Study and Halachic Ruling – Lesson 19
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- First-order halakhic ruling and autonomous ruling
- Permission to rule versus obligation, and the value of autonomy
- Harmonism in the “these and those” passage in Gittin
- “These and those” in Eruvin, a heavenly voice, and the methodology of decision
- Pluralism versus monism and the critique of halakhic pluralism
- Customs, one truth, and one who is qualified
- Rabbi Yosef Karo, Beit Hillel, and the permission to attribute things to a great authority
- “These and those” as legitimate error and halakhic tolerance
- A heavenly voice and unresolved doubt
- First-order halakhic ruling in clarifying facts: annulment of betrothal and “with this in mind”
- Closing questions: atheism, free choice, and vegetarianism
Summary
General Overview
The speaker defines autonomous ruling as part of the characteristics of first-order halakhic ruling, but not as a synonymous term, and argues that formal halakhic authority ends with the Talmud, and from that point onward there is only substantive authority of expertise. He presents autonomy as a positive value, to the point of a certain obligation to rule out of one’s own clarification even when there is a chance of error, and sets the discussion against the background of the passage of these and those in Eruvin, between a pluralist reading and a monist reading. He interprets these and those as legitimate error based on correct reasons, and considers it a basis for halakhic tolerance and respect for the autonomy of a Torah scholar, while expanding the approach of Beit Hillel as a methodological decision that advances truth through humility and listening. Later he argues that first-order halakhic ruling also requires first-order factual clarification, and demonstrates this through a discussion of annulment of betrothal, where the question of whether with this in mind applies is a factual question about women’s intentions and not just a matter of quoting Talmudic passages.
First-order halakhic ruling and autonomous ruling
The speaker argues that a person can be an autonomous halakhic decisor but still a second-order one, when he decides between positions on the basis of rules such as following the majority or following a particular great authority, without entering into the Talmudic passages and forming an independent view. He says that first-order halakhic ruling is supposed to enter into the reasoning and the passages themselves, and not suffice with summarizing bottom-line rulings of halakhic decisors and commentators. He says that formal halakhic authority ended with the Talmud, where it was entrusted to the Sanhedrin and to the Talmud, and from then on there is only substantive authority of expertise and not binding formal authority. He adds that alongside the absence of formal authority there is an independent value to autonomy that justifies ruling on one’s own even when great figures like Maimonides might be more likely to hit the truth.
Permission to rule versus obligation, and the value of autonomy
The speaker distinguishes between two discussions: whether one may rule autonomously by virtue of the absence of authority, and whether one ought to rule autonomously by virtue of the value of autonomy. He says that most of the sources he had brought until now deal with permission to rule autonomously and not with obligation, and attributes to Maharal a stronger engagement with the obligation to rule autonomously. He argues that the value of autonomy is significant דווקא when there is a halakhic truth, because then there is value in following what appears to a person to be true even if he may be mistaken. He cites Maharal as preferring autonomous error over ruling out of books even if the latter is correct, and connects this to Rabbi Meir, whose opinion was not accepted because people could not get to the bottom of his reasoning.
Harmonism in the “these and those” passage in Gittin
The speaker presents the concept of harmonism through the passage in Gittin about the concubine at Givah, where Elijah the prophet tells Rabbi Evyatar that the husband found both a fly and a hair. He explains that each sage grasped a correct aspect of reality, and the truth is the combination, so that all of them are right in the sense that each of their claims is true, but all are also mistaken in the sense that each speaks only a partial truth. He compares this to the parable of the elephant, where the description of the animal changes depending on one’s point of view, and argues that disputes among sages are usually disputes about the weighting and balancing of correct reasons that lead to a different bottom line.
“These and those” in Eruvin, a heavenly voice, and the methodology of decision
The speaker quotes Eruvin about the three years in which Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disputed, until a heavenly voice came out and said, These and those are the words of the living God, but the Jewish law follows Beit Hillel. He argues that the central dispute between them is meta-halakhic, about the way of deciding: whether we follow the majority of people or the majority of wisdom. Therefore there is no internal way to decide it through the rules of Jewish law, and that justifies a heavenly voice without getting entangled in the principle that the Torah is not in heaven. He rejects the interpretation that the heavenly voice decided that we follow the majority of people, because the Talmud explains the ruling in terms of gentleness, humility, and placing the words of Beit Shammai before their own, and he adds that the continued dispute among medieval and later authorities over majority of wisdom versus majority of people shows that no unequivocal meta-halakhic decision was handed down here.
Pluralism versus monism and the critique of halakhic pluralism
The speaker presents a pluralist reading of these and those as a multiplicity of halakhic truths in which both sides are right, and then the Jewish law follows Beit Hillel becomes a binding determination for the sake of uniformity rather than a statement of truth, and the choice of Beit Hillel is something like an educational reward for politeness and humility. He presents a monist reading according to which there is one halakhic truth, and therefore the Jewish law follows Beit Hillel because Beit Hillel were right, and then one must explain what these and those are the words of the living God means. He says he does not accept halakhic pluralism a priori, because it assumes that halakhic sages do not make mistakes, and he argues that pluralism saws off the branch it sits on, since in the very dispute over how to read the passage one cannot say that both the pluralist and the monist are right. He adds that the persistent fear among halakhic decisors that perhaps they erred shows that sages do not assume there is no error, and that the motivation for first-order halakhic ruling rests on the assumption of halakhic truth.
Customs, one truth, and one who is qualified
The speaker says that the fact that there are different customs among Ashkenazim, Sephardim, and Yemenites does not negate the existence of one halakhic truth, but rather shows that some are mistaken and some are correct. He argues that custom serves as a decision rule when a person has no position of his own, and cites the Jerusalem Talmud: “If you do not know, O fairest among women, go forth in the footsteps of the flock and pasture your young goats by the shepherds’ dwellings.” He argues that when a person has his own position there is no reason for him to follow Rema or Rabbi Yosef Karo just because of his communal affiliation, and that the concept of local custom has in our time been translated into ancestral custom because geographic place has become dynamic. He says that today the custom is that Rema and the Shulchan Arukh function as ancestral custom, and notes Rabbi Ovadia’s attempt to establish Rabbi Yosef Karo as the local authority in the Land of Israel, which was not accepted. He argues that someone who is qualified may—and even should—rule autonomously even if he may err, and that the value of autonomy does not mean that the truth is whatever he ruled, but that there is value in ruling according to what appears to a person to be true.
Rabbi Yosef Karo, Beit Hillel, and the permission to attribute things to a great authority
The speaker attributes to Rabbi Yosef Karo, in his rules of the Talmud, a monist interpretation according to which Beit Hillel merited that the Jewish law be established in accordance with them because they hit the truth, and the reason for that is that they put the words of Beit Shammai first and weighed them seriously. He presents the sharpness of Beit Shammai as a factor that may lessen listening and humility, and formulates the tension between sharpness and attentiveness as “the sharper it is, the more mistaken it can be.” He cites Magen Avraham, who permits saying things in the name of a great person so that they will accept it from him, and explains that the permission is meant to cause the disputant to take the argument seriously, not to accept it by virtue of formal authority. He distinguishes between falsely attributing something to a great authority when there is no formal authority, and forging Talmud, such as a Jerusalem Talmud on Kodashim, and argues that forging Talmud is forbidden because the Talmud has formal authority that compels acceptance, and therefore that would be causing others to stumble.
“These and those” as legitimate error and halakhic tolerance
The speaker formulates a distinction between legitimate error and illegitimate error, and argues that these and those are the words of the living God means that the error of Beit Shammai is a legitimate error based on correct reasons but mistaken balancing. He says that in such a situation a Torah scholar may act according to his autonomous position even if he is mistaken, and notes that Beit Shammai continued to practice according to their own view even after the Jewish law was ruled in accordance with Beit Hillel. He defines this as tolerance and not as pluralism, because one respects independent conduct even though it is not correct. He connects the phrase the words of the living God to the exposition in Chagigah about “bringing life into the world” and “words of Torah being fruitful and multiplying,” and suggests that the vitality of Torah is what gives rise to a multiplicity of branches and disputes.
A heavenly voice and unresolved doubt
The speaker argues that a heavenly voice does not come out everywhere the Talmud remains unresolved, because usually there are rules of doubt and halakhic tools that allow functioning even without a decision. He says that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel created a threat of breakdown and sharp division, even to the point of violence described in the Jerusalem Talmud, and therefore an external decision was required in order to prevent fragmentation. He explains that the opening phrase “for three years they disputed” is meant to emphasize that the lack of decision was not an ordinary unresolved doubt but a systemic situation that could not be settled within the ordinary rules of decision.
First-order halakhic ruling in clarifying facts: annulment of betrothal and “with this in mind”
The speaker divides halakhic ruling into two processes: clarification of facts and clarification of the law, and argues that first-order halakhic ruling is usually perceived as belonging to the legal plane, but there is also a need for first-order factual clarification. He brings a case of a private religious court that discussed annulment of betrothal not as uprooting betrothal on the basis of whoever betroths, betroths with the consent of the rabbis, but as a claim that the betrothal was invalid from the outset because of a defect in the facts of the act of betrothal. He describes a case in which the groom disappeared already on the first night, traveled to the United States, and lived with another woman, and raised the claim she did not betroth herself with this in mind as a basis for annulling the betrothal in a case of refusal to grant a divorce, with consequences for the children as well. He presents the Talmud in Bava Kamma 110b about a yevamah who fell before a man afflicted with boils, and the Talmud’s answer, better to sit as two than to sit as a widow, and emphasizes that in his view one should not infer from this a sweeping rejection of with this in mind, because the presumption is in favor of wanting couplehood, and in a case where there is no couplehood at all, that presumption does not operate against annulment. He concludes with his main claim that in his opinion the question whether women consent to such a situation is a factual question that must be clarified in reality and not by means of fine textual inferences in the Talmud, and he describes this as a case in which decisors act as “second-order” decisors even with respect to facts.
Closing questions: atheism, free choice, and vegetarianism
The speaker argues that the atheist position is not rational, but that a person can be rational in many areas and still mistakenly adopt an irrational position, and he distinguishes between judging an argument and judging a person. He refers to his book The Science of Freedom and argues that there is free choice because the will penetrates the law of causality and can move electrons without a physical force, adding that without a non-material mental dimension there is no free choice. He states that he is a vegetarian and argues that industry causes horrors to animals, explains the value of vegetarianism both through cumulative influence and through the “categorical imperative,” and says that eating meat could be moral if the killing and raising were humane or if human beings needed it in order to survive. He notes that standards in Europe are better than in Israel, is in principle open to lab-grown meat, and argues that the gap between public sensitivity to abuse of pets and the industrial abuse is very sharp.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, in previous sessions we talked about first-order halakhic ruling, and from there I moved into the question of autonomy. And the basic claim was that autonomous ruling is part of the characteristics of first-order halakhic ruling, and I said these are not synonymous terms. Meaning, a person can be an autonomous halakhic decisor but still second-order. For example, if in a dispute among medieval authorities (Rishonim) or later authorities (Acharonim) he decides autonomously what the Jewish law will be, but he decides it not by entering into the Talmudic passages and forming a view of his own, but rather by rules. I don’t know, you follow the majority, you follow this one, you follow that one. So he’ll decide that Rashba is greater than Maimonides and therefore he’ll rule like Rashba. Just as an example. So that’s autonomous ruling, meaning he decides for himself, but it isn’t first-order halakhic ruling. So the terms are not synonymous, but there is a connection between them. We also saw the relationship between the reasons and the bottom line. The claim is that first-order halakhic ruling is supposed to enter into the reasons and the Talmudic passages themselves, and not merely summarize bottom lines from halakhic decisors and commentators. In the end I talked about autonomous ruling, I brought a few sources that speak about autonomous ruling, and I said that halakhic authority ended with the Talmud. Meaning, it was entrusted to the Sanhedrin and to the Talmud, and that’s where it ends. From that point onward there is only substantive authority, meaning authority of expertise, not formal authority. Therefore from then on we’re not really supposed to accept the rulings of all the great decisors, great as they may be. They have no formal authority. Beyond that, I argued that there is a value to autonomy. That’s an additional claim. Meaning, first of all, there is no authority. Fine, there’s no authority, but still, why not rule like Maimonides if he was greater than I am, and if I rule like him I’ll probably hit the truth, even though he has no authority in the formal sense? And my claim was that there is a value to autonomy, and the value of autonomy basically says that there is significance or value in my ruling for myself, even though Maimonides may have been greater. So that’s an additional claim. In other words, not only am I not obligated to go by what Maimonides ruled, but in fact there is value in not doing that and instead doing what I think. We brought Maharal, and Maharal really dealt more with that—with the obligation to rule autonomously. In the sources I brought, most of the sources I brought until now—that is, in the previous lecture—did not really deal with an obligation to rule autonomously, but with permission to rule autonomously, meaning with the absence of authority. I brought the Rosh, we talked about it at the end of the previous lecture, and all the later authorities I brought who basically say that the decisor can rule on his own and doesn’t have to rely on precedents. But only a few of them really speak about the value of autonomy and not just the permission to rule autonomously. And the value of autonomy basically says that given that I have authority to rule independently, there is also value in my doing so. And I want to touch a bit on that point—the value of autonomy beyond the question of the absence of authority, which is really the question of the possibility of autonomy. These are two different discussions: whether one may rule autonomously, and whether one should rule autonomously. So if there is no authority, then one may rule autonomously, and I want to argue that there is also value in ruling autonomously, and I want to dwell on that a little today. I’ll do it through the passage we discussed—the passage of “these and those.” We talked in one of the earlier sessions, a few sessions ago, about the passage of “these and those” in Gittin, the passage there about the concubine at Givah, Rabbi Yonatan and Rabbi Evyatar, and I focused on it there because that was the context in which I brought the passage. In connection with harmonism—what I called harmonism—that there are 150 reasons to declare impure and 150 reasons to declare pure, and basically all three hundred reasons are correct reasons, and the dispute is really over how to weigh the correct reasons. Meaning, it’s not a dispute between someone saying incorrect things and someone saying correct things—I mean among sages—but rather the dispute is over how to balance the correct considerations in all directions. There are correct reasons this way, correct reasons that way, and the dispute is over how to weigh them or how to balance them. So in that context I brought the passage of “these and those” in Gittin, where you see that the prophet—that Elijah the prophet says to Rabbi Evyatar—he says to him: he found a fly and didn’t care, he found a hair and did care. Meaning, the husband of that concubine at Givah—the partner, not sure, husband—of that concubine at Givah found the fly and didn’t care, and then he found a hair and did care. So he says that basically the one who said he found a fly in her, and the one who said he found a hair in her, both said correct things: he found a fly and he also found a hair. The only question is: how do you relate to these two statements? The Talmud there says that the truth is the combination of those two statements. He found both a fly and a hair, and those two realities together brought him to the great anger that was there. Therefore, each of the sages really grasped one aspect of the truth, and that is what I called harmonism: basically everyone is right in the sense that everything they say is true, but the truth is the sum of all those true things. And therefore in a certain sense everyone is also mistaken, because each of them says only a partial truth. We talked a bit about the elephant parable: if you look at it from the side, then there are two distant legs and one eye; if you look at it from the front, there are two close legs and two eyes. And everyone is right, each from the side from which he’s looking at the elephant. Same thing with Talmudic passages. From the side from which I’m looking at the passage, I see the reasons in one way; he looks at the passage from another side and sees the reasons differently; but both those sides of the passage exist. And therefore in the end, when I want to exhaust the passage, I need to take all its aspects into account. And disputes are usually disputes about weight—meaning what weight to assign to each aspect—and that leads to a different bottom line. So in the discussion of harmonism I brought the passage of “these and those” in Gittin. Now I want to deal with the passage of “these and those” in Eruvin, and there talk about it from a different angle. So I’ll start with the Talmud; I’ve spoken about this in the past too, of course. It starts with the Talmud: Rabbi Abba said in the name of Shmuel: For three years Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disputed. These said, “The Jewish law is in accordance with us,” and those said, “The Jewish law is in accordance with us.” A heavenly voice came out and said: “These and those are the words of the living God, but the Jewish law is in accordance with Beit Hillel.” And since these and those are the words of the living God, why did Beit Hillel merit to have the Jewish law established in accordance with them? Because they were gentle and humble, and they would teach both their own words and the words of Beit Shammai, and not only that, but they would place the words of Beit Shammai before their own. As we learned: one whose head and most of his body were in the sukkah and whose table was inside the house—Beit Shammai disqualify and Beit Hillel validate. Beit Hillel said to Beit Shammai: Was there not such an incident, when the elders of Beit Shammai and the elders of Beit Hillel went, and so on. Meaning, they basically teach the words of Beit Shammai together with their own words. But I want to focus on the first part of the passage. There’s a dispute here of three years between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel—of course it was much longer, but never mind—and at a certain point a heavenly voice comes from heaven and says: “These and those are the words of the living God, but the Jewish law is in accordance with Beit Hillel.” Now regarding the dispute and the inability to decide, I talked about that in other series. I said that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disputed—or really there was a dispute between them—about the methods of ruling. Beit Shammai were sharper; that’s what the Talmud in Yevamot says. And Beit Hillel were more numerous, and that of course is the other side of the same coin—there were fewer sages. And the dispute between them was over whether, when we need to follow the majority, that means the majority of people or the majority of wisdom. Do you count feet, do you count heads—that’s my favorite expression. So that’s the dispute. Now once that is the dispute, then obviously there is no way to decide it. What are we going to do—hold a vote and follow the majority? After we hold the vote, the dispute will arise again: which majority do we follow, the majority of people or the majority of wisdom? And therefore this is basically a dispute that cannot be decided, and so a heavenly voice had to come out from heaven and decide it, because the sages could not decide it. And that resolves the question of the medieval authorities here: how did they resort to a heavenly voice, after all we know that the Torah is not in heaven, and so on. I think that question is simply mistaken. Meaning, you don’t need all kinds of answers; it’s simply because “the Torah is not in heaven” means making decisions according to the rules of Jewish law. And where the rules of Jewish law do not enable me to make the decision, then I have no alternative. So here yes, you go after heaven; that’s why the heavenly voice came out. In any case, that was the context. Then the heavenly voice comes out and decides. But what it says sounds a bit like the oracle at Delphi. Meaning, some vague statement that can be interpreted in different directions. It’s really divided into two parts: first the heavenly voice says, “These and those are the words of the living God,” and then it says, “but the Jewish law is in accordance with Beit Hillel.” On the one hand both sides are right, on the other hand the Jewish law follows Beit Hillel—like the judge’s wife: he’s right and he’s right and she’s right too. So those two parts seem to contradict one another. If these and those are the words of the living God, then why does the Jewish law follow Beit Hillel? So the words of the heavenly voice can be read in two ways. One way is a pluralist reading. A pluralist reading says there are multiple truths, and therefore when I say “these and those are the words of the living God,” I mean both are right. There isn’t one halakhic truth. Meaning, both Beit Hillel are right and Beit Shammai are right. Then of course the question arises: so what is the meaning of the statement that the Jewish law follows Beit Hillel, if both are right? One can also read the words of the heavenly voice in a monist way. Monism, as opposed to pluralism, means one truth. I mentioned that in connection with harmonism. And monism is basically the view that there is one halakhic truth, and then you can understand why the Jewish law follows Beit Hillel—apparently because the truth was with them. But then the first part of the heavenly voice is difficult, so what does “these and those are the words of the living God” mean? In short, the pluralist reading needs to explain “the Jewish law follows Beit Hillel,” and the monist reading needs to explain “these and those are the words of the living God.” When we want to decide between those two readings, then on the face of it the continuation of the Talmud hints that we should read it in the pluralist way. Because the Talmud then asks: “And since these and those”—yes, we said it—“and since these and those are the words of the living God, why did Beit Hillel merit to have the Jewish law established in accordance with them? Because they were gentle and humble, and they would teach their own words and the words of Beit Shammai, and not only that, they would place the words of Beit Shammai before their own.” That is the explanation the Talmud offers for the heavenly voice. The heavenly voice ended in the previous sentence, and here the Talmud returns and explains why the heavenly voice ruled like Beit Hillel. But what does it mean: since these and those are the words of the living God, why did Beit Hillel merit to have the Jewish law established in accordance with them? On the simple level it means that because both are right, it isn’t clear why the Jewish law follows Beit Hillel. What would you say? So the question why the Jewish law follows Beit Hillel—the pluralist will tell me—the Jewish law follows Beit Hillel not because the truth is with them, but because you need to establish some uniform halakhic standard. Meaning, you need to establish the Jewish law so that not everyone does whatever he wants. So you establish the law according to one side even though both sides are right. That determination is not truth, but you need to establish the law. So the Jewish law follows Beit Hillel. That’s probably how the pluralist would explain it. And then the Talmud really does ask, “Why did Beit Hillel merit to have the Jewish law established in accordance with them?” What does “merit” mean? It means some kind of prize. After all, they aren’t more right; Beit Shammai are just as right as they are. So why did they merit it? Why did they get this prize that the Jewish law would be according to them? And the explanation is because they were righteous and polite and behaved very nicely. A reward for good behavior, or if you want, an educational decision. Basically the Jewish law was decided like Beit Hillel in order to educate the public to behave nicely, politely, to listen to the words of someone who disagrees with you, and the like. So that’s the pluralist reading. So basically in the pluralist reading you can understand the whole passage. “These and those are the words of the living God”—that means exactly what it says, because this is pluralism, everyone is right. And why does the Jewish law follow Beit Hillel? Because you need to establish some single agreed—or not agreed, binding—determination, even though both are right. That determination is not truth, but you need to establish the law. So the Jewish law follows Beit Hillel. Then the Talmud asks why. Why was it established that way, since the truth is not uniquely with them? So why did they merit it? A prize for good behavior. Meaning, we basically want to educate the public to behave nicely, and therefore we rule like Beit Hillel, even though we could just as well have flipped a coin. Meaning, it’s not because Beit Hillel are right. That’s the pluralist reading. I spoke about that, I think, then. I don’t accept it, first of all, a priori. I don’t accept it because I think—I mentioned this—that the pluralist basically claims that a halakhic sage cannot be mistaken, right? That’s how he understands “these and those are the words of the living God.” And of course we know that people apply this also to medieval authorities (Rishonim) and later authorities (Acharonim). Meaning, there is some kind of view in the Torah world, the yeshiva world, I don’t know what to call it, that there really can’t be a mistaken position among Torah scholars, among halakhic decisors, among important people. There is no mistaken position; everyone is right. “These and those are the words of the living God” applies to all disputes. In the Talmud itself it appears only regarding Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, and Rabbi Evyatar and Rabbi Yonatan there in Gittin, which is aggadic literature anyway. But somehow it’s taken for granted that “these and those” applies to all Talmudic disputes, and afterward they apply it also to medieval authorities and later authorities, and that is at any rate the accepted view. Then the notion is that there really cannot be error in the words of a fully-fledged halakhic sage. Call it divine assistance, call it divine inspiration, call it just sublime wisdom, I don’t know exactly what—but there is some such conception.
[Speaker C] To the point that today people even use this not only in Jewish law but also in worldview. Okay, in worldview, in approaches—this idea of seventy faces to the Torah, you hear it in the context of everything.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In worldview I’m even more willing to accept it, because there really there isn’t any truth anyway, but there it’s all made-up stuff. But in Jewish law it’s still more serious, and therefore…
[Speaker C] Why? But worldview often affects a person’s way of life. Meaning, people change their whole lives based on a worldview they think is right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The fact that things are made up doesn’t mean they don’t have influence. Made-up things can have influence—what can you do, that’s life.
[Speaker C] No, but it really affects even how they implement the Jewish laws. Meaning, everyone can adapt according to what… adapt his Jewish laws and his conduct according to the worldview, supposedly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And I still repeat and argue that it’s still made-up stuff. I didn’t say it doesn’t influence; of course it influences. Okay, fine, but we’re not going to step on that landmine now. I’ve already spoken about it more than once.
[Speaker C] Yes, Rabbi, one more small question: why is the Jewish law like Beit Hillel? Can’t you say that the heavenly voice simply came out to decide that the Jewish law follows Beit Hillel just because they were the majority?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It decided the meta-dispute: when there is a dispute between a few sages and many fewer sages—well, between a few wise sages and a greater number of less sharp sages—do we follow the majority of wisdom or the majority of people? And the heavenly voice decided that we follow the majority of people.
[Speaker C] Right, that’s what I’m asking.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, you’re claiming that it really decided the meta-halakhic question. But it seems pretty clearly from the Talmud that that’s not right, because the Talmud itself explains that it’s because they were gentle and humble. So that doesn’t fit with a decision that we follow the majority of people.
[Speaker C] Yes, meaning there would have had to be some additional justification beyond that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not some random patch after the fact or things like that. Beyond that, I think I mentioned…
[Speaker D] And there’s also a dispute among the medieval authorities.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly—that among the medieval authorities and later authorities there is still a dispute over whether we follow the majority of wisdom or the majority of people. If they had understood the Talmud’s ruling that way, then there would be no room to dispute it in later generations. So that doesn’t sound plausible in this Talmudic passage. So basically the claim is that… so I said that, at least a priori, I don’t accept the pluralist conception, because the pluralist conception basically assumes that there cannot be error among halakhic sages. But within itself, it seems to me, that doesn’t work. Because in this very passage of “these and those,” for example, here it must be that one of the sides is mistaken in this very issue itself—this issue of pluralism versus monism. In this issue you can’t be a pluralist. You can’t tell me that both the pluralist is right and the monist is right, can you? So in this issue you do have to decide. Once you decide, the other side is mistaken. And if the other side is mistaken, then that means a halakhic sage can be mistaken. And by that you’ve broken your own pluralism. Meaning, pluralism saws off the branch on which it itself is sitting. Beyond that, I think that when you just look at halakhic literature, at first glance it looks terribly pluralistic, but I don’t think that really holds water—that whole way of looking at it. We constantly see all those who are fearful in issuing rulings, all that concern lest I made a mistake, lest this, lest that. After all, if there is no halakhic error, then what is this fear that maybe you made a mistake? There is no mistake. Everything you say is correct. So what’s the problem? There really seems to be here some kind of indirect statement, but one that slips out innocently. It seems to me that you can see that sages are very afraid of making mistakes in ruling. They do not assume that whatever they say will be correct. So there is here some kind of indication in favor of halakhic monism. And beyond that, I also think that once we are talking about Jewish law, we are trying to seek the halakhic truth. If I didn’t think there was halakhic truth, then all the motivation to start checking what is correct and what is not, and to discuss this reasoning and that reasoning, disappears. Flip a coin and that’s it. The whole first-order approach, all first-order halakhic ruling, basically assumes that there is halakhic truth. Otherwise what is the point of entering the passage and forming a view, when that view is neither right nor wrong? All views are right. That sounds like a rather bland, silly game.
[Speaker C] Yes, but Rabbi, in practice we see that it isn’t like that. In Jewish law today it isn’t like that. Between Ashkenazim, Sephardim, Yemenites, there are substantive differences in Jewish law. I didn’t say there aren’t differences. No, so what does that mean? That supposedly a significant part of the people is mistaken, if there is only one truth. Obviously. So that’s what the Rabbi is saying.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously, yes. That’s exactly what I mean when I say there is halakhic truth. Yes. You know, that’s a very common logical mistake, for example in the context of morality. In the context of morality, people often bring proof in favor of moral pluralism or relativism—some kind of moral relativity—from the fact that there are many societies in the world with different moral conceptions. There are disputes in moral matters between people, between groups, between outlooks, and therefore, they say, that means that there really is no moral truth or one morality, but rather moral relativity. That argument is a logical mistake. Meaning, if you are talking about moral relativity in the factual sense—that factually different people think differently about moral issues—that is of course true; that’s a trivial fact. But if you want to prove from that that in reality there is no moral truth, I don’t see how you make that Olympic leap. Meaning, the fact that people disagree—so what if they disagree? One is right and the others are mistaken. Does the fact that they disagree mean there is no truth? It only means that some of them are mistaken. I say the same thing with respect to Jewish law. Meaning, the fact that people disagree is obviously true, but that doesn’t mean there isn’t one truth. Now of course you can ask a harder question: fine, if there is only one truth, then why do you obligate people to follow customs? Ashkenazim this way, Sephardim that way, Yemenites another way. Let them follow the truth. Why follow custom if that isn’t the truth? So here I say: it depends. If you really have a position of your own, then you should do what you think, regardless of whether you’re Ashkenazi, Sephardi, Yemenite, or I don’t know, Hindu. Meaning, you should do what you think. The fact that you happen to be Ashkenazi is no reason at all to do what the Rema says. You should do what you think. The whole idea of following customs is only when you have no view of your own. If you don’t—we talked about that in previous sessions—if you have no view of your own, then you follow customs. I think I brought the Jerusalem Talmud, right? “If you do not know, O fairest among women, go forth in the footsteps of the flock and pasture your young goats by the shepherds’ dwellings.” I follow in the footsteps of the flock, after the custom, when I don’t know—if you do not know. But if I do know, then I don’t need to follow customs; then I do what I think. And therefore exactly—that is exactly what this means: I assume there is one halakhic truth, I am a halakhic monist, and therefore if I have a position, then obviously that is what I have to do. And what about customs? Customs are a decision rule for a place where I have no position of my own. If I have a position of my own, then obviously I have no reason to follow customs. Custom is a decision rule in a case of doubt. If I’m not in doubt, I don’t need decision rules, as I discussed in the previous lecture. So the fact that there are different customs doesn’t prove anything. In the end, one is right and the others are mistaken. Now, I’m not saying—there can be halakhic questions where maybe there are two correct answers; that can happen. I’m only claiming that this is not an essential claim. Meaning, it’s not true that in all halakhic questions all positions are correct. Or in other words, what I’m claiming is not necessarily that there is always exactly one halakhic truth, but that there are halakhic positions that are mistaken. It is not true that there are no errors among halakhic sages. That is what I want to claim. There can be particular halakhic questions in which this can be an acceptable position and that can also be an acceptable position. Fine, that can happen.
[Speaker D] Rabbi, I’m saying, I—
[Speaker C] know that the Rabbi still hasn’t answered the question of who really is what the Rabbi calls “qualified.” I know we still haven’t answered that question, but I did understand from the Rabbi that this is really a minority of the people, right? The ones called qualified. Meaning, the overwhelming majority of the people are not qualified and cannot decide and cannot rule on their own. Right. And therefore, if again we go with a monist approach, the implication is that most of the people are mistaken, and that’s huge.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, if most of the people were qualified, then they wouldn’t be mistaken? They’d also be mistaken. What does that have to do with anything?
[Speaker C] Among—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the sages who really are qualified, after all, they also disagree among themselves. And if I’m a monist, that means that some of them are mistaken and some of them are right. So it has nothing to do with the question of who is qualified.
[Speaker C] Okay, so those sages who really are all qualified—they have the ability to rule on their own, right? Because they have the value of autonomy, and most of the people follow them. Meaning, the majority relies on them.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what does that mean?
[Speaker C] Meaning, what the Rabbi is basically saying is that even though a person is qualified, he may still rule on his own and yet be mistaken.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course. That is exactly everything I brought from Maharal, that Maharal says it is preferable in the eyes of the Holy One, blessed be He—
[Speaker C] preferable to be mistaken—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] autonomously than someone who rules from books even if he is correct. So Maharal says outright that the value of autonomy means I should rule for myself, but that does not mean that the truth is whatever I rule for myself.
[Speaker C] On the contrary.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What the value of autonomy says is that even though the truth may not be with me, there is value in doing what I think. That’s also what I brought from Rabbi Meir, whose opinion was not accepted because people could not get to the bottom of his reasoning. The whole idea of autonomy is actually specifically where there is no pluralism. Because where there is pluralism, in my view—even though on the face of it the value of autonomy very much resembles the pluralist conception, that if everyone is right then everyone should do what he thinks—but that’s not correct. If everyone is right, or not everyone is right—if there is no halakhic truth—then everyone can do what he thinks. But the question whether there is value in doing what you think—not just that you may do it, but that there is value in doing what you think—I think that has meaning only if there is halakhic truth, specifically if there is halakhic truth. Because if there is halakhic truth, then there is value in following the truth that you think is the truth. After all, if there is no halakhic truth and you’re just drawing lots, then do whatever you want—what is the value in playing games? Precisely in my opinion, there is value to autonomous conduct specifically in a monist conception, in a conception that there is halakhic truth.
[Speaker C] Even if you are mistaken, basically?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, correct. Of course you need to strive for the truth—not that you just do random things unrelated to truth—but what you think is the truth, that is what you should do. But in your consciousness you are of course striving for truth. Not that in the name of autonomy I’ll do whatever comes into my head, or in the name of autonomy I’ll flip a coin and do whatever comes out—that certainly not. All right? That’s what the Rosh writes; we read him in the previous lecture: the judge should not say, “I’ll do whatever I want,” because if the Jewish law was not explicitly ruled, the judge should not say, “I’ll do whatever I want,” because after all this one is right and that one is right, “these and those are the words of the living God.” No—you need to rule the Jewish law according to what appears correct to you. Okay, so let me return to our passage for a moment.
[Speaker D] Rabbi, just a comment: what the Rabbi mentioned, that in a case of doubt custom decides—does the Rabbi also hold that ancestral custom has force to decide in a doubt in Jewish law?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand.
[Speaker D] The Rabbi mentioned that when I’m in doubt about the law, custom can decide for me. Does the Rabbi also hold that ancestral custom, even without local custom, can also do that?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The local custom has now been translated into ancestral custom. Today that “place” is a place, but a virtual place, not a geographic one. The place is the community or the background, yes.
[Speaker D] So the Rabbi holds that ancestral custom, even without local custom, has enough force to decide?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously, certainly. That’s the whole world. On this issue I’m completely—seems to me—I’m going with the consensus here. After all, today the determining custom, the Rema and the Shulchan Arukh, is not the local custom, it’s ancestral custom. Rabbi Ovadia wanted to turn it back into local custom. He wanted to argue that in the Land of Israel, since Rabbi Yosef Karo was the mara de-atra of the Land of Israel, then all the Ashkenazim who came here also have to rule like Rabbi Yosef Karo. Because he really wanted to insist that this is local custom, but of course that wasn’t accepted, because in practice local custom in our time has been translated into ancestral custom. The reason for that is that place today has no meaning at all. Once, place was much more static; today the world is much more dynamic. Place has no significance. Today I’m here, tomorrow I’m in Australia. What is place? It’s something so dynamic that you can’t anchor anything to it. After all, custom comes to create some kind of fixation, some kind of stability, something slower in its changes. And when you tie it to place today, place is the easiest thing to change. So perhaps not consciously, but I think that’s why they changed local custom into ancestral custom. True, already in the Talmud it appears, “Your ancestral custom is in your hands,” the people of Beit She’an there in the chapter “A place where they had the custom” in tractate Pesachim. So they tell them there, “Your ancestral custom is in your hands.” But it’s quite clear that “your ancestors” means because they lived in the same village. Their ancestors were also in the same place. “Your ancestral custom” was really the local custom—the custom practiced in your place from the time of your ancestors, from the time of your forefathers—because in that period it was the same thing. But originally it’s clear that the parameter determining custom was place, not genealogy, not ethnic origin. And among us today it’s somehow obvious to everyone that the relevant custom is the ethnic custom. Therefore, in the very same place there can be Ashkenazi and Sephardi synagogues, and everything is fine. Everyone follows the custom of the place—their “place,” in quotation marks, of course. Their place is where they came from.
[Speaker D] So the Rabbi agrees with that—I thought the Rabbi agreed.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Custom is something it’s hard not to agree with. What people practice is the custom. You know, you’re reminding me of an amusing story. It amused me a bit less, though. I was at Bar-Ilan when I was doing my master’s degree. They exempted me from general studies—I don’t remember exactly why—I argued with them, and since I was learning in yeshiva every day for half a day, they exempted me from general studies, because I wasn’t stupid enough to tell them that I hadn’t finished hesder yeshiva. I had left for the army in the middle, so then I wasn’t entitled to an exemption from general studies. I told them that people who were exempt from general studies sat in my class at home. It didn’t help; I was obligated in general studies. Somehow in the end they managed to exempt me. Then in my doctorate they started bothering me again with those general studies. In the end, somehow—I don’t know—through connections and this and that, because I just didn’t want to waste time on that instead of learning in yeshiva, they told me to write a paper on custom in the thought of Rabbi Uziel instead of taking a course, to do some kind of paper. Fine, so I did it. I sat down one afternoon and wrote that paper. And it really was quite fascinating, because I went through Mishpetei Uziel and all that, through his responsa, and I saw that the rules about which custom determines and how much custom determines are themselves a product of custom. In the end there really are no rules. Ultimately, what people do is what people do, that’s it. Even though they try to formulate it as if there are rules and laws of custom, what counts and what doesn’t count, in the end they do what they do. The rules for how to deal with customs are themselves a product of customs. Therefore, when someone tells me there is such a custom that Ashkenazim follow the Rema and Sephardim follow Rabbi Yosef Karo, then that custom is a custom that determines how to determine our customs. It’s a meta-custom, but it’s still a custom. So when you ask me whether I agree—there’s no question of agreeing or not agreeing here. That’s the custom. Custom goes by how people practice. What I can disagree with is the question whether there are places where I think it’s not correct to follow custom in general, and then I don’t care that people do it, because I claim they’re mistaken. But once we’ve reached the conclusion that in this topic one should follow custom, then I have nothing to say about whether I agree or not agree. What people practice is the custom. Okay, so I’ll return—so basically.
[Speaker E] Rabbi, I never fully understood what it means that Beit Shammai were sharper and Beit Hillel gave precedence. Now, if Beit Shammai were sharper, then I would expect that they weighed the other position very carefully, were fully aware of it at the deepest level, and rejected it. So of course they gave it precedence. What does it mean that they didn’t? If they weren’t attentive to all sides of the problem, then what does their sharpness amount to? Or maybe I just didn’t understand what “sharpness” means.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t understand the connection. The opposite, exactly. Sharpness means they’re very sharp—but why would sharpness mean they’re also attentive? Why does sharpness imply attentiveness?
[Speaker E] I mean, I thought sharpness included, among other things, considering all the possible sides, including the side presented by your disputant.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you thought about those sides, then you’ll weigh them. But it could be that you didn’t think about them. And that is exactly the idea this Talmudic passage is teaching us. In a moment I’m getting there exactly: when Beit Hillel were more attentive to Beit Shammai, then although they were less sharp, they reached more correct conclusions. And Beit Shammai, precisely because of their sharpness, apparently tended more to dismiss Beit Hillel and didn’t really listen—didn’t listen carefully—to the arguments Beit Hillel raised, because it was obvious to them that they were smarter and probably right. And “the sharper the mind, the greater the mistake.” That’s exactly the point. Sharpness does not mean attentiveness—quite the opposite. Many times, because of your sharpness you’re less inclined to listen to others, because it’s obvious to you that you’re a genius and right, and they’re fools and you have nothing to hear from them. And the reverse—that is exactly the point: here sharpness is set against attentiveness or humility. And it turns out—and in one sentence you already anticipated me, but that’s what I want to argue—that Rabbi Yosef Karo writes this in his rules of the Talmud. It’s printed with Halikhot Olam, where he writes that “these and those are the words of the living God, but the Jewish law follows Beit Hillel”—the Jewish law follows Beit Hillel because they are right. This isn’t a prize for good behavior. He read it in a monistic way. And he says the Jewish law follows Beit Hillel because they are right. And when the Talmud says, “Why were Beit Hillel privileged that the Jewish law was established according to them?” what does that mean? Why were they privileged to hit upon the true Jewish law? No, it’s not a reward for good behavior—because they gave precedence to the words of Beit Shammai before their own. Because someone who listens very carefully to the words of the one who disagrees with him, and weighs them, and presents the dissenter’s words first, and only at the end forms his own position—he will probably hit the truth more than the other person, even if the other person is sharper than he is. That is exactly what this Talmudic passage says according to Rabbi Yosef Karo. Therefore his claim is that what the Talmud explains here is not that they ruled according to Beit Hillel as a reward for good behavior. They ruled according to Beit Hillel because they were right. Because one who behaves like Beit Hillel, even if he is less sharp, will more likely arrive at the truth. That’s the lesson.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In this context, I always think of the Magen Avraham, which you’ve probably heard—or at least some of you have. The Magen Avraham says—he brings it there, in one of those places where he puts all the laws he doesn’t know where to place—that one may say things in the name of a great person “so that they will accept it from him.” That’s a Talmudic statement. He brings it as Jewish law. He says I’m allowed to lie, to say my own ideas in the name of some great halakhic authority, so that they’ll accept them from me. And of course the obvious question is: this permission is insane. Some ignoramus will come and say, “I’m telling you it’s permitted to do such-and-such on the Sabbath, and Rabbi Elyashiv said so.” Fine—if Rabbi Elyashiv said so, then I’ll probably do it—except it’s all nonsense from the ignoramus speaking to me; he lied. How can it be that they permit a person to cause other people to stumble in such a blatant way? How can it be permitted to lie in such a matter? So my claim was the opposite: that the whole permission of the Magen Avraham—of the Talmud, as brought by the Magen Avraham—comes from the fact that I will not accept the words even if I hear that Rabbi Elyashiv said them. So you’ll ask, then why attribute it to Rabbi Elyashiv if in any event it doesn’t persuade me? And the answer is exactly because there are people who, because of their sharpness—or because of their arrogance that makes them think they are sharp; not always rightly—they don’t listen to the other person. There’s someone who feels that he’s giving correct reasons, and his disputant isn’t listening to him. He tries to persuade him and feels that the person isn’t listening at all. In such a situation he says: you know, what I’m saying was said by Rabbi Elyashiv. What happens then? My disputant won’t accept what Rabbi Elyashiv said just because he said it, but he also won’t dismiss it out of hand. He will seriously consider my position, because now he thinks Rabbi Elyashiv said it. In the end, he’ll reach his own conclusions—either he’ll accept it or he won’t—but he will seriously weigh the reasons I’m offering, the arguments I’m offering. That’s what I want to gain when I lie and say it in the name of Rabbi Elyashiv. Therefore it is permitted to lie. And the idea is that this lie will ultimately cause the person opposite me to behave like Beit Hillel and not like Beit Shammai—to take my position seriously, weigh it, and in the end reach his own conclusion. He may accept it, he may not, but it will be after he has seriously considered what I said. For that, it is permitted to lie. That’s the claim.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are several difficulties with this Magen Avraham. For example, in Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century—or the end of the nineteenth—there was someone there, I don’t remember exactly when, something like that, who forged the Jerusalem Talmud on Kodashim. Someone claimed he found a Jerusalem Talmud on Kodashim and forged it. There was also the well-known forgery Besamim Rosh with Kisei Deharsena, a forgery of responsa attributed to the Rosh. Also a very famous forgery that caused many controversies—whether it was authentic or not. Books were written about the Jerusalem Talmud on Kodashim too—whether it was authentic or forged. In the end it turned out to be a forgery, and everyone was very, very angry about it. And I wondered: why be angry? All in all, this is exactly what the Magen Avraham rules. It’s written in the Talmud that I may attribute something to a great person—“one who wishes to hang himself, let him hang himself on a great tree.” I’m allowed to lie to people and say my own ideas in the name of a great person so that they’ll accept them from me. So what’s the problem? Why did everyone come with complaints against the forger—how could he do such a thing? And the answer, based on what I said before, is very simple. The moment you forge a Jerusalem Talmud on Kodashim, you’re forging Talmud. You’re not saying, “Rabbi Elyashiv said this”; you’re saying, “Rabbi Yohanan said this.” So you are forging Talmud—but Talmud has authority. Meaning, once you say, “Well, that’s what the Jerusalem Talmud on Kodashim says,” then I will accept it, since the Talmud has formal authority. In such a case, forging is forbidden. The whole permission to forge is only if you hang it on some great person such that your interlocutor is not obligated to accept what he said. He has no formal authority; he has substantive authority. I will take it seriously because the person is a great Torah scholar, so the other person will consider his words seriously. But if you hang it on someone with formal authority, that is certainly forbidden. Then you are simply misleading the other person, and that is “do not place a stumbling block”—you are causing the other person to stumble. That was my initial difficulty. And the answer is that when the Magen Avraham permits lying and saying things in the name of a great person, it is only because people will not accept the words even if the great person says them. Therefore, what I really want to say here is that when Rabbi Yosef Karo reads the Talmud in Eruvin, he reads it in a monistic way. And he says that there is in fact one halakhic truth, and the Jewish law follows Beit Hillel because Beit Hillel were right. And what the Talmud explains afterward—that Beit Hillel gave precedence to the words of Beit Shammai before their own—that was their methodology, and because of it they really were right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What remains for us to explain is the first part of the Talmudic passage. There are three parts in the Talmud: “These and those are the words of the living God”; “the Jewish law follows Beit Hillel”—that’s the second part; and the Talmud’s explanation that they were gentle and gave precedence to the words of Beit Shammai before their own. In the pluralistic reading I explained all three things. In the monistic reading I explained the last two things: why the Jewish law follows Beit Hillel, and what the explanation means—that they gave precedence to the words of Beit Shammai before their own, and therefore they were right. But what does “these and those are the words of the living God” mean? Here—I explained this when we spoke about harmonism—I said that “these and those are the words of the living God” means that the reasons of Beit Shammai and the reasons of Beit Hillel are all correct. But in the final overall balancing, Beit Hillel were right; the truth is really with them. Now I’ll formulate the same idea differently. I say as follows: there are really two kinds of error—maybe I mentioned this then too—two kinds of error. There is legitimate error and illegitimate error. “These and those are the words of the living God” means that this is a legitimate error. In other words, Beit Shammai are not right. This is not a pluralistic reading. Beit Shammai are mistaken. If Beit Hillel are right, Beit Shammai are mistaken. But what does it mean that these are the words of the living God? That this is a legitimate mistake. What is a legitimate mistake? It is a mistake based on correct reasons; only the overall balancing of those correct reasons was not correct for Beit Shammai. For Beit Hillel the balancing was correct, and for Beit Shammai it was not. But the reasons are correct reasons. And then what this means is that if your mistake is indeed a legitimate mistake, then you are called “the words of the living God.” What does that mean? It means you can act in accordance with what you think, even though you are mistaken. Since it is legitimate—you are a Torah scholar, you give correct reasons—so fine, your balancing wasn’t right. Beit Shammai continued to act according to their own view even after the Jewish law was ruled according to Beit Hillel. They continued to act according to their own view. That ruling obligated everyone who wasn’t from one of those two schools, but Beit Shammai themselves continued to act against Beit Hillel, because they followed what they thought. So in that sense, when they tell you “the words of the living God,” it means: you may act according to what you think; it is legitimate; you are a Torah scholar. Okay? Or in other words, there is some statement here, and it is a statement of tolerance. I am willing to accept the legitimacy of your conduct even though you are not right. Not pluralism, which says that you are right, but tolerance says: although you are not right, I accept your conduct. That is essentially the claim of “the words of the living God.”
[Speaker D] And here too, the Rabbi brought the example in Kiddushin, in Sukkah, with the Ritva.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, I brought that example. Okay, so I didn’t remember—I thought I hadn’t brought it. So really, I’ll shorten it then. The claim is that I relate with tolerance to an incorrect position because that position is a well-grounded one; it is a legitimate mistake. Or in other words, I respect the autonomy of someone who acts that way. And why? Because he is a Torah scholar. A Torah scholar has permission to act autonomously according to his position even if he is mistaken. That is basically the point. And if I brought the Ritva, then this Ritva is actually a very good example, yes, because there you see that the Talmud assumes that a person should act according to his own view even if he is mistaken. That is basically the claim. And of course this is said only to someone capable of it, only to someone for whom acting autonomously is not irresponsibility. Not every child should do whatever he thinks, because that is just irresponsibility. Okay.
[Speaker C] Rabbi, I think I’m going back to the beginning, but basically the Rabbi said that here you can’t say “It is not in heaven” in this Talmudic case, because supposedly they couldn’t decide, right? So that’s why they needed a heavenly voice, right? Now my question is: why does the Talmud so often end with a stalemate or without deciding?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand.
[Speaker C] I mean, why did the heavenly voice supposedly leave the Talmud without an answer in many cases where the discussion ends in a stalemate?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why is there a heavenly voice every time the Talmud remains in a stalemate?
[Speaker C] So why sometimes yes and sometimes no? What—there’s no pattern to it? It’s just whenever…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, that’s a topic for a lecture in itself. I spoke about it in other series. With Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel there was a fear of the disintegration of the Jewish people and of the Torah. These were two schools that disagreed not on one point; they disagreed on a great many disputes. And once you can’t decide, what is created here is a kind of split—to the point that in the Jerusalem Talmud it is even described that they killed one another. Okay? “They killed one another” means there was no way to reach an agreed-upon decision, and the fear was very, very great that the whole thing would fall apart, to the point that violence was used. Therefore a heavenly voice came out and said: this has to be settled somehow. But after the heavenly voice, and after the very long process—about this I spoke in many lectures—in the end some kind of system was accepted, within which decisions can be made without falling apart. And then the heavenly voice becomes unnecessary; you don’t need it. So for example, when the Talmud remains in a stalemate, there are the laws of doubt. If there are disputes, we go after the majority, we do this, we do that—laws of doubt, whatever it may be. But we have already accepted the tools by which I can decide disputes within a framework. That was not the bind in the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. And the Talmud there introduces it—when I just read the passage—“For three years Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed and could not decide.” Why does the Talmud preface it that way? The Talmud prefaces it exactly to answer your question. Not every place where we can’t decide gets a heavenly voice. The heavenly voice comes out in a place where the dispute threatens to break us apart, to fragment us. Then the heavenly voice came out and prevented that. Everywhere else, once we remain in a stalemate, with no clear decision, we know what to do. There are rules of doubt. We have no problem. Jewish law gives us enough tools to know how to function even where we don’t have a clear decision. Here they couldn’t manage.
[Speaker C] Yes, I understand. Does the Rabbi know how to explain this wording, “the words of the living God”? What does that mean? What is the meaning of “living”? The words of the living God. I mean, why does the Talmud write it like that?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] These are the words of the Holy One, blessed be He. These are the words of the Holy One, blessed be He.
[Speaker C] No, I understand the meaning; I’m asking what…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is—maybe it’s connected to the Talmud in Chagigah. The Talmud in Chagigah—just a second. The Talmud in Chagigah also speaks about disputes. And it says there: “He too opened and expounded”—yes, you need to see the whole context there; I won’t go into all the context—“He too opened and expounded: ‘The words of the wise are like goads, and like firmly planted nails; the masters of assemblies were given by one shepherd.’ Why were the words of Torah compared to a goad? To tell you: just as a goad directs the cow to its furrows, to bring life to the world—the concept of life—so too the words of Torah direct those who learn them from paths of death to paths of life. If a goad is movable, perhaps the words of Torah are movable? Therefore the verse says: nails. If a nail diminishes and does not increase, perhaps the words of Torah diminish and do not increase? Therefore the verse says: planted. Just as a planting bears fruit and multiplies, so too the words of Torah bear fruit and multiply. ‘Masters of assemblies’—these are Torah scholars who sit in many groups and engage in Torah. These declare impure and those declare pure; these forbid and those permit; these disqualify and those validate. Lest a person say: how then can I learn Torah from now on? Therefore the verse says: all of them were given by one shepherd. One God gave them, one provider said them, from the mouth of the Master of all deeds, blessed be He, as it is written: ‘And God spoke all these words.’ So you too should make your ear like a funnel and acquire for yourself an understanding heart to hear the words of those who declare impure and the words of those who declare pure, the words of those who forbid and the words of those who permit, the words of those who disqualify and the words of those who validate.’ In this language he said to them: no generation is orphaned in which Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah dwells.” All this is Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah’s exposition, yes, “dwells in it.” What does that mean? So the “life” here connects to the idea that the words of Torah bear fruit and multiply. There are forbidders and permitters, those who declare impure and pure, and so on—in short, disputes. Meaning, when there is life, things grow, right? The words of Torah—when there is life, when there is water, when there is life—then things grow. And when things grow, many branches come out. Many branches come out—there are disputes. So perhaps the claim of “living God” is actually God who causes all the opinions to grow, and therefore there is dispute, and these and those are the words of the living God. Meaning, these and those are both the result of Torah, which is called life, which basically grows all sorts of different branches, and that is a way of relating to disputes. Maybe. Whether yes or no. Fine.
[Speaker B] Thank you.
[Speaker D] The Rabbi gave a nice homily. The Rabbi started preaching.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Without noticing it I enter the world of homily, but the question was a homiletic question. Fine. So I really want to move on. I didn’t remember that I had already done this whole business of autonomy. Now I want to return for a moment to first-order halakhic ruling. When we approach ruling on Jewish law in a first-order way—that is, we want to formulate a position ourselves—this involves two moves. One move is the need to clarify the facts. What is the factual basis of the matter? And the second move is to clarify the Jewish law, to decide the Jewish law. In the end, when I issue a halakhic ruling regarding a case before me, it is a combination of these two moves. You have to determine what the truth was, and you have to determine what the Jewish law says about those cases. Yes, I brought the paradox of adjudication in one of the previous lectures, where exactly this played on the discussion at the factual level and there was a discussion at the legal level. What does the contract say, and the question of what the person did—that is the factual question. And the verdict had to be a combination of these two clarifications: the factual clarification and the halakhic clarification. That’s generally how it is. When ruling in Jewish law, you need to clarify the facts and you need to clarify the law.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now when we speak about first-order ruling, the accepted conception—or the initial intuition—is that first-order ruling is something that relates to the halakhic clarification. In the halakhic clarification there would be room to say that I go after precedents, after one halakhic authority or another. And if I say that one should rule in a first-order way, that means entering the topic itself, clarifying the Jewish law, and arriving at my own position in the halakhic questions. That is where we are talking about first-order rulings. That is where there is the dilemma whether to rule first-order or second-order. But on the factual plane, what? Obviously we have to clarify the facts. Obviously one has to clarify the facts. What, there is no question there of first-order and second-order? But it turns out that this too is not so simple. And I’ll perhaps clarify this through an example.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ve had occasion more than once to sit on a religious court that annulled kiddushin. Of course not on behalf of the Rabbinate, God forbid—don’t suspect me of that—but rather a privately convened religious court. And then the discussion of annulling the kiddushin is of course not based on the Talmudic rule that “whoever betroths, betroths subject to the authority of the rabbis.” Right? Meaning, we didn’t get to that level of megalomania. I don’t think everyone who betroths does so subject to my authority. Meaning, I didn’t get there. “Whoever betroths, betroths subject to the authority of the rabbis, and the rabbis nullified his betrothal”—that is uprooting kiddushin, not annulling kiddushin. Uprooting kiddushin is based on the idea that kiddushin are done subject to the authority of the sages, and if the sages don’t agree then the kiddushin are uprooted. Fine. But that was said regarding the great court of the generation and all kinds of things; there are limitations on that. That’s not what we’re talking about. When I speak about annulling kiddushin, I mean claiming that the kiddushin were not valid. Not canceling them, not uprooting them, but claiming that the kiddushin were not valid. For example, finding that there was a disqualified witness there, or that the ring was not worth a perutah, or that her intent was not directed toward the ring, or things like that. Here I don’t need the authority of uprooting kiddushin. Here I am basically giving an opinion that the kiddushin were not valid. There was a bug in the kiddushin; there was a problem in the kiddushin. As simple as that.
[Speaker C] But Rabbi, why do people try to annul kiddushin in the first place? What’s the context?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For example, in refusal to grant a get. The husband does not want to give the woman a divorce document, so if I can annul the kiddushin—that is, say that these kiddushin from the outset…
[Speaker C] Then there’s no need for a get at all. Right—no marriage, no get.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The woman is freed, so there’s no need. Many times religious courts try to convene over annulment of kiddushin in order to solve a problem of get refusal. Okay, that’s one example. Or for example, to permit mamzerim. Meaning, if there is a child who would be a mamzer, then if I show that his mother was not a married woman, then the one who had relations with her did not create a mamzer. So I annul the woman’s kiddushin so that the child will not be a mamzer. Those are the reasons. In our case, by the way, both things were true. Meaning, there was both a problem of get refusal and also a problem with the children because the woman was living with another man. In any event—yes—so the claim is that we were sitting on a case of annulling kiddushin. Now usually when religious courts annul kiddushin, as I said before, they often find, for example, some flaw in the witnesses—the witness desecrates the Sabbath or something like that—and then they annul the kiddushin.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We were sitting on kiddushin that took place in the following situation: the woman—the couple got married. They were young and reckless. They married at a very young age. On the first night they were supposed to be in a hotel. The guy didn’t even get to the hotel—didn’t get there at all. He disappeared; no trace of him was known. After some time they searched and searched, and it turned out he was in the United States. The kiddushin had been here in Israel, and he was in the United States living with a woman already, with a home, they had their own home, he was living with a woman, maintaining a couple’s life, as if nothing had happened. So the matter reached a religious court, and it went on for years and years. They tried to force him to give her a get, and he was a get-refuser. I’ve already lost all the data, all the facts that were there. I could have written a book this thick about all the blunders of the Rabbinate in that case. It’s unbelievable what went on there. It’s just unbelievable. People don’t… they sent an agent and he got lost, and the get was sent by mail, and no get, and here, and he agreed and didn’t agree, and they bribed him with money so that he’d give a get, and all sorts of totally bizarre things—bizarre. In short, we sat over it, and I suggested to my colleagues to annul the kiddushin on the basis that she would never have betrothed herself on that understanding. Meaning, if she had known that the guy didn’t even intend to arrive at the hotel on the first night, then clearly she would never have consented to the kiddushin. More than that, it’s obvious that this was from the outset, because he bought a plane ticket, that very night he flew, everything was planned. So already at the stage when he gave her the ring, he had no intention of living with her. It’s not that it happened afterward. I claim that even if it happened afterward, the kiddushin are void, but here it didn’t even happen afterward.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, it reminds me of a story I once heard from Rabbi Katz, who was the head of the institute at Bar-Ilan. He told me that once they converted a man—they finished the conversion on Friday. That Friday night he held a wedding in a hall on the Sabbath eve. At the wedding that night he held a wedding in a hall, with his partner, long may she live, with an orchestra and all the guests, in full proper fashion. So they canceled the conversion. Even though a person who sins after conversion is a sinful Jew and that doesn’t cancel his conversion, his argument was: you don’t organize a hall from Friday afternoon to Friday night with all the guests unless it was obviously planned in advance. Which means that at the moment he converted he had no intention of accepting observance of the commandments; he did not accept the commandments, and therefore the conversion was not valid. They canceled the conversion.
[Speaker C] No, but maybe the conversion wasn’t planned for that specific day?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand.
[Speaker C] Maybe the conversion wasn’t planned…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The moment he converted on Friday, he accepted…
[Speaker C] Yes, but I’m saying, the wedding could have been planned a long time in advance, and this conversion wasn’t planned for that day; maybe it was planned for two days later, and then he was still allowed to marry on the Sabbath because he was still a non-Jew before the conversion.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He married a Jewish woman—what do you mean?
[Speaker C] Oh, she was Jewish.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He married here in Israel. Fine, in any event, the point—I’m only bringing this as an example—so basically I wanted to argue that the kiddushin there were void because she did not consent to that. She did not consent. And I claim this is true even if he decided to travel abroad after the kiddushin—but certainly, certainly if it happened before the kiddushin.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now the problem was that there is a Talmudic passage in Bava Kamma on page 102… one second… here, 110b. The Talmud says as follows: “If so, a yevamah who fell before a leper should go out without chalitzah, because she would not have betrothed herself on that understanding.” Right? A woman was married, her husband died, and the husband’s brother is a leper; now he is supposed to enter levirate marriage with her. So the Talmud says: she can leave without chalitzah—no levirate marriage and no chalitzah—she is permitted. Why? Because she would not have betrothed herself on that understanding. If she had known she would fall to levirate marriage before a leper, she would never have consented to the kiddushin of the dead brother, and therefore her kiddushin are void and she is essentially unmarried, so she needs neither chalitzah nor levirate marriage. So the Talmud says—and this is really, really exactly what I wanted to argue, right? Basically, the Talmud says that if she had known something would happen that was against her will, she would not have consented. Since she would not have consented, her consent was mistaken, and the kiddushin are void and she is unmarried. Kiddushin are void because of “on that understanding.” The consideration of “on that understanding” is the very consideration I wanted to make. Except that here the Talmud says: “There, we are witnesses that she is content with any husband at all,” in accordance with Resh Lakish, who said: “It is better to dwell as two than to dwell as a widow.” Yes, this is the joker of the religious courts. What does that mean? We are witnesses that this woman did want the kiddushin. Even if she had known she would fall before a leper for levirate marriage, she would still consent to the kiddushin. Why? “It is better to dwell as two than to dwell as a widow.” A woman wants couplehood at any price.
[Speaker D] But in the Rabbi’s case—even if we say today this presumption still exists—that’s not the case at all. The Rabbi was talking about a case where the husband isn’t here. From day one she’s a widow, so to speak.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. So I’m getting there—I’m getting there, you’re right in my view, I’m getting there. So the Talmud basically says “it is better to dwell as two than to dwell as a widow.” In other words, the woman wants couplehood at any price. Even if her husband is a leper, or she falls to levirate marriage before a leper, she wants couplehood in any case. By the way, notice that she wants couplehood with the first husband, and she is willing to pay the price that she may fall to levirate marriage with a leper. The Talmud does not say that if the husband himself were a leper, she would also consent. That’s another discussion. She wants couplehood with a normal husband, and she is willing to take the risk that she might fall to levirate marriage before a leper. But never mind, let’s leave that. At the moment the Talmud seemingly says: she is content with any husband at all. That means: in every case, in every condition, she is content to receive couplehood. Any price she is willing to pay. And that is indeed how it is generally accepted in the religious courts: there is no annulment of kiddushin on the claim of “on that understanding.” Why? Because “on that understanding”—because the woman does consent to any kiddushin at any price, and therefore you can’t annul kiddushin by claiming that if the woman had known something she would not have consented. She always consents, at any price. That is essentially the claim.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now I want to make several comments on this. First, the earlier comment I made: it is not true that this is at any price. Here we are dealing with a case where she had a good marriage; she only fell to levirate marriage before a leper. If the husband himself is a leper, who says even then? It’s not certain that this was said about every price. And indeed here and there you can find among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and later authorities (Acharonim)—for example, someone who falls to levirate marriage before an apostate—then Maharam of Rothenburg claims that the kiddushin are void: she would not have consented on that understanding. So there is annulment on the basis of “on that understanding”; you do find such things in the halakhic decisors.
[Speaker F] And also in the Talmud they don’t force her when she falls before a leper—in the Talmud, doesn’t it say nearby things like that, that they don’t force her into levirate marriage? She can refuse levirate marriage.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I hear, but I didn’t understand.
[Speaker F] Also when she falls to levirate marriage before a leper and so on, there’s the nearby passage in the Talmud that they don’t force her—that they don’t compel her to enter levirate marriage. She can refuse levirate marriage.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, she can—but through chalitzah. She still needs chalitzah.
[Speaker F] Yes, yes, but…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here the Talmud says no—she needs neither chalitzah nor levirate marriage, because the kiddushin are void. She never consented on that basis at all.
[Speaker F] That’s what the Talmud says, no? Right, meaning what the Talmud says here, that she is content with any husband at all, is only enough to obligate her in chalitzah, but it’s not… okay, fine.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course, that’s what I’m saying. The kiddushin are not void—that’s what the Talmud says. Right. Obviously she can say, I don’t want levirate marriage, I want chalitzah. In any event, so that’s the first claim. The second claim is what Dov said earlier. In our case, the one I described before, the woman didn’t get the couplehood. She is willing to accept couplehood at any price, but here she didn’t get any couplehood at all! On the first night he already didn’t come to the hotel, went abroad, and lived with someone else. So did she consent on that basis? Here the Talmud says the opposite. Not only does it not say against me; here in the Talmud this is a source for what I’m saying. Because the Talmud says she is willing to pay any price for couplehood. But if she didn’t get couplehood, then obviously she didn’t consent on that basis! What, she consented in order to remain chained as a married woman? If she had known she would remain chained all her life, would she still consent to kiddushin? Why? Because she has couplehood? She has no couplehood! He doesn’t come to the hotel on the first night. For the sake of “dwelling as two” she is willing to pay any price. But she has no “dwelling as two.” So how can one say on the basis of this Talmudic passage that the kiddushin are not void? The opposite! This Talmudic passage says the kiddushin are void. Because this passage says there is a claim of “on that understanding” in kiddushin, right? That is what the Talmud says. Only what? Just because she is always content to pay any price for the sake of couplehood, therefore they don’t make that claim. Well, in a place where she doesn’t get the couplehood, that is exactly what the Talmud says—that there is a claim of “on that understanding” in kiddushin when she doesn’t get the couplehood. This Talmudic passage is the strongest proof for what I said. Everyone brings this Talmudic passage against me, but that’s wrong. This Talmudic passage is the strongest proof for what I said.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But what matters for our purposes is the third point I want to make about this topic. I’ll just say it and stop here, because I need a bit of time for it. What I basically want to argue is the following claim: in order to determine whether there is a claim of “on that understanding” or not, it is not relevant to study Talmudic passages. The Talmudic passages are not the source for clarifying this issue. This is a factual question: do women consent or not consent? Conduct a survey and see whether women consent or not. Why do I care about all the fine readings in the Talmud, the medieval authorities (Rishonim), the Geonim, and the later authorities (Acharonim), and whether the Talmud spoke about this or something else? We are trying to clarify a factual question here. A factual question is not clarified from the Talmud; a factual question is clarified in reality. You simply look and see what the facts are. And somehow all the halakhic decisors immediately run to the Talmudic passages to check whether women are comfortable entering kiddushin in such a situation or not. The way to clarify it is simply to ask the women, not to go to the Talmud. Here too this is first-order ruling about facts. It is absurd to think that one even needs to say this, but it turns out that apparently one does. Because people rule second-order even regarding facts, not only regarding Jewish law—and that is simply unbelievable. If I hadn’t read these things I wouldn’t have believed it. But I’ll elaborate on that a bit more next time. Fine, let’s stop here. If there are any comments or questions?
[Speaker G] Rabbi, may I ask a question that isn’t related to the lesson? Yes. I read what you wrote, that atheism is, in your view, heresy in rationality. But I know lots of atheists who are rational in the highest degree. Isn’t that a contradiction?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How do you know they’re rational?
[Speaker G] I can testify about them. I know them personally.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m telling you that if they deny, then they are not rational. You’re assuming they’re rational; you’re begging the question.
[Speaker G] No, I’m saying, I know them personally, I know the reasons for their atheism, and in my view it’s completely rational.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so you disagree with me. You’re claiming—leave aside whom you know and whom you don’t know—you’re claiming that there can be rational reasons for atheism. That’s a different claim; it has nothing to do with whom you know and whom you don’t.
[Speaker G] You don’t agree with that at all?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not? I think it’s a non-rational argument, yes; it’s a non-rational approach. One has to distinguish here between two statements. There is a difference between judging a person and judging an argument. Yes, I understand. I’m saying that the atheist position is not rational. That doesn’t mean that the person who holds it is not rational. He may make a mistake and mistakenly adopt a non-rational position. And in all other matters he can be rational in the highest degree—a rational genius, brilliant in all areas of science and philosophy.
[Speaker G] So it’s strange that he arrived at such a position. Rationally? But God is derived from philosophical arguments that are sometimes hard to understand, so isn’t it a bit problematic that God expects us to reach Him that way?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What he expects—you’d have to ask Him. I can tell you what I think about atheism. I don’t know what God expects, so that’s…
[Speaker G] Wait, but if you arrive at God through this kind of philosophical route that’s more or less your own new approach, then how were Jews in the past supposed to believe?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not new, I mean it’s really not new at all, it’s written in…
[Speaker G] Why? The idea that the principle of causality applies also to the time before the Big Bang and all that—that’s basically your idea, something derived from thought.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The physico-theological argument—I’m definitely not taking credit for that. Meaning, it’s written in midrashim, it appears in Maimonides, it appears in medieval authorities (Rishonim), it appears among Christians, it appears…
[Speaker G] Yes, but it has a different version. You have a different version of it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait a second, I know. That’s the argument. Now, there are all kinds of objections, and those are newer objections, and I have my answers, which are newer answers. But all that does is present the old argument in an updated form. That’s all. Now, both the objections are new and my arguments are new, that’s true. But the argument itself is an old argument, and it’s very, very logical. It’s just that the objections that come up, which are newer objections, need to be rejected with… newer arguments. The argument itself—
[Speaker G] It’s a logical argument that was always true and always made sense. Yes, but with a caveat, yes, and maybe.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What’s the question?
[Speaker D] No, what the Rabbi said, that the Rabbi’s method is old and all that—maybe the Rabbi’s novelty is more generally in terms of, like, the synthetic method, that it’s…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does that have to do with syntheticity? Syntheticity—that’s not… why is that connected here? I want…
[Speaker D] Right, no, it’s not connected to the essence… not connected to the proofs.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] From the fact that something complex doesn’t just come into being for no reason—that’s my claim. The old claim… not mine, an ancient old claim. I go over the rules and formulate things in various ways, because all kinds of objections and counterarguments came up and so on, so I also make arguments, color it, or dress it in new clothing.
[Speaker G] And in your view, does it hold up?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It was always true, and it’s still true, and I don’t see anything overly sophisticated in it.
[Speaker G] On the contrary, the argu—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The counterarguments are very sophisticated, and against them you need counter-counterarguments that are also sophisticated. The basic argument is a simple and correct argument, and it was always correct.
[Speaker G] But what you did with the law of causality—without that the argument wouldn’t have worked at all, so that seems strange to me, because in the past it wouldn’t have been justified to believe on the basis of this argument.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It was—first, first, you can believe based on other arguments too, not only this one.
[Speaker G] Yes, that’s true.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And second, I think this argument was always correct. And the fact that people don’t know how to formulate all their assumptions completely and define all their concepts completely—that doesn’t mean that intuitively they don’t grasp this logic. They do grasp this logic, exactly this logic. I didn’t innovate anything. I just formulated explicitly what was already in the intuition of any person who thinks about it.
[Speaker G] I understand.
[Speaker D] Rabbi, regarding what the Rabbi remarked about the criticism of formalism, that it cuts off the branch it’s sitting on—is that similar to the criticism of postmodernism?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You could say that, yes. Relativism, yes, on the level of thought, yes. It’s not just similar, it’s exactly that.
[Speaker C] Rabbi, I wanted to ask: does the Rabbi also come give lectures in synagogues? If we wanted to invite the Rabbi, things like that—is that possible?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s possible, we’d have to talk, yes.
[Speaker C] How do we talk?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] By phone, by email, by…
[Speaker C] Okay. Can we write to the Rabbi through WhatsApp? Yes. Okay.
[Speaker G] Rabbi, I wanted to ask about vegetarianism, if that’s okay. Okay. I wanted to ask what the benefit is of being vegetarian if in any case, when they serve you meat, then if you don’t eat it, it’ll be thrown out anyway. So what difference does it make whether you eat it or not? It hardly affects the industry.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s—first, the answer is twofold. First, the more people do this, then yes, the piece of chicken or meat they offered you will be thrown out, but it still has some cumulative effect over time. Not on that particular piece, but more generally. Maybe you’ll influence others to become vegetarian, maybe next time they won’t serve it to you because they’ll know you’re vegetarian, and so on.
[Speaker G] Do you think there’s hope for such a big change?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think so. Second, there’s the categorical imperative, which doesn’t depend on outcomes at all. The categorical imperative says that you’re supposed to do what you would want to become a universal law. And as a universal law, it’s clearly right that everyone should be vegetarian. True, that won’t happen in practice, but the whole categorical imperative, its whole idea, is that it’s not a consequentialist imperative. It’s not… you don’t do it in order for us to reach those outcomes. You do it because it’s the right thing. The indication that it’s the right thing is that this is what you would want to be a universal law.
[Speaker C] What, is the Rabbi vegetarian?
[Speaker D] Yes. By the way, doesn’t the Rabbi think there’s some…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Vegan. I’m not strong enough, but one really ought to be vegan.
[Speaker D] Does the Rabbi think there’s a prohibition here because of causing suffering to animals, because of the industry?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think there’s… I can’t tell you at the formal halakhic level—I’m not sure there’s a prohibition there, but there is a moral prohibition.
[Speaker D] But does the Rabbi think it’s a moral prohibition only because of the industry, or because of vegetarianism itself?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not because of eating in itself. If killing animals in order to use them were done humanely, yes—so they don’t suffer—but what happens in the industry is horrifying.
[Speaker C] I understand, and if… if it were done, theoretically, the way it used to be done once, without industry, then the Rabbi wouldn’t be vegetarian? Yes, I—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] think so.
[Speaker G] Rabbi, but isn’t there a halakhic obligation to eat on certain holidays, no? To eat meat?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can rejoice without meat too. “There is no joy except with meat and wine” and a few other things.
[Speaker G] And that’s Jewish law, no?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you can rejoice without it too. Yes? Fine. Originally it was sacrificial meat altogether.
[Speaker C] I understood that just wine is enough for joy.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I can’t hear?
[Speaker C] I understood that just wine is enough for joy.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wine doesn’t make me happy either; for me it only makes me sad.
[Speaker G] Wait, and Rabbi, do you think it’s really terrible to eat meat? Or is it still kind of okay, like one bad thing out of four?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know how to rank it. I think what they do to animals is utterly horrific, really terrible what they do there. Terrible and awful.
[Speaker G] And you think it’s proper to make an effort to avoid it completely? Yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again, I myself say—I admit the truth. I’m not strong enough to be vegan. I just don’t like all those grains and things, I can’t live on that. It’s too hard today. But anyone who can—bless them. What’s happening there is terrible and awful. Terrible. They whitewash it with all kinds of nice words. In the supermarket we see it wrapped up and frozen and everything is excellent and clean. It went through horrific things. Terrible and awful. They stop people in the street for abusing cats—it’s a joke compared to what they do to animals in the industry.
[Speaker G] Yes, I completely agree about that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Good.
[Speaker C] But isn’t there halakhic supervision on these things?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You know, that’s one of the problems—go convince rabbis who deal with kashrut to supervise this too. If it were open on the Sabbath they wouldn’t give it kosher certification. But the fact that these people are carrying out a Nazi Holocaust on animals—they have no problem with that. Everything is fine.
[Speaker F] Because even when it comes to facts, they go by second-order considerations. What? Even with facts they go by second-order considerations.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Nice, a nice connection.
[Speaker G] Rabbi, but things like this are happening in nature all the time.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Nature is nature.
[Speaker G] What… cruel killing is common everywhere in nature, it’s unavoidable.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If the lion brings me the carcass he murdered cruelly, I won’t eat that either. I can’t control lions, right? There’s no guardian…
[Speaker G] Yes, but wouldn’t it be better to make an effort to prevent it altogether in nature rather than stopping only what humans do?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I can’t make an effort to prevent it in nature. A lion has to eat. The gazelle is not preferable to the lion. That’s nature; that’s how we were created.
[Speaker G] So if we lived in the age of primitive man, when he often had to eat meat, then that would be moral?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does “moral” mean? To create an industry? Not an industry. Primitive man didn’t produce industrial meat. If he needed it for survival—an industry, then yes, then you need… I don’t prefer animals over human beings. If human beings need a meat industry in order to live, then you need a meat industry. But they don’t need it.
[Speaker G] And right now it’s not necessary?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. I understand. When they grow tissues—
[Speaker G] I—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know, when they get to industrial production in that kind of way, that’ll be wonderful. It’ll solve the whole problem. But in the meantime we’re not there yet.
[Speaker G] And do you know processed meat? Would that be okay to eat?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean by processed meat? Processed meat is meat in every sense.
[Speaker G] What’s called processed? No, I mean, there’s a plan to take one cell and replicate it, so that it doesn’t harm any animal.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, in a lab, in tissues—that’s what I was talking about. But there still isn’t industrial production of those.
[Speaker G] I think there is, but it’s not too common.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s industrial production in the sense that you can buy a piece of steak for a hundred dollars—that’s not exactly… right. It—
[Speaker G] It seems to me that it’s still not…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’re still a long way from it being truly industrial. There were all kinds of hopes like that, which apparently now aren’t working out. It apparently isn’t as close as we thought.
[Speaker G] And if it is, would you eat that kind of meat? What? If it is, would you eat that kind of meat?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not? Sure. Not only that—even if they slaughtered a cow humanely, I’d eat that too.
[Speaker G] But that’s still murder. What—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What is murder? I don’t see that as murder. It’s permissible to kill animals in order to eat.
[Speaker G] But even in the industry, their death is often very quick, so what’s the difference?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The death is very quick—but until they get to that death, they go through hell.
[Speaker G] Depends on the case, no? No.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is no place where this business is done in a normal way. None. As far as I know, there’s no place that even comes close to normal. None. I’m not talking about the moment… the moment of the killing itself—fine, it’s a knife and he dies. I’m not talking about that, I’m talking about all the stages, including the raising. From the raising—not only in the…, not only in the slaughterhouse. Even in the slaughterhouse itself, the process of how it’s brought to the point of the knife—horrible things.
[Speaker G] So why do they do it like that in the first place? What’s the problem with building slightly bigger cages, more spacious ones?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Apparently economic difficulty. I can’t judge the people, but I don’t think it’s right to eat from that. There’s probably an economic problem with it. It’s not… probably. Look, in other countries the situation is better. In Europe the situation is much better. With free-range eggs everything is glatt there, but they have much stricter standards there than in Israel. Israel is a terrible country in that respect.
[Speaker F] Also in France, also in France—every so often in France there are big scandals that get exposed in the media.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what I’m saying—exposed is something else. Here the standard itself is like this. Wicked people always exist everywhere, criminals exist everywhere, but they’ve already established standards there that are much better than what we have. There are lobbies here that don’t let this business move forward.
[Speaker G] Wait, so would you eat meat there in Europe?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know, you’d have to check the situation. When I get there I can try to check. I don’t know. But certainly the legal situation there is much better. The standards there are much better.
[Speaker G] Rabbi, I wanted to ask again regarding atheism. If there’s a person who believes he is completely rational and he arrived at an atheist position?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Napoleon is sure he’s completely rational.
[Speaker G] Napoleon? I didn’t understand, what?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A person who thinks he’s Napoleon—he too is sure he’s rational.
[Speaker G] Yes, but a mentally healthy person, who’s also willing to argue about it, to have debates, you know. So what will happen to him in the World to Come, like? It’s a bit problematic to punish him, no?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? Obviously not—he’s coerced. What do you mean?
[Speaker G] So it’s okay, basically? No?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously. When I say he’s not rational, that doesn’t mean I’m assigning him blame. I assume that maybe I’m also not rational in things that I…
[Speaker G] No, I mean a person that… you’re answering me on the assumption that he definitely isn’t really rational and only thinks he is.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand.
[Speaker G] Because if he really is rational and comes out an atheist, then what happens? It doesn’t sound justified to punish him.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t understand. A person can make a mistake—what do you mean? Mistake is coercion. A person makes a mistake and adopts an irrational position—so what?
[Speaker G] He made a mistake. But then what? So he’s exempt from punishment because of that? Because he was coerced, basically? But that’s true of almost everything, every sin.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of everything. Everywhere that a person is truly coerced, he’s coerced.
[Speaker G] But absolute causality prevents free choice, doesn’t it? Free will. I didn’t understand. You wrote that absolute causality prevents free will, so it’s problematic to punish in that situation.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what? I didn’t understand—so what’s the question?
[Speaker G] The question is how reward and punishment work in the World to Come if we don’t really have free will.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But we do have free will. How?
[Speaker G] But there’s causality.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re pulling me into a completely different topic—about that I wrote a book. Which book? The Science of Freedom.
[Speaker G] And what’s the conclusion? How do we have free choice?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We have free will because our will penetrates the law of causality.
[Speaker G] How? But we depend on the conditions of nature, on our limited body.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We don’t. The soul maybe doesn’t.
[Speaker G] The will can move electrons.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How? The will can move electrons without any physical force acting on them.
[Speaker G] You mean the soul, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, the will—that is, our mental aspect. Soul, psyche, spirit—call it whatever you want.
[Speaker G] No, because that’s problematic, since many don’t believe in a soul, and in that case everything is basically materialistic.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Many don’t believe, so ask them. I’m telling you what I think, not what they think. They don’t believe in a soul? Then they don’t believe, fine—what can I do?
[Speaker G] And if there’s no such mental thing and everything is materialistic, then there’s no free will, right? You agree with that? Yes. Fine. So wouldn’t it be better simply to investigate that issue deeply instead of… you know, checking whether there really is free will directly? I didn’t understand. It would be better to check whether souls exist and whether there’s mentality that isn’t materialistic.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Good luck. Let me know when you have a way to test that—I’d be happy to participate.
[Speaker G] No, there are just many disputes about it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are disputes, yes. I’m only asking whether you have a way to test it. There are disputes; I’m only asking whether you have a way to determine who’s right.
[Speaker G] At the moment no, not that I know of.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so when there is, let me know and I’ll be happy to examine it.
[Speaker G] Okay, I—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, have a peaceful Sabbath, good night, goodbye.
[Speaker G] Good night.