A Look at the Torah and Torah Study – Lesson 10 – Rabbi Michael Abraham

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying it could be that maybe this can help you in the causal, teleological sense. You do it in order to get somewhere in the end. But what is the desirable state itself? The desirable state itself is to improve your character traits not because there is a command and you need to discharge your obligation. It may be that doing it not for its own sake is something on the right path. It’s like another example I’ve used in other contexts. For example, think about a person—you know, when discussing a complex phenomenon, physicists always begin with a point-mass donkey. Let’s start with a point-mass donkey, see how it behaves, and then we’ll add a tail, legs, and see whether we can still do anything with it. Once it gets stubborn with the tail and legs, then all the more so. But let’s start with a point-mass donkey. Take a person—a point-mass donkey in various senses—take a person who has one principle in his world. In that sense he is point-like. His value system is point-like; there is only one value: maximum reward, minimum punishment. That’s it. He serves not for its own sake. Now, this person is a demon in the service of God—that is, he fulfills every clause of one halakhic decisor or another, Mishnah Berurah, hysterically, okay? His whole life he thinks constantly about how to discharge his obligation and not fail, and everything is perfect. A servant of God in all 248 limbs and 365 sinews—but only in them. Okay? And now you ask him, you try to persuade him to serve for its own sake, all right? How can you do such a thing? You tell him: if you serve for its own sake, you’ll get more reward. Right? That’s what you can tell him. Meaning, you have to speak to him in his own language. You can’t tell him, listen, it’s wonderful to serve for its own sake. Okay, wonderful for you—I have my own thesis. If you want to persuade him, you have to work on the basis of his current state. You have to tell him, listen, if you serve for its own sake, you’ll get a thousand times more reward. It’s worth your while to serve for its own sake. Do you understand that maybe I’ll succeed in persuading him, but it won’t be serving for its own sake. And therefore he also won’t get the reward; nothing will come of it. There are states that destroy themselves. Meaning, when you try to persuade someone to serve for its own sake because that way you get more reward, you haven’t turned him into someone who serves for its own sake. Exactly the same thing when you tell a person, improve your character traits because there is commandment number 613 to improve your character traits—then he hasn’t improved his character traits. Meaning, there are things that logic simply does not allow.

[Speaker I] The basis is that you tell him to do it that way, and he’ll start doing it in that way, like someone who begins doing commandments not for their own sake and in the end gets into it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s what he said earlier: from doing it not for its own sake one comes to doing it for its own sake. So that’s what he said. So yes, from not for its own sake one comes to for its own sake, fine. So you’re telling me that not for its own sake has some instrumental value. But that does not mean that not for its own sake is the desirable state. I’m talking about the question of what is defined as the desirable state. You’re talking about the question of how one gets there. Fine, that can be discussed—that’s a technical question, how one gets there. But the desirable state in itself is certainly not that. That’s all. That’s my whole claim. So in short, going back to our topic: the claim is that the Holy One, blessed be He, expects us to study Torah because of recognition of the importance of Torah study, and not because there is a commandment to study Torah. And so actually, on the contrary, the commandment of Torah study—reciting Shema in the morning and evening—you have discharged your obligation, everything is fine, nothing happened. You don’t need anything beyond that. But that doesn’t mean that all the rest is exempt and that there is no demand whatsoever regarding Torah study.

[Speaker D] No, there is a demand regarding neglect of Torah study.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But neglect of Torah study is not neglect of the positive commandment of Torah study. It’s not neglect of a positive commandment. It is neglect of the obligation to study Torah, not of the commandment of Torah study. It is not neglect of a positive commandment in the formal sense; rather, it is the neglect of someone who does not recognize the significance of Torah study. Okay? Does Torah study include understanding, or only the act of studying? That’s another discussion. I think it’s obvious that it includes understanding, but that’s another discussion; we won’t get into it right now. We’ll still talk about that. That’s the plain meaning of the Talmud, by the way. The Talmud says that if one recited—

[Speaker J] Shema in the morning and evening, he has discharged his obligation. The Ran has to force the reading there: he has discharged—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —the obligation of what is written, but he has not discharged the Torah-level obligation of something learned from exposition. That’s forced. Fine. But the Rosh and the commentator certainly learn it this way. Where does the Ran write this? In Nedarim 8a. So that was basically the thesis. Here, for example, apparently neglect of Torah study really does mean not studying Torah. In Berakhot 5a: “If a person sees that sufferings come upon him, let him examine his deeds, as it is said, ‘Let us search and examine our ways, and return to the Lord.’”

[Speaker C] “Our ways, and examine them, and return to the Lord.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “He examined and found nothing—let him attribute it to neglect of Torah study, as it is said, ‘Happy is the man whom You discipline, O Lord, and teach him from Your Torah.’” It’s from the verse in Psalms, yes. It appears that in this case neglect of Torah study really is neglect in the sense of not studying. I just remembered because of what I said earlier. But that is not the simple meaning of the term neglect of Torah study. In any case, I’ll remind you—I think maybe I spoke about this last time too—just as a side note, Rabbi Israel Salanter, in the article of his that I mentioned, argues that what the Talmud says—why is it uncommon for the sons of Torah scholars to themselves become Torah scholars? One of the explanations—there are several explanations—one of them is that they did not first recite the blessing over Torah. They didn’t recite the blessing over Torah. They were sloppy about the blessing over Torah. He asks: what is the meaning of this sloppiness? These are people who are Torah scholars, who invest their time and energy in Torah study—and they’re sloppy specifically about the blessing over Torah? Why, specifically there? So he argues that they did not recite the blessing over Torah as a matter of conception—not that they were sloppy. They claimed that Torah study is a means in order to know what to do. As you can often hear from Rabbi Ovadia. What? Like a mode of learning? Not a mode of learning, but rather a means in order to know what to do. Yes. On the contrary, I argued that it’s only a mode of learning, but he argues that it is a means in the very essence of Torah study. Now, the general rule—the Talmud in Menachot says that one does not recite a blessing over preparatory acts for a commandment. Anything that is not the end-point of the commandment, one does not recite a blessing over it, as for example building a sukkah. That is a preparatory act for a commandment. If you don’t build a sukkah, you won’t have anything to sit in and fulfill the commandment. But the commandment is to sit in the sukkah, not to build a sukkah. Therefore one does not recite a blessing over building a sukkah. In the Jerusalem Talmud it says that one does recite a blessing; that doesn’t matter right now. But in the Babylonian Talmud it says not to. Why? Because it is not the end of the commandment; it is a preparatory act. It is not the commandment itself. Meaning, one does not recite blessings over preparatory acts for a commandment; one recites blessings only over the commandment itself. And if so, says Rabbi Israel Salanter, that is why those Torah scholars did not first recite the blessing over Torah. They did not first recite the blessing over Torah because they understood that their study was a preparatory act for a commandment, in order to know what to do. And over preparatory acts for a commandment one does not recite a blessing. Of course, he also assumed that the blessing over Torah is a blessing over commandments; we also talked about that, and I don’t agree with it. And his claim that therefore their sons also do not emerge as Torah scholars is because they do not correctly understand the significance of Torah study. If you do not correctly understand the significance of Torah study, then your education toward Torah will also not succeed. That is the claim. Now, for our purposes, what I’m saying here is basically a similar point. You have to understand well what the significance of Torah is, and do it מתוך the correct motivation, because otherwise something very fundamental is missed. Meaning, if you do it in order to discharge some commandment, to fulfill the commandment of Torah study—yes, someone who says “for the sake of the unification of the Holy One, blessed be He, and His Presence” before he sits down to study Torah has ruined the commandment. Quite apart from the dispute between the Hasidim and others about whether one says that formula or not. But I’m saying, even according to the view that one does say it—for the commandment of Torah study, do not say it. Because if you say that formula, you are basically saying: I am doing this in order to fulfill the commandment of Torah study. No. If you are doing it in order to fulfill the commandment of Torah study, then you’re just an ignoramus. There is no such commandment. There is no commandment. Fine, you can ask the Holy One, blessed be He, to help you focus your mind; that’s all fine. But if you do it in order to fulfill the commandment of Torah study, according to the conception I’m presenting here, you’ve ruined it.

[Speaker J] Because it’s not being done—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —in order to fulfill the commandment of Torah study. I said: he claims that the blessing over Torah is a blessing over the commandment of Torah study, that it is a blessing over commandments. And in the previous class I spoke about this—also the Magen Avraham and the Mishnah Berurah regarding women. After all, women recite the blessing over Torah, and they are exempt from the commandment of Torah study. So how do they recite the blessing over Torah? So the Magen Avraham and the Mishnah Berurah say: because they need to study the laws that pertain to them. Fine? But I say: that is exactly the point. You say that women are exempt from Torah study. If they need to study the laws that pertain to them, then why is that called being exempt from Torah study? They are obligated exactly like me, only the laws that pertain to them are such-and-such laws, and the laws that pertain to me are these other laws. You see that studying in order to know what to do is not Torah study. In that, even one who is exempt from Torah study is obligated. One simply needs to know how to learn in order to know what to do. But of course that kind of learning is a preparatory act for a commandment; it is not the commandment. Studying in order to know what to do. Okay? So in short, that’s the claim. Okay, so what—about women am I—? No, Rabbi Israel Salanter argued that study needs to be done for its own sake and not in order to know what to do. I brought proof from the blessing over Torah recited by women. He speaks about the blessing over Torah of Torah scholars, and there too he assumes, just as the Mishnah Berurah and the Magen Avraham assume, that the blessing over Torah is a blessing over commandments. And that is not correct. The blessing over Torah, in my opinion, is a blessing of praise; it is not a blessing over commandments. And therefore there is no question why women are obligated—obviously they praise the Holy One, blessed be He, for giving the Torah to the Jewish people. It doesn’t matter whether they are obligated to study Torah or not obligated to study Torah; that is not the issue at all. Fine. In any case, that is the general idea. Now I want to show this through a passage in Menachot. Here I’ll connect to the sources, so to speak. I don’t know whether this thing works. Huh? There’s a little red button and a switch there. Yes. Oh, here. Is it there? Good, this is the Talmud in Menachot. Wait, I’ll share this on Zoom too, for the benefit of the thousands watching later. Okay, “Rabbi Ami said: from the words of Rabbi Yosei we learn”—the context doesn’t matter right now—from what Rabbi Yosei said regarding the showbread, “from the words of Rabbi Yosei we learn: even if a person studied only one chapter in the morning and one chapter in the evening, he has fulfilled the commandment, ‘This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth.’” So this is basically a claim that greatly minimizes the commandment of Torah study: “This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth”—one chapter in the morning, one chapter in the evening. What? No, this is from the book of Deuteronomy… fine, so what? No, this commandment is only—no, so these are words of tradition, or sometimes the prophet explains the commandment written in the Torah. It says, “You shall meditate upon it day and night,” and here it says, “This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth.” Yes, after all, on the contrary, “This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth” is not a verse that says that reciting Shema in the morning and evening is enough, right? It says the opposite. “This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth” means all the time. Therefore the claim is not against the prophet; the claim is against the prophet. Meaning, the claim is: despite what is written in the prophet, “This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth,” know that one chapter in the morning and one chapter in the evening is enough. How do you know that it is enough? Because it is written, “You shall meditate upon it day and night.” Like it, yes, “when you lie down and when you rise.” “You shall meditate upon it day and night”—is that from the Torah? Isn’t it the continuation of that? No no, it’s Joshua. Ah, Joshua. Here—“You shall meditate upon it day and night,” that’s this verse, right? I’m saying “when you lie down and when you rise.” Okay? So basically we are not speaking about the verse in the prophetic writings; on the contrary, we are coming to explain that the verse in the prophetic writings is not correct, or at least not in its simple sense—we do not constrict it that way, okay? Good. “Rabbi Yohanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai: even if a person only recited Shema in the morning and evening, he has fulfilled ‘shall not depart.’” What is he doing now? Narrowing it? Even more, right? Meaning, now you’re having a competition over who narrows it even more. The first says one chapter in the morning and one chapter in the evening. Rabbi Yohanan in the name of Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai says to him: what are you talking about? You recite Shema anyway; you don’t even need one chapter in the morning and one chapter in the evening. You recite Shema anyway in the morning and evening; everything is fine, that’s good enough. Meaning, the competition is over who narrows the commandment of Torah study the most. This sounds strange; the direction sounds strange. “This statement is forbidden to be said before ignoramuses.” Wait, one second, I’m reading this sentence by sentence. In a moment you’ll see every sentence falls into place here. It’s really a marvelous interpretation of this passage. Look. In a moment we’ll see. In a moment we’ll see. “And this statement is forbidden to be said before ignoramuses.” And that’s interesting—why? “But Rava said: it is a commandment to say it before ignoramuses.” Let’s see what the dispute is. Okay. The one who says it is forbidden to say it before ignoramuses—what does he say? So that they won’t find for themselves a license: Shema morning and evening, right? Why not? That really is the definition, that really is the obligation—what’s the problem? Why? But the commandment really is Shema morning and evening and everything is fine. Are we going to lose everyone who does this not for its own sake, who thinks one should study 24 hours? Yes, but what does “lose” mean? You really don’t need to, so what’s the problem? Why is that called losing? He will do what is required; everything is fine. We also don’t tell them that one must take eight species with the lulav, because one doesn’t need to; one needs four. Are we losing all those who could have taken eight species with the lulav? There is no such obligation, so what’s the problem? You understand that clearly there is such an obligation, right? So precisely when you tell me it is forbidden to say this before ignoramuses, you are basically telling me: you are right in terms of defining the commandment, correct? He is not telling you: you are wrong. He is telling you: but why are you saying this out loud? There are things one doesn’t say out loud. What does that mean? The commandment truly is Shema in the morning and evening, but there is an obligation to study Torah that is not the formal commandment. And if you tell ignoramuses, who don’t understand, they think that only the commandments obligate. Yes, it’s a little the opposite of what happens today. Today the Torah scholars think that only the commandments obligate, and they do not recognize the existence of extra-halakhic categories; they cling to Jewish law. But back then it wasn’t like that. Then Torah scholars were actually wise. And so they understood that ignoramuses think you need to discharge your obligation with what is written, that one has to keep the law, and then they would not study more. And try explaining to them that yes, you aren’t obligated, there’s no commandment, but everyone is obligated to study. Meaning, there is no commandment, but everyone is still obligated to study. There is no commandment, but everyone is obligated to study. An ignoramus doesn’t understand such a thing; it’s too sophisticated for him. There has to be—exactly. So he says it’s too sophisticated for him, so he would not study. So it really is a loss that he does not study, because one really does need to study. Meaning, the definition here is a definition of what the commandment is, but in the background all the time, notice, there is the obligation here, and the obligation is to study all the time. So what is the meaning of this competition? We’ll see in a moment. “But Rava said: it is a commandment to say it before ignoramuses.” Well, what about him? It’s simple. What? That you lose everyone who despairs because the bar is too high. Ah—meaning it could be that he won’t even study enough to recite Shema in the morning and evening. That’s one possibility. Another possibility I would suggest—and here I think both possibilities exist. The second possibility continues in the same direction. He says to him: listen, on the contrary, you need to say this to the ignoramus in order to explain it to him. He will recite Shema morning and evening because he understands that this is the definition of the commandment of Torah study, this is the halakhic obligation. So explain to him that he should stop being an ignoramus, that he should understand there are halakhic obligations beyond the formal definition of the commandment, and maybe something will come out of him other than an ignoramus. Therefore it is a commandment to say it before ignoramuses. Now, if that were all, it might sound like hair-splitting if I hadn’t first introduced the previous opinion. In the previous opinion it comes out clearly; it’s simple reasoning. Right? In the previous opinion you tell me: that is the obligation, you are right, but it is forbidden to say it before ignoramuses. Why? Because there really is an obligation outside the formal definition of the commandment. And now Rava says to him: ah, if so, then on the contrary—that is exactly what makes ignoramuses what they are. Tell them that not only Jewish law obligates; there are things beyond formal Jewish law, and maybe they will cease to be ignoramuses. The one who comes out an ignoramus is the same person who carefully recites Shema in the morning and evening every day, every morning. And that is exactly what the Ran wrote in Nedarim, right? That if you say Shema in the morning and evening, from that you will not in any way fulfill “and you shall teach them diligently”—to retain the Torah, to know the Torah. Recite Shema in the morning and evening and you fulfill the commandment of “when you lie down and when you rise,” but you will not be a Torah scholar. That is exactly the ignoramus against whom we want to fight here. We want to tell him: listen, it is ignorance to think that all you need to do is only what is included in formal Jewish law. And therefore it is a commandment to say it to ignoramuses, because we are not speaking about an ignoramus who is looking for ways to escape, but about an ignoramus who has an incorrect conception of what Torah is and what obligations are. Okay? So to such a person it is a commandment to say it. And it could be that if so, one sage said one thing and one sage said another, and they are not disputing—depending on which ignoramus you are speaking to. If there is an ignoramus whom you can truly rescue from his condition by telling him, listen, there are things beyond the obligation, tell him. If it is another ignoramus, then don’t tell him. Okay? It depends which ignoramus you are speaking with. If one speaks with ignoramuses at all. So that is the first part. Now I continue. “Ben Dama, the nephew of Rabbi Ishmael, asked Rabbi Ishmael: such as I, who have studied the entire Torah—what is the law regarding studying Greek wisdom?” Good, that’s a very interesting question, and the speakers here are interesting too. Rabbi Ishmael—we’ll get to him in a moment—but yes, his nephew asks him: I have studied the entire Torah; may I engage in Greek wisdom? Greek wisdom is like—what is Greek wisdom? Why is it “Greek wisdom” and not “a Greek wisdom”? I don’t know. Okay. No, the question is what Greek wisdom is; it’s not so simple. Greek wisdom, which they decreed about there, together with the pig that shook the Land of Israel for 400 parasangs, that one should not teach one’s son Greek wisdom—there Rav Hai Gaon, for example, says that it means the poems of Homer or Greek literature, not philosophy. It depends; there are disputes. It doesn’t matter. In any case, let’s think for a moment about this question. Once, when I was teaching in Yeruham, during the Shavuot night study one of the students there came to me and asked: if he studied the entire Torah, then how does he not know the answer to this? You came to ask me a question in Jewish law? Well, you studied the entire Torah, answer yourself—why do you need to ask? So I told him that I think it fits into the direction of this whole passage. He knew the entire Torah, but the idea that you need to study all the time beyond the basic obligations—that is really not part of the Torah; it is an extra-halakhic obligation. That he does not know. So he comes to ask Rabbi Ishmael: is there an obligation to study beyond knowing the material, beyond reciting Shema in the morning and evening, or even beyond learning in order to know what to do, or something like that? Is there value in study itself? And the answer is an answer that is not within the framework of Jewish law, within the framework of what is written in the Torah. And therefore he says: I have studied the entire Torah—what is the law regarding studying Greek wisdom? He cannot answer that question, because he restricts himself only to what is written in the Torah, to Jewish law in its formal sense. That he does not know; what lies beyond that he does not know, so he comes to ask Rabbi Ishmael. Fine, maybe that’s hair-splitting, I don’t know, but I think it fits well with the direction of the passage, and you’ll also see the continuation. He asks whether it is permitted? Yes, he asks whether it is permitted—no, whether it is permitted, whether it counts as neglect of Torah study. Is there value in Torah study for the sake of study itself? That is basically what he is asking. Again, if you studied the entire Torah, how do you not know the law that it is forbidden? So I say: because this is not part of the Torah. Greek wisdom—isn’t that disqualified? Because this is an obligation that is not part of the commandment. The commandment of “when you lie down and when you rise” is Shema in the morning and evening, that’s it. Everything else is not written in the Torah. You need to understand that Torah is something so fundamental that it must be studied, but this principle itself is not part of the Torah—it is a meta-Torah conception, or whatever you want to call it. So that he did not learn. He went through the whole Shulchan Arukh; he didn’t find it—no, it doesn’t appear there. The reference to this? Yes, exactly. So now he is basically like an ignoramus. He clings to what Jewish law obligates; that he learned, that he knows, he knows everything. Ignoramuses don’t know everything, but whatever they do know, they cling to what they know. He also knows everything—but he knows everything that is written. What about what lies beyond that? After all, he is only in Jewish law, he is only Sinai, not one who uproots mountains; he doesn’t know how to innovate. So if so, he still has more to learn, so why is he asking? Let him study advanced analytical classes, not proficiency classes. “He recited over him this verse”—who is this? Rabbi Ishmael, yes? “He recited over him this verse: ‘This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth, and you shall meditate upon it day and night. Go and check for an hour that is neither of the day nor of the night, and then study Greek wisdom.’” It says, “This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth, and you shall meditate upon it day and night”—one must study all the time. Meaning, there is value in study for the sake of study; you need to study in order to study, even if you know everything. Okay? That is his answer.

[Speaker E] Now first of all, notice, basically what—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —he says here is in direct contradiction to what appears above, right? After all, what is written above? How did we open the passage? “Even if a person studied only one chapter in the morning and one chapter in the evening, he has fulfilled the commandment, ‘This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth.’” It brings this very verse itself, “This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth,” right? Now true, that is a tanna in the name of Rabbi Yosei; he is allowed to disagree with Rabbi Ishmael. But seemingly it is a direct dispute, right? Agreed? The verse itself, “This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth”—Rabbi Yosei says, Rabbi Ami in the name of Rabbi Yosei says: no, not at all, this is not all day; one chapter in the morning, one chapter in the evening. He would answer Ben Dama, if he came and asked him, by saying: even if you don’t know the entire Torah, you can study Greek wisdom. What’s the problem? You recited Shema in the morning and evening, everything is fine, you’re set. Right? Rabbi Ishmael says to him: what are you talking about? Find an hour that is neither of the day nor of the night—of course there is no—

[Speaker K] —such hour. You need to—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —study all the time, right? So—

[Speaker K] He directly disputes what is written above.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, you’re saying that it is forbidden to say it before ignoramuses? He rules not like Rava, but like Rabbi Yohanan—that it is forbidden to say it before ignoramuses. Okay, it’s not likely that someone who studied the entire Torah wouldn’t know—maybe. But simply speaking. “And this disagrees with Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani, for Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani said in the name of Rabbi Yonatan: this verse is neither an obligation nor a commandment, but a blessing.” In what way does he disagree with him? Because he says that this is a commandment, right? Agreed? It says, “This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth”—that’s an obligation. You ask me if it is permitted to study Greek wisdom? What are you talking about? It says, “shall not depart.” He says to him: what are you talking about? This verse is only a blessing to Joshua, that the book of the Torah should not depart from his mouth, but it is not a commandment, it is not an obligation imposed on us, right? So that is the dispute between Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani. Now I ask you—tell me, are these people with us? “And this disagrees”? Obviously! After all, there was Rabbi Yosei above, with whom you opened the passage. Now you bring Rabbi Ishmael, who goes directly against him. And then you bring me—

[Speaker L] —some amora, Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani, from whom something else seems to emerge. So you have a dispute. So Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani goes according to Rabbi Yosei. What’s the problem? Rabbi Yosei didn’t say that it is a commandment; he narrows it. Well fine, but if so, then you don’t need this at all. He says obviously that reciting morning and evening and all that—you still need to say that, after all it is written “when you lie down and when you rise” in the Torah. It only narrows “shall not depart.” Fine? So “shall not depart” doesn’t matter, but there is Shema in the morning and evening from the Torah. Okay? So you—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —can study Greek wisdom. What’s the problem? In any case you can. Therefore the fact that they don’t note that he disagrees with Rabbi Yosei above means that clearly he does not disagree with him. Rabbi Ishmael does not disagree with him. Clearly not. Why? Because Rabbi Yosei too says that one fulfills the commandment of “This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth”; the commandment of Torah study is fulfilled with Shema in the morning and evening. But what—there is no obligation to study beyond that? Of course there is: day and night. Find a book—that is what he is saying: one fulfills the commandment of “This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth,” but one has not fulfilled “shall not depart.” “Shall not depart” is taken literally; we do not remove it from its plain meaning. Everything he said above—recite one chapter in the morning and one chapter in the evening and you have fulfilled the commandment of “shall not depart”—that does not come to explain the commandment of “shall not depart.” On the contrary, it comes to say that “shall not depart” is not a commandment. “Shall not depart” is a meta-halakhic obligation.

[Speaker L] The commandment is “when you lie down and when you rise” from the Torah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Don’t derive from “shall not depart” that actually “when you lie down and when you rise” means all day. Not true. “Shall not depart” and “when you lie down and when you rise”—that is Shema in the morning and evening. And “shall not depart” says that despite the fact that the commandment is Shema in the morning and evening, there is an obligation to study all the time. That is “shall not depart.” Okay? That is what Rabbi Yosei said. And that is exactly what Rabbi Ishmael says; he does not disagree with him. Rabbi Ishmael too, this is what he says to him. You cannot engage in Greek wisdom not because it is neglect of the positive commandment of Torah study. Fulfill Torah study—you fulfill it with Shema in the morning and evening. It is because of neglect of Torah study. Neglect of Torah study is neglect of the meta-halakhic obligation to study Torah, not neglect of the positive commandment. And therefore the Talmud assumes that Rabbi Ishmael does not disagree with Rabbi Yosei at all. So with whom does he disagree?

[Speaker B] With Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Where do we see otherwise in Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani? Because he says that “this verse is neither an obligation nor a commandment, but a blessing.” Now, that expression too is interesting. What is the difference between an obligation and a commandment? “It is neither an obligation nor a commandment, but a blessing.” Does that make sense or not make sense? First let’s hear what he says; afterward we’ll see whether it makes sense. What is the difference between obligation and commandment? A commandment is something for which you get—

[Speaker C] reward; an obligation—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —is something for which you don’t get reward. Why wouldn’t I get reward? If I do my duty, why shouldn’t I get reward? Because it’s an obligation. So what? Every commandment is also an obligation. What, is there no obligation to fulfill the commandments? No, but even when you do a commandment there is reward for it. But I’m saying—is there no obligation to fulfill the commandments? That too is an obligation. So why do I get reward? What is the difference between obligation and commandment?

[Speaker C] The difference between obligation and commandment is—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The difference that this whole passage is dealing with: there is a difference between the commandment of Torah study and the obligation to study Torah. It’s not the same thing. And now, up to this point, the entire passage agreed that the commandment of Torah study is reciting Shema in the morning and evening. The obligation of Torah study is all day and all night, as much as you can. And here, for the first time, a view appears that says no, that’s not correct. Until now nobody disagreed with anybody. That’s what I said earlier: nobody disagreed with anybody. The discussion is not about Jewish law. In Jewish law, by reciting Shema in the morning and evening you fulfill your obligation. The discussion is about an obligation beyond Jewish law. And now Rav Shmuel bar Nachmani comes and says no—not only is it not a commandment, it’s not even an obligation. It’s just a blessing to Joshua. He really does disagree with them, with both Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Yishmael. Okay? He really disagrees with them. Because he says this is only a blessing to Joshua, but it isn’t an obligation.

Now by the way, just parenthetically—again, a linguistic anachronism—the difference between obligation and commandment. What I just pointed out: the term “commandment” here in the baraita is parallel, I think, to what I call “obligation.” What is written here as “obligation” means what I call “commandment.” A formal commandment, in the sense that… when they say here “commandment,” they mean a good deed. When they say here “obligation,” they mean a halakhic obligation—that is, a commandment. That’s just the… I think so, because that seems to me to be the plain meaning of the words. Today we’re already used to the idea that “commandment”—just think about the street, when you go outside—“you did a commandment.” They don’t mean that you fulfilled a positive commandment obligation of something. They mean you did a good deed, right? When someone says to you, “you did a commandment.” That’s the meaning it has in the Talmud. “Commandment” means you did a good deed. “Obligation” means something you have to do because there is Jewish law, that kind of formal commandment. I think it gets reversed, but it doesn’t matter for our purposes.

In any case, Rav Shmuel bar Nachmani rejects both of those and turns it into a blessing to Joshua. Neither an obligation nor a commandment. That really does disagree with Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Yosei. You see that throughout this whole passage it’s clear—even though it doesn’t appear anywhere explicitly—but throughout this whole passage every line of it is basically crying out that there is an obligation to study Torah that is not connected to the commandment of Torah study. Two different things. There is the commandment of Torah study, and there is the obligation of Torah study. Two different things. Okay? And Rav Shmuel bar Nachmani is the one who disagrees with everything. He claims it’s not even an obligation. It’s a blessing to Joshua.

Now a blessing already means that this is something positive, because otherwise what kind of blessing is it that you should occupy yourself with Torah day and night? So even he is not saying that it has no value. He just doesn’t define it as an obligation. Meaning, from his perspective maybe there really is no problem of neglecting Torah study, in the sense that it’s not neglect of a positive commandment and it’s also not a problem because it isn’t an obligation; the meta-halakhic obligation is not an obligation in his view. But it is a value to study Torah, to engage in Torah all the time—that is certainly a value even according to him. Okay? But this is the first time in this passage that a view appears which rejects even the meta-halakhic obligation to study. Okay? And therefore it is no accident that he says “it is neither an obligation nor a commandment”—he rejects both things.

Why does he reject both things? In most places in the Talmud you won’t find “what is an obligation and what is a commandment”; where do we find that this is an obligation and this is a commandment? Because here the whole discussion is on a meta-level about what is obligation and what is commandment. Until Shmuel bar Nachmani comes and says, what are you talking about? It’s not an obligation and not a commandment. It’s just a blessing to Joshua. So I think it’s very clear that in the subtext of this whole passage there is all the time this meta-halakhic obligation beyond the commandment. Blessing—we have it by halakhic entitlement. What? A blessing specifically, actually we do have blessing by halakhic entitlement. What do you mean? “Whoever is stringent, a blessing will come upon him.” No, here it’s a blessing in which the Holy One, blessed be He, blesses Joshua. He blesses him that “this book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth.” There is also blessing in blessings over enjoyment. Obligation. That one has to say it morning and evening, as though that is the commandment. Right, and you fulfill the obligation, but that’s not from this verse. That’s from “when you lie down and when you rise” in the Torah. This verse is neither obligation nor commandment, but a blessing. There is “when you lie down and when you rise” from the Torah; that is something else. You fulfill your obligation through Shema in the morning and evening. Right, everything is fine.

And then it says: The Holy One, blessed be He, saw that words of Torah were especially beloved to Joshua, as it is said, “And his attendant Joshua son of Nun would not depart from the tent.” The Holy One, blessed be He, said to him: Joshua, are words of Torah so beloved to you? “This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth.” Okay? So up to here we’ve already found a view that disagrees. Now look at the continuation.

It was taught in the school of Rabbi Yishmael: “Words of Torah should not be upon you as an obligation, yet you are not permitted to exempt yourself from them.” What does that mean? Usually, if I hadn’t given all this introduction, what would you have said? That it means: don’t do it as slaves who serve the master, right? Meaning, it shouldn’t be an obligation; rather, do it willingly. I don’t think that’s correct. This is a continuation of exactly the same line of thought. And he says to them: “Words of Torah should not be upon you as an obligation,” Rabbi Yishmael says. What does that mean? Obligation here, remember, is what he calls commandment. Meaning: this is not a formal commandment. Don’t think of it as a commandment. And nevertheless, “you are not permitted to exempt yourself from them.” Because there is here a non-formal commandment. It’s not obligation—it is commandment. You see? This is that same Rabbi Yishmael with whom Rav Shmuel bar Nachmani disagrees. Rav Shmuel bar Nachmani says, after all, that this verse is neither obligation nor commandment. And in what does he disagree with Rabbi Yishmael? Because Rabbi Yishmael claims it may not be an obligation, but it is indeed a commandment. That’s the dispute. And Rabbi Yosei above does not disagree with this, nobody disagrees with this.

Here it looks as though Rabbi Yishmael is aligned with Rav Nachmani. No—the opposite. Pay attention, read his language carefully. “Words of Torah should not be upon you as an obligation.” A commandment? No—“yet you are not permitted to exempt yourself from them.” What is that? Even though there is no obligation in the halakhic sense, you cannot exempt yourself from them. Why? Because there is a meta-halakhic obligation. You have to study, not because of the commandment of Torah study. The commandment of Torah study—Shema in the morning and evening—that’s perfectly fine. Everything is fine. But that doesn’t mean there is no obligation. The ignoramus thinks that if it isn’t included in… if it isn’t included in the commandment, then there is no obligation. That is what Rabbi Yishmael comes to say: don’t be an ignoramus. Right, the commandment includes only Shema in the morning and evening, but that doesn’t mean “you are permitted to exempt yourself from them.” Notice, he is not speaking on the psychological plane, in terms of how you should relate to it—whether it should feel like a burden to you or not. No, this is a continuation of the entire move of the whole passage.

It is simply a sharpening of the dispute: why did they say that Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani disagrees with Rabbi Yishmael, when Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani said that it is neither obligation nor commandment, while Rabbi Yishmael claims that it may not be a commandment but it is an obligation—yes, for him the terminology is reversed, it doesn’t matter, but that’s what he means to say. Okay? That is Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani’s dispute. And if that is so, then there is no dispute here at all except for Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani. All the others—Rabbi Yosei and Rava and Rava and all those guys—they all say the same thing. And what they say is what we saw in the Talmud in Nedarim: that the commandment to study Torah is Shema in the morning and evening. But that doesn’t mean “you are permitted to exempt yourself from them.” There is a meta-halakhic obligation to study Torah as much as you can. Two different things.

Or in other words, this whole passage is really dealing with the tension between the commandment of Torah study and Torah study itself. It is not correct to identify Torah study with the commandment of Torah study. The value of Torah study is much broader than the commandment of Torah study. The commandment of Torah study is one of the 613 commandments. And this whole competition here in the passage—how to reduce the commandment of Torah study as much as possible—is a competition with a very clear educational agenda. It comes to tell you exactly this: notice, studying Torah is not the same as fulfilling the commandment of Torah study. In order to fulfill the commandment of Torah study, read Shema morning and evening and everything is fine. Torah study is much more than that. It is something more fundamental, which will not enter into the 613 commandments at all, because of how fundamental it is. Because it is so fundamental, we don’t want to turn it into one of the 613 commandments, because it is something much more fundamental than that. And therefore you need to understand—and that is all this passage is trying to say—you need to understand that although there is no commandment, that very absence of a commandment is precisely because they wanted to leave this value as a more fundamental value than merely performing a commandment. And therefore “you are not permitted to exempt yourself from them”; that’s how the passage ends. Even though there is no obligation, you are not permitted to exempt yourself from them. Because ignoramuses think that if Shema in the morning and evening is enough, then that’s what they do—they don’t do more than that. And Rabbi Yishmael comes and says to them: this is not a novelty in the laws of the commandment of Torah study, in the parameters of the commandment of Torah study. As far as the commandment of Torah study is concerned, everybody agrees: by reciting Shema in the morning and evening you fulfill your obligation. The whole discussion here is a meta-halakhic discussion, not a halakhic one.

And now look what that means. There is a famous contradiction. Okay? What did we actually see here? On the one hand Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai says that by reciting Shema in the morning and evening you fulfill your obligation, right? Rabbi Yishmael says, “Go out and choose a time that is neither day nor night”—you have to study all the time. That is Rabbi Yishmael’s position, right? He says, “you are not permitted to exempt yourself from them,” and so on. Come see what happens in the Talmud in Berakhot.

The rabbis taught, Berakhot 35b: “And you shall gather in your grain”—what does this come to teach? Since it says, “This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth,” one might think the words are to be taken literally—that one should study all the time. Therefore Scripture says, “And you shall gather in your grain”—conduct yourself in them according to the way of the world. These are the words of Rabbi Yishmael. Does that fit for you? Rabbi Yishmael is the one who said that “it shall not depart” means literally, day and night. Okay, fine, so that’s just one narrowing on top of another. Let’s see.

Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai says: Is it possible that a person plows at the time of plowing and sows at the time of sowing, reaps at the time of reaping and threshes at the time of threshing and winnows at the time of wind—what will become of Torah? Rather, when Israel do the will of the Omnipresent, then their work is done by others, and so on. Don’t reveal this to Religious Zionism. And the work of others is done by them, as it is said, “And you shall serve your enemies,” and so on. Okay? What does that mean? A complete crossover, right? An actual crossover. Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai says in our passage in Menachot: Shema in the morning and evening is enough. Rabbi Yishmael is the imperialist: he says no, what are you talking about? Day and night—go and study at an hour that is neither day nor night. Okay? What is going on here?

The question is whether we can engage in worldly occupation, work, go to work, all kinds of things. Rabbi Yishmael: everything is fine, do everything, study Torah, set fixed times for Torah, everything is fine. Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai is hysterical, saying what are you talking about, what will become of Torah? You should study all the time and let them support you, let others do your work for you. That is an approach people today fulfill with great piety. So what is the meaning of this matter, this crossover? It’s really a full crossover. They turn their positions around one hundred and eighty degrees.

So later authorities discuss all kinds of ways to reconcile the passages. The common denominator of all those approaches is that they basically want to define the commandment of Torah study in a flexible way. What does that mean? There is some kind of discussion here: the commandment of Torah study is all the time—that’s the initial premise. Now we start to see what can encroach on that, because you need to eat, you need to sleep, right? There are things you can’t do without. Fine, the intention is that in all the hours you can devote to Torah, you have to study Torah. There are activities that are fine, that you are allowed to engage in, and that won’t count as neglect of Torah, because that’s the way of the world, that’s how a person lives. But basically the commandment is to study all the time. Okay? Now there are different formulations, different definitions. I don’t think there are really substantive differences. The Netziv, the Or Sameach, all kinds of people discuss this passage and define in one way or another that neglect of Torah is basically a function of the person. There are things you need to do as part of your life; don’t become hysterical about neglect of Torah. Neglect of Torah is when you have an hour in which you could study and you don’t study. But if you go to work, that’s not neglect of Torah. If you go serve in the army, that’s not neglect of Torah. Or I don’t know what. If you go eat or sleep, that’s not neglect of Torah. Or even go to a movie. Fine, you want to clear your head a little—what happened? It’s allowed. It’s allowed to live.

So you can see that in the commentators on the contradiction between the passages. But the way I said earlier, we don’t need to get into all that. There is no crossover here, there is nothing. The whole discussion in the Talmud in Menachot deals with the distinction between Jewish law and meta-Jewish law. So what is the disagreement between Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai and Rabbi Yishmael? No disagreement. In the Talmud in Menachot there is no disagreement. Both agree that by reciting Shema in the morning and evening you fulfill your obligation. Rabbi Yishmael adds something, and Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai said nothing about it. Rabbi Yishmael adds that nevertheless you are not permitted to exempt yourself, because there is the meta-halakhic obligation. Okay? Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai said nothing there about what he thinks of that. That is in the Talmud in Menachot. Therefore there is no disagreement there at all, so there is nothing to talk about in terms of a crossover, because they’re not even arguing there. They are simply talking about different things.

On the halakhic plane, both agree that Shema in the morning and evening is the commandment. Rabbi Yishmael only adds: there is also a meta-halakhic plane in which you must study Torah beyond that as well. Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai didn’t talk about that; he simply did not address it in the saying quoted there. What happens in the Talmud in Berakhot? Here the discussion is about “this book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth,” which has nothing whatsoever to do with the commandment of Torah study; after all, that is how the passage in Menachot began. The commandment of Torah study is “when you lie down and when you rise” in the Torah, right? “This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth” is about the meta-halakhic obligation, not the commandment. And the whole discussion here in Berakhot is about that.

Now the question is: regarding the meta-halakhic obligation, Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai disagree over how far it extends. And here Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai is stricter than Rabbi Yishmael. He claims that it needs to extend over the entire day. Don’t go to work and don’t do anything; they’ll take care of you. How will you live? Goldknopf—there are people for that, they’ll take care of you. Meaning, they’ll work for you. Okay? How can everybody do that? Where will the money come from? Fine. So that’s Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai. Rabbi Yishmael claims no, you should go to work, everything is fine. There is no contradiction to what they said there, to what they said in the Talmud in Menachot. The Talmud in Menachot is on a different plane of discussion, and there there is no disagreement at all. Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai also agrees that although by reciting Shema in the morning and evening you fulfill your obligation, you are not permitted to exempt yourself from it, right? He doesn’t say it there; he says it here. Not only does he agree, he is even stricter than Rabbi Yishmael on this point. He says you can’t even go to work, from the standpoint of the meta-halakhic obligation. Not that this would count as neglect of the positive commandment of Torah study—it would not. It’s from the standpoint of the meta-halakhic obligation. There is no contradiction at all between the passages; there is no need to look for reconciliations.

If you read the passage in Menachot correctly, there is no contradiction at all. And why do you call it meta-halakhic? Because it is not included in the positive commandment of Torah study. The positive commandment of Torah study is part of Jewish law: there is a commandment, and it has definitions of what it requires. There are obligations that go beyond what the commandment requires. And what is the source of this obligation? It is not necessarily behind the commandment; it stands behind the Torah as a whole. It is not specifically tied to the commandment of Torah study. Rather, you need to understand what Torah is, and understand that this should be your basic occupation.

So they both agree that the obligation is one chapter in the morning and one chapter in the evening? That’s the commandment, that’s the definition of the positive commandment. But that doesn’t mean you can spend the whole day not studying. Right, that is what Rabbi Yishmael says: “yet you are not permitted to exempt yourself from them.” “They should not be upon you as an obligation”—what does that mean? It means: it is not included in the obligation. By reciting Shema in the morning and evening you fulfill your obligation, but you are not permitted to exempt yourself from them because there is an obligation to study Torah not because of the positive commandment. Is that sort of like an act of piety? Yes, but I’m saying here it’s not an act of piety in that sense. An act of piety is usually perceived as something less binding. Okay, that’s basically the claim. So something of a serious flop comes out of here. No, there is a dispute. Rabbi Yishmael tells you—Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai in Menachot do not disagree. They do not disagree. Rav Shmuel bar Nachmani in Menachot does disagree. He says there is no extra-halakhic obligation.

In Berakhot, yes, there is an extra-halakhic obligation. Here in this context I assume he would join at least Rabbi Yishmael, maybe even be more lenient than Rabbi Yishmael in Berakhot. Because in Berakhot the whole discussion is about what the definition is of the extra-halakhic obligation. So Rabbi Yishmael is more liberal on this point. He says, live your life, and whenever you can, study. No, if someone comes and says, but I want only to study, then he says, all the more so, even better, please. Not sure, not sure, because that’s what Abaye says at the end—we haven’t read it yet—that many did so and it did not work for them. It did not work for them because they failed? Yes. Therefore it is not recommended to do that even if you want to. Only very exceptional people are advised to do such a thing. Right? But people are generally too weak. So if you have ambitions but you’re weak, it’s not worth it, don’t do it. You’ll fail, you’ll fall flat on your face.

There is Ben Zoma and Ben Azzai—sorry—and Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai, who get exemptions in some matters, even from Shema according to the Jerusalem Talmud. They are exempt from Shema because they are occupied in Torah study all the time, and one who is engaged in one commandment is exempt from another commandment. Why are others not exempt? So the Talmud says: you study Torah in order to perform it, so if the performance is prevented because the study prevents you from performing, then what have you accomplished? So therefore most people are not exempt from a passing commandment while they are studying Torah. But the Talmud says that Ben Azzai and Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai are exempt. They are exempt because they really are people who… those are the people who should be exempted from military service. Ben Azzai and Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai. Today there are maybe one and a half such people. Those should be exempted from military service. That is completely correct.

No, but with that approach you want to exempt as many as possible so that you can find the Ben Azzai and the Rabbi Shimon. You find them by age twenty. By age twenty you can already see who is Ben Azzai and who is not Ben Azzai. Statistics? Yes. Anyway. And what if he woke up at age forty? Fine, there are some you’ll miss. That’s life. Every policy can miss things. There is no policy guaranteed not to miss anything. In an ideal world I would like to sit with my feet up and eat cream cakes while studying Bava Kamma. Fine, but we are not in an ideal world. We were not born into an ideal world, we were not created into an ideal world, and therefore it’s a shame to deal with… we are not there. It is far, far away. In the world of AI we’ll talk; we’re not there yet. And when we get there, it’s not clear you’ll be able to have cream cake so easily. Fine, they’ll have to distribute the money somehow.

Anyway, these are tangled issues, we won’t get into them here. So in short, the bottom line—I just want to summarize—what he is basically saying is that what we learn from here is that Torah study and the commandment of Torah study are two different things. The commandment of Torah study, according to the more limiting views, is that by reciting Shema in the morning and evening you fulfill your obligation, maybe one chapter in the morning and one chapter in the evening. According to the Ran, maybe rabbinically, it comes out that you also have to study the rest. According to the Rosh and the commentator, no. That is the parameter of the commandment of Torah study, the halakhic parameter. There is an extra-halakhic obligation to study Torah as much as you can. Again, everyone agrees with that. There is no dispute about that. Maybe Rav Shmuel bar Nachmani, who defines it as a blessing or as something proper but not an extra-halakhic obligation. But that is the near-consensus, let’s call it that—if not a full consensus—that there is an extra-halakhic obligation. Up to here, that’s the Talmud in Menachot, and that’s where it ends.

Now the Talmud in Berakhot says: okay, this extra-halakhic obligation—how far does it go? Rabbi Yishmael says, “conduct yourself in them according to the way of the world.” Live your life, you don’t have to live in a crazy way. You should live normally, and alongside that study as much as you can. Okay? You don’t need the hysteria of neglect of Torah: having to eat quickly and all that because otherwise it’s neglect of Torah. No. Live normally, and study Torah in the time you have. Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai is more hysterical on this matter. And therefore there in Berakhot there is a disagreement between them about the extra-halakhic obligation—how far it extends. And that’s all. But it is not a halakhic dispute; that is basically the claim. It concerns the extra-halakhic obligation. And about that Abaye says at the end that many did so and it did not work for them. In short, for many it is not practical. There are individuals who can maintain that way of life—Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai—but it is not practical for the many, for two reasons by the way, and this is current again.

One reason is that not everyone is built for it. There are two who are built for it, but there aren’t thousands built that way who can truly realize it. Second, if many do this, then who will support them? Meaning, there has to be some division of labor in society. So I’m prepared to support a small number of such people who really dedicate themselves—fine, their livelihood is on us. Absolutely. Torah should not be treated as less than an innkeeper’s trade. We support institutions of culture, art, sports, all sorts of things like that—so shouldn’t we support Torah? Of course we should support Torah. But as for those who are truly suited to this, all the others, with all due respect to them, should conduct themselves according to the way of the world, go to work, and alongside that study as much as they can. That is the conclusion—very current conclusions, but it seems to me they emerge very simply from the passages.

Conduct themselves according to the way of the Land of Israel. When we merit that, when the nations come, then we’ll talk. Okay? Today the nations come and we pay them for it—an exit—so somebody has to pay them. Still today only the nations work for us, but we have to pay them. High-tech and so on, yes. How do you learn this? Nobody—it has to suffice according to ability, except for Rabbi Yishmael, whom I too can read. But Rabbi Yishmael is the conclusion of the passage. Abaye said: many did so and it did not work for them. The conclusion is Rabbi Yishmael. That is the conclusion of the passage. No, fine. What do you mean “except for Rabbi Yishmael”? Rabbi Yishmael is the conclusion.

Who will pay them a salary? Who? What do you mean, who? Doesn’t matter who. It matters very much! It matters very much. Who pays? The government? But who is the government? The government is us. Who pays them? Do you have money to pay them? No, there isn’t—but there isn’t. No problem. If you can find money to pay whoever you want, you can also give gifts to whoever you want. You can encourage shepherds to be shepherds; if you have money, give it to them. If you neutralize the livelihood problem, for the sake of argument, then I say: if you neutralize the livelihood problem, there is no discussion. We can all sit on the beach and tan and give me money too. But I’m telling you, it doesn’t say that here—what do I care? If you have no livelihood problem, go study Torah. Everything is fine. Right, if you have no livelihood problem, go study Torah—but you do have a livelihood problem! You have a livelihood problem. So what? You rob others so that you won’t have a livelihood problem. Fine, I’m not saying robbery isn’t also a livelihood; many times it’s a very profitable livelihood. But if society says so, then maybe that’s correct. Everything is fine. Society can pay more to whoever it wants. Everything is fine. If society can do that and is willing to do that, there is no problem, everything is fine. That is an idealized state. It may be an idealized state, but it is not the state in which we live. In an ideal world everyone would also keep Torah and commandments. In an ideal world we would all be righteous and not speak evil speech. In an ideal world everything would be wonderful. But we are not in an ideal world. Right. Fine, I aspire to that too. Here, aspire to it—and go to work. And aspire to it on your lunch break. And aspire to it on your lunch break. You can’t aspire to it at my expense. Let there be a blessing, let there be a blessing, then we’ll talk. Bring me the blessing from the Sabbatical year first, and then we’ll talk about the blessings you’re inventing from your fevered imagination. Even the blessings written in the Torah I don’t see, so let’s leave those blessings for later. That’s a blessing after the meal, not before the meal. Give me the meal and I’ll recite the blessing afterward. Anyway.

So much for current events and our subject. I’m a bit completely… we’re set. Why? Why not? If a person has nothing to do in life, for example? Fine, let him study Torah. Does anybody disagree with that? Does anybody disagree with that? No. Everything is fine. If you have nothing to do, study Torah. That’s all. I’m asking: does anyone disagree with that? One could have learned it that way. One could have learned it. Does anyone disagree with that? Is there anybody in the country who disagrees with what you just said? In the religious world? In the religious world, not secular people—secular people disagree with everything, that’s unrelated. No, there isn’t. Nobody disagrees with that—that if you can, study Torah. Obviously, amen. Who says not? That’s not the discussion. The discussion is when you can’t—that’s the discussion. I’d also have no problem exempting everyone from the draft if soldiers weren’t needed. But soldiers are needed—what can you do? In an ideal world we wouldn’t need soldiers either, we wouldn’t need anything. We’d all be shepherds, playing the flute and studying Torah. Fine, a wonderful world—but you are there, however…

It reminds me of my sponsor from the Weizmann Institute, he was kind of a left-wing guy. He was some kind of academic-political type, in charge on behalf of the UN for South America, and an important figure in the scientific establishment. So once he went to Denmark, I don’t remember for what matter. He said, I entered the hotel room and lay down. Such peace and quiet. No wars, no politics, no left and right, no Israel, no noise. He says after three minutes I started itching. After five minutes I was already tearing my hair out, after ten minutes I was already back at the airport; I can’t live in such a boring world. Meaning, you need these wars, because otherwise the world is boring. Meaning, it’s no accident that the Holy One, blessed be He, did not create us in an ideal world. There is no world more boring than an ideal world. I really mean this: you need friction. It’s interesting also in the essential sense—you want to fix something, you don’t want to live in an ideal world. You need to repair things, so you need to deal with difficulties, you need to deal with problems. And you need a blessing in order to do that. And in Torah? In Torah. In Torah? In Torah. Okay.

All right, friends, so that is the first stage. I maybe want to connect the two parts I spoke about when I return, for example, to women’s obligation. We said that women are not obligated in the commandment of Torah study, right? But they are obligated to learn the laws that pertain to them, in order to know what to do. Now I want to add something else, in light of the distinction we made here. In my opinion, women are obligated in Torah study completely, just like men—to study the whole Talmud analytically with the medieval authorities and later authorities exactly like men. What they are exempt from is Shema in the morning and evening; that is the commandment of Torah study. Women are exempt from the commandment of Torah study. From Torah study itself—why should women be exempt? Torah study is not a formal commandment, so who is obligated in it? Anyone who understands that there is such an obligation, the importance of the matter, the significance of the matter, right?

I’ll give you an example. Yes, so I won’t now get into the next law; I’ll give you an example. For instance, there is a contradiction between two passages. A Talmud in Sanhedrin on page 56: “stumbling and disgrace.” The Talmud says there that if there is an animal that was sexually used by a person, or that had relations with a woman, then it is killed. If you wish, say it is because of stumbling; if you wish, say it is because of disgrace. “Disgrace” means that it shames the person who committed the transgression, or it goes through the marketplace and they say, here is the one with whom so-and-so had relations—the donkey that had relations. And “stumbling” means that it goes through the street and they say: a transgression was committed through it. So because of removing evil from your midst, the animal must be killed.

What happens with an animal that had relations with a minor? So the Talmud says: it is killed. Even according to the one who says “stumbling,” it is killed. Now why? After all, in the case of a minor this is not a transgression; a minor is not obligated in commandments. “Stumbling” means a transgression. Rashi says there: there was no transgression here because the minor is not obligated in commandments. Okay? So ostensibly we see that the transgression of a minor is also a transgression—that’s one side. That’s the Talmud in Sanhedrin.

There is a Talmud in Yevamot on page 33 about “one prohibition does not take effect on another prohibition.” There the Talmud says that a minor who brought forth two pubic hairs and entered the Temple in impurity—then he violated two prohibitions, entering the Temple and serving—yes, entered the Temple in impurity and violated the Sabbath and served, I don’t remember which two prohibitions he did there. And it applies to him all at once, because it takes effect when he brought forth the two hairs; before that, not. And there the discussion is about one prohibition not taking effect on another prohibition, so when the two prohibitions take effect

[Speaker E] at the same time, both take effect.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If one comes after the other, then the second

[Speaker C] does not take effect, only the first.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now the Talmud wants to find a case where they take effect simultaneously, so it says: a minor, when he brings forth two hairs and is engaged in some transgression, the two transgressions take effect on him at the same time when he brought the two

[Speaker B] hairs.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So from there several later authorities point out that we see that until he brought forth the two

[Speaker C] hairs, there are no transgressions upon him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And regarding a minor there are no transgressions until he brought forth two hairs. But in the Talmud about stumbling and disgrace we see that a minor’s transgression is indeed a transgression. Many later authorities discuss this: Chelkat Yoav and Kovetz Shiurim and Ein Yitzhak and quite a few later authorities deal with this question. And some of them answer it in different styles, but with the same principle. And the principle is that there are certain commandments which are commandments that even gentiles are obligated in, and in those certainly even a minor would be obligated.

The Hatam Sofer says, for example—he learns this from the Rosh—that the measure of majority is a measure, like any other measure, and therefore it was not said concerning gentiles. So gentiles—from what age are they obligated in their seven commandments? From the age at which they understand. There is no formal halakhic age like ours—thirteen or two hairs—but from the moment they understand, they are obligated.

[Speaker E] There are no

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] fixed halakhic measures stated there.

[Speaker E] Okay?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So he says: if so, then Jewish minors too will be obligated in those same seven commandments. Because there is no such thing—there is no matter,

[Speaker C] the Talmud there

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] in Sanhedrin

[Speaker C] says—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] there is no matter in which something is forbidden to a Noahide and permitted to an Israelite. No. There cannot be something that is forbidden to a Noahide and permitted to an Israelite. What is the idea behind that? Because in every Israelite there is a small Noahide. Meaning, you are a Noahide with one

[Speaker E] additional layer, so

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] what obligates a gentile obligates you too. Only you have additional obligations as well, okay? Therefore there cannot be something that the gentile

[Speaker C] is

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] obligated in and you are not—that is the claim.

What I want to say beyond

[Speaker L] that is that basically the commandments that the gentile is obligated

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] in, as Maimonides says, are commandments toward which reason inclines. Reason inclines toward them; these are commandments rooted in logic. And anything rooted in logic obligates anyone who understands the logic. So it makes no difference whether he is a minor or an adult. Formal commandments obligate the one who was commanded. The Torah does not command someone under age thirteen, so he is not obligated; he is a minor, he has not brought forth two hairs, fine. So he is a minor, he is not obligated.

[Speaker E] But a commandment whose basis is reason

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] does not begin

[Speaker E] from being commanded.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Anyone

[Speaker E] who understands the logic is obligated.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It makes no difference what his age is, what his gender is, it makes no difference at all. If you understand the reasoning, you are obligated. So relations with an animal is a commandment whose basis is reason, and therefore it applies to a gentile. Since that is so, then for a Jewish minor too it is a transgression from his perspective, and that is the passage in Sanhedrin page 56. But in Yevamot we are talking about formal halakhic transgressions—impurity, Temple, service on the Sabbath, and so on. Those are all formal transgressions. That starts from age thirteen, because there the command determines the obligation, and the command is addressed only to adults, not to minors. These are two kinds of commandments.

But we have learned from here that commandments whose basis is reason obligate everyone who understands

[Speaker C] the logic.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are no formal definitions here of

[Speaker E] who is exempt and who is obligated.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Women are exempt because it is a

[Speaker E] positive time-bound

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] commandment—not that it matters for whatever reason. Minors are exempt because they lack understanding. All those exemptions are irrelevant. They are relevant to formal commandments. Formal commandments are addressed to whoever was commanded; whoever was not commanded is not obligated. But a commandment whose basis is reason, just as a gentile is obligated in them

[Speaker E] even though he was not commanded,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] so too in commandments in which he was not commanded, he is

[Speaker E] obligated

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] in them. Why is he obligated? Because reason says that he is obligated in them.

Rav Nissim Gaon, in the introduction to the Talmud—it’s printed at the beginning of tractate Berakhot in the Vilna editions of the Talmud—he says there about all the commandments. He asks: how can it be that there are thirty commandments that Noahides were commanded in, when we know there are seven? He says: because all the commandments that depend on reason and on the understanding of the heart, a person has been obligated in them forever. Whoever understands is obligated; it makes no difference whether you are a gentile or a Jew. If it is reason, then that is what reason says; if you understand the logic, you are obligated. A commandment whose basis is formal, not logical, you are obligated in by virtue of the command, and the command is addressed to whom it is addressed. If you are a gentile and not obligated, then you are not obligated. If you are a woman

[Speaker L] and it is a positive time-bound commandment,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] a woman is exempt. If you are a minor, you are exempt because you were not commanded. Commandments whose basis is reason obligate everyone.

Therefore I want to claim that if indeed the commandment of Torah study is a commandment grounded in reason, then there is no definition of who is obligated and who is exempt. So women too will be obligated, and minors too will be obligated—fully obligated. Obligated, obligated, exactly like adults. It is not a formal halakhic obligation. The formal halakhic obligations are only according to the definitions of who is commanded. Okay? But here we are talking about some sort of obligation whose basis is reason. An obligation whose basis is reason addresses everyone. It has nothing to do with adult, minor, woman, gentile; none of that matters at all. Whoever understands is obligated.

And therefore there are no limitations. So “and you shall teach them diligently to your children,” right? That you need to teach your son—how can that be?

[Speaker E] After all, the son is exempt from commandments.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, that is the commandment of education on the father. The commandment of education on the father is a rabbinic commandment. The commandment of education is rabbinic. So what is “and you shall teach them diligently

[Speaker H] to your children”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It is written in the Torah.

[Speaker N] The answer is that in Torah

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] study there is a Torah-level obligation on the minor.

[Speaker N] It is not

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] a rabbinic obligation.

[Speaker N] It is a Torah-level obligation

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] because it is a commandment whose basis is reason; therefore even a minor

[Speaker K] is obligated.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So another example: Maimonides writes that one does not administer an oath to a minor because he does not know the punishment of an oath. Maimonides, in the Laws of Hiring, I think, regarding the oath of custodians.

[Speaker E] So if

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] you entrusted something to a minor and he needs to swear the custodian’s oath, we do not administer the oath to him

[Speaker E] because he does not know the punishment of an oath.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And then—

[Speaker E] what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If

[Speaker E] he

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] doesn’t know the punishment, then he won’t be deterred from lying under oath, and the oath won’t achieve its purpose. The whole purpose of the oath is to make sure you are not

[Speaker E] lying because you fear the punishment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But what

[Speaker B] does it mean—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] he does not know

[Speaker M] the punishment of the oath?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is no punishment of oath upon him. It’s not that he doesn’t know the punishment of the oath; there is none upon him. On the contrary, with a smart minor I’d be much more careful, because he knows there is no punishment on him. With a foolish minor you can fool him—there is a punishment for you, you don’t know it, but there is a punishment. But a smart minor understands that you’re fooling him. There is no punishment on him. What does “he does not know the punishment of the oath” mean? It means: because there is no punishment of oath upon him. We see in Maimonides that even on a minor there is punishment for an oath. He just doesn’t know. So fine—it depends whether he has understanding or not—but there is punishment for oath upon him. Why is there punishment for oath upon him?

[Speaker L] Why?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because standing by your word—

[Speaker E] meaning keeping your oath—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] is an obligation whose basis is reason.

[Speaker E] And obligations

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] whose basis

[Speaker E] is reason obligate

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] everyone—minors, adults, women, men, it makes no difference; gentiles, Jews, it makes no difference at all.

[Speaker E] Even minors. And therefore

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] he has punishment for oath if he swears

[Speaker E] falsely.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The punishment is

[Speaker E] not lashes,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] because the prohibition of the oath was stated only regarding one who is obligated. Meaning, that is clear. But the obligation—for example, oaths that were said before the giving of the Torah: Abraham swore,

[Speaker M] Eliezer

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] swore, yes, Jacob. What are all those oaths?

[Speaker E] They are

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] oaths.

[Speaker E] They

[Speaker B] are not

[Speaker E] binding on the halakhic level, but

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] it is obvious that any person of understanding—if

[Speaker E] you swear,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] you have to stand by your word, you must fulfill what you swore. That is what the Mishneh LaMelekh says in the Laws of Kings. How did the Holy One, blessed be He, make Israel swear at Mount Sinai—“already sworn from Mount Sinai,” we saw that earlier—after all, the whole obligation to keep oaths is from the Torah, so how can it be possible to make me swear

[Speaker E] to keep the Torah?

[Speaker B] After all, the whole obligation to keep

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Shavuot is because of the Torah, and if I didn’t accept the Torah then the concept of an oath doesn’t exist. So the Avnei Nezer says, in Yoreh De’ah, siman 306, that that’s not correct. The obligation to keep an oath exists even before the giving of the Torah—not a formal halakhic obligation, but a meta-halakhic obligation.

[Speaker L] If you swear, then you

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] have to keep it. And that was the oath with which the Holy One, blessed be He, bound Israel at Sinai: a meta-halakhic oath to keep the Torah. After they accepted the Torah, there is already a formal dimension as well in the prohibitions of oaths, but first of all there is the non-formal dimension. And therefore, for example, he says, there is a discussion among later authorities about a written oath, a written oath. Rabbi Akiva Eiger and others discuss this: does an oath require explicit verbal articulation? The question is whether writing is like speech—if I swore in writing, is that considered as though I spoke or not? So the Avnei Nezer says there, in that same responsum in 306, that the discussion is irrelevant, because the concept of an oath, based on simple reasoning, certainly exists in writing as well. What difference does it make whether it was written or not? That is a matter of halakhic definition—when the prohibitions of oaths take effect on you. But the moral, value-based definition, by force of reason, applies to anyone whom you understand to be obligated; and if you committed yourself in writing, then you committed yourself in writing as well. By simple reasoning, you are certainly obligated. You won’t be flogged in a religious court, but you are certainly obligated. And then he brings that Mishneh LaMelekh and everything we said earlier—the oath at Sinai and the oaths before the giving of the Torah, and so on. So what do we see? We see exactly this. He cites the responsum of Ri Migash, who writes this. And Ri Migash was the teacher of Maimonides’ father. So it’s no accident that Maimonides writes that a minor is not made to swear because he does not know the punishment for an oath—but there is a punishment of an oath upon him, because the conception is that an oath is something that also has a foundation in reason, beyond the halakhic commandment, and something whose foundation is in reason obligates everyone. So also in our context, if we understand that the obligation to study Torah is not only the commandment of Torah study, but that there is some meta-halakhic dimension grounded in reason, that dimension exists for everyone. A woman is also obligated to study, a minor is also obligated to study—everyone, anyone who understands the reasoning. Okay, that’s it for now.