Learning and Rulings – Lesson 35
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- Defining leniency and stringency as options
- Leniency in the laws of blessings, and “in cases of doubt about blessings we are lenient” versus “do not take God’s name in vain”
- Pressing circumstances and the relation between “following the lenient view” and “ruling leniently”
- A doubt among major authorities and the example of the Ran in tractate Megillah
- “Rabbi Shimon is worthy to be relied upon in pressing circumstances” and the difficulty of permitting something against the accepted ruling
- Mahari Mintz and the Rema: leniencies only when the decisor’s view tends toward full permission
- Maimonides versus an interpretation that reconciles him with the Rema: reciting Shema after dawn
- The authority of the sages to uproot fulfillment of a Torah commandment, and examples from sukkah and shofar
- The Brisker Rav and the distinction between stringency in order to fulfill one’s obligation and stringency for a “scrupulous person”
- Halakhic ruling as drawing a map, and handing the practical decision over to the questioner
- The example of family planning and the claim that the practical decision is not a halakhic question
- A primary rabbi, “a sage who forbade something may not have his ruling overturned by another,” and formal authority versus expertise
- The limits of this claim in relation to disputes among Tannaim that were already decided
Summary
General Overview
The text defines a leniency as opening up more halakhic options, not as an instruction that is more convenient in practice, and defines a stringency as closing off options. It distinguishes between the leniency of the halakhic decisor, which ends with drawing the halakhic map of possibilities, and the borrowed sense of “being lenient” on the part of the questioner, who in practice chooses the less demanding option. From there, it raises a difficulty about the permission to “be lenient in pressing circumstances,” especially in Torah-level law and in cases like “Rabbi Shimon is worthy to be relied upon in pressing circumstances,” and cites Mahari Mintz and the Rema, who limit such leniencies to cases where, according to the halakhic conclusion, there is full permission and it is only proper to be strict. Finally, it presents a principled position according to which the role of the decisor is not to decide for the questioner, but to present the halakhic courses of action and their cost, while the practical decision depends on the questioner and his circumstances.
Defining Leniency and Stringency as Options
Leniency is defined as opening up more options for halakhic conduct, and stringency is defined as closing off options. A decisor is called lenient relative to another decisor when he permits more possible courses of action, even if one of them is very burdensome, like “fasting for two days on Yom Kippur,” because the very addition of an option makes him lenient. The usual intuition that leniency means “more convenient” stems only from the fact that more options also make it possible to choose what is convenient, but that is not the definition of leniency itself.
Leniency in the Laws of Blessings, and “In Cases of Doubt About Blessings We Are Lenient” versus “Do Not Take God’s Name in Vain”
In a case of rabbinic doubt, “to go leniently” means, in the ruling itself, that there is no obligation and one may do either way—for example, “he may recite the blessing and he may refrain from reciting it.” The practical choice not to recite the blessing because it is more convenient is a borrowed use of the term “to be lenient,” and it is done by the questioner, not by the decisor. He explains that in cases of doubt about blessings there is leniency within the laws of blessings, but because of the prohibition of do not take God’s name in vain, a practical stringency is created that prevents one from reciting a blessing when there is an option not to do so. Therefore, the practical result may be a stringency that belongs not to the laws of blessings but to the laws of do not take God’s name in vain.
Pressing Circumstances and the Relation Between “Following the Lenient View” and “Ruling Leniently”
In pressing circumstances people use the phrase “one may be lenient,” but leniency in its precise sense is still the opening of options, not necessarily a solution that will help in that particular pressing situation. He distinguishes between a lenient ruling that expands possibilities and a practical choice of an option that actually makes things easier, and emphasizes that the common usage of “being lenient in pressing circumstances” mixes together these two meanings. He raises a principled difficulty: if “in a Torah-level doubt we rule stringently” is a binding rule, how can it sometimes be permitted in pressing circumstances to rely on a lenient opinion even in Torah-level law.
A Doubt Among Major Authorities and the Example of the Ran in Tractate Megillah
In a dispute where one decisor obligates X and another obligates Y in a rabbinic law, there is no leniency or stringency in the sense of opening options, and so the decision is not a matter of “being lenient or strict,” but of choosing a rabbi or ruling for oneself if one is qualified. He analyzes the situation through the laws of doubt: regarding each obligation separately, a rabbinic doubt is created, and in principle one may therefore do neither X nor Y. He cites the Ran on Megillah concerning a city of doubtful walled status, which from the standpoint of the laws of doubt should have been exempt from reading the Megillah on both the fourteenth and the fifteenth, except that the Ran introduces an additional rule: where the laws of doubt would completely cancel the rabbinic enactment of reading, we are stringent so that the rabbinic law will not be uprooted.
“Rabbi Shimon Is Worthy to Be Relied Upon in Pressing Circumstances” and the Difficulty of Permission Against an Accepted Ruling
He cites the Talmud in the laws of muktzeh, about moving the Hanukkah lamp because of the Chaveri, where it says “pressing circumstances are different” and “Rabbi Shimon is worthy to be relied upon in pressing circumstances,” and raises the question how an opinion that was rejected can serve as a basis for permission in a pressing situation. He argues that if Jewish law was already ruled against Rabbi Shimon, then seemingly it should make no difference that Rabbi Shimon thought otherwise, and pressing circumstances should not be able to change the law. The difficulty becomes sharper when Torah-level law is involved, where the rule is that in Torah-level doubt we rule stringently.
Mahari Mintz and the Rema: Leniencies Only When the Decisor’s View Tends Toward Full Permission
He quotes from the responsa of Mahari Mintz that leniency for a poor person during the week and for a wealthy person on Friday is said only when the decisor’s opinion tends toward the matter being “fully permitted,” while the usual prohibition is “against his own view” for some side reason. He cites the Rema in the introduction to Torat Chatat, who justifies leniencies in cases of major financial loss, for a poor person, or in honor of the Sabbath, because in his opinion this is “fully permitted according to the halakhic conclusion,” and only the later authorities were stringent. According to this approach, “being lenient in pressing circumstances” really means “not being stringent” in a case where the thing is fundamentally permitted, and not permission to violate something that the decisor actually considers forbidden.
Maimonides versus an Interpretation That Reconciles Him with the Rema: Reciting Shema After Dawn
He cites the Talmud in Berakhot 9 about the evening Shema after daybreak but before sunrise, and Maimonides, who rules that one has not fulfilled the obligation unless he was prevented by circumstances, such as being drunk or sick. He sees Maimonides as an example of permitting reliance in pressing circumstances on a lenient view even without saying that the law fundamentally follows it, in contrast to the framework of Mahari Mintz and the Rema. He quotes the Mishnah Berurah, who presents the possibility that the sages “canceled” the commandment for someone who delayed, and in that way it can be explained that the recitation itself is valid on the Torah level, and only a rabbinic penalty prevents fulfillment—bringing the explanation closer to the Rema’s approach.
The Authority of the Sages to Uproot Fulfillment of a Torah Commandment, and Examples from Sukkah and Shofar
He raises the question of the sages’ ability to uproot fulfillment of a Torah commandment, such as one who blows shofar on Rosh Hashanah when it falls on the Sabbath, or one who sits in the sukkah while his table is inside the house. He cites Tosafot on Sukkah 4, who say, “you have never fulfilled the commandment of sukkah in your life,” implying that someone who violates a rabbinic enactment not only violates rabbinic law but also fails to fulfill the Torah commandment. He notes that the Ran disagrees. He mentions Rabbi Asher Weiss, who proposes a distinction according to which specifically in protective enactments rooted in “you shall safeguard My charge” there is power to uproot the thing itself, and he expresses conceptual reservations about such an extreme understanding of that power.
The Brisker Rav and the Distinction Between Stringency in Order to Fulfill One’s Obligation and Stringency for a “Scrupulous Person”
He brings an anecdote about the Brisker Rav, who drank water outside the sukkah even though it is written that a scrupulous person should be stringent even regarding water, and explains in his name that this is not a “stringency” at all, but a choice to adopt only what is needed to ensure fulfillment according to various opinions. He emphasizes that the Brisker approach does not adopt stringencies that are defined in advance as mere stringencies with no opinion actually requiring them, but it does narrow the options where there is concern that according to some opinion one has not fulfilled the obligation. He reconciles this with his definition that stringency means closing off options; therefore, “fulfilling the obligation according to all opinions” counts as a stringency because it requires one path that satisfies everyone and blocks the other paths.
Halakhic Ruling as Drawing a Map, and Handing the Decision Over to the Questioner
He argues that halakhic ruling divides into two stages: first determining the halakhically possible courses of action, and then making a practical choice among them. He states that the role of the decisor is only the first stage—namely, to present the questioner with the halakhic map, the gradations among the options, and the halakhic and practical “cost” of each option—while the final choice is left to the questioner. He presents this as a response to the fact that pressing circumstances depend on the details of a person’s situation, his fear of Heaven, money, and suffering, and these are data the decisor cannot know precisely and therefore should not decide in his place.
The Example of Family Planning and the Claim That the Practical Decision Is Not a Halakhic Question
He gives as an example questions of family planning and delaying procreation, and argues that there are “many considerations” that allow postponement and that there is no basis for the hysteria of stringencies “because of the Holocaust.” He presents the halakhic role as laying out the considerations and the different levels of ideal, after the fact, rabbinic prohibition versus Torah prohibition, and not as deciding for the couple how much to suffer or how much to pay. He says that at the point where the options and their costs have been presented, “the halakhic expertise ends here,” and what follows is the person’s own decision-making.
A Primary Rabbi, “A Sage Who Forbade Something May Not Have His Ruling Overturned by Another,” and Formal Authority versus Expertise
He distinguishes between a situation where the questioner has accepted upon himself a primary rabbi or a local halakhic authority who has formal authority, and a case of consulting a halakhic expert who is not binding. He suggests that the prohibition against permitting something after a sage has forbidden it may derive either from the formal authority of the first rabbi, or from a concern for respect when a decisor has already given a conclusive instruction, even though in his opinion that is not the proper mode of halakhic ruling. He compares a decisor to a medical expert who is obligated to present options and alternative treatments rather than conceal disagreements among experts, and argues that a decisor who gives different answers to different people based on personal tailoring is “a liar,” because he is supposed to give a consistent picture of the halakhic map.
The Limits of the Claim in Relation to Disputes Among Tannaim That Were Already Decided
He clarifies that the model of laying out options for the questioner applies to disputes among medieval authorities (Rishonim) and later authorities (Acharonim) that were not decided by formal authority such as the Sanhedrin or the Talmud, and not to disputes among Tannaim in which the law was already decided. He says that if “the law was decided in accordance with Beit Hillel,” there is no point in laying out Beit Shammai’s opinion for the questioner, whereas in a dispute like Maimonides and the Raavad there is no “the law has been decided” in a binding sense, and therefore there is room to present the other opinions to the questioner together with the decisor’s own view. He concludes that his explanation still does not resolve the phrase “Rabbi Shimon is worthy” in the context of a decided Tannaitic dispute, and says that the continuation of the inquiry will be postponed to the next lecture.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Last time I began—I began talking about the question of what a leniency actually is. I’ll just briefly remind you how far we got, and in a moment you’ll see from this that it actually sheds a somewhat different light on the meaning of halakhic ruling in general. But right now I’m dealing with the question of what a leniency is at all—what is a leniency and what is a stringency. So the claim was that a leniency is not necessarily a ruling to behave in a way that is more convenient for me or less burdensome for me. Rather, the definition of a leniency is opening up more options. Meaning, if there are two halakhic decisors who ruled something regarding a certain case, decisor A is called lenient relative to decisor B if the options he opened up are greater in number. Meaning, if he opens up three options for how to act and the first one opened up two options, then he is lenient—even though the third option could be to fast two days on Yom Kippur, which is not exactly what we usually think of as a leniency, okay? But since there is an additional option here that the first one does not allow, that is called a leniency. And a stringency means fewer options. Meaning, someone who closes off options that I open up is considered more stringent than I am. Okay, that is basically the definition.
And the claim was: how does this connect to our usual intuition about leniency and stringency? Simply because if I have more options, then obviously I can choose among them the one that is convenient for me. So someone looking for convenience really will want a lenient decisor. But that does not mean that a lenient decisor is always a decisor who instructs me in a more convenient way. Those are two different things. Meaning, a decisor who says, for example in the laws of blessings—a decisor who tells me that in a certain situation I may recite a blessing and I may refrain from reciting a blessing—then were it not for the problem of “do not take God’s name in vain,” we talked about that last time, then I may recite a blessing and I may refrain from reciting a blessing. Now what does that mean? Another decisor, say, says that I am obligated to recite the blessing. So if it is more convenient for me not to recite it, then I will prefer the first decisor, because he tells me that the option of not reciting the blessing also exists—that is, I can choose that too. The other decisor does not allow me that option.
But he is not called stringent because he doesn’t let me follow the option that is convenient for me. Rather, because he does not allow one of the options that the other one does allow—regardless of whether it is convenient or not—that is why he is called stringent. Therefore, if for example someone actually finds it more convenient specifically to recite the blessing, then from his standpoint too, the decisor who allows both reciting and not reciting is lenient compared to the decisor who says one must recite the blessing and there is no option not to. Even though it is more convenient for me to recite it—so no, I’m not necessarily happy that they added for me another option that lets me avoid reciting it, because in any case I do recite it, I want to recite it, I like reciting blessings. So the added option is not necessarily convenient for me. But the very fact that the second one added an option—or in other words, permits something that someone else forbids—that is called being lenient. If he permits me to pray after midday, permits me to fast for two days on Yom Kippur, permits me all kinds of things that are seemingly more burdensome—but he permits something that someone else forbids—then in that sense he is lenient.
Okay, that is basically the definition of leniency. We saw examples of this in the laws of blessings and also all the leniencies of the Beit HaLevi and so on. In any case, that is the definition of leniency and stringency that we arrived at last time. Now, in order to move further and understand what this thing actually means, I want to go for a moment into something else, another question. We often know when the terms leniency and stringency are used—what contexts do we use these concepts in? For example, if we are in pressing circumstances, then one may be lenient because it is a pressing circumstance, okay, right? That is a well-known halakhic approach: in pressing circumstances one may be lenient. What does that actually mean? It means that I can choose a more lenient ruling in pressing circumstances. But what does it mean to choose a more lenient ruling? To choose a more lenient ruling means a ruling that opens up more options. Now, a ruling that opens up more options will not always help me in pressing circumstances. If it opens up more options that won’t help me in those pressing circumstances, then that leniency is not relevant to the pressing circumstance. Therefore in pressing circumstances—there, what is really being used is the concept of leniency in the sense that it actually makes life easier or less demanding. Okay? So there they really are using the term leniency that way, and that is a borrowed usage. In the end, leniency means opening up more options.
Let’s try to get into this very idea of leniency in pressing circumstances. So, for example, when we are in a case of rabbinic doubt, then in a case of rabbinic doubt one may follow the lenient path. What does it mean, in a case of rabbinic doubt, to follow the lenient path? We talked about doubtful blessings. To follow the lenient path means that one may recite the blessing and one may refrain from reciting it. That is called lenient. Do what you want; there is no obligation. You are allowed to do what is convenient for you—do what you want. But to follow the lenient path and to rule leniently are not the same thing. When we say that in a case of rabbinic doubt we follow the lenient path, or that in a case of rabbinic doubt we rule leniently, what that means is that to rule leniently in a rabbinic doubt means: you may do it this way and you may do it that way. That is the ruling. Now the question is what I will actually do. Let’s say: fine, I’ll be lenient, I won’t recite the blessing. You understand that this is a different use of the phrase “to be lenient.” Here “to be lenient” means to choose this option and not that one. Here “to be lenient” really already means choosing the option that is less demanding or less annoying. And that is a borrowed usage, and it is also something done by the questioner, not by the decisor. The decisor does not tell you not to recite the blessing. The decisor can tell you: you are not obligated to recite the blessing. Now you decide whether you want to recite it or not. That is no longer a halakhic question. Once Jewish law says you may recite the blessing and you may refrain from reciting it, the halakhic ruling is over. You can do either. So who decides whether to recite it or not? You. You have two options—choose what is convenient for you.
[Speaker B] Rabbi, according to that, “in cases of doubt about blessings we are lenient” is not a genuine statement, because in the end I can only refrain from reciting the blessing because of “do not take God’s name in vain”? So it’s a borrowed usage.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I talked about that in the previous lecture. I said that “in cases of doubt about blessings we are lenient” means you may recite the blessing and you may refrain from reciting it. But after you are lenient in the laws of blessings, there is a stringency in the laws of “do not take God’s name in vain.” And because you may also refrain from reciting it, then the prohibition of “do not take God’s name in vain” comes and says: if so, then you are forbidden to recite the blessing, because you can avoid it, so it is an unnecessary blessing. And that is already a stringency, not a leniency. When we say “in cases of doubt about blessings we are lenient,” that is a leniency in the laws of blessings: from the standpoint of the laws of blessings, you may recite it and you may refrain from reciting it. That is from the standpoint of the laws of blessings. The only thing is that every blessing includes God’s name, and therefore there is a problem of taking God’s name in vain, and therefore if you also have the option not to recite it, then you have no permission to recite it. But that really is a stringent ruling, not a lenient one. It’s just that it’s not a stringency in the laws of blessings; it’s a stringency in the laws of “do not take God’s name in vain.” In the laws of blessings we really are lenient. And without our being lenient in the laws of blessings, the stringency of “do not take God’s name in vain” would not even be relevant. Only because I can refrain from reciting it, now the stringency tells me: if so, then you must refrain from reciting it, because you can. But if you could not refrain, then fine—you would recite it. In a place where one really is obligated to recite a blessing, no one will say, “No, no, there’s ‘do not take God’s name in vain,’ don’t recite it.” No—I am obligated to recite it. The only reason “do not take God’s name in vain” enters the picture is because from the standpoint of the laws of blessings, one may recite it and one may refrain from reciting it. Okay?
So leniency, basically, is opening up options. That is the point. And when I choose, once I have several open options—which one to choose—that is no longer the decisor’s decision. That is the questioner’s decision. The decisor told him what options stand before him—that is what Jewish law says. Which one you decide to do—that is your decision. Okay? That is basically the point. Therefore, when you say as a decisor, “I am lenient,” what that means is: I open up more options. When you say, as the recipient of the ruling, as the person carrying out Jewish law, “I follow the lenient path,” what that means is: I choose the third option out of the three, the one that made things easier for me or more convenient for me in some sense. But that is a borrowed concept of leniency; it is not really leniency. It is a borrowed concept. Only what? Where there are more options, of course you can choose the easier option. So leniency in the ruling also allows for leniency in the practical choice, in the practical selection of the option. The more options there are, obviously the more possibilities you have to choose the one that is most convenient for you. But when we speak about leniency in Jewish law, it is really in the first sense, not the second.
[Speaker C] Rabbi, and what if there is some dispute and one opinion says you have one option, and it’s an option that requires more, and the second says you also have one option, but it requires less—without the issue of “do not take God’s name in vain”?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because if one says you need path A and the second says you need path B, that means the second closed off path A—that’s a stringency. The first closed off path B—so he too is stringent. Each of them is stringent relative to the other in a different respect.
[Speaker B] So the mechanisms for deciding doubts are not relevant in such a dispute?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I didn’t understand.
[Speaker B] So the mechanism for deciding doubts, like “in a Torah-level doubt we rule stringently,” is not relevant in such a dispute?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. Only if you say—again, you now have to say—you’re talking now about what happens when there is a doubt among major authorities. Two decisors: one says do X and the other says do Y, and this is rabbinic law. Okay? Now I say: what am I supposed to do in such a case? If one says do X and the other says do Y, then there is no leniency and no stringency here. So first of all, if there is no leniency and no stringency, then this is not a question of being lenient or being strict. So you need to choose a rabbi and do what your rabbi says, or if you yourself are qualified, then rule for yourself whatever you decide.
But if you’re speaking, say, if you look at these doubts each one separately—say decisor A says do X and decisor B says do Y and not X, because one says X and not Y and the other says Y and not X. Now I want to know what to do. So regarding whether I am obligated to do X, there is a doubt, right? Because according to A I need to, and according to B I don’t. So in a case of rabbinic doubt we are lenient, so I don’t need to do X. I may do it and I may refrain from doing it—that is called a lenient ruling in doubt. I may also refrain. Regarding Y, same thing. Decisor B tells me to do Y, decisor A says not to, so I am in doubt, and therefore regarding Y too I don’t need to do it. So in principle, if this is rabbinic law, I can do neither X nor Y.
This reminds me of the Ran in Megillah—the Ran in Megillah, if I remember correctly, talks about reading twice?
[Speaker B] What? About reading twice in the cities?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In a city whose status as walled is doubtful, regarding the reading of the Megillah. So he says that in such a city—its status is doubtful, walled or not walled—then on the fourteenth you have a doubt whether you need to read, right? Because maybe… when does one recite the blessing?
[Speaker B] Can’t hear. The question is when do we recite the blessing?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, the question is when—
[Speaker B] —do we read.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So he asks: on the fourteenth you have a doubt whether you need to read, because the question is whether you are walled or not. On the fifteenth too you have a doubt. Now since the obligation to read the Megillah is rabbinic law, then don’t read either on the fourteenth or on the fifteenth. And that is indeed what the Ran basically claims—that according to the basic laws of doubt, that is what should have happened here. He only adds an innovation: he says that in a place where the laws of doubt would completely cancel the existence of this law, then even though it is rabbinic one must be stringent. But that is only because he added another rule. Because from the standpoint of the regular laws of doubt, without that added rule he introduced, if I look at this in the regular definition of the laws of doubt, then indeed what the Ran says is that we could have avoided reading both on the fourteenth and on the fifteenth. In a rabbinic doubt we are lenient. Which is exactly the case of the two decisors with X and Y. Of course, at least one needs to read on the fourteenth and thereby fulfill the obligation, so it is not entirely symmetrical—but yes, the principle is clear. What? I didn’t hear.
[Speaker D] Rabbi, from the standpoint of the laws of doubt, basically at least one has to read—even at least once for sure—the only question is when.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not true. If I am walled and now it is the fourteenth, then I do not need to read.
[Speaker D] But again, still, at least you’re obligated to read once.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who said you need to read at least once? Decide. If I am walled, then I need to read on the fifteenth. If I am not walled, I need to read on the fourteenth. Now since I am in doubt, I have a doubt about this and a doubt about that. In a rabbinic doubt we are lenient. The Ran says what you are saying, but that is an additional innovation. He says that according to the laws of doubt I should have avoided reading on both days. That is basically the ordinary result of the laws of doubt. The Ran only adds another innovation: in a place where the laws of doubt will lead you to cancel this rabbinic law entirely, there yes, you should be stringent. Fine—but I’m only bringing proof from there as to what should emerge from the laws of doubt themselves in such a situation. Right, regarding the case of the decisor who says X and another decisor who says Y, I said: do neither X nor Y. Which is basically the result of the ordinary laws of doubt. Okay.
Now I want to continue for a moment with the idea of being lenient in pressing circumstances. That was in a case of rabbinic doubt. Now there are places where there is a dispute among decisors, and when someone is in pressing circumstances, they tell him: since there are opinions according to which you may be lenient, then if you are in pressing circumstances you may rely on them. Now this is said also regarding Torah-level law and not only regarding rabbinic law. Meaning, this is not the ordinary rule of “in a rabbinic doubt we are lenient.” Because if it were that ordinary rule, then it would be said only in rabbinic law. But even in Torah-level law, when there are disputes and someone is in pressing circumstances, or significant pressing circumstances, decisors allow leniency. And that means this is not from the ordinary laws of doubt. And then the question really arises: what could be the justification for such a thing?
We already find in the Talmud itself: “Rabbi Shimon is worthy to be relied upon in pressing circumstances.” It says this in several places in the Talmud. What does that mean? Is the law in accordance with Rabbi Shimon? If so, then rely on him even when it isn’t pressing circumstances. Is the law not in accordance with Rabbi Shimon? Then what difference does it make that Rabbi Shimon said something? The law was ruled otherwise. Does pressing circumstances permit you to go against Jewish law? So what if Rabbi Shimon thinks this way? The law was not ruled that way. There is a dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel about an egg laid on a Jewish holiday, or I don’t know what, things like that. So what? Just because there is the view of Beit Shammai, and I am in pressing circumstances, does that mean I can be lenient? Even in rabbinic law, no. Because if the law was ruled like Beit Hillel, then that is the law. Certainly we do not become lenient even in rabbinic law, not even in pressing circumstances. So why does the existence of a lenient opinion allow me to follow it in pressing circumstances? That is the question. Gabi? Yes.
[Speaker C] If, say, in a dispute we don’t really know the truth, and we have some rules of decision, and both sides have logic and basis—so the rules of decision usually say do it this way, but in pressing circumstances you can follow the lenient view.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What, from the laws of doubt?
[Speaker C] From rules of decision, not from the analysis of the dispute itself.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the dispute itself—I don’t know, there are laws of doubt.
[Speaker C] Yes, but those rules of doubt say that in pressing circumstances you can choose the lenient opinion. Not because you know it is correct, and even when you ruled stringently you didn’t know that was correct either, but as a matter of rules of decision—that’s how you ruled.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but if this is a Torah-level doubt, then in a Torah-level doubt you are supposed to be stringent, right? Those are the rules of doubt. So in pressing circumstances it is permitted to violate the law?
[Speaker B] No, or maybe one could say—
[Speaker C] In pressing circumstances—what is the source for this idea that in pressing circumstances one may be lenient?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The source is from statements in the Talmud. It says this in several places in the Talmud.
[Speaker B] But maybe one could say—
[Speaker C] What is the source for the idea that in Torah-level law one has to follow the stringent position? What is the source for that?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, that is the Talmud, yes.
[Speaker C] No, but what is the source of the Talmud? Where does the Talmud say it?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Where does the Talmud derive it from? For example, Nachmanides writes that it is derived from a doubtful mamzer.
[Speaker C] Yes, but in the end what leads them to rule that way? Hm? Why do they rule? What is the reason they really do this?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, what is the reason? That is the rule. The rule is: in a Torah-level doubt we are stringent; in a rabbinic doubt we are lenient. Simple rules. What difference does the reason make?
[Speaker C] Yes, but if the halakhic rule inherently also contains—the rabbi gladly accepts that halakhic rule, so why does he not accept the halakhic rule in exactly the same way where the Talmud says that in pressing circumstances one may follow the lenient authority? That too is said in the Talmud. And Maimonides also said it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And those are two contradictory things.
[Speaker C] No, not contradictory at all. These are all rules of decision. If a person identifies and knows, “I understood that the correct truth is the stringent one,” then indeed he is forbidden to be lenient.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That has nothing to do with it. You don’t know. You are in doubt.
[Speaker C] So there are rules of decision that usually say that in a Torah-level doubt one is stringent, and when there are pressing circumstances you can follow the lenient path. That’s all. They are rules of decision of equal force and equal weight.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But that’s a contradiction.
[Speaker C] A contradiction at all? But you don’t rule because it is true; you rule because there are rules of decision.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does truth have to do with it? The laws of doubt are also part of Jewish law.
[Speaker C] Yes, but they tell you how to act. They tell you that generally you should act stringently, and in pressing circumstances leniently. What is so complicated about that sentence?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is a Torah-level law that in a doubt I need to be stringent, right? Right. So how is it permitted to violate that Torah-level law in pressing circumstances?
[Speaker C] Because the sages who told us that in a Torah-level doubt we should act stringently also told us that in pressing circumstances we should not act stringently. But the sages said this; it isn’t written in the Torah. What do you mean, it isn’t written in the Torah? It is written in the Talmud.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Listen, Shmuel, listen a second. This is a Torah-level law. What do the sages have to do with it?
[Speaker C] Obviously, no, but from doubt—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —one has to be stringent, say, not according to Maimonides.
[Speaker C] Is that written explicitly in the Torah? They derive it from somewhere. Who derived it? The sages. And the sages also said from somewhere that in pressing circumstances you don’t need to do that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why did the sages derive it? I’m asking from where—what is the idea behind it? It’s contradictory. What do you mean, “the sages said”? So what if they said it? Does that mean I’m not allowed to ask questions?
[Speaker C] What’s the problem with inventing some narrative that explains it? No, no—the sages, I can say—what do you mean?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It says so in the Talmud.
[Speaker B] Maybe use the view that really in a Torah-level doubt, on the Torah level one is lenient, and only rabbinically stringent? Can one really say that? No!
[Speaker C] It’s only a contradiction if this is absolute truth—if I know the truth. If I only—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] These are rules of decision; this has nothing to do with absolute truth in any way. The laws of doubt are part of Jewish law. The laws of doubt are part of Jewish law too. The instruction to be stringent in doubt is also Jewish law. And according to most views, that law itself is Torah-level. How are you permitted to violate that Torah-level law when you are in pressing circumstances?
[Speaker C] Because there is another Torah-level law that says: in pressing circumstances, be lenient. The same Torah-level force. So I asked the rabbi: is that a derivation of Maimonides? Is that a derivation of… did the Talmud just wake up one morning and say, “in pressing circumstances, be lenient”?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “That is perfectly permissible”—it says so. And I am asking a question, namely that it contradicts what was said earlier. You can’t tell me, when I ask—
[Speaker C] If, say, they had written—if, say, they had found a verse, if some Amora or Tanna had told you this comes from some verse—everything would be fine, everything would be fine. So what is the rabbi’s problem—that there is no verse?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Yes. Because otherwise it contradicts. Without a source, in a doubt you need to be stringent. Or explain to me logically why this is so, I don’t know, but there has to be some explanation. These are two contradictory principles.
[Speaker C] No, the logic is actually very simple. If I know the law, then I rule as one should. It is forbidden to murder because it is forbidden to murder—we don’t need… I am not in doubt. But if I don’t know whether I need to recite a blessing—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You already said that. It’s not correct. When you explain it to me, you keep repeating that if I know and if I don’t know. It has nothing to do with whether I know. The laws of doubt are clear laws for a situation in which I do not know what I need to do. So why does it matter that I don’t know? There is a halakhic instruction to be stringent. That’s all. It doesn’t matter whether I know or not. Why should it matter? Fine, let’s…
The question really is how to understand this principle that in pressing circumstances one can supposedly violate the rule that in a Torah-level doubt we rule stringently. For example, I don’t know, a woman comes to a rabbi with some question about a chicken—they slaughtered a chicken and the question is whether it is non-kosher or not. So the rabbi sees that the woman is in difficult financial circumstances, and so he says, “Fine, you can be lenient because there is an opinion that is lenient.” Okay? Let’s say this is a dispute among decisors. I’m now talking about Torah-level law. Now, to another woman who had come before him, he would have said, “Absolutely not. On the Torah level it is forbidden to you. If you eat this, you are committing a Torah-level transgression. In a Torah-level doubt we rule stringently.” So the fact that the first woman is in pressing circumstances permits her to violate a Torah-level law? That is the question, basically. Right? So I’ll bring perhaps an example from the Talmud.
[Speaker F] It’s a dispute, Rabbi, whether this is Torah-level or rabbinic. What?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The doubt. Yes, I said—I am not following Maimonides’ approach. And Rav holds like Rabbi Yehuda regarding the laws of muktzeh—a dispute in the laws of muktzeh. And they came and asked Rav: what about moving the Hanukkah lamp away from the Chaveri on the Sabbath? The Chaveri on the Sabbath, yes? Chaveri was some nation that decreed not to light Hanukkah candles, which to this day causes people to light Hanukkah candles inside the house because of that utterly bizarre Rema. In any case, the question is whether it is permitted to move the Hanukkah lamp on the Sabbath so that these Chaveri won’t see the Hanukkah lamp in the window. And he said to him: it is perfectly permissible. Pressing circumstances are different, right? Perfectly permissible. So the Talmud answers: pressing circumstances are different. In pressing circumstances it is permitted. For Rav Kahana and Rav Ashi said to Rav: is that actually the law? Is that really the halakhic ruling? He said to them: Rabbi Shimon is worthy to be relied upon in pressing circumstances. Meaning, you see that the law is not like that, but Rabbi Shimon may be relied upon in pressing circumstances. Okay? The fact that there is an opinion of Rabbi Shimon, even though we do not rule like him, allows me to be lenient in pressing circumstances. Okay, so that is one example. There are more—many more examples of this matter, but that is one example.
Now there is—I want to bring an interesting source. There is in the responsa of Mahari Mintz: “As for what you asked regarding Friday, let his honorable Torah know that I reply every Sabbath in its proper time, and for me all the days of the year are equal. But sometimes you will find a gaon who forbids something against his own opinion for some reason or cause. But his opinion inclines that it is fully permitted. So if an actual case comes before him and the questioner is poor, or if it is Friday and close to the Sabbath, even if he is wealthy, the honor of the Sabbath makes him equivalent to the status of a poor man, and he permits it to him.” Yes—when we are close to the Sabbath, because we are exerting ourselves in honor of the Sabbath, we are lenient even for a wealthy person as though he were poor. And on an ordinary day, not close to the Sabbath, this leniency is given to poor people. “And in any case, the custom is to tell them the reason for this—this one because of his poverty and that one because of the honor of the Sabbath—so that they should not be puzzled why sometimes he forbids and sometimes he permits.” Okay? What is he really saying?
When I permit something to a poor person throughout the week and to a wealthy person close to the Sabbath, that is only where my opinion inclines that it is fully permitted. Right? Basically, that same gaon, that same decisor, forbids the thing against his own opinion—“for some reason,” but his opinion inclines that it is fully permitted, that is what it says here. In such a case, then for a wealthy person close to the Sabbath and for a poor person during the week, you may be lenient. But if your opinion inclines that it is forbidden, then you may not be lenient—not in pressing circumstances, not for poor people, and not for wealthy people near the Sabbath. Okay? Meaning, all the leniencies are only in a place where I think that fundamentally this really is permitted, not only in pressing circumstances—but I have some reason that in ordinary cases I nevertheless instruct people to be stringent. In that sort of case, if a poor person comes or someone near the Sabbath, then I can be lenient. Why? Because that leniency is not against the law. Fundamentally I think it is permitted. On the contrary—the stringency is against the law. The stringency is against the law.
[Speaker F] Is it not because of a prohibition? What? It doesn’t really prohibit. Right. So what does that mean?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It shows a kind of standard. There is no such thing as being lenient in a situation where you think it is forbidden—not in pressing circumstances and nowhere else. All the leniencies I grant you, says the Mahari Mintz—or that decisors grant in pressing circumstances—are only in those things which fundamentally are permitted, not only in pressing circumstances, but if it is not pressing circumstances then it is proper to be stringent for one reason or another even though one is not obligated, and in pressing circumstances they allowed him to be lenient.
[Speaker F] But to say that about the Talmud—isn’t that a little disrespectful to the Talmud? That it ruled something not in accordance with the law, as it were. What? To say that about the Talmud is a little disrespectful, no?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? I didn’t understand.
[Speaker F] Because it rules something, basically, not according to the law—rules it for some public reason or I don’t know, for some other reason.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Where—where does it rule? I didn’t understand.
[Speaker F] No, what the rabbi says—that it forbids, not like Rabbi Shimon, what Rabbi Shimon says.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] When you instruct that something is forbidden even though it is not really forbidden, but because of side reasons, or I don’t know, because the time—
[Speaker F] —requires it, or things—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —of that sort, then you can be lenient in pressing circumstances.
[Speaker F] Yes, but the very act of forbidding such a thing—isn’t there a problem with that?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, you’re asking whether my personal view is that it’s forbidden to do such a thing? I’ll get to that later. Step by step. Look at the Rema; he brings this Mahari”m in the introduction to Torat Chatat: “And hereby I will excuse myself regarding one matter, so that the reader should not suspect me, namely that sometimes I was lenient in a case of substantial loss, or for a poor person in an important matter, or for the honor of the Sabbath. And the reason is that in those cases it seemed to me that it was completely permitted according to the actual Jewish law, only that the later authorities of blessed memory were stringent in the matter.” Meaning: I personally think it’s permitted; the later authorities were stringent about it, and therefore perhaps ordinarily one should take their opinion into account. And therefore I wrote that where it is impossible otherwise, one should leave the matter at its original law; yes, in a pressing situation. So since I think it’s permitted, then it’s permitted. “And so too we find among several later authorities who acted this way, and Mahari”m wrote in his responsum that a poor person all the weekdays and a rich person on Sabbath eve are equivalent.” Meaning, the Rema has—generally, the Rema is considered a fairly stringent halakhic decisor—but he has several very unusual leniencies: new grain outside the Land of Israel, and ordinary gentile wine, and various others, and Hanukkah candles, and all kinds of leniencies. So he says: all these leniencies are only in places where I think that by strict law it is permitted. I was never lenient in something that, in my opinion, is actually forbidden. So you see, this reinforces everything I described earlier. What I said earlier was: what does it mean that now it’s a pressing situation, and because it’s a pressing situation you’re allowed to be lenient? What does it mean to be lenient? Are you allowed to violate Jewish law in a pressing situation? You can’t violate Jewish law. Why should I care that someone else thinks differently? But if you think it’s forbidden, then it’s forbidden. And it’s a pressing situation, a pressing situation—so what? Certainly Jewish law would not be lenient in a pressing situation?
[Speaker D] So that’s certainly Jewish law. Why should I care that someone else thinks differently? Let him be lenient, because he thinks differently. What does that have to do with me? If I think it’s forbidden, then it’s forbidden.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Only in a place where I think it’s permitted by strict law—only in a normal case I nevertheless am stringent, taking other views into account, for whatever reasons—there, in a pressing situation, I will be lenient. Meaning, I won’t be stringent—not that I’ll be lenient. I won’t be stringent. In short, there is no such thing as “to be stringent”; there is such a thing as “not to be lenient.” To be lenient—there is such a thing as not being stringent. That’s it. Maybe, Rabbi, Rabbi, maybe that “being lenient” in a pressing situation is simply an expression for a situation of coercion, where in truth the Jewish law is A, but in a pressing situation, since you’re under coercion, you can do B. But then what does that have to do with being lenient in a pressing situation? If you’re coerced, then everything is permitted. A pressing situation is not coercion. If it were coercion, everything would be permitted. So what is there to discuss? Whether a Torah-level prohibition is also permitted in a pressing situation? Whether a rabbinic prohibition? What? There’s no such thing. Meaning—
[Speaker D] So what’s the definition of a pressing situation?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A pressing situation. It costs you a lot of money, causes you great distress. I don’t know, something like that. Of course, now we have to measure what counts—how much pressure is needed. I’ll get to that later. It’s somewhat connected to what I’m going to say later. So that’s regarding the Rema and Mahari”m Mintz. According to those approaches, when we read the Talmud and it says there, “Rabbi Shimon is worthy to be relied upon in a pressing situation,” then according to the Rema and Mahari”m Mintz, what should that mean? That the Jewish law follows Rabbi Shimon. When they say, “Rabbi Shimon is worthy to be relied upon in a pressing situation,” the meaning is: the Jewish law is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon. It’s only that if it’s not a pressing situation, then one ought to be stringent like Rabbi Yehuda. But basically, if you ask me what the law is—the law is like Rabbi Shimon. Because if the law were like Rabbi Yehuda, then even in a pressing situation you couldn’t be lenient like Rabbi Shimon. Okay, that’s what emerges according to the Rema and Mahari”m Mintz. Now, I’ll send you this article; maybe I already sent it, I—
[Speaker G] don’t remember.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbi, Rabbi? Yes.
[Speaker G] Isn’t it possible to say that a pressing situation is actually part of the halakhic consideration? It’s not some sort of—some sort of thing outside the halakhic discussion. As though we took the halakhic considerations, and then a pressing situation is just some external factor.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why, in ordinary Jewish law?
[Speaker G] Why in definite Jewish law are we not lenient in a pressing situation? No, in Jewish law, when you’re not in a pressing situation, then that consideration isn’t there, because it doesn’t exist.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In a pressing situation—but in a law that is not doubtful law, definite law—why are we not lenient in a pressing situation?
[Speaker G] No, again, I didn’t say that it decides the matter. It’s part of the halakhic consideration. And it could be that it enters the basket of considerations, and then it changes the law, the view, the halakhic position.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If Jewish law says that in a doubt one must be stringent, then how is that different from any other Torah-level law where I’m not lenient in a pressing situation?
[Speaker G] It needs explanation. Each case on its own merits. There are cases where it determines the outcome and is important; maybe they wouldn’t permit an agunah except in a pressing situation—various things, every case on its own merits.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I need explanations. I don’t know what “every case on its own merits” means.
[Speaker G] That’s a general statement. No, I’m saying on the principled level that it’s not something outside Jewish law; it’s part of the halakhic considerations. Words—it’s words.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know what it means that it’s part of the halakhic considerations.
[Speaker G] In practice, that’s what exists. After all, we all do it. Every halakhic decisor does it, if he has even a drop of life in him.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again with this point. It’s not relevant that everyone does it. So what if everyone does it? I’m asking why they do it. Apparently because they understand that it’s part of the halakhic consideration. Zeno’s paradox: I say that from afar Achilles never catches the tortoise. You say, wait a second, but we can see with our own eyes that he does catch it. So what’s the paradox here? That’s the paradox. I’m asking one question, and the answer is something else. I know the answer is something else—that’s why I’m asking.
[Speaker G] I’m saying that when we want to fulfill the word of God, part of the word of God takes into account the person’s ruling, the price it costs him.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not entirely without logic.
[Speaker G] We’re not just doing it for no reason.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why doesn’t part of the word of God tell me to be lenient even in a definite prohibition? This is a Torah-level prohibition and that is a Torah-level prohibition. What’s the difference?
[Speaker G] There are also arguments, there are also other considerations.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there aren’t. There aren’t. In a pressing situation we are not lenient with prohibitions. We don’t permit prohibitions in a pressing situation.
[Speaker G] No, obviously. But you have considerations to be stringent, and people are stringent.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are no considerations to be stringent—it’s forbidden. It’s forbidden, and there’s a pressing situation, so I’ll be lenient? No. A Torah-level doubt is treated stringently—that too is forbidden, so why there am I lenient in a pressing situation?
[Speaker H] By the way, is this only in a halakhic doubt, meaning not in a doubt whether it’s forbidden fat or permitted fat? We haven’t heard such a leniency, right? Or is it… no, in a factual doubt, not a doubt among legal authorities. Do we have leniencies there too? Say, doubtful forbidden fat, doubtful permitted fat—would we also say that in a pressing situation one may be lenient?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Those are the laws of doubts, of course. That’s why I say: “Rabbi Shimon is worthy to be relied upon in a pressing situation” applies only in a dispute among major authorities.
[Speaker H] So we need to ask what’s unique about that, about this type.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think—I don’t know, I’m not sure—but I think you also won’t find, certainly not many, situations where it’s a non-factual doubt, a legal doubt. But your own legal doubt—not that there are disputing opinions. Do you understand what I’m saying?
[Speaker H] There are, after all, three kinds of doubt.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s factual doubt, there is a legal doubt—doubt in reality, and dispute among authorities. If it’s a factual doubt, then we follow the laws of doubts. If it’s a dispute among authorities, then in a pressing situation we’re lenient like the lenient opinion. A legal doubt in that sense would be like a factual doubt. Yes. The point is that you need someone who actually permits it, not just that I have a side suggesting permission. Because then…
[Speaker F] Rabbi, your position is that there is no such thing as a dispute among authorities, no? What? The Rabbi’s position is that there is no such thing as a dispute among authorities.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll get to that too in a moment. Yes, I do think there isn’t.
[Speaker D] So Rabbi, when we rule stringently in a situation of Torah-level doubt, it’s not that we definitely rule that the stringent position is correct; rather, it’s only because of the doubt that we rule as though it’s correct. So when there’s a principle that comes and clashes with that—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The principle is that Jewish law says one has to act like the stringent position. Yes.
[Speaker D] The question is whether—
[Speaker B] it’s a decision under certainty or a decision under doubt. No, no, that’s irrelevant. Even if it’s a decision under doubt, so what?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But that’s what one has to do. That’s what one has to do when one can—
[Speaker D] do it, but when another principle stands opposite it, then you weigh it and the balance says you can be lenient… Why can’t you do it? Of course I can do it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I can; it’s not coercion. We discussed that earlier. It’s not coercion. A pressing situation. It’ll cost me more money, I don’t know, cause me some kind of distress. I can do it. In a moment I’ll offer some explanation that resembles that, but it needs to be sharpened more, because these formulations don’t satisfy me. There are other places where they also say, “Rabbi Shimon is worthy to be relied upon in a pressing situation.” For example, the recitation of Shema—someone who recites the evening Shema already toward morning, when dawn has risen but before sunrise. According to Rabbi Shimon, they are lenient like Rabbi Shimon in a pressing situation. That’s what the Talmud says in that case. It’s in Berakhot 9. And there Maimonides says: “One who recites the evening Shema after dawn has risen and before sunrise has not fulfilled his obligation, unless he was under coercion, such as one who was drunk or ill or the like. And one under coercion who recites at that time does not say the blessing ‘Who causes us to lie down'”—that’s something else. What do we see in Maimonides? That when they said, “Rabbi Shimon is worthy to be relied upon in a pressing situation,” it wasn’t because the law really follows him. It’s not like the Rema and Mahari”m Mintz. Maimonides says the law follows Rabbi Yehuda; therefore someone who recited it when it was not a pressing situation has not fulfilled his obligation. It’s not that fundamentally it’s permitted. No, it’s forbidden. The law is like Rabbi Yehuda. In a pressing situation you can be lenient like Rabbi Shimon. So this is directly against the Rema and Mahari”m Mintz. Here there is a leniency against the law in a pressing situation. Look, for example, at the wording in the Shulchan Arukh, section 235—the Mishnah Berurah, sorry: “For even though by Torah law we recite ‘when you lie down’ until sunrise, because there are still some people who sleep at that hour, nevertheless where one was not compelled, the Sages withheld from him the commandment of reciting Shema because he delayed so long, and he does not fulfill his obligation by reciting it.” Does he not fulfill it even on the Torah level? They sort of took the commandment away—even on the Torah level he doesn’t fulfill it? Yes. The Sages penalized him, yes—they withheld the commandment of Shema from him because he delayed. So you see that he holds that really, by strict law, had the Sages not withheld it—after all, Shema is a Torah-level law—then the recitation would in fact have been valid. And if so, then when they say, “Rabbi Shimon is worthy to be relied upon in a pressing situation,” that fits with the Rema and Mahari”m Mintz, because it really means that when we were lenient here, we were lenient in something that is actually permitted. It’s just that true, the Sages penalized you so that if you were not under coercion, the Sages penalized you and suspended the commandment—but essentially you fulfilled your obligation were it not for the penalty of the Sages. Okay? So with that formulation it does fit the Rema and Mahari”m Mintz. In the plain meaning of Maimonides’ language it doesn’t seem so, and I think the plain meaning of the Talmud doesn’t seem so either.
[Speaker D] How can they cancel something that in reality I’m doing?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I can’t hear.
[Speaker D] How can they cancel something that in reality I am fulfilling?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We see this in several places. For example, what happens if someone blows the shofar on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath? He blows the shofar. According to the Babylonian Talmud, let’s say it’s only rabbinic that we don’t blow at that time; the Jerusalem Talmud says on the Torah level one need not blow, but according to the Babylonian Talmud one should blow, and the Sages were concerned lest he go to an expert, so they said they suspended shofar blowing on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath. Someone transgressed and blew. Did he fulfill his obligation? Did he perform a commandment? Say he violated a rabbinic prohibition—but did he fulfill, did he perform a Torah-level commandment?
[Speaker B] It depends whether they uprooted the commandment itself or only the obligation—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] to fulfill the commandment. I can’t hear. It depends whether they uprooted the commandment itself or only the obligation to fulfill the commandment. Okay, but say they even uprooted it.
[Speaker D] But how can they uproot the commandment itself?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the question. Can they uproot the commandment itself? Exactly. Meaning, can they? If they deliberately decide not to uproot the commandment but only impose a rabbinic prohibition, then of course that would be the situation. Our question isn’t that. Our question is: what happens if they decide to uproot the commandment itself—can they? So there is Magen Avraham and Rabbi Akiva Eiger; apparently there is a dispute about this. Rabbi Akiva Eiger, in some sermon—
[Speaker B] and novella, in section H.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I can’t hear.
[Speaker B] In sermon and novella, in section H.
[Speaker G] In section K or H, I think. Wait, what’s the practical difference whether he fulfilled the commandment or not? What does that mean?
[Speaker B] Whether he fulfilled it once that day.
[Speaker G] What practical halakhic difference does it make whether he fulfilled it or didn’t fulfill it?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he has a positive commandment—
[Speaker G] What does it mean that he has a positive commandment? That he gets a share in the World to Come for it? Or what?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—if he fulfilled a positive commandment, what does that mean?
[Speaker G] But what kind of statement is that? What does it mean?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A practical difference for betrothing—
[Speaker E] a woman.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Did he fulfill a positive commandment? More than that—say there was also a prohibition involved, okay? Does a positive commandment override a prohibition?
[Speaker E] Okay, so basically—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] he didn’t violate the prohibition because—
[Speaker E] the positive commandment overrode it. So the question—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] is: did he violate the prohibition or not?
[Speaker E] If he fulfilled the positive commandment—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] then he also violated the prohibition, in addition to the rabbinic prohibition.
[Speaker E] And also if—
[Speaker B] he can recite a blessing over it—
[Speaker E] that too.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I can’t hear.
[Speaker B] Whether he can recite a blessing over it.
[Speaker E] A blessing—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m somewhat doubtful, because the Sages said not to do it, so how could he recite a blessing?
[Speaker D] Guys, we can’t hear well, there’s an echo here.
[Speaker I] You can’t hear, there’s an echo. Everyone who’s not speaking should turn off their audio, otherwise it’s impossible to hear.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I muted everyone, okay. Whoever wants to speak should jump in, but afterward turn it off again. So Rabbi Akiva Eiger and the Magen Avraham—and by the way I’m not sure that there it’s really a dispute; that’s the accepted assumption, but—and there is also Tosafot in Sukkah 4, yes, where it says about Rabbi Yohanan ben HaHoranit, who sat in the sukkah while his table was inside the house, and they said to him: “If that’s how you acted, you never fulfilled the commandment of sukkah in your life.” Because it’s forbidden to sit in the sukkah while your table is inside the house, lest you be drawn after your table. Now this is a rabbinic law, and they say to him, “You never fulfilled the commandment of sukkah in your life.” The simple meaning seems to be that he never fulfilled the commandment of sukkah at all. And Tosafot there says that indeed, once the Sages said not to sit in the sukkah when one’s table is in the house, if he does so then he also does not have the Torah-level commandment. But the Ran disagrees.
[Speaker B] Rabbi Asher Weiss, I think, once said that only in matters that are a safeguard for a Torah-level commandment—
[Speaker E] then—
[Speaker B] they uproot it completely.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s an echo here again.
[Speaker E] Someone didn’t turn it off.
[Speaker B] Rabbi Asher Weiss says that specifically in matters that are a safeguard—when they enacted a safeguard—only then can they uproot the thing itself completely, because they derive it from the verse, “You shall keep My charge.” But in ordinary enactments that are not for the purpose of a safeguard, lest one violate a Torah prohibition, there they can only remove the obligation, but not uproot the thing itself, because for that there is no source in the Torah. But with safeguards they have a Torah source to say that they can uproot it: “You shall keep My charge.”
[Speaker D] Yes, so that’s only a source; it’s not really an explanation of how this mechanism works.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] To me that sounds strange, because the Torah source doesn’t say they can cancel the commandment; it only says they can impose a safeguard.
[Speaker B] So that’s how he understands it. He reads that verse a bit more broadly; he says that specifically in such matters they can really uproot it. And then, for example, he disagrees with the famous Pri Megadim, who says that if the Sages enacted a certain kind of kiddush in a particular form, then the whole Torah-level commandment of kiddush is only through verbal sanctification over a cup. Right—there’s a famous Pri Megadim like that, who says that if the Sages enacted a certain mode of fulfilling a Torah-level positive commandment, one fulfills it only in the mode they enacted.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So—
[Speaker B] he says in such matters that’s not true, because there it wasn’t made as a safeguard. But specifically where there is a safeguard, the verse gave authority. He reads that verse in a very, very extreme way.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think he’s wrong. As a matter of reasoning it’s simply blatantly illogical. If the Sages enacted that one should recite havdalah, say, over a cup, right? By what authority do they do that? Why isn’t that adding to the Torah? How are they allowed to do it?
[Speaker B] That’s also from the verse, “You shall keep My charge.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Or “a charge for My charge,” or I don’t know, some other source. So there too there is a source.
[Speaker B] Otherwise it would be adding to the Torah.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And that’s one point. And second—even if there is a source, the source says they can add a safeguard, but the source doesn’t say that someone who violates the safeguard thereby cancels the positive commandment, the commandment itself. Where does that come from? It doesn’t sound logical to me. Well, I don’t know, we need to see whether there are mistakes there, but on the face of it it doesn’t sound logical to me. In any case, for our purposes the claim is that the Sages—yes, the Sages sometimes, according to certain approaches, when someone does things not in the manner the Sages determined, he has not fulfilled the Torah-level requirement. By the way, even in Tosafot in Sukkah, where he says that someone who sits in the sukkah while his table is inside the house has canceled the positive commandment, he canceled the positive commandment not because he committed a rabbinic transgression there, but because that’s not the manner of sitting in a sukkah as the Sages instructed him. Do you understand? That’s a different formulation. The Sages told you to sit in the sukkah when your table too is in the sukkah. And if you sit in the sukkah while your table is in the house, then you have not fulfilled the Torah-level commandment of sukkah, because the Torah-level commandment of sukkah is to sit while your table too is in the sukkah. That’s what emerges from Tosafot. And on that Tosafot says that if so, then you didn’t fulfill even the Torah-level commandment. But the reason you didn’t fulfill the Torah-level commandment is not because of the rabbinic transgression you committed there—not because you violated the safeguard—but because the Sages are the ones who define how one is supposed to sit in a sukkah.
[Speaker D] That makes sense, but then again that’s not a safeguard for that commandment. What did you say? That makes sense, but then again that’s not a safeguard for that commandment. Fine, but initially it started as a safeguard for the commandment of sitting in the sukkah, as though they said that sitting in the sukkah means sitting and eating in the sukkah.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s how they explain it; I don’t care whether it’s a safeguard or not. It’s a safeguard against eating outside the sukkah, not against sitting in the sukkah, lest you be drawn after your table and eat outside the sukkah. But it’s a safeguard against canceling a positive commandment, not a safeguard against violating a prohibition. But for our purposes that doesn’t matter, because in the end, once the Sages established it, we treat it as the proper form of sitting in the sukkah. The Sages established that this is how one sits in a sukkah. Now once you didn’t sit that way, then you didn’t fulfill the commandment of sukkah even on the Torah level—not because you violated a rabbinic prohibition, but because that’s not how one fulfills the commandment of sukkah. Do you understand? And therefore, if one really understands it that way, then there is no room at all for the distinction between whether it is a safeguard against this or not a safeguard against this. What do you say?
[Speaker F] On Rosh Hashanah though, with shofar blowing—would that answer the question? There it’s like, what? You can’t say that the Sages determined how to do the commandment of shofar; there it’s already not that—they simply canceled it, they said don’t do it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, you’re right. With shofar blowing you can say it, but it sounds forced. They’d be saying, this is not how one blows the shofar; on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath this is not shofar blowing. There it really is more forced, you’re right. But again, there too there is indeed a dispute whether that is said or not—Rabbi Akiva Eiger and the Magen Avraham. Anyway, that reminded me of an anecdote that is also connected to this matter. There is the Brisker Rav, yes, the Griz, who as is well known was very stringent. Like his grandfather the Beit HaLevi—with his leniencies I opened this whole discussion of leniencies. Yes, the leniencies of the Briskers—heaven protect us. In any case, the Brisker Rav was very stringent. And once someone saw him drinking water outside the sukkah. And it says in the Shulchan Arukh that a spiritually refined person should be stringent and not even drink water outside the sukkah. So they said to him: you, who are so stringent—how can it be that you don’t follow the stringency mentioned in the Shulchan Arukh, and you drink water outside the sukkah? So the Brisker Rav said: I’m stringent? I’m not stringent at all—just like his grandfather. I’m not stringent at all. Rather, whenever there is a concern that according to a certain opinion I have not fulfilled my obligation, I make sure to fulfill my obligation according to that opinion as well. That’s not called being stringent; it’s called making sure you fulfill your obligation. But something that is by its very nature a stringency—drinking water outside the sukkah—there is no opinion that says one halakhically has to drink water inside the sukkah. But a spiritually refined person should be stringent and even drink water inside the sukkah. That is something defined from the outset as a mere stringency. I’m not on that level, says the Brisker Rav; I’m not among the stringent ones, not on the level of a spiritually refined person. All the stringencies that we call stringencies among the Briskers are not really stringencies; they are a desire to fulfill one’s obligation according to all opinions. But if there is something that from the outset is defined as a stringency, that they don’t do. You understand that this is the mirror image of the Rema and Mahari”m Mintz.
[Speaker F] Someone spoke about this, that the fact that the Brisker Rav is—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] permitted, and the Briskers were not stringent in anything that wasn’t forbidden.
[Speaker F] The Rabbi said that the Briskers don’t know how to decide, and therefore they do—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] everything, all the sides. Exactly. They’re not stringent; they simply don’t know how to decide. Yes, right? That’s the same thing, that’s the statement.
[Speaker J] But Rabbi, last week we summed up that basically to be lenient is to add possible options. So what’s the opposite of that, basically? Meaning, what is a stringency, actually? Is it to cancel options?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] To cancel options. Yes.
[Speaker J] So therefore what the Rabbi is defining right now regarding the Briskers isn’t a stringency, because that isn’t the definition of a stringency.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course it’s a stringency. The Briskers are basically claiming that someone who acts that way has not fulfilled his obligation. There is the view of Terumat HaDeshen, who says that one does not fulfill one’s obligation in such a situation. So they closed off an option that other decisors leave open. They were stringent. Meaning, to take all views into account is called being stringent. Because taking all views into account means reducing the number of options by which I am allowed to act. Okay? Certainly.
[Speaker J] But specifically that I could also interpret differently, and say that they act according to all the opinions and therefore according to all the options so to speak.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not according to all the options. They’re not telling you: you can do this, you can do this, and you can do this. That would be a leniency. No. They’re telling you: you must act in such a way that you fulfill everyone’s view.
[Speaker J] Ah, the one method that fulfills the obligation according to everyone. Exactly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They are not saying that you can follow Terumat HaDeshen and that’s fine according to his view, and you can follow Rashba and that’s fine according to his view. That really would be a leniency. That’s exactly the point. But they are stringent because they close off all the options that do not fulfill the obligation according to everyone. So okay, that’s just the mirror image of the Rema. Now, I think that in this context, what we discussed regarding the Rema and Mahari”m Mintz—how can it be that one may be lenient in a pressing situation if the rules of doubt tell us to be stringent? So the Rema and Mahari”m Mintz say that in truth you can’t. All that is possible is not to be stringent in a pressing situation, but you can’t be lenient in a pressing situation. But the straightforward meaning, both of the Talmud and of Maimonides, is not like that. And in the halakhic decisors too we see that it is not so. They are lenient in a pressing situation even in places where they otherwise would not be lenient. Meaning, they don’t really hold that way in practical Jewish law. How do we explain such a thing? So here I come to the comments of Shmuel and others who tried to suggest various formulations here. A fairly similar formulation, but still I think different from what I’m saying here. My claim, basically, is that in a place where, say, someone comes to ask me a question, and there are several opinions. One can do A, B, or C according to different approaches—not the Briskers who want to fulfill the obligation according to all of them, but someone who is satisfied with all the possible approaches. So there is, say, A, B, and C. Now A seems right to me. I hold like A. So he comes to ask me: what’s the law? It could be that… that basically I need to tell him: look, there are three opinions here among the halakhic authorities, A, B, and C. My personal opinion is A, but the decision about which of the three paths to follow—you have to make that decision, not me. All I can do is lay out before you the possible paths, and the decision of which path to take is your decision. Now, if that’s really so, then perhaps there would be room to say that when there are lenient opinions, then true, I don’t hold like them, but they’re Jews too. And therefore I say: you happened to come ask me—say I’m not your primary rabbi. If I am your primary rabbi, then it would indeed be harder. But say I’m not your rabbi; you came to ask me because I know Jewish law and I happened to be available, so you came to ask me. You could just as well have asked someone else, and then you’d have gotten a different answer. So it could be that as a halakhic decisor I really need to expose the path to you and tell you what answers you can get from all the decisors. These are the paths available; my personal opinion may be A, but there are also decisors who say B or C.
[Speaker J] So now you—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] need to decide which of the three paths you’re following.
[Speaker J] Rabbi, but usually when people go to halakhic decisors it’s not in order to receive all the options; they want the rabbi to give the ruling.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what they want, but I don’t provide that service.
[Speaker J] No, I’m saying: as a decisor, isn’t it really the decisor’s role to decide?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s exactly—exactly what I’m about to address now. No, absolutely not. So my claim, basically, is that when we divide the—I divide—I spoke earlier about the definition of leniency and stringency, and I said that we need to divide the discussion into two stages. The first stage is to examine which halakhic paths exist in this situation. In the second stage one chooses one of them. I argue that the role of the halakhic decisor is exhausted in the first stage. He must determine what paths exist in this situation. The one who has to decide which path he follows is the questioner, not the decisor. Because the decisor tells him: look, these are the three paths. There may be costs involved; so the cost of this path is such and such, the cost of that path is such and such. This is ideal practice, this isn’t ideal practice, this is after the fact, this is optimal from the outset. Give him all the halakhic data, because you’re the halakhic expert. So draw him the halakhic map; explain to him exactly what the options are and what the cost of each option is, or how they rank relative to one another. Maybe this one is preferable, this one less so. Give him the map. In the end, the decision of what to do is his decision, not yours. The role of the decisor is exactly the opposite—it’s not to decide. The one who decides is the questioner. The decisor must give him the options among which he must decide, and the different costs of choosing each option. The role of the—
[Speaker D] decisor, the role—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] of the decisor is the role of a halakhic expert. You need to give him the halakhic information. But to decide what to do—why should the decisor decide for you? You now know the costs, you know the options; decide how God-fearing you are, how much of a pressing situation this is for you, how much money you’re willing to spend, whatever the considerations are, how hard it is for you, for your wife, whatever, in the home—only you know that, not the decisor. So you understand: among the paths the decisor laid out before you, you need to decide which one you’re taking. And therefore the question of a pressing situation is not really a question directed to the decisor at all. The decisor should draw out the paths. The questioner will say, okay, for me this is very difficult, so I’ll take path A or B or whatever.
[Speaker J] Rabbi, this really reminds me of what the Rabbi explained at the beginning of the series, that someone who is truly qualified can actually rule for himself.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no, I’m not talking about someone qualified. I’m talking about a questioner. Someone who is qualified doesn’t come to ask at all—he should rule for himself. I’m talking about someone who comes to ask, someone who comes to ask and is not qualified. So I explain the issue to him because he isn’t qualified, and I lay out before him all the paths and the costs of each path—what is preferable, what is less preferable, this is a rabbinic prohibition, this is a Torah-level prohibition, this is permitted after the fact, this is permitted from the outset—the whole map. Okay. And I also tell him how much money one needs to spend for a rabbinic prohibition and for a Torah-level prohibition and for a commandment, giving him all the data theoretically, yes, all the halakhic data. From that point on, the decision of what to do is his decision, not the decisor’s. The decisor can never know how much fear of Heaven a person has, how important this is to him, how much suffering will be caused to him if he does A or B, how intense the pressing situation is here. How would the decisor know that? Only the questioner himself can know that. As often happens, people come with questions—I wrote about this on the website too, the article—I wrote about what’s called family planning. Very common questions. People go to a decisor: am I allowed to wait a bit because I’m now in the middle of studies, in the beginning of a job, whatever, there are various constraints, or it’s hard for us here, hard for us there, we want to wait a little. And let’s say we still don’t have—haven’t yet fulfilled “be fruitful and multiply,” we don’t yet have a son and a daughter, but we want to wait another two years. Is that permitted or not? Every day people ask decisors these questions. Is it permitted to postpone the commandment of being fruitful and multiplying? Now after the Holocaust there developed a hysteria regarding this commandment; there are insane stringencies, and in the Haredi world they really go wild with it, but there’s no basis for it. Meaning, it’s just hysteria, apparently following the Holocaust. Meaning, there were Jews missing, so they had to replenish the numbers. In the sources we see that there are many considerations that allow postponing it. Yes, there is no problem; one can postpone. It’s not trivial—there is a positive commandment, there is the principle that the zealous perform commandments early, meaning there is an idea to do it sooner—but okay, if there are relevant considerations then one can also postpone. Now usually it’s not one or zero. You need to tell the person: look, these are the examples; for this reason one may postpone, for that reason less so, decisors say that one may postpone—lay out the map for him. From that point on he has to decide whether he postpones or not. Let him decide how important it is to him, how difficult it is for him in terms of work, how important it is to him to fulfill the commandment of being fruitful and multiplying, how much he’s willing to suffer for it, what the price will be at home. Only he knows all that; the decisor doesn’t. Why should the decisor decide that? It’s not even a halakhic decision. We finished the halakhic work once we drew the map of the possibilities with the prices beside each one. That is where halakhic expertise ends. From then on it’s decision-making. In decision-making, the questioner will make the decision much better than the decisor. Or in other words, if I return to the question of leniency and stringency: we spoke earlier about what it means to be lenient. Usually people say that to be lenient means to choose the easier path. When I tell you not to recite a blessing—”in cases of doubt regarding blessings, be lenient”—people understand what it means to be lenient, because I tell you not to recite a blessing, to cut corners, and therefore that’s called lenient. So I said no. Choosing not to recite the blessing is your choice, the questioner’s. The role of the decisor is to tell you that you may choose not to recite it. The decisor has to present the possibilities to you: one may recite the blessing and one may refrain from reciting it. Leave aside for the moment the prohibition of taking God’s name in vain; I’m just using it as an example. So the decisor says: one may recite the blessing and one may refrain from reciting it—that’s what Jewish law says. From here on, what you will do—if it’s hard for you, if you’re God-fearing, not God-fearing, don’t have time, don’t have energy, do have energy—you decide. Because halakhically you can recite it and you can refrain from reciting it. So who makes that decision? The questioner. Therefore, when I speak about leniency in the sense that I defined here, it’s the concept of leniency on the part of the decisor. How many paths are there when I draw the map for you—how many paths are available to you in the given situation. If I open up more paths for you, then I am being lenient. And that really is the role of the decisor: to see which paths are open before the person.
[Speaker F] How does that connect to Rabbi Shimon?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One second, one second. The decision what to do, which of the paths to choose—which many times people think is where the concept of leniency enters, choosing not to recite the blessing rather than to recite it—that is the questioner’s decision altogether, not the decisor’s. The questioner must decide what he does. Therefore the concept of leniency in halakhic decision-making, by definition, speaks about the first plane and not the second, because only the first plane is halakhic decision-making. The second plane is a person’s own decision-making with himself, given the halakhic options. Yes—what was the question asked earlier here?
[Speaker F] How does this connect to Rabbi Shimon, Rabbi? I didn’t understand. What does it have to do with “Rabbi Shimon is worthy to be relied upon in a pressing situation,” if I hold differently from Rabbi Shimon?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, so I’m saying that here we need to distinguish between two things. If you’re talking about a tannaitic dispute, and in that dispute the law has already been decided, say in the Talmud or in the decisors, it doesn’t matter—but say that for me the law has been decided like Rabbi Yehuda against Rabbi Shimon—then in such a situation what I’m saying now won’t help. Because in such a situation the law has already been decided like Rabbi Yehuda. I can’t say to the questioner who comes to ask me: look, but there is Rabbi Shimon who says otherwise. Why should I care that there is? The law has already been decided. Part of halakhic decision-making is also understanding that the law follows Rabbi Yehuda and not Rabbi Shimon. Up to now I was speaking only about a case where there is a dispute among medieval authorities, or later authorities, or contemporary decisors, it doesn’t matter. In such a case I say that the decisor is supposed to lay out the paths for you. What you do from that point on is your decision. When it comes to paths that have already been ruled against—yes, I don’t need to tell you that there is also the opinion of Beit Shammai after the law was decided like Beit Hillel. That—I haven’t explained yet. I’ll get to that in a moment. Rabbi?
[Speaker D] Yes. How is the questioner supposed to decide if he doesn’t know the issue at all and isn’t aware of the halakhic considerations on the side of claim A?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He doesn’t need to be aware of the halakhic considerations. I’ve already done the halakhic considerations, laid out the map for him. This is the map; we’ve finished the halakhic considerations. From here on, you need to decide.
[Speaker D] No, he is supposed to decide from the issue itself which view is the correct one.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you’re talking about a questioner who is qualified. A questioner who is qualified needs to decide which path seems correct to him. I’m not talking about that decision. That’s a qualified questioner; he should rule for himself, that’s true. I’m speaking specifically about a questioner who is not qualified. So I do the work for him. I do the work for him, lay out the map for him, but still, the decision of which of the paths on the map to follow—that decision he makes, not me. But this isn’t a decision that he takes because that path seems correct to him. He isn’t qualified; he doesn’t know what “correct” means. He takes that path because that’s what he wants, because that’s his fear of Heaven, because that’s what is convenient for him, because he doesn’t want to spend money or does want to spend money, he likes reciting blessings, he hates reciting blessings. His decision. It has nothing to do with Jewish law. It’s not a decision of “this seems right to me, therefore I do it.” That’s the decision of someone qualified.
[Speaker D] So I didn’t understand: when do you lay out all the possibilities before him, and when do you mention only the position of Beit Hillel?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I say: if the law has been decided like Beit Hillel—for example, disputes in… what does it mean the law has been decided?
[Speaker D] I, as a halakhic decisor, follow the view of Maimonides in a dispute between Maimonides and—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Leave Maimonides aside. My personal position is that Maimonides doesn’t count as a final halakhic ruling. In the Talmud—
[Speaker D] No, no, I’m saying that Maimonides and the Raavad disagree on a certain point, and in my own approach, after studying the issue, I follow Maimonides. How am I supposed to lay out the Raavad’s opinion before him too, after I think Maimonides is right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So say: there is Maimonides’ opinion, there is the Raavad’s opinion, and I think like Maimonides.
[Speaker D] Yes, but what’s the difference between that and saying that there is the view of Beit Shammai and the view of Beit Hillel, and you don’t lay them both out before him—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because in Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel the law was decided. Maimonides and Raavad—I think like Maimonides—that doesn’t mean the law was decided. What I think doesn’t obligate anyone else. So what if I think so? Someone else thinks differently. The Raavad thought differently.
[Speaker D] So was Jewish law settled, and does the concept of “Jewish law was settled” end after the Talmudic period, and that’s it?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, in principle, yes. You could say that the accepted practice of the world, together with all the decisors, I don’t know, made an error in judgment—that’s already more subtle stuff—but in principle, only the Talmud.
[Speaker J] That’s the formal authority.
[Speaker F] Rabbi, wait, I didn’t understand. What the Rabbi… isn’t he saying that a decisor doesn’t have to state his ruling where it’s clear and certain? If it’s clear to him that Jewish law follows Maimonides, then he says right away, at the beginning, “I hold that Jewish law follows Maimonides.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying no. I’m arguing that you have to tell him both opinions. You can say that, and add, “and I think like Maimonides.”
[Speaker F] Yes, but Rabbi, only someone competent can choose whether it’s like Maimonides or like the Raavad.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He can’t know whether it’s Maimonides or the Raavad.
[Speaker F] Again, I’ll say it again.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If the questioner isn’t competent—I’m talking only about a questioner who isn’t competent. Yes, yes, obviously, a questioner who isn’t competent. A questioner who isn’t competent—I say, “I hold like Maimonides,” but the Raavad wasn’t an idiot, and I’m not a greater genius than the Raavad. That’s what I think. So if he had gone to ask another halakhic decisor… wait, if he had gone to ask another decisor who holds like the Raavad, he would have gotten a different answer, right? Yes. And by chance he came to ask me. Which means that I, as a halakhic expert, have to tell him: listen, there are two possibilities here. Maimonides says this and the Raavad says that. How will he decide? He’ll decide whatever he wants.
[Speaker F] Ah, so the Rabbi isn’t talking about “make for yourself a rabbi.” He’s not going to his own rabbi in the sense of “make for yourself a rabbi”; that’s not what this is.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said, I said, I’m talking about someone who… if it’s his rabbi, then maybe it would be different, and then he has to do what his rabbi thinks. So as a halakhic decisor, you hold…
[Speaker D] That the halakhic decision is based on psychological and personal considerations of the questioner, not on substantive considerations of the…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s not a halakhic ruling; that’s a practical decision about what to do. A ruling… yes, that’s… there’s a very nice article by Nadav Shnerb, maybe I’ll send you a link to it. I think he calls it “The Jewish Cabinet of Lies,” modeled on “The Jewish Bookshelf.” He starts that article by praising some great decisor who knows how to understand the questioner standing before him and tailor the answer to what suits him. But that is not the decisor’s role at all. That decisor is a liar if he does that. A decisor cannot do such a thing. The decisor has to present the picture before him. If the person is built in such a way that he wants to choose path A, let him choose it; I’m not the one who should do that. I have to present the halakhic picture as I understand it. If I give one person one answer and another person a different answer, I’m a liar. That’s all.
[Speaker D] So what I said stands: the halakhic decision is based on extra-halakhic considerations, psychological considerations…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no. Who said that? I don’t accept myths. No. A halakhic ruling is based on a halakhic ruling, period. All the other considerations are none of your grandmother’s business. All the other considerations are left to the questioner. He can ask you, he can say, “Look, I have these kinds of difficulties—what do you think?” I can try to advise him, but that is no longer part of the halakhic ruling. I’m only helping him choose one of the paths on the map I drew for him.
[Speaker D] So you tell him that the halakhic ruling is according to approach A, but you lay out other possibilities before him? What?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. That if, for example, he’s in a pressing situation, and he feels distress, then he should know that if he acts like the Raavad, okay, the Raavad is worthy of being relied upon in pressing circumstances. Even though I think like Maimonides, I’m the decisor. Fine, that’s exactly what “worthy of being relied upon in pressing circumstances” means, but that’s not Rabbi Shimon. That’s only in disputes like these, where there still isn’t a clear halakhic ruling; rather, my opinion is like Maimonides. Fine, and other decisors can think like the Raavad.
[Speaker F] Yes, but that’s a bit nontrivial. Let’s say, for example, this story the Rabbi always tells about the Rabbi’s friend, who went to ask Rabbi Zalman—he already knew what the ruling there was—so what does that actually mean? I didn’t understand. Meaning, even if he comes to ask you as a halakhic decisor, that doesn’t obligate him in anything?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand—right. Who said I disagreed with him?
[Speaker F] Ah, okay, no—let’s say he’s not competent. Let’s say he isn’t competent.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he isn’t competent, then why are people coming to ask him?
[Speaker F] He just wanted to know what…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbi Wosner—what, he’s just a messenger.
[Speaker F] Yes, the questioner isn’t competent, but my friend was competent.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes, but let’s say…
[Speaker F] That the Rabbi’s friend wasn’t competent—let’s say, in a case where he isn’t competent—so you ask Rabbi Wosner, then basically there’s no problem, meaning you ask…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbi Wosner, he says…
[Speaker F] What he thinks, and that still doesn’t obligate him in anything? Right. Even though, and the Rabbi also showed this a few lessons ago, there’s that Talmudic passage that says you can’t permit what…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “If one sage forbade it, another sage may not permit it.”
[Speaker F] So that’s only if it’s his rabbi?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And besides, if that sage is wise, then let him not forbid; let him lay out the possibilities. It may be that if he forbade it, then afterward it’s forbidden to permit it. But that sage isn’t wise. If he were wise, he wouldn’t forbid it; he would lay out the possibilities.
[Speaker F] Fine, but after that how is he supposed to act? I didn’t understand. I mean, if I think like Maimonides, then I really think like Maimonides; for me it’s not a doubt. For me it’s Jewish law. I know there’s the Raavad, I know clearly that the Raavad wasn’t saying nonsense.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It still could be, it still could be. I’m saying, there’s room here to hesitate—how much certainty I have, and so on—but in principle, I haven’t brought the source yet; in a moment I’ll bring Shlomo Zalman. There’s room to say that even if I think like Maimonides, and for me it’s not a doubt, I think like Maimonides. What I’m saying here is not from the laws of doubt. This is the nature of halakhic ruling. You, as a halakhic expert, are not the Sanhedrin. If you were the Sanhedrin, then you would decide what seems right to you, and whatever you decided would be the Jewish law, an obligatory law. But if people come to you not as the Sanhedrin but as a decisor of Jewish law, then you have no formal authority; you’re merely a halakhic expert. A halakhic-automat. Yes. They ask you what the options are in this situation, so give them the options—you’re the expert, give the options. You can add that you think like option A.
[Speaker F] Yes, maybe that’s what they want, no? The options they can look up on the internet. I mean, that’s what they want—they want my opinion on the matter.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it’s the internet, then really there’s no point in coming to me.
[Speaker F] Yes, but they want my opinion on the matter.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If they want me to decide for them, I don’t provide that service. They want it? So what if they want it? They might also want to fly to the moon.
[Speaker F] Ah, okay, but there are people, there are decisors, who do want to provide that service. Obviously.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Almost all decisors do that—only in my opinion they’re mistaken.
[Speaker F] Why are they mistaken? If the public wants…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m claiming that that is not halakhic ruling. That’s what I explained here. And I’m not claiming that what I’m saying now describes how all decisors work—quite the opposite. This goes against the mode of operation of the overwhelming majority of decisors. The overwhelming majority of decisors see themselves as the ones who are supposed to decide for the questioner what he must do. And I’m claiming that this is a mistake—not true. That is not the decisor’s role. And it’s also not right on the substantive level, because you don’t really understand his situation. So who are you to decide in favor of option A if B and C also exist? You don’t really understand his distress, his constraints, the significance of things for him—so why should you decide? That isn’t even a halakhic ruling.
[Speaker F] The Rabbi has said several times that in Jewish law it doesn’t matter what… it’s not… it’s only facts. If it’s facts, then of course you said the facts in order to understand the law, but if it’s not facts, and for him it’s Jewish law, then no matter how…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How difficult it is, how little he understands—the full halakhic information.
[Speaker F] Okay, and also…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What the Rabbi is saying—when you go to a doctor and the doctor believes in a certain therapeutic approach, in my eyes he is criminally negligent if he doesn’t say that there are others who believe in a different therapeutic approach. I need to state all the possibilities that exist among experts. Then afterward he can say, “And I believe in this approach; my reasons are my own,” it doesn’t matter right now, “and this is what I recommend.” But if he says, “This is what must be done,” and doesn’t tell you that others disagree with him and believe in other approaches, then he’s negligent. And I claim that a halakhic expert is exactly like a medical expert: an expert in a certain field, and that is the service he is supposed to provide. The decision in such a case is not halakhic ruling.
[Speaker F] Okay, so the Rabbi is only challenging this whole idea of the authority they took for themselves in the matter of deciding?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes—and the other side of the same coin, namely that this is not halakhic ruling.
[Speaker F] Yes, but it still is a halakhic decision. I mean, I can decide this way; that’s how I decide for myself, that’s how I decide for myself. If I’m a rabbi—if I’m now a judge—wait, if I’m a judge, a judge doesn’t decide?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you’re not using the right term. You choose one of the possible paths. To decide means to determine what the law says. To choose one of several paths that the law permits—that is not a decision in the halakhic sense; it is a choice, a decision in the ordinary sense. Call it my decision about which path to take, because it’s hard for me, because it bothers me, because I like it, whatever the reason may be. That is not a ruling; it’s just a decision.
[Speaker F] When the Rosh brings a dispute on a certain issue and says, “And the Jewish law is—that I say the law is such-and-such,” does the Rabbi call that a ruling?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He’s expressing his opinion. What do you mean, a ruling?
[Speaker F] He says, “I think that this…”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Is correct, that this is the right path.
[Speaker F] And until now he’s the judge and he’s the decisor, and that’s what the litigants do.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let them do it. What—I’m claiming they shouldn’t do that. I didn’t understand the…
[Speaker F] No, he rules for the litigants. Now let’s say I’m a judge—now a judge, I have to decide.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A judge is something else; a judge isn’t connected to the issue. A judge has to decide.
[Speaker F] Ah, okay, so then it is true—the term “decision” is correct. What? I didn’t understand. The term “decision” in this matter is correct.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A decision is a decision on the question of what the law says. But if there are several paths that the law allows, then choosing among them is not a halakhic decision.
[Speaker F] Why? If in my opinion there aren’t several paths—for me, for the Rosh—one, just like the Rosh says, “and these are words of nonsense,” for example.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But in the opinion of others there are.
[Speaker F] Yes, but let’s say now the Rosh says, he brings “some say,” and “these are words of nonsense”—why does he bring it that way, he brings proofs here and there, and therefore says these are things he rejects. So for him, for him—wait—for him the Jewish law is like that, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He identified a possibility and also expressed his opinion—exactly what I’m saying should be done. What’s the problem?
[Speaker F] Right, right, obviously. But what’s the problem with calling that a ruling in the case of the Rosh? The Rosh decided the Jewish law—what the law says for him, what I think the law is?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re playing with words. When the decisor states his opinion, that is a ruling. But from the standpoint of the questioner, the questioner does not have to accept my ruling.
[Speaker F] Ah, right—if he didn’t come for that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He has to decide which of the paths to follow. When you speak about a ruling—if I were deciding for myself, that might be a ruling, because I think that’s halakhically correct. Any time the consideration is halakhic, that’s a ruling. But from the standpoint of the questioner, even if I think path A is halakhically correct, if others think that paths B and C are correct, then from the questioner’s standpoint all three paths exist, and he has to decide—not rule, decide—which one he will follow.
[Speaker F] Okay, so that’s what I’m saying. So the Rabbi is basically saying there is no authority—they have no authority—which is fine, it’s just a different business, okay.
[Speaker H] If the decisor is really just Google, then why is there this rule that if I went to one rabbi and he forbade something for me, I can’t go to another rabbi?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what they asked earlier. Okay. One of two possibilities. The first possibility is that you went to your primary rabbi—that is, someone who is your rabbi, or the local halakhic authority, it doesn’t matter—someone who has formal authority over you, okay? Then it’s something else, because what he says basically obligates you. But if you just go to another halakhic expert, then no—then it’s like Google, as you said. And why, with a primary rabbi, can we stop and say: okay, this is authority?
[Speaker H] Why? What makes it more authority? After all, it’s not the Sanhedrin. Why is a primary rabbi more authority? I mean, let’s say it’s just a better Google.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A primary rabbi—what we call today a primary rabbi doesn’t mean someone who taught me to learn in yeshiva. It means a rabbi who rules on Jewish law, whom I accepted upon myself as my decisor. Like a vow…
[Speaker H] Sort of? What? Sort of like a vow? Like someone who did something three times?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Like a community that accepted upon itself a rabbi to be the local halakhic authority—it doesn’t matter—yes, someone who has formal authority over that person or that place. That’s one possibility. The second possibility: there are decisors—most decisors really do operate this way—who do decide and tell the person what to do. In my opinion it’s not right to do that, but certainly there are many decisors who do it. It could be that if the decisor nevertheless said it, then someone else is forbidden to come and permit it. On that same case, of course—not in general. On that same case, he may not come and permit it out of respect for the first one. But not because that was really what the first one should have done; he shouldn’t have done it. But once he already did it, you don’t want people to treat his honor lightly. So if he already did it, then the questioner will have to do what he was told.
[Speaker F] Wait, Rabbi—parenthetically—doesn’t the Rabbi think that if an entire community, like with Rabbi Ovadia, where people come and ask him, that basically means they’ve accepted him upon themselves? Maybe.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What?
[Speaker F] No, no, I was only speaking in order to justify a decisor like Rabbi Ovadia and Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, where you see that…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You should know: if I had gone to ask Rabbi Ovadia, I don’t assume I would have gotten a different answer from that other person who goes to ask him in the way you describe. Rabbi Ovadia doesn’t check with me whether I accepted him upon myself as my decisor of Jewish law or whether I’m only coming to ask him as Google. He was accustomed to answering what he answered, like most decisors. So yes, with respect to certain people maybe that is in fact justified—but not with respect to everyone.
[Speaker J] Rabbi, that’s exactly what I wanted to ask. There are people who systematically, in every case of doubt that comes up, follow one rabbi. Let’s say every time there’s a doubt, I go according to Rabbi Ovadia. I hear that a lot from people. So what’s the value of that? I mean, you lose a bit of your autonomy, basically, when in every doubt you act according to Rabbi Ovadia and don’t even look at other things.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here there is no value to autonomy. If you aren’t competent, then you need to receive a halakhic ruling from someone. Whether you take Rabbi Ovadia upon yourself or not take Rabbi Ovadia upon yourself—there’s no problem of autonomy there at all. Autonomy exists only where you can decide for yourself and you let someone else decide. If you aren’t competent, you can’t decide for yourself. You can choose among paths—choose whatever you want.
[Speaker J] No, no, I mean many people don’t even look for the paths. As far as they’re concerned there’s one path: Rabbi Ovadia, and that’s it. They don’t even try to see what the other paths are.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Most people, when they come to ask—as we also saw here earlier—it’s convenient for them that the decisor make the decision, even though it makes no sense that he should make the decision. They are supposed to make the decision, because they know the situation and themselves best. But people don’t want to make decisions; they don’t like making decisions. They pressure the decisor: no, no, tell me what to do. It happens every day. I think that in such a situation the decisor should tell them: friends, I don’t provide that service. That’s it. You have trouble deciding? Flip a coin.
[Speaker J] I’m saying they don’t even get into that state of there being a possibility of deciding, because they don’t even want to hear the other approaches. I said—the decisors—the question is what value that has. Is it correct to act that way at all as a questioner, not as a decisor? In my opinion, no. That is, almost blindly saying: everything I do in my life is according to Rabbi Ovadia.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you want to accept Rabbi Ovadia or someone else upon yourself, there’s no problem at all; everything is fine. If you accepted him upon yourself, then whatever he tells you, you’ll do—everything is fine. No, there’s no drawback in that at all. But if you didn’t accept him upon yourself and you’re asking him only as a halakhic expert, then he is supposed to lay out the map for you, and you have to decide which path to follow. I didn’t say there’s a problem with accepting someone upon yourself as a rabbi—quite the opposite, that’s perfectly fine: “make for yourself a rabbi.” For someone competent, that’s a problem. Because someone competent should decide for himself, and that’s an injury to autonomy. But someone who isn’t competent can’t decide for himself anyway, so what difference does it make whether he accepts a rabbi upon himself or not? From the standpoint of autonomy, it’s irrelevant.
[Speaker H] Why yes? Because it’s always one rabbi—what’s the point of that? Is there some value in it?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know. Whoever wants can accept one rabbi; whoever doesn’t want to, shouldn’t.
[Speaker H] It’s a matter of convenience; there’s no value issue here. What? It’s already just a matter of convenience, not some value issue that there’s a point to choosing one rabbi.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t think so, I don’t know. It could also be that you want to be more consistent, to know him better—it doesn’t matter. Everyone and his own considerations. But I don’t think there’s good and bad here in this matter.
[Speaker J] No, but it’s also not a matter of good and bad. I mean, if I collect from every rabbi what’s convenient for me—certainly not.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “The leniencies of this one and the leniencies of that one—that is wicked.” But no, you can choose one rabbi, and you can say—I mean, generally most people proceed this way. They go to whoever is available at the time, whoever is convenient to approach, whoever answered them—it doesn’t matter. All the time—what, people don’t always ask the same rabbi all their questions.
[Speaker H] By the way, in every rabbinic-level doubt do we say that in pressing circumstances one may be lenient, or is that only in places where Rabbi Shimon is one side there, or people like him? Meaning, when is this said—that “this Rabbi Shimon is worthy”…? About every doubt that…?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are places in the Talmud where that is said, but decisors also do it in places where it isn’t said.
[Speaker H] Can you generalize it to every place that there’s a doubt, as it were?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think so, but I haven’t explained that yet—I haven’t gotten there. I can already see that the time has passed, so we’ll do that next time. I said that with regard to Rabbi Shimon, the explanation I just gave is not relevant to Rabbi Shimon. The dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon is a tannaitic dispute, and it has already been decided, so that’s a different chapter. Okay, we’ll continue next time.
[Speaker F] Yes, in the meantime there’s only the Maharam of Mintz’s answer. What? In the meantime there’s only the Maharam of Mintz’s answer.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, so I—I’ll end up with a formulation quite similar to what Shmuel said earlier, but I’ll sharpen it a bit.
[Speaker F] Okay, thank you very much, all the best,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Bye, see you, good night, Sabbath peace.
[Speaker E] Sabbath
[Speaker F] peace.