For the Perplexed of the Generation – Lesson 4

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, this is from the current chapter, I assume that’s what it is. The current chapter, right? 25. “Know that our refusal to accept the claim of the eternity of the world is not because of the verses that appear in the Torah saying that the world was created anew.” In other words, Maimonides says: the fact that I don’t accept the claim that the world is eternal is not because of the verses in the Torah, not because of what is written in the Torah that the Holy One, blessed be He, created the world, that the world is newly created—that’s not what compels me. “For the verses indicating the creation of the world are no more numerous than the verses indicating that God is a body,” corporeal, that He is somehow physical, yes? “And the gates of interpretation are not closed to us, nor are we prevented from doing so regarding the creation of the world. Rather, we could have interpreted them just as we did in rejecting corporeality, and perhaps that would even have been much easier. We could have interpreted those verses and upheld the eternity of the world just as we interpreted the verses and rejected the idea that He, blessed be He, is bodily.” What does he mean here? He’s making an analogy between two topics: the eternity of the world and the corporeality of the Holy One, blessed be He. So regarding the corporeality of the Holy One, blessed be He, as is well known, the Torah contains quite a few expressions that relate to Him in a physical way—“the hand of God,” yes, as is well known, Onkelos is always making an effort to correct that—and that’s because the Torah contains certain physical descriptions of the Holy One, blessed be He. And about that Maimonides says: so what? The Torah says that the Holy One, blessed be He, is physical. If it is clear to me by proof that this is not true from the standpoint of reason and intellect, then I will interpret the Torah’s verses figuratively, that is, allegorically. So I’ll do a bit of interpretive creativity and I’ll manage. The verses themselves do not compel me. So that’s what he did regarding the corporeality of the Holy One, blessed be He. From here we now move to the analogy with the eternity of the world. So regarding the eternity of the world as well, Maimonides says: we think the world is not eternal. But that is not because of verses, because there are also verses about corporeality. And in that case, in fact, I did not accept what the verses seem to say. Therefore, the fact that there are verses saying that the world was created is not what compels me to reject Aristotle’s claim about the eternity of the world. And he says more than that: interpreting the verses about the eternity of the world figuratively might actually have been even easier than what we did with the verses about anthropomorphism. “But what led us not to do this and not to believe it”—meaning, so why indeed don’t we believe in eternity? Two reasons. “The first is that God’s being non-corporeal has been demonstrated by proof.” Meaning, there is evidence for that. It cannot be that the Holy One, blessed be He—here he goes back once again to the example, yes? To God’s being corporeal—but of course the goal is the discussion of eternity. He is just trying to show his methodology through the issue of corporeality, and after he clarifies the methodology he will return to discuss the question of the eternity of the world. So he says: what actually led us to adopt—not to believe this thing? “The first is that God’s being non-corporeal has been demonstrated by proof, and therefore it necessarily follows that everything whose plain sense contradicts the plain meaning of the proof must be interpreted, and it becomes known that it necessarily has an interpretation. But the eternity of the world has not been demonstrated by proof, and there is no need to reject the verses and reinterpret them because of the dominance of an opinion that can be countered in various ways.” What does he mean? Regarding the eternity of the world—well, regarding the corporeality of the Holy One, blessed be He—he had a proof, meaning a clear demonstration. When there is a clear proof, I do not accept even what is written in the verses. So now let’s go back to the question of the eternity of the world. If I had a clear proof that the world is eternal, I would do the same thing to the Torah’s verses saying that the world was created, exactly what he did with the verses that make the Holy One, blessed be He, corporeal. So the fact that there are verses does not bother me. So what does? The fact that there is no proof for it. Meaning, if there is no proof that the world is eternal, why should I distort—or engage in creative interpretation of—the plain meaning of the verses? And that is one reason. And the second reason: “For our belief that God, blessed be He, is non-corporeal does not contradict any of the foundations of the Torah and does not render false any statement of any prophet.” The fact that the Holy One, blessed be He, is spiritual—of course not only does that not contradict anything among the principles of the Torah and not render false any prophetic statement, it also does not contradict any claim or any basic Torah principle. It contradicts the plain sense of the verses, but we manage that through creative interpretation. But it does not contradict the Torah’s principles or the words of the prophets and so on. “And in it there is only what fools think to be contrary to Scripture”—that is, that it is supposedly against Scripture, but that’s only what fools think. “And it is not contrary to it, as we explained; rather, it is the intention of Scripture.” On the contrary, that is Scripture’s intention: that the Holy One, blessed be He, is not a body. Yes, and in his introductions he also speaks about the three groups regarding the interpretation of the aggadic literature of the Sages. There is the group of fools, who interpret all aggadic literature literally, even the completely absurd ones—as far as they’re concerned, it’s historical truth. And Maimonides calls that the group of fools. And there is the group of the wicked, who also interpret all the aggadic literature literally, and therefore laugh at it, because it’s nonsense—they saw Rabbah bar bar Hana or all kinds of strange things like that. And what is the group of the wise? If something is absurd, then understand that it is not literal; you need to apply some creative interpretation. And that is basically what he is saying should be done here with the verses as well. By the way, following this there is a very large polemic in a responsum of Rashba, yes, as is well known. Yedaya HaPenini, a student of the author of Hashlama, in Rashba’s time, apparently headed some group of allegorists. People who interpreted the Torah figuratively, and they were accustomed to hanging their position on Maimonides, among other things on statements of this kind, that if there are verses we can always interpret them figuratively, that is, allegorically or as a parable. And against this Rashba came out strongly there and said that he imposed a ban on studying philosophy until age twenty-five, by the way—not not studying at all, but he restricted the matter. And they really did rely on Maimonides, but on this Maimonides, not on the Maimonides in the introductions, because in the introductions Maimonides speaks about the aggadic literature of the Sages, interpreting it non-literally. Here he is speaking about verses, taking verses away from their plain meaning. Same thing with the binding of Isaac and the angels; there are several verses that Maimonides interprets as parable or dream or something like that. And that is one reason. “And the second reason is that our belief that God, blessed be He, is non-corporeal does not contradict any of the foundations of the Torah nor render false any statement of any prophet, and in it there is only what fools think to be contrary to Scripture, and it is not contrary to it, as we explained, but rather is the intention of Scripture.” But that is regarding corporeality. “However, the belief in eternity in the sense in which Aristotle sees it—that it is by necessity and that nature never changes at all, and that nothing ever departs from its customary course—this undermines religion at its root and necessarily renders false every sign,” sign meaning miracle, “and nullifies all that the Torah hopes for,” meaning the Torah’s hopes—what we expect, its goals, its purposes—“or that God uses to inspire fear, unless the signs too are interpreted as the esoteric thinkers among the Ishmaelites did,” which is apparently some kind of hidden or mystical Muslim sages; there were also various mystics, yes. The son of Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides was very close to the Sufis, yes, to the Muslim mystics. I assume he means something of that kind as well. “And in this they lapsed into a kind of delusion. But if one were to believe in eternity according to the second view…” up to here. What is he actually saying? Beyond the fact that we have no proof of eternity—if there were proof, I would distort the verses, I would interpret them figuratively—not only do we have no proof, but here it also contradicts Torah principles. In contrast—sorry—even with corporeality, corporeality too really contradicts Torah principles, and therefore it is obvious that it cannot be true, and we reinterpret the verses. Here, of course, it works in the opposite direction. Here, reinterpreting the verses would come out contradicting Torah principles, because the verses say that the world was created, that it is not eternal. Here the opposite of that is what contradicts the Torah principles, and therefore there is no reason to depart from the plain meaning of Scripture. Not only do we have no proof that the world is eternal as Aristotle thought—that was his hypothesis, but we have no proof of it whatsoever—so why distort verses? Beyond the fact that we have no proof, that is the first reason. The second reason is not only that we do not have proof; we have proof in the opposite direction: it contradicts all sorts of Torah principles. What does it contradict? So here he explains what it contradicts. He says that the way Aristotle sees eternity is “by necessity, and nature never changes at all, and nothing departs from its customary course.” Meaning, the world is somehow one fixed form and it cannot change in any way whatsoever. And that is basically the Aristotelian conception. And that cannot be. What do you mean? The Holy One, blessed be He, can certainly perform miracles—that is what he says. It would contradict the signs, the signs that the Holy One, blessed be He, performed. He can perform miracles, He can suspend the laws of nature. These things do not have to remain the same forever. There is no inviolable law that such things cannot change. And by the same token, the Holy One, blessed be He, can also create the world; there is no reason to adopt the claim of eternity. Now here there is a point about which I don’t have a good answer, and I’ll note it. In practice, what troubles Maimonides is not really the conception of eternity at all. The fact that the world is eternal does not contradict anything, at least from the standpoint of this argument. What troubles Maimonides is the reasoning—why Aristotle arrived at the claim that the world is eternal. After all, why did Aristotle decide that the world is eternal? Usually when we see something, our assumption is that it was formed at some point, right? Why did Aristotle suddenly reach the conclusion that what he sees around him, this world, is eternal, has always been this way? Because he assumes—he is a determinist—that nothing can change, nothing at all. Everything has to remain the same all the time. That assumption is the problematic one. Meaning, if someone were to come and tell me, “The world is eternal,” and I have no necessity for that, not because I’m a determinist and it can’t be otherwise, but simply because “the secret of the Lord is with those who fear Him”—the world is eternal—I don’t think that contradicts anything. It shouldn’t contradict anything. What troubles Maimonides is the reasons that led Aristotle to the claim of eternity, not the claim of eternity itself. Therefore I don’t fully understand why Maimonides treats eternity itself as something so problematic. He should treat the reasons that brought Aristotle to eternity as the problematic thing—determinism, the necessity that the world is eternal. The fact that you are forced to reach the conclusion that the world is eternal—that is the problem. But if by chance it became known to you that the world is eternal, fine, what happened? What does that contradict?

[Speaker D] What’s the problem with that? The fact that the world is eternal doesn’t deny that there was creation?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? It doesn’t deny it. Why?

[Speaker D] What’s the problem?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does it contradict? Verses? We’ll interpret the verses, no problem. We already talked about that.

[Speaker D] Everything is fine, it’s just a bit—what—there wasn’t a creation?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no. The Holy One, blessed be He, keeps the world alive all the time, operates it, and that’s it. We use some kind of creative interpretation and everything can be worked out. And exactly as Maimonides says—what troubles him here is the necessity, the determinism that comes out of it. That’s what troubles him here. But determinism does not come from eternity; determinism led to eternity. The other way around: eternity follows from determinism. Aristotle came to the conclusion that the world is eternal because he was a determinist. He did not arrive at determinism because he thought the world was eternal. Exactly the opposite. How does he know the world is eternal? Was he there? Is he eternal too? How does he know the world is eternal? He reached that conclusion rationally. He says: if everything is deterministic, nothing can be renewed, nothing can change, everything follows its accustomed course, then apparently it has always been this way. When did it start? It couldn’t start at any point. So he began with determinism and arrived at eternity. What troubles Maimonides is not his conclusion—eternity. What troubles him is his premise—determinism. And that also—

[Speaker B] Human beings aren’t solved by that because determinism—the conclusion contradicts… No, no, I’m not talking right now about human beings, I’m talking about the world,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Leave human beings aside for now. That’s another question. I don’t know what he thought about that either, I have no idea. But right now he is talking about the world.

[Speaker B] Yes, about nature. What is the essential difference between the verses regarding the eternity of the world or like the… the interpretation? Why interpret the verses and the miracles…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he probably assumes that it’s not the verses—the miracles and creation and all that—it’s not the verses. Here it’s… this is tradition, these are principles that you will not be able to interpret creatively.

[Speaker B] Meaning this is tradition?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, I assume so. I assume so. That’s not the problem, because otherwise what would be gained by giving a creative interpretation to these verses or those? What difference would it make? Clearly, here he understands that there is some tradition saying that this is indeed how it was, regardless of the fact that the verses describe it that way.

[Speaker B] What? Maimonides’ thought does not contradict the question whether there were miracles in the past or not?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What—whether miracles are possible? Not whether there were miracles in the past, but whether miracles are possible at all.

[Speaker B] But that’s what he says. Why does Maimonides really explain so much—what exactly does he mean, what really bothers him about it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He tells you: “It undermines religion at its root and necessarily renders false every sign and nullifies all that the Torah hopes for,” the signs that God performed—unless, that is, one interprets the signs, the miracles, as well, the way the esoteric thinkers or something like that did, maybe in some… what?

[Speaker B] Here too is it called that because of a miracle or because of something fixed?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That goes back to the same question as before. He probably interprets it here… He doesn’t explain, but he assumes this isn’t necessary regarding free choice… He says these are principles. Those principles he will not change. It’s not because of the verses; the verses he is willing to interpret…

[Speaker B] What? There too he doesn’t compel—doesn’t interpret; here it’s a matter of faith… fine… He doesn’t explain, he doesn’t explain, but he has some basic intuition that is clear to him—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that the Holy One, blessed be He, can perform miracles, can create the world, that’s it—can, that’s exactly the point. What bothers him is not that it happened, but that He can. Because according to Aristotle He cannot. That’s why he arrives at eternity, that’s why he… That’s why I say: eternity itself doesn’t bother him. What bothers him is what led Aristotle to eternity: the claim that there cannot be change in nature. Now, what bothers him about that? Again, it’s not the right God. Once again, this is an intellectual way of looking at it. What will bother Rabbi Kook is a replay of this whole move. But what bothers Rabbi Kook—I’m returning to the earlier point—is that the Holy One, blessed be He, is not free. That cannot be. It is a deficiency in God’s omnipotence. Meaning, this is very similar to what Maimonides says, but notice that it comes from a slightly different angle. For Maimonides, there is here a mistaken conception of the Holy One, blessed be He; it is an intellectual mistake. This is not the God I have heard of; this is some other God. For Rabbi Kook, something much deeper bothers him here: the Holy One, blessed be He, acts not out of freedom. He cannot do things—how can that be? The Holy One, blessed be He—the thing that perhaps most distinguishes Him and characterizes Him is that His freedom is absolute. He can do anything. It is almost the same thing as Maimonides, but again, from the angle of will and freedom, not from the angle of intellect and right versus wrong.

[Speaker B] Which is still, from our perspective, not right—that if I describe the Holy One, blessed be He, as having no freedom—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, of course, of course. So in the end it always comes down to being wrong. But I think it goes through the problem of freedom, and therefore it is wrong. Not just because it’s not—it’s simply not the right thing, it’s not the right God. That’s why this also appears here, understand. Why doesn’t Maimonides put this into chapter 1 of Guide of the Perplexed? For Maimonides, this is in Part II, chapter 25, somewhere in the middle of the book. For Rabbi Kook, it appears here, in the second paragraph of the book. After he finishes with “image,” where he innovated that the image is will and not intellect, suddenly he moves to eternity. Why does he move to eternity? Because for Rabbi Kook, if we now read his parallel passage in Orot HaKodesh—let’s read, look. So he says: “The reason that the eternity of the world is something opposed to the entire Torah—Maimonides already wrote that this is not so, not so insofar as it is only against the indication of the verses. For if it were possible for the entire aim of the Torah to coexist with eternity”—if it did not contradict the principles of the Torah, our tradition—“then there would be room to interpret the verses figuratively, as was done with the anthropomorphism that appears from the plain sense of the verses, especially if there were proof forcing that conclusion. But the main thing is that it contradicts the entire Torah because eternity is bound up with necessity, and with necessity there is no room for possibility, nor for miracles, nor for reward and punishment.” It’s like a repetition of Maimonides, but from the context it is completely clear that for Rabbi Kook, the aspect that truly bothers him is that it binds the Holy One, blessed be He. That He does not have absolute freedom. And we’ll see—the continuation of the chapter is devoted to this. Meaning, it’s not accidental. He really continues translating Guide of the Perplexed into the language he wants to use in the twentieth century. And I now return to Maimonides. That was the first stage. After that he says: “But if one were to believe in eternity according to the second opinion,” a bit after a third of the way through the—

[Speaker B] chapter, can you see?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “But if one were to believe in eternity according to the second opinion that we have explained, which is the opinion of Plato, namely that the heavens too come to be and pass away.” Let us say that what is meant there is primordial matter—Platonic eternity, as opposed to Aristotelian eternity. Aristotle understood that the world as we know it today has been this way from time immemorial; nothing changes. Plato made the claim more refined. He argued that what was eternal was some formless primordial matter. And what is renewed over time is that this matter receives forms and new beings are created and so forth. Meaning, there is change in the world and in the nature of the world, even though matter in itself is eternal—it never began. That is Platonic eternity. So about Platonic eternity, Maimonides—who as is well known was an Aristotelian—says the following. Aristotelian eternity he rejects out of hand: such a thing cannot be; it contradicts all the basic religious principles—not because of the verses, but because it cannot be. Therefore it is problematic. But with Plato, no. He says: “That opinion does not contradict the foundations of the Torah, nor does there follow from it the denial of the signs, but only their reinterpretation. And the verses can be interpreted accordingly, and many analogies can be found in the Torah’s verses and elsewhere that one could rely on and that could even serve as evidence.” Here this could somehow even fit with the Torah’s verses. This could be made to work. “In the beginning God created” out of primordial matter the heavens and the earth. And there are even midrashim of the Sages. He himself cites a midrash that he calls the most wondrous midrash he ever encountered. That’s how Maimonides describes it in Guide of the Perplexed. It’s something in Pirkei de-Rabbi Eliezer: “From what were the heavens created? From the snow beneath the Throne of Glory,” which makes it sound as though there was something prior to the creation of heaven and earth—which is exactly the Platonic conception. But he says: so here, with the verses, it could work, and it does not contradict the principles of religion either. So in principle, Plato could have been accepted. The two reasons stated above do not exist here. So what then? “But no necessity brings us to this,” and in that sense it is also like Aristotle. We have no proof of it. Why? Because the Holy One, blessed be He, can certainly create matter too out of nothing. No problem. So it is not that we have some proof that it cannot be and that primordial matter must have been eternal. Understood?

[Speaker B] Could it be that He didn’t use matter—that He can create matter? Here, yes or no?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand.

[Speaker B] No, not that this matter existed—that it’s not that He used that matter.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well, I didn’t understand—but did this matter exist?

[Speaker B] The Holy One, blessed be He, decided whether to use it or not to use it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. And that is what he says, and therefore it does not contradict anything. “In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth” out of primordial matter, and He can create something else, He can do whatever He wants, fine? He can shape for it whatever form He wants. So he says, “But no necessity brings us to this, unless that view is demonstrated by proof. However, so long as it is not demonstrated by proof, neither does the mind incline toward this opinion, nor do we pay any attention to that opinion at all; rather, we look at the verses according to their plain meaning.” Fine? Once this is open, we have no proof whether the world is this way or that way—neither this view nor that view. The mind inclines neither here nor there; we have no proof. So why take the verses away from their plain meaning? The plain meaning of the verses is that the world is indeed created. Notice, this is much more complex. Because with Aristotle it is not under consideration at all, and this is not because of the verses. Not because of the verses at all. With Plato, the verses do matter. Because here what matters is—he says, I have no proofs. This can fit with the tradition. What? Exactly. No—with Aristotle it is not even one of the reasons, because the verses do not interest him at all. Not interesting. With Aristotle the two reasons are that there is no proof that Aristotle is right, and there is also proof against him. The verses play no role at all; somehow it seems the verses are like plasticine—you make of them whatever you want.

[Speaker B] And here it only arises with Aristotle.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And this is with Plato, yes. Exactly. This consideration appears with Plato—the one that says: still, there are verses. They can be interpreted creatively if I have a reason, if I have proof that the plain meaning is not correct, like with corporeality, for example. But here I have no reason at all. I have no contrary reason—it doesn’t bother me—but I have no reason. So why take them away from their plain meaning? Therefore he thinks Plato is not right.

[Speaker B] What is Maimonides’ problem with Aristotle? What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It means that this is determinism. It reflects determinism. It reflects determinism—Aristotle’s conception.

[Speaker B] So he has no proof against Aristotle?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So he has no proof. He says determinism is absurd. He doesn’t enter now into the issue to clarify why determinism is out of the question; he takes it as self-evident. Determinism cannot be correct, and that is obvious. He doesn’t go into the question of determinism here; he is dealing with the question of eternity. He just says: since eternity in effect presupposes determinism, such a thing cannot be accepted—without now continuing with all the explanations of why determinism is impossible. But with Plato there is no problem. It does not lead to determinism and is not led by determinism. There are no constraints, nothing. So what then? There are the verses. Why not take them away from their plain meaning? If I have proof, I take the verses away from their plain meaning. But if not, then Scripture does not depart from its plain meaning. So if the plain meaning is such, then the plain meaning is such. Now, if someone really were to bring proof, then he would say: fine, let’s become Platonists—so what? Nothing happened. Okay? So here there are two levels of the—

[Speaker B] Yes. Maimonides understands from this passage that this conception, the Platonic conception, is not only not absolutely necessary, but also not something that should have any advantage over any other conception regarding the verses?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. It’s not even problematic at all. It’s just not the plain meaning of the verses, that’s all.

[Speaker B] No, I mean more than just understanding the verses incorrectly? Yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s not even called understanding them incorrectly. After all, Plato did not propose this as an interpretation of the verse. Plato proposed this thesis as a thesis he thought was true. But when we discuss whether to adopt it or not, the plain meaning of the verses says not like that. You didn’t bring me evidence that would force me to accept it, so I go with the plain meaning of the verses.

[Speaker B] And that is what he explains there in the laws of repentance—that this doubt, even according to Maimonides’ view, would not now be considered denial of a principle.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Platonic eternity? Yes. I don’t know that—where is it?

[Speaker B] There he writes: “Likewise one who says that there is besides Him another being, and that He is not the first alone and the fashioner of everything and the cause of all creatures,” and then Raavad comments that even one who says that He takes pre-existing matter in His hand—or some sort of spiritual things—some say that this is also what he means. He writes, “He is not the first alone”; if He is not first alone, then matter existed.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well, once you reach the conclusion—once you reach the conclusion that the verses say this—then automatically now you are against the verses. Because if you say such a thing without proof, then it comes out that you are going against the verses, so then you do come out as a heretic.

[Speaker B] That’s the point. But then you could erase all the verses in the Torah as some kind of dogma. No—why? I didn’t understand. If the problem is that I’m going against the verses, then one could also—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] write among the principles: one who says that Abraham our forefather is not Abraham Isaac. Right, right, right. Anyone who—so in short, that’s the second layer, and here he rejects it because it’s not in the verses—there is no necessity to take the verses away from their plain meaning. I’m going back to Rabbi Kook. Rabbi Kook says: “However, all this”—the second paragraph on page 16—notice, this is really the same structure as Part II, chapter 25, and precisely for that reason it is interesting to see the differences. “However, all this follows only from Aristotle’s narrow concept of eternity.” Exactly like Maimonides’ move. Aristotle’s narrow concept of eternity is completely out of the question. There is the Platonic concept. But notice how he continues: “that the world, in all that it contains, as we see it before us, is eternal in his view; it never departed and never will depart from its configuration, and everything comes from the necessity of the supreme intellect. But according to the new inquiries”—and here of course he is speaking about his own time—“it is already quite well known that to say of the full world, with all its character, that it has thus existed eternally is folly, and the changes that have taken place in creation are enormous.” With evolution and the development of creation, he says, we already know today scientifically that the Aristotelian conception is out of the question, so there is really nothing to discuss. Meaning, we have evidence that Aristotle is wrong. So that is not even an option. So what follows? That the perplexed of the generation should not really need treatment on this, because it is not a question that ought to trouble people in the twentieth century. It troubles Maimonides, so he mentions it for the record. But now let’s see how he continues. He continues as though in analogy to Maimonides, and suddenly, look, he deviates. “In this way we can broaden the concept of necessity.” What does that mean? Take the last paragraph in the previous line: “One may understand in two values, one above the other, the relation of actions to the supreme will.” Just as Maimonides proposes two models of eternity, one of which he says is out of the question, the other possible but contradicted by the plain sense of the verses—Rabbi Kook too uses the same structure. The first is like Maimonides’ first. Absolutely out of the question, although for a somewhat different reason as I said earlier. The second he now presents: “In this way we can broaden the concept of necessity,” meaning, to present a softened version of eternity and say—“In this way we can broaden the concept of”—what? Of necessity, not of eternity. There is no real eternity, exactly. Meaning, he is not really now offering a softened model of eternity. He is entering the question of necessity altogether. Why? Because we saw that even in his opposition to the Aristotelian thesis, what bothers him is the necessity involved in it, the lack of freedom. So now he says: let us formulate a second, softened model in which necessity, determinism, is in fact conceivable, is possible within the Torah worldview, and that we reject because it is not a pure worldview—that is what he said at the end of the previous page. This is the softer thing, meaning a parallel structure to Maimonides, but notice the deviation. For Maimonides, it is two concepts of eternity, because what interests Maimonides is: what is true, what was, intellect, the facts. For Maimonides, what matters is the facts. Was the world always there or not? Was there primordial matter or not? So those are two levels of factual error. When Rabbi Kook speaks about these two levels, they are two levels of freedom, two levels of necessity—how deterministic it is. One is out of the question, and the second is softer; still he rejects it as a matter of worldview. He thinks it is not correct as a worldview, but it is not a total breach of the framework. And then he explains: “and to say that the decree of the supreme wisdom necessitates the spiritual and material existence, with all their instruments and all the details, near and far, to bring the entire reality—natural, sensible, and intelligible—toward the purpose of perfection and completion, including also human intellect and will, its opinions, qualities, and tendencies.” Meaning, basically there is some divine structure—“the nature of the good is to do good,” as Ido pointed out earlier from Ramchal—“the nature of the good is to do good”; there is some nature in creation, and that nature dictates the changes. There are changes in creation. But those changes are dictated in some mechanical way. There is some divine perfection that says the world must be built this way. The world seems terribly dynamic to us, but it is all just a program, a plan. It’s like a running computer. Exactly the example you gave earlier about a running computer. So it is still necessity, but a necessity that seems very dynamic to us. What is static here is not what happens, but the program that operates it. There is some program that operates it, and that program is perfect and is the divine will, and everything is fine. And then he says that everything, “including human intellect and will, its opinions, qualities, and tendencies,” everything is led in some such way “toward the ultimate perfection and completion.” Notice: this is not a static world; it is a dynamic world, a world that improves. But it improves according to some pre-written program that could not be otherwise, because there is only one perfect program. Understood? So this is a softer determinism, but it is still clear that it troubles Rabbi Kook. “And since for this perfection it is necessary that there be judgment from the supreme intellect or divine wisdom”—wisdom, yes—“of prophecy and ordered governance, whereby a person’s deed is repaid to him and according to a man’s path it is found for him, and an organized development arranged divinely in one people especially suited to it, the people of Israel.” Everything we understand as divine will is really not will, but the implementation of software. There is some software here; the software is supposed to bring the world to its perfection. In order to bring it to its perfection, a person must work on his traits and choose and sin and receive reward and so on. It all looks terribly dynamic, terribly immediate: there are reactions to what we do. Nothing of the sort. It is a blind system. Meaning, everything is through some perfect program, and the whole business may look very dynamic to us, but really it is the result of some nature—“the nature of the good is to do good,” exactly this Ramchal-like expression. “And an organized development arranged divinely in one people”—there will be one people to which these special roles are given, and the other nations will stand around it in some form. “And to continue with many varied events, all of which act to bring into actuality the proper relation with all humanity”—this people is supposed to create some interaction with all humanity around it and with reality. “And from this the supreme wisdom will necessitate introducing into the tradition of reward and punishment that brings about the development of the human spirit, also all the things that strengthen the spirit of this people and weaken it,” and so on. So there is here a very dynamic picture that fits what is accepted, as he said in the previous paragraph, that today we already know that the world is dynamic; it is not as it was. But even this picture can still be understood on the basis of some hidden determinism. There is some program here that actualizes everything so that it reaches its perfection, and everything is fine. And we pray and sin and receive punishment, which makes it look like a dynamic process, not one fixed in advance—it is a response to our deeds; there are choices, punishment, reward. No, no. It is all levers and gears. And that is the picture he is describing here. “Yet with this expansion,” says Rabbi Kook, top of page 17, “with this expansion”—meaning this expansion of the concept of necessity, this softer model—“there is nothing that contradicts the Torah, despite all the necessity.” Exactly Maimonides’ move, notice—but on a different axis, on the axis of determinism, not on the axis of eternity. All right? Again, there is some softer model here that in principle could be accepted; it does not contradict the verses. In principle it could work. There were even those who actually thought this way, by the way. We’ll note that in a moment. “Except that the depth of true knowledge”—meaning knowledge in the sense of awareness, yes—“requires that everything be attributed to free will.” Here again you see the point. Why can’t such a thing be accepted? It fits everything. It is dynamic. From the standpoint of intellect and facts it fits. Straightforward intellect in relation to the facts—it works, no problem. When I test it scientifically, so to speak, it works. But it cannot be, because it leaves the world unfree. It is all just gears. Nothing free is happening here, nothing out of divine will, not by choice; it is all from some… You live in a blind world.

[Speaker B] Apparently that is what the prophets said, that the prophets teach that in the future it will be this and that, so that marks a point, so—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe we’ll talk about that in the chapters where we get to that issue. I don’t think it’s correct, but when we get to those chapters, since it is a topic in itself, let’s leave it for now.

[Speaker B] Okay? Absolute free will and nothing from it is fixed in advance.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He says within—

[Speaker B] some chapter, he brings some specific paragraph, some sort of spirit that the world ultimately always strives toward repair, and you also always see what has been.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but that is will; it is not a mechanical striving. It is will. Like attraction to a woman. Okay. And that’s it—here he insists on it once again: here this is a pure worldview. It does not directly contradict the principles of tradition, but he is not willing to accept it. And again, now you see why this whole discussion of the four species appears in the middle of Guide of the Perplexed, whereas for Rabbi Kook it appears in chapter 1, immediately after the question of the image. Because Rabbi Kook here is talking about the issue of freedom. This is the first chapter of his Guide of the Perplexed: the absolute freedom with which the Holy One, blessed be He, acts, and our being in the divine image, which means absolute freedom, that we have freedom of choice and that there are different possibilities, and the whole dynamic versus static issue. And therefore he is not even willing to accept this apparent dynamism; there can be no blemish in freedom. He is not willing to accept it.

[Speaker B] “A pure worldview”—is that also damage to man’s worldview or to God’s?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—to God’s, yes, right. Man chooses freely, yes, exactly, but God’s.

[Speaker B] Even that bothers him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what he says: “For it cannot be at all that the superior side of perfection, apprehended by every precise and perfect knower, should be lacking in the true Perfect One.” How can it be that this perfection—to act out of free choice—should be lacking in the most perfect being, in the Holy One, blessed be He? It cannot be that freedom would be lacking in Him. Exactly. Will.

[Speaker B] Autonomy—it can’t be accepted. And here, according to the words of the Kuzari, he explains there that the Holy One, blessed be He, is also free—the second possibility, the more complex one; I don’t know what makes it more complex. Here there is something dynamic and not fixed, but still there is choice.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no. Man has choice; the Holy One, blessed be He, does not have choice.

[Speaker B] The complex possibility—yes, yes, of course.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I commit a sin, I get punished. The punishment comes from the gears. Meaning, I commit the sin and activate gears—boom, they hit me on the head.

[Speaker B] Yes, yes,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there is choice here. Man has choice. It’s just that the world in which he acts—the Holy One, blessed be He, has no choice. Here the Holy One, blessed be He, is stripped of freedom. He is somehow forced into some mechanical system of reward, punishment, chosen people, non-chosen people—it’s all, it isn’t really chosen, it is something dictated as the result of some divine program of beneficence, some kind of software that gets actualized. Yes.

[Speaker B] And still there is free choice with God too, because He chose the program.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] All right, all right, here you could be even more precise and move one more step forward now: if he chose the program, then ostensibly yes, he does have it. Fine, let’s leave it at that. Still, that’s the direction I’m trying to point to, how important this concept of freedom is to him, and why the question of foreknowledge is discussed here in this chapter. And know that even prayer and all its details, like the advantage of one prayer over another and the special importance of the prayer of the righteous, also do not require rejecting the law of necessity when it comes in its fullest sense. Even prayer itself can be understood this way. By the way, in Nefesh HaChayim, in quite a few chapters, you can definitely understand prayer that way. Prayer is just the activation of gearwheels in the upper worlds, that’s all. There’s no dialogue here. You’re not conversing with the Holy One, persuading Him, and then He decides to respond or not respond. It doesn’t work like that. You activate the eternity within splendor, and that bangs into the splendor within foundation, and then abundance flows down from there, and then you say “Happy is the people” with that intention, and boom, some lever over there releases and brings down abundance for you. It’s that kind of process. A picture from the kabbalists. Yes, right, that kind of kabbalistic picture that basically says that all response to actions—our actions are out of choice, but the response to our actions is mechanical. And Rabbi Kook here says: he’s dealing with God, not with man. God is free; don’t turn God into something bound—not man. Man here has free choice, fine? He says that through the perfection of all existence, the human soul too will be perfected, and with all its freedom it will actively and with full strength weave only toward the good and the upright. Therefore it is impossible that all the means that bring perfection should not be prepared—and that is the purpose. Therefore the causes are arranged in such a way that prayer, by taking part in the perfection of the spirit, will bear fruit. In short, this whole business is mechanics. All right? And then he says, however—I’m already moving to the last paragraph—however, the true recognition of one who beholds the splendor of perfection will recognize that complete freedom ought to be found in the truly perfect being, so all this mechanics cannot be the whole story. And then his prayer will be the most natural action possible. So what does “most natural” mean? Natural doesn’t mean mechanical, of course. Natural means that we speak with the Holy One and He decides whether to respond to us, whether we persuaded Him or didn’t persuade Him. These aren’t engines, not gearwheels; we are in a real interaction with the Holy One. We’re not dealing here with some enormous robotic system operating various machines around us. And then his prayer will be the most natural action possible, and with the knowledge that all the changing particulars are not in the law of God but only in relation to the changing creatures, he will know how to draw forth favor from the Lord and to walk in His ways with a whole heart. We’ll explain that whole sentence when we get to Chapter 4. In the last paragraph of Chapter 4, that’s on page 24, there he talks about the question whether this whole picture is a picture of the Holy One or a picture of how we see the Holy One. Meaning, that’s an important point for here too, but that

[Speaker B] That’s me.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll leave for later because of time. What? Yes, that He has free will and so on—even that picture is a picture from our side; we’re supposed to grasp the Holy One that way. Maybe I don’t know how to say something about the Holy One Himself, but this has to be our conception of divinity. Why? Because it also projects onto our own freedom. The whole focus is really what we do with the issue; man is at the center of the ceremony here. So the picture of God too is about how man perceives God. If a person understands that what is central in God is His freedom, then the person will also understand that what is central in himself—the image of God within him—is also his freedom. And freedom is the terribly important point here. Now I just want one more point connected to this issue. We’ll do that point already in Chapter 4, that will be in the next class. Remember, next class is Chapter 4; maybe read it already for next time. That’s after Sukkot. After Simchat Torah. On the first page, in the first passage on the sheet I gave you, there’s a famous passage from Orot HaKodesh, and there I won’t have time to elaborate here, so I’ll say it in two words because I still have to get to the passage at the end as well. So. Rabbi Kook says here as follows: there is a perfection of added perfection, and that cannot exist in divinity, for absolute infinite perfection leaves no room for addition. He’s really asking an implicit question here. He says one of the human perfections is self-perfection, improvement, right? Now that perfection can’t exist in God, because He’s already perfect. So how could He improve? Meaning, one of the perfections is missing in Him. How can that be? It can’t be, because all perfections must exist in Him and emerge from Him; He is their root. Right, something like that. You could maybe also translate it into a paradox of this type. So the question really is: how can it be that in the source of all perfections, one of the perfections is missing? Or on the other side of the same coin: then how can we do it? If it isn’t found in Him, after all everything comes to us from Him. So how can we perfect ourselves? How does that perfection exist in us? So he says: and for this purpose—for the sake of this too, that the addition of perfection should not be lacking in being—the worldly existence must come into being. What does that mean? Basically his claim, and you can see this a bit from the surrounding context there too, is that the Holy One also perfects Himself. He perfects Himself through us. Meaning, He created us lacking so that we would perfect ourselves, and that is, כביכול, His completion, because He Himself is bound—He can’t, as it were, perfect Himself, because He is already perfect. He cannot perfect Himself. So He created us, and through us He perfects Himself. Now, to understand this a bit better I need more time, so I won’t go into it. I once wrote something about it; whoever wants, I can let you read it. What?

[Speaker B] Why does it have to be that He’s already perfect?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What, the Holy One? Perfect. I don’t know, that’s an assumption, a postulate. But in order for Him to be able to perfect Himself, couldn’t there be some lack in Him? What? The contraction in the infinite light? That’s not in the Holy One Himself.

[Speaker B] But in order for Him to perfect Himself?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On one hand that’s an advantage, but on the other hand you’re still missing something if you can perfect yourself. So that’s a deficiency. Yes, indeed. That’s why he says there’s still something problematic here either way. Whichever model you take, it always comes out lacking. So He can’t really be perfect. Which is basically a question about the very concept of perfection. It can’t be perfect at all, because either He’s missing the advantage that would let Him perfect Himself—and then that advantage is missing—or He has all the advantages, but then He can’t perfect Himself. It’s like the omnipotence paradox.

[Speaker B] Why do we need to define the capacity for improvement as something necessary?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, necessary? Not necessary; it’s one of the perfections.

[Speaker B] Like that,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s Rabbi Kook’s assumption: that the ability to perfect oneself, to improve oneself, is one of the perfections.

[Speaker B] That’s not absurd.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We know that a penitent is preferable to a completely righteous person, right? Why is a penitent preferable to a completely righteous person? After he’s already corrected all the sins, he becomes completely righteous. Fine—so in what way is he better? Because he has perfected himself; he isn’t only whole. Meaning, self-perfection is one of the perfections. There is something there—it’s not only the question of what state you’re in; the derivative matters here too.

[Speaker B] There is an advantage to a penitent in the sense that a penitent reached that reality through greater spiritual labor.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] More than a completely righteous person—how is that possible? It seems that, simply speaking, a completely righteous person is the highest level there can be.

[Speaker B] Someone who never sinned, always performs commandments.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. You can argue the point. Fine, I just want, in the last few minutes, today really unrelated to what we just learned, just something for Yom Kippur. This morning I heard from Rabbi Katz, who was the head of the kollel and now is one of the teachers in the kollel at Bar-Ilan, he brought this Talmudic passage. It’s a legal Talmudic passage in Chullin about the question of udder in Chullin. Right. Udder is the breast of an animal. It’s the breast of an animal. What’s a breast? The breast, the… the udder of an animal, yes, exactly, which has milk in it, and there are meat-and-milk issues with it, the question is whether one may eat it or not. We won’t go into the Jewish law details now. In Sura they did not eat udders; in Pumbedita they did eat udders. In Sura the custom was not to eat udder, and in Pumbedita they ate it. Rami bar Tamri, who is Rami bar Dikuli from Pumbedita, where they did eat udder, happened to come to Sura, where they did not eat it, on the eve of Yom Kippur. And all the people took out their udders and threw them away. What did the people of Sura do? They threw away the udder—after all, they don’t eat it, it’s garbage, they threw it out. There was apparently a recycling bin for udders there. He went, took them, and ate them. They brought him before Rav Chisda. They brought him before Rav Chisda—again, all this on the eve of Yom Kippur, that’s a very important point. They brought him before Rav Chisda. Rav Chisda was the local authority now in Sura. He said to him: why did you do this? Why are you doing this? It’s forbidden to eat udder. He said to him: I’m from Rav Yehuda’s place, where they eat it. He said to him: doesn’t the rule apply to you that one imposes on him the stringencies of the place from which he came…? He said to him: I ate them outside the boundary. And with what did you roast it? With what did you burn it? He said to him: with grape pits. Some grape seeds or something like that. The Gemara asks: he cracked some grape pits and burned them, and with that fire he roasted the udder. But maybe they were from wine used for idolatry? Then you used forbidden wine! He said to him: they were after twelve months. After twelve months it has already dried out; the moisture is gone, so it’s no longer forbidden. But maybe they were stolen? He said to him: there had been owner-despair, since weeds had already grown in them. That’s a law in “These Found Articles,” that if grass has already grown there from old age, then surely the owner has despaired. You can take it even if it has an identifying mark. He saw that he was not wearing phylacteries. Now they say: this Jew also doesn’t put on phylacteries, besides eating udder. He said to him: why doesn’t the master put on phylacteries?

[Speaker B] He said to him: I have intestinal illness.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And Rav Yehuda said—of course Rav Yehuda is his rabbi from Pumbedita—one with intestinal illness is exempt from phylacteries. He saw that he had not put on fringes, he wasn’t wearing tzitzit. He said to him: why doesn’t the master have fringes? Why don’t you have strings on the garment? He said to him: it’s a borrowed cloak. And Rav Yehuda said—notice again, Rav Yehuda—a borrowed cloak is exempt from tzitzit for the first thirty days. Meanwhile, in the middle of this, they brought a certain man who did not honor his father and mother, did not honor his father and mother. They bound him. He said to them—that same Jew said to them—leave him alone. For it was taught: any positive commandment whose reward is stated alongside it, the earthly court is not enjoined concerning it.

[Speaker B] That’s what the rabbi said in the story.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He said to them: what are you binding him for and trying to coerce him to honor father and mother? A positive commandment whose reward is stated alongside it—because “Honor your father and your mother, so that your days may be lengthened”—the reward is written in the verse. The rule in the Talmud in Chullin is that anything whose reward is stated alongside it is not enforced coercively. He said to him: I see that you are very sharp. He said to him: if you were in Rav Yehuda’s place, I’d show you what sharpness is. If you were in Rav Yehuda’s place, I’d show you what sharpness is; I’m the smallest among them. Now this sounds like a very amusing story, but what I really liked in the story is the interpretation Rabbi Katz suggested, and it was really eye-opening. This is truly Yom Kippur eve. What was really happening there? A completely different story was taking place from what appears before our eyes. This man was wandering the streets of Sura. He had nothing to eat. He gathered udders from the garbage in order to eat them. If someone had invited him home, then they’d have given him something to eat that wasn’t udder—he’d have eaten something else. He was wandering the street, had nothing to eat, he picked up udder from the trash and ate it. What bothers them when they hear this? Why are you eating udder? You’re a criminal. Fine, I went outside the boundary, he tells them. Then he says to him: and with what did you roast it? And they start debating with him. Of course he didn’t even have what to burn the udder with; I found some pits, something. What bothers them about that? They won’t go invite him over—come to our fire. No, but maybe it’s theft and wine used for idolatry and all kinds of things of that sort? And then of course: don’t the stringencies of the place apply to you? Meaning, he says, what, you don’t follow the custom of the place where you are? It reminds us very much, I think, of all kinds of phenomena in which what always bothers us is only that we should be right, and everyone else—we’ll explain to them where they are wrong. We have to be punctilious in Jewish law. They don’t see the person who’s here in terrible shape. Why doesn’t he have tzitzit on his garment? Because he has no garment! He borrowed the garment; he has nothing to eat, nothing to wear. Why didn’t he put on phylacteries? Because he has intestinal illness. The man has intestinal illness, wandering the streets, nothing to eat, nothing to wear, and you’re asking him whether the grape pits have already passed twelve months because maybe there’s forbidden wine here. So there is something very problematic here. And I think the most problematic thing here is that when I see this Gemara, it would never have occurred to me that this is what was happening there. I too would have said the same thing. We just don’t see the person. The person is standing here and we’re debating with him about the laws of wine used for idolatry. And then he says to him: you’re very sharp. What does “very sharp” mean? He thought all this was just jokes. He still didn’t understand. The man is telling him: listen, I have nothing to eat, I have no home, no clothing, and I have intestinal illness. He didn’t say to him, fine, come to my house, we’ll take care of you, call a doctor, I don’t know what. He says to him: ah, you’re very sharp, you’re slipping away with all kinds of tricks. He still doesn’t grasp that these are not tricks. What, don’t you know that a borrowed garment is exempt from tzitzit? How much sharpness does that take? Don’t you know that… what, you don’t know that borrowed is exempt from tzitzit? If you were wearing a borrowed garment, you also wouldn’t put tzitzit on it. He simply didn’t see the person at all; he saw some sort of Jewish law give-and-take. He said: oh, he found all sorts of tricks, somehow managed to fool us so as to show us.

[Speaker B] It seems to me that Rabbi Chaim of Brisk asked about four cups of milk.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, and that’s Beit HaLevi, his father. Beit HaLevi, not Rabbi Chaim. Right. So there really is here, I think, something so powerful. Meaning, there is here something—extraordinary halakhic punctiliousness, the stringencies of the place, and you have to do exactly as we do, and there are laws and rules—and then he says to him: if you had come to us, to Rav Yehuda’s place, you would have seen what sharpness is. In other words, he’s saying to him: what are you bothered about, the law of your place or the law of our place? If you had come to us, we would have shown you what to do with sharpness. Not what sharpness is. Leave your sharpness aside—you don’t see that here is a man who is sick, has nothing to eat, nothing to wear, and nothing at all. You’re debating with him and thinking he’s sharp. You simply don’t see him. It’s just unbelievable. Meaning, only the stringencies of the place, who is right and who is not right, who is sharper and who is less sharp. Look—there is someone here to whom you need to say: peace be upon you, do you have somewhere to eat? Somewhere to sleep? Something to wear? After that start debating with him about various laws.

[Speaker B] And it connects nicely to the haftarah of Yom Kippur: “Is it not to share your bread with the hungry and bring the poor that are cast out into your house.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, and so on. I think that on the eve of Yom Kippur, that isn’t accidental. There’s some story here that isn’t about the laws of udder. This story is about the laws of Yom Kippur. May you be sealed for a good year.

[Speaker B] May you be sealed for a good year. This concludes the lecture of Rabbi Michael Abraham, 8 Tishrei leading into 9 Tishrei 5771, September 16, 2010. May you be sealed for a good year.