already including, then let’s include Torah scholars. So that means that the whole mechanism by which the Sages are operating here is very similar to interpretation and not to legislation. Because basically, if there were a Sage who came and said, there’s no logic at all to include reverence for Torah scholars—that’s idolatry—then if it depended only on him, he would never legislate a rabbinic law saying one must fear Torah scholars. Rather, what happened? In the verse itself, “You shall fear the Lord your God,” there is the word “et,” and the word “et” comes to include. Now I have to include—there’s the word “et”; what am I supposed to do? So I ask myself, okay, what should be included? Fine, the least illogical thing is Torah scholars, so I’ll add that; I’ll extend it to Torah scholars. But again, this is not because I think one ought to fear Torah scholars—I don’t think that at all—but because I’m coerced by the verse. The verse tells me: expand. This is the least illogical expansion. So you can see that there is something here between legislation and interpretation. Of course, once there is the word “et,” which comes to include, then the Sages use their reasoning and say what makes the most sense to include. So yes, the Sages’ reasoning does enter here. But the reasoning enters in order to determine what to include. It’s not reasoning that would by itself have been enough to establish this law. Because if it were, then one could simply establish that there is an obligation of reverence for Torah scholars as a rabbinic law—because the Sages decided it is proper to fear Torah scholars. So then they would establish it as a rabbinic law. There would be no need to hang it on a verse or make a derashah from “et” or anything like that. It seems very much that the Sages, on their own, would not have legislated such a law. Their reasoning says: what do you mean? There is no need to fear Torah scholars. But the verse compels them, because there is the word “et”—you must include something. You can even see this in the Talmud, in tractate Pesachim 22. The Talmud there says that Shimon HaAmsuni, or Nehemiah HaAmsuni, used to expound every “et” in the Torah, until he reached “You shall fear the Lord your God” and fell silent. He couldn’t find what to include. Meaning, every time he saw the word “et” in the Torah he would include something. Now he reached this verse and couldn’t find what to include. So he said, fine, he withdrew; he does not expound “et.” His students asked him: and what about all the other “ets” that you expounded until now? So he said: just as I receive reward for the exposition, so I receive reward for the withdrawal. He says: all the inclusions I made from the word “et” up to now—throw them in the trash. Because this verse shows me that apparently there is nothing to include from the word “et.” Why indeed? What is special about this verse that made it so hard for him to include anything? After all, Rabbi Akiva came right afterward and said: “You shall fear the Lord your God” includes Torah scholars. Why didn’t Shimon HaAmsuni think of that inclusion? What’s the problem? There’s the word “et”—include Torah scholars. For Shimon HaAmsuni it was clear, based on reasoning, that it is impossible to fear anyone other than the Holy One, blessed be He. What do you mean, fear human beings? That’s idolatry. Therefore he said: by definition, it is impossible to include anything from the word “et” in this verse. But if that is so, then it casts a huge question mark on inclusions from the word “et” in general. So apparently the word “et” doesn’t really come to include. Therefore he thought to abandon all the derashot he had already made until now, even in verses where he had found something to include. I’m telling you all this to show that, from Shimon HaAmsuni’s own reasoning, he would never in his life have legislated such a law as reverence for Torah scholars. He was so opposed to it that even when he was stuck with the word “et” and couldn’t find what to include, he refused to include Torah scholars, because it was so obvious to him that it could not be that one should fear Torah scholars. And nevertheless Rabbi Akiva comes and says: “You shall fear the Lord your God” includes Torah scholars. Why? Did Rabbi Akiva not understand the difficulty Shimon HaAmsuni had? He probably did understand that there is something very problematic about fearing someone besides the Holy One, blessed be He. He says: yes, but the word “et” comes to include—what can I do? I am compelled to include something because there is the word “et” in this verse. So this shows you that the mechanism of derashah is a mechanism that operates not because the Sages have a logical intuition. On the contrary, many times it operates despite the fact that the Sages do not have such a logical intuition. The Sages’ reasoning enters at the point where I have to decide what to include. I could have included—I don’t know—microphones. Included fans. Telephones. I don’t know. No, they say: include Torah scholars. Why? Here, yes, there is reasoning. If you’re already including something, then the most sensible thing to include alongside the Holy One, blessed be He, is Torah scholars and not all sorts of nonsense. But it’s not that I have reasoning to say one ought to fear Torah scholars. On the contrary, the reasoning says one should not. And if I’m already coming to include, then I use reasoning to say what is the most sensible, or least absurd, thing to include. So reasoning is involved here, but it is not reasoning in the way it functions in legislation. In legislation, I legislate because my reasoning tells me this is the right thing to do, so I legislate that law. I—that is, the Sanhedrin.

[Speaker C] A side question: how can you even derive from a verse something that’s about reality? The Rabbi explains many times that you can’t derive a command concerning reality, like with belief—you can’t command someone to believe if he doesn’t believe. So with fear too—fearing someone is something in reality: either I fear someone or I don’t fear him. Can you command someone to fear? Fear a bottle? You won’t fear a bottle—that’s reality. What does it mean to command fear?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, if I take a lulav, then if I took a lulav, I took it; if I didn’t, I didn’t—that’s reality. So how can you command taking a lulav?

[Speaker C] No, that’s not similar. Because lulav is taking something in your hand; you don’t need to think about it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here one has to fear. So what?

[Speaker C] No—I can’t fear something if I don’t actually fear it. Fear a cat. I don’t fear a cat—what am I supposed to do?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What are you—those are two completely different questions. You mixed apples and oranges. Meaning, you want to ask a different question, not the question of facts versus norms. What you want to ask is: how can a person act against his nature? How can one command a person commandments concerning

[Speaker C] psychological movements?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s not the question of

[Speaker C] about reality, not facts, yes—like belief, if you add

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] to that, belief.

[Speaker C] It’s like belief, completely.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The question of how one can command belief is not at all this question.

[Speaker C] It’s something completely different. Why? Both are matters of the mind.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—what are you talking about?

[Speaker B] Belief is a factual matter.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Either it’s true or it isn’t true. You can’t command me that something be true. It will be true without your command, and if it isn’t true, then even if you command it, it isn’t true.

[Speaker C] But with fear too—either I fear or I don’t fear.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. With fear, whether you fear or don’t fear, that is the same as whether you take a lulav or don’t take a lulav. It’s exactly the same.

[Speaker C] Why? It has to do with the mind, no? It has to do with what I think.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It has to do with the mind—so what? What difference is there between the mind and the hands? There are actions you do with the mind and actions you do with the hands. And you are commanded to perform an action; there is no problem at all with such a command.

[Speaker C] But it’s not an action.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The only problem you could raise here is whether it is possible to carry it out.

[Speaker C] Again—it’s the same as belief.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Can a person fear something he doesn’t really fear? And my answer is unequivocally yes. How? What’s the problem? Pay close attention. What is a Torah scholar? Reflect deeply on the meaning of the matter and acquire reverence for a Torah scholar.

[Speaker C] What is there to reflect on? A Torah scholar is someone who knows Torah. What is there to deepen here? I don’t understand.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] When you understand the importance of Torah, and you understand that knowing Torah is not the same thing as knowing auto mechanics—

[Speaker C] Okay, so what? But I still don’t fear. Fear doesn’t belong here. I can’t fear.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What is fear? Fear is not being scared that he’ll hide your… Okay, so what is it? It is awe of exaltedness, right? That is fear—that is, a kind of appreciation. And appreciation can be acquired; obviously it can

[Speaker C] be acquired.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is no problem at all commanding that.

[Speaker C] And that’s not at all the same

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] question as the question of commands regarding facts. It’s not—those are two completely different things. It’s a common question; the medieval authorities (Rishonim) already asked it. How can one command traits, or movements of the soul, love, yes, things—emotions, things of that sort. That is—

[Speaker D] Is that not included in

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] emotions, so to speak?

[Speaker D] Isn’t it included in emotions? Isn’t fear included in emotions?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. It may have an emotional expression, but first and foremost it is cognitive work. First of all to understand, and afterward the emotional expressions. Meaning, if I arrive at the correct recognition of what a Torah scholar is, then naturally a person with a normal makeup will also feel a kind of awe before him. But that is an expression of what you are supposed to do; it is not the thing you are supposed to do. Okay? Fine. In any event, let me get back to our topic. Rabbi, one more question? Is the case of “Honor your father and your mother,” where I think Rashi says that it includes the older brother—is that the same thing?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does Rashi say?

[Speaker D] Is it the same case? Yes. Why not? Okay, so what is the status of that? Meaning, how should one relate to it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maimonides says that a law of that kind is law from the words of the Sages. “You shall fear the Lord your God,” including Torah scholars—that’s the example Maimonides brings in the second principle. And he says that something learned from derashah is law from the words of the Sages. And I said that although Maimonides calls it rabbinic law, in fact it is some kind of intermediate status between ordinary rabbinic law—legislation—and Torah law, which is interpretation. Why? Because it is not legislation in the ordinary sense, but it is also not interpretation in the ordinary sense. It is not legislation because it is not a law that comes from the interpreter’s reasoning—that is, from the reasoning of the legislator, not the interpreter, the Sanhedrin, right? The reasoning of the Sanhedrin says this is how it should be, and that is what they legislate—that is legislation. Here it doesn’t begin with their reasoning; it begins with the verse. But on the other hand, what I derive from the verse is not really something that was latent in it. It is an extension of what is in the verse, and therefore it is also not interpretation. It is something in the middle. In today’s language this is called judicial legislation. It is something between legislation and adjudication. Okay? Legislation is basically…

[Speaker B] So basically what the Rabbi is saying is that only rabbinic enactments—only rabbinic enactments—are considered not Torah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, I’ll still get to that. I haven’t reached that yet; I’m still just in the introductions. But yes, in principle, correct. So even according to Maimonides, where this is rabbinic law, I still think that laws learned through derashot would count as Torah. But I’m getting ahead of myself. So that’s point number one: what is rabbinic and what is Torah law. Now I want one more short introduction, to discuss the question: what is the source of authority for rabbinic laws? The source of authority for rabbinic laws is a very problematic topic. As is well known, Maimonides and Nachmanides disagreed about it. Maimonides bases everything on *lo tasur*. Maimonides says that *lo tasur*—yes, both the positive commandment and the negative commandment of *lo tasur*—both of them are basically the foundation for the authority of the Sages to legislate, interpret, expound—anything. Meaning, the source for all these actions, the authority of all these actions of the Sages, is that verse of *lo tasur*. Maimonides mentions *lo tasur*, but also the positive commandment—the positive and the negative.

[Speaker B] Is that Peninei here? I can’t hear.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, I’ll mute here—maybe there’s some mute issue. Okay. That is Maimonides’ position. Nachmanides disagrees with Maimonides because he says that if the source for rabbinic laws is based on *lo tasur*, if the authority of rabbinic laws is based on *lo tasur*, then rabbinic laws should basically have the status of Torah law. Because when you eat poultry with milk, you have violated the prohibition of *lo tasur*, and therefore in cases of doubt it should have to be treated stringently, and so on; they should have the parameters of Torah law. Therefore Nachmanides disagrees with Maimonides and argues that *lo tasur* is only a source for the authority of the Sages to interpret, but not for the authority of the Sages to legislate. In other words, *lo tasur* is the source for the authority of the Sages to interpret and expound the Torah, because there the product really is Torah law. But the authority of the Sages to legislate cannot be based on *lo tasur*. A big question is what it is based on—I won’t get into that here. I have an interesting approach to it; I even have a column on the site about this with—Dov, here?

[Speaker B] Which column, Rabbi, if I may ask? What? Which column, Rabbi? Which column?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Which number it is, I don’t remember. The column, the column—

[Speaker B] You don’t remember. Can the Rabbi say it briefly?

[Speaker C] Rabbi Shlomo Fisher writes in his responsa that it’s built on the acceptance of the people. Like the Rabbi, I think, also explained—that it’s built on the people’s acceptance. He also explained that with the Sadducees, the reason they weren’t accepted—well, what now?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What, to explain Nachmanides?

[Speaker C] He explains Nachmanides; he explains from what authority, according to Nachmanides, people still do have to listen to the Sages. So he explains that it’s a matter of the acceptance of the people. He also explains that this is the reason the Sadducees weren’t accepted, because people hated them, so nobody accepted them. Basically, what’s the difference between them and the Pharisees? They also had a Sanhedrin.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the derashot, section 15. Yes, so that is basically taken from Rabbi Kook, of course. It’s his way of quoting things in the name of Rabbi Kook—saying things in the name of Rabbi Kook without mentioning the…

[Speaker C] Yes, but the innovation about the Sadducees—that too is from Rabbi Kook?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that I don’t know. But the principle, the principle comes from there. Yes, fine, okay, you can keep splitting hairs about this a lot more, but we won’t get into it now. In any case, the claim… yes. So there’s a dispute between Maimonides and Nachmanides about the question of what the source of the authority of the sages is to legislate. About interpretation they both agree that it comes from “do not turn aside”; about legislation, Maimonides says yes, Nachmanides says no. Now there’s an interesting point here. According to Maimonides, Nachmanides asks Maimonides that on his view, if a person violates a rabbinic prohibition, he has really violated the Torah prohibition of “do not turn aside.” So how can you say that in a rabbinic-level doubt we rule leniently? And if in a rabbinic-level doubt we rule leniently, then apparently you didn’t violate “do not turn aside” if you did, say, eat poultry with milk. So about that—in truth I don’t want to get into this too much here; it’s a topic for a whole separate lecture—but I’ll say only what I need. The claim, practically speaking, is that if a person ate poultry with milk, even Maimonides agrees that he did not violate “do not turn aside.” Maimonides does not claim that everyone who eats poultry with milk violates “do not turn aside.” Maimonides claims that someone who eats poultry with milk because he does not fundamentally recognize the authority of the sages has violated “do not turn aside.” But if someone eats poultry with milk because he has an evil inclination—he knows it’s forbidden to eat poultry with milk, and he recognizes the authority of the sages, and everything is fine, but his inclination overpowered him—not under coercion, because if it’s coercion then he’s coerced, but rather his inclination got the better of him, he didn’t resist, he was weak, and he ate poultry with milk—then he did not violate the Torah prohibition of “do not turn aside.” Even Maimonides would agree with that. And therefore their doubtful cases are ruled leniently, because these are rabbinic laws. When does a person violate the Torah-level “do not turn aside”? When you eat poultry with milk while not accepting upon yourself any obligation at all regarding the prohibition of poultry with milk—you do not recognize the validity of the sages’ determination. The sages’. Then you violate “do not turn aside.” If you just eat poultry with milk, then you ate poultry with milk. You did not violate “do not turn aside.” And therefore Maimonides, for example—Maimonides writes: why don’t you receive lashes for this prohibition of “do not turn aside”? That’s Nachmanides’ proof, I think. Nachmanides says: how do I know that Maimonides sees every rabbinic violation as a Torah violation? Because Maimonides says: why don’t you get lashes for the prohibition of “do not turn aside”? Because it is a prohibition connected to a warning for execution by the religious court. There’s a rule that if there is a prohibition that can lead to capital liability, then even when I don’t reach capital liability there still won’t be lashes. That’s called a prohibition connected to a warning for execution by the religious court. Now with “do not turn aside,” if there is a rebellious elder, he is liable to death by force of the prohibition of “do not turn aside.” If he is a rebellious elder, he is liable to death. So an ordinary person, someone who is not a rebellious elder, is liable under “do not turn aside.” But if he violated “do not turn aside,” he does not get lashes, since with that same prohibition itself one can also arrive at liability for death in the case of a rebellious elder. Therefore there are no lashes—that’s what Maimonides says. So you see that Maimonides understands that even an ordinary person who violates a rabbinic prohibition violates the prohibition of “do not turn aside.” In principle he ought to get lashes, were it not for the rule that this is a prohibition connected to a warning for execution by the religious court, and therefore there are no lashes, and you need explanations why there are no lashes. So you see there is a Torah prohibition here. And I want to argue no, that’s not precise. Because when is a rebellious elder liable? He is liable when he does not accept the ruling of the sages—the ruling of the Sanhedrin, sorry, not of the sages. The ruling… he does not fundamentally accept the authority of the Sanhedrin. After all, the whole idea of a rebellious elder is that he rebels. He does not accept the authority of the Sanhedrin. For that he is liable to death. Not for the fact that he acts differently from what the Sanhedrin did. Therefore, on the contrary, to act differently from what the Sanhedrin did—it could be that he is even obligated to do so, so that he not make a mistake in the commandment to heed the words of the sages. Once he starts issuing rulings and he does not accept the authority of the sages, then he is a rebellious elder. So I’m saying: then with an ordinary person it’s the same thing. If the ordinary person does not fundamentally accept the authority of the sages, then he violates the Torah prohibition of “do not turn aside.” He won’t get lashes because it is connected to a warning for execution by the religious court, but he does violate the Torah prohibition of “do not turn aside.” But that is only if he fundamentally does not accept the authority of the sages, exactly like the rebellious elder. But if he just eats poultry with milk because his inclination overpowered him, then he violated a rabbinic prohibition; here he did not violate a Torah prohibition. Even according to Maimonides, not everyone who violates a rabbinic prohibition violates a Torah prohibition. So that basically means—what does that basically mean? It basically means…

[Speaker B] Hello Rabbi, is it like that also according to Nachmanides? Is it like that also in…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand.

[Speaker B] According to Nachmanides, regarding the interpretations, regarding… is it like that also according to Nachmanides regarding the extension of the verse? Is what the Rabbi is saying also…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand the question.

[Speaker B] In… yes, according to Nachmanides regarding “do not turn aside,” meaning the interpretation of the verse.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, what’s the question?

[Speaker B] So is it there too that someone who didn’t do as the sages’ interpretation says, because he fundamentally doesn’t accept it—only then does he violate “do not turn aside”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think there, no. Why not? Because once the sages revealed that this is the content of the verse, then that is the content of the verse, and he violated a Torah law. The problem here is not only obedience to the sages. In other words, with a rabbinic prohibition—and we’ll get to this later on—what’s really happening here is that with a rabbinic prohibition, when you violate “do not turn aside” in the case of a rabbinic prohibition, the whole problem is that you are rebelling against the sages. That’s the whole problem. There is no problem in eating poultry with milk in and of itself. The problem is that you are supposed to obey the sages and you didn’t obey. Okay? But eating poultry with milk in itself is not a problematic thing. So this is a very important point that I’ll get to in a moment. Just an aside: the Minchat Chinukh makes some totally far-fetched claim. He claims that if, for example, you need to feed a sick person something forbidden on the Sabbath—yes, danger to life—not on the Sabbath, I mean you need to feed him forbidden food, okay? Now the question is: which prohibition is preferable to feed him? A prohibition stated explicitly in the Torah, or a prohibition derived from an interpretation? I’m not talking about Maimonides’ view. According to the regular medieval authorities, the majority of medieval authorities (Rishonim), a prohibition derived from an interpretation is also Torah-level. So which is preferable to feed him? He claims that it is preferable to give him a prohibition that is stated explicitly in the Torah. Why? Because if you give him a prohibition that comes from an interpretation, then he violates two prohibitions: both the prohibition of the thing itself, and he also violates “do not turn aside.” That is more severe than a prohibition explicitly written in the Torah, where he violates the prohibition written in the Torah, which is just one prohibition. But of course that doesn’t even get off the ground. “Do not turn aside” in the context of interpretation is not a prohibition that one violates at all in the context of… “do not turn aside” simply reveals that what the sages interpret in the verse, that for us is the content of the verse. Now the prohibition is because it is written in the verse, not because the sages said so. “Do not turn aside” only reveals that what is written in the verse is what the sages said. From that point on, the prohibition that you violate is the prohibition of what is written in the verse. No, it’s unrelated to… you are not violating “do not turn aside.” You can only violate “do not turn aside” in the context of a rabbinic law. That answers the question we asked earlier. You can only violate “do not turn aside” where you violate a rabbinic law. Since in a rabbinic law there cannot be a Torah prohibition other than “do not turn aside.” There is a rabbinic prohibition, but not a Torah prohibition. And the prohibition of “do not turn aside” really is the prohibition against not obeying the sages. But with the authority of the sages to interpret, when you do not obey what they interpreted, you are not in awe of Torah scholars. So you violated the prohibition regarding awe of Torah scholars; you nullified the positive commandment of awe of Torah scholars; you did not violate “do not turn aside.” “Do not turn aside” only reveals that if the sages said that within this verse there is also a prohibition, an obligation, to be in awe of Torah scholars, then that is what there is in this verse. And now from that point on, that is what the verse says. If you violated it, then you violated the positive commandment of awe of Torah scholars.

[Speaker C] So why didn’t he… why didn’t he violate… I didn’t understand. It’s true that this is an interpretation of what’s written, but still it’s “do not turn aside”; the transgression is still there.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there is no “do not turn aside.” “Do not turn aside” in the context of legislation—of interpretation, it is only disclosure.

[Speaker C] Why say it’s only disclosure? Why isn’t it an additional prohibition?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the straightforward reasoning. The straightforward reasoning says that something derived by interpretation is no more severe than something written explicitly.

[Speaker C] The opposite—here there’s… it’s not that it’s more severe, it’s just two.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly—then it’s more severe.

[Speaker C] No, what does “more severe” mean? If you separate it out as its own thing then it’s just… by itself it’s not worth more, it’s simply that there are two, and two is worth more than one.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but de facto you are saying that it is more severe to violate this prohibition than to violate a prohibition explicitly written in the Torah. That’s unreasonable, and it’s not logically necessary either, so why say it? What I’m saying is something very sensible even without that difficulty. It’s very sensible. Obviously, once the sages hang it on a verse, then from our standpoint that is what is written in the verse. So now when you violate that prohibition, you are violating a prohibition written in the verse. Therefore what was asked here earlier—I think Dov asked, right? What they asked earlier here: so even in the sages’ interpretation, do I violate “do not turn aside” only when I am rebelling against their very authority? But if I simply violate the prohibition, then not? No. There, if I simply violate the prohibition, I have violated the Torah prohibition of awe of Torah scholars. Since the whole idea, the entire prohibition there, is the prohibition written in the Torah; it is not “do not turn aside.” “Do not turn aside” only reveals that there is such a prohibition in the Torah.

[Speaker D] Rabbi, but I didn’t understand what the difference is, say in the Rabbi’s example of poultry with milk. Why can’t you say that that too is an interpretation of the verse? Because not. Why not? I mean, why is that less an interpretation of the verse than being in awe of Torah scholars, which isn’t written there at all?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because that too isn’t written there at all. I didn’t understand. The sages themselves say they are not interpreting the verse. It’s a rabbinic law. In what?

[Speaker D] In poultry with milk? Yes. And with awe of the sages they say that it is an interpretation of the verse?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Everyone agrees that it’s rabbinic. It has nothing to do with Maimonides, what I said earlier. Poultry with milk is a rabbinic law; everyone agrees.

[Speaker D] Why… I didn’t understand, what’s the difference between that and awe of the sages?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because poultry with milk is not written in the verse.

[Speaker D] But neither is awe of the sages written in the verse.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes it is. It is included by the word

[Speaker D] “et.” That’s kind of… yes, okay… it looks like some trick, like they’re trying to find…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Absolutely not a trick. It is included by the word “et.” It’s not written in the verse, but it is included from the verse. And if you interpret the verse not by a formal interpretation, then interpretation explains what is written in the verse, but with a formal derivation too it’s like that. But with a rabbinic law, they do not connect it to anything in the verse; it’s not an inclusion and nothing of the sort. They simply say it is forbidden to eat poultry with milk because otherwise you may come to eat meat with milk. They are not claiming to derive it from the verse. They are establishing a new law here, unrelated to the verse. Why did they establish it? So that you won’t come to eat meat with milk. But it’s not… they are not claiming that it is written in the verse or that it is an extension of the verse.

[Speaker D] So okay, then you’re saying that the difference is basically in the nature of the transgression itself, as it were. Meaning, once I don’t… if I don’t have awe of the sages, am I violating a Torah prohibition? Is that on the same level as awe of God?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not a prohibition but nullification of a positive commandment, yes. “The Lord your God shall you fear” is a positive commandment. So the “et” comes to include—it too is a positive commandment.

[Speaker D] A positive commandment, not a prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wow, Rabbi, so according to…

[Speaker B] What the Rabbi is saying, according to Nachmanides it’s impossible to violate “do not turn aside.” I didn’t understand. According to what the Rabbi is saying, then according to Nachmanides you can’t really violate “do not turn aside.” “Do not turn aside” itself? “Do not turn aside” is only disclosure, and it can’t be violated.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A rebellious elder? What do you mean? A rebellious elder violates “do not turn aside.” He is liable to death for it.

[Speaker B] Yes, just, only someone who is a rebellious elder, but someone who errs unintentionally…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. Nachmanides writes that “do not turn aside”—what the Talmud says in tractate Sabbath, “and where did He command us?” yes, regarding the Hanukkah candle—how can you recite the blessing “Who sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us,” where did He command us? The Talmud says: in “do not turn aside.” Nachmanides says: that is just a scriptural support. Okay, so let’s get back to our point. So basically, what I wanted to show you with this introduction is that there is a special character to this command of “do not turn aside.” This command of “do not turn aside,” basically all it instructs me is to obey the sages, or not to rebel against the command of the sages. It does not turn poultry with milk itself into something inherently problematic. There is no object-based prohibition here, let’s call it that in the yeshiva-style language. Eating poultry with milk is not a problematic act. The problematic part is that if I eat poultry with milk, I did not obey the sages’ command. And the problem is the disobedience, not the eating of the poultry with milk. Okay? That is essentially what emerges from here. All right? Now let’s see where this takes us. Maybe one more… you know what, fine, let’s see where this leads us. In the Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 232, the Shulchan Arukh writes—I’ll share it for a moment—“But one who sells his fellow something whose prohibition of eating is by rabbinic enactment: if the fruits still exist, he returns the fruits and takes back his money, and if he ate them, then he ate them, and the seller returns nothing to him.” All right? I sold you fruit that had a rabbinic prohibition. You ate it. Now you come to me and say, look, you sold me forbidden fruit, give me back my money. I say, what do you want? You ate the fruit; you got the value for the money you gave me; I am not obligated to return your money. That’s what is written in the Shulchan Arukh; that’s how it rules. In Torah prohibitions I have to return his money even if he ate it. All right? In rabbinic prohibitions, if the fruit still exists—if he hasn’t eaten it yet—the sale is void. But if he ate it, then he ate it, that’s it. The Netivot says as follows: “And the seller returns nothing to him”—the Shakh in Yoreh De’ah ruled that even the amount in excess of its value need not be returned. And at first glance that is not understood, since because the sale is void, it is like one who damages or like one who eats not through a valid sale; and why should he have to pay more than its value, for example the excess of permitted over forbidden? The permitted item is worth more. So he says even that does not need to be returned. “And it is possible that even in Torah prohibitions, although one who eats unintentionally needs atonement and repentance to protect him from suffering, nevertheless in a rabbinic prohibition no atonement at all is needed, and it is as though he did not transgress at all.” The Netivot says as follows: in Torah prohibitions, if you ate—even if you didn’t know—you committed a prohibition. You committed an unintentional prohibition. But in rabbinic prohibitions, if you ate those fruits and did not know they were forbidden, you ate them unintentionally, you violated no prohibition at all. It is as if I sold you fully permitted fruits. Even though, again, if the fruits still exist you can return them to me because you don’t want to eat them since they’re forbidden—but once you ate them unintentionally, there is no problem at all. Why? Because nothing happened; it is like eating permitted fruit. Why is that? Because with rabbinic prohibitions, if you violate a rabbinic prohibition unintentionally, there is no such thing. Torah prohibitions can be violated intentionally, they can be violated unintentionally. Unintentionally is a lighter violation; one is not punished, but still I did violate the prohibition, only unintentionally. In rabbinic prohibitions, when you violate unintentionally there is no prohibition at all—not that you are not punished; you did not violate any prohibition. And he has proof from the passage in tractate Eruvin. “Know that we say in Eruvin 67: with rabbinic matters we let the act be done and only afterward ask the question.” So someone who sees his teacher committing a transgression—what is he supposed to do? The Talmud says with a Torah prohibition, stop him politely and say to him, “Didn’t you teach us, Rabbi, that it is forbidden to do such-and-such?” Maybe he forgot or didn’t notice, so it’s worth preventing him from committing a prohibition. So you politely stop him before he does it, and you ask him politely: tell me, is this permitted? Did I miss something? But with rabbinic prohibitions, “we let the act be done and only afterward ask the question.” Let him eat, and afterward ask him why he ate, just in order to know. But—but let him eat; you don’t need to stop him. Now the Netivot says: “And if he would be punished”—this is the Talmud—“if he would be punished for the unintentional act, how could they let him transgress and receive punishment?” Punished, of course, means in the heavenly court; there is no punishment in a religious court for a rabbinic prohibition. But even in heaven he is not punished. In other words, there is no prohibition here at all when it is unintentional. Because if there were a prohibition here, then even with rabbinic matters I would expect the student to politely stop his teacher and ask him, tell me, did I miss something? Isn’t this forbidden? Why with rabbinic matters are you so indifferent that you let him do the act and only afterward ask? Rather, it is certain that he is not punished at all for an unintentional act regarding a rabbinic prohibition, and for the eater it is as though he ate something kosher. And since he enjoyed it just as from kosher food, therefore he must pay the full value of his benefit, as in the rule “this one benefited and that one lost a little,” where the rule is that he must pay according to the benefit he received. Not so with a Torah prohibition, where he receives punishment for the unintentional act, and his loss is greater than his benefit. So the Netivot is basically telling us—the Netivot is basically telling us—that with rabbinic prohibitions, if I violate them unintentionally, I did not commit a transgression. No need for atonement, no punishment, nothing, everything is fine. Nothing happened. What is the idea behind this? The explanation of this is probably a simple explanation: with rabbinic prohibitions, as we discussed earlier, all that obligates me is to obey the sages. The act itself is not a problematic act. If he ate poultry with milk, and his teacher is about to eat poultry with milk unintentionally—let him eat, good health to him. “Let the humble eat and be satisfied.” Meaning, when you eat a rabbinic prohibition unintentionally, nothing happened. Why? Because the whole prohibition here is a prohibition against not obeying the sages. But if you didn’t know that this was something the sages forbade, then there was no act of disobedience here. And as for the eating itself, eating itself is not, in and of itself, a problematic act. So therefore there is nothing here. There is no disobedience here, there is no problematic act here, there is no problem of obedience here, he…

[Speaker C] He didn’t violate anything, it’s permitted to him. If he does it for pleasure, then he didn’t violate anything? Unintentionally. No—if he did it intentionally, to enjoy it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, intentionally is something else.

[Speaker C] Why not? According to the Rabbi’s approach about the object itself.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, there is no problem in the object itself, but he did not obey the sages—what do you mean?

[Speaker C] No, but if he says, I obey the sages, only intentionally he wants to eat it because it tastes good to him, milk and meat.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand. What do you mean, he also obeys? To obey the sages means to listen to them not to do it.

[Speaker C] Why? According to the Rabbi, obeying the sages means he agrees with the theory itself—no? Only on the Torah level.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said: if I eat poultry with milk because of an evil inclination, not because I fundamentally do not recognize the authority of the sages, it is not permitted—that is a rabbinic prohibition. It’s just that there is no Torah prohibition of “do not turn aside” here. The Torah prohibition of “do not turn aside” is only a prohibition about obedience. That does not mean it is permitted to eat poultry with milk.

[Speaker C] And unintentionally there’s no rabbinic prohibition either. Right. Why is there no rabbinic prohibition unintentionally—why is there no rabbinic prohibition? There’s nothing at all; basically the whole problem

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] is the problem of obedience; the act itself is not problematic. Again, if the whole problem is a problem of obedience—which I don’t understand—then…

[Speaker C] the moment he does it because he wants to eat it, he enjoys the pleasure of eating.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is called rabbinic disobedience. After all, you are not obeying. So what if it is because of your inclination? But you are not obeying.

[Speaker C] But what does “obey” mean?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obey means that I am obligated at all times to do

[Speaker C] it in practice, or is it just the fact itself? You need to obey them—what do you mean? That’s just plain Hebrew. No, maybe the meaning is that you agree with the very concept that there is such a thing as “do not turn aside.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The concept itself—but in practice I can do whatever I want?

[Speaker C] Not whatever I want—right now I crave it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Whenever I eat, I crave eating it.

[Speaker C] No, the question is whether I also crave it, or whether I can’t.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] When I don’t crave it, then anyway… no, no, when I crave it, I…

[Speaker C] am not doing it in order to anger the sages, to mock this prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll explain again. So basically what you’re saying is that rabbinic prohibitions have no meaning.

[Speaker C] I’m asking, not saying.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s what you’re asking. You’re saying there is no meaning at all, there are no rabbinic prohibitions in the world. Because if I intend not to obey the sages, then I violated the Torah law; and if I don’t intend not to obey the sages… maybe the prohibition? But maybe the rabbinic prohibition in the universe?

[Speaker C] Would the rabbinic prohibition be only if I deny the very authority of the sages?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that is a Torah prohibition. If you do not recognize their authority, you violated “do not turn aside.” That’s exactly the distinction I made earlier.

[Speaker C] So if

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] you do recognize their authority, but you do not obey because you have an evil inclination, then you did not violate the Torah-level “do not turn aside,” but you still did not obey; there is a rabbinic transgression here.

[Speaker C] And why would I be exempt when it’s unintentional?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Unintentional in this case? It is not true that you disobeyed; you didn’t know they prohibited it.

[Speaker C] The non-obedience here is by rabbinic law, not Torah law—that’s what the Rabbi meant. Certainly, certainly. And where do we know that from? This non-obedience… what gives it force?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What gives what force?

[Speaker C] This rabbinic prohibition, if not from “do not turn aside”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the whole point. Look at the column I wrote; I’m not…

[Speaker B] It’s

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] a huge logical move, and I don’t want to get into it

[Speaker B] here.

[Speaker C] By the way, Rabbi, there’s also Noam Steffenshtetter in his book Noam Piryo, he brings Rabbi Yosef Engel on conspiring witnesses, where he discusses there the conceptual inquiry the Rabbi is talking about now—I just remembered it now—whether there is really such a thing that the object itself falls under “do not turn aside,” or whether they completely change the object itself and cause it now to be something new or not. They discuss it regarding conspiring witnesses. Whether conspiring witnesses, say at the beginning of tractate Makkot there, whether it turns the person into… he says there at the beginning, at the start of the tractate, in the first mishnah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The son of a divorcee and the son of a chalutzah?

[Speaker C] Yes. So they discuss there whether it turns him into a son of a divorcee and a son of a chalutzah, something like that—really the exact same conceptual inquiry. There he tends to say the opposite of the Rabbi, that they really change reality, as it were. And why?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does that have to do with the sages? That’s Torah law with conspiring witnesses.

[Speaker C] I don’t remember exactly; he talks there about conspiring witnesses. I don’t remember the situation exactly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The son of a divorcee and the son of a chalutzah is a Torah law of disqualification by refutation, not a rabbinic one.

[Speaker C] I don’t remember exactly what he was talking about there, something there, I don’t remember exactly, but somehow he arrived at this conceptual inquiry, the one the Rabbi is talking about.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Could be, I don’t know. I’ll send it to the Rabbi.

[Speaker D] Rabbi, may I ask? Yes. If I understand the Rabbi correctly, what is the meaning of “unintentional” here? Meaning, if today I violate a rabbinic transgression because I don’t know it, I never learned it, did I do nothing?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but if you did it because you didn’t know it, there may be negligence here.

[Speaker D] It’s hard to know all the sages’ prohibitions.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, so if it was hard and you learned, then it was hard. But I’m saying again—

[Speaker D] my question is what the meaning of this “unintentional” is. Is not having learned something called unintentional?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what I’m saying, and my answer is no. If there is negligence in it, it’s not called unintentional.

[Speaker D] So what is unintentional then?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A mistake that you don’t know. You were mistaken.

[Speaker D] What does that mean, “you don’t know”? Why didn’t I know? Because I didn’t learn. What, not on purpose? I did something not on purpose?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes—you didn’t know the facts, that it was poultry with milk; you thought it was soy. Rabbi, I didn’t understand

[Speaker B] why the Rabbi says that. Why not just say that it’s obedience—you disobeyed unintentionally. I don’t understand. The sages prohibited… that’s what the Netivot claims.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Netivot claims that unintentional disobedience is not disobedience. In ordinary transgressions, when you do them unintentionally, then you did the transgression, only unintentionally, so you deserve less punishment. But when the whole transgression is disobedience, then the unintentional element here is essential. Meaning, if you did it unintentionally then there is no transgression here at all, not just that you don’t deserve punishment. Because disobedience—or call it rebellion, not disobedience—rebellion against the sages is when you know that they say such-and-such and you do not listen to them, you turn away from their words. But if you do not know what they said, then there is no rebellion against what they said. Factually, you did something they said not to do, that’s clear, factually. But the psychological dimension of rebellion does not exist here. Okay?

[Speaker B] Rabbi, regarding that law we saw in the Shulchan Arukh

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] regarding the fruits there.

[Speaker B] What? I can’t hear. Regarding that law we saw in the Shulchan Arukh concerning the fruits there, I actually saw an explanation of it from the Rogatchover, who says that basically with Torah law it changes the law in the fruits themselves, in the object-status of the fruits, and here it’s only on the person, and therefore it’s not…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, that’s the accepted explanation. But in the Netivot it says more than that—not only that it’s on the person, but that it’s a special kind of person-based law. An oath is also a person-based law. But here it’s not just a person-based law; it’s a law of obedience. Not every person-based law, if violated unintentionally, ceases to be a prohibition. A person-based law violated unintentionally will still be a prohibition to the same extent. An oath prohibition violated unintentionally is still a prohibition. Here the Netivot is saying more than that, more than that it’s a person-based law. Many say rabbinic laws are person-based laws, that too. But the Netivot claims that this is a special kind of person-based law: it is a duty of obedience, or if you like, a prohibition of rebellion. All right? So what does this thing actually mean? This thing basically means that when I eat poultry with milk, there is really nothing problematic here at all. Except what? Except that the sages decided to forbid it for good reasons, whatever—they decided to forbid it because I might then come to eat meat with milk. But if I ate poultry with milk and did not come to eat meat with milk, then nothing truly problematic happened here. Except what? I did not obey the sages. And I need to obey the sages. So if I did it unintentionally, then nothing happened. This teaches us something about rabbinic prohibitions in general, even intentionally. When I intentionally violate rabbinic prohibitions, basically the claim against me is not about eating poultry with milk; rather, it is about rebellion against the sages’ command. Because eating poultry with milk in itself is not problematic—certainly not if afterward I did not come to eat meat with milk, which was the reason they forbade poultry with milk. So there is—nothing happened. I did not come to eat meat with milk. Did anything happen from the fact that I ate poultry with milk? Nothing. But I did not obey the sages. And because I did not obey the sages, I violated a prohibition. So the prohibition is a prohibition of obedience. But the thing itself has nothing problematic in it. You can already see where this is going. This is leading to the point that rabbinic law is exactly like state law. Just as in state law there is nothing essential in the state’s determination of the laws of bailees. Fine, the state decided this way, all well and good, it obligates me, but there is no point in delving into it because there is no essence behind it. It is not something with spiritual meaning. You need to do it because that is what Jewish law says. But analyzing the thing itself has no significance. I claim that rabbinic law is exactly the same. Because with poultry and milk there isn’t some idea behind it such that when I learn the topic of poultry with milk I understand some Torah idea. There’s nothing. There is no Torah idea there. Nothing at all. I just need to obey because the sages said so, just as I need to obey state law. So I have to clarify what counts as poultry with milk and all those things, of course, in order to know what the sages forbade. But in the final analysis, that clarification is a clarification of facts—what did the sages forbid—just like the clarification of facts of what the law forbids. But from the standpoint of Torah there is no value here. I did not examine or refine some spiritual issue and arrive at some insight, some will of the Holy One, blessed be He, became clear to me, some spiritual structure represented in Jewish law became clear to me—none of that, nothing at all. To sharpen this more, I’ll add one more introduction. In the ninth root of Maimonides, Maimonides writes there—the roots are the rules for counting the commandments—and in the ninth root Maimonides writes that if the Torah repeats itself several times, in the count of the commandments we count it only once. For example, when the Torah says twelve times that there is a commandment to observe the Sabbath, in the count of the commandments only one commandment is included, even though the Torah commanded it twelve times. That sounds reasonable to us, right? The Torah repeats it twelve times, fine, but in terms of content there is only one commandment here: to observe the Sabbath. Therefore only one commandment enters the count of the commandments. And the Torah repeats many commandments and prohibitions, and each repetition—whether it is to strengthen the matter, that is a dispute between Maimonides and Nachmanides—but Maimonides says the Torah repeats in order to strengthen the matter. But that adds nothing for me, therefore in the count of the commandments only one commandment is counted.

[Speaker E] When they are phrased in the same wording, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The same wording. No, it can also be with variations.

[Speaker E] A positive commandment and a prohibition, no?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] When there is a positive commandment and a prohibition, that’s the sixth root. When there is duplication in a positive commandment and a prohibition, then both are counted. I’m talking about the ninth root, when both are positive commandments or both are prohibitions. For example with the Sabbath, there is both a prohibition and a positive commandment of resting on the Sabbath, but there is only one positive commandment even though the Torah commands that positive commandment twelve times. So that’s the first part of the ninth root. In the second part of the ninth root, Maimonides says something that appears to be the opposite. There he speaks about a general prohibition, and he says what is a general prohibition? For example, “Do not eat over the blood.” Regarding “Do not eat over the blood,” the sages understand that there is here a warning against several actions that are forbidden to do. A religious court that decrees a death sentence is forbidden to eat on that day; Maimonides also brings the prohibition of eating before prayer, implying that it is Torah-level from “Do not eat over the blood”; a warning to the stubborn and rebellious son; and so on—there are five or six things learned from “Do not eat over the blood.” Maimonides says: in a general prohibition we count in the number of commandments only one prohibition, not five or six, because there is only one verse. Rabbi Yerucham Fishel Perlow asks—yes, in his introduction to Saadia Gaon’s Sefer HaMitzvot, where he goes through Maimonides’ roots—in the section on the ninth root he asks that Maimonides contradicts himself. In the first part of the ninth root, Maimonides says that what determines things is the content, not the commands. If there is one content with twelve commands, we count one commandment in the number of commandments, so what determines things is the content and not the commands. In the second part of the ninth root Maimonides says the opposite. What determines things is the commands and not the content, because when there is one command with five contents, even though there are five contents we count one commandment. Why? Because there is only one command. So he goes by the number of commands and not by the number of contents. So there is a contradiction between the first part of the ninth root and the second part. What is the answer? He leaves it unresolved. No—the question obviously doesn’t even begin. Because…

[Speaker F] It’s from the same prohibition, from one and the same source only.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, one source?

[Speaker F] A general prohibition has only

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] one source

[Speaker F] from which all the contents branch out.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But there are five contents, and if you go by the contents, what difference does it make to me that there is one source?

[Speaker F] No, what he means when he says we go by the contents is when each of them has a separate source.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So then if we go by the contents, in the commandment to observe the Sabbath we should also count twelve commandments because there are twelve commands?

[Speaker F] No, when the commands repeat themselves, then you count only one. Why?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What I understand is that Maimonides says—but there is a contradiction between the two things.

[Speaker F] No, because when the contents derive from a different source each and every one, then fine, that’s explicit. When I need to expound this interpretation and derive from one source several different contents, then everything I gathered is not the second root.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The ninth root—it’s a different root. These are all straightforward interpretations; none of them is a formal derivation.

[Speaker E] In short, you need both.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There can be many contents without commands. It’s not difficult, because Maimonides says that in order for a commandment to be counted, it needs both a content and a command. We always—and this is a great lesson in conceptual analysis—there’s some tendency in conceptual analysis toward dichotomous thinking. The question is whether we go by the commands or by the contents. Maybe we go by both? Yes—regarding damage caused by property, is what obligates you the negligence in guarding it, or what obligates you the fact that your property caused damage? Maybe what obligates you is both? There is some kind of pathological way of thinking in the yeshivot that always pushes us to a dichotomy: either this possibility or that possibility. But there are additional possibilities; it could be that you simply need both. And here in this context I think that’s the straightforward interpretation of Maimonides. Maimonides says that in order for a commandment to be counted, it must have a separate command and it must have a unique content. If one of the two is missing, it cannot be counted. So in the first part of the root we are talking about twelve times the command to observe the Sabbath. So I have twelve commands, excellent, but I have only one content. So I cannot count twelve commandments, because to count twelve commandments I need twelve commands and twelve different contents. In the second part of the root, Maimonides says: I have five different contents, but there is only one command. And since in order to count five commandments I need each of them to have both a command and a content, I count only one commandment. Meaning that in order to count, you need both the command and the content. What does this thing actually mean—what is hidden behind it? Why do you need both a command and a content? That’s what Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman writes in his essay on repentance. He writes there—he asks—the Ramchal writes that repentance is something we received beyond the letter of the law. Really they should not have forgiven us for sins, even if we repented. You can’t change history; what was done was done. But beyond the letter of the law, the Holy One, blessed be He, forgives us if we repent. Then he asks: it says in the Talmud in Kiddushin that a perfectly righteous person who rebelled lost his merits. The Talmud asks: but let him be half-and-half. What he did in merit should remain to his credit; from now on, when he commits sins, they should be recorded against him. Why did he lose the merits that he already performed? What, does he erase history? So the Talmud says: because he regretted the earlier deeds. Meaning, he didn’t just leave religion from this point on. Rather, he actually regretted what he had done in the past too. He regretted the earlier deeds. So he lost also what he had done in the past. Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman asks: if truly erasing history—if I regret the history, the history is erased—that is only beyond the letter of the law, but fundamentally what was done was done. It doesn’t matter if I now regret what I did. So beyond the letter of the law, the Holy One, blessed be He, acts beneficently. And if someone regrets his wicked deeds, then the Holy One, blessed be He, erases those wicked deeds for him beyond the letter of the law. Fine? But to erase merits for me because I regretted those merits—then beyond the letter of the law He is acting against me. We know that the Holy One, blessed be He, inclines toward kindness; acting beyond the letter of the law goes in the direction of kindness. He does not act beyond the letter of the law to do harm or to punish. Therefore he says: apparently from the Talmud in Kiddushin it emerges against the Ramchal, that when someone regrets something he did, fundamentally that erases it, not beyond the letter of the law. And the proof is that it works also on the side of harm, and in any event repentance too is by law and not beyond the letter of the law. I have a different answer to that, but Rabbi Elchanan…

[Speaker C] So the Rabbi’s view is simply that he disagrees?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Disagrees about what? The Ramchal with the Talmud? The Ramchal disagrees with the Talmud?

[Speaker C] No, on matters that belong to worldview issues.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t think the Ramchal subscribed to that approach.

[Speaker C] Maybe he didn’t know? Yes, in Metask.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, he merited kindness.

[Speaker G] You have a series of four chapters on repentance; I think you explained it there.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but there I took it in the direction of how I resolve the difficulty. Now I specifically want to go with Rabbi Elchanan. So Rabbi Elchanan says that in order to resolve this, he says—and he also brings the Ramchal in Derekh Hashem—that the Ramchal says there that every commandment has two aspects: there is the aspect of obeying the Holy One, blessed be He, or not obeying Him—rebellion or obedience—and there is the essential aspect of why we were commanded, because it apparently repairs something if we do it, or damages something if we do it. So with every commandment that I fulfilled, I did the repair for which the commandment was intended, and I also obeyed the Holy One, blessed be He. If I committed a transgression, then I both created the damage because of which that act is defined as a transgression, and I also rebelled against the command of the Holy One, blessed be He. That means that in every commandment there are two benefits, or two positive things, that I did when I performed the commandment. And in every transgression there are two negative things that happen when I commit the transgression. One of them is the obedience or rebellion against the command of the Holy One, blessed be He, and the second is the essence—the repair or the damage of the act in itself. So he wants to say that what is erased retroactively is the subjective dimension. When I was wicked and committed transgressions, and now I repent, okay? Then according to strict law, what gets erased is that I was pleased with the wickedness. But the act of wickedness itself, the results of the wicked act, the reality—that is not erased; that is only beyond the letter of the law. And with a righteous person who regrets his earlier deeds, then what is really erased is only the merits I gained from that commandment, or from obeying the command of the Holy One, blessed be He. But the benefits produced by the commandments that I performed remain. You can’t change history. That’s what he wants to argue. But his difficulty is less important; what matters to me is his underlying principle. And his principle says that in every commandment and every transgression there are two aspects. And I think that’s what stands behind what I said earlier about Maimonides. Why, in order to count something as a commandment in the Torah, do you need both a command and an essence or content? The command is so that when I do it, I obey the command, and when I don’t do it, I rebel against the command. And besides that, there also has to be content—meaning there has to be a benefit or a harm in doing it or not doing it. Only then is it a Torah-level commandment. A Torah-level commandment exists only when these two dimensions are really both there. Okay, that is basically Maimonides’ claim, and I think that’s also what stands behind this Ramchal that Rabbi Elchanan brings. And that’s also the reason—yes—Tosafot Rosh and the Ritva write that when the Talmud says, “Greater is one who is commanded and does than one who is not commanded and does,” there are all kinds of little explanations people try to give for why that is so. And they say it’s very simple; you don’t need any clever explanation. Because one who is commanded and does has both things: he both repaired what this act repairs, and he also obeyed the command. So he has two benefits from the commandment he performed. One who is not commanded and does has the benefit that the act brings—he brought that about—but obedience to a command is not present here, because he has no command. Therefore, greater is one who is commanded and does. That’s an implication of the same idea. Now why am I saying this? Because what we saw earlier in Netivot—what is he really saying? That a rabbinic commandment—what is the difference between it and a Torah-level commandment? A rabbinic commandment has only command and no essence. Right? In this language, I can now understand better, or define better, the concept of a rabbinic commandment. A rabbinic commandment is a commandment that has only command and no essence. What does it mean that it has no essence? The action you did does not repair or damage anything. It can lead me to a future repair or future damage. If I eat poultry with milk, maybe I’ll come to eat meat with milk, and then there will be damage. But eating poultry with milk in itself repairs nothing and damages nothing. It has no metaphysical significance whatsoever, let’s put it that way. But there is still the dimension of obedience or rebellion against the command, because the sages said not to eat poultry with milk.

[Speaker C] What I said to the Rabbi earlier in the name of Umans Geshtetner—I looked in HebrewBooks and saw that he brings it regarding the son of a chalutzah, which is rabbinic.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, okay. And the son of a divorced woman? After all, the son of a chalutzah and the son of a divorced woman are the same thing there.

[Speaker C] Even though they’re two cases, okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And the Talmud compares them—the son of a divorced woman or the son of a chalutzah, the Talmud compares them.

[Speaker C] I’m not holding in the passage, but I looked and saw that it’s rabbinic, so that there would be an example that the Rabbi…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, fine, we need to look at it there. In any case, the claim is that in the definition of a rabbinic commandment—and this is really what Netivot also said—the definition of a rabbinic commandment is a commandment whose entire essence is obedience or rebellion toward a command. It does not have the second dimension of repair or damage, the essential dimension. That is a rabbinic commandment. Therefore Maimonides also does not count such a commandment, because it is not a Torah-level commandment. A Torah-level commandment, by definition, has both dimensions: both the command and the spiritual significance of the commandment.

[Speaker E] So what, rabbinic laws are just slippery slopes?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean? I didn’t understand.

[Speaker E] About rabbinic laws—you assume it’s only in the person, and it’s only slippery slopes?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He claims it’s only in the person, but not everything is slippery slopes. For example, Hanukkah and Purim are rabbinic commandments that are not safeguards.

[Speaker E] So they have essence, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They have essence, but on the Torah level they have no essence; otherwise there would be a Torah-level obligation. The essence is not strong enough to count as essence in the sense of the Torah level.

[Speaker E] No, because not everything that has essence was addressed by the Torah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? Because it’s apparently not significant enough; otherwise it would be Torah-level.

[Speaker D] Rabbi, but obedience to the sages in itself…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is logic behind rabbinic commandments. Sometimes it’s the logic of a slippery slope; sometimes it’s logic intrinsic to the matter itself. But even if there is logic intrinsic to the matter, it is a logic that does not meet the Torah’s standard; there is no Torah-level essence here. And regarding the other laws that emerge from exegesis, I spoke in one of the previous series: my claim is that there there is no command, because it is not written in the Torah—it is only an extension—but there is essence. The same essence that exists in awe of the Holy One, blessed be He, also exists in awe of Torah scholars. Since there is essence and no command, that is not considered Torah-level. But there, in laws that emerge from exegesis, the essence is a full essence.

[Speaker E] Yes, but Rabbi, in rabbinic laws like Hanukkah and Purim, or extensions of Torah-level law—suppose eating poultry with milk is not a decree lest one come to eat meat with milk, but rather an extension, where the spirit of meat-and-milk is also present in poultry and milk—does that also have no essence in this sense?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You could say that it has essence in the sense that the act in itself has significance, but the significance is rabbinic significance. It is not significance on a level that would already make it Torah-level.

[Speaker E] And that’s still not enough to make it Torah study, at least?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—well, as for Torah study, I’ll still get to that, but I’ll still get to Torah study regarding this type of rabbinic law. Okay, we’ll stop here at this stage.

[Speaker H] Rabbi, in this Talmudic passage that the Rabbi brought—that if a person sees someone violating the words of the sages unintentionally, he doesn’t need to tell him—from Netivot, is that true even when it has rabbinic content that can be very significant? I didn’t understand. What the Rabbi brought from the Talmud—that if a person sees another person, his rabbi, violating the words of the sages unintentionally, then even if it has metaphysical content, admittedly rabbinic, but still significant—you still wouldn’t tell him?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If there’s room to deliberate, it could be that the Talmud was not speaking about rabbinic commandments of that kind. Fine, I’ll still talk about this a bit. I’ll distinguish between these two types of rabbinic law. In the columns where I deal with this, I also distinguish between them, so we’ll get to it.

[Speaker D] Rabbi, can I ask a question about one of the previous lessons on the same subject? I think in the second or third lesson the Rabbi spoke about the prohibition of theft, right? That the prohibition of theft has force only when there is ownership, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes.

[Speaker D] So I was thinking to myself, what is the law for people who live in a kibbutz? A communist kibbutz where there isn’t really ownership, where everything belongs to everyone?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What’s the question?

[Speaker D] So there’s no theft there?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, there’s no theft there? It’s not that it belongs to everyone; rather, they distribute equally. And after they distribute, each person has what is his. If you go into a kibbutz member’s house and take the loaf of bread that he received, then you stole. They distribute the property equally.

[Speaker D] So there is still ownership there? There is private property there. There is ownership, yes.

[Speaker B] But the Rabbi spoke about Gibraltar. Yes,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s something else.

[Speaker B] About the rabbi from Gibraltar.

[Speaker E] Rabbi, and all the rabbinic enactments that have a teleological explanation for social regulation and order and all that—don’t those also have essence, if I…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll talk about that too.

[Speaker E] Can we about that? Yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. Okay, thank you very much. Sabbath peace.

[Speaker B] Thank you very much.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] May we hear good news.