Mysticism – Lesson 15
This transcription was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- What Kabbalah is and what it is not
- Emotion, experience, existentialism, and pragmatism
- Theoretical Kabbalah versus practical Kabbalah
- The prohibition on engaging in Kabbalah before age forty and the accompanying threats
- The framework of questions about mystical practice: does it work / does it not work, and is it permitted / forbidden
- Three contexts: commandments and segulot, idolatry, and means derived from idolatry
- The prohibition on being healed by a non-Jew as a digression from the topic
- Separating challah for a match: factual criticism and halakhic criticism
- “Test Me now in this,” immunity from refutation, and prayer experiments
- A commandment that comes through a transgression, and Maimonides’ reasons: divination, sorcery, and contempt for Torah
- “The merit of the commandment” versus attributing practical power to the act
- Mezuzah and names of angels: Maimonides on “fools” and an amulet
- Amulets, tefillin, and the Maimonidean link between “works” and “permitted”
- “One who gives charity so that his son may live”
Summary
General Overview
The text defines Kabbalah as dealing with factual claims about spiritual planes of reality, not as a poetic language or a tool for stirring emotion, experience, or “existential benefit.” It draws a distinction between theoretical Kabbalah, which describes spiritual worlds, and practical Kabbalah, which claims to bring about effects in reality, and argues that criteria like “it helps me” or “it benefits me” are not tests of truth. It expresses sharp skepticism toward segulot, threats, and practical promises attributed to commandments or to statements of the Sages, and suggests that some of them function as tools of deterrence and motivation rather than factual claims. It states that in segulah-type rituals such as separating challah for a match there is no indication that it works, and in addition argues that this involves a serious halakhic problem of divination, sorcery, and a commandment that comes through a transgression, relying on formulations of Maimonides.
What Kabbalah is and what it is not
The text raises the question whether Kabbalah is a metaphor and an alternative language for describing the revealed realm, or a separate field that describes actual spiritual worlds. It attributes to the Leshem (and also to Rabbi Moshe Chaim Luzzatto) the claim that Hasidism uses Kabbalistic language to speak about psychology and spirituality that could also be described in another language, and states that according to the Leshem this is “not Kabbalah at all.” It argues that when Kabbalah is understood as an alternative language for describing human phenomena there is no place to judge it in terms of truth and falsehood, but when it presents factual claims about the world of Atzilut, these are claims that can be true or false even if they are not accessible to observation.
Emotion, experience, existentialism, and pragmatism
The text links identifying Kabbalah with emotion and experience to the assumption that it does not deal with factual claims but with generating devotion and experiences. It states that existentialism is a branch of psychology and not of philosophy, and therefore if Kabbalah is meant to solve existential difficulties it is “like a psychiatric pill” and is judged by effectiveness rather than truth. It defines this as a categorical mistake and connects it to pragmatism, distinguishing between those who think that if something is useful it is probably true, and those who define “true” as “useful,” and argues that such an approach is not Kabbalah but a practical technique.
Theoretical Kabbalah versus practical Kabbalah
The text describes one possibility of seeing Kabbalah as a description of spiritual worlds, parallel to the way physics describes the material world, as a theoretical field with intellectual value. Alongside this it presents a view of practical Kabbalah as an arsenal of techniques for healing, miracles, prediction, and non-natural influence on reality, and defines discussion of it as different. It states that theoretical Kabbalah is discussed in terms of truth and falsehood, while practical Kabbalah is discussed both in terms of whether it is true and whether it works, and later also whether it is permitted or forbidden.
The prohibition on engaging in Kabbalah before age forty and the accompanying threats
The text presents the tradition about the prohibition on engaging in Kabbalah before age forty and the threats about possible harm, and interprets such threats as assuming a conception of powers and techniques that act in reality. It expresses skepticism toward claims of the type “for the sin of vows, a person’s children die” and similar statements, and argues that there is no clear basis from which the Sages could have known such factual claims. It suggests that the use of threats is sometimes meant to achieve practical results through “holy lies” or intimidating language, and emphasizes that even if there is no good explanation for the wording of the threats, there is no reason to accept them as factual claims.
The framework of questions about mystical practice: does it work / does it not work, and is it permitted / forbidden
The text formulates two independent questions about mystical practices: does it work, and is it permitted. It argues that the question “does it work or not” is a factual question that can in principle be tested scientifically through sample and control groups. It adds that according to Maimonides the two questions are linked, such that what does not work is also forbidden, but on the conceptual level four possible combinations are presented between works / does not work and permitted / forbidden.
Three contexts: commandments and segulot, idolatry, and means derived from idolatry
The text divides the discussion into three contexts in which the two questions are asked. It presents a first context of using commandments and segulot associated with commandments, such as mezuzah and separating challah. It presents a second context of using idolatry itself for healing or some practical result, under the framework of “be killed rather than transgress.” It presents a third context of using means that come from the pagan world without the person himself performing worship, and gives the example of a terminally ill person considering treatment from an “Indian healer” who uses spells and incantations, asking whether that is permitted.
The prohibition on being healed by a non-Jew as a digression from the topic
The text notes the Talmudic prohibition on being healed by a non-Jewish doctor and interprets it as stemming from concern that he may kill the patient, not from the context of idolatry or mysticism. It argues that today, because of documentation, oversight, and changed circumstances, the prohibition simply no longer exists, and emphasizes that the matter is unrelated to the discussion of mysticism. It adds a riddle about two things each of which is forbidden separately but permitted together: getting a haircut from a non-Jewish barber and looking in a mirror.
Separating challah for a match: factual criticism and halakhic criticism
The text distinguishes between learning the laws of separating challah and fulfilling the commandment as an educational value, and events whose purpose is “to bring matches” through a “certified rebbetzin,” presenting them as a serious deviation. It argues that there are two negative claims here: there is no indication that it works, and in addition the matter is halakhically forbidden, so it is “the sum of all disadvantages.” It states that the burden of proof lies with whoever claims that it works, and argues that collecting sources from the Sages and later books does not replace a controlled factual experiment that shows results.
“Test Me now in this,” immunity from refutation, and prayer experiments
The text points out that the prohibition on “testing the Holy One, blessed be He” creates a thesis that cannot be refuted, and emphasizes that tithing is an exception in which one is permitted, and even called upon, to test. It argues that people do not carry out systematic tests even where this was permitted, and suggests as a hypothesis that the reason is fear of negative test results. It claims that experiments on the effects of prayer were carried out mainly by Christians and not by religious Jews, and presents this as a cultural difference in willingness to put beliefs to the test.
A commandment that comes through a transgression, and Maimonides’ reasons: divination, sorcery, and contempt for Torah
The text argues that segulah rituals involve prohibition and therefore are not a matter of “what do we care, we’ll gain a commandment,” but rather a commandment that comes through a transgression. It quotes Maimonides in the Laws of Idolatry, chapter 11, halakhah 12, about “one who whispers over a wound and recites a verse from the Torah,” and about placing a Torah scroll or tefillin on a child so that he will sleep, and states that according to Maimonides these are included among “diviners and sorcerers” and even “deniers of Torah,” because they make words of Torah into “a remedy for the body” instead of “a remedy for souls.” It emphasizes that Maimonides permits “a healthy person who recited verses and a psalm from Psalms so that the merit of their recitation might protect him,” and raises the point that Maimonides phrased this regarding a “healthy person” and not a sick one.
“The merit of the commandment” versus attributing practical power to the act
The text argues that if this is really only about “the merit of the commandment,” then there is no reason to choose specifically one commandment such as separating challah for a match, and therefore in practice people attribute operational power to the act itself. It accepts as a reasonable formulation a vow to do a commandment if one is saved from trouble, so long as there is no thought that the act itself produces the salvation. Regarding Psalms, it distinguishes between using them as the wording of a request and the conception that saying Psalms “does the job,” and argues that the public custom of reciting Psalms may come close to Torah-level prohibitions and should therefore be approached with caution.
Mezuzah and names of angels: Maimonides on “fools” and an amulet
The text quotes Maimonides in the Laws of Tefillin and Torah Scroll, chapter 5, halakhah 4, about writing “Shaddai” on the outside as a custom, and about writing on the inside names of angels and sacred names as the act of “those who have no share in the World to Come,” with Maimonides stating that these are “the fools” who turn the commandment of God’s unity into an amulet for their own benefit. It quotes Maimonides in the Laws of Idolatry, chapter 11, that these things are “falsehood and lies” and “emptiness and vanity,” and emphasizes that Maimonides identifies foolishness with the prohibition.
Amulets, tefillin, and the Maimonidean link between “works” and “permitted”
The text responds to a question about an expert amulet and a layman’s amulet, and about using tefillin as a segulah, and argues that according to Maimonides what works is permitted and what does not work is forbidden. It clarifies that it is not using Maimonides as a source for the factual claim that it does not work, but as the basis for the halakhic conception that resorting to something that does not work is a prohibition of divination and sorcery. It presents the position that even if the Talmud permitted an “expert amulet,” one must still check in practice whether it works, and if not then it is forbidden and even severe.
“One who gives charity so that his son may live”
The text explains that the permission of “one who gives charity so that his son may live” means doing a commandment in order to fulfill one’s obligation while motivated by the hope that, in the merit of the commandment, help from Heaven will come, and not a conception that the action itself heals. It argues that when this is limited specifically to charity it may look like attributing unique power to the action, whereas understanding it as applying to all commandments fits better with the idea of “the merit of the commandment.” It again emphasizes the need to distinguish between a request based on merit and mystical use that attributes causal influence in reality to the action itself.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, last time I finished with a discussion, after the passages we saw there, I ended with some remark about the question whether Kabbalah is a metaphor or engagement in a different domain. In other words, is it a different language for dealing with the regular domains, or is it a different domain of inquiry? And I said that at least the Leshem claims that Hasidism — and I think also regarding Rabbi Moshe Chaim Luzzatto he writes this — is not really dealing in Kabbalah at all, but rather using Kabbalistic language in order to talk about psychology or spirituality or things that could also be discussed in another language. It’s just a different mode of description or a different terminology for dealing with the same domains. And that, says the Leshem, is not Kabbalah at all. Kabbalah is to deal with things that belong to some other spiritual worlds, and not merely another language for dealing with our world. I remarked that this also connects to the question — yes? — meaning, if we are talking about a different language, then there is nothing to say about truth and falsehood. Is it true or not true? It’s another language for describing phenomena that we could also address in the usual language, the revealed realm, and therefore it is not judged in terms of true or false. In contrast, if I am speaking about factual claims concerning the world of Atzilut, then there it is true or false. In other words, there is a domain here like any other domain — of course not accessible to observation, and therefore it is mystical or esoteric — but on the conceptual level these are factual claims that can be right or wrong. From that I also said that the connection people make between Kabbalah and emotion, experience, or things of that sort — our existential dimensions, as they are sometimes called — actually assumes that Kabbalah does not deal with factual claims, because really it is only a way of arousing emotions in us, devekut, experiences. Can one drink? No. Or all sorts of things of that sort. Wait, I’ll mute here. So the whole question of emotion and experience as against, let’s call it, intellectual or scientific coldness, or whatever you want to call it, is also really connected to these two interpretations of the field of Kabbalah. And I said that existentialism — yes, what for some reason is considered, and I don’t understand why, a branch of philosophy — is really a branch of psychology and not of philosophy. And therefore if the purpose of Kabbalah is to provide an answer to existential difficulties, then it is like a psychiatric pill. In other words, okay, you can take it, and then again of course it is not judged in terms of truth or falsehood, but in terms of whether it helps or doesn’t help, whether it is effective or not. If it’s effective, then fine, be my guest — recite the ten sefirot three times a day, and maybe your headache will go away, or you’ll have some wonderful mystical experience. Okay, that’s a matter of practice; it has nothing to do with questions of truth and falsehood. So I do not regard such things as Kabbalah. That’s just, I don’t know, chasing after the wondrous, the mystical, the esoteric, and so on — part of the New Age. I’ve spoken about this before, and I’ll say it again: it may be that engaging in Kabbalah will also arouse experiences or emotions in someone; that doesn’t disqualify it. I’m only saying that if that is the whole meaning of Kabbalah, or if someone does it for the sake of the experiences and emotions, then he is not engaging in Kabbalah. And indeed, many times the feeling is that people measure the truth or falsehood of these things by the question of what experiences and emotions this gives me, or what existential contribution it gives me. And I think that is a categorical mistake. These are two planes that have nothing to do with one another. In that sense it is somewhat related to — I think I mentioned this too — it is somewhat related to a view that is also considered a philosophical view for some reason, though entirely undeservedly, what is called pragmatism. Right? That is, you judge things in light of the practical benefit they give me. If it benefits me, then it is true, so-called. Now, here too I said there are two different nuances. There are those who proceed from some belief that if something is useful, then it really is true. And that’s fine; I may disagree, but it is a claim one can hear and discuss. But there are others who say no — not that because it is useful it is true, but rather that being useful is what “true” means. That is what is called true. Not that there is some rule — I don’t know where it came from — that if something is useful then it is probably true. Rather, there is no such thing as true; the useful is actually the meaning of true, that it is useful. Fine, then that’s just practical techniques. Maybe they help people, maybe not — it doesn’t matter — but that is not what I call Kabbalah. I don’t deal with that. It doesn’t interest me. Later on we may also see that there may even be prohibitions involved in it. So that’s what I spoke about last time. Now I want to discuss what, in my understanding, really is called Kabbalah. And that is indeed some sort of factual claims. We are basically talking about certain planes of reality, not about things that contribute experiences to me or some sort of existential benefit, but engagement with certain dimensions of reality. Here too one has to divide it into two aspects, or maybe two conceptions. One possibility is to see Kabbalah as some kind of description of the spiritual worlds, just as physics is the description of the material world. Okay? Meaning, we have a science, so to speak — not really observational in the ordinary sense — but some sort of science that deals with this domain, with the description and understanding of this particular domain. But still, this is basically something of theoretical value. Notice: theoretical does not mean psychological. Theoretical means philosophical, intellectual, whatever — but theoretical. In parallel, there are of course conceptions that see Kabbalah as a practical instrument, practical Kabbalah as it is called. Meaning, one can use Kabbalistic techniques to bring about various things: heal people, perform miracles, I don’t know what, predict things, or all kinds of things of that type. Those are practical uses of Kabbalah. Okay? Now I repeat: independently of the question — I’m not talking now about what I rejected earlier, seeing Kabbalah as some sort of language or technique for stirring emotions in me. I’m talking now — all the distinctions I just made at the end were within what I do call Kabbalah. Meaning, engagement in certain domains of reality of which Kabbalah is the teaching that describes them. Okay? The theory that describes them. And still, one could relate even to that itself in two ways. One can see it like history, which describes what was, meaning Kabbalah describes what happens in the spiritual worlds. And one can see in it a kind of practical science: bringing cures, producing miracles, prophesying prophecies, or all kinds of things of that sort. And again, not necessarily that this is the purpose of the study, but since it deals with a certain aspect of reality — not just some subjective experience, but something real — then maybe it can also work, operate, influence reality. And then we arrive at the set of techniques — I don’t even know what to call it — whether there are such things or whether there aren’t, but what people call techniques of practical Kabbalah. Meaning, attempts to bring things about by non-natural means, mystical means. So that is another branch, but it too belongs to Kabbalah, and each of them must be discussed separately. About the first we discuss whether it is true or not true; about the second we discuss both whether it is true or not true and whether it works or does not work. In other words, the question is whether it works, and maybe one can even discuss whether it is permitted or forbidden. That is already a third layer of discussion, and I’ll get to that shortly.
[Speaker D] Amulets, for example?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I didn’t hear.
[Speaker D] Amulets, for example?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For example, yes. Maybe one more remark before I go into this. People speak about the prohibition on engaging in Kabbalah before age forty — if there is such a thing, there is some tradition like that, that there is some prohibition on engaging in it before age forty, before one has filled his belly with Talmud and halakhic decisors, or things of that kind. Sometimes all kinds of threats accompany these prohibitions — some sense that if you engage in it too early or not in the right way, it can cause damage. To you, to the world, I don’t know exactly what. Which of course already takes us very much in the second direction that I mentioned earlier, the direction of operative mysticism, effective mysticism — not mysticism as a theory that describes or tries to understand reality, the sort of things I did in the previous two sessions. Rather, here I am speaking about techniques, powers of one kind or another that can be used to bring about things and produce phenomena. So the threats that accompany improper engagement in Kabbalah basically assume that there really is some sort of power here, and therefore it must be handled carefully. And if you don’t do it that way, then all sorts of terrible things will happen. So all these threats really assume the second conception I mentioned earlier, the conception of Kabbalah as an arsenal of tools or as a field that can also act and bring things about.
[Speaker D] Why not say that this is not a kind of threat but a warning sign — that if a person is not yet ready and mature for such levels, then he himself will be harmed, he’ll misunderstand it and cause himself various kinds of damage?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What damage? He won’t understand — right. Mistakes, that’s not damage.
[Speaker D] But if he doesn’t understand correctly and acts not as he should, then he himself—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He’ll make mistakes, say, in halakhic contexts? Maybe. Fine, that’s not what I meant earlier. I’m getting to that in a moment. And indeed, many times — and this I think one has to understand — many times all kinds of threats that also appear in the Talmud, “for the sin of vows, a person’s children die,” or “whoever recites havdalah over a cup will have male children.” There are all kinds of segulot or all kinds of practical results of mystical acts, or of commandments, or of one mystical act or another. Regarding these things I am very skeptical, first of all about the claims themselves. Whether they are true or not, I have no idea where the Sages could have known this from, and I am not impressed that this is some tradition that came to them from Sinai or from the prophets or I don’t know exactly from where. And therefore I have a suspicion — and again, these are all things I cannot really substantiate. On the other hand, the things themselves do not seem substantiated to me, so I am looking for some possibility at least to understand what is going on there. And I think that many times the use of threats is simply intended for consequential purposes. They don’t really mean that your children will die if you violate vows, but if they threaten you that way, then you won’t violate vows. What are called holy lies. Meaning, we are basically threatening you with various threats in order to achieve practical results, not that we really mean it. Or perhaps one could formulate it a bit more charitably: perhaps your children would deserve to die because this is so very, very severe, and then that is meant to deter you from violating the prohibitions concerning vows. But not that they are really trying to make a factual claim that if someone violates the prohibitions of vows, then his children die. So I don’t know where the Sages got this from, or where various wise men got it from. I simply see today how all kinds of people churn out all kinds of segulot and all kinds of positive or negative consequences for all kinds of actions we do — and I… I don’t see any sense in it, any basis, just inventions out of thin air that spread through the world like wildfire. And the fact that it works — that it works only means, first, that in the past too it probably could have been the same way. But the fact that all kinds of beliefs like this spread does not mean that anyone ever actually tested them or that they have some source. And second, perhaps that itself means that if it works — okay, then let’s use it to achieve the results even though we ourselves, the Sages for example, or whichever scholars use it, do not really believe it. Now this sounds bad. It sounds like they are lying, maybe for good purposes, what I called holy lies. Yes, but we know — this is a technique that sages have not disqualified throughout the generations, the technique of holy lies. Right, from “the law is thus, but we do not instruct accordingly,” which is a passive lie, to all kinds of esotericism and concealment and things where one keeps one’s cards close to the chest so that people won’t do various things. You don’t reveal certain things that really could have been revealed. So this is a common technique even to this day: sages hide their reasons. On the contrary, there are those who claim that the Sages enacted decrees, and even if the reason no longer applies, those decrees should be preserved because perhaps there were hidden reasons. So why didn’t the Sages say that if they had hidden reasons? I don’t know, they decided to hide it; I don’t know exactly why. There was some tendency toward esotericism, and therefore I do not rule out the possibility that sages throughout the generations, including the Sages of the Talmud, used holy lies in order to achieve results, among them positive results. It infuriates me; I oppose such an approach. But given that sages accept this and do it from time to time, I do not rule out that the Sages of the Talmud also did it. And if I put it a bit more charitably, I would say not that the Sages really lied or didn’t believe it and said it anyway, but that they said your children deserve to die because this is extremely severe. It’s something so serious that it’s really worth your children’s death. And it was said in that form in order to deter you. So many times an imprecise formulation is used, but you can’t quite call it an outright lie. An imprecise formulation. Okay, in any event, I say: even if I have no explanation — I have no explanation for what the Sages said — still I see no basis on which the Sages could have built such factual claims. Therefore, as a factual claim I do not accept it, even if I have no explanation for why the Sages said it. In other words, I suggested explanations earlier, but even if you don’t accept those explanations, still as a factual claim this seems baseless to me. I don’t see where the Sages could have known it from, or where sages today could know it from. Yes, we’ll soon get to matters like separating challah and the like, which today too are very, very popular. Every single time I am astonished anew to discover really intelligent people taking part in these ridiculous absurdities, which of course also involve prohibitions, with some expression of deep devotion, backed by rabbis, with all sorts of learned articles. Some woman wrote there — she did quite extensive work on separating challah and its segulot, and collected from the Sages and from all kinds of midrashim and all kinds of places — and she said, “What I’m telling you is not rhetoric; it is a fact.” How does she know it is a fact? Did she run some experiment to test that it helps for a match? Or I don’t know — yes, there it was about finding matches. No, I’m sure she didn’t test it, at least she didn’t say she did. Of course she has one story or another as an illustration, and I already talked about the law of small numbers, by which one can explain everything. So therefore — but people treat this as facts, and innocently. Again, I don’t think that woman who wrote that article is trying to lie. She sincerely believes it. So there you have it, how things can reach the level of statements that are not lies — people really believe them even though they have absolutely no basis, just a collection of nonsense. So therefore, these threats that accompany improper engagement in Kabbalah — it seems to me the only thing I can perhaps infer from them is that the sages were troubled by improper or premature engagement by people who should not be engaging in it. But the fact that they tried to prevent this by threats does not mean that I am supposed to regard those threats as factual claims. Okay, that is basically the claim. And therefore I again say that I do not think this can be seen as any support for the idea that there really is such a thing as practical Kabbalah, that by Kabbalistic means one can bring things about in reality on the practical plane. I’ll just remind you, because similar threats can also be found regarding engagement in philosophy, not Kabbalah. No one on earth would say that philosophy has some mystical powers that can bring terrible damage or wondrous benefits. It is obvious that there too the threats are meant to prevent the engagement, not to make a factual claim that this is indeed what will happen. So in the Kabbalistic context too — what are the concerns? I think the concerns are quite clear. Engagement in Kabbalah by unworthy people, and perhaps in philosophy too, but in Kabbalah even more so, can lead them to many very problematic places. You can see that at every turn; we see it around us all the time. So why people want to prevent it is very clear. The question is by what means to prevent it, what means are appropriate, and what means were actually employed — that is the discussion I had earlier. I don’t know. So therefore, on the question whether Kabbalah works, helps, can bring things about — I am very skeptical about that, but fine, maybe yes and maybe no. Independently of that, I said, on the question whether Kabbalah correctly grasps certain dimensions of reality, I tend to think yes. Meaning, that there is some kind of depth-perception of reality there as a theory, yes. As a practice — I can’t rule it out, but I am more skeptical about that. Now, in the contexts of — I want to move to mystical practice. Yes, all that was a connecting passage; I want to move to mystical practice. In mystical practice, basically we ask two kinds of questions in three contexts. Two kinds of questions — yes, basically that’s six questions. Two kinds of questions in each of three contexts. The two kinds of questions are: first, does it work or not work; and second, is it permitted or forbidden. These are six independent questions, at least on the conceptual level. We’ll see later that not everyone agrees that they are independent, but conceptually they are two independent questions. The question whether it works or not is a factual question. In principle one can test it scientifically. Yes, the question is whether you succeed — not specifically healing, but anything, any claim about using mystical means to bring about something in reality can seemingly be tested with scientific tools. Let’s test it. Do it, compare it against sample cases, sample groups, and see whether you really succeed in bringing about things that would not have happened without it. So this is a claim about reality, a factual claim that can be tested — does it work or not work. The second question is whether it is permitted or forbidden. It could be that it doesn’t work and is permitted; doesn’t work and is forbidden; it could work and be permitted; work and be forbidden. All possibilities exist, and therefore these are two independent questions. Okay? Conceptually. We will see later that Maimonides and those who follow him tie them together. Meaning, Maimonides’ claim is that the prohibition applies to what does not work. Meaning, if it doesn’t work then it is also forbidden; if it works, then it is permitted. In other words, Maimonides identifies these two questions, but conceptually they are two independent questions. So those are the two kinds of questions. In what are the three contexts? The three contexts in which I ask these two questions: one is the use of commandments. Commandments or segulot, if you like. Not every segulah is a commandment — amulets, for example, are not a commandment — but it is a segulah. But there is use of commandments: mezuzah, separating challah, all kinds of things like that which have some segulah-like uses. They can bring about all sorts of results in reality. So yes, that is one context in which I ask the question. And again I ask the two questions: does it work or not work, is it permitted or forbidden. Okay? That is the first context. The second context is using means that are idolatry. Is one allowed to be healed by idolatry? There too, one can ask whether it works and whether it is permitted. Two different things. Okay?
[Speaker D] What does it mean to be healed by idolatry?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What, to worship an idol and then the idol heals me? Or I don’t know, something happens that heals me.
[Speaker D] But idolatry is in the category of be killed rather than transgress.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So you already have your answer to that. Right now I’m asking the questions; I didn’t say there are no answers. So the first question, or the first area in which I ask the two questions — the two questions are does it work or not work, and is it permitted or forbidden. The first area in which I ask the questions is commandments or segulot somehow connected to commandments one way or another. The second area is using idolatry — doing a prohibition in order to bring things about. And the third area, which is not always distinct from the second, is using means taken from idolatry but where you yourself are not committing a prohibition. For example, there was a question on “Stop Here, Think,” where I was exposed a bit to this whole world and even managed to get rather annoyed. There was some fellow there with — a practical question was raised there about someone who really struggled with it, who was terminally ill with an incurable disease for which conventional medicine had no remedy. And he heard that there was some Indian healer in South America who had good success with this disease. Now, he performs all kinds of spells, pagan incantations and whatnot, various such techniques. Now the question was whether it is permitted to go be healed by him. When I go to be healed by him, I am not going to worship idols, and I am not violating the prohibition of idolatry; I am not performing an act of worship, okay? But the techniques that healer uses are techniques taken from the world of his idolatry, the pagan world. Okay? So the question is whether it is permitted to do such a thing or forbidden. That is the third area. The first area is commandments and segulot; the second area is to be healed or do something through the prohibition of idolatry; and the third area is with things taken from idolatry, while you yourself are not doing any prohibition, but only the world from which these means are taken is an idolatrous world. Okay, so those are the three contexts, and in each of them the question arises: permitted or forbidden, works or doesn’t work. So I want to begin — or perhaps one more remark first. There is another prohibition that appears in the Talmud, in tractate Avodah Zarah on pages 26 and 27; there the Talmud deals with these things. And the other prohibition that appears there is the prohibition on being healed by a non-Jew, by a non-Jewish doctor. Sometimes it is mentioned as an idolater doctor, but you know that in the Talmud there is censorship and so on, and when it says idolater sometimes it means just a non-Jew, not necessarily literally an idolater. Sometimes there is a dispute among the commentators what exactly is meant. But this prohibition, simply speaking — and so it appears in the Talmud and so the commentators say — stems from concern that he might kill you. The problem is not his idolatry, but simply that if you place yourself in the hands of a non-Jewish doctor there is concern that he may kill you, and therefore it is forbidden. It is forbidden because of danger to life, not because it is connected to the prohibition of idolatry or anything like that. This is talking even about a non-Jewish doctor who practices ordinary conventional medicine. Okay? So here they say, for example, that nowadays, since everything is documented and there is oversight, and of course non-Jews do not necessarily want to kill Jews the way they once did, this prohibition no longer exists. But it does not concern us at all, because the prohibition on being healed by a non-Jewish doctor due to concern that he may kill you has nothing to do with the use of mysticism. Therefore it is not our topic; it has nothing to do with us. It reminds me — yes, a riddle. Do you know this riddle? Two things, each one separately forbidden, but together permitted. There are two things, each one separately permitted, but together forbidden — that’s meat and milk. But I’m talking about two things each one separately forbidden, but together permitted. So: it is forbidden to get a haircut from a non-Jewish barber, again because of concern that he may kill you with his scissors or knife, and it is forbidden for a man to look in a mirror — that’s women’s attire on a man. But if you are getting a haircut from the barber and looking in a mirror, so you can see what he is doing to you in the back, then it is permitted. Because you can watch that he isn’t killing you in the meantime back there, assuming of course that you have quick reflexes and when he lunges at you with the scissors you immediately do a backward flip-flop and kick the scissors out of his hand and all sorts of things like that. Anyway, yes, it’s very amusing, I don’t know, it’s amusing from a distance. Probably the experiences that led to these rulings were less amusing — I was just scolded now over all sorts of things. In any case, so the… but that really does not concern us. That is the prohibition on being healed by a non-Jew, and it is simply danger to life. It has nothing to do with mysticism or using mysticism. So here I really want to begin with the questions of the first type — or, the two kinds of questions regarding the first context: commandments and segulot. Okay? And here — yes — I’ll perhaps begin; actually I wrote a column about this.
[Speaker D] Doesn’t Maimonides write something about this in the Laws of Mezuzah?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I can’t hear.
[Speaker D] Maimonides, in the Laws of Mezuzah. It seems to me he writes something there about people who think it protects or something like that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, he does. I got some question for the website here. I was sure it was a prank, I don’t know. “Hello Rabbi, I want to organize an evening of separating challah on behalf of several of my friends who are looking for a match. Does the rebbetzin leading the evening need any special certification? I ask because I have a righteous neighbor who wants to lead the evening for free, but I see online that there are organizations specializing in the matter and they have special rebbetzins for challah-separation events nationwide.” There is regulation, there is regulation and academies certifying certified challah-separators and all sorts of things like that. This whole business has completely lost proportion. I mean, these are really populations I never imagined would participate in these absurdities — everyone. Today it’s everywhere. It’s unbelievable how widespread this thing is. It’s just a pile of nonsense bound up with prohibitions, apparently Torah-level ones, and everyone is celebrating and dancing there literally as though for Peor, with great joy. In any event, yes, so that was — that was a prank. Wait, wait, that’s who—
[Speaker B] There’s something here I don’t agree with. What happens is that the girls of our generation, say my daughters and certainly my granddaughters, have never once seen kashering meat or separating challah, because all the chicken you buy in the supermarket, and challot and meat, already come with all the certifications. So we do indeed make at home from time to time, focaccia just for the sake of it, and they can see what kashering meat looks like, the way grandmother used to do, to do…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yossi, I’m not talking about that, Yossi.
[Speaker B] We do it as a kind of educational event for the grandchildren, for the girls, for the daughters, and in my opinion that has educational value.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] About that I’m not—
[Speaker B] talking.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t talk about that. Obviously, if you’re studying the legal aspects, I’m not against learning the laws of separating challah and fulfilling the commandment of separating challah. What do you mean? It’s a Torah commandment. That’s not what I was talking about. I’m talking exactly about what she asked there: she wants a certified rebbetzin in order to find matches for her friends. And the question is whether that rebbetzin underwent certification to practice idolatry in the academies, or whether she can be an amateur idolater. In other words, the question is: does she have to be certified in idolatry, or can she be an amateur practitioner of idolatry? That’s the question I was asked there. So that is certainly not relevant to the issue. If someone studies the laws of separating challah, or even separates challah for the sake of the commandment, to learn how to do it and to fulfill a commandment, not just to learn, excellent, blessings on them. Of course I have absolutely nothing against that—on the contrary. That’s something completely different. So yes, beyond all the mockery I’m opening with here, I really do want to touch a bit on the problematic nature of the matter. My claims against all these foolish rituals—again, by rituals I mean challah-separation ceremonies whose purpose is to bring about practical results: matchmaking, healing, whatever, anything at all. Success in an Olympic competition, it doesn’t matter. My claims are basically divided into two types, as I said before: first, on the factual level, there is no indication whatsoever that this works, even though this is, of course, a fact and not just a rhetorical flourish, as is well known. And the second claim is on the halakhic level, that it is not permitted—that it is forbidden. Okay? So first, it doesn’t work, and second, it’s forbidden. The full package of disadvantages. I mean, fine, if it worked, you could say, okay, we’ll do something forbidden, but at least my friends will find matches. But to do something forbidden with no result—then why did you do the forbidden thing? What, wasn’t that a shame? So on both of these planes, regarding this matter, I think the answer is negative. And as I mentioned, according to Maimonides these are not two separate planes; one is connected to the other. Fine, so first of all, on the factual plane I don’t need to elaborate. I already spoke about the law of small numbers, and all the conclusive proofs they’ll bring you showing that separating challah immediately brings a match are conclusive proofs according to the law of small numbers. I can bring you conclusive proofs that sitting on a chair brings a match, reading articles in biology brings a match, and going to a matchmaker also brings a match. As my father used to say to our relatives from Bnei Brak, who were quite occupied with segulot for livelihood, he told them that he knows a proven segulah for livelihood: go to work. It’s tested and proven. So yes, that’s the option they didn’t think so much to try. In this context, then, on the factual level it seems to me that I’m exempt from dealing with the matter, because the burden of proof is on the one who claims it works. I haven’t seen any indication that it works, so why assume that it does? I’m not obligated to grapple with that question. On the level of prohibition, maybe one more comment. There are various sources—Talmud, medieval authorities, later authorities—that she brings, the woman I mentioned earlier, the comprehensive article she wrote on this. She really did a very large collection of all sorts of sources that point to this segulah and that segulah about separating challah and all sorts of things like that. Even if you find Talmudic sources for it, for me that still does not meet the burden of proof. For two reasons that are connected to each other. One reason is that I don’t know how the Sages could know such a thing. So the Sages say it—so what? Apparently maybe they thought so for some reason, but why assume it’s true? I don’t see any indication that it’s true. And as a result of that, I also raise the second problem, which is connected to the first: because I don’t think there is any indication that it’s true, I suspect that when the Sages said it, they said it for the same reasons I described earlier—not really as a factual claim that it helps with a match or whatever, but rather as a claim meant to motivate you to do it. Maybe in the merit of the commandment you’ll merit a match or something like that. And slowly shortcuts are taken and people say that this commandment is conducive to matchmaking, and in a moment we’ll get to that shortcut. Therefore, even if such sources are found in the Sages, and certainly if they are found in various later books of one sort or another, I treat it, let’s say—call it with limited reliability, to speak in respectable language. So I treat it with limited reliability, and therefore I don’t see this as proof on the question of whether it works or not. You can read her entire article, a long detailed article that collects many sources, but there’s one thing you won’t see there: any documentation of an actual experiment that tests it and shows that it works. In other words, in the end her conclusion is that this is not just a rhetorical flourish but a fact. The first thing I would expect, after she brings all the Talmudic, medieval, and later sources, is for her to show me that it really works. Let’s see: take a sample group, a control group, and see whether it works or not. For some reason I didn’t find that there—apparently those experiments are still classified at this stage. So without an experiment, in short, I’m not inclined to accept claims of this sort, unless some polished prophet tells me this, or it’s written in the Torah, and then there has to be a discussion. Maybe there’s also another way to interpret it, but there I’m willing perhaps to hear the claim that there’s at least a basis that requires discussion. If Rabbi So-and-so or Rabbi Such-and-such said it—fine, so he said it. So what? So that’s on the level of whether it works or not. There’s maybe one more comment, you know. Today I’m kind of making fun of these things a bit, partly because I like making fun of these things, and also because I really think it’s important to let the air out of these balloons. The Talmud, after all, says, “Test Me in this,” “Bring the whole tithe to the storehouse”—with tithing one is allowed to test the Holy One, blessed be He. With all other things one is forbidden to test Him. So now on that, of course, you can build mountains upon mountains. The moment I give you a thesis that cannot be falsified because it’s forbidden to subject it to a falsification test, I can tell you whatever you want—or whatever I want. Okay? So where the Holy One, blessed be He, said this because it is written in the Torah, “Honor your father and your mother so that your days may be lengthened.” Okay, so it’s written in the Torah that one who honors parents will have long days. Okay, again, this can be interpreted in other ways, but suppose I read it literally. Fine. Then they tell me, look, don’t test it. If I trust the Torah and the Holy One, blessed be He, said it, then the Holy One, blessed be He, can certainly know it. Whether it’s true or not, I don’t know, but I don’t have a difficulty with the Holy One, blessed be He—how does He know this, right? That’s not the question. Okay, so if I reached the conclusion that the Holy One, blessed be He, said this in the Torah, okay, then that’s a basis I can accept, even if there is a prohibition against testing the matter. Okay, by the way, regarding tithing and charity as well, I’m not aware of any systematic tests—someone who ran a double-blind controlled experiment and checked the matter, whether charity really enriches, “tithe so that you may become wealthy.” Tithe produce or tithe money, it doesn’t matter, but whatever it may be, to test it, yes? And it seems to me that this is no accident—they didn’t check. There, one is allowed to test: “Test Me in this.” That one is permitted to test. Other things—you’re forbidden—so we’re all set. We can go on reciting it, and it’s immune to falsification. On the contrary, if you test it and it doesn’t work, that’s a punishment from the Holy One, blessed be He, for committing a prohibition by testing. You’re not allowed to test. So it becomes immune to falsification. But with tithing you’re allowed to test: “And test Me in this.” And “test Me” may even be a call to test, not just permission to test. So then why did nobody check? I’ll tell you my guess why nobody checked: because everyone knows what the outcome of such a test would be. It’s pretty clear—or they are very worried about what the outcome would be—so nobody checks. It seems to me I already mentioned that not a few experiments have been conducted checking the effects of prayer; some of them were even successful. There are disputes about them, never mind. What they all have in common is that these are Christian experiments. You won’t find an experiment done by Jews, at least not by religious Jews. Okay. What do you mean, because Christians? You could say because it’s forbidden, “Test Me in this,” although in this case I don’t think there is any prohibition. Because the prohibition applies to promises of the Torah. The Torah doesn’t say prayer must be answered. To test things written in the Torah, aside from tithing, is forbidden—but is it also forbidden to test what the Sages said? Why? Who said it’s forbidden to test the Sages? Or whoever it may be? But I think the basic motivation—or lack of motivation—to do this is not because it’s forbidden, but because people are afraid it won’t work. Let’s be honest with ourselves. The Christians, by contrast, are serious people—not like us, they don’t play games. If they really believe in something, then they really believe in it; they don’t just recite it. They truly believe it, and they’re willing to put it to an experimental test. Okay? And for that, hats off to them. Did it succeed or not? There are many arguments about that. There are some non-trivial experiments that also show results, and there are various debates around them, but it’s not so simple, at least from the little I skimmed there. It’s not simple. I bring this in the book on evolution in one of the appendices there; I also give some sources on this issue there—Appendix B, I think. So the point is that not only do we not rely on a systematic controlled experiment, yes, a scientific experiment, to check whether it works or not—but it is forbidden to do such an experiment. Well then, that’s a wide-open door, a wide-open opening I found, as the Talmud says in Ketubot. In other words, you can put anything in here, and it’s no wonder this field is a wild one. Why is it a wild field? Because nobody bothers to check, and if someone does bother to check, immediately they’ll accuse him of violating a prohibition. “Test Me in this”—only with tithing is it permitted. You must not test the Holy One, blessed be He. Okay, and that way we are immune to refutations, and this whole business becomes fertile ground for charlatanism, for making things up, for all sorts of pronouncements delivered with this self-righteous certainty, backed by rabbis, great rabbis of the generation, and all sorts of things like that—and it’s a collection of nonsense and absurdity. I really think there are very few fields that compete with the absurdity involved in the use of mysticism. And thank God there is competition over the level of absurdity in these circles. So that’s regarding the factual plane. The problem is that there is also a halakhic problem here. Because you’ll tell me, fine, as the Sages said—suppose what I said earlier: suppose the Sages gave us threats, or promised promises, or all sorts of things like that, and they didn’t really mean them literally, but only in order to motivate us to do or not do something. Suppose, okay? So then you’ll tell me, fine, separating challah too—basically this is a bit what Yossi maybe wanted to say earlier—what do you care if people are encouraged to do a commandment and promised matches? In any case they don’t test it in the end, right? It’s true that it doesn’t work, and in any case they don’t test it in the end, and what do we care? We gained the commandment of separating challah. Is that bad? What’s bad about it? So first of all, I think it’s bad to lie. Second, it’s bad to be stupid. And third—and this is the point I want to get to now—it’s bad to commit prohibitions. And I claim that actions of this sort, which have the purpose of producing a practical result, involve a prohibition. And then it’s no longer a question of what do you care. Let them do it—what do I care? We’ll gain a commandment. No. It’s a commandment that comes through a transgression. You lost the commandment, and you also have a transgression charged against you. A commandment that comes through a transgression. It’s forbidden. Now where do these things come from? So let’s look a bit at a few example sources. Yes, Maimonides in the Laws of Idolatry—yes, notice the location too—Laws of Idolatry chapter 11, law 12: “One who whispers over a wound and recites a verse from the Torah, and likewise one who recites over a child so that he not be frightened, and one who places a Torah scroll or tefillin on a child so that he may sleep—not only are they included among diviners and charmers…” A charmer and a diviner are Torah prohibitions, yes? “…but they are also among those who deny the Torah, because they make words of Torah into a cure for the body, whereas they are only a cure for the soul, as it is said, ‘and they shall be life to your soul.’ But a healthy person who recited verses or a psalm from Psalms so that the merit of their recitation should protect him and save him from troubles and harm—this is permitted.” So Maimonides tells us: someone who whispers over a wound—“whispers” meaning verses, not idolatrous incantations—recites a verse from the Torah, or recites over a child so that he not be frightened, or places a Torah scroll or tefillin on a child so that he will sleep—he violates the prohibition of divination and charming, and he denies the Torah. What does “denies the Torah” mean? He doesn’t mean denying the Torah in the sense of heresy. “Denying the Torah” here means degrading the Torah. Why? Because he turns the words of Torah into bodily medicine, whereas they are only medicine for the soul. Here there is already a hint that it doesn’t work. It is not bodily medicine; it won’t do the job. The purpose of the Torah is to repair the soul, spiritual elevation, service of God. It doesn’t fix things in the world; it is not medicine for the body, it does not bring things about in our world. And therefore Maimonides says there is divination and charming here, and degradation of the Torah. And in fact, if you pay attention, there are two kinds of prohibition here. The diviner and charmer—that is a prohibition on doing these acts regardless of words of Torah. All kinds of things, all kinds of nonsense like that that don’t really work. For Maimonides, the question whether it works or not, and the question whether it is permitted or forbidden—I said, they are the same question. So according to Maimonides, resorting to all kinds of things of this type is divination and charming. It is forbidden. Yes, for example, separating challah in order to bring about a match is a prohibition under the accessories of idolatry, a Torah prohibition. Anyone who participates in such a ceremony for the sake of, again, a match—not someone who participates in order to fulfill a commandment and to learn, that is excellent—but someone who does it in order to bring a match or healing or whatever, a Torah prohibition. Charming is among the accessories of idolatry. According to some opinions among the medieval authorities, one must be killed rather than transgress even the accessories of idolatry. Even rabbinic accessories, according to some medieval authorities, are subject to “be killed rather than transgress.”
[Speaker D] But how do you explain “one who gives charity so that my son may live”?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll get there, we’ll get there, we’ll get there. The second prohibition is the prohibition of degrading the words of Torah. What does that mean? When you do this with a commandment or with words of Torah—not just with a whisper, an amulet, whatever, unrelated—that’s the prohibition of divination and charming. If you use Torah for this, and apparently also a commandment or anything else, here there is what he calls denial of the Torah, or degradation of the Torah, because there is a conception that says that Torah is basically… that engagement in Torah and commandments can bring practical consequences. Maimonides says this is degradation of the Torah. You turn the Torah into some kind of therapeutic instrument. Torah is not a therapeutic instrument. Torah is spiritual correction. Okay, so that is an additional prohibition. So you have to understand: these are two different things in Maimonides. In the Laws of Tefillin and Torah Scroll, chapter 5 law 4, Maimonides writes as follows. A common custom—wow, maybe one more note on the previous passage—Maimonides contrasts it with: “But a healthy person who recited verses or a psalm from Psalms…” Yes, basically it is forbidden to say Psalms over a sick person so that he will recover. So Maimonides says no, it’s permitted. When? “But a healthy person who recited verses or a psalm from Psalms so that the merit of their recitation should protect him and save him from troubles and harm, this is permitted.” So the straightforward understanding is that where you use Psalms in order to perform a commandment, and the merit of that recitation should protect you—the Holy One, blessed be He, through the merit of the recitation should protect you—that is permitted. It is not divination and charming. So when is it divination and charming? When you think that the recitation of Psalms itself heals you, okay, and not that in the merit of the commandment it will protect you. Therefore, for example, with an amulet, where you are not engaged in words of Torah or in a commandment but just some amulet, something that is not itself a commandment, there it is clearly forbidden in any case. Because you are not performing a commandment here, so there is no reason to assume there is any merit for someone who puts an amulet on himself. There is no merit in putting on an amulet, because you have not performed any commandment by doing so. This entire distinction of Maimonides here applies when you are using a commandment, and then the problem is degradation of the words of Torah, and also divination and charming. Maimonides says that if you only want to rely on the merit, then it is permitted. But there is another important point here that he mentions. It seems not incidental, even though it appears only in passing. He says this about a healthy person who recited verses and a psalm from Psalms. Why not a sick person? What about a sick person who says Psalms in order to recover? It seems from Maimonides that this is forbidden.
[Speaker D] He’s actually using the commandment while sick—he’s in the hospital.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A healthy person who wants the merit of the commandment to protect him—that’s permitted. And if I’m sick and want the merit of the commandment to protect me?
[Speaker D] Maimonides thinks that this would be very close to a kind of using the commandment, not really performing a commandment.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know. Again, I don’t know. But it really does seem that Maimonides understands that if you are sick and make use of it, then there is probably—or at least there is a reasonable chance—that you will take the commandment as actually producing the effect itself, not merely by virtue of the merit you accumulate through the commandment, but that the commandment itself will make the change. And therefore Maimonides says it only regarding a healthy person and not regarding a sick person. It may be that Maimonides also really thinks that protection means only protection against an illness that may come, but there are no such protections meant to drive away an illness already present in you. I don’t know. All this is of course left obscure in Maimonides. I don’t know exactly why. But one should pay attention—fine, he speaks about a healthy person. In other words, even regarding the recitation of Psalms he speaks only about a healthy person, yes. This is a protection, as in the Talmud, of course—there are other interpretations there too—but I also think Maimonides is taken from there. In any event, that’s one point. Now there is still a question here. There was also some discussion we had about this on WhatsApp. The question is: if this is really only the merit of the commandment, then why read Psalms or why separate challah? Study Torah, honor parents, give charity, whatever. Once you decide on a specific commandment, that itself already means that you probably understand that what is happening is because of the commandment, not because of the merits you accumulate by engaging in the commandment. To say that there are merits by virtue of certain commandments that help with matchmaking, and merits by virtue of other commandments that help heal the sick—that is already very forced, and it also has no source. Where would you make that up from? If you tell me, look, I have the merit of a commandment and I ask the Holy One, blessed be He, to help me in the merit of the commandment—that’s legitimate, no problem. But then what difference does it make which commandment you do? What difference does it make whether you study Torah, read Psalms, separate challah, honor parents, observe the Sabbath, or I don’t know what, or separate terumot and ma’asrot? It doesn’t matter. Therefore, if you are already using a specific commandment, I don’t see how one escapes this. How can it even be that someone does this only for the sake of the merit of the commandment? I can’t even imagine it, yes. I’ll get to that in a moment, Menachem. I can’t imagine at all someone who does it only for the sake of the merit of the commandment, although many people say that. They say that because they know that the matter involves a prohibition, but I don’t believe them. I don’t believe them because if it were really the merit of the commandment, then I don’t see why they choose specifically these commandments. Accumulate merits in any way you like. No—even commandments whose reward is explicit, I don’t think that changes it. No. If you tell me, regarding long life, yes, if the explicit reward is long life, that I can understand, of course. But where there is no source whatsoever for it—someone invented that separating challah is good for finding a match. If you say it’s only the merit of the commandment, then I don’t see why separating challah would do something that charity wouldn’t do, or I don’t know, any other commandment. So therefore I don’t buy it. I think that someone who separates challah intends that the separating of the challah itself does the work, not the merit.
[Speaker D] How does the Rabbi explain a case where a person is in distress, and he vows that if, with God’s help, he gets out of this trouble, he’ll give charity, he’ll do something—how does the Rabbi…?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, that’s perfectly okay. I have no problem with that. Okay. As long as he vows something, and he doesn’t think that that thing itself will save him, he can vow to give charity, he can vow to study Torah, or whatever—it makes no difference. Any commandment whatsoever is fine. The problem is when you choose a certain commandment and believe that specifically it does the work. Then basically, don’t tell me that you’re saying this only because of the merit of the commandment, the merit you accumulate by performing the commandment. Rather, you are claiming that the commandment itself does the work, and that is a prohibition of divination and charming. Regarding Psalms—and I wrote this in the column there too—what Menachem remarked earlier, correctly, is that regarding Psalms it’s a bit different. Why? Because with Psalms, it’s simply a text that I use in order to ask for what I want to ask for: “A song of ascents: from the depths I have called to You, O Lord.” Fine. So I say to the Holy One, blessed be He, I call to You from the depths and I ask You, save me. And the fact that I use King David’s wording from Psalms—what’s wrong with that? It’s excellent wording. No need to compose the prayers myself. But there, that is really a third mechanism. It’s not that saying the Psalms itself does the work. It’s not the merit of the commandment of Torah study, because studying Ketzot is far better Torah study than studying Psalms, if what you want is merits. Rather, you are simply using King David’s wording as good wording to express what you want to express. That I can understand, although even there I’m suspicious. Why? Because we actually use Psalms in a way that is often artificial. After all, there is a better way to pray. We choose verses from Psalms that are somehow connected to the issue. But why choose verses that are somehow connected to the issue instead of formulating something that expresses the issue itself? So I don’t think you really succeed in escaping some lingering touch of the prohibition of charming and divination. Something in the notion that if you say Psalms, it does a job, is present there. Therefore I am very, very uncomfortable with the customary Psalm recitations in synagogues—always to pray for a sick person and all sorts of things like that. Even though there it can be understood a bit more, because if you want communal prayer, then you need to use a text that is familiar to everyone, just technically. You can pray by yourself in wording that you choose for yourself. If you want an entire community to pray, then it makes sense to choose some text familiar to everyone, and Psalms is a natural and obvious candidate. So I can understand it, but I’m saying: this touches so closely on these Torah prohibitions that I think we should be careful. With far lighter prohibitions and far more distant proximity, we are careful. So with prohibitions that are accessories of idolatry, in a proximity that is almost impossible to avoid, I think one ought to be careful. And if people aren’t careful, that means they don’t really recognize this prohibition, and they don’t care that yes, we think the commandment itself does the work. And therefore I think these things are a very good example of the first type. Maimonides writes here in the Laws of Torah Scroll—what I started to do there before, I showed you earlier—“It is a common custom…”
[Speaker E] May I ask something? Yes, yes. A double question about the conclusion we’ve reached so far from Maimonides’ words. We see in the Talmud legitimacy also for using—we see in the Talmud legitimacy also for using tefillin, right? As a segulah, such that you are allowed to carry them on the Sabbath from place to place. And also amulets, right? We have an amulet of an ordinary person, an amulet of an expert. Of course these are two different examples, but how does that fit with what we said? I don’t know.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying that according to Maimonides this can fit, in my opinion, because for Maimonides what works is permitted. With tefillin—if it works? I’m saying, according to Maimonides there isn’t this category split. So if the amulet is an expert amulet, meaning it works, then it’s also permitted, so there’s no problem. The whole prohibition is only the prohibition of being stupid, of using things that don’t work. So according to Maimonides, yes, this can be understood.
[Speaker E] But according to Maimonides an ordinary amulet would not necessarily always be forbidden.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I didn’t hear. Never mind.
[Speaker E] Regarding an ordinary amulet, and regarding tefillin.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying again, same thing. If it works, then it is apparently true. Maimonides is speaking here about fools who think this brings healing to the body, whereas in fact it heals the soul. But if indeed we see—suppose we checked systematically, not that I think anyone ever systematically checked these expert amulets—but never mind. So they thought such a test was a good test. I assume that even then there was the law of small numbers. But they were not aware of these statistical aspects, and they thought this was a good test. Fine. Every generation and its own modes of thought. So in their view it was tested and it worked, and therefore it was permitted. Now if this thing with tefillin worked too, then from Maimonides’ point of view that would also be permitted. The whole problem is that it doesn’t work. But that is really only Maimonides’ approach. And Maimonides, following Rif, is also the most extreme in the formulation of these prohibitions. There is a source in the Talmud for these prohibitions, but in the Talmud itself there are already different interpretations. Rif and Maimonides—Maimonides here follows Rif—go in the direction I described earlier: it is forbidden to use words of Torah in this way, and it is divination and charming, period. There are other interpretations as well. Still, there is such a Talmudic text, so some prohibition exists here in any case. But that’s one source. The second source, I said, is the Laws of Torah Scroll and Mezuzah: “It is a common custom to write on the outside of the mezuzah, opposite the space between section and section, the name Shaddai, and there is no loss in this because it is on the outside. But those who write on the inside names of angels, or holy names, or a verse, or seals—they are among those who have no share in the world to come. For these fools”—notice that, fools—“not only nullified the commandment, but they turned a great commandment, which is the unity of God, blessed be He, and His love and His service, into something like an amulet for their own benefit, as it arose in the heart of the fool that this is something beneficial in the vanities of the world.” So all the time, “fool” and “simpleton” hint that Maimonides understands that it also doesn’t work. According to Maimonides, they are fools because they don’t understand that it doesn’t work. In other words, it’s not only that they are wicked, they are also stupid. For Maimonides, the two go together. Also in the Laws of Idolatry chapter 11, there he writes this more explicitly: “And all these things are falsehood and lies, and it was with them that the ancient star-worshipers deceived the nations of the lands in order that they should follow after them. And it is not fitting for Israel, who are wise among the wise, to be drawn after these vanities, nor to think that they have any benefit in them, as it is said, ‘For there is no divination in Jacob nor sorcery in Israel,’ and it is said, ‘For these nations that you dispossess listen to soothsayers and diviners, but as for you—not so…’ Anyone who believes in these things and the like and thinks in his heart that they are true and wise things, but that the Torah merely forbade them…” By the way, there are medieval authorities who do understand it that way—that all the divination and sorcery and everything are true, but the Torah forbade them. They distinguish between whether it works and whether it is permitted or forbidden. But for Maimonides, that is the same question. “…is among the fools and the deficient in understanding, and included among women and children whose minds are incomplete”—let us hope there are no women here—“but people of wisdom and sound understanding know with clear proofs that all these things the Torah forbade are not matters of wisdom but emptiness and vanity, which the deficient in understanding were drawn after, and because of them abandoned all paths of truth. And because of this the Torah said, when warning against all these vanities, ‘You shall be wholehearted with the Lord your God.’” In other words, Maimonides’ claim here—just to sharpen this—here Maimonides is already talking about the second and third types: divination, not use of commandments, but use of omens and incantations and matters of idolatry. And about this Maimonides says: it is all nonsense. But as we saw earlier, also in the first context, the context of using words of Torah, there too Maimonides says not only that it is forbidden, but that it is also nonsense. And not only that it is both forbidden and nonsense, but that it is forbidden because it is nonsense. What is not nonsense is apparently not forbidden. By the way, that question about that Indian witch doctor, “and withhold not medicine from the sick,” whom I mentioned earlier—I claimed that according to Maimonides it is permitted. Because if indeed there are good indications—assuming that is the case—if indeed there are good indications that it works, then it is also not forbidden. The fact that he took it from idolatry—why should I care where he took it from? That’s only the context of discovery. I’m interested in the context of justification, in the philosophy of science, yes? I don’t care how he discovered that this technique works. As long as it works and I have indications that it works, then it is permitted. What is forbidden according to Maimonides is the prohibition of being stupid. Okay? So that is of course only Maimonides’ approach, Maimonides and those who follow him. I’ll mention later—there is a long responsum that discusses the different approaches on this issue, so I’ll still comment on it later. We won’t really get into the details, but I will still note it. In any event, this is what Maimonides writes here. So according to his consistent approach all along, he says that it also doesn’t work and it is also forbidden. Now I want to emphasize: I am not using Maimonides as a source for the claim that it doesn’t work, just as I would not use other medieval authorities as a source for the claim that it does work. Because the question whether it works or not is a factual question, and it has to be checked with the tools by which we check facts—scientific tools, let’s call them that. Therefore I’m not using Maimonides here as an authoritative source to tell me that it doesn’t work. That I decide for myself. There is no indication that it works, so in my opinion it doesn’t work. I use Maimonides to show the halakhic conception that says that resorting to something that doesn’t work is forbidden. It is divination and charming. What works and what doesn’t? Check it. I suspect that even the expert amulet that the Talmud says works did not work, because I do not think their tests were serious tests. That’s my impression. I don’t know, I wasn’t there, but that’s my impression. Therefore, in order to permit an expert amulet, I would not be satisfied with the Talmud. I would check whether it really works. And if not, then despite the Talmud’s permitting it, I think it is forbidden, by a Torah prohibition, as I said—“be killed rather than transgress”—this is idolatry, accessories of idolatry. So the point I want to learn from Maimonides is not this issue of whether it works, but that it is forbidden, and that the prohibition is connected to the fact that it doesn’t work. Fine, so we spoke about the merit of the commandment—
[Speaker F] the commandment and all that, I said earlier. One last comment, because someone really asked earlier—Shlomo, I think—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] it seems to me, regarding one who gives charity on condition that my son live. The Talmud says this is permitted. But there are different interpretations of that. Some say it is a special rule regarding charity. Some say there are various explanations of how this is nevertheless permitted. And there are opinions that this applies to all commandments, that one may perform all commandments on condition that my son live. But performing commandments on condition that my son live is not what I’m talking about here. That is an important point. To perform commandments on condition that my son live means to perform the commandment because it is a commandment. And now I say: in the merit of the commandment, I would be happy if my son lives. My motivation for doing it is that my son should live. But I perform the commandment in order to fulfill my obligation. Commandments require intention. The motivation to perform the commandment in order to fulfill the obligation is so that in the end it will help my son live in the merit of the commandment. Not that the charity will heal him, but in the merit of the commandment that you performed. And then, in a substantive sense, I would say this actually applies to all commandments, not specifically charity. Because if it applied only to charity, then again, as I said earlier, that would not be the merit of the commandment, but apparently the commandment itself does it. Because if it is the merit of the commandment, then what difference does it make which commandment? Do any commandment, accumulate merits, and ask that in the merit of those merits your son should live. So דווקא according to the views that say this applies to all commandments, it seems to me easier to reconcile with what I’ve said so far, that I ascribe it to the merit of the commandment. But then indeed it is not specifically charity. Charity saves from death just as Torah study saves from death, just as separating challah saves from death, and honoring parents saves from death. They all save from death. The merit of a commandment can save you from death, perhaps. I’m not getting here into my own views of divine providence, which would also have to enter here, but at the moment I am completely ignoring that aspect. Okay, let’s assume the standard view of providence, that of the Sages. Fine? Therefore, giving charity so that my son may live is absolutely not the same as separating challah for a match. At least according to how I understand it. To give charity so that my son may live means: in the merit of the commandment, the Holy One, blessed be He, may perhaps help my son live. And I can do any commandment, not specifically charity.
[Speaker D] Maybe charity comes in here because charity also gives life to someone, so it’s as if I’m asking in that same… maybe, possibly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So the point is that commandments require intention, and one must do it for the sake of the obligation and in order to fulfill one’s obligation. And the fact that in the end you want help to come to you in the merit of the commandment—that is perfectly fine, as long as it is clear that you are really attributing it to the merit of the commandment and not to the act of doing the commandment itself. And even there, I said, Maimonides writes only about a healthy person and not about a sick person. In other words, there is room to worry about these confusions even where it doesn’t seem that way. And since we are dealing with very severe prohibitions, I would stay away from this like fire. Okay, that’s all.
[Speaker G] Good evening, thank you very much, more power to you.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Goodbye, good evening. Thank you very much. Good night.