Halachic Thought – 5783 – Lesson 20

This is an English translation (via GPT-5.4). Read the original Hebrew version.

This transcription was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

🔗 Link to the original lecture

🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI

Moving from dispute to changes in Jewish law
The swimsuit-and-coat parable: literal conservatism, midrashic conservatism, and heresy
Behavior does not identify conservatism; the reasoning does
The suspicion of “it suits me, so they permitted it” and the “too good to be kosher” fallacy
Symmetry in halakhic dispute: each side sees the other as violating Jewish law
The story of Adam HaKohen and the idea that heresy can also pay a price
Positions versus people, and a “sheep” as someone who acts without a position
An attempt to map the camps: Haredi, modern religious, and secular
The heap paradox, fuzzy logic, and rejecting dichotomous thinking
Defining “Reform” as partial commitment to tradition and as an ideological stance
Literal conservatism as a Haredi ethos, not as a type that really exists in practice
Conservatives, Haredim, and modern religious Jews as midrashic conservatism in different doses
Examples of changing presumptions: “a person does not repay before the due date” versus “better to dwell as two than to dwell alone”
The criterion between a midrashic conservative and a Reform Jew: the existence of a “conservative midrash”
The example of Moshe Zemer, “Reasonable Halakhah,” and columns 475–480 (column 478)
The claim that “conservative midrash dismantles Jewish law” and the reply using an absurd example
Women as witnesses as conservative midrash, a “sensitive issue,” and the price of not changing
“Murder in the mikveh” and the question of accepting women’s testimony
Judging arguments by the person making them versus judging arguments by their content
The structure of conservative midrash and the naturalistic fallacy (“is–ought”)
Evidence, burden of proof, and reasonable intuition as a basis for interpretation
Brisk, “only what and not why,” and the view that reason is binding unless proven otherwise
Interim conclusion

Summary

General Overview

The text presents a model for understanding changes in Jewish law through a parable about people moving from a cool desert and wondering whether to keep wearing a “swimsuit” or put on a “coat.” It argues that the central question is not what people do in practice, but what their reasoning is: one can be conservative even while changing, if the change is justified as implementing the deeper principle of the tradition. The text distinguishes between “literal” conservatism and “midrashic” conservatism, warns against dichotomous thinking by means of the heap paradox and fuzzy logic, and suggests that the Reform position is different in that it changes without presenting a “conservative midrash,” or because it represents only partial commitment to tradition. It goes on to argue that in practice there is almost no such thing as a real “literal conservative,” because all of Jewish law is full of time-sensitive interpretation, and that the differences between Haredim, modern religious Jews, and Conservatives are mainly differences of degree and sociology, while the essential distinction is between those who reason within the rules of the halakhic game and those who change without such an interpretive mechanism.

Moving from dispute to changes in Jewish law

The speaker notes that in the previous lecture he finished the topic of dispute and tolerance and now turns to changes in Jewish law. He uses a parable to carry the entire discussion around the question of how to relate to change and how to determine whether a position is conservative.

The swimsuit-and-coat parable: literal conservatism, midrashic conservatism, and heresy

The text describes a group that has walked for generations in the desert in swimsuits and then reaches a colder region. It defines a “literal conservative” as someone who keeps walking in a swimsuit because that is what the ancestors did, and a “midrashic conservative” as someone who puts on a coat but explains it by saying that the traditional principle is to dress according to the weather. The text defines a “heretic” as someone who wears a coat simply because he is cold and is not bothered at all by tradition or by any reasoning that expresses fidelity to principle.

Behavior does not identify conservatism; the reasoning does

The text states that the act itself does not reveal whether a person is conservative, because a midrashic conservative and a heretic may behave exactly the same way in practice. It adds that even someone who does not change in practice may still not be conservative if he admits what he thinks the binding principle is, yet acts against it out of desire or defiance. The text concludes that the way to identify conservatism is to examine the reasoning, not the behavior.

The suspicion of “it suits me, so they permitted it” and the “too good to be kosher” fallacy

The text describes the tendency to suspect that the midrashic conservative chooses the convenient solution and only afterward invents excuses. It argues that this is already moving into psychology and that there is no proof for it, and it defines “too good to be kosher” as a fallacy. It states that something can be both “good” and “kosher,” and that convenience or hardship does not let you infer whether someone is conservative or not.

Symmetry in halakhic dispute: each side sees the other as violating Jewish law

The text uses examples such as “an eye for an eye” and “do not form factions” to show that words require interpretation and that the application of Jewish law changes. It presents a situation in which the midrashic conservative may view the literal conservative as someone violating Jewish law, just as the literal conservative sees change as a transgression, and it states that there is no principled advantage to the one who “pays a price.” It frames the debate as a question of “who is right” rather than “who is wicked,” and places this in the context of monism versus pluralism discussed in the previous lecture.

The story of Adam HaKohen and the idea that heresy can also pay a price

The text tells a story about Adam HaKohen as an Enlightenment figure found in the synagogue on the Sabbath wearing a prayer shawl and swaying before the ark. It quotes his remark that “being a heretic at home in bed in a swimsuit” is no great feat, and that the real heretic is the one who does it “with a prayer shawl, swaying before the holy ark.” The text adds another story according to which Adam HaKohen wanted to repent on his deathbed in order to refute the rabbinic saying that the wicked do not repent even at the entrance to Gehenna.

Positions versus people, and a “sheep” as someone who acts without a position

The text emphasizes that it is classifying positions, not people, and that a person with no position cannot really be classified. It calls someone who does something “because everyone does it” a “sheep,” and presents this as a kind of “religion of everyone,” of just doing whatever is mainstream.

An attempt to map the camps: Haredi, modern religious, and secular

The text proposes an initial identification in which the literal conservative parallels the Haredi, the midrashic conservative parallels the modern religious or religiously liberal Jew, and the heretic parallels the secular person. It argues that identifying the “modern religious” as “light religion” is conservative propaganda, and distinguishes between someone who has reasons for change and someone who is just sloppy. It argues that a “traditional” Jew does not fit the map when he thinks like the Orthodox but “it just doesn’t work for him right now,” because that is not a position but a mismatch between belief and practice.

The heap paradox, fuzzy logic, and rejecting dichotomous thinking

The text presents the heap paradox and the ice paradox to show that the failure comes from assuming that everything is either yes or no. It states that the solution is that adding one stone changes the status “a little,” and that there is a continuum between 0 and 1 of different “degrees of heap-ness,” calling this fuzzy logic. It adds an example about exams to show that the world is not divided only into lazy and diligent people but into an intermediate spectrum, and connects this to the fallacy of the “dilemma” and the structure of “whichever way you go.”

Defining “Reform” as partial commitment to tradition and as an ideological stance

The text argues that the model misses another possibility because of dichotomous thinking, and suggests that a Reform Jew is someone committed to tradition but “not at any price,” so the commitment is neither 0 nor 1 but some intermediate value. It distinguishes between non-ideological weakness and an ideological movement with rabbis and halakhic rulings that define commitment as non-total, and argues that this is a genuine stream on the map and not mere sloppiness. It presents an internal debate in which one side insists that commitment is all or nothing, and the text replies that this is exactly the dichotomous fallacy it is criticizing.

Literal conservatism as a Haredi ethos, not as a type that really exists in practice

The text argues that there is “no such creature” as a literal conservative in reality, because no one thinks we need to observe the Torah today “the way they did in the time of Moses.” It describes a “Haredi ethos” that educates as if “they did not change their dress or their language,” and brings an anecdote about an uncle who said that “Abaye and Rava studied in Yiddish,” to illustrate the power of the ethos. It states that Haredism itself is an unconscious, or only partly conscious, form of midrashic conservatism.

Conservatives, Haredim, and modern religious Jews as midrashic conservatism in different doses

The text states that the difference between Haredim, modern religious Jews, and Conservatives is not essential but mainly a difference of degree in the use of conservative midrash, along with sociological differences in scope and fields of application. It argues that from a single argument alone one cannot tell whether the person making it is Haredi, modern, or Conservative, because the halakhic arguments may be “completely balanced.”

Examples of changing presumptions: “a person does not repay before the due date” versus “better to dwell as two than to dwell alone”

The text brings the presumption “a person does not repay before the due date” and explains that today, in situations like mortgages, people do repay before the due date, and therefore a “normal” judge will interpret the context and change the application. By contrast, it presents the presumption “better to dwell as two than to dwell alone” and argues that nowadays women are not willing to live “with just any husband” in extreme cases, yet rabbinic courts do not rule in accordance with this change in reality. It cites Rabbi Soloveitchik’s statement that presumptions “descended from Sinai” and calls that “nonsense,” saying he does not believe Soloveitchik himself believed it.

The criterion between a midrashic conservative and a Reform Jew: the existence of a “conservative midrash”

The text states that the difference between a midrashic conservative and a Reform Jew or heretic is whether one presents a conservative midrash that interprets the sources and explains what changed, and therefore why the application changes. It argues that the Reform Jew “makes the change without presenting a conservative midrash,” and sometimes explains it only by saying that “it doesn’t fit now,” whereas the midrashic conservative presents an interpretation that can be disputed within the framework of Jewish law. It notes that even a “bold” midrash remains conservative if the person truly believes it and it is located within the rules of the halakhic game.

The example of Moshe Zemer, “Reasonable Halakhah,” and columns 475–480 (column 478)

The text refers to a series of columns on the website, from column 475 to 480, and notes that column 478 explains why Reform Jews do not fit the map. It brings Moshe Zemer and his book Reasonable Halakhah as an example of a Reform rabbi who cites supporting sources, but according to the speaker usually does not present the mechanism of conservative midrash—interpreting the source, identifying changed circumstances, and inferring a new application.

The claim that “conservative midrash dismantles Jewish law” and the reply using an absurd example

The text presents the criticism that if you allow conservative midrash, then you can “do whatever you want” and empty Jewish law of content. It responds with an absurd example about the letters in “Africa” and “Scandinavia” to show that not every formally valid argument is a serious argument, and it emphasizes the role of common sense and of discerning whether the person really believes the midrash or is just playing a game. It states that an unreasonable midrash is rejected, while a reasonable midrash enters the conservative field even if people disagree with it.

Women as witnesses as conservative midrash, a “sensitive issue,” and the price of not changing

The text proposes a conservative midrash according to which women’s disqualification as witnesses was connected to the fact that in the past they were not educated and not socially involved, whereas today they are, and therefore they should be deemed valid. It argues that there is no principled reason not to make such midrashim, as in many other cases, and that only “the status of women” is a “sensitive issue.” It emphasizes that there is a price in both directions and argues that if the truth is that women are valid witnesses and we still disqualify them, then we are releasing criminals and preventing the just collection of money, and it calls that a “halakhic offender,” assuming the midrash is correct.

“Murder in the mikveh” and the question of accepting women’s testimony

The text invents a joke about “Murder in the Mikveh” as if it were an Agatha Christie book, in order to illustrate a scenario in which women see a murder but are disqualified from testifying. It notes that Noda B’Yehuda and Terumat HaDeshen say that testimony is accepted in such a situation, and distinguishes between the systemic difficulties of capital cases and the disqualification of women, which is unrelated to prior warning and the like. It states that in ordinary Jewish law one does not accept women’s testimony, and gives the example that a betrothal performed before two women is invalid.

Judging arguments by the person making them versus judging arguments by their content

The text objects to judging arguments according to the speaker’s label, and notes that a conservative midrashic argument can be spoken by a Reform Jew and vice versa. It gives a historical example of Reform Jews who argued that the prohibition of pork was based on health concerns, and today one can cook it in ways that prevent harm, and it defines that as conservative midrash. It insists that we must get used to examining whether the argument is correct, not who said it.

The structure of conservative midrash and the naturalistic fallacy (“is–ought”)

The text analyzes the argument about women as witnesses as invalid if it infers a norm from purely factual premises, and calls that David Hume’s fallacy and the naturalistic fallacy. It explains that a “bridge premise” is required to connect facts to norms, such as the claim that the disqualification stemmed from lack of education or the rule that “whoever is not educated is disqualified from testimony.” It argues that people often omit the bridge premise because it is the “Achilles’ heel” of the argument, and that this is where the real debate lies.

Evidence, burden of proof, and reasonable intuition as a basis for interpretation

The text proposes searching for evidence in the Talmud, medieval authorities (Rishonim), and later authorities (Acharonim) regarding the reason for the disqualification, and demonstrates how people discuss the reason a wicked person is disqualified as a witness through practical ramifications in a woman’s testimony. It argues that even if there is no decisive evidence, reasonable intuition is enough to accept a conservative midrash, and the burden of proof then shifts to the one claiming that it is a scriptural decree or some other explanation. It states that there is no reason to assume by default that the Torah says something unreasonable when a reasonable explanation exists, and that it is willing to accept irrationality only if proof is brought that this is indeed a law that does not fit human reason.

Brisk, “only what and not why,” and the view that reason is binding unless proven otherwise

The text describes a view associated with the “Brisk method,” according to which one does not enter into the reasons for commandments and asks “only what and not why,” and notes that in practice they do enter into the reasoning but present this as an ethos. It adopts the position that Jewish law ought to be reasonable, and that the proper tendency is to accept a reasonable interpretation unless proof has been brought that the law in question does not accord with human reason.

Interim conclusion

The text pauses when another “unrelated” question is raised about “partial twins,” and the discussion prepares to continue.

Full Transcript

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let’s start with our topic. Last time we talked about—and finished—the issue of dispute and tolerance and how to relate to disagreement, and now I want to deal with changes in Jewish law. I’ll start, maybe, with an example that I’ll build from; it’ll accompany us through this whole discussion. It’s an example I once heard from some non-religious friend, and it came up in a discussion we had with him. Think about a group of people who have been walking through the desert for generations, dressed in swimsuits. Their parents also wore swimsuits, their grandparents wore swimsuits—they wore swimsuits. At some point the desert ends, and they begin reaching a colder region.

[Speaker C] Abroad, the Land of Israel—just an example—clothes are on you.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So now some of them say: we continue the tradition of our ancestors, and even though the region is cold, we keep walking around in a swimsuit. Just as our ancestors walked around in swimsuits, so too we walk around in a swimsuit. That’s a conservative approach, right? They are preserving the tradition they received from their ancestors. Of course the swimsuits and the weather, desert and non-desert—all that is just the parable. But let’s think for a moment about what it stands for. Fundamentalist conservatism? Conservatism.

[Speaker C] Stupid conservatism, no.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, no. Okay, so conservatism for the moment, okay. You’re right. Now, others say: come on, it’s cold, bring a coat, right? So of course they’re Reform, heretics, I don’t know what to call them, traitors to Israel—they’re not conservative, right? Maybe they are. Wait, from a conservative standpoint. How?

[Speaker C] In the sense that there’s a conservatism that preserves the outer shell, and a conservatism that preserves the principles.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, and what are the principles?

[Speaker C] Let’s say the principle is that you should dress according to the environment, or in a way that helps us function. Traditionalists and liberals?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, we’ll see in a moment—it’s not that simple. Slowly. Traditionalists and liberals are two completely, completely different things. So yes, apparently those who wear a coat assume that they are not conservative—they’re not preserving the tradition they received from their ancestors. But there could be a group of people who say: we wear a coat, but not simply because we’re cold and we don’t care about our ancestors’ tradition, but because just as our ancestors wore clothing suited to the weather—it was hot, so they wore swimsuits—we wear clothing suited to the weather. Now it’s cold, so we wear a coat. Or in other words: we are no less conservative than the first group; we simply claim that the principle that has to be preserved is not the principle of walking around in a swimsuit, but the principle of wearing clothes suited to the weather. Okay? So I think this third group is just as conservative as the first group. The difference between them is simply the question of what exactly is being preserved. One group preserves the principle that our ancestors wore swimsuits; the second group preserves the principle that one should wear clothing suited to the weather. In other words, they disagree over what principle was transmitted to them in the tradition, what principle their ancestors demanded of them. But they do not differ from one another in their degree of conservatism. They are conservative in exactly the same way; they are just preserving a different principle. Okay? Agreed? Good. So for the sake of the rest of the discussion, let’s give them names. The conservatives of the first type, those who keep going with a swimsuit even though it’s cold—they are literal conservatives. According to the plain meaning, there’s a swimsuit, so we go with a swimsuit, okay? And the conservatives of the second type—the third group I mentioned—we’ll call them midrashic conservatives. What does that mean, midrashic conservatives? They make a midrash out of the plain meaning that “your ancestors wore swimsuits.” That’s the plain meaning. The verse says: go with a swimsuit, okay? Now I make a midrash on the verse, and I say: what does “go with a swimsuit” mean? It means because they were in the desert. So I call this a midrashic conservative, as opposed to the literal conservative.

[Speaker C] Okay? It’s interesting that the Rabbi calls this midrash. Is that what midrash means for us in general?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, for the purposes of our discussion, leave it—I’m not making broad claims here about the whole world of midrash. Okay? The third group—I wouldn’t even call them Reform; I’d call them heretics. Why heretics? Because they say: we don’t care about the tradition of our ancestors; we’re cold. That’s it. Right? They’re not dressing it up with explanations that what our ancestors did was such-and-such and we preserve it because of such-and-such, cold weather or something—they’re not looking for explanations. I’m cold, so I wear a coat. No, I’m not bothered by the question of what my ancestors did and why I’m not doing what they did. So they’re heretics. Okay? In our parable. Notice that the midrashic conservative and the heretic behave in exactly the same way in practice. Both put on a coat. The difference between them is in the question of the reasoning. What reasoning do they give for putting on the coat. Which means, notice, that a person’s behavior does not indicate whether he is conservative or not conservative. His reasoning determines whether he is conservative or not. Okay? It could be, for example, that a person does not change the swimsuit, and keeps walking around in a swimsuit, and he is not conservative. Why? He says: I agree that the principle our ancestors handed down to us is to wear clothing suited to the weather; in that sense I’m a midrashic conservative—but I just don’t feel like it. I want to walk around in a swimsuit. In principle, in order to preserve things, I should be putting on a coat, right? Because I’m a midrashic conservative; I think the instruction is to wear clothing suited to the weather—but I just don’t feel like it. I like challenges; I want to walk around in a swimsuit in a cold place. Fine? So notice: here is someone who doesn’t change what his ancestors did, and he is not conservative. So it works both ways. You can’t learn anything from a person’s behavior about whether he is conservative or not. In both directions—whether he changes or whether he doesn’t change—you have no way to know whether he is conservative or not. The way to find out whether he is conservative or not is to examine his reasoning. Why he changes or doesn’t change. Okay? Now maybe one more point. We have some tendency to think that the midrashic conservative is really a heretic. He chooses the convenient solution—he feels like wearing a coat because he’s cold—and afterward he comes up with excuses. Right? A lot of times we relate like that to all kinds of liberal claims or claims for changes in Jewish law, as though you first shoot the arrow and only afterward draw the target around it. Now first of all, maybe that’s true and maybe it isn’t, but that’s already dropping down to the psychological level. The argument in itself is a conservative argument. You can say, listen, I don’t believe you—you don’t really think this way, you’re just looking for an easy life, that’s all. You can always choose not to believe a person, but you have to understand that you have no proof whatsoever that this is the case. What’s called “it’s too good to be kosher,” right? Meaning, if something is convenient then it can’t possibly be permitted—in other words, if you do something convenient, then clearly it must be forbidden. That “too good to be kosher” is a fallacy. Something can be both good and kosher. Okay? Beyond that, as in the example I gave before, there can be people who keep walking around in a swimsuit, yes? But in fact they’re heretics. Even though apparently they’re paying a price—they’re wearing clothing unsuited to the weather—and nevertheless they’re not conservative, because they think one should wear clothing suited to the weather and they still keep walking around in a swimsuit. Why? Because of the challenge I mentioned before. I’m just giving an example here to show that you can’t draw conclusions from what a person does regarding whether he is conservative or not. All these speculations that if a person does something convenient then apparently he’s not conservative and he’s just lying or telling stories—there is absolutely no necessity that this be true. The whole question is whether you judge him favorably or not.

[Speaker A] It depends on the definition you set in advance of what a conservative is, so that if I want to know whether he’s conservative in his views, then—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, meaning—is that what midrash means for us in general? No, let’s talk about Jewish law. No, you won’t be able to discover it, because according to the actions—if I have reasoning—then I explain to you that now conservatism, Jewish law itself, tells me to behave this way and not the way it used to be.

[Speaker A] I’d say he’s not conservative in his views, but conservative in his actions.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But all of this is Jewish law—what do “views” and “actions” mean? In Jewish law there’s no difference between views and actions. The views determine what I have to do—that’s Jewish law. Now the question is whether I’m observing Jewish law or not. So what—if I put on a coat, am I observing Jewish law or not? Jewish law says to walk around in a swimsuit—or that’s what was written in the Shulchan Arukh: you need to walk around in a swimsuit. Now I say, yes, because the Shulchan Arukh was in the desert; what it really means is that one should wear clothing suited to the weather. That’s my claim. Now I ask: can you say about me that I’m conservative or not conservative? Can you determine that based on the fact that I’m now wearing a coat?

[Speaker A] It depends on the definition of conservative—what that means.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He’s committed to Jewish law—leave the definition aside. I’m asking: is he committed to Jewish law?

[Speaker A] So if he does what’s written in the Shulchan Arukh—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But what does “written” mean? What’s written in the Shulchan Arukh?

[Speaker A] To wear a garment—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, those are the words. But you understand that very often we interpret words. What does that mean? In the Torah too it says “an eye for an eye,” and we say it means monetary compensation. In Jewish law it says “do not form factions,” meaning not to have two synagogues or two religious courts in one city, and today we do have that—so is everyone violating Jewish law? No. We simply understand that Jewish law today has to be applied differently. Because Jewish law, because the Torah, is—

[Speaker A] A certain principle, that it should be the Torah of the sages, basically.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But what is “the Torah of the sages”? What does the Holy One, blessed be He, want us to do? It’s all words. What does the Holy One, blessed be He, want us to do? I want to know what the Holy One, blessed be He, wants from me—that’s all I want. Now I say: when I wear a coat, am I doing what the Holy One, blessed be He, wants or not? According to my view, yes—if I justify it with the conservative midrash. Maybe I’m wrong and maybe I’m not, fine. In any dispute, someone may be wrong and someone else may not be wrong. We discussed that in previous lectures. The value of autonomy—we talked about that last lecture—a person has to do what he understands. Okay? I interpret Jewish law and act according to my interpretation—that’s what I do. On the contrary, from my point of view, the one who keeps walking around in a swimsuit is the heretic. Even though that’s what’s written in Jewish law. Because what’s really written in Jewish law is to wear clothing suited to the weather, and he is walking around in a swimsuit in a cold place, so he’s the heretic. Now somehow we’re not used to thinking that way. Why? Because someone who pays a price—why assume he’s a heretic? I mean, why is he paying a price? It’s more comfortable to wear a coat, so why would he wear a swimsuit? Apparently because he believes in it, apparently he has a presumption in his favor. If he wanted comfort, he would wear a coat—why is he walking around in a swimsuit? But that’s not true. Because I’m not talking right now about comfort or discomfort. I’m talking about whether he is observing Jewish law. If I think that Jewish law says one must wear clothing suited to the weather, then he is not observing Jewish law if he walks around in a swimsuit. It doesn’t matter that he pays a price and that he’s righteous and that he gives up his life for it—he desecrated the Sabbath. Because that is not how you keep the Sabbath today.

[Speaker C] Are you now talking about the leader-type person? The person claiming that you have to preserve the—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m saying no—I’m even talking about the first one. I, as a midrashic conservative, look at the literal conservative. Fine? In my view he is violating Jewish law. True, according to his own view he is observing Jewish law because he thinks that’s what Jewish law says—fine, that’s according to him. But from my perspective he is a heretic; he is violating Jewish law; he desecrated the Sabbath.

[Speaker C] No, he’s not a heretic.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s already a matter of words. He desecrated the Sabbath, he violated Jewish law. Okay? I’m only claiming that it’s not only those who wear swimsuits—because that’s what all of us naturally take for granted, that someone who wears a coat is violating Jewish law, right? Everyone feels that naturally. I’m saying that to exactly the same degree, the one who wears a coat looks at the one who keeps the swimsuit and says: he is violating Jewish law. They disagree over what Jewish law is; neither of them is wicked. Both are committed to Jewish law. They just have different interpretations of what Jewish law says. I’m only saying it’s symmetrical on both sides. There is no advantage for those who wear swimsuits over those who put on a coat. It’s the same thing. The argument is over who is right. Fine, one of them is right, the other is not right. We discussed that last lecture—monism versus pluralism. Okay? But I’m not now talking about who is right, but rather I judge a person according to his own position. Now, according to his own position, he is conservative just as the other one, according to his own position, is conservative. And according to his view, I’m an offender—maybe under compulsion, because I think this is what should be done. But still, I’m not observing Jewish law. And according to my view, he too is an offender. Same thing. It’s completely symmetrical. There is no advantage whatsoever to those who keep the swimsuit over those who put on a coat. Even though it looks like a harder life as opposed to—still, as far as the argument goes, it’s a legitimate argument. Okay? A question, Rabbi—we just talked about four types: the literal conservative, the heretic, the midrashic conservative—

[Speaker C] But you talked about that same person who recognizes that the principle is that you should dress according to the weather—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And he chooses not to behave that way. That’s the heretic. That too is a heretic, certainly. What’s the difference? He’s not—he’s not committed to the principle. The principle is that one should change into clothing suited to the weather, and he is not committed to it. If it’s a binding principle, yes.

[Speaker C] That’s the principle,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying—assuming that that’s how he interprets the Torah. Then for him that is the principle. And if he doesn’t do it, then he’s a heretic. Sometimes a heretic can pay a price. Heresy is not always an easy life. There’s a well-known story about Adam HaKohen. Adam HaKohen was one of the Enlightenment figures. So once somebody came looking for him on the Sabbath. He came to his house. His wife said: he’s in synagogue. He’s in synagogue? Fine. They went to look for him in synagogue, figuring he was probably hanging out with the guys outside by the entrance. They look around at the people there, they don’t find him. They ask: where is Adam HaKohen? Inside, in the synagogue itself. What’s he doing inside the synagogue? They went inside the synagogue, looking for him—probably in the last row reading something, who knows. No. They ask: where, where is Adam HaKohen? There, by the holy ark, with a prayer shawl, swaying hard, hard—that’s Adam HaKohen. They waited till the end of the prayer. When he came outside they said to him: tell us, you’re a heretic, you don’t believe in any of this story—what were you doing there with the prayer shawl swaying in front of the holy ark? He said to them: what, is it such a great feat to be a heretic at home in bed in a swimsuit? To be a heretic with a prayer shawl, swaying in front of the holy ark—that’s the real heretic. Okay? Someone who wears a swimsuit in a cold region because he wants to be a heretic—that’s the real heretic, not someone who puts on a coat because it’s convenient. Okay? And there’s another interesting story about him, now that I remember. They say he wanted to repent on his deathbed, Adam HaKohen. Why? In order to refute the rabbinic statement that the wicked do not repent even at the very entrance to Gehenna. All right, so that’s enough praise of Adam HaKohen. Anyway.

[Speaker A] It’s a street in Tel Aviv.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s a street in Tel Aviv, but there was also such a person once. Anyway, back to our topic. Someone who offers no reasoning is nothing, he’s a nobody. He does it because everyone does it—

[Speaker E] Fine, so what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s not a position. I’m classifying positions. I’m not classifying people. People who have no position—I’ve got nothing to classify there, classify them however you like. A sheep. I would classify him in the sheep category. Someone who does something because everyone does it—he’s a sheep. Why? A sheep does what everyone does.

[Speaker A] And if he does what everyone does, that’s—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Something else, then fine, then he’s someone who finds favor in it—he believes in another religion, the religion of everybody, that you should do what everyone does.

[Speaker C] Like today’s mainstream. Yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So the claim is—so in short, at this point we have three models. One of them is the literal conservative, the second is the midrashic conservative, and the third is the heretic. Okay? Now let’s try to think what a Reform Jew is in this model. Seemingly, when we look at this model, it seems there’s no further option. Meaning, we’ve covered all the possibilities. What else could there be? Either you wear a coat or you continue with the swimsuit. Either your reasoning is midrashic or your reasoning is literal. That’s it, four possibilities. What else could there be? Mistaken? No, mistaken again is not a position. That’s an error. I’m talking about what he claims. What according to his own view he claims. Any one of them could be mistaken. Like, in my opinion, the midrashic conservative—

[Speaker C] Maybe in this sense, just as the midrashic conservative tries to think for a moment what the real intention behind things is, that’s also what the Reform Jew does. Well then, he’s a midrashic conservative.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then that’s not Reform. Fine—so you’re saying a Reform Jew is a midrashic conservative. That’s what you’re claiming. There isn’t a fourth mechanism here; rather, it’s one of the three—a midrashic conservative.

[Speaker A] I’m just thinking.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. Fine, agreed?

[Speaker A] It could be that the Reform movement arrived there from the outset with the goal that the Jewish law you keep doesn’t fit the times—you need to change.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We all know this. I’m asking within this model that I described here: where is there another possible mechanism? Where is there? Where does another mechanism enter here? Midrashic conservative, like you said, like he said. Fine, I don’t agree. I’ll tell you more than that: if I try to identify these examples I described here about the swimsuits—in the swimsuit example—with the groups we know from our world, then as an initial identification, not an exact one, but as an initial identification, I’d say: the simplistic conservative is the Haredi (ultra-Orthodox), the midrashic conservative is the modern religious person, and the heretic is, yes, the secular person, the heretic. Okay?

The modern religious person basically looks different from the way his ancestors looked, behaves differently, but explains that this is what should be done today. Now, the Haredi continues to go with the clothes his ancestors wore—as a metaphor, not only the clothes—but he thinks we need to keep doing what our ancestors did, and therefore he is basically a simplistic conservative. Okay? So if I want to identify the figures I defined here with the groups we know in today’s religious sociology—or theology, or religious sociology of today—then it seems to me that this is the natural identification. Okay? Simplistic conservative is Haredi—Haredi not in the sense of anti-Zionist, also Hardali, fine? By Haredi I mean someone who is halakhically conservative, yes? Midrashic conservative is the modern religious person, who tells you—unlike me. Fine?

People tend to identify the modern religious person with the light version, but that’s propaganda by the conservatives, of course. “Datlight” is someone who cut corners. The modern religious person isn’t that; he has reasons why today we need to do things differently from how they did them once. You can agree, you can disagree—he has arguments; he’s not just not doing it because he doesn’t feel like it. Okay?

It reminds me of a story. There was once—well, not once, there still is—a theater actor named Haggai Luber, a major actor. He has a theater called Aspaklaria. What is it? A theater? So he’s the owner there. He used to be—I don’t know if he still is—I once went to one of his performances. He would put on plays in different places to raise issues for discussion, and afterward he’d discuss them with the audience. A play about some formerly religious person, something—I don’t remember exactly.

After the performance, and during the discussion, he said that he had been an instructor in the midrasha in Ofra. Various youth groups come there and so on, and they have discussions, ideological issues, religion, faith / belief, all kinds of things like that. He said: listen, I’ve been there about seven years. Seven years ago we’d sit around the campfire and you could cut the air with a knife. If I could prove to them that there is a God and the revelation at Sinai, everybody would repent and go—I don’t know what—study Torah day and night, okay? And if not, then we’d all go to the beach, throw everything away, end the whole story, nothing would remain.

And seven years passed—like five generations. We sit around the campfire with the same kind of people, the same age, from the same place, from the same society, the same social group. I say to them, sitting around the campfire: there is a God, there are proofs, and this and God. “Yeah, sounds reasonable.” Then he says to them: and He also revealed Himself at Sinai. “Of course, because otherwise how would you know He exists?” And He also gave the Torah there. “Otherwise what was He doing there?” And everything He said has to be observed. “Right, obviously—He’s God, no?”

And then he says: that’s where I stop, as if—so where are we stuck? Wait—there is a God, He revealed Himself at Sinai, gave commandments, and everybody has to observe them. So what else do I need to convince you of in order for you to do it? They say: it just doesn’t suit us right now. In the past, everything depended on the question of what you thought was true. Today it’s more of an existential issue. Okay? Theoretically everything can be true, but it just doesn’t suit me at the moment. That’s it. It doesn’t speak to me right now, I don’t connect to it. Okay? That’s it. Yes.

So the claim—this is why I say the light people are those who “don’t connect to it.” That’s not a position. Fine, I’m talking about positions. So in short: the Haredim are simplistic conservatives, the midrashic conservatives are the modern religious or, if you like, the liberal religious, and the heretic is the heretic—the secular person, the one who doesn’t accept the whole thing.

That’s why, for example, the traditionalist doesn’t appear on this map. Because a traditionalist—again, there are a few kinds of traditionalists—but one type is someone who basically thinks like the religious, like the Orthodox, conservative or simplistic, doesn’t matter—but like the Orthodox, except that it doesn’t suit him right now. He doesn’t do everything because it doesn’t suit him, it’s hard for him, I don’t know, it’s just not the custom in his circle. Okay? That’s not a position. I’m talking about positions. If someone acts according to his position—someone who thinks like this and acts like this—I have no problem defining him. Fine, I can be a simplistic conservative, think like the simplistic conservative, and act like a midrashic conservative. So what? I’m discussing positions, not people.

Now, what is the Reform position? The Reform position—not Reform people. Is there another position besides these three? Seemingly, no. But is there? Yes. And this is a major lesson: many times when you get stuck, you get stuck because of the following fallacy. Because you’re thinking dichotomously. What does that mean? Let’s start—maybe I mentioned once the heap paradox? The heap paradox: if one pebble is not a heap, if I have a pile that is not a heap, adding one pebble doesn’t change the status—but a thousand pebbles is a heap. Or baldness, right? With one hair you’re bald, adding one hair doesn’t change it, but with ten thousand hairs you’re no longer bald. Okay? So where’s the problem? What’s not right here?

Seemingly, there are three reasonable assumptions. One pebble is not a heap. Adding one pebble doesn’t really change the status. But a thousand do. Three assumptions, each of which sounds reasonable. So what? But you can’t have all three together, right? There’s a contradiction here. So what isn’t right? That adding one pebble doesn’t change anything—that’s not right. But the formalists will say, yes, from seventeen and up it’s already a heap. Which is of course not right. We don’t have such a definition of a heap. In everyday language that isn’t what the word “heap” means.

So what is right? The correct claim is: adding one pebble changes the status a little. That’s the right answer. You become a little more of a heap. Meaning, the world isn’t divided into piles that are heaps or not heaps. There are piles that, from zero to one, have degrees of heap-ness. Zero heap, 0.1 heap, 0.15 heap, 0.22 heap, 0.9 heap, 0.99, 1—that’s completely a heap. Fine? There’s a continuum of levels of heap-ness. Every everyday concept is like that. Okay?

So what really led to the fallacy, and how did we solve it? We thought about it dichotomously, that everything is either a heap or not a heap—and that’s not true. Since the concept “heap” obeys fuzzy logic—if you like, continuous logic—between zero and one, it’s not either yes-a-heap or not-a-heap, binary logic; rather there is a continuum of levels of heap-ness between zero and one. That’s what’s called fuzzy logic.

For example, if I look at exams and say: it’s not worth giving exams, there’s no point. Because lazy people don’t study even when there’s an exam, and diligent people study even without an exam. So what’s the point of an exam? Either way, there’s no point; the exam doesn’t help at all. Either you don’t need it or it doesn’t help. Where’s the mistake? The world isn’t divided into pathologically diligent people and pathologically lazy people. There is a continuum of levels. The pathologically lazy won’t be helped by an exam. The pathologically diligent don’t need an exam. But those in the middle—it could be that the push of the exam gives them motivation to study, and without the exam they won’t study. Right?

Meaning, once again, we divide the world into either lazy or diligent. But no—there’s a continuum of levels between the diligent and the lazy. This is what in logic is called a dilemma argument. There’s a dilemma argument, and there are two possibilities: you show that both this and that lead to the same conclusion; therefore the conclusion—yes, if P implies Q and not-P also implies Q, then Q. That’s a contradiction, no? No, the other way around. The answer is Q. Q follows whether you assume P or you assume not-P. Meaning, whatever you assume, Q always comes out. In other words, Q is a true proposition. Fine? And that’s what is called a dilemma proof. Dilemma proofs, or in Talmudic language, “either way.” “Either way” in Talmudic language basically means: look, if you assume this, you reach this conclusion; but if you assume the opposite, you also reach this conclusion. A sign that this conclusion is true—that’s a proof. Okay.

[Speaker C] But now, in a logical argument, P and not—and also not-P—isn’t that a contradiction?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course P and not-P. I said P implies Q, and also not-P implies Q. I didn’t say P and not-P. P and not-P is an internal contradiction. P implies Q, and not-P implies Q. You have an argument: P implies Q, first premise. Second argument: not-P implies Q. Conclusion: Q. Q is true. Okay? Because P or not-P is a tautology. P and not-P is a contradiction. Okay.

So what this thing is really saying is that many times we think dichotomously. And that dichotomous thinking leads us to fallacies because we ignore all the intermediate states between the two extreme poles. Okay? The same thing is happening here. So let me return to our problem. Our problem is where to put the Reform person in this model. What is Reform? A Reform person is someone who is committed to the tradition of previous generations—systematically, either conservatively or midrashically. Usually it will be midrashically, but that doesn’t matter; in principle it doesn’t matter. But not completely, or not at any price. Somewhat committed, or partially committed. What does that mean? If the price is too high, then no—then he won’t do it. But in principle he is not secular, he is not indifferent to the tradition of previous generations. In principle he would like to continue it; just not when the price is too high. Okay? So that, for example, is a model that can fit here to represent the Reform position.

[Speaker A] And is that their deepening—they’re basically like the midrashic conservatives and say that the Torah really wants…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Once they became an ideological group, then they’re no longer that. Once they became an ideological group, that means this is their interpretive move. It’s not that they’re weak, so they don’t observe it because it’s hard for them. No, that’s something else. That may be traditionalists. Rather, they turned it into an ideology. They have rabbis who issue halakhic rulings for them about what should be done and what shouldn’t. And once you turn it into an ideology, you’ve become another stream on the map. Here it’s not someone who… okay, he’s one of the regular streams, except he doesn’t do what he thinks. No—they do what they think. That is what they think. They think it isn’t worth any price.

[Speaker C] So also—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not only a moral price and not only an interest-based price. It could be prices like these or prices like those, it doesn’t matter.

[Speaker A] Yes, but among the midrashic conservatives, with the midrashic conservative, they also explain midrashically that he really understands the Torah in one way or another…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that I don’t care about. All of those are midrashic conservatives; it doesn’t matter to me right now what conservative midrash he’s making. I don’t care what midrash he’s making. If he’s making a midrash, then he’s a midrashic conservative.

[Speaker A] So the traditionalist could also fit in…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the traditionalist can fit in there in his outlook, but he doesn’t observe what his outlook says.

[Speaker A] He understands that this is what the Torah wants, so—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then why doesn’t he do it?

[Speaker A] What does the Torah want? This is how he interprets…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He doesn’t say it’s permitted to drive on the Sabbath. He says it just doesn’t suit him right now.

[Speaker A] And he has an interpretation…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he has an interpretation, he’s a midrashic conservative. I’m talking about that traditionalist I mentioned. There are several types you could call traditionalists. If he has an interpretation, he’s a midrashic conservative.

[Speaker A] Yes, but basically it depends, because every reasonable person usually has certain assumptions and positions… right, right, right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not because he said… no, no, no, not because he said it. There are people who have an ideology that they do not live by ideologies. They do not live by interpretations. They don’t need to justify everything. What suits me I’ll do; what doesn’t suit me I won’t do. They’re not claiming that the Holy One, blessed be He, in this situation doesn’t want this from me. They don’t enter that issue at all. They say, fine, we have a framework, we live within it, and we’re flexible. There are things that suit us, things that don’t. I mentioned earlier the story around the campfire, right? That’s basically the idea.

[Speaker C] But what about the heretic?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The heretic is someone who has no interest in continuing. He doesn’t recognize the validity of the traditional laws at all. End of story… either I’m committed, or I’m not…

[Speaker C] No, no. Right now, I’m not committed in the sense that I would like to be committed, but it doesn’t really suit me, so I’m not committed.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, then you can call it whatever you want, but I’m saying: that’s a different model. The Reform person… the heretic has no interest in tradition. The Reform person is traditional Judaism—the movement for traditional Judaism, that’s what they’re called in the world. Tradition does interest them, but not at any price. Fine? I’m saying their level of commitment is neither one nor zero. It’s a third, half, I don’t know—something in the middle. Okay? That’s a model. It’s also a model.

[Speaker C] It seems to me like the heretic.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can say he’s worth no more than the heretic. Fine. But it’s a different model. The heretic doesn’t care about tradition.

[Speaker C] It’s as if there’s some intermediate stage there, but it plays no role.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It does play a role. In a place where there is no price, he will do the tradition. The heretic won’t.

[Speaker C] Only because it suits him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, what does “because it suits him” mean? Not because it doesn’t sufficiently not suit him. Again: he will do things not because they suit him. He does things because that’s what the tradition says.

[Speaker C] If it—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] doesn’t suit him,

[Speaker C] then he won’t do it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s not the same thing. He doesn’t simply do whatever suits him, period. From the standpoint of Torah from Heaven, when I’m committed… he doesn’t have Torah from Heaven. The Reform person doesn’t have Torah from Heaven. So in that sense he’s like the heretic. You can relate to him like the heretic, health and happiness to you. But he’s not like the heretic. You can say he’s worth no more than the heretic; he’s also a heretic. Fine—but it’s a different model. There’s a difference between not being committed and being committed but not fully. That’s all. You can say, from my perspective it makes no difference because this one is wicked and that one is wicked. Okay. But it’s still a different model.

[Speaker C] Not operationally—in terms of a position. A different position, let’s say, of what you’re committed to.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The position is different. The position is different. Why? You judge both of them negatively, but it’s a different position. Because this one is only partially committed and that one is not committed at all. That’s all. Like that one is a heap at 0.3 heap, and this one is not a heap at all. What do you mean it’s the same thing? It’s not the same thing. There are different levels of heap-ness.

[Speaker C] In terms of positions it looks like they’re in the same position. No, they’re not in the same position. It could be that in—I don’t know—in other circles he sees himself as more committed.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We keep repeating ourselves. You’re mixing two planes. You’re saying that from your point of view he’s worth no more than a heretic.

[Speaker C] No, not from my point of view. Yes, only from your point of view. No, I’m talking about what the difference is between the heretic and the Reform person when both of them, in their position toward the Torah, are yes or no commitment. A very big difference.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They see it as binding at level 0.3, and they see it as not binding at all. That’s all. Different position. And you’re saying yes, commitment at 0.3 is also heresy. Fine, because that’s your position. But it’s a different position. You’re just disqualifying both in the same way. Fine, so what? But that’s your position.

[Speaker C] No, taking commitment and spreading it out as a spectrum loses the whole point of commitment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In your opinion. Right. But not in his opinion.

[Speaker C] You can’t determine now—we’re trying—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you can’t determine that he has the same position as that other one just because you disqualify both of them.

[Speaker C] They’re not in the same position. They are in the same position. It could be that there are different interpretations of this; they also have additional assumptions.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Doesn’t matter—so those are different positions. You want to call it the same group, call it whatever you want—groups—but they are different positions.

[Speaker C] I would say they have the same basic assumption.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But they don’t have the same basic assumption.

[Speaker C] They have the same basic assumption: the Torah doesn’t really bind me.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s one assumption. And the second assumption is: the Torah binds me partially.

[Speaker C] No, no. I—assumption—what no?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. That’s what he’s telling you.

[Speaker C] What we said: the Torah doesn’t really bind me.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s not true.

[Speaker C] To say they have—you’re a heretic. I would say I, I, you—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] can repeat it again and again—

[Speaker C] but that doesn’t make it true.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Love of Torah, love of the Jewish people—he will do

[Speaker C] as much as possible.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But it doesn’t make it true if you repeat it again and again. Why? Because these are two different positions. One says the Torah doesn’t bind me; the other says the Torah binds me partially. That’s all. Different positions. You can say that both of them do not see the Torah as fully binding. Correct—so what? That’s it! Correct—so what? So because of that they’re also Christians? Because Christians also do not see the Torah as fully binding. Hindus also do not see the Torah as fully binding. So Christianity—

[Speaker C] and Hindus are the same thing?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Very possibly.

[Speaker C] Christianity and Hindus—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] are the same thing?

[Speaker C] And both of them don’t see the Torah as binding. Right, so that means they have some common denominator.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m asking whether that’s the same group. According to your approach it’s exactly the same thing. After all, neither of them accepts the Torah completely. That’s it. Correct. That’s it. They’re in the same group. No, they are not in the same group! In this context of whether the Torah binds them. No! In this context, but they’re not the same group. And exactly likewise these are also not the same group. They are in the same group in the sense that according to both of them the Torah does not bind fully. Correct! But for one it binds partially, and for the other not at all.

[Speaker C] They are the same identity; even within the conservatives I can come and find non-identities.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You won’t be able to find anything! You won’t be able to find anything, any difference. What? Between the conservatives.

[Speaker C] Between the conservatives? Ah, in practice I see that they’re different. In practice what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m talking to you now about my swimsuit model. You won’t find any difference.

[Speaker C] Between what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Between the conservative—the different kinds of conservatives. No difference.

[Speaker C] Here—one wears, one doesn’t—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A simplistic conservative and a midrashic conservative are two models. Within each of them I’m asking.

[Speaker C] Right—want an example? There isn’t one.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You won’t find any difference. But in terms of—

[Speaker C] commitment, in terms of commitment, either you’re committed or you’re not committed. Not true! Or you’re partially committed. If you’re partially committed, then you’re not committed.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again you’re going back to dichotomy. I explained—for that very reason I gave the introduction of the heap paradox. Either you’re a heap or you’re not a heap. What’s the difference between a 0.3 heap and a zero heap?

[Speaker C] No, a heap—you’re talking about something vague. We’re not talking about something vague.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I am talking about something vague. You think it’s clear.

[Speaker C] What do you mean not clear?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For you it’s clear. But the Reform person says it’s vague. That’s what he says. That’s the position!

[Speaker C] That’s why we’ve been here this whole time.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Good, so now you understand why you’re not in the same group.

[Speaker C] You can say that there—or something completely different.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Put him wherever you want, but he is not in the same group. Not with you and not with the heretic. A different group, that’s all. You see him differently—that’s exactly the point.

[Speaker C] It’s just a semantic division.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s not a semantic division; it’s an abyssal difference in a completely different place. Why? Because it’s a completely different model. What connection is there between them at all? Other than the fact that neither of them is one. So what? You and he also are both not heretics. You know what? In the model, you and the Reform person are together. Neither of you is a heretic at the zero level of zero commitment. That’s it. So you’re basically Reform. You and the Reform person are the same thing.

[Speaker C] Boaz, no, that’s—Rabbi, you just said there is some similarity between us.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No! It’s exactly the same thing. If you say that the Reform person is like a heretic, the heretic will say that the Reform person is like the Orthodox. Same thing. Neither of them is a total heretic. He’s a heretic at 0.7 and he’s a heretic at 1. That’s not true.

[Speaker C] Boaz, no, there’s the basic assumption.

[Speaker A] No—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Traditionalist—traditionalist is not on the map.

[Speaker A] The discussion is about commitment.

[Speaker C] Conservative—if I’m half committed, there’s no such thing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I don’t care, I didn’t get into what kind of conservative. A 0.3 conservative can be this kind, can be that kind. On the contrary, usually it’s a midrashic conservative, a kind of modernist, where every—

[Speaker C] one says what he thinks. Fine, come, wait a second, come, come—so the Haredim are the only ones who are committed, because they’re committed totally? What’s the connection? So the Religious Zionists aren’t committed?

[Speaker A] The Religious Zionists also aren’t committed?

[Speaker C] You don’t understand what you’re saying. What you’re saying is what I’m saying.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Religious Zionists—

[Speaker A] They are committed. What’s the connection? Half committed means he’s not committed.

[Speaker C] Committed—he only claims he’s committed. There are also cases where maybe in practice he doesn’t act that way, but we’re talking now in terms of a theoretical position.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] His theoretical position is that he is committed somewhat. That is his theoretical position. He’s not sloppy—you’re mixing things up.

[Speaker C] He’s not sloppy because it’s a commitment that isn’t systematic.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s a fully systematic commitment at the level of 0.3. That’s it.

[Speaker C] Let’s say, from my point of view, that’s commitment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] From your point of view, but not from his. You have a different position.

[Speaker D] Fine, this is postmodernist discourse.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, this is not postmodernist discourse, no. You’re just waving slogans around. No, it has nothing to do with postmodernism in any way. No connection—even with a telescope you won’t see a connection. With a microscope. Because postmodernism says that both of you are equally right, not that both of you have the same position. When I say these are two different positions, what does that have to do with postmodernity?

[Speaker C] Postmodernity is what the Rabbi is saying: fine, so according to you commitment is one, and according to him commitment is something else.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he isn’t claiming that this is commitment—not true. There’s not even a hint of similarity here. So I’ll explain: it’s not similar at all, there isn’t the slightest resemblance. Postmodernity talks about the question whether everybody is right, not about the question whether they are identical. When I say there are two different positions, that is not a postmodern statement. When I say both positions are equally correct, that is a postmodern statement. I did not claim that the Reform person is as right as you; I also think he is wrong. I only claim that he is a different position from yours and from the heretic’s. That’s what I claim. To say that one position is different from another position—what does that have to do with postmodernity? Those are facts. The question whether everyone is right or not—that is a debate.

[Speaker C] What I said, what resembles postmodernism, is when the Rabbi says okay, he doesn’t accept your definitions—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] in the subjective sense.

[Speaker C] No, he—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] accepts your definitions.

[Speaker C] He doesn’t accept my definition. He accepts the term commitment as one or one.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re not defining commitment; you’re just playing with words. What you’re saying is that your commitment is one. That’s what I’m saying—very good. And he says his commitment is 0.3. That’s all. It’s not a question of definitions at all. Nobody here is arguing about definitions.

[Speaker C] But what does that mean?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] 0.3 in prices. Up to 100 shekels I’m committed to all the commandments; if it costs me more than 100 shekels, then no. That’s all. That’s my position.

[Speaker C] We’re assuming a spectrum for something that’s hard to spread out over many things. Right. I don’t understand how commitment can be spread out.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why can’t commitment be spread out? Commitment can be spread out. How?

[Speaker C] Tell me—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Is there commitment to the law? Can that be spread out? No? Then how is there conscientious objection?

[Speaker C] What do you mean?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Conscientious objection, “a transgression for the sake of Heaven” in Jewish law, whatever.

[Speaker C] That’s refusal of the law, but it’s loyalty—that’s what Rawls calls civil disobedience.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rawls—there is commitment to the law; commitment to the law is full.

[Speaker C] For a person who engages in civil disobedience?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, civil disobedience—

[Speaker C] he acts against the law but in loyalty to the essence of the law.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do I care about the essence of the law? That’s word games. Is he committed to the law?

[Speaker C] We were just talking now about the midrashic conservative.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Is he committed to the law, I ask. No—what do you mean, it’s not connected to the midrashic conservative? He’ll sit in jail. What does that have to do with it? That’s all.

[Speaker C] He sits in jail, but on what claim? On the claim that the law itself deviates from its original essence, and therefore he opposes it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Look, first of all, we really are drifting. You’re talking about civil disobedience; I was talking about conscientious objection, not civil disobedience. Something completely different. Conscientious objection is when you are unwilling to do something because it crosses some red line of yours. Civil disobedience really is rebellion in the name of the very idea of the law itself. Okay. I’m talking about conscientious objection.

Conscientious objection means that I’m committed to the law, but not at any price. There are prices at which I will not be committed to the law. Like a Nazi law, I don’t know, the Nuremberg laws, or a law that would force me to violate…

[Speaker C] Then you’re not committed to the law.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly! You’re not committed to the law. Not at all. Zero! Zero! What are you saying? Anyone who conscientiously objects has no obligation to the law? Then every citizen in this country is not committed to the law, according to your definition. Your definition. Fine. Okay, an interesting definition, even though 100 percent of people disagree with it. But aside from that, it’s an interesting definition.

[Speaker C] What is commitment? What is commitment to the law? You’re playing with words. No, it’s a person who will act in accordance with the law when… not true!

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not true! Commitment to the law comes in levels. There is commitment to the law at 100 percent—that’s a Nazi fascist. There is commitment to the law at 80 percent—that’s someone prepared to engage in conscientious objection in 20 percent of cases that cross his red line. That’s all. So he is committed to the law at the level of 80 percent. But in all the other cases he obeys.

[Speaker C] But that same person, that same person who does not see, say, the law as the essence of absolute truth, as Torah from Heaven—then in truth he really does not accept it as Torah from Heaven. That’s the great surprise. This is a person who really does not—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t say that was a surprise. I’m asking you—

[Speaker C] whether he is committed or not. No, he is not committed to divine law, let’s say, he is committed—leave me alone with divine law. Is he committed at 100 percent, at 80 percent, at zero, not at all?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so if so, then the claim… you’re just being stubborn.

[Speaker C] No, not true. The claim is that this is a completely different kind of commitment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not like… you’re playing with words. It’s not like you… you’re playing with words because this has nothing to do with Heaven. Who talked about Heaven? The question is what degree he is committed to the law. The commitment we were talking about…

[Speaker C] I’m asking whether he is committed to the law. In law—so define commitment for me. What is commitment?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Commitment to the law. Someone who—

[Speaker C] obeys the law, thinks one should obey the law. There are many people who don’t… not true. Obedience to the law is commitment to the law—that’s not the same thing at all. It’s not the same thing. There are many people who obey the law and are not committed to the law. I don’t understand. Someone who thinks one should obey the law. There is no identity—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] between obeying the law… someone who thinks one should obey the law, fine—that is commitment. Yes, that is commitment. Someone who thinks one should—

[Speaker C] obey the law is not necessarily committed to the law. But in my opinion—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If so—

[Speaker C] then it’s not the same thing, what, it’s not so… it’s not the same thing. It’s exactly the same thing. It’s not the same thing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. Fine, we’ll continue, there’s no point. Moving on. So in short, there is… so we actually have four models, where the Reform people enter in the place where the commitment is not full commitment.

Good. Those are the four models. Now let’s try to sharpen things a bit more. First of all, simplistic conservatism—there is no such creature. It’s a fictional model; there’s no such creature. All the greatest Haredim in the universe—none of them is a simplistic conservative. None of them thinks that today we should observe the Torah the way it was in Moses’s time. That’s obvious. So what is it? The ethos in which they operate is an ethos of simplistic conservatism.

Yes, I have an uncle who said that Abaye and Rava studied in Yiddish. I think I told you that, no? Abaye and Rava studied in Yiddish, because if they knew how to study they probably studied in Yiddish. Now, he knew they were Iraqis, but he understood… the ethos he really lived in was that Abaye and Rava studied in Yiddish and wore a gartel and a shtreimel. Because you educate people on the idea that we have not moved from the tradition of our ancestors, that they did not change their clothing and their language—yes, according to the Haredi ethos, they did not change their clothing and their language. The natural assumption is that Abraham our father walked around with a gartel and a shtreimel, right? I mean… after all, no generation changed its dress; otherwise that’s the whole idea of the Jewish people. So it turns out that Abraham our father walked around with a gartel and a shtreimel. Okay?

Now, they know that’s not true, but the ethos in which they live and on which they educate is like that. So simplistic conservatism is the Haredi ethos. But Haredism itself is certainly midrashic conservatism. Just midrashic conservatism that is not self-aware, or only partially aware—I don’t know what to call it. Okay? Therefore, the difference between Haredim and midrashic conservatives, and modern religious people, is basically only a difference of degree. How far are you willing to go with your conservative midrash? Okay, that’s all. Some do it less, some do it more; it’s not an essential difference.

Incidentally, the Conservatives are also located on this axis. Conservatives have no separate definition on this axis; they belong to midrashic conservatism. Exactly like the Haredim, exactly like the Religious Zionists, whether national-religious or modern, however you want to call them. These three groups belong to the same group. It’s only differences of degree. You can’t define a difference between them; there is no difference between them. There is no definition of a difference between them. The Conservatives make halakhic arguments that are completely equivalent to the arguments you’ll find among the Haredim and among the modern religious. They just do it more. That’s all.

And therefore you won’t be able… if you look at a person and hear one of his arguments, you won’t be able to point and say whether he is conservative, whether he is Haredi, whether he is modern religious, or whether he is Conservative. In principle there is no difference between them. The difference is more sociological. How much do you use that argument, in what contexts do you use those arguments—but really there is no… you can’t explain to me why here you do it and there you don’t do it.

Take an example—we may still talk about it. The Talmud at the beginning of tractate Bava Batra, on page 5, says that there is a legal presumption that a person does not repay before the due date. Yes? Someone claims money from me that he lent me, okay, a week ago, and I say to him, “I already repaid you.” Then in principle I’m not believed. Why? Because there is a presumption: a person does not repay before the due date. I could have held onto the money for a month, and I’m claiming I already repaid even though only a week has passed—that’s not plausible. If I can hold the money for a month, why would I repay after a week? Therefore I’m not believed. Okay.

Now, what happens—I mean, if, say, he came after two months and claimed the money from me, and I said, “I repaid,” I would be believed, because the burden of proof is on the claimant. Right? Meaning, if he wants to extract money from me, let him bring proof that I didn’t repay.

[Speaker C] If he comes—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] after two months, yes—one month after the repayment date, let’s say a thirty-day loan. Then he would be believed. Okay. Now let’s assume we live in a situation where people do in fact repay before the due date. Factually. I don’t know—think about mortgages. Mortgages now, with the interest constantly rising, if people suddenly receive an inheritance, they’ll go to the bank and pay off as much of the mortgage as they can, because they don’t want to pay the interest over the coming months and years. Right? Someone who has no money has no money; he keeps paying. But someone who does have it will repay before the due date.

Now think: the bank comes and claims the money from me, and I say, “I repaid”—before the due date. A mortgage is for twenty years. And I’m claiming I repaid before the due date. Okay. What is a religious court supposed to rule?

[Speaker C] A simplistic religious court would say no, you’re not believed.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A person does not repay before the due date—a legal presumption. It says so in the Talmud, it’s ruled in Jewish law in the Shulchan Arukh, in Maimonides, everywhere: a person does not repay before the due date, right? You have to pay. What would a normal judge rule? Of course you’re believed. Why? What do you mean “of course”? Meaning, there’s no problem believing you if you bring me some indication that money really did fall into your hands. Whatever, and so on. Then you would be believed. Why? Because in reality today people do repay before the due date, right? Today that’s how it is. So is there some Haredi judge who wouldn’t rule that way? I don’t think so.

That is midrashic conservatism, not simplistic conservatism. The principle is the presumption that a person does not repay before the due date. That’s what it says in the Shulchan Arukh. It doesn’t say there that this applies only in places where people don’t customarily repay early, but that’s clear to us from the context. We interpret it and say: all this was said in a place where people don’t repay before the due date. But in our case, where people do repay before the due date, the Jewish law should be different. That is exactly a conservative midrash. Right?

By contrast, think about a woman who got married and it turned out that her husband is violent, mentally ill, violent. Fine? And he never—he became ill only now; they simply didn’t discover it earlier. In principle I would say: mistaken transaction. She consented to the marriage because she didn’t know he was that kind of person. If she had known, she would not have consented—mistaken transaction, the marriage is void without a bill of divorce. Right? But the halakhic decisors today—none of them will say that. Why? Because the Talmud says: “Better to sit as two than to sit alone as a widow.” The Talmud says that there is a presumption that for women it is better to live with any partner, no matter what kind. Partnership is more important to them than anything else—even if he has leprosy, is violent, whatever you want. Women very much want partnership. That is the Talmud’s assumption.

[Speaker A] The question is what kind of partnership.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, nowadays—wait, forget nowadays, I’m saying this is what is written in the Talmudic text. Now the question is what a judge is supposed to rule. Compare this to the presumption that a person does not repay before the due date. It seems to me the conclusion is very clear, right? Say it’s true: in the time of the Talmud, apparently it was extremely important for women to be in a relationship, even at any price. I wouldn’t put it that way, but if the Sages say so, they probably knew the reality. Okay, but in our time, after all, we know our own reality, and it’s not true. In our time, women are not willing to live with just any partner; that’s obvious. Okay, so in fact today the presumption that “better to sit as two than to sit alone” no longer holds. At least in sufficiently extreme cases. Women still want relationships, and men do too. That’s obvious; it still exists, it’s not as if things changed by 180 degrees. But in sufficiently extreme cases, certainly not. No religious court rules that way. Why? God knows why. I have no idea. What’s the difference between that and the presumption that a person does not repay before the due date? This is a presumption and that is a presumption. Rabbi Soloveitchik writes somewhere that presumptions were given at Sinai. We cannot change them in any way. And it doesn’t depend on circumstances or changes in human nature and all that, because the Torah penetrated to the depths of human nature and this came down from Sinai. And I—this is such nonsense that I don’t believe he himself believed it. He—

[Speaker A] Did he really say that? He wrote it, yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He wrote it, and it was probably against the Reform movement or whatever he was afraid of there, various things. It’s obvious that he himself didn’t believe it; it’s nonsense. And the fact is that with respect to the presumption of “better to sit as two than to sit alone,” they don’t do the conservatism, the conservative midrash; and with respect to the presumption that a person does not repay before the due date, every normal religious court will do it. Here there’s no argument with Reform or anything else; this is monetary law, you have to discuss whether he did in fact repay or did not repay. Okay? So what does that mean? It means that the question of whether you use a conservative midrash or don’t use a conservative midrash—you can’t define it sharply, or distinguish between those who do such midrashim and those who don’t; everyone does. Just in some cases yes, in other cases no. Some do more such midrashim, some do fewer. There is nobody who is a plain-text conservative in the sense that he is unwilling to accept conservative midrashim. There is no such thing. Jewish law is full of conservative midrashim at every turn. There is no halakhic decisor who doesn’t need such midrashim. Therefore, the very concept of a plain-text conservative is only a theoretical concept. It’s a typological type, what they call in philosophy, right? I present different types, but these aren’t really types that exist in the field. Okay? In the field, almost everyone is a midrashic conservative. Conservatives, Haredim, and modern religious people, all of them are midrashic conservatives. The whole question is just how many midrashim you are willing to make, that’s all, and how nervous you are from various threats from Reform. And that’s it; that’s the whole difference. There is no principled difference between them. What’s the question? Is a midrashic conservative a different model?

[Speaker F] Yes,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Reform are a different model; I’ll explain that now. And the Reform in general—what is the difference between a Reform person or a heretic and a midrashic conservative of all kinds, whether Conservative, modern religious, or Haredi? The difference is in the question of whether you do midrash. The Reform person doesn’t bother explaining to you how he interprets the sources in such a way that now they must be applied differently. He says: this doesn’t fit now, and that’s that. He doesn’t explain what the sources meant, what changed now, and therefore why—like with the presumption that a person does not repay before the due date. I showed you why it should be interpreted that way, right? Meaning, I made a conservative midrash. The Reform person makes the change without presenting a conservative midrash. In other words, the price is too high, let’s say in crude language. Okay? The moment you don’t present a midrash, then you are in the Reform camp, or the heretical camp, or one of those. You are not in the camp of the midrashic conservative. The difference is the question of whether you present a midrash that, again, can be a very far-reaching and very bold midrash. As long as you sincerely think this is the correct midrash, you are conservative. You are offering an interpretation; I may disagree with you or agree with you, but the discussion is a discussion within the framework of Jewish law. You are offering an interpretation that I may agree with or may not agree with, but you are playing the game within the rules of Jewish law. You are offering your own interpretation, which I may dispute or not dispute, like any dispute in Jewish law. Okay?

[Speaker A] But the fact that there is a Reform rabbi—doesn’t that mean the Reform person is also basically trying to speak in the name of…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you just have to know, you just have to know and see; it’s not—they don’t make midrashim, they don’t present midrashim. They try to speak—

[Speaker A] In the name of the Torah…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] To speak in the name of the Torah is very unclear among the Reform, because the Torah is not exactly from Heaven there, that’s the question of how exactly to understand it, but you can simply look at the responsa. The responsa—I have a series of columns on the website. In column 478, from 475 to 480, I speak exactly about this map, about the Conservatives and the modern religious, and I try to define what a modern religious person is more precisely. In column 478 I explain why the Reform do not fit into this map, and I simply bring one book by Moshe Zemer, who was a Reform rabbi here in Israel, and he wrote a book called Sane Jewish Law. In that book he supposedly really does bring supports from halakhic sources for Reform rulings. And even he, who does that—which others don’t bother doing at all—even he, you can see, and I show it there in the column, he doesn’t really bring arguments. It’s “this doesn’t suit our generation” or something like that; he does not interpret the source and explain what changed from then to now, and therefore why today it needs to be applied differently. There is no conservative midrash in some cases—though in some cases there is. And in some cases there is no conservative midrash; he simply changes it because it doesn’t fit, and that’s it. Okay? So even though he may relate to halakhic sources, he’ll bring all the halakhic sources—I don’t know, not all of them but many—and after that he’ll say, yes, but all this doesn’t suit us, and that’s it. He won’t explain what they meant, why in their time it was true, and what changed today, why today it isn’t true. That’s what you need to explain when you make a conservative midrash. And someone who doesn’t bother making such a midrash is not in the conservative game. Now, how many times you do this, and on what scale you do it—that is already the difference between different midrashic conservatives. Haredim will do it less… modern religious people more, Conservatives even more.

[Speaker A] So that’s a kind of loyalty level of 0.3?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Not at any price. Meaning, there are prices I won’t pay. Not because I’ll explain to you why it doesn’t apply today, understand? Someone who explains is basically saying: I am one hundred percent committed. Meaning, if I don’t have an explanation, I need to do it as written. Therefore he needs an explanation, because from his point of view it is binding. The Reform person doesn’t need an explanation because if the price is high enough, then even without an explanation he won’t do it.

[Speaker A] You could present someone very, very smart who can basically explain everything, all the sources in a certain way, and in the end not keep almost anything.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So yes, first of all you have to see—look, there is—

[Speaker A] That’s exactly—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] what I’m dealing with right now, because there was some critique by someone who wrote a critique of one of my books, and precisely he made that claim. The point is this—look, I’ll tell you, I’ll give you an example. What was the question? That basically if you adopt the possibility of making a conservative midrash, then all of Jewish law goes to pieces, because after all you can do whatever you want. You can always interpret it to mean that it was once applicable and today it is different, and therefore today it doesn’t apply, and basically nothing remains of Jewish law. But look, I’ll give you an example. Suppose someone comes and says about swimsuits: we were in Africa, we walked around in swimsuits; we arrived in Scandinavia, it’s cold, okay? So now what, should we go around naked? We should go without clothes? In Scandinavia it’s very nice to go naked. Why? What’s the problem? In Hebrew, with what letter does Africa begin? Aleph, right? So there you have to go with a swimsuit, which begins with bet. The rule is always that you must wear a garment that begins with the next letter after the place where you are. So if you’re in Africa, you go with a swimsuit, and if you’re in Scandinavia, which begins with samekh, you go naked, which begins with ayin. Everything is fine, right? Now ostensibly he’s right; there is a conservative midrash here, and it’s obvious that this is nonsense. There is such a thing as common sense. True, you can present an argument and the argument is logically valid, but it’s nonsense. It’s obvious to everyone that it’s nonsense. And whoever wants to be a formalist—there’s no difference. This is a conservative midrash and that is a conservative midrash, everything. So nothing remains. Fine, but I am not a formalist. Meaning, when it is clear to me that the person is not really offering a conservative argument, but is presenting some supposed argument and showing me some logical argument whose conclusion is his conclusion, that doesn’t interest me. These are games, and I know what games he is playing. He himself doesn’t believe it. And if a person sincerely believes that he has a midrash, and I don’t agree with him at all, and that the midrash is not correct, but I am convinced that he himself really believes in that midrash, then fine, he is in the conservative field. Then he is playing the conservative halakhic game. And I disagree with him, and we have an argument. But there are cases where common sense applies—you can’t take every piece of nonsense someone brings up and say, well, anything goes. Not everything can be done, in short. Some things are reasonable and some are not. I’ll give you an example, something—the example I wrote, I once wrote an article, and that was the example I used. I said: let’s suppose I want to validate women as witnesses today. Okay, it is written in the Talmudic text that women are disqualified from testimony. “Then the two men who have the dispute shall stand before the Lord”—men and not women, Talmud in tractate Shevuot.

[Speaker A] Shailai or Alexander, maybe they know? Okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now I say: since women in the past were—

[Speaker A] Not—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] educated, they were at home or something like that, and were not familiar with what went on in the marketplace, in the economy, what happened among people, and so on, therefore they were disqualified from testimony. Today women are involved in economic life and social life, so today they are fit for testimony. That is a conservative midrash. Right? Now what do you think? Would an Orthodox person make such a midrash? Usually not. There is no reason not to do it. No reason. What is the difference between that and a thousand other midrashim that people do make? Only one thing: this deals with the status of women. The status of women today is a sensitive issue. It’s a sensitive issue, that’s all. But arguments like this are made by the thousands in every area of Jewish law. I brought up “do not form separate factions”—two synagogues or two religious courts in one city. Today nobody is careful about that. A Torah-level law, nobody is careful about it, a halakhic ruling in all the decisors.

[Speaker A] So if there is such a big practical consequence, and you can make this explanation—once?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I’m saying, notice carefully: since there is such a major practical consequence here, if you do not validate women as witnesses, then you are a criminal. Because you are doing a great many things—someone who goes around in a swimsuit even though he should be wearing a coat is not playing it safe. I have the feeling that someone who keeps going around in a swimsuit is the one playing it safe. That’s for sure. If you go with a coat, maybe you’re right and maybe you’re not right. No, that’s not true. Because if I am right, then when you go around in a swimsuit you are a criminal. There is a price in every direction. People think that being conservative is cost-free. If you make a change, either you’re right or you’re wrong, and therefore you have to be careful. No, that’s not true. If you do not—if the truth is that women are fit as witnesses and you let murderers go because there is women’s testimony against them, or you don’t collect money from someone who is a thief because there is only women’s testimony against him, then you are leaving a criminal with the money, or a murderer walking free, because you have women’s testimony. If Jewish law says that women are fit as witnesses, assuming this argument is correct, then you are a major criminal. A deliberate criminal. Much more than accepting women as witnesses, by the way. Because in accepting women as witnesses, nobody claims that women are not trustworthy. The disqualification of women is a decree of Scripture. Because in testimony concerning a woman—where the testimony of a woman is accepted—or in a bill of divorce concerning a woman, or in matters of sexual prohibition, or regarding menstruation status for example, from where this is learned, the counting of niddah and all that—a woman is trusted regarding testimony; it is a decree of Scripture not to accept her here. In my eyes, the price is far higher not to accept women as witnesses when the law in fact permits accepting them than the opposite. If the law says it is forbidden to accept them and I accepted them, then what happened? I violated the halakhic rule by accepting women as witnesses—and they accepted it upon themselves, and in any event one can do that, so it’s not even a problem. That’s peanuts. The really serious problem is the opposite one. If the truth is that today women are fit as witnesses and you did not accept them—that is the real problem. This is like an Agatha Christie book, right? Murder at the mikveh. Do you know an Agatha Christie book? Do you know Agatha Christie? A British detective writer. I’m just kidding, I made it up. Murder at the mikveh—it could have been an Agatha Christie book. What happens? A murderer wants to kill a woman—

[Speaker A] By Rebbetzin Agatha Christie. The rebbetzin.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He wants to murder some rebbetzin. So what does he do? He goes to the mikveh and murders her before all Israel. There are another hundred women there, but they are women and disqualified from testimony. He can murder her, then throw a carnival, dance with everyone in a circle, and walk out. He goes free. Right? Because all the women are disqualified from testimony. Is that reasonable?

[Speaker C] No, that’s not reasonable. Rabbi, I have a question though.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] By the way, Noda B’Yehuda—one second—Noda B’Yehuda and Terumat HaDeshen actually say that in such a case testimony is accepted, so that they will execute him. One says by rabbinic law and one says by Torah law. It can be accepted.

[Speaker C] Right, so that’s what I was going to ask, because in practice I know that when necessary they do accept testimony.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s only today because today things don’t work according to Torah law. What would happen according to Torah law? Excellent question. A hard question.

[Speaker C] There are, after all, a great many punishments written in the Torah where Jewish law really tied its own hands so as not to be able to carry out the law.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but the disqualification of women has nothing to do with that. There is prior warning, there are all sorts of things—you need two witnesses and not one, you need prior warning. But the disqualification of women is not that. It has nothing to do with that.

[Speaker C] But in practice, they do accept women’s testimony?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, they do not accept women’s testimony. In Jewish law they do not accept women’s testimony. If women are witnesses to a marriage, the marriage is not valid. You are single. If in front of two women you gave a woman a ring and said, “Behold, you are betrothed to me with this ring according to the law of Moses and Israel,” you can get married again. You are unmarried. In short, what I want to say is that there is no one who disagrees with the possibility of a conservative midrash. It’s just an ethos. There are such ethoses, that the moment I would raise something like this—not the moment I would raise it, the moment I did raise something like this—they immediately said I was Reform. Immediately. It’s automatic. Right? When you analyze it, it has nothing to do with Reform at all. Only an Orthodox person raises such an argument. A Reform person does not raise such an argument. A Reform person says: I validate women as witnesses because I don’t care what is written in the Talmudic text, or because the value of equality overrides Jewish law. I didn’t say that. I said—I explained why what is written in the Talmudic text is applied differently today. That is exactly the opposite of Reform. But from their point of view, whoever wears a coat is Reform. It doesn’t matter what his reasoning is. If he wears a coat, he is Reform. But I explained: Reform is not determined by what you do. Reform is determined by your reasoning. If your reasoning has midrash in the background, then you are not Reform. You can tell me you disagree—fine, legitimate, no problem, that’s an argument. You cannot tell me I am Reform; that is simply a misunderstanding.

[Speaker A] If they called you traditionally religious, would you agree?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, of course not. Obviously not. Because I’m not.

[Speaker A] And also—or Conservative.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Conservative, Haredi, and modern religious are the same thing. They’re just three words for the same thing. There are only differences of dosage, but you cannot put your finger on what would be legitimate according to Haredim but not legitimate according to Conservatives, or vice versa. There is no criterion.

[Speaker A] This is basically the question you’re raising: whether it is also connected to this matter that the Rashba and Maimonides talked about—that is, whether the Torah has the purpose of making society… it was not meant for that. Meaning that you… it seems to me there is such a position also in Rashba.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I disagree. I hold the position of Ran, that the Torah was not intended for that.

[Speaker A] Not intended for that. Not intended for that. Not in order to cause society to function and all the moral parts—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, Jewish law is something entirely different.

[Speaker A] Now let’s see that… basically we need to discuss the law of the king. If we need to discuss the law of the king, that’s perfectly fine.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s no problem with that, except that you don’t need it because it’s not true. I am not trying to solve problems. I am asking what the Torah wants. Exactly. That is people’s great confusion. People think I do this in order to advance the status of women. I am not doing it in order to advance the status of women; I am doing it because this is what is correct, in my view this is what the Torah says should be done today, even if it harmed the status of women. My claim is that this is correct—not that there is some possibility to do it, so let’s advance the status of women. That is the claim of all sorts of trendy people. Okay? That I might call “lights,” maybe. That I really would call “lights.” Because these are people who are not really asking what the Torah says. They are looking for ways within the framework of the Torah to advance the status of women. Maybe that’s legitimate, it doesn’t matter right now, but that’s not what I’m talking about. I’m arguing that someone who does not do this is a criminal. A halakhic criminal, not a moral one.

[Speaker A] Assuming that this midrash is correct.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, assuming that this midrash is correct. I’m saying, you can argue about the midrash, but I’m saying—

[Speaker A] Meaning, if I understood correctly, then here it kind of exposes everyone—everyone says we are conservatives, but in practice they are midrashic.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. Conservatives are the only ones who admit it. Ah no, modern religious people admit it too.

[Speaker A] They admit what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That they are midrashic conservatives. Look, I want to make two comments. One comment: the distinctions I made here are distinctions between arguments, not between arguers. I am not talking about people and not about groups. I am talking about types of arguments. And a Reform person can come and raise a conservative midrashic argument. Then it is a halakhic argument that must be discussed—what do I care if the one making the claim is Reform?

[Speaker C] Yes, there were such cases. Like that one about pork, I know that back in nineteenth-century Europe there were Reform thinkers who argued that the Torah forbade pork… because of verses saying pork is unhealthy, so they argued that the Torah forbade pork because it was unhealthy, and today we know how to cook pork in such a way that it doesn’t cause problems.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, that is a conservative midrash, for example. Right, yes. In short, it can be… the point is that we have a tendency to judge arguments according to the person making them. Meaning, if it’s a Reform rabbi, then it’s a Reform argument. If it’s Orthodoxy, then it’s an Orthodox argument. No. There are Reform arguments that come from an Orthodox rabbi, and there are Orthodox arguments that come from a Reform rabbi. We need to get used to judging arguments and not arguers. We need to see whether the argument is correct or not correct; what do I care who said it? In that book of Zemer, that Reform rabbi I mentioned to you, there are also arguments that I accept and arguments that I don’t. Meaning, this terrible disease whereby everything goes according to the label hanging over a person—you judge everything he says because of that label. That is the first comment. The second comment: I want to go a bit deeper into conservative midrash. I said that the most important criterion for being conservative is whether you bother making a midrash when you make a change. If you make a change without bringing a midrash, then you are either Reform or a heretic. If you bother to bring a midrash, then you are conservative. That doesn’t mean I will accept your midrash; one can argue. But you are playing the halakhic game, you are offering an interpretation. One can argue, one can accept. There are arguments in Jewish law; Jewish law is full of arguments. We are not frightened by disagreements. Now what is the nature of this midrash? I want to explain two things. First of all, think about—let’s go back for a moment to women’s testimony. Suppose I want to validate women as witnesses. So what do I say? Women in the past were not educated, let’s say just education, or social involvement—let’s speak about education. Women were not educated in the past; today they are educated; therefore today they should be validated as witnesses. Okay? That argument is an invalid argument. Take the argument: women in the past were— the Talmudic text disqualified women from testimony, premise A. Premise B: women in the past were not educated. Premise C: women today are educated. Conclusion: today women should be validated as witnesses.

[Speaker A] It’s invalid because it is not connected to the premise that because they were not educated they were not…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Meaning, there is what is called in David Hume the is-ought fallacy. And following Moore, today they generally call it the naturalistic fallacy. What is the naturalistic fallacy? It’s when you derive a normative conclusion from factual premises. You have premises that are facts, and the conclusion is a judgment or a norm. The moment you see such an argument, don’t examine it—it’s an invalid argument. No need to examine it. The moment that’s the situation, the argument is invalid. Suppose I say to you: this wall is white, therefore this wall is beautiful. Invalid argument. Because “the wall is white” is a fact, and “the wall is beautiful” is a judgment. I say: murder causes a great deal of pain to the family of the murdered person. Therefore it is forbidden to murder. Invalid argument. The fact that murder causes pain to the family is a fact, and “it is forbidden to murder” is a norm—an ethical judgment or norm or something like that. What do you need to add for the argument to become valid? To connect a norm with—exactly.

[Speaker D] Exactly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A bridge premise. Right? A premise that links the norms to the facts. For example: this wall is white; whatever is white is beautiful; conclusion: this wall is beautiful. That is already a valid argument. Why? Because now its premises are not only facts. One premise is a fact—this wall is white. The second premise is a link between facts and norms—whatever is white is beautiful. And the same—

[Speaker A] thing you can do with the norm? And what about the women?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can do whatever you want, but I’m saying you have to add this. Okay? In order for the argument to be valid you have to add it. Otherwise the argument is invalid. And what happens many times is that in the discussion around, for example, women as witnesses, people actually present it like this: women were disqualified as witnesses in the time of the Talmudic text. At that time they were uneducated. Today they are educated, therefore today they should be validated. That is an invalid argument. What do you need to add? You need to add that the disqualification of women then was because of lack of education. Or in other words, whoever is uneducated is disqualified from testimony. “Whatever is white is beautiful,” right? Education is the fact, and disqualification from testimony is the norm, the halakhic norm in this case. You need to add that premise. Now it is not for nothing that people often omit that premise. Sometimes they omit it because it seems self-evident to them. But sometimes they omit it because that is the Achilles heel of the argument. The Achilles heel of the argument. That is the problem in the argument. Everyone agrees on the facts. Everyone agrees that the Talmudic text disqualified women. Everyone agrees that women in the past were not educated. Everyone agrees that women today are educated. So the most convenient thing is to present it as: look, you agree to all this. So obviously women should be validated as witnesses. And the most convenient thing is not to put on the table the premise that is the source of the problem. The premise that says, wait a second, who said so? You say women were disqualified from testimony because of lack of education. That will be hard to prove. Who told you that? And therefore you need to pay close attention: when making such an argument, you need to put on the table the premise that women are disqualified from testimony because of lack of education. Okay? What I want to note about this is something that qualifies it. I put this comment on the table, and now the argument begins. The debate will be over that. There is nothing to argue about regarding the facts; everyone agrees on the facts. The debate will be only about that premise. That is the most important premise. That is why many times people don’t put it on the table. Now how do you argue about such a premise? So I can—we look for evidence, right? We need to look for evidence as to why women were disqualified from testimony.

[Speaker D] For example, the Talmudic text does not—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] say it was because of your lack of education, and nowhere. Nothing is written. Nothing is written in the Talmudic text. In the Talmudic text there is no evidence. But for example, in the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and later authorities (Acharonim) one can see discussions, for example, why a wicked person is disqualified from testimony. Is it because we suspect lying, or is it an intrinsic disqualification? And on that there is evidence; they bring practical ramifications. For example, in women’s testimony. If a wicked person is disqualified from testimony because it is an intrinsic disqualification, then in testimony concerning a woman he will be valid. There they validate all the disqualified people. But if it is because of suspicion of lying—can you explain what you said?

[Speaker C] It’s just that not everyone here is familiar with—if—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If a wicked person is disqualified by something intrinsic, you said? The question is why a wicked person is disqualified from testimony. Is it because I suspect that he will lie and cannot trust him? Or because the Torah disqualified a wicked person from testimony—an intrinsic disqualification. A type, as it were. Not because of suspicion of lying. We are not prepared to give a wicked person the status of testimony. Okay? This is a problem of what is called in legal philosophy admissibility and not credibility. We do not accept the testimony, not because he is not credible. Okay? Now the medieval and later authorities discuss this and bring evidence. For example, if you find someone who says that a wicked person is valid for testimony concerning a woman—testimony concerning a woman meaning that her husband died, to permit the woman, an agunah. We want testimony that her husband died. So there are various leniencies that the Sages made, that we accept testimony of one witness, we accept testimony of a woman, because we want to permit, to save the agunah.

[Speaker A] And they never check whether the wicked person—?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So if you find someone who validates a wicked person for testimony, then clearly he holds that the disqualification of a wicked person is intrinsic and not because of suspicion of lying. Because if it were suspicion of lying, you couldn’t accept him even in testimony concerning a woman, because maybe the woman’s husband is alive. How can you permit her to remarry? The facts still have to be true. You can be lenient in the formal requirements of Jewish law in that place. So if someone accepts a wicked person for testimony, apparently he understands it as an intrinsic disqualification and not suspicion of lying. For example, that is one of the proofs that the later authorities bring. Meaning, we do have ways in Jewish law to examine why someone’s disqualification from testimony exists. The same thing, in principle, we could examine regarding the disqualification of women. We can see whether it is a problem of credibility, whether it is an intrinsic disqualification, for what reason, it doesn’t matter. A woman who is wise, who does business—did they accept her testimony, did they not accept her testimony, it doesn’t matter. One can try to look for evidence in the Talmudic text, in the medieval authorities, in the later authorities, and so on. We did not find evidence. What do we do? There is no evidence, we are in doubt. I argue that one can still do it. Why? I say: look, I have a reasonable explanation for why the Sages disqualified women from testimony. A reasonable explanation, right? If the woman is not informed, then she is disqualified. It’s not necessary—it could be something else. So it is certainly a reasonable explanation. Now someone else will either offer me another reasonable explanation, which I don’t really know of, or he will tell me: yes, but maybe it is a decree of Scripture or something we do not understand. And I say: that’s possible, but if I have a reasonable explanation, then the burden of proof that this explanation is not correct and there is something else is on you. I have a reasonable explanation—why should I abandon it? Everywhere I bring you a reasonable argument in the Talmudic text, you can always say: wait, but maybe you are wrong? Maybe I’m wrong, fine, this is what I think, it sounds reasonable to me. Do you have an alternative? Something difficult about my explanation? Nothing. So why not accept it? Why is it called reasoning? If I have logic, I use my logic, don’t I? Therefore I argue that even if I have no evidence, if the conservative midrash is reasonable, there is no reason not to accept it. If it is reasonable—unless someone shows me why it is not reasonable, or why there is another reasonable alternative explanation that leads to different conclusions, and then I really would be in doubt.

[Speaker C] But then doesn’t this whole thing called a decree of Scripture collapse completely?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, because you do not declare something to be a decree of Scripture unless it is given that it is a decree of Scripture.

[Speaker C] And doesn’t the Talmudic text testify that this is a decree of Scripture? On the contrary.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Talmudic text there learns it from a very dubious derashah, by the way, and therefore it is quite clear that it is not a decree of Scripture.

[Speaker C] Because that’s exactly what we’re talking about now.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course not, because everywhere else, on the contrary, the Talmudic text says that the law of men and women is equal. If it says “men,” the meaning is both men and women. And there suddenly women are disqualified from testimony. There is some very dubious derashah. More than that: “Then the two men who have the dispute shall stand before the Lord.” Who are the “two men”? Are those the witnesses? “The two men who have the dispute.” Who is that? The litigants. The litigants. So either an interpretive midrash that preserves or an interpretive midrash that creates, but it is strange. And therefore I say: if I have a reasonable explanation, then why not accept it? Just because maybe it is not correct? For every reasonable argument I make in learning, you can tell me maybe it’s not correct. Maybe it’s not correct—what kind of claim is that?

[Speaker C] You’re saying something like this: if the reasoning standing against the reasonable midrash is speculation about a decree of Scripture, then it’s speculation. Meaning, it’s not that it really is a decree of Scripture. Then obviously there is no—what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, what does decree mean—if the Talmudic text tells me this is a decree of Scripture, then it is a decree of Scripture. And if something is written in the verse—not from a derashah, but actually written in the verse—even then, if I have a reasonable explanation, then that is the explanation.

[Speaker C] Meaning there is a kind of speculation of decree of Scripture, meaning maybe it’s a decree of Scripture—that is not something that holds water. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And if I have a reasonable explanation, then someone tells me: look, but maybe it isn’t correct. Maybe it isn’t correct? Then bring evidence. The burden of proof is on you. After all, the explanation I offer is reasonable. If the explanation I offer is not reasonable—if it’s just the aleph-bet of Scandinavia and walking naked—fine, that’s nonsense. You don’t need arguments at all; it’s simply stupid. But where I truly offer a reasonable explanation—I went with a swimsuit because it was hot, now it is cold so I put on a coat—that’s very reasonable. Maybe it’s not correct? Bring evidence. If you bring evidence I’ll say fine, you’re right. But the burden of proof is on you. After all, I have a reasonable explanation; everywhere I use my logic. And never do I say, okay, but maybe it isn’t right. It could be not right, but if the judge has only what his eyes see, then I have logic and this is my logic. Therefore I argue that it is not so simple. Meaning, it is true that you need to add another premise that connects facts with norms. And it is true that one can always argue about that premise, unlike the facts, which are generally agreed upon. But in that argument, the question of who bears the burden of proof is a very important question. Because many times in that argument we will not settle it with evidence. We won’t find evidence, or we’ll find evidence this way and that way, and we won’t be able to decide. What do we do then? Usually the conception is: what you do is you don’t change unless you bring proof that you should. I say no. I say that usually one should change unless you bring proof that one should not. Because if the claim for change is a reasonable claim, then I am not coming to change things; I am telling you what the logic is. You want to argue that it’s not logical? Bring evidence. He said: if it’s not agreed upon, then it’s a dispute. I say: but assuming it is agreed upon and you only tell me, yes, but since because we are only making analogies, should we act? Maybe it isn’t correct? Maybe not—but this is my logic.

[Speaker A] Usually that’s the discourse—what is the logic, and whether the Torah comes to establish for you a new logic.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I say: here I do not accept that claim. I say that if I have a reasonable explanation and I have no reason to assume it is incorrect, why assume by default that the Torah says something unreasonable? And if you bring me evidence, then fine, I’ll understand that here the Torah said something I do not understand and not according to my logic. Bring evidence for that. Otherwise, if I have a reasonable explanation, why assume the Torah said something unreasonable?

[Speaker A] Because many times the Torah says things that are not logical; there are commandments that are—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, only where I have no explanation do I declare that it is not logical; where I do have an explanation, then it is logical. Even though the Brisker approach basically says that even what is logical is in fact not logical. No, Brisk doesn’t say it is not logical; they say simply that one does not enter into the logic. And of course they do enter into the logic, so it doesn’t matter; it’s just naive. Rabbi, even though—

[Speaker A] it is—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] not logical, they say that we do not enter into the logic; I ask only what and not why. Because the Torah’s logic—

[Speaker A] is a logic that is above, and I do not enter into it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One does not expound the reason of the verse, or whatever—I do not enter into it. But that does not mean it must be illogical, not necessarily.

[Speaker A] We very much want to say that it is logical.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think it should be logical unless they prove to me that it is not. I do not claim that I understand everything, but if I do understand, why assume that this understanding is not correct? Bring me evidence, and then I’ll understand that it is not logical. Good.

[Speaker C] Rabbi, I have an unrelated question, about what I asked you regarding partial twins, and then you explained to me that it could be that in a situation where the partial—

Halachic Thought – 5783 – Lesson 20

Table of Contents

Summary

General Overview

Moving from dispute to changes in Jewish law

The swimsuit-and-coat parable: literal conservatism, midrashic conservatism, and heresy

Behavior does not identify conservatism; the reasoning does

The suspicion of “it suits me, so they permitted it” and the “too good to be kosher” fallacy

Symmetry in halakhic dispute: each side sees the other as violating Jewish law

The story of Adam HaKohen and the idea that heresy can also pay a price

Positions versus people, and a “sheep” as someone who acts without a position

An attempt to map the camps: Haredi, modern religious, and secular

The heap paradox, fuzzy logic, and rejecting dichotomous thinking

Defining “Reform” as partial commitment to tradition and as an ideological stance

Literal conservatism as a Haredi ethos, not as a type that really exists in practice

Conservatives, Haredim, and modern religious Jews as midrashic conservatism in different doses

Examples of changing presumptions: “a person does not repay before the due date” versus “better to dwell as two than to dwell alone”

The criterion between a midrashic conservative and a Reform Jew: the existence of a “conservative midrash”

The example of Moshe Zemer, “Reasonable Halakhah,” and columns 475–480 (column 478)

The claim that “conservative midrash dismantles Jewish law” and the reply using an absurd example

Women as witnesses as conservative midrash, a “sensitive issue,” and the price of not changing

“Murder in the mikveh” and the question of accepting women’s testimony

Judging arguments by the person making them versus judging arguments by their content

The structure of conservative midrash and the naturalistic fallacy (“is–ought”)

Evidence, burden of proof, and reasonable intuition as a basis for interpretation

Brisk, “only what and not why,” and the view that reason is binding unless proven otherwise

Interim conclusion

Full Transcript

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Table of Contents

Summary

General Overview

Moving from dispute to changes in Jewish law

The swimsuit-and-coat parable: literal conservatism, midrashic conservatism, and heresy

Behavior does not identify conservatism; the reasoning does

The suspicion of “it suits me, so they permitted it” and the “too good to be kosher” fallacy

Symmetry in halakhic dispute: each side sees the other as violating Jewish law

The story of Adam HaKohen and the idea that heresy can also pay a price

Positions versus people, and a “sheep” as someone who acts without a position

An attempt to map the camps: Haredi, modern religious, and secular

The heap paradox, fuzzy logic, and rejecting dichotomous thinking

Defining “Reform” as partial commitment to tradition and as an ideological stance

Literal conservatism as a Haredi ethos, not as a type that really exists in practice

Conservatives, Haredim, and modern religious Jews as midrashic conservatism in different doses

Examples of changing presumptions: “a person does not repay before the due date” versus “better to dwell as two than to dwell alone”

The criterion between a midrashic conservative and a Reform Jew: the existence of a “conservative midrash”

The example of Moshe Zemer, “Reasonable Halakhah,” and columns 475–480 (column 478)

The claim that “conservative midrash dismantles Jewish law” and the reply using an absurd example

Women as witnesses as conservative midrash, a “sensitive issue,” and the price of not changing

“Murder in the mikveh” and the question of accepting women’s testimony

Judging arguments by the person making them versus judging arguments by their content

The structure of conservative midrash and the naturalistic fallacy (“is–ought”)

Evidence, burden of proof, and reasonable intuition as a basis for interpretation

Brisk, “only what and not why,” and the view that reason is binding unless proven otherwise

Interim conclusion

Full Transcript

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