Learning from Experience – Lesson 13

This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

🔗 Link to the original lecture

🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what? If I already believe, then de facto I also fulfilled a commandment? Fine, maybe. But you can’t demand that I believe. So that, that’s not possible. So the claim, basically, is that with respect to facts, not only is it true that I won’t accept determinations of the Sages with respect to science or facts, not only because their science was not developed, but even if a sage got up today and issued some ruling regarding facts, even though it could be that he knows the science as well as I do or better than I do, I still would not accept what he says if he did not persuade me. Why? Because with respect to facts, the demand for authority is not defined even on the logical level. No—even if you’re right and you have the essential expertise and everything is fine, everything is true—but formal authority with respect to facts is an oxymoron. There is no such thing; it’s simply not conceptually defined. Therefore, in this matter of facts and science and the like, there cannot be authority. So I’m sharpening the point, because earlier I said there are three claims here: the Sages learned from experience; therefore, like any other person, the Sages can also make mistakes; therefore there is also no obligation to obey them. And now I’m adding another layer: the fact that there is no obligation to obey their factual determinations is not only because they can make mistakes, but because with respect to factual determinations, formal authority is not defined. Even if they cannot make mistakes. There is no formal authority. At most, if I reached the conclusion that they cannot make mistakes, then I’ll accept it because I was persuaded that they are right. That’s fine. But then the authority here is still substantive authority and not formal authority. There is no such thing as formal authority with respect to facts. By the way, exactly the same is true of metaphysical facts as well—for example, the principles, belief in the coming of the Messiah, I don’t know what, the resurrection of the dead, the World to Come, or all kinds of things of that sort. There is no such thing as formal authority for those beliefs. There cannot be such a thing. At most one can say to me: listen, accept it because this is the tradition we received from Sinai and the Holy One, blessed be He, said it, and after all He knows. Then what I accept is because I was persuaded that it is probably true, because the Holy One, blessed be He, knows, and if He said it then it is probably true. But you cannot demand of me: accept it because the Torah has formal authority, and even though you are convinced that it is not true, you are obligated to think that it is true. There is no such thing. In order for me to think it’s true, you have to persuade me. If you didn’t persuade me, you can’t demand it of me. Since the question whether the Messiah will come or will not come, the question whether there will or will not be resurrection of the dead—those are factual questions. Not facts that can be discovered by simple observation, but they are facts; either it will happen or it won’t happen. This is a question of facts. And therefore, with respect to facts, you can’t speak of formal authority. Okay, so that is basically the framework of the discussion.

Now I want to go a bit more into the details. So I’ll start first of all with the first claim. I’ll bring maybe a few examples, a few examples I took from the doctoral dissertation of Professor Steinberg. Professor Steinberg, as is well known, is an expert in ethics and Jewish law, and his dissertation was on experimentation and medicine among the Sages, or something like that—I don’t remember the exact topic anymore. And he brings there several sources; he basically argues that the Sages first of all looked—they simply learned practical knowledge. Rav, for example, in the Talmud at the beginning of tractate Sanhedrin says: “For eighteen months I grew up among cattle shepherds in order to know which blemish is permanent and which blemish is temporary.” Meaning, for Rav to understand animal blemishes—and you need to know that for the laws of non-kosher defects, for firstborn animals, for all kinds of things of that sort—where does he go? He goes to cattle shepherds, the veterinarians of that time. In other words, he goes to learn it not through Bible codes in the Torah, but by going to people who investigated it and examined it and are expert in it, who studied it. Meaning, the sources of scientific information were experiment and science and observation. He also brings there a Talmudic passage in tractate Hullin 93. Rabbi Yohanan was asked—they ask him to show the place of the fat that is on the kidneys and the flanks. And then he answered: “I am not a butcher, nor the son of a butcher.” I’m not a butcher, not a slaughterer; I’m not expert in this. Meaning, I don’t have the factual knowledge because I didn’t engage in it. So you see that the source for the Sages’ scientific and factual knowledge was scientific observation—not necessarily science in the modern sense, but among people who were experts who had studied it—and from there they learned their material.

After that he brings—he says—the Sages did not engage only in passive observation or in study, but they carried out experiments themselves on the bodies of animals and human beings in order to learn anatomy, physiology, pathology, all kinds of things like that. For example, the Tosefta in tractate Niddah chapter 4, also in Bekhorot, the Talmud in Bekhorot 45 and elsewhere, and in Niddah, describes that the sages in the Talmud performed autopsies on human beings—in that case, non-Jews. They performed autopsies. Steinberg argues, by the way, that they were the first in history to do this. I don’t know—he probably checked it; I don’t know exactly. He is basically claiming that before that people didn’t do experimentation, didn’t perform dissections on human beings, and this was the first example of autopsies. He brings Niddah 25—they did embryological examinations, fetal development. They did gynecological examinations in Niddah 22 and 66. Gastrointestinal examinations—I don’t know exactly what that is—with the use of an instrument; it’s probably some intestinal inflammations or something like that, if I understand correctly. I’m not sure, I only looked on the internet to see what that word means. In any case, all kinds of scientific fields—the Sages basically experimented actively in order to learn this or that physiological or pathological information that they needed. Meaning, the Sages basically used experience, learned from experts, performed experiments and dissections, and therefore the source of the information they had was, one could say, scientific in our language today.

Why is this important, actually? Sometimes there are arguments—Torah and science, all kinds of mistakes people find, scientific mistakes people find in the Talmud in various contexts. There are many scientific mistakes in the Talmud, by the way. There are these pamphlets called “Da’at Emet”; I assume at least some of you know them. It’s someone who once was some kind of newly religious returnee; I think he was the head of a kollel in Kfar Hasidim, in Rekhasim, and then one night he decided to run away, abandon everything together with his family, and ever since he has engaged in propaganda against Judaism. And among other things he puts out all kinds of pamphlets about scientific mistakes among the Sages and all kinds of things of that sort. And it always struck me as some kind of educational failure, because these pamphlets are built on the assumption that if the Sages made mistakes in science, then apparently Judaism is not true. Meaning, there is here, in a certain sense, some ultra-Orthodox expectation that says the Sages knew everything, and if you prove to me that they didn’t know everything then apparently the whole story is nonsense. But that’s simply not true. It isn’t true. As a believing person, I don’t think that is true, and therefore when I discover mistakes there it won’t do anything to my religious worldview. Meaning, I do not expect to find in the Sages advanced science beyond the science of their time. I’ll say more than that: in all kinds of debates surrounding these problems of Torah and science, there are all kinds of explanations for what the Sages really meant and all kinds of this and that—never mind—explanations that are sometimes quite casuistic. Now I don’t need to get into the question at all whether those explanations are correct or not. I don’t need those explanations. Those explanations assume that the Sages probably knew, and if we don’t understand then we’re not understanding something. And therefore you look for explanations. But I don’t have that basic assumption. I don’t look for explanations, because if the Sages made a mistake then they probably made a mistake. There is no reason to build some tower in order to reconcile a scientific mistake I find in the Sages, because I have no reason to assume there won’t be mistakes. Why assume that? Therefore, not only do I not find explanations for mistakes found among the Sages—even if I do find explanations, I won’t accept them. If the plain meaning is that they made a mistake, then they probably made a mistake. And even if there is an explanation that is a sophisticated explanation, I won’t accept it. I won’t accept it because there is no reason to accept it. Meaning, there is a starting point here—it’s much stronger than arguing over this explanation or that explanation, maybe it is right, maybe it isn’t right, doesn’t matter. I don’t need the explanations and those explanations don’t interest me. They don’t interest me because it makes no difference to me at all whether in the end the Sages were right; even if they were right, that’s the case. That’s the case because the scientific information they had was the information of their period, and there is no reason in the world to assume there was something there beyond what was known to others in their time.

Maybe I’ll bring a few examples so that things won’t remain completely up in the air. Yes—for example, the Sages assumed that the earth is flat. In several passages that appears. The earth has thickness, yes, at twilight and in the morning at dawn, so the sun passes along the sides of the earth. There is in the laws of absorption of prohibitions, “the lower overcomes,” “the upper overcomes.” There is a passage in tractate Bava Batra—it’s a fascinating passage altogether. Someone once asked me about this when I was in Bnei Brak—yes, I was the science representative there in Bnei Brak—so they once asked me: there is a dispute between Rashbam and Tosafot in Bava Batra in those passages where they measure graves, distances with graves; you need to know so that the priests will know how far they may go and not come within four cubits and so on. Anyway, there are all kinds of passages there dealing with measuring graves. Now among other things a question arises there: what is the length of the diagonal of a rectangle four by six? So Rashbam says its length is seven, because in a square of five by five the length is also seven. Yes, for the Sages, after all, the square root of two is 1.4. So yes, one and two-fifths is the square root of two, which is fine to one digit after the decimal point—that’s correct; it’s 1.414 or something like that. So for the Sages, when there is a square of five by five, its diagonal is five times 1.4, meaning seven. Okay? Rashbam says: five by five and six by four have the same diagonal. Why? Because they have the same perimeter. Five by five has perimeter twenty; six by four also has perimeter twenty. If they have the same perimeter, they have the same diagonal. So Tosafot disagrees with Rashbam, and Tosafot argues: what do you mean? Six by four has an area of twenty-four, and five by five has an area of twenty-five, a larger area. Therefore it is obvious that the diagonal of five by five is longer than the diagonal of four by six. And what is the truth? The truth is that both are mistaken, of course. The diagonal of six by four is larger than five by five. Six by four is the square root of fifty-two—Pythagoras’ theorem—and five by five is the square root of fifty. So the diagonal of six by four is larger than the diagonal of five by five. Now for Rashbam this is not necessarily a mistake, because Rashbam may just not have been exact. He says it’s roughly the same thing. He says it’s the same thing; after all the whole square root of two is already—he’s not exact there. 1.4 is not exact, it isn’t precise, so he says it’s roughly the same thing—could be. But Tosafot, when he argues with Rashbam, Tosafot disagrees with him exactly on that point. That is, he says: look, it’s not the same thing; five by five is more than six by four. Now in Tosafot this is definitely a mistake, because Tosafot is talking about the differences. If you say it’s approximately the same thing, fine, then you’re speaking approximately and you can’t know whether you erred or not. But if you say no, no, let me show you—five by five is more than six by four—that is clearly a mistake, since if anything six by four is larger. Therefore in Tosafot it is definitely a mistake.

Another passage, also in Bava Batra there, on not-so-distant pages from there—someone once asked me—the Talmud says that one must tip by a handbreadth. Someone who sells merchandise in the market, the goods need to sit a handbreadth lower than the weights. When you weigh merchandise against the standard weight, the merchandise should be lower than the weight, in favor of the buyer, so that he can be sure he is receiving the quantity he bought, so that there should be no fraud here. Now when you think about it, according to at least some of the medieval authorities (Rishonim), what does the scale look like? It’s a rod, from both sides of which hang strings with scale-pans, yes, with little plates tied by strings to the two ends of the rod. Now you understand—and in the middle there is some kind of post on which this rod sits, and here something hangs and here hangs a pan and here hangs a pan, and thus the scale moves. Now you understand—this is mechanics for beginners—you understand that there is no such thing as tipping by a handbreadth. That is, if the weights are in exact equilibrium, then wherever you place them they will stay. If you put them like this they will stay like this, put them like this they will stay like this, put them like this they will stay like this—they will always stay. There is no meaning to saying it should tip by a handbreadth and still be balanced. If it stands, then it is in equilibrium; if it is not in equilibrium, then it will simply fall all the way down—it also won’t stop at a handbreadth. So to say that one should tip the scale by a handbreadth as an indication that you are giving some bonus weight to the buyer so he can be sure he receives what he is supposed to receive—that is simply a mistake; there is no such thing. Now I looked a bit among the medieval authorities; there was one medieval authority who wanted to claim that the beam is not a straight line but that at its ends there is a downward bend, like a sort of H-shape with two short legs here, and then from those legs they hang the strings with the pans. Then it is already possible, because if the beam tilts, then the two legs are already at an angle. So this leg comes closer to the central rod and that leg gets farther from the central rod; the moments are no longer balanced, and then there can indeed be a weight advantage that determines at what distance it will stop. So according to those medieval authorities, fine. But according to the medieval authorities—and this is the straightforward reading—who speak of a straight rod, there is no such thing as tipping by a handbreadth with a straight rod. Now you have to understand, you don’t need a particle accelerator to understand this. Anyone in the marketplace would see it immediately; this is not overly sophisticated science. A real question arises here: how did they keep the Jewish law that they themselves established? It is impossible to keep this law, unless there was some rust there at the pivot and by chance it stood for them, but that is completely accidental; there is no real possibility here. So that too is, for example, a clear mistake.

Therefore there are quite a few examples—there are more, of course. Quite a few examples. There is, of course, the killing of a louse on the Sabbath, the famous example, because it comes into being—it is not made from male and female, it comes from decay or something like that, or worms that are born from decay, a louse is born from water, something like that—really all sorts of bizarre statements like these that are simply not true. Now we are talking here about Sabbath desecration. The Sages permit killing a louse on the Sabbath because there is no taking of life involved. Okay. Now clearly there is taking of life in a louse; killing it on the Sabbath is a capital prohibition, even though the Talmud says it is permitted.

[Speaker E] Rabbi, can you—I just want to ask again about the earth. The sages said it was flat?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are several passages.

[Speaker E] I always remember that in the Zohar they bring that the Zohar already knew from way back that it was… so how does that…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They always bring that, because they always bring—there are sources, and since the sources are so diverse and reflect all kinds of views, so true, there are also places where you see otherwise. But there are several passages in which you see that the earth is flat. By the way, even among the Greeks there were disagreements; there were those who claimed that the earth is round. It’s not an invention of Columbus. That’s an ancient view that existed for many years. But it was that kind of dispute, you know—nobody really knows. I even saw today some diagram in a book, in some Greek work, that actually shows that the earth is round through the disappearance of a ship’s masts at the edge, on the horizon. It’s really an excellent proof. The earth is round; the fact is that the masts disappear as the ship moves forward. So the position that the earth is round is an old position and of course long predates the Zohar. There’s no need to brag too much about the Zohar; this predates the Zohar by a lot, except that it was not agreed upon. And in the Talmud, in several halakhic passages, it says the earth is flat; it says so very clearly and unequivocally.

[Speaker F] So where did this predate the Zohar? In which books? Greek ones?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying, there were such views among the Greeks. There were also many other views. I’m only saying that such a view existed from time immemorial. Meaning, it’s not that the Greeks thought the earth was flat and the Zohar knew it was round. It simply probably reflects a certain opinion by which the authors of the Zohar were influenced. But that is a view that existed much earlier. Okay, so all these claims about pi, the Sages of Caesarea—yes, pi; they had gross mistakes in pi and in area calculations there in the Talmud in tractate Sukkah page 8, and there is a parallel in Eruvin and so on, and in Tosafot too, not to mention all kinds of strange calculations they make there. The Sages of Caesarea there—that’s already approximate calculations, fine—but the Sages of Caesarea in the Talmud, that is apparently a mistake, an actual mistake. Although there is an interesting article by Mordechai Alperin—I saw an article of his—that interprets the Sages of Caesarea in such a way that it is not a mistake. And not only that: a student of mine sent me an article she wrote that basically repeats exactly what he… She’s a mathematics student; she did a doctorate in mathematics. And I actually referred her to Mordechai Alperin’s article, which says exactly the same thing. So the Sages of Caesarea are really an interesting question. On the face of it, it is probably not a mistake—that is, there is a good interpretation of their claim. In any case, there are quite a few examples.

By the way, we are speaking here about things that were known in their time, not modern science. Meaning, the areas of a circle, of a triangle, pi, Pythagoras’ theorem—all these things were knowledge that existed long before the Talmud. And even in those matters the Talmud makes mistakes. Not to mention relativity and quantum theory, yes, which some people also want to find there in the Talmud. They simply drew on the scientific knowledge they had—not even what existed in the world, but what they had. There is another nice example. Once someone did a doctorate—Shlomo Harir, of blessed memory. He later was some school principal and afterward something in the Ministry of Education. He came to me once; he was doing a doctorate in mathematics with Hershkowitz, on mathematical problems in the Talmud. And he asked me whether I had some problems to give him; he was looking for a little meat for his dissertation. So I brought him one nice example involving a Mishnah in tractate Mikvaot. There is a Mishnah in Mikvaot that speaks about a pit of drawn water, and a water-channel passes through it at a certain rate, a certain flow-rate of water passes through the pit, enters and exits. And the water is valid water, but the whole pit contains forty se’ah of drawn water. The question is after how long one may immerse in the pit—that is, the assumption is that all the water inside it is no longer drawn water, or that there are less than three log of drawn water. So there are all kinds of—the Mishnah says something, and all the medieval authorities, the Ra’avad and all the commentators on the Mishnah in Mikvaot there, discuss it and do calculations and so on. Now these calculations are wrong by thousands of percent. Not ten percent, not some approximation or another—thousands of percent. Some of those calculations are wrong. You write a simple differential equation; you can solve this problem for every flow-rate, every water rate, under the assumption of uniform mixing—of course that’s only with very slow flow, never mind that right now—but under reasonable assumptions one can arrive at some sort of calculation, and you discover there things off by thousands of percent. Now if anyone ever relied on this Mishnah in order to determine the law of a mikveh, the people who immersed in that mikveh could have violated serious prohibitions, because that mikveh was entirely drawn water. In the end one can arrive at some sort of calculation and discover there things off by thousands of percent. Now if anyone ever relied on this Mishnah in order to determine the law of a mikveh, the people who immersed in that mikveh could have violated serious prohibitions, because that mikveh was entirely drawn water. And that is an error of all the medieval authorities. And why? Because they didn’t know calculus. That really is a mistake that stems simply from knowledge that did not exist in their time. The previous mistakes I brought were mistakes in things where the knowledge did exist in their time, not modern knowledge. Okay? So in short, there are all kinds of examples of scientific mistakes of the Sages. So meanwhile what we learned in anatomy, of course, in the laws of niddah—there are many, many things there. So in principle, then, what we see is first, that the Sages made use of experience and scientific knowledge, and not that their scientific knowledge was received at Sinai and is beyond all doubt; and we also see the results—there are quite a few errors in the scientific determinations of the Sages, because they drew on the scientific knowledge available to them.

By the way, the attitude toward scientific knowledge—in general one can say—was different among sages, say, in the Middle Ages, among the medieval authorities (Rishonim), between Ashkenazic sages and Sephardic sages. Sephardic sages treated external scientific knowledge with much more respect and openness. And Ashkenazim were closed off, as always. The Ashkenazim were closed off—there’s no such thing—and everything was, yes, Tosafot wants to bring proofs that there are many stars in the heavens, so he brings a verse. And the Ran, when he wants to say that there are many stars in the heavens, says: go outside and look, you’ll see that there are many stars. Meaning, there’s some sort of difference, right? The Ran writes on “its shade is greater than its sunlight,” the Ran in Sukkah, and this Ran is very dear to me, he says: “One should not deny what is perceived by the senses.” They discuss there whether the sun is more above or more below. He says: look, see, and reach your conclusions; one cannot deny what we perceive with the senses. Don’t bring me proofs from verses and proofs from the stars and proofs from reasoning. Go look and see. That is a classic Sephardic approach. Among the Ashkenazim, the Tosafists make calculations from verses; that is, they learn about reality from various verses, and of course they also reach all kinds of strange conclusions as a result. So there is some basic approach, I would say, more closed in the Ashkenazic world and more open in the Sephardic world. As a generalization, of course—there are always exceptions in both directions—and I think there were many more scientists, yes, that is, prominent sages who were scientists, among the Sephardim than among the Ashkenazim. At least in the Middle Ages. So there is a certain difference in approach.

But in principle—and this is an interesting point—despite everything I have said until now, one should know, and I think I mentioned this last time, the accepted approach among halakhic decisors, both Ashkenazic and Sephardic, is that there are no scientific errors among the Sages. Meaning, if the Sages said something, that is binding even in factual determinations. There are no scientific errors among the Sages. That is the accepted approach. The most common example of this, yes, is killing the louse on the Sabbath—that is the example they always bring; it is a question that troubled sages already—not that many, by the way—but here and there, and there were a few polemics about it. And it was accepted until not too many years ago—you would not hear a halakhic decisor tell you that it is forbidden to kill a louse on the Sabbath even though that is the stringent position. Meaning, to defer to modern science is to go stringently, not leniently; it is to forbid killing it even though the Sages permit it. Okay? Almost no halakhic decisor would allow himself to say such a thing even as a stringency, because no—the Sages do not err. Even Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, who overall is a very clear-eyed and open halakhic decisor—you see—he is very careful; I don’t think you will find in him any statement that the Sages erred in a scientific determination or in any factual determination. I have found several places in him where he works very hard in discussing modern non-kosher defects and all kinds of things of that sort, where clearly overall we are simply talking about mistakes—or mistakes or failed, yes, ancient medical technology. He is not willing to say such a thing, and if that’s Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, then I’m certainly not talking about more closed and conservative halakhic decisors. So the accepted approach, contrary perhaps to what one might think, is that there are no scientific mistakes among the Sages; what the Sages said is what binds.

I brought the Hazon Ish, who spoke about two thousand years of Torah—he was actually more clear-eyed; he understood that they could make mistakes, he only claimed: yes, but their science is the binding science. I spoke about this last time. But within his words one can understand that he held that the Sages could make mistakes. Maybe I’ll bring an example—I took an interesting example, I think I also found it once in Steinberg. There is Rabbi Yitzhak Lampronti, who wrote an encyclopedia called Pahad Yitzhak. He discusses—this encyclopedia is alphabetical—and under the entry “forbidden trapping,” under the letter tzadi, he brings an exchange of letters. He himself claims—he was very open to modern science—and he argues that today one should refrain from killing lice; one should forbid it against the law of the Talmud. But his rabbi, Rabbi Yehuda ben Rabbi Eliezer Brill, held that the law should remain as it was. Let’s read the responsum for a moment. He says as follows: “And I, the young writer, were it not that I am afraid”—yes, if I were not afraid, I would say. You see? “If I were not afraid, I would say”—that’s always the language of politeness before he says what he wants to say. “That in our time, when the natural scientists have looked and seen and known and written that every living creature, whoever it may be, comes from eggs”—is born from eggs, including lice—“and all this they have proved with clear proofs, if so, one who guards his soul should keep away from them and not kill either a flea or a louse, and should not bring himself into possible liability for a sin-offering. And in this matter I would say that if the sages of Israel were to hear the proofs of the nations of the world, they would retract and admit their words, as in the matter of the revolving sphere and the fixed constellation.” What is he saying? If the Sages were alive in his time and heard the scientific proofs that a louse is indeed born from an egg and therefore it is forbidden to kill it on the Sabbath, they, as upright people, would admit it. And therefore the fact that they write otherwise in the Talmud is simply because they were not scientifically up to date. He brings an example from the passage in tractate Pesahim—we’ll see it in a bit more detail in a moment—where the sages of Israel admitted to the sages of the nations of the world in some scientific debate they had there. Yes, and he says: and the Shiltei HaGibborim and the Ran and Alfasi in tractate Shabbat discuss whether the flea is white or black, etc. “But I asked my teacher, our master from Mantua”—that is Rabbi Brill—“and he upheld the permission in this responsum.” And now he brings his teacher’s responsum.

So he writes as follows: “I was asked whether in this age, when the land is full of the knowledge of researchers engaged in these matters, who say that every living creature is born and generated from an egg, it is permitted to kill a louse on the Sabbath.” Yes, is it permitted today to kill a louse on the Sabbath? “And I answered that one should not change laws founded upon the tradition of our predecessors because of the investigations of the sages of the nations of the world.” Modern science should not move Jewish law from its place. “Do you not see that many of the investigators deny, with proofs, the matter of the evil eye? Yet Nachmanides of blessed memory wrote that it is enough to refute their words by what is written in the Talmud regarding the law that it is forbidden to stand by one’s fellow’s field when it is standing in its stalks”—yes, a Talmudic passage in Bava Batra, which says that it is forbidden to look at your fellow’s field when it is standing in its stalks, when the wheat is shooting up again, as it were, because of the evil eye. So Nachmanides says there is an explicit Talmudic statement, therefore obviously the sages of the nations of the world are mistaken. “And a believer need not seek proofs and arguments from elsewhere, even though there are many and mighty ones.” There are also scientific proofs against those researchers, he argues, but you don’t need them. If the Talmud says otherwise, the Talmud is what determines. “Let the tradition of our rabbis suffice, upon whose pillars they impressed and founded a complete and absolute law and judgment. And another trustworthy testimony for me”—says Rabbi Brill—“is what is written in the Talmud in tractate Pesahim regarding whether the sphere is fixed and the constellation revolves.” There is a dispute there in the Talmud between the sages of Israel and the sages of the nations of the world. The question is whether the sphere—yes, once people thought that in the heavens the stars are situated on some kind of sphere—so does the sphere stand still and the stars move relative to it, or does the sphere move and the stars stand still? Relative motion. So this is a dispute between the sages of Israel and the sages of the nations of the world, in which the sages of Israel at that time retracted and admitted the sages of the nations of the world. By the way, this is the proof that Maimonides and his son Rabbi Abraham bring to show that science is what determines and not the tradition of the sages of Israel, because the sages of Israel admitted it as soon as the sages of the nations of the world brought proof for their words. But he takes this, and says: “And in the end, after many hundreds of years, all the astronomers from the nations of the world, in their investigations by experiment and demonstration, returned to the words of our sages and our ancient tradition.” The sages of Israel who admitted there to the sages of the nations of the world because of the proofs the sages of the nations of the world brought—were mistaken. Today science has discovered that the Sages were the ones who were right then. And he is basically claiming that this is not accidental. The Sages are always right. And if we think they are mistaken, the mistake is ours.

Yes, and what is nice is that even the Sages themselves thought they were mistaken, and in that they were mistaken. After all, they themselves admitted it to the sages of the nations of the world. He says yes, but the scientists of our time came back and argued that the view of the Sages back then was the correct view, not that of the nations of the world. So what happened to the fact that the Sages admitted to the sages of the nations of the world? They were right in what they thought; they were mistaken in admitting their mistake. Well—so can the Sages make mistakes or can they not? In my opinion this letter is self-contradictory. On the one hand he proves from there that what the Sages say is apparently a tradition from Sinai and they are necessarily right. Therefore science too will discover this at some stage, and in that case science discovered it, so he claims. But if that were so, it’s not clear to me why in the Talmud itself the sages admitted to the sages of the nations of the world. After all, they have a tradition from Sinai that this is what is correct, so what do I care about all the proofs brought by the sages of the nations? Rather, it is clear from here that the Sages themselves understood that the information in their possession was not a tradition from Sinai. Rather, it was what they thought scientifically, and when they heard a decisive proof against them—by the way, a very problematic proof, but never mind—when they heard a decisive proof against them, they admitted it. Meaning, right there in that very passage you can see against what he writes. Even if he is right that after hundreds of years the astronomers came back and discovered that the Sages were actually the ones who were right—even if that were true. But the very fact that the Sages admitted, because of proofs, to the words of the sages of the nations of the world shows us that the Sages themselves did not treat this information as a tradition from Sinai. Rather, for them it was a matter of proofs, and whoever brings proof is the one who is right. Therefore the whole story is a very strange story.

And this is what he says: “If so, one should not move from what was ruled by our Talmud even if all the winds and all the human investigations in the world come and blow against it, for the spirit of the Lord spoke within us. Indeed the investigator lacks understanding, and his intellect does not reach the depth of the wisdoms of nature and the work of creation, for they are many. And it is written, ‘He declares His words to Jacob,’ and ‘The secret of the Lord is with those who fear Him.’ And the sages of the nations of the world did not know and did not understand nature except superficially—the things visible to the eye, but not their inner essence—as those who received the tradition of the work of creation understood it, as the Ran of blessed memory wrote in his homilies, and the like.” I don’t know where this Ran is in his homilies; I’m prepared to bet that the Ran in his homilies thinks otherwise. I don’t know which statement in the Ran’s homilies he means, because the Ran in his homilies was a very, very rationalist person. In short, his claim—after that he continues—in any case after that he also brings Maimonides, which is especially strange because Maimonides certainly says the opposite. Yes: “If so, the law is true and firm and correct and enduring in its place, and one should not change it at all because of the claims of the new investigations that have come recently. Come and see what the great eagle, the father of fathers of sages in Torah and in every investigation, Maimonides of blessed memory, wrote in his commentary to the Mishnah, chapter Ha’Orev VeHaRotav, concerning a mouse half of flesh and half of earth—and that is all.” Yes, Maimonides noted there that what the scientists discovered is that indeed there is such a thing as a mouse half of flesh and half of earth. Fine—that’s what Maimonides thought then, but you cannot derive from this Maimonides a general statement that the Sages are always right; that is simply the opposite of what Maimonides himself writes explicitly.

Now where does Maimonides write this? So let us take a look for a moment at the essay by Maimonides’ son, Rabbi Abraham ben HaRambam, printed at the beginning of Ein Yaakov. Ein Yaakov is a work on the aggadic passages of the Talmud. At the beginning of the first volume several essays are brought about how to relate to the teachings of the Sages—by Rabbi Moshe Hayyim Luzzatto and several others, quite a few essays. One of them is an essay on the teachings of the Sages by Rabbi Abraham ben HaRambam. It is a letter of Rabbi Abraham ben HaRambam. And here he brings words also in the name of his father; Maimonides indeed writes some of this in Guide for the Perplexed, and he also brings things in the name of his father. So he says here—now I’m reading: “Know that you are obligated to know: anyone who wishes to uphold a known opinion and show favor to the one who said it, and to accept his opinion without examination and understanding concerning that opinion, whether it is true or not—this is among the evil opinions, and it is forbidden by the way of the Torah and also by the way of reason.” Meaning, he says, one who wants to accept things simply because someone said them—that is something bad, forbidden by the way of the Torah and also by the way of reason, and it is a bad trait, to accept things just because someone is wise and therefore because he said it, I also accept it. “And it is not fitting by the way of reason because it entails deficiency and lack in contemplating what one ought to believe.” You need to contemplate what you believe, reach conclusions, and thus verify your beliefs—not simply because someone is wise and therefore you adopt what he says. “And by the way of Torah, because it inclines away from the way of truth and departs from the line of uprightness. The blessed God said: ‘You shall not favor the poor, and you shall not honor the great; with righteousness shall you judge your fellow.’ And He said: ‘You shall not show partiality in judgment.’ There is no difference between accepting that opinion and upholding it without proof, and between believing the one who said it and showing him favor and arguing for him that the truth is surely with him because he is a great man like Heman and Kalkol and Darda—for all this is no proof, but it is forbidden.” Yes, ad hominem. The ad hominem fallacy: accepting something only because a wise person said it.

[Speaker B] And according to this introduction, we don’t see the screen sharing. Wait. It slipped away from me for a second. There. You don’t see the sharing? Wait. Now

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You see? Yes, good. So, here I am. And according to this introduction, we are not obligated, because of the great stature of the sages of the Talmud and their perfection—their perfection in interpreting the Torah and its details, and the soundness of their judgment in explaining its general principles and particulars—to defer to them and uphold their views in everything they said about medicine, natural science, and astronomy. Yes, the fact that they are authorized to determine and are wise in the halakhic realm does not give them credit, and should not lead us to believe them in scientific determinations, in natural science and astronomy and medicine, and to trust them there just as we trust them in interpreting the Torah, whose wisdom is in their hands and which was entrusted to them to teach to people. By the way, this is what is nice here: “whose wisdom is in their hands” means essential authority—they are experts. “And it was entrusted to them to teach to people” is the formal authority. But all of this is only with regard to Jewish law, not about scientific facts. Because regarding what was said, “according to the Torah that they shall instruct you”—you see that concerning matters that were not clarified to the sages by way of their reasoning and debate, they say: “By God, if Joshua son of Nun had said it, I would not obey him.” Meaning, I would not believe him even though he is a prophet, since he has no ability to inform us of the matter—that is, to prove it—except by way of reasoning and analysis and the methods through which the Talmud is expounded. This is sufficient proof and demonstration, and we need not concern ourselves with them further, since we find them saying that the medical statements in the Talmud were not verified and did not hold up. The remedies that appear in the Talmud do not seem to be correct. For example, the matter of the “preserving stone,” which they said prevents miscarriage, was not verified. And similarly many matters they discussed in the chapter “Eight Creeping Things”—remember “Eight Creeping Things”? This is the proof brought by the teacher of Rabbi Yitzhak Lampronti from Maimonides in the chapter “Eight Creeping Things.” Now look what he writes there about that chapter: that one need not believe the Sages in these matters, because they are not experts in such areas. And then he brings the passage in tractate Pesachim that I mentioned earlier, and this is what he says: when we see them, of blessed memory, saying, “If it is a Jewish law, we will accept it, but if it is a matter of reasoning, there is an answer”; and likewise they do this when one of two opposites has not been decided, leaving it with the expression teiku; and they retract their own views when the truth is clarified to them, saying in many places, “Rabbi so-and-so retracted his view,” “Beit Hillel retracted and ruled in accordance with Beit Shammai.” And even greater than this: in their rulings and in their love of the path of justice they said, “Have Rava’s interpreter stand for him and teach publicly,” and he said, “The things I told you before were mistaken.” And he also said: I saw fit to bring here a statement of the Sages, of blessed memory, and I will explain it to you so that their love of truth and their admission of it will be settled and accepted in your mind. They said what they said. The Sages, of blessed memory, said in the Talmud in Pesachim—this is the passage I mentioned—yes, the Sages, of blessed memory, said in the Talmud in Pesachim: “The rabbis taught: the sages of Israel say the sphere is fixed and the constellations revolve,” and so on, until Rabbi said, “The view of the sages of the nations appears more correct, for during the day the springs are cool and at night the springs are warm.” Yes, the sun passes underneath the earth—how do I know? Because in the morning the spring water is warm. Apparently the sun fried it from below. Now you understand that this is a very dubious proof, but to the Sages back then it seemed like an excellent proof, and they retracted because of that proof. And then he explains this whole matter and says as follows—I’m moving to the left page, the left column—“And although this proof is weak and feeble, as you see, still reflect on what they taught us in this baraita and how precious is the lesson they taught. For Rabbi did not look at the view of these people except by way of observation, paying no attention either to the sages of Israel or to the sages of the nations; and he decided in favor of the sages of the nations because of this proof, which he thought was an acceptable proof, namely, that during the day the springs are cool and at night the springs are warm. And reflect on the wisdom of this secret: Rabbi did not rule according to the sages of the nations”—he did not give preferential treatment to the philosophers of the nations, but neither did he give it to the Sages—“rather, he decided in favor of their view through his own judgment based on the proof we mentioned. That is why he said, ‘their words appear more correct,’ and this wording indicates a decision. Had it become clear to him with certainty and proof that the sphere revolves and the constellations are fixed, he would have ruled accordingly, just as other sages did in other views and said, ‘The sages of the nations defeated the sages of Israel.’ And truly this master is called Rabbi, Rabbeinu HaKadosh, for when a person casts falsehood from before him and upholds the truth and decides in accordance with its reality, and returns from his previous stance, ready to admit his mistake when the opposite becomes clear to him—there is no doubt that he is holy. Thus it has become clear to us that the sages, of blessed memory, do not examine opinions and consider them except in light of their truth and their proofs, not because of the identity of the one who said them, whoever he may be.” In other words, the Talmud here is teaching us: it doesn’t matter whether the constellations revolve, or the sphere revolves, or the constellations stand still—that is not what the topic is coming to teach. And Maimonides writes this in the Guide for the Perplexed—he brings it here in the name of Maimonides, his son. He says that all this comes to teach us is that one must accept the truth from whoever says it. And if there is good evidence, I accept the evidence. And if the Sages thought the opposite, then they thought the opposite, and they were mistaken. And I am forbidden to accept things just because the Sages said them; rather I must accept things because that is what reason says, because I checked it, because that is what science says, what observation says. And in the end, what Maimonides and his son are saying is: what determines the matter is the scientific, empirical, logical conclusion, not what the Sages said. In Jewish law they have authority; in science, what determines things is scientific thinking, observation, evidence, logic—that is what determines things. Therefore, for our purposes—if I wrap this up here—it is a very good point on which to end this whole series: ultimately, in scientific fields the Sages have no authority, and they also do not have special knowledge. And therefore, the fact that there are many mistakes there—correct, there are many mistakes there—and so when we issue a halakhic ruling in aspects that touch on science, we are supposed to rely on up-to-date scientific knowledge, not on what is written in the Talmud. By the way, this is true also in other factual areas that are not necessarily connected specifically to modern scientific knowledge. Even determinations like the presumption that a person does not repay a debt before its due date—we’ve spoken about that more than once—even that determination is a factual one: that reasonable people do not pay before the due date. Facts have to be examined: are these facts correct or not? Even if it is not a scientific issue, not physics or modern mathematics or whatever, but simply looking at the world and seeing what the correct facts are. And with every scientific and factual determination, the way to reach a conclusion is the scientific method, the path of logic and the path of observation—not by quoting sources and other such things. Even though, as I said earlier, almost all halakhic decisors throughout the generations took the opposite approach. They claimed that there cannot be a scientific error in the Talmud. And as is well known, the famous Vilna Gaon on Maimonides—that Maimonides deleted all the Talmudic passages dealing with the evil eye and demons and sorcery because he did not believe in it or thought it was all untrue—including Jewish laws based on these ideas, such as the rule mentioned earlier not to stand over your fellow’s field when the grain is standing, from tractate Bava Batra 5. Maimonides does not bring that. Maimonides does not bring that, and similarly washing hands because of an evil spirit, and all kinds of laws connected to demons and spirits. Yes, and the most famous Maimonides passage, which is also cited in the Shulchan Arukh, is that it is permitted to whisper over a scorpion bite on the Sabbath, even though it is forbidden to do healing on the Sabbath, because in any case it does not help at all, so there is no problem—it can be done even on the Sabbath. So the famous Vilna Gaon, in his glosses there on the Shulchan Arukh, says that accursed philosophy led Maimonides astray for the most part, and therefore he goes against the Talmud and declares that this matter has no substance. But that is a mistake, and obviously the Talmud knows better, and if it is written in the Talmud then it is certainly true—that is what he writes there in very harsh language about these positions of Maimonides. But of course Maimonides is right. Okay, so that is a good point on which to end this series. As I said, the next series will actually be a kind of continuation; we will talk about errors in inference from experience, statistical errors, various kinds of mistakes, but I decided to define it as a separate series. That’s it. Any comments or questions?

[Speaker B] Will the next series already be next week? What? Will the next series already be next week, or is there—?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On Thursday, yes. Okay. Good, so goodbye, good night, Sabbath שלום.

[Speaker B] Thank you, be strong.