Tractate Sotah – Chapter 5 – Lesson 1 – Rabbi Michael Avraham

[Speaker A] Okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Sorry for the delay. Let’s begin.

[Speaker A] Technology problem.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. A technology problem.

[Speaker A] There is—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It has disadvantages and advantages too, that’s what there is. My brother always says—he’s nine years younger than I am, he always helps me with technology—but if the problem is really hard, you have to go lower and lower in age. For impossible problems, only under age three. Meaning, only they can deal with this kind of problem. It’s simply that the intensity of the problem times the age of the solver is a constant. It’s fixed. Okay. In any event, we’re dealing with chapter five of Sotah, and if we have time, then chapter six as well. We’ll see how much we get through. We’re not really going to learn every line in the chapter; rather, we’ll take the interesting topics, the main topics. Okay. In any event, that’s what we want to do. Each time I’ll talk about a different topic. In terms of preparation, this isn’t defined as something that requires preparation or study around it. Whoever does that, of course, all the better. So I’ll tell you more or less what we’re going to deal with. If there’s something I want you to look at in advance, I can send it or upload it to the system, whatever is convenient. And in principle, I’ll give the lecture, I’ll upload a recording of the lecture for whoever isn’t here or just wants to hear it again, and relevant materials, a summary of the lecture—I hope I’ll make summaries too—I’ll also upload that to the system. So for those interested, the materials will be there. Of course, anyone who wants to reach out and talk is welcome to do so gladly, whether about the topic of the lecture or other topics, either here or in the study hall, to catch me, or by phone, WhatsApp, whatever is convenient. You are definitely welcome to contact me about anything if something isn’t working out, certainly first-year students who still don’t quite know how things work around here, so feel free to reach out about anything. Any topic that isn’t technological. Okay, that’s the general point.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What I want to do today, since this is just an opening lecture, is talk a bit from above, broadly, about this issue. The Mishnah—and afterward, it’s a very short chapter—the Mishnah and then the Talmudic text dealing with it mainly treat two subjects: the prohibition to the husband and to the adulterer of a woman who committed adultery, who went astray, and the laws of doubt. Yes, the laws of doubt that we learn—doubtful impurity in the public domain and in the private domain—we learn that from sotah. And we’ll touch on both of these topics later, but today I want to look at these two topics, especially in relation to sotah, from a broader perspective. Okay. So I’ll begin maybe with the laws of doubt. Again, I’m not going into the laws of doubt; I want to look at the issue through the prism of the laws of doubt. Right? So we still haven’t started the actual learning. This is an opening lecture, a general lecture. It gives some framework.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We see in our Talmudic text that the laws of doubtful impurity are different from the laws of doubtful prohibition. And in general throughout Jewish law, that’s true. In doubtful prohibition, the rule is that a Torah-level doubt is ruled stringently, and a rabbinic-level doubt is ruled leniently. There is a dispute among medieval authorities over the rule that a Torah-level doubt is ruled stringently—whether that rule itself is Torah-level or rabbinic. According to Maimonides it is only rabbinic; according to most medieval authorities it is Torah-level. But still, bottom line, a Torah-level doubt is ruled stringently, whether that itself is rabbinic or Torah-level, and a rabbinic-level doubt is ruled leniently.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In doubtful impurity, the rules are different. Doubtful impurity—and I’m speaking now about Torah-level doubtful impurity—is different from Torah-level doubtful prohibition. Torah-level doubtful prohibition needs to be ruled stringently. Torah-level doubtful impurity depends on what domain the doubt arose in. If it arose in a private domain, then you go stringently. If it arose in a public domain, then you can go leniently. Okay, that’s the rule in the laws of doubtful impurity, as opposed to doubtful prohibition. There’s another difference: in doubtful prohibition there is a difference between a single doubt and a double doubt. With one doubt we are stringent; with a double doubt we can be lenient, even on a Torah level. Okay? In doubtful impurity there is no difference between doubtful prohibition and double doubt—sorry, no difference between a single doubt and a double doubt. If it’s in a private domain, then they are always stringent, even with a double doubt, even with a triple doubt, always stringent. If it’s in a public domain, they are always lenient, even with a single doubt. All right? Meaning, in the context of impurity we do not make the distinction between a single doubt and a double doubt. That’s a Mishnah in Taharot. The Mishnah says there that no matter how many doubts you add, it makes no difference. In other words, with doubtful impurity in a private domain, no matter how many doubts there are, they are always stringent. In a public domain, no matter how many doubts there are, they are always lenient. Okay, so that is another difference between doubtful impurity and doubtful prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now let’s look at a certain context in which it seems there’s a problem with this distinction. A Talmudic passage—I’ll share the screen here, okay? Okay. So the Talmud in Bava Kamma 11a: “And Ulla said in the name of Rabbi Elazar: a placenta that came out partially on the first day and partially on the second day, one counts for her from the first day.” This is talking about the impurity of a woman after childbirth. After she gives birth—whether to a male or a female, it doesn’t matter—there are certain days of impurity during which she remains in a state of impurity. From when do we begin counting? From the moment of birth. Now what happens if a placenta came out, yes, and you don’t know exactly what happened inside it, okay? Let’s say the birth ended a day later, but the placenta began to come out on the first day. The birth ended on the second day. Fine. Now the question is: from when do you begin counting the impurity?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So the Talmud says: if part of it came out on the first day and part on the second day, one counts for her from the first day; the impurity begins from the first day. Rava said to him: What do you think—because of stringency? What, because you want to be stringent here, because you have a doubt whether to count from the first day or from the second day, so you’ll count from the first day, go stringently because a Torah-level doubt is ruled stringently? So he says: What do you think—stringently? It’s a stringency that leads to a leniency, because you are thereby declaring her pure from the first day. After all, the end of the impurity period will also be calculated from a count that starts on the first day, so the beginning may indeed be a stringency, but the end is a leniency. So you can’t explain this law by the rule that in a doubt we go stringently, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So the Talmud says: Rather, Rava said, she is treated with concern, but one does not actually count except from the second day. Meaning, they begin counting the days of impurity on the second day, but they are already concerned about impurity from the first day. In short, they go stringently both at the beginning and at the end. What is it coming to teach us? What’s the novelty? Fine—Torah-level doubt is ruled stringently, so you need to count both the first day and the last day; what’s the problem? It says no, it is coming to teach us that there is no partial placenta without a fetus. Meaning, the novelty is that there is no partial placenta without a fetus. If part of the placenta came out on the first day, it cannot be that within that part that came out there was no part of the fetus. Because if no part of the fetus came out, then it’s not relevant for counting the days of impurity. The count of impurity is not determined by the placenta but by the fetus. We don’t know whether a fetus came out or not; we see that a placenta came out. Now the Talmud says: we see from here that there is no partial placenta without a fetus. What does that mean? If part of the placenta came out, it cannot be that there wasn’t some part of the fetus inside. How did we hear that novelty from this statement of Ulla?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because if there could be a partial placenta without a fetus, then what would happen here? Then it would be a double doubt, right? On the first day part of the placenta came out, right? Now it could be that no fetus came out at all, and then it’s irrelevant—that’s one doubt: did a fetus come out or didn’t it? Second, there’s another doubt: even if a fetus did come out, the question is whether most of it came out, most of the fetus. Part of the placenta came out; within that part of the placenta, it’s possible that most of the fetus was there. So in effect there is a double doubt here. If there can be a situation of placenta without fetus, then right now when part of the placenta came out, we’re really dealing with a double doubt, and we should have been lenient. So why are you telling me to be stringent and already be concerned from the first day? It’s a double doubt. Okay, that’s the claim.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is room to discuss why this is called a double doubt at all—whether the doubts reverse each other or are of the same type—I’m not going into those details right now. Because all right, part of the placenta came out; maybe there’s some placenta, maybe 30% placenta, 40% placenta—you can turn that into doubt upon doubt upon doubt upon doubt. We don’t split doubts apart that way. In other words, either there is a majority of the placenta, or a majority of the fetus, or there isn’t a majority of the fetus. Why should I care whether there could be a fetus or not, whether it’s 20% or 30% or 50% of the fetus? Fine. But that’s a question in the laws of double doubt; I’m not going into it here. In any event, that’s how the Talmud understands it, and that is how Rashi explains it here: from this law of Ulla—or from what Rava ultimately says, that we are concerned both at the beginning and at the end—we can learn a novelty. Because the novelty itself, that in a case of doubt we go stringently, is not a novelty. So what is the novelty? The novelty is a physiological novelty: that if a placenta came out, then something of the fetus was inside it, that’s certain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And then what? Then on the first day we have only one doubt, right? Because it’s clear that there was a fetus there; we just have a doubt whether it was most of the fetus, in which case you need to count, or not, in which case you don’t need to count. Since we are in doubt, we must be stringent and count from the first day. If the reality were that there can be a partial placenta with no fetus at all, then we would not be stringent to count from the first day, because on the first day it would be a double doubt. From the fact that Rava says we need to be stringent already from the first day, we understand that Rava is probably teaching us that there is no partial placenta without a fetus. Fine. And then it’s only one doubt and not a double doubt. That’s the Talmud. Then it goes on: “A placenta that partially came out is forbidden to be eaten”—and it moves to the placenta of an animal giving birth; here it had been the placenta of a woman giving birth. Fine, that’s less important for our purposes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Tosafot there asks about this phrase, “there is no partial placenta without a fetus.” Tosafot says: And if you say that according to Rabbi Elazar, who says we are concerned because there is no partial placenta without a fetus, but if there could be a partial placenta without a fetus—if it is possible for part of a placenta to come out and there be no fetus there—then you would not be concerned. Why? Because it would be a double doubt, right? The novelty is that it’s only one doubt and not a double doubt, but if it were a double doubt then we wouldn’t be stringent and be concerned from the first day, right? That is what Tosafot infers, and rightly so, that’s obvious.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Tosafot asks: what are the circumstances here? If it happened in a public domain, then even with a single doubt we declare it pure. Where did this happen? She gave birth in the public domain. If she gave birth in the public domain, then whether it is one doubt or a double doubt, we would not be concerned, because even with one doubt we are not concerned. Even if there is no partial placenta without a fetus and there is only one doubt here, still in the public domain we should go leniently, because with doubtful impurity we are supposed to go leniently whether it is one doubt or a double doubt. If it is in a private domain, then we should be stringent even if it is a double doubt and not only if it is one doubt, since in doubtful impurity there is no difference between a single doubt and a double doubt; it all depends on which domain the doubt arose in.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In short, Tosafot says that here in the Talmud we see there is a difference between a single doubt and a double doubt. How can that be? In impurity there is no difference. If it is a private domain, there is no difference—they are stringent. If it is a public domain, there is no difference—they are lenient. But practically speaking, either way there is no difference. How can there be a case where with one doubt we are stringent and with a double doubt we are lenient? In the laws of impurity there is no such thing. If you are lenient, you are always lenient, and if you are stringent, you are always stringent. There is no difference between a single doubt and a double doubt. So why do I care whether there is or is not a partial placenta without a fetus? Okay, that is basically what Tosafot asks. Yes—“even a double doubt is also impure, as we learned: any doubt that you can multiply in a private domain, even a double doubt, is impure.” That is the Mishnah in Taharot that I mentioned before. That is Tosafot’s question.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And he answers: “It can be said that our passage is dealing with forbidding her to her husband.” Here we are not talking about her impurity; we are talking about forbidding her to her husband. A woman who gave birth is also forbidden in marital relations with her husband, and therefore we are speaking only about that aspect, not about the aspect of her impurity, but only about the aspect of prohibition. All right?

[Speaker A] And therefore they forbid her already from the first day.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Regarding prohibition, the regular rules of doubt apply: with a single doubt we are stringent; with a double doubt we are lenient. So when the Talmud here said that it depends on whether there is or is not a partial placenta without a fetus—meaning, whether it is one doubt or a double doubt—it is really speaking only about the prohibitory aspect, not about the aspect of impurity.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And here many later authorities discuss this. They prove from this Tosafot—just as an important conceptual lesson, or an important logical lesson—that even when two things come together, they are not always necessarily attached one to the other. We know that a woman who gives birth is both impure and forbidden to her husband, right? Now, prohibition to her husband and impurity are two different things. Impurity means that if she touches something, she imparts impurity to it. Prohibition to her husband is something else; it is a prohibition. We usually connect these two things. We say that the prohibition to her husband is basically impurity, okay, and therefore it is the same law itself with two aspects: she imparts impurity to things she touches, and she is also forbidden to her husband. From this Tosafot we see that that is not correct. Because if it were so, then it would be impossible to distinguish between the law regarding prohibition and the law regarding impurity. You’d have to decide what is the source and what is the consequence, but still in practical terms, either there is a difference between a single doubt and a double doubt and then that would be true both for impurity and for prohibition, or the opposite. Okay? From the fact that Tosafot splits impurity from prohibition, we see that impurity and prohibition are two consequences of the woman’s state of having given birth, and they are two independent consequences; one can come without the other.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So for example, if she gave birth in a private domain, okay, then whether or not there is a partial placenta without a fetus, she will be impure. But regarding prohibition to her husband, if there is no partial placenta without a fetus, then she will be forbidden because it is only one doubt, but if there is a partial placenta without a fetus, then she will be permitted because it is a double doubt. And regarding prohibition to her husband, there is a difference in the laws of doubt between one doubt and a double doubt. Meaning, if there is a partial placenta without a fetus and she gave birth in a private domain, then she will be impure and permitted to her husband. And if she gave birth in a public domain and there is no partial placenta without a fetus, then she will not be impure but she will be forbidden to her husband. In other words, there can be a situation in which these two consequences do not come together.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You know, we find this kind of thing in many places in Jewish law. For example, the second Passover offering—a dispute among the tannaim. There is a second Passover offering, so when we read in the Torah, what is the second Passover? It’s compensation for the first Passover, right? Someone who did not bring the first Passover offering brings it a month later, as the second Passover, right? Now what happens if someone was not obligated in the first Passover at all—

[Speaker A] —offering?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then obviously he should not have to bring the second Passover offering. For example, a minor who came of age between the two Passovers—the famous Maimonides case—a minor who became an adult between the two Passovers, say he became bar mitzvah on the first of Iyar, okay, like with the Omer. What happens? Yes, he became bar mitzvah on the first of Iyar, so at the first Passover he was not yet someone under obligation at all; he was not obligated. When the second Passover comes around, then surely he should not be obligated in the second Passover even though he is now an adult, since the second Passover is only compensation for someone who did not do the first Passover. But he was not obligated in the first Passover at all; he has nothing to make up. But there is a tannaitic dispute, and we do not rule that way; we rule that he is obligated in the second Passover. Why? After all, it is clear that the second Passover is compensation for the first, because as a matter of fact only someone who did not bring the first one brings the second one, right? So how can it be that someone who was not obligated in the first one nevertheless has to bring the second Passover? Here is an example of two things that come together—that is, second Passover is always for someone who did not bring the first Passover—but they are still two things that are independent.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What statisticians call it is correlation; it is not causation. Yes, statisticians have lots of jokes about this confusion between correlation and causation. When two things come together, there is a statistical correlation between them, but that does not mean one is the cause of the other. Okay, that’s correlation, not causation.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Once I saw a letter to a newspaper by some professor from the Technion who said that the State of Israel should increase investment in higher education because countries that invested more in higher education have a higher GDP. So it’s worthwhile to increase investment in higher education. Fine? If you invest in higher education, then somehow people become more skilled, contribute to the market, and GDP grows. Of course, the opposite interpretation could also be true, right? Countries with higher GDP have a lot of money, so they also invest in higher education. In other words, the question is which is the cause and which is the effect, right? You can’t bring proof from that. Meaning, if my interpretation is correct, then there is no point in increasing investment in higher education—it won’t increase your GDP. The high GDP is what causes the investment in higher education, not the other way around.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, if I examine the connection between cancer and cigarette smoking, once I find a correlation between the two things, does that mean it is worthwhile to stop smoking cigarettes? Not necessarily. Only if I decide that cigarette smoking causes cancer. But if someone who has cancer has some increased tendency to smoke cigarettes, meaning the cancer causes the smoking and not the smoking causes the cancer, then reducing smoking will not lower your chances of getting cancer. It’s not enough to point to correlations; you also have to point to a causal direction. Who is the cause and who is the effect, if at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There can also be a situation where neither one is the cause of the other. Leibniz’s clock parable, yes: there are two clocks that always show the same time. Okay? Is clock A the cause of B, or is clock B the cause of A? There is no connection between them. Neither one nor the other, right? There is simply a clockmaker who built them both and synchronized them to some universal time axis. Okay? Neither one is the cause of the other. That is a correlation where there is some third thing that is the cause of both clocks, if anything. There can even be a correlation that is accidental, with no cause at all, but still there is a correlation. Okay?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Good. So basically, coming back to our matter, that means that even though these two things come together—the woman’s prohibition to her husband and her impurity—neither one is the cause of the other. Just like the clocks. These are two things that come together, but that is correlation and not a causal relationship. Therefore there can be a case where one of them appears without the other, or the other without the first. That’s what later authorities learn from Tosafot here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Except that there is a very interesting comment on Tosafot’s words. I once found it—on Shabbat I used to have a hobby of playing around with pilpul. Pilpul on the weekly Torah portion—that’s delighting in Shabbat. Those are the books of Rabbi Yonatan Eybeschutz. He has a collection of pilpul books—delightful. Nothing there is actually correct. It’s just Shabbat delight, not Torah study. It’s just for enjoyment. So one of the books is Nefesh Yehonatan on Parashat Chukat. Yes, it’s written in Rashi script and all that, so you feel like you’re learning Torah too. It even gives you a good feeling. Some of the things there he just invents—I mean sources that he asks from some midrash that never existed; there is no such midrash at all.

[Speaker A] You’re going in a negative direction.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why negative? The Holy One, blessed be He, delights in Torah dialectics. It’s Shabbat delight—how is that different from any other Shabbat delight? And every now and then you even encounter a correct source there. Most of the sources are in fact correct. So fine, it gives you a bit of practice for your learning mode of thought.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Anyway, one of the books is called Nefesh Yehonatan. There are many books; there is a kind of collection of all the books of Rabbi Yonatan Eybeschutz. In this book on Parashat Chukat, the publisher—who was the grandson of the brother of the Sochatchover—the publisher of the book—brought in the name of his great-uncle a note below there on Parashat Chukat, by Rabbi Yonatan Eybeschutz, and I copied it here. “And I heard from the holy mouth of his holy honor, my revered great-uncle, the holy gaon,” and so on—all the praises. “An explanation of the above words of Tosafot according to the words of the Kuzari in Essay 3, section 49, that there is no impurity except in a place of holiness.” What? Where does it say that—

[Speaker G] —that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Impurity is relevant only where there is holiness.

[Speaker G] The more holiness there is, the more impurity there is.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Before I read him, maybe I didn’t copy the objection. There is a difficulty here in Tosafot’s words. What is the difficulty? The difficulty is: from where do we learn that doubtful impurity in the private domain—the laws of doubtful impurity? It’s our Mishnah, from sotah. If she secluded herself in a private domain and she became defiled, and I have a doubt whether she became defiled or not, doubtful impurity in a private domain is ruled stringently—impure. Okay? We learn this from sotah. And in sotah too, it is about forbidding her to her husband. In sotah it is only about forbidding her to her husband; there is no aspect there of impurity. We say that she “became defiled,” but that’s not really defiled. Rather, she became forbidden to her husband. It is not impurity such that if she touches something she imparts impurity to it. “Became defiled” there is seemingly only a metaphorical term. The point is that she became forbidden to her husband.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So then, all the laws of doubtful impurity are learned from the prohibition of a woman to her husband. So how can Tosafot say, no, no, here we are not dealing with the laws of doubtful impurity; here it is only with regard to forbidding her to her husband? What does that have to do with the laws of doubtful impurity? All the laws of doubtful impurity are learned from the prohibition of a woman to her husband.

[Speaker G] So is he coming to refute Tosafot?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. What do you mean—after all, the prohibition of a woman to her husband is the doubtful impurity we are talking about. So what are you telling me—no, here it’s speaking about that woman who gave birth, about her prohibition to her husband, and we’re not talking about laws of impurity. Well then, how do you learn it at all? If you say there is a difference between the prohibition of a woman to her husband and doubtful impurity. Rather, if the Talmud learns it, then apparently the prohibition of a woman to her husband is impurity. So you cannot make Tosafot’s distinction, that with the woman after childbirth there they are dealing only with forbidding her to her husband and not with impurity. It’s the same thing. Forbidding her to her husband and impurity are the same matter. The source is from sotah, not—

[Speaker E] —not for forbidding her to her husband, a sotah woman.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But there is no other kind of impurity there in sotah. In the woman after childbirth, there really are the two aspects. There is both the prohibition to her husband, and also if she touches something she imparts impurity to it. She really is impure in the regular sense of purity and impurity. But in sotah, if she touches something, she does not impart impurity to it. Everything written there that she became defiled means defiled to her husband, meaning she became forbidden to her husband—the sotah. So there you cannot say that it is speaking only about the impurity aspect and not the prohibition aspect. There is only the prohibition aspect. That’s a very strong objection.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So now let’s read what he writes. He says: “I heard from my revered great-uncle the explanation of the above words of Tosafot according to the words of the Kuzari, Essay 3, that there is no impurity except where there is holiness, such as with sacred offerings, terumah, tithes, and a menstruant woman with respect to her husband among ordinary things, as written in Hullin 31. Necessarily, the fact that the Torah forbade a menstruant woman to her husband is not because of impurity but only mere prohibition—see there in his delightful words, precious as gold. And these are the words of Tosafot above: with a doubt regarding a menstruant woman to her husband, one should not judge it as doubtful impurity in a private or public domain, but only as mere doubtful prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “And the fact that we derive doubtful impurity in the public domain from sotah with respect to her husband—and her husband is ordinary, so how is it considered doubtful impurity?—that is because when we say in the Talmud that her husband is ordinary, that is only with regard to the prohibition of a menstruant woman, because that is not a prohibition due to kiddushin, since even with an unmarried woman there is liability to karet. And if so, the prohibition of a menstruant woman has no connection to kiddushin but only to intercourse itself, and thus her husband is rightly considered ordinary. But sotah, whose prohibition is only to her husband, to whom she is consecrated, and kiddushin is language of consecration, for it forbids her to everyone like hekdesh. And the Talmud asks in Kiddushin 6, that we derive kiddushin from the whole idea that it is compared to an offering. And since the prohibition of sotah is drawn by force of holiness, the prohibition is indeed from the side of impurity, because it is in a place of holiness according to the above words of the Kuzari, and properly…”

[Speaker C] What is that? That word? I don’t—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know what this thing is—“sita bala.” In my view, these are typing problems. Maybe I copied it before it was possible—maybe I typed it. “…and properly, sotah with respect to her husband is a double doubt and not doubtful prohibition.” And see Tosafot in Yevamot, who wrote that taking back one’s divorced wife after she has married another is a prohibition of kinship, since the prohibition comes because of the first kiddushin, therefore it is indeed doubtful impurity and not doubtful prohibition. Unlike a menstruant woman, where the prohibition is not because of kiddushin but only a mere prohibition, so it counts as doubtful prohibition and not doubtful impurity. Up to here is the essence of his holy words, and he goes on at length.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What is he saying? He says the following—and it’s brilliant. He says: the Kuzari says that holiness belongs only in a place where impurity also belongs. Meaning, in the halakhic world there are several categories, each standing on its own. One category is on the axis of impurity-holiness. Another category is ordinary things. In the realm of ordinary things, which is not connected to impurity and holiness, there you have prohibition and permission. Prohibition and permission are one category; holiness and impurity are another category. Just as we see that the laws of doubt in prohibition and permission are different from the laws of doubt in holiness and impurity.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now he says, that’s the first point. The second point is: the prohibition of a woman to her husband—and that is really the focus of the difficulty—does the prohibition of a woman to her husband belong to the axis of holiness-impurity or to the axis of prohibition-permission? Meaning, it depends. If the prohibition of the woman to her husband is because of damage to kiddushin, then it belongs to impurity and holiness. Because kiddushin is holiness. Holiness, and in a place where holiness is relevant, impurity is also relevant. But if the prohibition of the woman to her husband is just a plain prohibition, unrelated to damage to sanctity, then that is prohibition and permission.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now let’s check. The prohibition of a menstruant woman to her husband, or a woman after childbirth—it’s like a menstruant woman to her husband—which axis does it belong to? Holiness and impurity, or ordinary things, or prohibition and permission? Prohibition and permission. How do I know? Because when a woman is a menstruant, she is forbidden to the whole world, not only to her husband. It has nothing to do with her husband at all. It is forbidden to have intercourse with a menstruant woman. We speak about her husband because usually the one who has intercourse with a woman is her husband. But the prohibition of a menstruant woman is not a prohibition specifically to her husband; it is forbidden to have intercourse with her in general, for anyone. What?

[Speaker F] Does kiddushin take effect with a menstruant woman?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, betrothal takes effect; that’s even more so. But I’m saying it even apart from that. The reason is that the prohibition of a menstruant woman is not a prohibition on her husband specifically; it’s a prohibition in general. Okay? And therefore, yes, even though it is one of the cases punishable by karet, maybe that really explains why, with a menstruant woman, despite the fact that it is punishable by karet, betrothal still takes effect. It’s not like the forbidden sexual relations—unlike those forbidden relations where, as a matter of Jewish law, betrothal does not take effect. So what does that actually mean? It means that we are dealing with a prohibition. And if there is a doubt, then the doubt is judged according to the laws of doubts regarding prohibition. What happens with a suspected adulteress? With a suspected adulteress, why does she become forbidden? To whom does she become forbidden? To her husband. Only to her husband, right? To her husband and to the man she slept with; she is not forbidden to anyone else. Meaning, the prohibition here is one that belongs to the realm of betrothal. And why? Because really, why does she become forbidden? She becomes forbidden because she damaged the bond of betrothal between her and her husband. There was a sin here, but it’s not just a sin; it’s a sin that damages the bond of betrothal. So if she damaged the holiness of the bond of betrothal, then the prohibition that takes effect upon her is really in the category of impurity. It’s a prohibition whose basis is damage to the bond of betrothal. How do I know that the bond of betrothal is a world of holiness? So he brings the Talmud in tractate Kiddushin on page 7, I don’t remember, something like that, where the Talmud discusses someone who betroths half a woman. And the Talmud says: if the betrothal spreads, then she is betrothed. The Talmud asks: if the betrothal spreads over all of her, then let the betrothal spread to all of her so that she should indeed be betrothed—just as with someone who says, “the leg of this animal is a burnt offering.” I consecrate the leg of this animal. There we say that if, at least, it is a limb upon which life depends—I’m not going into the details here—but if it is a limb upon which life depends, then the holiness spreads over the whole animal. The Talmud says that with a woman too it should be like that. If you betroth part of the woman, the betrothal should spread, just as when you consecrate part of an animal. And Tosafot there indeed asks: what is the basis of this comparison? Why is this similar to that? Because betrothing a woman is like consecrating an animal. It belongs to the world of holiness. And what operates here are the laws of consecrated things. Just as in the laws of consecrated things the holiness spreads over the whole animal, so in the laws of betrothal the holiness, or the betrothal, spreads over the whole woman. And therefore Tosafot there on page 2 says there is a practical difference: this whole idea that “the holiness spread over all of her” is relevant only if he betroths her using the language of betrothal: “Behold, you are consecrated to me.” But if he says “Behold, you are betrothed to me,” or “Behold, you are mine,” “set aside for me,” or something like that, then no. The rule that holiness spreads over all of her would not apply. Because if he says “Behold, you are consecrated to me,” he is approaching the topic from the aspect of holiness. And from the aspect of holiness, all the laws of holiness apply here. Not for nothing is the bond between a woman and her husband called kiddushin, betrothal/consecration. Why is it called kiddushin? Because it belongs to the world of the holy. Okay? If it belongs to the world of the holy, then the moment a woman commits adultery or becomes a suspected adulteress, she has in effect damaged the sanctified bond, the betrothal, between her and her husband. If so, then the prohibition created—her being forbidden to her husband—is really within the laws of impurity. Because it is damage to holiness, and the Kuzari said that wherever there is holiness, damage to holiness brings us into the world of impurity. But a menstruant woman did not do anything; there is no transgression here, she did not damage anything, this is nature. Or a woman after childbirth, or something like that, right? So that’s not relevant; there is no damage to holiness here. And indeed the prohibition is not a prohibition specifically to her husband; it is just an ordinary prohibition like any other prohibition. Therefore here the prohibition of a menstruant woman, or a woman after childbirth, to her husband is a prohibition; it is not impurity. And therefore the doubts regarding this prohibition are indeed doubts of prohibition; that is what Tosafot says. So when we discuss here the prohibition of a woman—if we were discussing her impurity, then it would operate according to the laws of impurity: in the private domain it is impure, in the public domain it is pure; there would be no difference between a simple doubt and a double doubt. Why? Because it really would be the laws of impurity, as with a suspected adulteress. But with a woman after childbirth and with a menstruant woman, her prohibition to her husband, or her prohibition in general—not specifically to her husband—is a prohibition, not impurity. And since that is so, the laws of doubtful prohibition apply here: in an ordinary doubt we are stringent, in a double doubt we are lenient, and it makes no difference whether it is in the private domain or the public domain. And therefore it may be detached from the laws of doubt regarding her impurity. In terms of impurity she may be impure, while regarding the prohibition to her husband she may be permitted, or the reverse. The two do not necessarily go together. Okay? So if that is the case, it turns out there are two kinds of a woman being prohibited to her husband. There is a prohibition of a woman to her husband whose basis is damage to the bond, to the betrothal connection between them. That prohibition is judged by the rules of doubtful impurity, not by the rules of doubtful prohibition. There are prohibitions of a woman to her husband that are prohibitions like any other prohibition. There are sexual prohibitions such as forbidden relations; that has nothing at all to do with doubtful impurity, it is doubtful prohibition. Okay? So too, the prohibition of a woman after childbirth and of a menstruant woman to her husband follows the ordinary laws of doubtful prohibition. Right? So “a woman prohibited to her husband” is not one single category. It is an umbrella term under which a few different shades fall. There is a case of a woman prohibited to her husband that is in the category of impurity, and there is a case of a woman prohibited to her husband that is in the category of prohibition. It depends on the basis of the prohibition. Is it damage to holiness, or just a prohibition like any other prohibition? Okay? That is basically the claim. How do we know that?

[Speaker H] I’m relying on Tosafot.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Kuzari is only explaining Tosafot. It doesn’t matter; I don’t rely on the Kuzari either. That’s the truth. Even if the Kuzari hadn’t written this, I would say the same thing. It doesn’t matter. So I’ll write it, so people will rely on it. I don’t rely on anybody. I check whether it is correct. That’s what matters. This explanation seems right to me. In any case, the claim, basically—what we see here—is that this whole realm of a woman being prohibited to her husband, in the case of a suspected adulteress—and that is our topic, yes, I brought this here only as background—but the prohibition of a suspected adulteress to her husband does not really belong to the world of prohibition and permission. It belongs to the world of holiness and impurity. And therefore the laws of doubt learned from here are laws of doubtful impurity, not laws of doubtful prohibition. And they work with different definitions than the laws of doubtful prohibition. We are used to—just a remark, I can’t resist—we are used to a somewhat imperialistic approach to the concepts of holiness, and consequently of impurity. A great many things, for us, become holy. Yes, basically anything connected to Torah we are used to treating as holiness. But that is actually a mistake. On the fundamental level within Jewish law, the categories of prohibition and permission, and the categories of holiness—all of them are within Jewish law. All of them are part of Torah and Jewish law. But these are two different categories. There is a world of the ordinary, and there is a world of holiness. Holiness and impurity belong only in that particular category. “There are ten degrees of holiness”—it appears there in the Mishnah in Keilim, yes, and elsewhere. These are very specific categories. For example, the Talmud in Megillah discusses a difference between objects used for holiness and objects used for a commandment. Objects used for a commandment are discarded. Strictly speaking, fringes that wore out, or something like that, you can throw them in the trash. A lulav—you can throw it in the trash. There’s no issue. But objects used for holiness—not so. They need to be put away respectfully. What’s the difference? There is a separate category called holiness, even though those too are objects used for a commandment. You use them. I don’t know—say, the case of a Torah scroll, or of phylacteries, or something like that. Regarding the issue in the chapter “One may save all sacred writings,” whether you save it from a fire or do not save it from a fire, there too they discuss objects used for holiness. Objects used for holiness are different from objects used for a commandment. Why? Because holiness is different from commandment. Commandments belong to the ordinary realm. Most commandments deal with the ordinary world. People think the Torah constitutes the world of holiness, while the world of the ordinary is some neutral world. No. The ordinary world is not a neutral world. In the ordinary world Torah has a great deal to say. What to do and what not to do, what is forbidden, what is permitted, and what is obligatory. Also in the ordinary world. And the world of holiness is a separate world unto itself. Yes, all the sons of Aaron, and all the terrible tension that accompanies entry into the holy, where everything there can be fateful and people die and get burned there and so on. Yes, all these stormy events characterize the world of holiness. But not all of Torah. When you enter the holy, things there are more sensitive. Notice: there it is holiness and impurity. In prohibition and permission, it is prohibition and permission. There are the rules; there is not all this—I don’t know what to call it—this metaphysical tension that accompanies dealing with holiness and impurity. And therefore, in my view, to sanctify things—even things connected to Torah—to sanctify them is almost, almost idolatry. It’s something that, yes, I don’t know, people talk about the holiness of the state, or the holiness of the garments of the High Priest, “the uniforms of the IDF are the garments of the High Priest,” all kinds of idiotic slogans of that sort. That is folly—not because it is something neutral or unimportant. The uniforms aren’t important, but the army is important. We need it in order to survive, right? It’s not—there are perhaps people who would say it is even a commandment; maybe, you can split hairs about that. But a commandment, at most, is not holiness. And one of the indications—you might say this is just semantics, fine, when they say holiness they mean commandment; it’s semantics. Maybe. Could be. But very often the implications show that it is not so. Meaning, when the ecstasy that accompanies these things points to the fact that they really are grasping some concept of holiness there, and not merely the ordinary realm in the purity of holiness, so to speak, or a commandment within prohibition and permission. When I see all kinds of dancing with the Israeli flag, I get a fever. In the synagogue, yes, I get a fever. There is no prohibition in this, but there is something terribly distorted here. There is some Israeli flag—I respect it as a symbol, all is well; some people connect more to symbols, some less, I don’t care—but I respect it as a symbol. But to bring it into the synagogue and start dancing with it as with a Torah scroll means that you are actually looking at it as something of holiness. That is fascism. Fascism gives holiness to things that may indeed have value—not because they have no value—but this is not holiness. And this is a point that may sound semantic, just fine, call it this, call it that. No. There is something genuinely substantive here; it is not only semantics. This rampaging fascism in relation to the state is, in my view, very problematic—not because I oppose the state, or Zionism, or whatever. No, I am entirely in favor. But I do not see in it something holy. I see in it something ordinary. And in the ordinary world too there are ways to do things right and ways to do them wrong. Perfectly fine. Most of Jewish law deals with the ordinary realm, not the holy realm. And it tells us that there is right and there is wrong. And by the way there are also things about which Jewish law says nothing, and still they are not neutral. There is the fitting and the unfitting, also not within the halakhic domain, also outside the halakhic domain. Maimonides talks about five kinds of speech in chapter 1 of his commentary on Avot. He says there are five kinds of speech. There is speech of commandment, there is speech that has value—the fitting, there is neutral speech, there is disgraceful speech, and there is forbidden speech. Five levels. So if you look at one side—the one corresponding to the other—then really there are three basic levels. There is the commandment, there is the fitting, and there is the permitted. And on the negative side there is the prohibition, there is the disgraceful—which is not halakhically forbidden—and the neutral, the permitted. Okay? People always bring Duties of the Heart as disagreeing with Maimonides. He claims there is nothing that is merely optional. It is either forbidden or obligatory. Meaning, there is no—perhaps there can also be an obligation beyond the strict letter of the law—but either forbidden and disgraceful, or obligatory and fitting. Meaning, there is no middle category of neutral. Yes, because if you just speak neutral things, then you have neglected Torah study, so it is forbidden. Meaning, nothing can be neutral. But that sounds hysterical to me. Okay. In any case, what I want to say is that here too it is the same thing. Meaning, there can be something that belongs to the world of holiness. I’m actually adding now two more categories to Maimonides. There is the neutral, there is the fitting, there is the obligatory, and there is the holy. And on the other side there is the neutral, there is the disgraceful, there is the forbidden, and there is the impure. Okay? And these are different categories, and it is not correct to connect them. I once wrote in this context about Nachmanides on the Torah portion of Vayechi. He says on “The scepter shall not depart from Judah, nor the ruler’s staff from between his feet,” that, yes, kingship must remain with the house of David. Yes, there is a question whether this is a commandment or merely the final instruction of our forefather Jacob; there are disputes about that. In any case, he says there that because of this the Hasmonean house was punished, because they violated the old man’s instruction, the instruction of Jacob our forefather, because they appointed themselves kings even though they were from the tribe of Levi, they were priests and not from the house of David. And therefore they were wiped out. You know—why were they wiped out? To wipe them out? Is this matter really so severe? So he says yes; he brings the Jerusalem Talmud, a dispute among Amoraim in the Jerusalem Talmud. Some explain that they were wiped out because of “The scepter shall not depart from Judah,” because they were not from the house of David and set themselves up as kings, and some say because they were priests. And what is the difference? They were priests, and therefore they were not from the house of David. No. The fact that you were not from the house of David is a general problem. Any tribe, anyone who is not from the house of David and sets himself up as king—that is a transgression. A transgression, or a violation of the old man’s instruction, it doesn’t matter. But if you are a priest, then beyond the fact that you are not from the house of David, there is another problem here. A priest is forbidden to be king even apart from the fact that he is not from the house of David. It is an additional prohibition, a double prohibition. What prohibition? So he says—I once heard this idea from Rabbi Shagar—that this is a mixing of holy and ordinary. A priest is forbidden to be king. Beyond the fact that it should be someone from the house of David and that someone else is not supposed to be king, a priest, essentially, even without Jacob our forefather’s instruction, is forbidden to make himself king. A priest belongs to the world of holiness, and a king belongs to the world of the ordinary. Now, with a king there are commandments; it is not a neutral world. But he belongs to the world of the ordinary. A king manages ordinary life. Like the state—we spoke before about the state—the state manages ordinary life. There is a way to do it right, a way to do it wrong. That does not mean I am indifferent to how the state behaves, but this is a realm of the ordinary, not a realm of holiness. So this imperialism of holiness is really, I think—sorry, that’s my mother. Hello? Hello? Mom? Hello? She gets tangled up with the phone and I never know whether this is… okay. Yes, so the claim is basically that behind these mixtures sits the same… sits the same… Hello? Mom? Shimon? Okay, she’s even older than I am; we already talked about technology; she can’t manage with the phone, and I can’t manage with the computer. Fine. The Hasmoneans? What? Yes, it’s more than that. The bottom line claim is that one must—meaning, it’s important to distinguish between the realm of holiness and the realm of the ordinary. It’s important in every direction. Not to turn the ordinary into holy, and not to turn the holy into ordinary. You know that Hanukkah is not explicitly mentioned in the Mishnah, but there are places where it is hinted at. One of them is in tractate Middot, where it says that there was a latticework barrier there, in the rampart there was a latticework barrier with thirteen breaches in it, and they instituted opposite them thirteen prostrations for everyone who entered the… Hello? Yes, I hear you, I’m in the middle of a class, I think you should… no, no, Mom, just a second. Mom, do you hear me? Listen, go over there to someone in Beit Juliana, ask them to help you. This is not—I can’t solve this from here. Yes, fine, ask someone if they can help you with it. The next one of us who gets there will try to look at it. I can’t solve it from here. No, no, you don’t need an address; go to someone from Beit Juliana, the desk or something like that. Okay? I’ll talk to you later. Fine, so if one of them happens to come by and tells me, I’ll tell him where. If one of them happens to come by and tells me, I’ll tell him where it is. Okay? I’ll speak to you in a little while, Mom, I’m in the middle of a class. I’m in the middle of a class. Okay, bye bye. Sorry. Right, so that was about concepts of holiness. I want to expand a bit more. So I want to expand a bit more on the question of what it means that a woman in relation to her husband is some kind of holiness, yes? What exactly is the meaning of this matter? For that I want to approach it from a somewhat different angle. We know that in Jewish law there are several kinds of offerings. In the context of sins there are mainly guilt-offerings and sin-offerings. A burnt-offering also comes for neglect of a positive commandment or something, but burnt-offerings and sin-offerings—sin-offerings and guilt-offerings are offerings brought for sin. Sin-offerings are, of course, offerings brought for sins whose intentional violation incurs karet and whose unintentional violation requires a sin-offering. A guilt-offering is brought for several very, very specific sins, and there are also guilt-offerings that are not guilt-offerings for sin: a Nazirite, a leper, and the like. But there are guilt-offerings that are guilt-offerings for sin. Where? What? For what are guilt-offerings for sin brought? There is the guilt-offering of the designated maidservant. One who has relations with a designated maidservant must bring a guilt-offering. There is the guilt-offering for misuse of consecrated property. For misuse of holy things one brings a guilt-offering. There is a provisional guilt-offering. For doubts. For a doubtful prohibition you bring a provisional guilt-offering. A doubtful prohibition whose intentional violation incurs karet and whose unintentional violation requires a sin-offering—then in a doubtful case you bring a provisional guilt-offering. What characterizes these sins for which a guilt-offering is brought? What is the difference between a guilt-offering and a sin-offering? Why for some sins do you bring a guilt-offering and for others a sin-offering? Nachmanides talks about this at the beginning of Leviticus, and he says something there that I did not fully understand—something very vague and blurry. I want to make the following claim. There are several indications that a guilt-offering is brought also for intentional sin, not only for unintentional sin.

[Speaker D] A guilt-offering for robbery, yes. A guilt-offering for robbery, yes, certainly. You can find a guilt-offering for robbery where the guardians… wait… one more second… or… as there is in misuse of consecrated property and with a deposit or with withholding wages or with robbery, he shall bring a guilt-offering. Right.

[Speaker J] Here, yes.

[Speaker E] One second. Another… or.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. So in the Mishnah in Keritot 9a, the Mishnah says there: “And these bring for intentional sin as for unintentional sin.” Yes, offerings that come for intentional and unintentional sin alike. One who has relations with a designated maidservant, a Nazirite who became impure, an oath regarding testimony, and an oath regarding a deposit. Except for the oath regarding testimony, the other three are guilt-offerings. Why? So we see that one characteristic of the guilt-offering, an essential characteristic of the guilt-offering, is that it comes for intentional sin as for unintentional sin. We also see in Rashi on the Mishnah in Horayot 8 and elsewhere that guilt-offerings do not have the law of “hidden matter,” because one is liable for a definite guilt-offering for intentional sin as for unintentional sin. Rashi says there is an essential principle in the guilt-offering: a guilt-offering is brought for intentional sin as for unintentional sin. There is no difference between intentional and unintentional in a guilt-offering. Does anyone have an idea? Any idea why? What stands behind the statement that there is no difference between intentional and unintentional?

[Speaker D] It’s the ceiling of the punishment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, what do you mean, the ceiling of the punishment? What is the idea? It distinguishes it from a sin-offering. Obviously it distinguishes it from a sin-offering, but what is the difference?

[Speaker D] A sin-offering offense is a very severe offense; its intentional violation incurs karet. And that is the… minimum of the punishment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why should there not be a difference between intentional and unintentional?

[Speaker D] There it is a severe punishment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On the contrary, then I would say that for severe offenses I even punish intentional sin as if it were unintentional; but with a guilt-offering, why should I treat intentional sin like unintentional sin? Think what makes sense. If I do not distinguish between intentional and unintentional, what does that say about the nature of the offense?

[Speaker H] Severe? Light? No, no, there’s no severity. If it’s always, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, I think—I would say the point is that this is a result-oriented offense. It does not matter what the aspect of the person is in this offense. Right? It doesn’t matter. Look, when we distinguish between intentional and unintentional, we are basically asking ourselves how guilty the offender is for what happened, right? If it was unintentional, then he is not so guilty, so there will be an offering. If it was intentional, he is guilty; he deserves punishment. Meaning, when I talk about whether you were intentional or unintentional, I am really talking about the question of how guilty you are in the matter. What degree of responsibility the person has for what happened. When I say I don’t care whether you were intentional or unintentional, I am really saying: it makes no difference to me at all how much of an offender you were. That is not the point. The point is what happened. In practice, it happened, so it happened. I don’t care now whether you were more guilty or less guilty. Bottom line, it happened. Meaning, what obligates one in a guilt-offering is the result that occurred. What obligates one in a sin-offering is the person’s criminality. And therefore Nachmanides and other commentators say: what is the problem in a sin-offering? A sin-offering comes to atone for a certain negligence. Therefore an unintentional sin that is close to compulsion does not require a sin-offering. Because he is not guilty. The claim is that even if you acted unintentionally, there is a certain degree of guilt in what you did. You were negligent, you didn’t pay attention, you didn’t learn, or you weren’t aware of what was going on, you didn’t investigate properly. So there is some measure of negligence here, and the sin-offering comes to atone for that. Meaning, a sin-offering is something that comes to atone for the guilt of the person. A guilt-offering comes to repair a result that occurred. Regardless of the question of what degree of responsibility you had for what happened. If it happened, you bring a guilt-offering for it. Therefore I claim that a guilt-offering is brought even where there is no criminality at all in that context. It has nothing to do with the matter. Even in a case of compulsion, in principle, you would bring a guilt-offering—unless because of the compulsion we say that it wasn’t really you who did it, so why should you bring the guilt-offering; let someone else bring it. On the fundamental level, even an unintentional act close to compulsion would indeed require a guilt-offering. Even though he would not bring a sin-offering, because I am not interested in whether you are guilty; it is not measured on the axis of guilt. It is measured by the question of what you did. If in the end you caused the devastation that occurred, then you need to repair it, and the guilt-offering is meant to repair it. I’ll briefly give you indications of this. Not just indications—I can show this to you for all the guilt-offerings, not just examples. All the guilt-offerings, one after another, I can show you that this is the definition. Let’s start with the guilt-offering of the designated maidservant. The guilt-offering of the designated maidservant is when a person has relations with a designated maidservant, half slave and half free, who is married to a Hebrew slave—that is what is called a designated maidservant. Now, betrothal takes effect with her; the Hebrew slave is Jewish, betrothal takes effect with her, okay? Whoever has relations with her is having relations with a married woman. Okay? But according to Jewish law, according to most opinions, the ruling is that there is no prohibition here at all. No prohibition whatsoever. He has transgressed nothing, not even neglect of a positive commandment, but he brings a guilt-offering—the guilt-offering of the designated maidservant. She herself probably is even flogged, but he… this is almost the only case where there is a difference between the man and the woman in sexual prohibitions. He is exempt from punishment and is only liable…

[Speaker A] …for an offering, and she has to receive the punishment. What punishment?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] She receives lashes, I think, if I remember correctly. But she transgressed a prohibition, she transgressed a prohibition. No, no, she does not receive lashes if she was coerced; intentionally—they committed adultery, simply. And he brings a guilt-offering. Now if there is no prohibition, then for what are you bringing a guilt-offering? There is no prohibition. Not half a woman; this is a woman who is fully married, the wife of the Hebrew slave. She is not half a married woman, she is fully his wife. She transgressed a prohibition; he—I am speaking from his side—he has no prohibition. On her side there is, as I said; this is the only case where there is a difference between the adulterer and the adulteress. On his side there is no prohibition and on her side there is, and he brings a guilt-offering. We see that the guilt-offering is brought irrespective of prohibition. The Pnei Yehoshua—the Pnei Milu’im in section 44 cites Pnei Yehoshua. Pnei Yehoshua asks: the Talmud says that we do not find a wife of two dead men. Yes, there is no woman who requires levirate marriage from two different men. Right? If she is the wife of one man, no one else can also be her husband. So if both died, that means there cannot be a situation in which she has two husbands. A designated maidservant married to a Hebrew slave—now someone comes and betroths her. Since she is not forbidden to him, not even by a simple prohibition, the betrothal takes effect. Even though she is a married woman, there is no prohibition, so the betrothal takes effect, right? So if the betrothal takes effect, it comes out that she is the wife of the Hebrew slave and also the wife of this one, so there is a woman of two husbands. And if they both die she would require levirate marriage from both. So why does the Talmud say that there is no wife of two dead men? That is Pnei Yehoshua’s question.

[Speaker I] Does a designated maidservant also require levirate marriage? Yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So he says—the answer of Pnei Yehoshua is some Brisker-type move. Pnei Yehoshua claims that there is a difference between the prohibition of a married woman and all the other forbidden relations. Why does betrothal not take effect with one’s sister? Because the prohibition is very severe. There are prohibitions of a certain level of severity for which the door of betrothal is locked before you. You simply cannot betroth. With a priest and a divorcee, and with cases prohibited by a mere negative commandment, this is a dispute among the Tannaim, but as a matter of Jewish law, in cases prohibited by a mere negative commandment betrothal does take effect. But with cases punishable by karet it does not. Fine? Pnei Yehoshua says yes—but for different reasons. With all the forbidden relations, what makes betrothal not take effect is the severity of the prohibition. With a married woman, betrothal does not take effect also because of the severity of the prohibition—like all the forbidden relations—and also because she is already someone else’s wife. She has no legal hand to receive betrothal. You cannot betroth her because she is not on the market. She is already someone else’s wife, apart from the prohibition. What is the practical difference? The designated maidservant. There the severity of the prohibition does not exist. But still, she is someone else’s wife. So if you come to betroth her, the betrothal does not take effect. Meaning, the betrothal does not take effect not because of the severity of the prohibition—because there is no prohibition—but there is still the status of married woman, and as a married woman the betrothal does not take effect. Meaning, with an ordinary married woman betrothal does not take effect for two reasons: both because of the severity of the prohibition and because she is someone else’s wife. With a designated maidservant there is only the second law. A kind of two-track distinction, the style of the Ra’ah. Okay? I once gave a lecture here at a conference on Pnei Yehoshua; I brought several places where Pnei Yehoshua anticipates Brisker thought, like in the 9th century—anticipates it. This is one of them. There are others. In any case, what does this actually mean? It means, in practice, that what makes betrothal not take effect with a married woman is that you are invading someone else’s domain. A domain that is already married to someone else; you cannot invade that domain, not because of the prohibition, apart from the prohibition. You cannot invade that domain because it belongs elsewhere. Not because of the formal prohibition. The prohibition may express that, but even if the prohibition does not exist, you cannot invade there because it simply cannot be done. It doesn’t work. The betrothal will not take effect. Not that there is a prohibition against betrothing. It just will not take effect. It will not take effect because she is outside your range. You are invading someone else’s domain. Okay? There is also another guilt-offering, the guilt-offering for misuse of consecrated property. Now what is that? I’ll give you two examples. First of all, it is misuse of consecrated things. You misused holy property. But there it is a bit difficult for what I’ve said so far, because misuse is defined specifically for an unintentional act. And we said that the guilt-offering is brought for intentional sin as for unintentional sin, based on the result, right? So why with the guilt-offering for misuse is it brought only for unintentional sin and not for intentional sin? The answer is because in misuse specifically, the result occurs only in the case of an unintentional act. What is the result in misuse? When I committed misuse, something happened, right? Not just that I transgressed a prohibition. The thing passed into ordinary status. Misuse takes the holy thing out into ordinary status, right? And that happens only unintentionally. If I commit misuse intentionally, I committed a transgression, if I intentionally misused it, but it does not pass out into ordinary status. Only unintentionally does it become ordinary. Therefore the guilt-offering for misuse is brought only for the unintentional act. This is not a difficulty against what I said; it is further proof of what I said. Because the guilt-offering is not brought for the prohibition. The prohibition exists also in the intentional case. The guilt-offering is brought because you invaded a domain that is not yours. You took the thing from holy to ordinary. In the laws of misuse we know this happens only unintentionally, therefore the guilt-offering is brought only for the unintentional act and not for the intentional one. But that is not in the laws of guilt-offering; it is in the laws of misuse, this distinction between intentional and unintentional. From the standpoint of the guilt-offering, if a result occurred, you are liable for a guilt-offering. If the result would occur intentionally, you would bring a guilt-offering also for the intentional act. It just happens that in the laws of misuse we know that the result occurs only unintentionally and not intentionally. Therefore the guilt-offering is brought only for the unintentional act and not for the intentional one. Where else do we see this? The guilt-offering for robbery. There too there is a guilt-offering. What is the guilt-offering for robbery? Rabbi Shimon Shkop—I won’t go into it at length—but Rabbi Shimon explains that robbery is not a prohibition based on “You shall not steal,” on the commandment of “You shall not steal.” Yes, for example, the proof is robbery from a gentile. So there is a dispute among the medieval authorities whether there is a “You shall not steal” regarding robbery from a gentile, whether robbery from a gentile is forbidden by Torah law or not. He says yes, but according to all opinions, robbery from a gentile is forbidden by Torah law. It is forbidden by Torah law as a legal prohibition, what he calls the law of legal order, the laws of justice. Okay? Apart from “You shall not steal,” even if there is no “You shall not steal.” Why? Because clearly the concept of ownership also exists with a gentile, on the legal level. The prohibition of “You shall not steal” is defined, according to those views among the medieval authorities, only regarding theft from a Jew and not from a gentile. But clearly, even when something belongs to a gentile, you have invaded a domain that is not yours. There is no prohibition of “You shall not steal” here, but you invaded a domain not yours—so you bring a guilt-offering for robbery. Because a guilt-offering is brought not for the prohibition. You bring it for invading a domain that is not yours. Now look at two nice consequences. One consequence is misuse of consecrated property in vows. You know that with a vow, if I violate the vow, then aside from violating “He shall not profane his word,” I also bring a guilt-offering, a guilt-offering for misuse. There is misuse in vow-prohibitions, the Talmud says. The Mishneh LaMelekh tears his hair out in sheer panic; he does not understand what the Talmud wants. Where did this guilt-offering in vow-prohibitions come from? This misuse in vow-prohibitions? There is no source for it, nobody brings any source for it. Somehow the Talmud decided there is—there is a negative commandment here, there are lashes for it, “He shall not profane his word,” the Talmud has straightforward definitions. Where did misuse come from? What is holy here? Why is a vow holy? I vowed not to benefit from a loaf of bread. I did not consecrate it. Why is there a guilt-offering of misuse when I eat from that bread? The answer is that the difference between a vow and an oath is that a vow is on the object. Right? What does that mean? That when I ate that loaf, I did not merely transgress a prohibition; rather, I invaded a domain that is outside my permitted range. Not holy, but a domain that is outside my range. There is a boundary between me and the thing. That is law in the object. The object is separated from me. Right? That is also the meaning of holy. The meaning of holy is that it is a separate domain. We spoke about the difference between holy and ordinary. Holy is separate territory, not simply accessible to someone standing outside, only if it is approached in a very, very specific way. Therefore in a vow too there is invasion—as opposed to an oath—besides the fact that I did not keep my word, I also invaded a domain that is not mine. I marked off that domain by means of the vow, and when I violate the vow I invade a domain that is not mine. For that I bring a guilt-offering. When you invade a domain that is not yours, irrespective of the prohibition. And even if there is no prohibition, but you invaded a domain that is not yours, you bring a guilt-offering for that. Therefore no source is needed. It’s not—you are not bringing a guilt-offering here because there is a negative commandment. You do not need a negative commandment at all in order to bring a guilt-offering. On the contrary. The guilt-offering is brought only for the aspects that are unrelated to the negative commandment, only for the reality itself. No, leave it—I could go on at length here because more needs to be said; I just want to give you the picture. I’ll send you the article and you can read the details there. Another example: the students of Rabbenu Yonah in Berakhot say that someone who eats without a blessing should bring a guilt-offering. Because the Talmud says that anyone who benefits from this world without a blessing is as though he committed misuse, or actually committed misuse. Now everyone understands this as a metaphor. What do you mean, committed misuse? It is a rabbinic prohibition to eat without a blessing. So what is this guilt-offering? There is no prohibition at all, so what is this guilt-offering? By Torah law there is no prohibition. The answer is that for a guilt-offering you do not need a prohibition. When you benefit from this world without a blessing, you invaded a domain that is not yours. That is the reality. It has nothing to do with Torah law and rabbinic law. So you bring a guilt-offering. No source is needed for this; you do not need a prohibition in order to incur a guilt-offering. By the way, the same thing is true with Maimonides regarding a provisional guilt-offering for doubtful prohibition. They say there that according to Maimonides, after all, a Torah-level doubt is treated leniently. So they ask about Maimonides—the famous first chapter of Shema’ta, yes, they ask about Maimonides—then why do we bring a guilt-offering? There is no prohibition at all. You transgressed the laws of Torah-level doubt. Rabbinically you have to be stringent, but by Torah law you can do whatever you want. So, I violated that. How is there an obligation of a guilt-offering? What is ordinary slaughter in the Temple courtyard? There is no Torah prohibition, there is only a rabbinic prohibition against eating without a blessing. So how do I bring a guilt-offering for that? The answer is that if I invaded a domain that is not mine, I bring a guilt-offering for that irrespective of prohibition. It has nothing to do with prohibition at all. With doubt it depends on how you define the doubt, and we’ll talk more about that when we discuss doubts. But doubt—doubtful prohibition is a prohibition. It is entry into the house of doubt, in Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s formulation. And doubt marks off a certain area into which you are not allowed to enter. Now the formal prohibition against entering there is only rabbinic, according to Maimonides. But once you have entered a domain you were not supposed to enter, you bring a guilt-offering irrespective of whether there was a prohibition there. There are all kinds of pilpulim—the Shema’ta also gets into this there—that according to Maimonides one must say that in those places where a provisional guilt-offering is brought, Torah-level doubt is treated stringently even according to Maimonides. There he did not say that a Torah-level doubt is treated leniently. Nonsense. Maimonides writes explicitly that a Torah-level doubt is treated leniently in all matters, including matters of karet, including everything. And there they emend the text in the laws of impurities, they emend Maimonides’ text because of these problems. No need to emend anything. The fact that one brings a guilt-offering does not mean there is a prohibition. The guilt-offering is brought for reality, not for prohibition. If you created a problematic result, or invaded a domain that is not yours, or blurred a boundary that exists between realities—between holy and ordinary, for example—you bring a guilt-offering for that. It has nothing to do with prohibition, but with the reality of guilt. And I think this is the meaning of “and she commits a trespass against her husband.” Why is betrothal holy? Why is damaging betrothal called misuse of consecrated property? Right, the Torah says “and she commits a trespass against her husband,” about a woman who commits adultery. Why is this misuse? Because a woman who commits adultery is damaging the holy, what we discussed before. So damaging the holy is called misuse; therefore it is called “and she commits a trespass against her husband.” The Maharik, for example, claims that this is only if she knew, and the Maharik argues that not every woman is forbidden to her husband and to the man she slept with. Right? That is in the intentional case. In the unintentional case she is not forbidden. That is the rule. The wife of a priest becomes forbidden in any case, even if she was coerced. But with the wife of an Israelite, if she committed adultery intentionally then she becomes forbidden to her husband and to the other man. If she committed adultery unintentionally she does not become forbidden. The Maharik says: it depends what kind of unintentional. If she did not know that it was not her husband and she slept with him—she simply did not know that it was not him, she thought it was her husband—then she acted unintentionally, and she is not forbidden. But if she knew it was not her husband, she just did not know it was forbidden—she erred with respect to the prohibition and not with respect to the facts—then she is forbidden. Why? Because her prohibition to her husband is not a result of the prohibition. The level of prohibition is the same in both kinds of unintentional act—it is an unintentional prohibition. But her prohibition to her husband is not a result of the prohibition she transgressed. Rather, she simply damaged the marital bond between them; she breached the fence of betrothal that binds her to her husband against the outside. She committed adultery with someone from outside. So in effect she breached the fence that is supposed to demarcate the marital bond from the outside. All this is if she knew it was not her husband, she just did not know it was forbidden. If she did not know it was not her husband, she did not breach the fence—she breached it in practice, but she did not understand at all that this was what she was doing—so she does not become forbidden. Once again we see that the guilt-offering, or the prohibition of the woman to her husband, is damage to the holy. This is called misuse. And then it comes out that it is not at all a problem of the prohibition of adultery; rather, the reality of adultery is the problem. The moment there is a reality of adultery, the woman is called a suspected adulteress. Not because of the prohibition; it has nothing to do with the prohibition. And therefore, as I said, both the aspects of the prohibition to the husband and to the adulterer, and the aspects of the laws of doubt, show us that when we talk about a suspected adulteress—both in the laws of doubt, doubtful impurity in the public domain and in the private domain, and in the prohibition to the husband and to the adulterer—in both of these places, this is not connected to the prohibition of adultery. It is connected to the reality that the woman and her husband create some sort of cell that is meant to be holy—holy meaning separated. “Be holy and be separate,” Rashi at the beginning of the Torah portion of Kedoshim. And anyone who invades that cell, or blurs the fence, the demarcation that exists between that cell and the outside, has in effect damaged holiness. And then the laws of doubt come in, and then the prohibition to the husband and to the adulterer comes in. Meaning, both the laws of doubt—which are the two topics of the chapter—both the laws of doubt and the prohibition to the husband and to the adulterer are reflections of the fact that the woman and her husband are a realm of holiness. It is a certain reality, a certain domain into which one may not invade. The prohibition at most expresses that, but the problem is not that I violated the prohibition. The problem is that I invaded that domain.

[Speaker F] And according to this focus on the fence, it’s easy to understand, because there is some kind of ownership here—of an object or something—in an unintentional case.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maimonides, for example, talks about the people of Shechem; he calls it that they robbed Dinah. Even though they didn’t rob—what does “robbed” mean? This is not monetary law; they had relations with her. Meaning, they took her in a personal sense. They didn’t rob; Maimonides sees this as robbery.

[Speaker F] There is an object-status here; meaning, you can distinguish between the prohibition and the fact that it belongs to someone else—the object or the woman—and what creates the fact that… On the contrary. Why? Why? On the contrary. Because you vowed and thereby prohibited it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On the contrary. The vow is like Tosafot in Bava Kamma 11. When I made the vow, before the prohibition, I created the fence, I put the thing outside the boundary. Now as a result of that, a prohibition was also created. No, the other way around. That is why it is called law in the object. What is the difference between an oath and a vow? Why with a vow does it take effect and with an oath it does not? Because the essence of the prohibition is different. In a vow, the prohibition begins with the reality that I created by means of the vow I made. The prohibition is a result. With an oath, no. An oath is law on the person. Right. An oath is law on the person, not on the object. Therefore the Talmud in Sukkah 16, the Mishnah in Sukkah 16 says that an oath not to sit in a sukkah does not take effect, but a vow regarding a sukkah does take effect. Because a vow is law on the object; the sukkah itself becomes prohibited. The sukkah is not a commandment that I should sit in it. But I cannot swear not to sit in a sukkah, because I as a person am commanded to sit in a sukkah. By the way, Nazirite status is a third thing. Nazirite status is an effect on the person, but here the person is functioning as the object. An oath has no legal effect at all; an oath is a floating prohibition. A vow is a legal effect on the object. A Nazirite is a legal effect, but a legal effect on the person, and here the person serves as the object. There is a Maharit with three methods. Not necessarily specific things between person and person,

[Speaker F] Not necessarily, no, I think it can also be more general. It seems there is simply an additional category here. Meaning, there is ownership, there is ownerlessness, and there is something additional that is a kind of not belonging to someone, but it is also not ownerless.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is, yes—when I make a vow forbidding something to myself, that doesn’t mean it’s permitted to the whole world; for me it’s forbidden. I set the boundary in relation to myself. It belongs to some domain that I created through the vow, a domain that is supposed to be set apart from me. In that sense it’s similar to something consecrated to Heaven. That’s why people get confused; many later authorities (Acharonim) write that it’s like holiness, but that’s nonsense—it’s not correct. A vow has nothing to do with holiness at all; it belongs to prohibition and permission, it belongs to the ordinary, non-sacred realm. Okay? But because it is set apart from me, like holiness, it is an independent domain, and therefore there is a guilt-offering there. And it is specifically a guilt-offering for misuse of consecrated property, because that guilt-offering too is not connected to holiness. A guilt-offering for misuse of consecrated property is a guilt-offering for trespassing into a domain that is supposed to be set apart from me. All right? Good, let’s stop here.