The Nature of the Miracle, Lesson 2
This transcript was produced automatically by means of artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- The basic frameworks: the Mutakallimun, Maimonides, and the emptying-out of the concept of miracle
- Clarifying Nachmanides at the end of Parashat Bo and the connection to reward and punishment
- Two meanings of “laws of nature”: law as description versus force as an explanatory entity
- Connecting the distinction to the Maimonides–Mutakallimun debate and to the question of miracle
- Maimonides’ view of miracles as conditions built into natural law
- Providence, “fire and forget,” and technological metaphors
- The question of “troubling the Holy One, blessed be He” and its literary meaning
- Maharal’s opening: faithful believers of Israel who struggle with miracles
- Maharal’s criticism of distorting the verses and of reducing the purpose of signs and wonders
- The “first” claim: there is no change in the intelligible order, and the denial of miracles
- The claim of “and he will further say”: a thing cannot come to be from just anything, and the plague of blood
- Maharal’s answer: nature acts in time, while the separate transcendent acts without time and without preparing matter
- Israel, attachment to transcendent beings, and the conclusion that a miracle not according to nature is possible
Summary
General Overview
The text presents three conceptions of the relation between nature and miracle, and shows how two of them empty out the distinction between nature and miracle in opposite directions: for the Mutakallimun, everything is miracle, because there are no substantive laws of nature, only a renewed divine decision at every moment; and for Maimonides, miracles are embedded in nature from the outset by virtue of the idea that “the Holy One, blessed be He, made a condition with the act of Creation,” and therefore everything is nature. It sharpens a distinction between “law” as a description of regularities and “force” as an explanatory entity, and ties that to the dispute between Maimonides and the Mutakallimun. Later, it opens a reading of Maharal’s introduction to Gevurot Hashem (the second introduction), where Maharal deals with interpretations by “faithful believers of Israel” who are uncomfortable with miracles, presents arguments denying miracles, and responds to the claim that miracles are impossible because one thing does not come into being from something of a different kind.
The basic frameworks: the Mutakallimun, Maimonides, and the emptying-out of the concept of miracle
The text presents Maimonides’ account of the Mutakallimun, who hold that there are no laws of nature at all, because the world is recreated at every moment, and therefore one could say that everything is miracle. Opposed to that, the text presents Maimonides, following the Sages and the midrash, according to which “the Holy One, blessed be He, made a condition with the act of Creation,” and miracles are built into the nature of the world from the moment of its creation. The text argues that in both of these conceptions the distinction between miracles and nature is drained of content: for Maimonides everything is nature, and for the Mutakallimun everything is miracle.
Clarifying Nachmanides at the end of Parashat Bo and the connection to reward and punishment
The text brings Ari’s comment on Nachmanides at the end of Parashat Bo, where Nachmanides says that “a person has no share in the Torah of Moses until he knows that all our occurrences are nothing but miracles,” and notes that this is often learned as a view similar to that of the Mutakallimun, and as a denial of laws of nature. The text argues that when one looks at the context of Nachmanides’ words, one sees that he probably does not mean that there are no laws of nature and that the world is renewed every moment as the Mutakallimun say; rather, what happens to human beings is not necessarily the result of the laws of nature, but the result of their deeds within the framework of reward for commandments and punishment for transgressions. The text explains that the meaning of “our occurrences are nothing but miracles” is that events are not merely the blind fate of natural processes, but depend on our actions, and it leaves for a later stage the expansion of the discussion about open miracles and hidden miracles, and about the relation between the world’s ordinary conduct and the Holy One, blessed be He’s response to our deeds.
Two meanings of “laws of nature”: law as description versus force as an explanatory entity
The text distinguishes between “the law of gravity” as a general description of phenomena and “the force of gravity” as a claim about the existence of an entity or mechanism in the world that causes those phenomena. The text presents a conception that sees laws of nature only as a convenient organization of facts and phenomena, and emphasizes that it is difficult to accept this because the ability to predict the future seems baseless if the law is merely an arbitrary arrangement. The text presents another conception that sees a natural law as a substantive claim about the world, according to which there really is a force, and therefore there is room to search for gravitons as particles that carry the force of gravity.
Connecting the distinction to the Maimonides–Mutakallimun debate and to the question of miracle
The text argues that the dispute between the conception of law as convention and the conception of law as essence lies behind the dispute between Maimonides and the Mutakallimun. The text explains that the Mutakallimun do not deny regularity in nature; rather, they deny that the regularity stems from a fixed force created and operating in the world. The regularity exists because the Holy One, blessed be He, operates the world almost always in the same way, and the miracle is a rare different decision. The text connects this to the formulation “Who renews in His goodness every day continually the work of creation,” and notes that Beit HaLevi presents a similar conception in which the continually renewed creation is carried out in a fixed pattern, and it raises the idea that “miracle or not miracle” becomes a function of frequency.
Maimonides’ view of miracles as conditions built into natural law
The text presents Maimonides’ conception according to which miracles too are not “momentary interventions,” but part of nature as predetermined from the beginning, so that a miracle is the result of the fact that natural law itself includes exceptions or conditions established at creation. The text describes the midrash of “He made a condition” as a kind of “if-then” stipulation, not as a freeze at a fixed date determined in advance, but as a mechanism that accompanies natural law constantly, so that the law is more complex and operates according to circumstances. The text illustrates this with an overly rational example of “a function of mass and prayer,” and emphasizes that from this perspective the miracle is not a deviation from law but part of a more complicated law.
Providence, “fire and forget,” and technological metaphors
The text says that Maimonides’ picture does not remove the Holy One, blessed be He, from the story, but describes the governance of the world through laws of nature fixed in advance so that they will carry out His will perfectly. The text uses the image of “a third-generation missile, fire and forget” to describe laws of nature that operate after being set, as opposed to a conception of changing course like a first-generation missile. The text adds a distinction between a “command circuit” and a “power circuit” as a metaphor for the idea that the Holy One, blessed be He, provides the energy for continuous existence but does not “decide at every moment” the details of what occurs, because the content is determined by the law.
The question of “troubling the Holy One, blessed be He” and its literary meaning
The text raises the question of how to understand the rabbinic statement that one for whom a miracle is performed supposedly “troubles” the Holy One, blessed be He, when according to the Mutakallimun everything is miracle, and according to Maimonides the miracle is built into the law. The text suggests that this should not be understood literally, but as a statement addressed to us: “Don’t insert miracles into the picture; conduct yourselves as the world ordinarily operates.” It suggests that miracles are more complex zones within the law, or rare changes within a sequence of decisions, so that the language of “trouble” is literary.
Maharal’s opening: faithful believers of Israel who struggle with miracles
The text returns to the opening of Maharal’s second introduction to Gevurot Hashem and quotes: “And there are those who are believers of Israel… and they became clever about them… and sought an interpretation for themselves.” The text clarifies that Maharal is speaking about people who believe in the Torah and believe in the ability of the Holy One, blessed be He, to perform miracles, but think that it is not fitting for Him to alter the order of beings that were created “in truth and uprightness,” and therefore they seek interpretations that reconcile miracles with an ordered worldview. The text distinguishes between denying the ability of the Holy One, blessed be He, to perform a miracle—which is outside the camp—and a theological claim from within faith that He can do so but is unlikely to alter the order, and it also adds the possibility of an observational claim by someone who says he does not see miracles in practice and therefore interprets Scripture too in a naturalistic way.
Maharal’s criticism of distorting the verses and of reducing the purpose of signs and wonders
The text interprets Maharal as arguing that the interpretations of those people “confused the verses for us and distorted the interpretations for us,” and gave an “unworthy” explanation according to which miracles are only “to strengthen those who believe in Him.” The text presents two possibilities for the purpose of a miracle: miracle as coming to strengthen faith, and miracle as coming to solve a practical problem when nature “gets stuck,” and explains that according to the theological consideration of the perfection of the Holy One, blessed be He, there is no room to see miracle as a solution to a tangle the laws failed to solve, and therefore they incline toward the explanation of strengthening faith, even though Maharal sees this as a “weakening of the signs and wonders.”
The “first” claim: there is no change in the intelligible order, and the denial of miracles
The text quotes Maharal on “behold the first one” and presents a philosophical position according to which “everything proceeds according to its custom and order” on the basis of “the side of the primordial necessity, which has not departed and will not depart,” and therefore there is no change in the world, “and not even the fly’s wing will lengthen.” The text explains that this is an approach that denies the actual existence of miracles and interprets the verses creatively in order to fit them into the fixed and necessary order of nature. The text notes that Maharal says the claim about “the side of necessity” also leads into the discussion of the eternity of the world, and that to this “one must respond in its proper place.”
The claim of “and he will further say”: a thing cannot come to be from just anything, and the plague of blood
The text brings the anti-miracle argument: “How can a thing come to be from any thing… how can it be that blood should come from water,” because “a thing does not come to be from any thing, but only from a particular thing.” The text suggests that this claim rests on a confusion between natural necessity and logical necessity, similar to the discussion of “there is no logical miracle” and the idea that something logically contradictory is not within the realm of power, and it gives as examples the discussion of a “round triangle” and the issue of creation ex nihilo.
Maharal’s answer: nature acts in time, while the separate transcendent acts without time and without preparing matter
The text presents Maharal’s answer that the opponent “brings proof from one kind concerning what is not of its kind,” because the natural agent acts “according to its nature and custom,” while the separate transcendent agent acts “according to its own mode,” and there is a difference between them. The text quotes that nature acts in time, and therefore “every natural agent requires an extension of time for its action,” whereas “an agent that is not natural does not require time for its action,” and it connects this to the verse “By the word of the Lord the heavens were made.” The text quotes that Maharal rejects the difficulty about preparing matter to receive form, and says that the need for preparation belongs to “the natural mode,” whereas “from the perspective of the action of the separate transcendent, all wonders exist,” and adds that the lower world is “the world of nature,” which has “attachment to the separate world,” and therefore miracles are renewed by virtue of this connection.
Israel, attachment to transcendent beings, and the conclusion that a miracle not according to nature is possible
The text quotes Maharal linking miracles to Israel: “And therefore miracles were only among Israel… because they have attachment to the separate transcendent beings.” The text sums up Maharal’s concluding line in this section: what is impossible “according to nature” is not impossible “not according to nature,” and therefore the difficulty, “how can it be conceived that one thing should come from another thing,” does not decide against miracles. The text closes by noting that the next phrase, “And likewise what he said,” is presented as the opening of a third difficulty that is postponed to the continuation.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We were talking about miracles, and I want to devote a bit more time to that, to continue it a little. We saw Maimonides’ discussion where he brings the Mutakallimun, who hold that there really are no laws of nature at all. Basically, at every moment the whole thing is coming into being anew, so the concept of miracle is emptied out a bit—really, you could say everything is miracles. And opposite that, Maimonides, following the Sages—I also brought the midrash—that the Holy One, blessed be He, made a condition with the act of Creation, meaning that miracles are built into the nature of the world from its very creation. That too empties the concept of miracle of content, but in the opposite direction. Meaning, for Maimonides everything is nature, and for the Mutakallimun everything is miracles, and still, the distinction between miracles and nature is a distinction that’s been somewhat drained of meaning in both of these approaches. Today I want to continue reading the introduction, the first part of Maharal’s introduction, in light of the things I spoke about last time. But one more comment, which I’ll probably get to one of the next times: Ari remarked after the previous lecture that I brought Nachmanides at the end of Parashat Bo, where Nachmanides says that a person has no share in the Torah of Moses until he knows that all our occurrences are nothing but miracles. And then I said that this seems like the approach of the Mutakallimun against Maimonides. And in fact that’s often how people learn this Nachmanides—that Nachmanides does not accept the existence of laws of nature. There was even some article—I didn’t even manage to look for it—but some article in Tzohar once, where someone wrote about Nachmanides’ approach to miracles, and anyone interested can look for it sometime, it was somewhere in Tzohar. And he discusses this because elsewhere you can see that Nachmanides doesn’t hold that way. Now, when you really look at his words at the end of Parashat Bo, you see—this is what Ari pointed out to me after the previous lecture—you see that this probably isn’t really what he means. Meaning, this sentence is indeed a famous sentence of his, and it takes things to a very extreme or very strong place, but when you see the context, he probably doesn’t mean that. He doesn’t mean to say that there are no laws of nature and that everything is miracles, that even ordinary nature is really a miracle performed anew every moment, like the view of the Mutakallimun that Maimonides brings. What he means is connected to the topic we’ll deal with later, so I’m leaving it for then. He means that what happens to us is not necessarily the result of the laws of nature, but the result of our deeds. Meaning, if we perform commandments then the Holy One, blessed be He, rewards us, and if we commit transgressions then He requites us with the opposite. But what happens to us is not just some blind fate, some outcome of the natural workings of the world; rather, things depend on our actions. Our actions have meaning, and that is what he means by “our occurrences are nothing but miracles.” The point is that they do not happen according to the laws of nature, but according to our deeds. But he does not mean there are no laws of nature. There are laws of nature, only what happens to human beings is not determined—or not necessarily determined—by the laws of nature alone, but also by their deeds. That’s really what he wants to say, and that’s already an approach that comes on top of the question of what a miracle is. Now we need to understand—and that’s why I’m saying I’m leaving it for the next stage—after we clarify this concept of what a miracle is, and how it relates to the acts of the Holy One, blessed be He, and to the laws of nature and so on, we’ll have to come back and ask what the miracle is meant to accomplish. And what exactly the relationship was between open miracles and hidden miracles; meaning, is what happens to us the result of the world’s natural operation, or is what happens to us the result of the Holy One, blessed be He’s response to our deeds, or maybe both? All these are additional topics, and there are still a few more things in the context of miracles. There are the interesting issues, like David Hume’s argument against miracles and things of that kind, which I’ll get to later. One final comment: let me remind you of what we discussed last time, that when we talk about laws of nature we need to distinguish between two meanings of that concept, laws of nature. One meaning is—let’s talk again about gravity, that was also the example I used. You can speak about the law of gravity, and you can speak about the force of gravity. The law of gravity means that every object with mass that I let go of falls to the earth—or more generally, that any two objects with mass attract one another. That is the law of gravity. The force of gravity is a claim beyond the claim that there is a law of gravity. It is the claim that there exists some phenomenon in the world, some kind of entity or process in the world, that causes this simple thing to happen. Meaning, there is a force pulling the object toward the earth, and therefore it falls. You could state the law of gravity even without that. You could say the law of gravity simply describes the set of phenomena under a general principle: any two things with mass are, as a matter of fact, attracted to one another—without committing yourself to the idea that there is such a thing as a force of gravity that takes care of this attraction, that performs this attraction. That’s an additional claim. Fine. Now if I see laws of nature as some description of the facts, of the phenomena, and nothing beyond that, then in effect I’m talking about the law of gravity, not the force of gravity. By contrast, if I see laws of nature as expressing or asserting something about the world—not merely organizing the collection of phenomena in a convenient and efficient way for use, which is one way you might see laws of nature—but as making a claim about the world: when I say there is a law of gravity, I’m not saying, look, I gathered these phenomena and organized them this way and it’s very convenient to see them this way, or use them this way, or draw conclusions from them. So let’s adopt the fact that this collection of phenomena—we spoke about tides, about planetary orbits, about the attraction of objects that fall to the earth—all of which were phenomena that did not seem related to one another until Newton, and then Newton comes along and suddenly says: friends, all of this is really specific expressions of one general law, the law of gravity. Now you can see Newton’s move as merely an intellectual move, meaning I’m organizing a set of phenomena that had no connection between them—and still don’t have a connection between them—but I can explain all of them within one conceptual framework, and it’s very convenient to do so, because it’s easier to deal with the world of phenomena that way, when it’s sorted by topics and I organize them into groups, and then I can try to understand the world in a more convenient way. But I’m not really claiming that there is such a thing called a force of gravity that actually exists and is responsible for all of these phenomena.
[Speaker B] Is the role of the law only to organize? That’s the question. Because within that, you also use it to predict what will happen in another situation.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so we already discussed that in one of the first workshops. I think that this approach—the nominalist approach, or maybe the conventionalist approach, which sees the law as a kind of convention, some convenient organization of the phenomena but not a statement about the world—is indeed hard to accept, because predictions about the future seem to have no basis at all. Why assume that the arbitrary arrangement I chose is also supposed to predict what will happen in a phenomenon I haven’t observed? There’s no reason. So that’s why I’m saying this approach is problematic. But it is one of the approaches to laws of nature—an approach that, incidentally, many philosophers accept. And the other approach is the one that sees a natural law as a claim about the world. Now when I say that there is a law of gravity, I am really saying there is such a force. I don’t see it with my eyes; I only see the phenomena. But I say these phenomena are caused by some force that exists in the world. And if that’s the case, then the tides, the planetary orbits, the attraction toward the earth—they all really do belong to the same domain. It’s not that it just happened to be convenient for me to organize them under one conceptual framework; rather, they are all really the result of the same thing, of the same kind of object or mode of behavior, which is the force of gravity. Fine. And one implication of this, for example, is the question whether I should now go look for gravitons. Someone who sees the law of gravity as a convenient subjective description—our minds are structured in such a way that it’s convenient for us to deal with phenomena when they’re divided up like this—has no reason to assume that what I call the force of gravity is really some kind of entity. It’s a manner of speaking. There really is no force of gravity; I just know that objects are attracted. Fine, they are attracted, but I’m not claiming that… Now once I say there is no force of gravity, and that it is only a way of speaking, there is no reason to search for gravitons. Gravitons are the particles that carry the force of gravity. There is no reason for them to exist, because the force of gravity is a conceptual fiction; it isn’t really a claim about the world. Right? By contrast, if I understand that when I speak about the law of gravity, I am really assuming that there is such a natural phenomenon in the world called the force of gravity, and it has lots of implications in many areas, then I’m saying there is such a force—that’s a claim about the world, not just my own manner of speaking. Once that is so, then of course there is room to search for gravitons, because that could be a good test of whether I’m right that such a force exists or not. So these two approaches to laws of nature stand here opposite one another—the conventionalist one and the essentialist one, which sees law as something essential, not something that is merely convention. And that is really what lies behind the dispute between Maimonides and the Mutakallimun. That’s why I talked about it last time, because the Mutakallimun too agree that the world proceeds according to fixed patterns. Nobody argues about that. We all know that when we let go of objects, they fall to the earth. So what does this statement mean—that in everything that happens it is really only a miracle, that there are no laws of nature? What they mean is that this is not the result of some force that the Holy One, blessed be He, created, and which now exists and operates here in the world. Rather, there is regularity because the Holy One, blessed be He, operates the world the same way all the time. But there is no force that does it. Instead, it is a law that we formulate ad hoc. When the Holy One, blessed be He, operates the world the same way each time, we call that a law of nature because it always happens that way; for some reason He always chooses to do the same thing. Not that there is really something here that ensures it will always be the same thing—the force of gravity. Obviously, I didn’t say the second approach removes the Holy One, blessed be He, from the picture. But what I said is that when the Mutakallimun say there are no laws of nature, they are not denying the facts we all know, that nature behaves in fairly fixed ways overall. They are not denying that—they are not stupid people. They are only claiming that this fixed pattern is not the result of some force, of something in the world that makes sure it happens. The Holy One, blessed be He, decides anew at every moment, and each time He decides the same thing—almost every time the same thing. Except for those cases in which He decides otherwise, and that’s what we call a miracle. But for a miracle, you do not need to assume that some other force intervened here and neutralized the ordinary force, say, or something like that. There is no ordinary force. They just decided differently now from what was decided before, that’s all. But at every moment there is a new decision—“Who renews in His goodness every day continually the work of creation,” yes? Beit HaLevi writes this, I think, on Parashat Bereishit, about the Sabbath. So Beit HaLevi says that on the Sabbath this idea was renewed, that the Holy One, blessed be He, creates the world anew every moment—but now it is done in a fixed pattern. There he’s expressing something like the view of the Mutakallimun, basically, in his words.
[Speaker E] What? So whether it’s a miracle or not is a function of frequency? What? Miracle or not miracle? Yes, exactly. Right, right. Meaning, if the splitting of the sea happened every week, I’d put that into the law too.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously. Incidentally, that’s pretty true. Presumably that is what would happen. If the splitting of the sea happened every week, then we would find some law that accounts for it. Tides happen once a day, let’s say, so immediately we understand—it’s not a miracle, apparently something here is causing it. So we discovered that the moon’s pull causes it. There is something to this on the methodological level: if something repeats, we look for the law behind it that accounts for it. The question is whether there really is something there behind it, or whether it’s just our way of organizing the phenomena. So the Mutakallimun say it is only our way of organizing the phenomena, and then the miracle is simply when what they always did isn’t done now. That’s all. But what they always did is also a miracle. “All our occurrences are nothing but miracles”—yes, that’s the Mutakallimun. So they have some conception in which laws of nature are conventionalist laws, not essentialist. Meaning, they are a convention. Meaning, it’s some kind of thing where we call it a law of nature because the decisions that the Holy One, blessed be He, makes at each and every moment are the same decisions, or made in the same pattern. Therefore we call it a law of nature. Okay? Yes.
[Speaker F] And is there no option to combine these two views? That there really is a force, and the Holy One, blessed be He, makes sure that everything continues to exist.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s all fine… no, that’s what he said, yes, I’m getting to that in a second. Now, that’s the Mutakallimun side. I brought a bit of… I spoke about Wittgenstein, right? That he says that basically behind every set of phenomena I can find some pattern. No problem. Meaning, almost any set. There are sets where the pattern would have to be as complicated as the number of phenomena—there are all sorts of names in mathematics for things like that—and then the pattern is pointless. But on the principled level, almost any set that has some very minimal properties, I can find some pattern that explains it, the collection of phenomena. Fine? So therefore, one can see law as some kind of ad hoc explanation that does not make a claim about the world. You take a set of phenomena—if I find a convenient explanation, I call it a law of nature. That’s all. Fine? That is the conception of law as some regularity that does not really make a substantive claim about the world, but simply says: I see that the Holy One, blessed be He, always acts the same way, so I call it a law of nature. By contrast, Maimonides’ view against the Mutakallimun is a view that says the opposite: there really are laws of nature that bring about what happens here. Meaning, forces. There is a force of gravity, not just a law of gravity. Now according to that conception, a miracle ought to be something that freezes natural law. Meaning, really, if the splitting of the sea happened, there should have been some force that neutralized gravity, because in principle gravity should have pulled the water downward and not allowed the sea to split. So you need to activate some other force here that neutralizes the force of gravity, and that is the meaning of a miracle. But Maimonides doesn’t say that either. Maimonides says that even that new force is really part of the force of gravity. It is implanted within the force of gravity from creation, such that when certain circumstances occur, the force of gravity does not operate. The equation we know for the force of gravity describes its regular activity, its routine activity, but it also has occasional exceptions, and that is built into it from creation. Not that this is a decision made at that moment—rather, “the Holy One, blessed be He, made a condition with the act of Creation,” that when the people of Israel arrive, then the sea will split. Fine? Now this conception too, as I said before, basically neutralizes the concept of miracle, because what does it really say? That the law of nature is more complicated than we thought, but it is still the law of nature doing everything. Everything is more complicated than we thought. We thought the law of gravity was simple—so it isn’t simple. It is also a function of time. Now, as I said, it isn’t exactly a function of time; it is more a function of circumstances than of time. Because we are not forced to arrive at the sea at a given moment, or any other event that requires suspending a law of nature. Rather, it is a response to circumstances that arise. But there is no problem with that. The Holy One, blessed be He, built into the force of gravity—yes, according to Maimonides’ conception—this matter, that when the people of Israel are standing on the shore of the sea, and I don’t know, praying or needing it or being pursued or whatever it may be, then simply it should happen, and if that happens, then the law of gravity is suspended. It is built into it. Fine? That’s the conception, basically.
[Speaker D] But what about “If you indeed hearken” and all that?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I said—we’ll get to that later. What happens in the ongoing course of events—we’ll get to that later. That is really Nachmanides, and that’s why I said we’ll get to him afterward, once we finish defining miracles in general.
[Speaker G] Why doesn’t that fit? What’s the problem? It would presumably be exactly the same principle, no?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—just a second, let’s leave that, because I’m not… let’s leave it. We’ll get to that after I finish clarifying the concept of miracle itself. Then we’ll see what happens in the routine course of events. So basically, according to the conception Maimonides assumes, this is a conception of laws not as convention, but there really are forces that carry out these laws. Now of course these forces are more complex than we think. We are used to describing them simply because we’re looking at ordinary behavior, but the fact that there are occasional miracles only means that the equation is more complicated. It’s a more complicated function of the circumstances. Meaning, I’d formulate it this way: every body with mass attracts another body with mass, unless the people of Israel are standing nearby and praying that it not happen. Fine? Never mind—it’s still a law. Meaning, prayer too is a parameter. The function is a function of mass and prayer. Fine? Let’s call it that. It’s a bit too rationalized, but never mind. That’s the principle. And incidentally this is an interesting point, because the Sages really do describe it this way. When they describe it—and I brought this midrash last time—they say that the Holy One, blessed be He, made a condition with the act of Creation. What is a condition? A condition means that if such-and-such happens, then such-and-such is done, or then the result is such-and-such; and if such-and-such does not happen, then not. Meaning, the condition does not say—contrary to the simple conception—that the law of gravity was suspended in advance on some specific date, when the people of Israel were supposed to arrive at the Red Sea. No, it’s a condition. Meaning, the law of gravity is always accompanied by some condition: if there are certain circumstances that require suspension, it will be suspended, and if not, then not. And according to the wording—even the rabbinic wording—it says that this is not a suspension at some fixed time in advance, but rather a stipulation that constantly accompanies every natural law, and therefore the natural law is simply more complicated. Natural law is built in an if-then form. It does not determine what the result will be, but only that if this, then the result is this, and if that, then the result is that. Meaning, the law of nature is more complex.
[Speaker E] Is there anything that isn’t a miracle? If that’s so, then is there anything that isn’t a miracle?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The opposite—not that. Is there anything that is a miracle?
[Speaker E] The fact that there is gravity, the fact that the waters don’t flood the world, that the waters are channeled within the sea—fine, that’s another definition. It’s a miracle in quotation marks. And the fact that we do another miracle through prayer is a miracle on top of a miracle. So there’s no such thing—and if I throw a seed into the ground and the sun and the rain make a tree come out, that’s also… no, but that’s semantics.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, you can call that a miracle if you want, it doesn’t matter. That’s not what we mean by miracle. We don’t call something a miracle when it proceeds according to the laws. A miracle is a deviation from the laws. Once it proceeds according to the laws, that’s not what is usually called a miracle. You can call it a miracle—it’s just semantics—but that’s not what we generally call a miracle. Because if you call that a miracle, then there is nothing that isn’t a miracle, so what does miracle mean? Miracle is always a deviation from nature. But if nature itself is a miracle, then what is a miracle?
[Speaker H] When you say, “A miracle happened to me,” then—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You mean that something happened that isn’t ordinary. Yes. That’s why I’m saying. But never mind—this is the next step. I only want to complete the summary. Obviously, Maimonides’ picture does not remove the Holy One, blessed be He, from the story. Meaning, the Holy One, blessed be He, causes everything that happens in the world through laws of nature that He established in advance. He is not making new decisions every moment in response to the situation that arises; rather, the laws of nature already do that. But in His wisdom He already established the laws of nature in such a way that they will carry out perfectly His purposes, His will—what He is aiming at. That’s all. But obviously everything is still the handiwork of the Holy One, blessed be He. Meaning, even Maimonides believes in the Holy One, blessed be He, and in His governance of the world. He just governs the world with third-generation missiles, yes—fire and forget. Meaning that you basically set the laws of nature, and now the laws of nature do everything necessary, everything you planned—including everything, including response to conditions, which is what we usually call miracles. And then it really comes out like this: according to the Mutakallimun, there are no laws of nature in the essential sense, only in the conventional sense. Really, everything is miracles. Every occurrence and every custom is nothing but miracles. The only question is: then why do we still call something a miracle? If everything is miracles, then what is a miracle? We call miracle a rare thing. Rare decisions of the Holy One, blessed be He—that’s all. Frequency determines what is a miracle and what is not a miracle.
[Speaker I] Rabbi, according to both of these approaches, why do the Sages say that anyone for whom a miracle is performed as it were troubles the Holy One, blessed be He? According to one view—that’s a good question.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe it’s only on the level of our experience.
[Speaker I] If everything is miracles, then what does it even mean to do one more miracle? If everything is nature, then—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Just between us, what does it mean to “trouble” Him? We said it’s not a first-generation missile. It’s probably some statement to us: don’t bring miracles into the picture; conduct yourselves the way the world runs. They say it in literary language—don’t trouble the Holy One, blessed be He. But what does that mean? It’s not trouble for Him. In any case, it can’t be understood literally.
[Speaker J] Apparently it’s a more complicated miracle—it’s harder. It’s a more complicated law.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s more or less the difference between a first-generation missile and a third-generation missile. I’d suddenly have to change the trajectory.
[Speaker J] He knew that I would do this and that, so that forced Him to make such a miracle-law.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but He already did it. So did I trouble Him retroactively?
[Speaker J] But it’s already built in, so what?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s the miracle according to the Mutakallimun. According to Maimonides too, miracle is just some non-regular phenomenon within the law. Meaning, when the law suddenly includes within it—say there is some graph of the law that looks like this, this, and keeps moving here—then what is called a miracle is simply that place where the law is a little different. But it’s still the law. Meaning, there are regions on the graph that are more complicated than the ordinary regions. That’s what we call a miracle. Fine? Basically both of them cancel the difference between miracle and nature as a real distinction. It becomes a question of frequency or of the regularity of the graph or something like that. Did you want to comment? Yes.
[Speaker K] I just wanted to sharpen something: Maimonides’ approach is not only that he doesn’t remove the Holy One, blessed be He, when he says that the Holy One, blessed be He, established these laws, but also that he holds that He is sustaining them right now.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, that’s what Yehudit said earlier. Okay, I’m willing to accept that too. But still, He gives them the energy, and He doesn’t make the decision about what will happen; rather, He gives them the energy to keep functioning all the time. Fine. But what will happen was already determined at the act of Creation. Meaning, it’s not that He now decides what the law will be. The law is clear. It’s like a control circuit and a power circuit. Let’s say there could be a switch that redirects the current somewhere—that’s a control circuit. There could be a small switch, powered by a simple battery, that transfers electricity to all of Gush Dan. How does that happen? Because there is some power circuit whose job is to provide power to Gush Dan, except that in the middle there’s a switch that decides whether it will pass through or not. So there’s a small battery that activates the switch, connects the circuit, and then the whole mass of energy flows toward Gush Dan. The thing that activates the switch is not the source of the energy. It’s only what enables the energy to act. So by analogy, the Holy One, blessed be He, is basically serving here as the one who makes sure the switch is always closed. But what that switch will channel—that is, what phenomena will occur—that is determined by the laws of nature. That’s already the electric company, with all its turbines. Okay? That’s the content of the law, what will happen. Okay? Good. So that’s the background we discussed last time. And then we also managed to read the first paragraph of the Maharal in the introduction to Gevurot Hashem, the second introduction. And there I spoke a bit about what this whole discussion is meant for—whether it’s for people who are God-fearing or for those who are not God-fearing. I won’t go back to that here; it doesn’t directly concern us. I’m moving on to the second paragraph: “And there are those among the faithful of Israel who, through their intellect and understanding, reflected on certain wonders and miracles that occurred throughout history, and they became clever about them, and came to think that the miracles as they understood them do not accord with their understanding and wisdom which they had grasped regarding existing things and the order of existing things, and because of this they sought for themselves an interpretation such as he mentioned.” Meaning, right now he is talking about the outlook of people who are among the faithful of Israel, meaning they believe in the Torah, but miracles don’t sit well with them—they don’t, it just doesn’t… So they look for some explanation of miracles that will somehow make the issue fit for them. “An interpretation such as he mentioned.” And therefore he says: this is not coming from people who deny the faith; these are people in whom faith exists. It’s an explanation given by believers. And of course it’s still mistaken, the Maharal says. Still, one can judge them favorably to some extent, right? There is some merit in their favor. Because they did not enter into this by attributing, God forbid, a deficiency to the One who performs miracles. Right? The difficulty troubling them is not that they don’t believe that the Holy One, blessed be He, can perform a miracle. He can. They believe in the Holy One, blessed be He, and in His omnipotence, and it’s clear to them that He can perform a miracle. Because someone who denies miracles because he doesn’t believe the Holy One, blessed be He, has the power to perform miracles—that person isn’t even in the camp at all. Right? He’s not among the faithful of Israel. That’s someone from the outside. But if he thinks—and by the way, even though the Maharal will ultimately arrive at Maimonides’ view, as I already said, and basically he too says that the Holy One, blessed be He, does not intervene—but that’s not because the Holy One, blessed be He, cannot intervene. Meaning, if the view is that He doesn’t intervene because He can’t, that’s illegitimate. Meaning, that’s not even on the playing field. He’s talking about people who do believe that the Holy One, blessed be He, can, they just don’t think He does. Why not? Because, I don’t know, it doesn’t fit their conception of reality. He’s talking about them. And about that he says that of course one can judge them favorably, because they do not deny the ability of the Holy One, blessed be He, to do this—“that there is a deficiency in the performance of miracles, for there is no such thing at all; rather, according to their intellect and understanding, it seemed improper for the true Agent to alter the order of existing things, which were created in truth and uprightness, to change something that is fundamental to reality, as was explained.” Meaning, they think it is unlikely that the Holy One, blessed be He, would alter the fixed order of existing things—not because He can’t; He can do anything—but it’s unlikely that He does so. Therefore they need to find some explanation for the concept of miracles. So they are mistaken, but that mistake is not the result of denying the power of the Holy One, blessed be He. Yes, that’s basically what he’s saying. Now there could also be another claim, by the way. For example, they may think that it is not fitting for the Holy One, blessed be He—this would be a theological consideration—that it is not fitting for the Holy One, blessed be He, to alter the fixed procedure He embedded in creation, as we’ll see in a moment. But one could also come to such a conclusion from a different view. For example, if I look at reality and say: look, I’m not denying that the Holy One, blessed be He, can perform miracles; the fact is that He doesn’t. That would be a conclusion from observation of reality, not theological considerations and not doubt about His ability to perform miracles. That’s a third kind of claim. Meaning, there can be a heretical claim saying that the Holy One, blessed be He, cannot perform miracles—it’s beyond His power. The Maharal says that is outside the game; that’s illegitimate. Yes, that’s a claim of people who do not believe. There is a second claim, which he is talking about—that is a theological claim from within the game. We believe that the Holy One, blessed be He, can perform miracles, but it’s unlikely that He does, because, say—and I’ll say this in advance, I also said it last time—if He established certain laws in the world, it’s impossible that He should need to violate them; He is perfect. After all, the laws are supposed to be perfect; they are supposed to realize exactly what needs to be realized. How can it be that the Holy One, blessed be He, after having established laws, could not establish them in such a way that they also handle all the exceptional cases? After all, He is perfect. So it’s not because He can’t suspend the laws of nature at some particular moment—of course He can—but it’s unlikely that He does that, or that He needs to do that. That’s a different claim; it’s a theological claim. That’s the one he’s talking about. But now I’m saying there could also be a third claim. The claim that says: true, maybe it is theologically plausible, and of course in principle He can do it. The question is whether in practice He does it. Who says He does? I don’t know—when I look around, I don’t see miracles. So it seems to me that He doesn’t actually perform miracles. He can, and it may also be theologically plausible, but the fact is that He doesn’t do it. That is an observational claim.
[Speaker K] No, but an observational claim—if we’re talking about someone who believes not only in God but also in the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh), then—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, then he’ll find creative explanations. No, then he’ll find creative explanations for what happens in the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh) too—what’s the problem? Maimonides already talked about that.
[Speaker K] No, but if the claim is that what happens in the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh) is something that today wouldn’t seem unusual—meaning? I didn’t understand.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Doesn’t matter—they’ll find another explanation. It wasn’t a miracle.
[Speaker K] It wasn’t a miracle. If we explained that there was, I don’t know, some cloud of ash that covered Egypt and therefore there was darkness—meaning, something that even then looked like a miracle, except that there was some side natural explanation that one couldn’t see—then that doesn’t answer our difficulty.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] From today’s perspective, you mean?
[Speaker K] If it’s something that even then looked like a miracle, except that there was some side natural explanation that one couldn’t see, then that doesn’t answer the question today either, because nowadays there are no such cases either.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not? There are such cases. If I explain it according to the laws of nature, then there are such cases. It was a tsunami, I don’t know—it doesn’t matter, I’m not getting into explanations right now. On the principled level, like Maimonides says about the eternity of the world and the corporeality of God—yes, about anthropomorphism—he says: if I had reached the philosophical conclusion that this was actually true, then I would give a creative interpretation to the verses. And regarding verses, the Sages gave them creative interpretation even under less compelling pressures. Fine? Meaning, it’s not such a disaster. Meaning, one could reach a situation where I basically have a type-three claim: He has the power to perform miracles, there is theological plausibility, I have no theological problem with His performing miracles, but still I don’t see that He does them, so observationally I say maybe they never happened at all.
[Speaker L] Rabbi, is that observational or interpretation? You’re interpreting, because you’re basically interpreting it as not being a miracle.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course. First of all, no—every observation at its root is a kind of interpretation. Even in gravity, the observation is not pure observation; you decide that there is some general law here, but you only saw a particular case. So there is always some interpretive dimension here. Fine. So I’m talking about observation plus interpretation, as is standard in science. Okay? So if I see that miracles do not normally occur, I make a generalization: law of nature—there are no miracles. Fine? Now this does not stem from either a theological problem or denial of the Holy One, blessed be He, but simply from the fact that it doesn’t happen. I just see that it doesn’t happen. That’s a third kind of claim. That is not the claim he is talking about here. Okay, so we should at least keep that option in mind too—I’m rather fond of it. Okay. “Who said,” that’s what they say, that same opinion he mentions here, “for if so, His handiwork would not have a lasting, established, and formed order,” and this is the merit that can be granted them. Fine. It’s not entirely clear to me what exactly he means by this sentence. Apparently he means something like what I said earlier: if the Holy One, blessed be He, established some fixed law of nature, then clearly that is how He wanted the world to behave—to be established or formed in that way, so that that is how it would behave. And if that is what He wants—why is intervention needed? What, did He not know in advance that it was supposed to behave differently? He knows everything; He can map out the mode of conduct in advance. And notice, I’m talking about including human choices; this doesn’t contradict anything, because I’m speaking in conditional terms. Meaning, in the sense that if such-and-such a situation occurs, then what should happen is this. If another situation occurs, then what should happen is that. Which situation will occur? That is the result of human choice, and that is perfectly fine. But nature, the laws of nature, can take everything into account. The Holy One, blessed be He, can put everything into the laws of nature in the form of conditions. If we do this, then nature will do that; if we do that, nature will do this. And in that sense, if this is what the Holy One, blessed be He, wants, why didn’t He do it through fixed laws? Okay? After all, “nature would not have a lasting, established, and formed order”—yes, that’s what he says. Meaning, that’s not the form the Holy One, blessed be He—I think at least this is what the sentence means—that’s not the form the Holy One, blessed be He, wanted to happen here. And then there’s some problem with His perfection. Right? Meaning, after all, He can do it—so what’s the problem? He doesn’t need miracles. “Who said—wait. However, on the other hand, they have no merit, apart from the rationale within their words and interpretations, which is not correct according to intellect and understanding, because their demonstrations and proofs are not valid. And they themselves testify that they have strayed from truth and uprightness, even though they have confused the verses for us and distorted the interpretations for us.” I said creative interpretation. According to this approach, we are speaking about people who are committed to the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh) and to faith and so on. So what do you do with the verses? What Ari asked earlier—creative interpretations, just as Maimonides says one should do in the Guide for the Perplexed. So he says they distort the verses because of their prior assumptions. “And they gave a reason for miracles, that they indicate the work of God, and therefore they are called a sign and a wonder, that they are a sign and a wonder of the awesome work of God—a reason that is not praiseworthy. And they imparted weakness to signs and wonders, for the main reason that He, may He be blessed, brought them into the world was to strengthen those who believe in Him.” Fine. So we’ll still have to see what the meaning of miracles is—whether miracles strengthen faith or exactly what, what they are needed for. Because one could—let me perhaps already say in a word here, just so the background is set—one could say that miracles are meant to strengthen our faith, to see that there is someone running the palace, that it is not the laws of nature doing everything on their own. I’m setting aside the two possibilities I described last time for the moment, because one has to understand how it works according to each of them. Rather, what is the fundamental conception one could have of miracles at all? A second possibility is not that at all. The second possibility is that miracles came to solve a problem. Meaning, not in order to prove that the Holy One, blessed be He, is omnipotent and governs the world, but simply: the people of Israel arrive at the sea, the Egyptians are pursuing them, and if the laws of nature proceed as usual and no miracle is performed, then the people of Israel will either drown or be killed. So the problem has to be solved, and in order to solve the problem a miracle is performed. Meaning, the role of the miracle is—if things could have worked out without a miracle, the Holy One, blessed be He, would have done it without a miracle. Meaning, He does not specifically want there to be a miracle in order to strengthen faith or something like that; the miracle is meant to solve a problem that the laws of nature cannot solve, do not solve.
[Speaker M] Creating the situation that the people of Israel went down to Egypt—so that was like a planned situation.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who says? That’s the result of choice.
[Speaker M] It says in the Covenant Between the Pieces and in all that, the Holy One, blessed be He, said so.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, that’s a question of how He said it in advance—what difference does that make? But that’s the question of how He said it in advance, and whether there was a choice to arrive at the sea or not arrive at the sea, and Pharaoh’s choice whether to pursue or not pursue—there could be a hundred thousand junctions of choice along the way. That doesn’t mean there is no choice. So in the end, look—if I see it this way, then the purpose of miracles can be one of two things, maybe even more, but for now let’s put two options on the table. One option is: you need miracles specifically in order to prove to people that the Holy One, blessed be He, is the Boss. Fine. A second option: you don’t specifically need miracles, but because we have a snag—the laws of nature are blocking us, what needs to happen is not happening—so a miracle is performed in order to solve the problem. So the Maharal says here that these people, the ones with the approach he is discussing here, believe that the Holy One, blessed be He, can perform miracles and so on. So they say: “they imparted weakness to signs and wonders, for the main reason He brought them into the world was to strengthen those who believe in Him.” Why is that a weakness in signs? They are basically not saying that the Holy One, blessed be He, performed the signs because it solved a problem for us, because the laws of nature would have blocked us. Because that is problematic—it is a form of denying the Holy One, blessed be He. Why? Because if the Holy One, blessed be He, is omnipotent, then He could also have foreseen that in advance and embedded it in the laws, and then the laws would have done the job. Therefore these people, who are believers—the Maharal gives them credit here, in that sense they did not fall there. Meaning, they understand that point. It’s not that. The Holy One, blessed be He, can do it, so they found an excuse: the Holy One, blessed be He, performs miracles only in order to strengthen our faith. Otherwise, if He had done everything within the framework of the laws of nature, then where would the strengthening of faith be? That would just be the normal course of events. Right? So in order to strengthen faith He wants specifically that the laws of nature not solve the problem, so that a miracle will have to be performed. So these people remain believers in that sense; that is a point in their favor. But it is still a weakening of the concept of signs. Why? Because it is actually a weakening of the Holy One, blessed be He. A weakness in the concept of signs. Because it basically means that His laws of nature are not perfect, in the sense that they did not solve the problem. Meaning, there is some weakening here. And then he says—if I understand correctly, apparently—and again, his formulations are a little difficult for me—but if I understand correctly, he brings here three claims of the adherents of this approach. And that’s what he says: “And behold the first, whose memory shall no longer be mentioned”—the first, meaning the first argument they raise. The second and third are on the next page. He doesn’t write ‘second’ and ‘third,’ but I’ll tell you when we get there. I think there are basically three arguments here that he means. He writes ‘first’ and then there is no continuation after that; I don’t know where the continuation is. He says: “And behold the first, whose memory shall no longer be mentioned, except in order that you may answer the heretic.” Meaning, I really wasn’t supposed to deal with this at all, but there’s no choice, since these arguments come up, so we have to deal with them. “This is the philosopher who says that all things came from Him in an intellectual order, according to an ancient necessity that has not departed and will not depart, and everything proceeds according to its custom and order. And since all things came from Him in an intellectual order, according to an ancient necessity that has not departed and will not depart, therefore there is no change in the world that would depart from the intellectual order, and He will not lengthen even the wing of a fly.” Meaning, even that the Holy One, blessed be He, does not do—everything goes according to the laws. Fine? Meaning, this first approach says that since the Holy One, blessed be He, does things in the proper order, it cannot be that some deviation from that order is needed, and therefore that order always continues and there are no miracles. Notice: this is a claim saying not that miracles are part of the laws of nature. There are no miracles, period; there never were. They distort the verses—meaning, the verses get a creative interpretation. There are no miracles; that’s just… no. What exists is only regular behavior. The laws of nature as we understand them are correct laws; they do not need to be amended. And everything that happened happened within them. And if it doesn’t seem that way to us, we have to find a solution, but we have to find an interpretation. But that’s it. They are basically denying the existence of miracles. And why? Because of that same theological consideration he mentioned earlier: if the Holy One, blessed be He, wanted the world to behave in this order, this proper order, then it cannot be that there are points at which it doesn’t function and He has to intervene, has to change things. What, did He not foresee it? Impossible. Again, from a believing point of view. It is impossible that the Holy One, blessed be He, is not perfect and needs this kind of thing. That is the first type of argument. Fine? And then he says that this approach—notice, this is neither of the two approaches from last time. This is an approach that denies the existence of miracles. Not one that says the laws of nature are conditional. Not one that says there is no nature at all and everything is a miracle, like the Kalam theologians. No. It says there are no miracles, there aren’t any, that’s a mistake. It’s simply not true. There were no miracles, and there are no miracles today either, because the ordinary laws of nature were established by the Holy One, blessed be He, and that means this is how He wants the world to behave. And if this is how He wants the world to behave, then that is the perfect mode of conduct, and there is absolutely no reason in the world to intervene. So they deny the existence of miracles—“He will not lengthen the wing of a fly,” and so on. “There will be no change in the world that departs from the intellectual order.” ‘The intellectual order’ means the regular laws, the normal way in which the world conducts itself. Right? It doesn’t mean the laws are laws with conditions. “If so, if a change were to come into the world through wonders, that would be a change of order, and it would not proceed according to its nature. And according to his opinion,” meaning the opinion of the one making the claim, “nothing is found that changes from its nature, for everything proceeds according to its custom by necessity.” Everything is predetermined by fixed laws of nature. “And therefore signs and wonders, which are a change in the nature and custom of the world, are altogether impossible.” He denies the existence of miracles, not that he explains them as part of the laws of nature. He is not even willing to alter the laws of nature. The laws of nature that we discovered—the law of gravity—that is the true law of gravity always, at every moment, under every circumstance, at all times. Fine? And if that is the law established by the Holy One, blessed be He, then that is the law that applies always in every situation; there is no need to change it. He is perfect. Okay? “And regarding the essence of their words, that the world exists by necessity, and because it exists by necessity it has no beginning, and therefore the world is eternal—on this matter one must answer in its proper place.” Meaning, according to this conception, it also follows that the world cannot have been created; the world must be eternal. Because the creation of the world was the first miracle, the first deviation from the laws of nature. The ordinary state of nature is a world that exists and functions—but once there was no world, and that was the ordinary state. The transition from no world to a world is itself a miracle. Now if there is no deviation from the laws of nature, if nothing can happen that does not happen all the time, then the creation of the world also could not have happened. So in effect, this conception of the world’s functioning—this theological conception—actually leads to eternity, precisely from a theological view. The eternity of the world is not the result of denying the existence of the Holy One, blessed be He; it is the result of great faith in the Holy One, blessed be He. Since it is impossible that the Holy One, blessed be He, should have to change the nature of the world if that is what He established, therefore according to this view the world is obviously eternal. And again, from a position of faith. And Maimonides in the Guide for the Perplexed writes that there is no principled problem with this. Meaning, if we had reached the conclusion that this is in fact what is required—if Maimonides had accepted this philosophical consideration and said yes, the world must be eternal—then he would already have arranged the verses for us with creative interpretation. That is not the problem, Maimonides says. Meaning, he does not see this view as something that is heretical in essence, as the Maharal writes here. This is the view of people from within the camp. Out of faith in the Holy One, blessed be He, it is clear that the world was not created but is eternal.
[Speaker K] Eternity is a view of people from within the camp?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, that’s what he says here. No—where?
[Speaker N] He’s not talking. That’s Aristotle’s view.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Aristotle’s view, of course—but the question is whether Aristotle is inside the camp. Meaning, I’m saying, I’m not talking right now about… who counts as among the faithful of Israel?
[Speaker K] I’m not talking—it doesn’t matter.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maimonides basically made him one level below prophecy. So that’s not a problem. He’s a prophet too—not one of the faithful of Israel. I’m saying, though, I don’t care which concrete people he’s talking about. He says this conception is a conception from within the camp. I don’t care at the moment who the people are that hold it; they could be unbelieving gentiles, that doesn’t matter. But the argument itself, the argument is a legitimate one, an argument from within the camp. It has to be examined on its merits. The Maharal will argue that it is not correct, but still—even if it’s wrong, it’s legitimate.
[Speaker D] What—where is the Holy One, blessed be He, here?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I said—Maimonides, for example, in the end we will give a creative interpretation and arrange everything. Maimonides says this. Is Maimonides among the faithful of Israel? So he says it.
[Speaker K] But if there were a proof, then we would explain it that way.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, it can be explained that way, right? So someone who now claims there is a proof—someone who claims there is a philosophical proof and, as a result, does what Maimonides says should be done, namely to interpret the verses creatively—what’s the problem? He is fully among the faithful of Israel.
[Speaker O] But—
[Speaker K] So if the world is eternal, that means—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The world always existed.
[Speaker O] Again—so why is God in the picture at all? What do you mean, why is He in the picture?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What, He only has to create the world? Fine, He’s in the picture for other things. What difference does it make? He doesn’t have to create the world. He didn’t create the world. The world always existed. That’s what they say.
[Speaker C] No, the Holy One, blessed be He, always existed, and in that always He created a world that always existed.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He created—yes, in some sense the world emanates from Him. You yourself said earlier—or Yehudit said it, actually, I don’t remember. The world emanates from Him; at every moment it receives from Him some energy to act. But it always existed. That’s it. And according to fixed laws, always, too. Only the energy—the control circuit, right? The energy always comes from the Holy One, blessed be He. That’s His role. Also a role, right? Fine. So we haven’t removed Him from the picture. No problem. Everything is fine. We can still join the prayer quorum even if we say this.
[Speaker N] I’m asking why you put Him in the picture.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because we believe in Him. What do you mean, why put Him in the picture? Did you put Him in the picture only because He created the world? There are people who don’t think it was specifically the creation of the world that brought them to faith. I don’t know—everyone comes to faith in a different way. One person comes to faith because he has a religious feeling. It seems to me that’s not far from what you have claimed from time to time. So that’s it—he comes to faith that way. He doesn’t have to start from creation of the world in order to come to faith. So from his perspective the world was not created, on theological grounds. It exists and everything is fine and that’s all, and the creative interpretation of the verses he’ll arrange the way Maimonides arranges it. Fine? So therefore he says: to that I will answer in its proper place, says the Maharal; that is not our issue here. He is only saying: notice that this is the implication of this conception—that the conception saying the Holy One, blessed be He, does not change the fixed laws because they are perfect also leads us to belief in the eternity of the world. And again, out of a theological consideration, not because I’m denying anything—on the contrary, because I believe. Because the Holy One, blessed be He, is perfect; if He created laws, it cannot be that they need to be changed. Rather, these are the laws that must always be. This is how the world is established and formed, as he said above. So therefore it is clear that the world always had to exist.
[Speaker P] But what is this thing he says later—that this leads to the eternity of the world? Why does he need to respond to that?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand. No, he’ll probably argue that eternity too is a problematic view, maybe, or something. I don’t know why he says “in its proper place”; I have no idea. I’m guessing that somewhere later in the book, within Gevurot Hashem, he responds to it somehow. This is not the place here. Yes, he’s not dealing with it here.
[Speaker D] I don’t know where that is—the view of the eternity of the world. And not in the conception—
[Speaker P] I don’t know, I don’t know—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What this “in its proper place” means that he writes here—I have no idea. I assume he means: I will deal with the issue of eternity somewhere—I don’t know—somewhere else. Maybe it’s inside this book, Gevurot Hashem. It sounds plausible to me that there is some treatment there of the issue of eternity. I don’t know.
[Speaker P] But in the end does it refer to eternity?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think so. It seems to me—again, it seems to me yes.
[Speaker H] And why—I don’t understand why the eternity of the world is necessary according to this? And the Maharal adds—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He says that according to this conception—no, he’s not saying there is eternity; he does not accept eternity.
[Speaker H] Why according to this conception?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because the creation of the world too is a kind of change in the laws.
[Speaker H] The moment He created the world, He established laws that apply.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but that establishment too is a change. You know, even a graph that starts at zero and then rises here in a kind of step function is still a graph, right? And that graph has a derivative that isn’t constant—in other words, it has a derivative that isn’t zero. It changes, right? A non-zero derivative on the time axis is impossible, because the Holy One, blessed be He, did something that is fixed.
[Speaker H] The Holy One, blessed be He, created the world—it didn’t exist before. So why? But the graph, the graph wasn’t there before.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the graph was there before—it was just at zero. That’s why I gave the graph example. It was there; its value was just zero. It’s a graph like that, not a graph that starts here. It’s a graph that is zero here and then rises, so it’s a graph over the whole time axis.
[Speaker H] Why does that contradict what he says?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because the mode of existence that existed before changed, right? Before there was no world.
[Speaker H] But he’s not talking about the mode of existence that was before; he’s talking about the mode of existence—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Extrapolation forward and extrapolation backward are the same thing. Extrapolation forward and extrapolation backward are exactly the same thing. By the same token you could say: I think a miracle could happen now, because although things have behaved one way until now, now that will stop and there will be another law. But the fact that there was a world is also a change in law. Look at it more abstractly. Fine, but it is still a change in law. So his claim is that this conception, according to which there can be no changes in the laws, should also lead to the conclusion that there cannot be a creation of the world. Fine—but again, come on, this… He thinks one can argue about it. It doesn’t matter right now; that is his claim.
[Speaker E] What does it mean that everything is under providence? Does “everything is under providence” have no meaning?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And according to Maimonides, whom we read earlier, what does it mean that everything is under providence?
[Speaker E] He keeps holding onto this—that everything is under providence.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And according to Maimonides, whom we read last time, what is providence? There are laws of nature that were created at the moment the world was created, and from that point on—third-generation missile: fire and forget.
[Speaker E] Maimonides himself, in all his books—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but the Maharal does not agree with that conception. It’s a conception he does not agree with. I’m speaking now according to that conception. According to that conception, the concept of providence is indeed different. The Kalam theologians maximize providence. The Kalam theologians say that every single thing that happens here in the world is the result of a decision by the Holy One, blessed be He, at every moment. That is maximal providence. Now we are beginning to retreat. Maimonides’ conception, which we saw, is third-generation providence—providence in advance. Meaning, the Holy One, blessed be He, established the laws in advance, including the conditions and circumstances and everything, and that is the way in which He oversees the world. What difference does it make why He has to do it at that time? He does exactly the same thing He would do according to the Kalam theologians, only since He knew it in advance, He organized everything in advance. What, that isn’t providence? That is also providence. What’s the problem? Now these people say something even better. These people say: forget it, the laws are even regular—not irregular laws established at creation. The ordinary law that we know is the fixed law. It was created at creation. That very law was established in such a way that it would itself constitute providence, that it would give me the outcomes the Holy One, blessed be He, wants according to His considerations of providence. And that is called providence according to this approach. Of course, a more minor providence, but that is the conception of providence according to this approach. That’s it—that’s what comes out. So up to this point, that’s the remark… It seems to me that now the second question begins. “And he will further say.” And he will further support his words—yes, the opponent of miracles is now raising another argument. This is the second one; the previous was the first. Right? That’s how I understand it, if I’m understanding correctly. Again, I don’t have much experience with the Maharal, but it seems to me this is the case. “And he will further support his words, for how can one thing come into being from another thing? For one thing does not come into being from just anything, but only from a specific thing. If so, how could it happen that blood should come from water?” Yes, an example from the first plague in Egypt. He says: blood does not come from water; water does not turn into blood according to the laws of nature. A thing cannot come into being from just any other thing; there are rules as to what each thing comes into being from. Now a miracle means that something comes into being from something else from which it cannot come into being according to the ordinary laws of nature, right? And basically this claim says: so therefore there cannot be miracles, because the laws of nature forbid it. A miracle means behavior not according to the laws of nature, and the laws of nature forbid it. It’s a bit of a strange argument, because in a moment we’ll see his answer, which is of course the obvious answer. But that is the second argument. It may be that behind this argument stands a conception that does not distinguish between laws of nature and laws of logic. Meaning, they essentially understand the necessity that blood cannot come from water as some kind of logical necessity, not as a result of the structure of the world—He lengthens when He wishes and shortens when He wishes, the Holy One, blessed be He, okay? He made this law; He can also suspend it, He can also change it—what’s the problem? That is the meaning of a miracle. So no—it may be that they understand that just as the Holy One, blessed be He, cannot make a square circle, cannot do something that is simply a logical contradiction, maybe they also understand that blood not being able to come from water is also some sort of logical necessity. It simply cannot be. And since that is so, they have some difficulty with the possibility of miracles. In other words, I think that implicitly—otherwise this view really seems very strange—this view basically assumes an identity between the laws of logic and the laws of physics. Basically it is a logical law: blood cannot come from water. Fine?
[Speaker E] And behold—unless it’s a creation like the creation of the world. Unless it’s a creation like the creation of the world. If the world is eternal, then it’s also impossible for blood to come from water. That’s what they’re saying. No, but is that impossibility a physical impossibility or a logical one?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here—but I’m speaking in terms of the eternal world, I’m speaking according to their position. According to them, the world is eternal; there are no changes. Fine? So they say—no, but they say the world is eternal and the laws do not change; everything is fixed. That is their position. Fine? Now they say more than that: since this law is a necessary law—blood doesn’t come from water—therefore it cannot be. I cannot accept that water turned into blood in Egypt. It cannot be that there was a miracle, because it contradicts the laws of nature. Now on the face of it this is a stupid argument, because that is the whole idea of a miracle. I agree that it contradicts the laws of nature, only a miracle means that the Holy One, blessed be He, can suspend the laws of nature—He made them. He who told the oil to burn can tell the vinegar to burn. What’s the problem? What kind of difficulty is this? What proof is there? You can hold that view, no problem, but what is the proof? What is the difficulty here that needs to be dealt with? If I believe in miracles, then I believe in miracles. If you don’t believe, you don’t believe—you’ve simply assumed your conclusion. Fine? What kind of difficulty is there here? Therefore I say that maybe behind this difficulty sits a conception that this necessity—that blood cannot come from water—is a logical necessity, not a physical necessity. A logical necessity means: such a thing is impossible; even the Holy One, blessed be He, cannot do such a thing. No—this is something the laws of nature treat as necessary, and there can be no deviation from it in any conceivable world. Just as in any conceivable world there cannot be a square circle. If it is square then it is not round; if it is round then it is not square, because that is a logical contradiction. There is no square circle. So this is not a problem of laws of nature such that the Holy One, blessed be He, could perform a miracle and presto, there is a square circle. No—He cannot perform such a miracle. That is what Maimonides says, that is what Rashba says—I already brought this last year, or I don’t remember when—that several medieval authorities (Rishonim) speak this way, Maimonides in the Guide and Rashba in a responsum and others, saying: there is no logical miracle. The Holy One, blessed be He, cannot do that. There is no such thing as a logical miracle. Because logic is not a law in the same sense that a law of nature is a law, such that if I want—or the Holy One, blessed be He, wants—He can suspend it, just as He made it He can also change it or suspend it. The laws of logic were not made by the Holy One, blessed be He; they are simply there. It is not something that was made. If you are a triangle, then by your very definition you are not a circle.
[Speaker Q] And therefore the word “ability” is irrelevant. The word “ability” is irrelevant.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Therefore omnipotence—the omnipotence paradox—in this context, we talked about it. So it’s not relevant. There is no lack of omnipotence here, because a lack of omnipotence applies only to something that in principle can be done and He cannot do it. But here, in principle it cannot be done; it is a non-thing, something impossible. So what’s the problem with His not being able to do it? Now it may be that he also understands the production of blood from water in the same way—as the same kind of impossibility as a square circle, a logical impossibility, not a physical impossibility. One more point: in Nachmanides on Song of Songs, in his commentary on Song of Songs—and this somewhat contradicts something he apparently writes on the portion of Genesis—he says that basically he presents there a Neoplatonic conception according to which the world was created from prime matter. And his claim is that creation ex nihilo is impossible; it is an impossibility, it cannot be. Now, impossible—fine, the Holy One, blessed be He, the laws of nature say there is no creation ex nihilo, but the Holy One, blessed be He, can change the laws of nature, so then He can create ex nihilo. What’s the problem? What kind of argument is it that because it contradicts the laws of nature, therefore clearly there was prime matter from eternity, and the Holy One, blessed be He, only imparted form to it, because prime matter was matter without form, and the creation of the world means imparting form to matter. But creation ex nihilo is impossible—this is what he writes there in chapter three, I think, in Song of Songs. And then—wait a second—what do you mean? After all, the Holy One, blessed be He, fine, He changes the laws of nature all the time; even the splitting of the sea is against the laws of nature, but the Holy One, blessed be He, changed it. What’s the problem? Nachmanides presumably means to say that bringing things forth ex nihilo is a logical impossibility, not a physical impossibility. Even that the Holy One, blessed be He, cannot do. If it is not, then it is not; if it is, then it is. It is impossible to bring something out of nothing. There—that is the conception found there. I’m not saying I agree with it; I’m saying that this is what stands behind the argument, because otherwise this argument is a very strange one. And here too, it seems to me that what the Maharal is bringing is an argument of that sort—that turning water into blood is something that is logically impossible, not merely something that contradicts the laws of nature. And therefore he says this is a difficulty for those who believe there were miracles. Impossible—miracles contradict logic, not physics. That’s the problem. And to that the Maharal of course gives the obvious answer. Is he talking about transformation?
[Speaker E] What? But he is talking about transformation. Yes. He’s not saying water should also be blood. Right. That a triangle should also be a circle. Even creation ex nihilo—the Holy One, blessed be He, really can. Wait—but the Holy One, blessed be He, can turn a circle into a triangle. No. Of course He can. The Holy One, blessed be He, can take something round—a ball—and make it into a triangle.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, because—
[Speaker E] Round—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And a triangle and a circle are forms of a thing. So now it can change its form from triangular to round. Right. But blood and water are two different kinds of things. If it’s blood, it’s not water; if
[Speaker E] it’s water, it’s not blood. But when we use the word “turn into,” we’re not saying that water will be blood. That of course is impossible. By “turn into” we mean—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s “turn into”—
[Speaker E] No, that’s “turn into,” but—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Turn into”—again, the question is how you understand “turn into.”
[Speaker E] We talked about this once. The Holy One, blessed be He, can’t make black be white, but He can turn black into white, if I insert the word “turn.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll explain it to you. According to this conception, “turn into” means that the water itself becomes blood. You can understand this in two ways, after all. The first way is: there was water, I erased the water from the world, and now I created blood out of nothing. Is that called turning water into blood? It’s like the movement of the cursor on a screen. You know the movement of the cursor on the screen? The cursor moves on the screen, right? When you press the right or left arrow, the cursor moves, right? What does it mean that it moves? It doesn’t move anywhere. It turns off here and turns on there, turns off here and turns on there. It’s just that some illusion is created in us as though it’s moving, right? That’s “turning into” in that sense. I erase the water and create blood out of nothing. That’s not called turning water into blood. Turning water into blood means that the water itself received a different form and became blood. But he says water and blood are not forms. Water and blood are the things themselves; they’re not the form of the things. A triangle I can turn into a circle, but after it’s round, it’s the same object, only with a different form. Not Platonic triangle and circle, where all they have is triangularity and circularity, but a thing that has a triangular form, I can cause it to receive a circular form. Because its form is not the thing itself. Wait, its form is not the thing itself. I change its form. But to turn water into blood—this is the conception here; I’m not saying I agree with it—but to turn water into blood means taking that same water, and the water itself will be blood. But if it’s water then it isn’t blood; if it’s blood then it isn’t water. So what does “turn into” mean? You can erase the water and create blood. That you can do. But that’s not called turning water into blood. Turning water into blood is a logical contradiction according to this conception, and therefore it cannot be that the Holy One, blessed be He, did that.
[Speaker E] But with height, yes. What? And thin to tall, narrow and low to tall, yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Because that’s just a different form of the same object. There’s no contradiction here that this object is not this but rather that. A triangle that is round. Water that is blood. There is no such thing as water that is blood. If it’s blood, it’s not water. So if it’s water, it’s not blood.
[Speaker J] But a triangle—
[Speaker E] You can also turn into a circle if you start folding it. Yes, right. But what was I talking about? Was I talking about turning into, or that a triangle should also be round? A triangle that is also round, that’s—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I’ll explain it to you again: “turn into” means the same thing. “Turn into” is the same thing. Because when you say “turn into,” what you’re really saying is that what now appears to you as blood is actually the water that was there before. Only now that water is blood. Not that that water disappeared and now I created blood, but that the water that was there is now blood. That means it is both water and blood, so it’s like a triangle that is triangular and round simultaneously. That can’t be.
[Speaker E] They weren’t at the same time.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not? At the same time.
[Speaker E] At 12:15—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They were water; at 12:16 they’re blood. No, they’re still water now too. Simultaneously. They’re still water now too. They’re water now. They’re still water now!
[Speaker K] After all, I turned the water—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] into blood, meaning the water itself. They’re not water. They are water. The same thing that was previously water is now blood. But that thing—water is the thing, it’s not a property of the thing—that’s how this is being understood. That’s the difficulty, that’s the claim. I’m trying to explain the difficulty; I’m not claiming I agree. I’m saying the claim is that being water is its definition, not its property. It is itself, its essence. So if you turn water into blood, it’s like making a round triangle, simultaneously, which is also water. If it’s water, it isn’t blood; if it’s blood, it isn’t water. Okay? That’s the claim. So what does he say? He says: “For nature acts in time; therefore every natural agent requires duration of time.” Yes, sorry a second: “And behold, he brings proof from one species acting on another species, that the natural agent acts according to its nature and customary way within the natural world, whereas the separate agent acts according to its own mode. And there is a difference between them.” Meaning, he says there are two modes of operation. You’re getting confused—I’m now translating, and these are all my translations, but it seems to me this is what lies behind the words. You identify the laws of logic with the laws of physics. But that’s not true. The laws of physics are not logic; the laws of physics are not the essence of things. Blood is not—turning water into blood—being water is not the essence of the thing, it’s a property of the thing. And you can change the property of the thing: now it won’t be water, it will be blood. Meaning, this is not logically impossible; it’s physically impossible. We don’t know how to do it; the laws of nature don’t do it. But all that is governed by the laws of nature. But the Holy One, blessed be He, who does not act according to the laws of nature—as long as there’s no logical contradiction—then that’s perfectly fine, He can do it. Why are you mixing natural operation with non-natural operation? What lies behind the words, again? What lies behind the words, it seems to me—after all, they’re not idiots either, I assume, those who raised the question, and if they are, then why does he even feel the need to deal with them? There is some claim here. Their claim apparently was that the laws of physics are really laws of logic, and physical impossibility is really a logical contradiction, and therefore it cannot be. And to that the Maharal says: what are you talking about? There is such a thing as nature. Nature has laws in nature; that’s not logic. And the laws of nature obligate only that which is conducted according to nature. But if there is something separate from nature, spiritual or something beyond nature, then it is not bound by those laws. And the Holy One, blessed be He, can change them. What he’s innovating here is something that seems trivial, and that’s why I’m giving all this interpretation, because it’s obvious. What was the question to begin with? It sounds absurd. You tell me there are no miracles because the laws of nature don’t fit miracles. But the whole meaning of a miracle is that there are laws and I temporarily suspend them. What kind of silly argument is that? Therefore I think the real question behind the words is: what are the laws of nature? Are the laws of nature laws of logic, or are they laws of a different kind? And they assumed they were laws of logic, and therefore it couldn’t be and the Holy One, blessed be He, could not do it. And the Maharal says no: these are laws of nature, not laws of logic. Ah—if they are laws of nature, then they obligate only natural processes. But if there is something not subject to natural processes—“separate,” in his language—then it can also do things that are against the laws. But here, so he says: “And there is a difference between them.” He wants to show what the difference is between natural operation and logical operation. Because nature acts in time, and therefore every natural agent requires a duration of time. Yes, to turn water into blood, maybe that could happen through some very, very long process. But it can’t happen immediately. That contradicts the laws of nature. Natural operation does not turn water into blood; it requires some very, very long process, if at all. “But the agent that is not natural does not require time for its action. For the natural force is a corporeal force, and every corporeal force acts in time.” By the way, that’s also an assumption of modern physics, something that perhaps once was not so clear. In modern physics the assumption is that there is no action at a distance, what’s called action at a distance. Meaning, if a body with mass is here and another body with mass is there, the mere fact of their being opposite one another does not mean that the very moment they are there, immediately there is a force.
[Speaker J] Like what people think about gravity.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, exactly. Meaning, there is some process here in which the mass located here creates a force. That force runs quickly to that body over there—those are the gravitons, okay?—and creates some phenomenon of attraction, pulling that body toward it. It’s not something that follows from the mere existence of the two bodies facing each other. It’s a natural process that takes time. Not only does it take time—one second—not only does it take time, there is also a limit on the time it takes: the speed of light. Meaning, the influence of one body on the second body will not reach the second body at a speed greater than the speed of light. And therefore at very great distances we should actually be able to see this time interval. If we bring a body here, we should see that this body does not immediately begin to move. It will take some millionth of a second, and only then will it start to move. Meaning, the assumption of physics is that even laws that look like laws—that don’t depend on time, where the moment there are two masses a force immediately acts—we move, in the language of physics, to what is called field theory. Field theory basically sees the attraction between two bodies as some kind of field created by this body, advancing toward that body; when it gets there, it exerts force on it, and then it begins to be attracted. In contrast to the way it’s always taught in high school, which is the perspective of regular mechanics, not field theory, where the assumption is that if there are two bodies here, there is immediately a force; there is no dependence on time. That force is not time-dependent; it is always there. The moment there is a body, there is force. And that’s an assumption that cannot hold under relativity, because that would mean that if I put a body here and there is a body there, then an influence occurs instantaneously. But it can’t be that this body knows of the existence of that body unless that information traveled between them at the speed of light—or at a speed no greater than the speed of light. So that is exactly the claim: every law of nature operates along a time axis; it does not operate immediately. It takes time for these processes to occur. “But separate things act without time, since they are not a force in matter, and therefore they act without time.” And therefore, say, in separate processes—for example, if I want to move that body over there—I don’t need action in matter. I don’t need gravitons to carry the force from here to there and create some attraction that pulls that body back. That is exactly action in matter: I act within the material medium, and that is how I bring about the result. A separate force does not act within matter; it acts directly on that thing. It decides that that thing will move, so it moves; it decides that the water will become blood, so it becomes blood. You don’t need the time axis that material action needs, requires. “And therefore”—wait—“By the word of the Lord the heavens were made, and by the breath of His mouth all their host”; and this is the separate agent, which acts without any preparation of matter at all. He is also hinting, of course, at creation out of nothing. “And therefore do not ask, since not every matter is prepared to receive form and requires preparation”—that water cannot become blood. Meaning, this matter called water is not prepared to receive the form of blood, because in its essence it is water, not blood; it cannot receive the form of blood; the moment it is blood, it is not water. That’s what we asked above. So he says: “Do not ask, since not every matter is prepared to receive form and requires preparation, and how are the waters prepared to receive the form of blood? Behold, this is no difficulty for one who understands, because the need for matter to undergo preparation before it receives form—this applies to the customary natural order. And because the philosopher followed nature in order thereby to deny the miracles, therefore we inform him that from the standpoint of nature, wonders do not exist. But from the standpoint of the action of the separate, all wonders do exist”; it is not bound by the laws of nature. “For the lower world is the world of nature, but it has attachment to the separate world.” You could say—and this is another claim that comes up, by the way, and is actually becoming very strong now—the question is whether there can be interaction between the separate and the natural; basically the psychophysical problem. He says: fine, let’s even grant that there is a separate world that is not subject to the laws of nature. But who says that this separate thing can produce phenomena in the physical world, in the natural world? Because after all, what happens? If it does produce phenomena in the natural world—say it moves some object—then this object starts moving, and I’ll look with instruments for what force caused it, and I won’t find any. It moved without any force acting on it; that contradicts the laws of physics. So notice: there is indeed a problem here. It sounds terribly simple; it’s not simple at all. A great many people today deny our free will precisely because of the consideration the Maharal is talking about here. Because they say: even if there is a spiritual thing, I have no problem—even if there is a spiritual thing—but the spiritual cannot create interaction with the corporeal. So let it operate in its own ways and not according to the laws of nature, no problem. But it cannot be that an electron moves because of that. If an electron moves without a force acting on it, that is against Newton’s laws. And if a force did act on it, then not the separate thing—the force did it. Either way. So if the separate did it, that contradicts the laws of nature. Suddenly we see that this claim is not as far-fetched as it looks at first reading. Today a lot of very intelligent people raise this claim: that this separate thing cannot intervene in the natural world, because otherwise the natural world would not operate according to fixed laws.
[Speaker J] And that—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] can’t be, otherwise—
[Speaker J] it wouldn’t be a natural world, exactly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. So you understand that the mere existence of a separate world doesn’t really solve the problem. You also have to assume that the material world can be the object of action by these separate forces, and that is already a claim about the material world. And the material world is indeed supposed to operate according to the laws of physics, and the Holy One, blessed be He, established that it should operate according to the laws of physics. Meaning, there is a non-trivial claim here. “For the lower world is the world of nature; it has attachment to the separate world”—there is interaction between them. It’s not enough to say there is a separate world, that there is a psychic world and a physical world. There also has to be the psychophysical—there has to be a hyphen between them, there has to be interaction between them. “And from there miracles come, for miracles are renewed through the fact that this world has connection with the separate beings.” “And therefore miracles occurred only in Israel,” as will be explained further, because Israel are the ones supposed to connect the natural with the separate. Therefore the influences of the separate upon the natural occur mainly in relation to Israel. “And all this is because they have attachment to the separate beings, and therefore miracles and wonders were found among Israel.” “And behold, what he says—how can one thing be imagined as becoming another thing, how can water come to be from blood”—that is impossible according to nature, but not according to nature it is not impossible. That’s the summary. Okay? That was his second difficulty. “And likewise what he said”—now the next sentence, that’s the third difficulty. This division into paragraphs seems to me completely irrelevant, this paragraphing here. I don’t know exactly what its nature is. But it seems to me that this is the third question, and we’ll get to it next time. So I suggest maybe we leave the pages here, or if someone wants they can take them, but—