Tractate Sotah, Chapter 5, Lesson 3 — Rabbi Michael Abraham

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, the water tests him as well, as it says, “and they shall come, and they shall come.” Twice. Now here it’s pretty clear that this is a repetition, right? It’s pretty clear that it’s a repetition, because here the vav appears both in the first and in the second. So it’s quite clear that here we really are talking about a derashah based on repetition. The next derashah: just as she is forbidden to the husband, so she is forbidden to the adulterer, as it says—it doesn’t say here “and she became defiled, and she became defiled”; it says “she became defiled and she became defiled.” Okay? And also according to Rabbi, who does indeed derive from the repetition, it doesn’t say “and she became defiled and she became defiled”; it says “she became defiled and she became defiled.” That’s the version we have before us. It could be there’s something here—we’d have to check in Dikdukei Soferim, I don’t know. In any case, in the Talmud it says: as it says, “and they shall come, and they shall come.” They asked: does it mean “they shall come, they shall come,” or does it mean “and they shall come, and they shall come”? What’s the difference? “They shall come, they shall come” is repetition; that’s not an extra vav. “They shall come, they shall come.” “They shall come, they shall come.”

[Speaker C] “They shall come, and they shall come” is an extra vav.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And “and they shall come, and they shall come” is a derashah from repetition. Right. So the Talmud asks about the first derashah in the Mishnah whether it’s a derashah of an extra vav or a derashah of repetition. Because really, you can understand it in both ways. In the first part of the Mishnah it says “and they shall come” twice. So actually it’s quite clear—by the way, it’s not clear at all what the Talmud is asking. There it’s pretty clear that it’s repetition. What’s the other option? With Rabbi Akiva there’s room to hesitate, but regarding “and they shall come, and they shall come,” it’s not clear what the Talmud is asking at all. Come and hear: just as she is forbidden to the husband, so she is forbidden to the adulterer, as it says, “she became defiled and she became defiled.” They bring the continuation of the Mishnah, okay? And then the Talmud asks: and still, let it ask—does it mean “she became defiled, she became defiled,” or does it mean “she became defiled and she became defiled”? What does that mean? “She became defiled, she became defiled” is repetition; “she became defiled and she became defiled” is an extra vav. Now what is written in the Mishnah is “she became defiled and she became defiled.” That’s what it says; that’s Rabbi Akiva’s wording. But the Talmud is hesitating—either about the version or about the meaning, I’m not exactly sure—whether this is repetition or an extra vav. The Talmud says: come and hear, from the fact that the latter clause teaches: Rabbi says, the two times stated in the passage are “and she became defiled and she became defiled.” Do you see suddenly here? This isn’t the version of the Mishnah, right? Do you see? In the Mishnah, according to Rabbi, it says “she became defiled and she became defiled.” Here, when they quote Rabbi, it’s “and she became defiled and she became defiled,” meaning twice “and she became defiled.” So here it’s clear that according to Rabbi we’re dealing with repetition, right? One for the husband and one for the adulterer. It follows that Rabbi Akiva derives the vav. So if Rabbi derives repetition, then why does he come after Rabbi Akiva? Apparently Rabbi Akiva derives the extra vav. As I commented parenthetically before, I don’t see why that’s necessary. It could be that Rabbi is coming to explain what Rabbi Akiva said, and indeed in the language of the Mishnah Rabbi uses the same language as Rabbi Akiva—that is, there is no vav at the first, only at the second. He’s repeating Rabbi Akiva’s wording; he just wants to explain to me what Rabbi Akiva said. In the Talmud, the quotation is—it’s probably a baraita—in the Talmud the quotation is different. According to Rabbi, a vav appears twice. So there it’s pretty clear that Rabbi is coming to disagree, right? Therefore when it says here “come and hear,” in my opinion that “come and hear” is already a question for that other wing, yes, the Talmud department. And I think the “come and hear” here in the Talmud is not a quotation from the Mishnah. They’re bringing a baraita. Because from the Mishnah you can’t prove it. In the Mishnah, it could be that Rabbi comes to explain Rabbi Akiva, because his quotation is “she became defiled and she became defiled,” exactly as Rabbi Akiva says. But in the baraita, according to Rabbi, it says “and she became defiled and she became defiled.” So in the baraita it’s clear that Rabbi is talking about repetition. So what about Rabbi Akiva? Rabbi Akiva is the extra vav. And from the baraita it sounds like there’s something here

[Speaker F] else: Rabbi Yehoshua said, this is how Zecharya ben HaKatzav would expound it. Maybe that flows with how you presented it—that Rabbi disagrees with Rabbi Yehoshua about how to expound how Rabbi Akiva expounded it. Otherwise, what is this? What is this segment: Rabbi Yehoshua said, this is how Zecharya ben HaKatzav would expound it—period. What is that segment?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Seemingly, it comes to say: not like Rabbi. Zecharya ben HaKatzav also learned like Rabbi Akiva, and Rabbi expounded it differently. You can say: this is how Zecharya ben HaKatzav would expound it—what would he expound? Rabbi says… meaning it’s an opening to…

[Speaker F] I don’t know.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly how much weight to give that—you can read it either way, I don’t know. In the baraita it’s very clear, because in the baraita the version is “and she became defiled and she became defiled,” so there’s no question. From there it’s clear that it’s talking about repetition, and that it’s not coming to explain Rabbi Akiva.

[Speaker F] The question was what it is in Rabbi Akiva’s position—meaning, are we deriving the vav or deriving the repetition? Could be. And that strengthens the conclusion.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but then the dispute is not between Rabbi and Rabbi Akiva, but between two tannaim according to Rabbi Akiva. Fine, yes, but still there’s a dispute here between these two possibilities, and we’ll see later that this dispute has significance. There’s a difference whether this version is a derashah of repetition or a derashah of an extra vav.

[Speaker G] And according to the wording, if you say Rabbi Akiva says this and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says this, that means he’s saying something different.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It can’t be that he’s saying what Rabbi Akiva said.

[Speaker G] It doesn’t say “and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says,” it says “Rabbi says.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It says “Rabbi Akiva says”—where are you? In the baraita?

[Speaker G] In the baraita, with Rabbi Akiva—I’m in the Mishnah now. Okay. As it says, “she became defiled and she became defiled.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now comes the new part,

[Speaker G] what Rabbi Yehoshua said—this is how Zecharya ben HaKatzav would expound it—like Rabbi Akiva. Right. And then they bring Rabbi Yehuda. So clearly they bring him to say that he disagrees

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] with Rabbi Akiva or with Zecharya ben HaKatzav.

[Speaker G] Yes, with both of them. Okay. This wording, in this form, you say

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that from the language of the Mishnah it’s clear there’s a dispute here. But it could be a dispute according to Rabbi Akiva—two tannaim according to Rabbi Akiva. Fine, it’s not so important for our purposes. What I want now is to discuss, in light of these two derashot, what this means. What’s the difference between these two derashot? What difference does it make whether we derive repetition or derive an extra vav? I want to argue that there’s a difference here in the implications, in how I understand the prohibition regarding the husband and the adulterer. To understand this, I’m moving to a parallel passage in Ketubot, which is what stirred the thoughts I mentioned earlier. The Talmud there discusses, yes, the topic of an open entrance—Ketubot 9. Yes, people with strong hearts. Greetings to people with strong hearts. Rabbi Elazar says: if a man says, “I found an open entrance,” he is believed to forbid her to himself. Okay? The husband had first intercourse with his wife and says, “I found an open entrance”—she had already had relations. Okay? So he is believed to forbid her to himself. Why to forbid her to himself? Because there is a concern that she committed adultery while under him, right? Before he came to her she had already had relations with someone else.

[Speaker B] There’s a verse—I don’t remember exactly where—there’s a verse at the beginning: “I did not find your daughter to be a virgin.” So he pays…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, and the question is what counts as “I did not find your daughter to be a virgin.” So there are whole discussions in the Talmud about what this is talking about. So if the husband comes and says, “I found an open entrance,” Rabbi Elazar says he is believed to forbid her to himself. The Talmud asks: but why? It’s a double doubt. Doubt whether it happened while under him, doubt whether it did not happen while under him; and even if you say it happened while under him, there is doubt whether it was under compulsion or willingly. That’s a double doubt. Why? It could be that she had relations before the marriage altogether, okay? And if she had relations within the marriage, after the betrothal, say, it’s still not clear that she becomes forbidden to him, because it depends whether it was by compulsion or willingly, in the case of an Israelite, not a kohen. Okay? So if she had relations under compulsion, then even if it was while under him she does not become forbidden to him. If it was willingly, she does become forbidden to him. So he says there’s a double doubt here. So in a double doubt he shouldn’t be believed to forbid her to himself; in a double doubt she is permitted. Okay? Therefore the Talmud asks: why are you saying he is believed to forbid her to himself? After all, it’s a double doubt. It was only necessary, says the Talmud, in the case of a kohen’s wife. And if you wish, say instead: in the case of the wife of an Israelite, where her father accepted betrothal on her behalf when she was less than three years and one day old. Two possibilities for setting up the case as one of a single doubt, not a double doubt. One possibility is that the husband was a kohen. If the husband was a kohen, then the doubt of compulsion or willingness is irrelevant. Even under compulsion she becomes forbidden to him. The doubt whether it was while under him or not while under him—that is relevant. If she had relations not while under him, then there’s no issue; she does not become forbidden to a kohen. Okay? So therefore the conclusion—that’s one possibility, hold on before the conclusion. And the second possibility is the wife of an Israelite, where her father accepted the betrothal for her at age two, okay? And now I find her—I had relations with her after several years—and I find an open entrance. Then it can’t be that she had relations before the betrothal, because if she had relations before the betrothal, her virginity would return, right? And if I found an open entrance, then her virginity did not return. So it’s clear she had relations while under me. That leaves only one doubt: was it under compulsion or willingly? Therefore it’s a single doubt, and therefore she becomes forbidden. So they set up Rabbi Elazar in one of these two possibilities; in any event it’s a single doubt and not a double doubt. Okay? There are tons of difficulties and lots of fine points and questions here; I’m not going into all the details now. But there’s a point here—this is what struck me just now, really. Suddenly I caught myself not understanding this whole issue. Remember that in the first class I spoke about the case of a placenta of which part emerged in Bava Kamma 11? The Talmud says there that if part of the placenta emerged—say a woman began giving birth, and part of the placenta emerged, okay, on Sunday, and the birth was completed on Monday. Now the question is whether she contracts the impurity of a woman after childbirth on Sunday. Okay? So the Talmud says in the conclusion—I’m not getting into the details—the Talmud says it depends. If the rule is that there is no part of a placenta without a fetus, meaning if part of the placenta emerged then something of the fetus also emerged, then I have a single doubt. What is the doubt? Whether most of the fetus emerged, in which case she already becomes impure on Sunday, or whether only a minority of the fetus emerged, in which case she begins only on Monday—she begins counting the impurity only on Monday. But if there can be part of a placenta without a fetus—if there can be a case where a placenta emerges and there is no fetus at all—then we are in a situation of double doubt: doubt whether there even was a fetus on Sunday, and even if there was, doubt whether it was a majority. Okay? There it’s a single doubt and I don’t know—you can pilpul a lot here. But it’s a double doubt, and therefore she is permitted. Tosafot asks there in Bava Kamma: what difference does it make whether it’s one doubt or a double doubt? After all, this is a case of doubt regarding impurity, and whether it was in the private domain, then both in a simple doubt and in a double doubt we treat it as impure; and if it was in the public domain, then both in a single doubt and in a double doubt we treat it as pure. In doubt regarding impurity… there is no difference between a doubt and a double doubt. So what is the case? Was it in the private domain or in the public domain? Either way, how can the Talmud distinguish between one doubt and double doubt? Tosafot says: we learned it regarding forbidding her to her husband. The discussion is about her prohibition to her husband, not about her impurity. The discussion is not about whether if she touches something in a state of impurity she imparts impurity to it, but whether she is permitted to have relations with her husband or not. The later authorities discuss this—I brought it in the first class—they say you see from here that the prohibition to her husband is not because of the impurity. These are two independent things, even though they come together. That’s just an important methodological lesson. Two things that come together—that’s correlation. Correlation does not mean causation. The well-known jokes among statisticians, that you confuse correlation with causation. The fact that there is correlation doesn’t mean there is causation. Here is an example. Two things come together; there is a correlation between them. When she becomes impure, then she is both forbidden to her husband and impure, but we see that there is no causation, meaning it’s not that one causes the other. And the proof is that there can be a case where she is not impure with respect to her husband, but she is forbidden, or vice versa. If it was in the public domain and it’s a single doubt, then regarding the prohibition I am strict, but regarding impurity I am lenient. If it was in the private domain and it’s a double doubt, then regarding the prohibition I am lenient, and regarding impurity I am strict. Meaning there can be two situations in which there is impurity and no prohibition, or there is prohibition and no impurity. Therefore they do not come together. On this the Sochatchover asks—the Avnei Nezer? No, the Eglei Tal, in the pilpul book of Rabbi Yonatan Eybeschutz, I mentioned this—he was his brother’s grandson, and he brings it in his name. He says: after all, doubt regarding impurity is learned from the sotah, right? Which means that the prohibition of a woman to her husband is considered doubt regarding impurity, not doubt regarding prohibition. That’s what you see, because with the sotah there is no question whether if she touches something she imparts impurity to it. She has no impurity of that kind. She does not become impure in the sense of ritual purity and impurity. She becomes impure to her husband, meaning she becomes forbidden to her husband. That is called impurity. Like impure animals. Impure animals have nothing to do with ritual purity and impurity; it means they are forbidden to be eaten. So too with a woman who became defiled: the meaning is that she is forbidden to her husband and to the adulterer. And nevertheless, says the Talmud, this is called doubt regarding impurity, not doubt regarding prohibition. How do I know? Because doubt regarding impurity is learned from sotah. That’s the source for doubt regarding impurity. So if that’s so, what does Tosafot mean here when it says the discussion is about forbidding her to her husband and not related to impurity? The prohibition of a woman to her husband is considered doubt regarding impurity, not doubt regarding prohibition. That’s the Sochatchover’s question. And what he answers is a wonderful answer. He brings the Kuzari and says that impurity applies only where there is holiness. And therefore, he says, when the prohibition of the woman to her husband stems from damage to the kiddushin, then the doubt is doubt regarding impurity, because then the whole section is a section of impurity, and the law of the doubt is the law of doubt regarding impurity. But if the prohibition of the woman to her husband has nothing at all to do with damage to the kiddushin, it’s just a prohibition, then it’s prohibition, not impurity. Now the impurity of a woman after childbirth—the fact that she is forbidden to her husband is not damage to their marital relationship in the kiddushin. She is forbidden to every person in the world. Someone who has given birth—it is forbidden to have relations with her even if she is unmarried. Right? This is not a prohibition of a woman to her husband, because there is a prohibition on a woman after childbirth from having relations with a man. It just happens that they speak about her husband because usually when a woman has relations, it’s with her husband. But this is not a prohibition of a woman to her husband, and of course it does not stem from damage the woman caused to the marital bond, to the holiness of the marital bond. Therefore there it really is doubt regarding prohibition. That’s what Tosafot says. But with the sotah, why does she become forbidden to her husband? Because she committed adultery while under him; she wronged him. And because of that, this is damage to the marital relationship, which has an element of holiness. We spoke about “holiness spread through all of it” in the Talmud in Kiddushin. So this is an element of holiness, and damage to holiness is impurity. Therefore doubts that arise regarding a sotah are doubt regarding impurity and not doubt regarding prohibition. In other words, whether the prohibition of a woman to her husband is treated one way or the other depends on what it stems from. If it stems from damage to the marital relationship, it is doubt regarding impurity—that is the case of sotah. If it stems simply from the fact that she became impure, simply because that is the Torah’s law that it is forbidden to have relations with a woman who became impure through childbirth or in menstruation or something like that—all those are not connected to damage to the marital relationship; that is doubt regarding prohibition, not doubt regarding impurity. Therefore also in menstruation, where there is a discussion of impurity by the way, there in the laws of impurity we’ll discuss it as doubt regarding impurity, but the prohibition of a menstruant to her husband will be doubt regarding prohibition, not doubt regarding impurity. Like here with childbirth. There is no difference. It’s a natural state; it’s not damage to the marital relationship. That’s what I said in the first class. And now. And the Talmud says here that if he says “I found an open entrance,” now the question is whether she becomes forbidden to him or not. The Talmud says it depends whether it’s a double doubt or a single doubt; if it’s a double doubt she ought to be permitted, and if it’s a single doubt she ought to be forbidden. Now I ask: what do you mean? Doubt regarding impurity is not doubt regarding prohibition, and in doubt regarding impurity there is no difference between one doubt and double doubt. Private domain is private domain, public domain is public domain. But where do you find a difference between one doubt and double doubt in doubt regarding impurity? Now here, it really is her prohibition to her husband because of damage to the marital relationship. This is sotah; it’s not like the impurity of a woman after childbirth or of menstruation, right? So it really should be discussed in the section of doubts regarding impurity, not doubts regarding prohibition. So why does the Talmud make a distinction here between one doubt and double doubt? This needs to be understood. It’s not a cute insight of the Sochatchover; it’s a Talmud in Bava Kamma. Meaning, I don’t think there’s another explanation for that Talmud there.

[Speaker F] And here the Talmud understands that there is no difference between double doubt and doubt.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s in the tractate Taharot.

[Speaker F] And how does it deal with that? That’s the question on the Mishnah in Taharot, and how does it deal with this Talmud?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here the question I asked comes up.

[Speaker F] That’s what I asked, that’s

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] what I asked, that’s what

[Speaker F] Tosafot dealt with.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, with “I found an open entrance,” you can say that this is not doubt regarding impurity but doubt regarding prohibition, because you’re talking about her prohibition to her husband. This is not impurity. Therefore I needed the sotah to show that the prohibition of a woman to her husband is judged under the rules of doubt regarding impurity. Once I’ve shown that, now I come to the Mishnah in Taharot, so if it’s doubt regarding impurity, then no matter how many doubts you pile onto it, in the public domain it is pure and in the private domain it is impure. There is no difference between one doubt, double doubt, or triple doubt; it doesn’t matter how many. Okay? In the private domain always pure—sorry, impure—and in the public domain always pure. So that’s a difficult question. I thought maybe one could continue the line of thought I spoke about earlier and say as follows. A woman who committed adultery—and this brings me back to the opening point I made today—we said that this is damage to the marital relationship, and therefore it is doubt regarding impurity and not doubt regarding prohibition. But perhaps this is not true of just any married woman who committed adultery. A married woman who committed adultery may be doubt regarding prohibition, not doubt regarding impurity. But if there was warning and seclusion in the sotah passage, then it is doubt regarding impurity. Specifically in the sotah passage, not every woman who commits adultery. Why? Because in the sotah passage the husband warned her. He told her: do not seclude yourself with so-and-so. When she does not listen to him and goes and secludes herself with so-and-so, she damages the relationship between them. She damages the relationship between them. The problem is beyond the fact that she committed adultery—which is a problem in itself—but that is a problem of prohibition. How does that prohibition turn into impurity? It turns into impurity where she went against the marital relationship, where she damaged the bond between her and her husband within the marital relationship. And therefore the doubt of prohibition turns into doubt regarding impurity. But only in sotah. When I say, “I found an open entrance,” then true, the concern is that she committed adultery, but there was no prior warning. She didn’t do it against me; she did it against the Torah, which forbids it. Okay? And because of that, this is really doubt regarding prohibition and not doubt regarding impurity. Therefore there is a difference between one doubt and double doubt. Now what comes out of this is a very major novelty—but I’m saying it because of the force of the question. What comes out of this—you’ll soon see perhaps another possibility, though in my opinion it’s strained—what comes out of this is something very far-reaching. What comes out is that when I speak about adultery as damage to the marital relationship, that applies only in the sotah passage. Not every married woman who commits adultery. A married woman who commits adultery—that’s a severe prohibition, all true—but if there was no prior warning, then she did not damage the bond between her and her husband; she simply committed a severe prohibition. So that will be doubt regarding prohibition and not doubt regarding impurity. Or in other words, the warning required in the sotah passage, which people usually think is required in order to create a basis for suspicion—if I warned her and she secluded herself, then there is some basis for saying she became defiled. I’m a bit skeptical about that: if I suspect she became defiled, then I suspect she became defiled; what exactly does the warning add? But that’s what the Talmud says, that warning is required to create… I am claiming that warning is required for something else as well. Even if there were grounds for suspicion, still you need to turn this into doubt regarding impurity and not doubt regarding prohibition. And that happens only if there was prior warning. If there was no prior warning, sotah is doubt regarding prohibition, not doubt regarding impurity. That’s a huge novelty. I haven’t found it anywhere, but I think it can resolve everything here. Meaning, it really sheds additional light on why it is so important that there be prior warning. Because you have to understand that here the woman acted against her husband. The problem is not only the prohibition involved. She acts against her husband. There is something like this in Maharik. Maharik famously says regarding “she has committed a betrayal against her husband”—so regarding a woman, as I said… an Israelite’s wife who committed adultery, yes, who had relations with someone else—if it was unwitting, she does not become forbidden to him. Now usually with unwitting acts we know two kinds of unwittingness. One is a factual mistake, the other is a legal mistake. For example, someone who didn’t know that today is the Sabbath—that’s a factual mistake. Someone who didn’t know that sorting is forbidden on the Sabbath but did know that today is the Sabbath—that’s a legal mistake. And both are called unwitting, for purposes of a sin-offering and all sorts of other things; both are called unwitting. Maharik says that regarding a woman who committed adultery, they are not both called unwitting. Meaning, if the woman committed adultery unwittingly because she thought that the man she was having relations with was her husband, then indeed she does not become forbidden to her husband. That’s the unwittingness about which it is said that she does not become forbidden to her husband. But if she committed adultery with him and knew he was not her husband, only she thought it was permitted—Ezra Sheinberg and all that, yes—then she becomes forbidden to her husband. Rabbi Dichovsky has a long discussion about the Ezra Sheinberg case, exactly this, because even though the women were, so to speak, unwitting with respect to the prohibition because he told them it was permitted, still they knew he was not their husband, and therefore they still become forbidden to their husbands even though they were unwitting. And Rabbi Dichovsky wants to argue no; he has some approach there that I’m a bit doubtful about, but that’s what the whole discussion there was. Okay, so Maharik says what lies behind this? What lies behind it is that the problem—and I think I mentioned this also in the previous class, in the first one—when a woman commits adultery, the problem is not the prohibition, not only the prohibition involved; the problem is the damage to the marital relationship between her and her husband. Okay? If she thinks that this really is her husband, then as for the prohibition, she did it unwittingly, but she did it. Okay? But if she knows that it is not her husband, only she doesn’t know that it is forbidden, then the prohibition is lighter—she doesn’t know it’s forbidden—but the damage to the marital relationship certainly exists. She knew she was damaging the marital relationship; she just didn’t know that the Torah forbids it, that Jewish law forbids it. Damage to the marital relationship is what forbids her to her husband, not because of the prohibition involved. Similarly, I want to say here, of course here I’m saying it about the laws of doubt, and I’m turning it from doubt regarding prohibition to doubt regarding impurity. It’s not the same distinction as Maharik, but the idea is the same idea: that in adultery there are two dimensions. One dimension is the prohibition involved, and the second dimension is the factual damage, regardless of the prohibition, to the marital relationship. And I want to claim: Maharik draws from this a practical difference regarding the prohibition of an adulterous woman to her husband in a case of unwittingness, yes, an adulterous woman unwittingly regarding her husband. I want to claim that this has implications regarding whether the doubt is doubt regarding prohibition or doubt regarding impurity. A doubt that relates to the prohibition involved is doubt regarding prohibition, like any other prohibition—a severe prohibition, but still doubt regarding prohibition. But if you are talking about her bond to her husband, then it already becomes doubt regarding impurity, not doubt regarding prohibition. This is a categorical difference, not a question of stringency or leniency. It’s a difference—indeed, in a certain sense the damage to her husband, even if there is no prohibition, is halakhically lighter, but factually she damaged her husband, so she did something here that is impurity. By the way, impurity is not prohibition. I am allowed to become impure as an Israelite—in ordinary impurity I mean. There is no prohibition on becoming impure; impurity is something negative, but it is not forbidden. Okay? Rashi writes in several places that it is fitting even for an Israelite not to become impure, even though there is no prohibition, because impurity is indeed something negative. The negative connotation attached to impurity is correct, but it has no halakhic expression; there is no prohibition on becoming impure. Similarly, I want to argue also about the woman. When I speak about a woman who “became defiled,” in our passage, why did she become defiled? She became defiled not because of the prohibition involved. She became defiled because she acted against the marital bond. Now true, if her husband told her not to seclude herself and she did seclude herself, but in the end it turned out she did not commit adultery, that is not considered sufficient damage to the marital relationship. It has to end with her actually committing adultery; that’s why the water tests her and so on. But the foundation of the matter is the very fact that she acted against the warning. It has to culminate in her also committing adultery, otherwise it’s not significant damage. She merely did something her husband did not want her to do. But the warning is essential to this matter. Meaning, without the warning, the fact that she committed adultery is not damage to the marital relationship; it is only a severe prohibition. That’s all. And therefore it is doubt regarding prohibition and not doubt regarding impurity. I don’t know if it’s right or not, but maybe it can resolve the issue. So that you can get a sense of it, in Shitah Mekubetzet on Ketubot, there on that passage, he basically asks this question. “Even though every doubt regarding impurity in the private domain is also impure, and we derive it from sotah, even though there are no supporting indications, because in general sotah is not because of a claim of supporting indications—this is not so, for doubt regarding impurity is because there is no one who says,” I don’t know what this phrase means, I don’t know what this phrase means, “here she did not become defiled, there is none,” I don’t know what that is. “But a sotah who secluded herself, where her claim is certain—were it not for supporting indications we would not treat her as defiled. And every doubt regarding impurity the Merciful One compared to sotah, whether there are supporting indications, for the Merciful One compared only to doubt. According to Rabbi Shimon we compare completely, as appears at the beginning of Niddah.” What is he saying? After all, in sotah there are supporting indications, right? So the doubt we have there whether she became defiled is not just some floating doubt; there are grounds to think she became defiled—a more severe kind of doubt. Now I learn from doubt of sotah to doubt regarding impurity in the public domain, so maybe we should say that in all doubt regarding impurity in the public domain—the stringency in the private domain, doubt regarding impurity in the private domain is stringent where there are supporting indications. In the source from which you derive it—after all, we learn it from sotah, right? And in sotah it is only when there are supporting indications that there is this stringency, that I am strict even though it’s a doubt. So also in doubt regarding impurity learned from sotah, I should be strict only where there are supporting indications. He says no, clearly not. In doubt regarding impurity you do not need supporting indications; that’s clear, from the Talmudic discussions. You don’t need supporting indications to be strict where there is doubt regarding impurity. So how can that be? We learn it from sotah, and in sotah there are supporting indications. So he wants to argue that the comparison between doubt regarding impurity in the public domain and sotah, and between that and the doubt in sotah, is not concerning supporting indications, only concerning whether it is something about which one can ask and so on—we’ll see later when we discuss doubt regarding impurity, but not today. But not concerning supporting indications. So there are partial comparisons? Why not concerning supporting indications? Strange. Indeed Rabbi Shimon Shkop discusses this at length in Shaarei Yosher. Meaning, what I just read is the Rashba, who is cited in the Shitah, yes? So that was before we even got to my question. So Rashba says in general, okay? Notice that according to what I said earlier, the words of Rashba sound better. Why? Because I claim that the warning does not play the role of supporting indications; the warning plays the role simply of turning it into doubt regarding impurity. Once you have turned it into doubt regarding impurity, then doubt regarding impurity is treated stringently in the private domain. So we learn from sotah. In sotah you need warning, but not because only warning gives you supporting indications and because of those supporting indications you are stringent in doubt regarding impurity in the private domain. You need warning so that there will be doubt regarding impurity at all, so that the doubt of sotah will count as doubt regarding impurity at all. Once it is doubt regarding impurity, I learn to every doubt regarding impurity. Now true, you can still say: but you have only its novel rule, meaning dayo, yes? Fine, but still warning also creates supporting indications, whereas ordinary impurity does not. So for that reason, Rashba remains a bit difficult in any case. But according to what I’m saying, it is much more understandable. Meaning, why do you need warning? Simply to turn it into doubt regarding impurity; therefore now you can compare doubt regarding impurity to doubt of sotah. There is still a question here, fine—but warning also creates supporting indications. So in that respect we did not learn from it. Fine. But still you understand that the existence of warning does not interfere with the derivation; on the contrary, the derivation is built on it. Precisely because there is warning. Okay? Now look—later he brings in the name of the Shitah: “And the Shitah asked, for how can we say everywhere that wherever you can increase doubts into a double doubt, in the private domain its doubt is impure?” This is the Mishnah in Taharot that I mentioned. So what do you mean here that there is a difference between one doubt and double doubt? After all, the rule in doubt regarding impurity is that no matter how many doubts you can pile up, it makes no difference. Okay? And he answered that this applies only when impurity had already been established there, but if impurity was not established there at all, then in a double doubt they do not forbid. He says there has to have been impurity established there—an established prohibition, some supporting indication that there was impurity or something like that—and therefore only in that situation do they forbid even in a double doubt. Where did he invent that from? Rabbi Shimon Shkop brings proofs from many places that this is not correct. So he has some kind of invention here, but the difficulty is a real difficulty. He asks the question: with “I found an open entrance,” why is there a difference between one doubt and double doubt? After all, this is doubt regarding impurity. According to what I said earlier, of course there’s no difficulty, because “open entrance” is indeed a doubt whether she committed adultery or not, but since there was no warning, it is doubt regarding the prohibition of a married woman who committed adultery, whereas the dimension of impurity involved does not exist without warning. Therefore with “open entrance” there really will be a difference between one doubt and double doubt, because it is not doubt regarding impurity but doubt regarding prohibition. Now in Shaarei Yosher he goes on at length about this and says: “And as to the main law of sotah, whether it is a law of impurity or of prohibition, it is not explicitly clarified in the Talmud or in the words of the early authorities.”

[Speaker F] Right, because this difficulty is on the Kuzari. The Kuzari said there is impurity where there is holiness. So wherever there is kiddushin there is holiness, and then there is impurity.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, because if you damage the kiddushin. And if you don’t damage

[Speaker F] the kiddushin, then

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] why do I care that there was kiddushin there? And a doubt that she committed adultery damages the kiddushin even without warning? She didn’t damage the kiddushin; she committed a prohibition. Damage to the kiddushin—the claim, and this is my claim—obviously the simple understanding is your way, but my claim is no: kiddushin means the bond between her and her husband. Now when she committed adultery, obviously there is a prohibition here, obviously something problematic happened, but damage to kiddushin means that I go against the… obviously this is a novelty; I’m not claiming this is the simple plain meaning. But if you adopt it, it’s simple.

[Speaker F] The claim about double doubt and all the laws—they’re really very similar. A woman who committed adultery after warning or before warning is basically subject to the same prohibitions, meaning the same capital punishment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the laws of doubt—I claim the laws of doubt will not be the same in these two cases.

[Speaker F] Yes, the distinction here between one doubt and another.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, here are more comments. With “open entrance” we see that it doesn’t work like sotah. In sotah, in a double doubt she is impure, and with “open entrance” she is not. These are Talmudic texts. Now the question is what the explanation is. Fine, but that’s the explanation I’m…

[Speaker C] “And she became defiled,” he says “and she became defiled” or “she became defiled”—“and she became defiled” is a definition of impurity? What does that mean?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Impurity like any other impurity, only I’m claiming that the prohibition of a woman to her husband when it is because of damage to the marital relationship is also called impurity. Aside from that there are the regular impurities, like corpse impurity or creeping-animal impurity. Yes, once someone asked me on my website what happens if a woman has—what do they call it today—an open marriage or polyamory or things like that, where the woman receives permission from her husband to have relations with someone else. The question is whether she becomes forbidden to the husband and to the adulterer. Now that sounds very strange—of course yes, what difference does it make if he gives her permission? The prohibition exists. According to what I’m saying now, it’s really not simple. It’s really not simple. The prohibition certainly exists; I’m not claiming it is permitted for her to do this. But that’s exactly what I’m saying: the prohibition certainly exists, but the question is whether she damaged the marital relationship. Will this thing be impurity or prohibition, for purposes of doubts for example? So it may very well be that it would be prohibition and not impurity. Now Rabbi Meir Berkowitz told me that he once saw in Rabbi Moshe Feinstein that Rabbi Moshe Feinstein really raises the possibility—he rejects it afterward, not the Maharik we saw earlier—he raises this possibility that maybe if the husband permits it, then perhaps she does not become forbidden at all. Not become forbidden. Now for me, that really is far-reaching. But regarding the question whether this is doubt regarding prohibition or doubt regarding impurity,

[Speaker G] there’s definitely room for that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It could be that this would be doubt regarding prohibition and not doubt regarding impurity.

[Speaker G] It’s not connected to the husband. What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The concept of “not connected”—in the accepted halakhic conception there is chauvinism. The husband determines it. The husband determines it, yes. He betroths the woman, he imposes the holiness, and he defines its boundaries. And if the woman doesn’t listen to him, then she desecrates the bond of kiddushin. Chauvinism—it’s not pleasant to hear, but that’s the situation.

[Speaker G] What if she does listen to him?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. That’s why I said this possibility has been raised: that if he permitted her, then seemingly she did not damage the marital relationship in that sense. She violated the prohibition, yes, but not the interpersonal bond between them, and therefore this would be doubt regarding prohibition and not doubt regarding impurity. And Rabbi Moshe Feinstein raises such a possibility and rejects it.

[Speaker F] Not Maharik? No.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean not Maharik? He doesn’t turn it into Jewish law.

[Speaker F] He doesn’t

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] discuss the question whether this is prohibition or impurity; he discusses the question whether she would not become forbidden to the husband and the adulterer.

[Speaker F] So

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I claim she would become forbidden to the husband and the adulterer even without this being impurity. Forbidden to the husband and the adulterer—that I agree. The question is whether in such a doubt it would be doubt regarding prohibition or doubt regarding impurity. On that I say maybe not.

[Speaker F] Fine? And once, and according to Tosafot’s view, among the things I understood that it is forbidden to go out during a pause. There was a lot of that in Gush Etzion too.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I turned to the rabbinate and maybe

[Speaker F] even already on the day of their wedding she became forbidden to the husband and the

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] adulterer.

[Speaker F] But the rabbinate is always just stringent; it doesn’t want complications.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, I’m not sure they are aware of this thesis. It’s a novel thesis.

[Speaker F] And it’s a difficult question for people who become religious—you tell them now whether to stay together or not. No,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] but if she is not a married woman then there’s no problem. Ah, if she was a married woman. Fine, it’s the same… not only people returning to religion; there are also religious people like that.

[Speaker E] People who become religious always suffer; it depends how they come back. I said Rabbi Feinstein did not retract.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, okay.

[Speaker C] That’s what my Rabbi Feinstein said.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So according to Maharik they really can’t go back to being together.

[Speaker C] Because it could

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] be that even if she did it deliberately, if she was secular then she didn’t know it was forbidden, so she is unwitting. It doesn’t matter that she did the act itself deliberately. But according to Maharik such unwittingness doesn’t help, because she knew that he was not her husband. It doesn’t matter that she is unwitting regarding the prohibition. Factually, she knew the facts. Okay, in any event, so Rabbi Shimon in Shaarei Yosher—

[Speaker F] In the distinction within unwittingness, the difference between lack of halakhic knowledge and lack of factual knowledge—what was that said about? About what did he say it? About prohibition or about impurity?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] About the prohibition to the husband and the adulterer.

[Speaker F] No, he makes a categorical distinction, that the distinction… in any case, it’s all unwitting; where it’s unwitting, that changes

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] in “a great principle” and everywhere in tractate Shabbat today, someone who forgot that sorting is forbidden on the Sabbath.

[Speaker F] Maharik brings it regarding the prohibition of the woman to the husband and the adulterer. Because with a woman, an Israelite’s wife who had relations, whose husband is an Israelite, then if it was unwitting she is permitted; she does not become forbidden.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. Now the question is what kind of unwittingness. He says: legal unwittingness—where she knows that he is not her husband but does not know that it is forbidden—she becomes forbidden even to an Israelite. That is not called unwitting for this purpose. If it is factual unwittingness—she thought it was her husband—then about that it is said that she is permitted.

[Speaker F] There’s also something like this in Yoreh De’ah, in Siftei Kohen, siman 69. There there is a distinction between doubt in knowing the laws, which is not considered a doubt, and doubt in the facts, which is considered a doubt.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For purposes of double doubt, or for doubt itself?

[Speaker F] For ordinary doubt. All the laws of prohibition and permission—doubt, whether there is sixty times the volume or there isn’t sixty times the volume—and there at the beginning he says there is a distinction between knowledge of the laws and knowledge of the facts.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I need to think about that, yes, because that’s

[Speaker F] basically the same category as the husband and the adulterer, both under the category of…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t see the connection. There I understand it, because he says this reasoning, a clear piece of reasoning. The question is whether it operated against her husband. Meaning, if she acted against her husband, I don’t care that there was no prohibition involved; in practice that’s what forbids her to him. They want to break apart the relationship. I don’t see the analogy in the context of prohibition and permission. We need to think about it. Anyway, the Sha’ar Yosher says as follows: now, the main issue in the law of the sotah is whether it is a law of impurity or of prohibition; this is not explicitly explained in the Talmud or in the words of the medieval authorities (Rishonim), of blessed memory. Therefore it is fitting to clarify this matter from several places in the Talmud that relate to this issue. And first let us say, from what appears in Ketubot chapter 1: Rabbi Elazar said, one who says, “I found an open entrance,” is believed to forbid her to him. And why? It is a double doubt: perhaps it happened while she was under him, perhaps not under him; and even if you say it was under him, perhaps by coercion, perhaps willingly. It is necessary only in the case of a priest’s wife, and if you want I can also say in the case of an Israelite’s wife, for example where he accepted betrothal with her, etc. And I saw in the Shitah Mekubetzet there that he brings a wonderful comment. This is what he says. Forgive me for the compliment; I also made this comment this morning. How did I then see it in the Shitah Mekubetzet? And the Shitah asks: we say everywhere that wherever you can increase the uncertainty, and yet in a double doubt in a private domain its doubt is impure; and there we say that this applies only when impurity was already present there, but if it was not established, etc. Now, the difficulty is clear to everyone, but his answer is sealed and closed, without explanation. And if his intention is that without warning and seclusion it is like a doubt whether there was a creeping creature, a doubt of impurity in a private domain, only if there was definitely a creeping creature there, we already brought earlier in chapter 14 from the Mishnah and the Tosefta that a doubt whether it was a corpse and a doubt whether it was a creeping creature is also impure in a private domain. Meaning, even if it’s not clear whether there was impurity there, that too is called doubtful impurity in a private domain. Therefore that can’t be it, and it is directly contradicted by the Mishnah. So that can’t be.

Maybe the intention of the author of this view is based on what Tosafot wrote in Sotah 28 at the end of the comment: and this is how tractate Niddah should be explained. There, regarding sotah and a doubtful creeping creature, the flaw in the creature and in the adulterer is before us, next to the pure items and the woman. But regarding a mikveh, before immersion we saw no flaw at all that could make us doubtful because of it. It is evident from their intent—I don’t think we need to get into the details—that they introduced this rule: in doubtful impurity in a private domain, its doubt is impure, only when at the time the impurity could have occurred, the possible sides of the doubt were already revealed to us. But if the doubt arose only after the act, the Torah did not innovate that doubtful impurity should be treated as certain. And according to this, in the case of “I found an open entrance” too, it is not relevant to forbid her with certainty by the rule of impurity in a private domain, because when she had relations I was not yet in doubt; I discovered it only afterward. So since I discovered it only afterward, then this is a doubt of prohibition and not a doubt of impurity. So a rule comes out here: the doubt has to be a known doubt from the very first moment, because if not, then the laws that apply are the laws of doubtful prohibition, not doubtful impurity.

But in any case, these words of Tosafot are not universally accepted, because according to Tosafot in several places the words of the Talmud at the beginning of Niddah are explained differently—not important now; there are other explanations too, and this is not agreed upon. Therefore we have to find some explanation for this great difficulty so that these positions can be resolved for us. Yes, Maharsha also notes this in his novellae regarding “you betrothed me and I was coerced,” what about the presumption? After all, from sotah we learn to render impure in a private domain even where there is a presumption. A similar question, right? In a private domain we render impure even when there is a presumption of purity. In doubtful impurity in a private domain we render impure even when there is a presumption of purity. Usually, if you have a doubt and there is a presumption, the presumption resolves the doubt; there is no longer any law of doubts. In doubtful impurity, presumptions do not resolve the doubt; it remains a doubt, and you render impure in a private domain despite the fact that there is a presumption, a presumption of purity. Okay? So Maharsha asks: then the same thing should apply regarding “you betrothed me and I was coerced.” What the Talmud says there, that there is a presumption of fitness or a presumption of purity—what does that help if this is doubtful impurity in a private domain? It’s doubtful impurity, so the presumptions don’t play a role. Okay?

Fine, so he brings the Shema’teta; I won’t now get into all the details there, but his conclusion in any event is that the straightforward reading of the passages of “I found an open entrance” and “you betrothed me and I was coerced” is not explained according to the laws of doubtful impurity, but rather like any ordinary doubtful prohibition. That is clear to anyone who studies it. In short, you haven’t managed to convince me that “I found an open entrance” and “you betrothed me and I was coerced,” all these laws between a man and his wife—where he found reason to suspect that she had relations under him—all these things are judged as doubtful prohibition, not as doubtful impurity. And I find no explanation for why not; that’s what Rabbi Shimon Shkop says.

Then he says: therefore, we are forced to say—yes, we have to say, it seems to me in my humble opinion—that the law of sotah is not a case of doubtful impurity at all, but rather doubtful prohibition. And in the doubt of sotah created by warning and seclusion, the Torah was stringent to make it like a certain sotah. And similarly the Torah was stringent in doubtful impurity in a private domain to make it like certain impurity. And likewise, in a public domain, in the case of two, the Torah permitted it. But their laws and reasons are different from one another. Rather, the sages received as a law given to Moses at Sinai that what is written in the Torah concerning sotah in the language of impurity is there to teach another matter: that if we encounter a real doubt of impurity, the law should be like this law of doubtful sotah.

What is he saying? Doubtful sotah is not doubtful impurity; it is doubtful prohibition. We treat doubtful sotah like doubtful impurity. Why? Because it says, “and she became impure.” Now where do we know that doubtful impurity is different from sotah? What I just said sounds like the opposite.

[Speaker C] There is doubt and there is certainty.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, in sotah the doubt is treated like certainty; that’s written in the Torah. So why does it say, “and she became impure”? Why does it say that? After all, this isn’t impurity. In order to teach you that the laws of doubtful impurity are treated stringently in a private domain, like doubtful sotah. But doubtful sotah is not doubtful impurity; it is doubtful prohibition. Okay? Meaning, doubtful sotah is not learned from doubtful impurity. Doubtful sotah is explicitly written in the Torah as a case where we are stringent. Doubtful impurity is learned from sotah—how? Not because sotah is a case of doubtful impurity, but because the word “and she became impure” is used. From the Torah’s use of that term, it hinted to us—sort of a hint—that in doubtful impurity you should treat it like doubtful sotah.

[Speaker C] Did you get that? Doesn’t the Talmud itself present this idea, that doubtful impurity is in that category? Of course it does. What? In the Talmud, certainly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes? The Talmud also says that we learn it from sotah. That too is in the Talmud. Ah, in the Talmud. Yes, yes, everything, everything is in the Talmud.

[Speaker C] So what you’re claiming is an even further step beyond that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I—he wants to say that doubtful sotah is altogether a question of whether it’s doubtful impurity or doubtful prohibition. And what we learn for doubtful impurity is only because of the wording, the Torah’s language, but it’s not really doubtful impurity. Yes, understand the strain in this. It’s strained, because they learn from it regarding private domain and also regarding public domain. After all, there is a novelty both in private domain and in public domain. In public domain the novelty is that even with a single doubt we are lenient, and that too is learned from sotah for impurity. Why? What? The phrase “and she became impure”—I’m talking about private domain, not public domain. This whole thing doesn’t make sense. And it’s also clear, clear from the commentators—he said earlier that there are other approaches, so don’t build everything on Tosafot. There are other approaches to what he said too, so don’t build everything on what he said. So what will they say? According to them, why in “I found an open entrance” and “you betrothed me and I was coerced” is it treated as doubtful prohibition and not doubtful impurity? There is no way out except to say what I said before: that the warning is what turns it into doubtful impurity. In “I found an open entrance” and “you betrothed me and I was coerced,” there is no warning. You have a doubt whether she committed adultery or did not commit adultery. Fine. But that doesn’t become doubtful impurity unless there was prior warning. The great novelty is that warning has a very important role in defining the status of a sotah. Not just because it gives some basis to the suspicion, some legs to the matter. Rather because it transforms it from doubtful prohibition into doubtful impurity.

That is what he says; he himself uses that kind of language: “And in doubtful sotah, by means of warning and seclusion, the Torah was stringent to make it like a certain sotah.” Why? Usually people understand that because warning and seclusion create grounds for suspicion. But no—because with warning it becomes doubtful impurity, and that is why the Torah was stringent. And from that we learn that every doubtful impurity is like this. Because why is warning required in sotah? Because in doubtful prohibition it wouldn’t be like this. Why is warning required? Because warning turns it into doubtful impurity. Ah, so then we understand that every doubtful impurity is different from doubtful prohibition. Not more stringent necessarily. It turns it into a different category. It can even be more lenient, because in a public domain, for example, it is more lenient. In a public domain, with one doubt in prohibition we are stringent, but in impurity we are lenient. In a private domain there is a stringency that even in a double doubt we are stringent. Or that even one doubt is treated like certain impurity. That too is a stringency. Both in double doubt and in single doubt—there are two stringencies in a private domain. But there is also a leniency in a public domain. Therefore I say this is not a difference of stringency and leniency; it is a categorical difference. If there is warning, it belongs to the category of impurity. If there is no warning, it belongs to the category of prohibition. Okay? So that gives a completely different role to the concept of warning.

By the way, I suspect maybe you could even load this onto the Tosafot that Sha’arei Yosher brought earlier. Why? Because what did Tosafot say there? When the doubt is born at the moment of the becoming impure, it is doubtful impurity. Otherwise it is defined as doubtful prohibition. What does that mean? That if it is a case of “I found an open entrance” or because she claimed, “I was coerced,” the doubt is created afterward. But if there was prior warning, then from the point of the warning, once she secluded herself, it became doubtful impurity. It is no longer doubtful prohibition, because the prior warning transformed it into doubtful impurity. So it was doubtful impurity from the beginning, and therefore we judge it as doubtful impurity. If there was no prior warning, then it could be that now a doubt has arisen for you regarding impurity, but it arose after the act. At the beginning it wasn’t connected to impurity. Once the doubt arose, suddenly it became for you—even if you say it became doubtful impurity and not doubtful prohibition—but if it wasn’t there from the first moment, then we treat it like doubtful prohibition. So this too still has to fit the role of warning. Okay?

He brings this, he brings a formulation from Maimonides, and this is Maimonides’ wording. By the way, I wasn’t convinced by it, but this is his claim. And this is the language of Maimonides in his Commentary on the Mishnah, tractate Tohorot: “We have already explained many times that doubtful impurity in a private domain is impure, and in a public domain it is pure. And we know this from sotah, that if she secluded herself with a man in a private domain she is forbidden to her husband. And the matter is one of doubt, because perhaps he had relations with her and perhaps he did not. And this is the meaning of the Blessed One’s statement, ‘and she secluded herself and became impure’—this teaches that every doubtful impurity in a private domain is impure, provided that the one regarding whom the doubt arose is a being with understanding such that it can be asked and can answer verbally”—we’ll still see that there are conditions in doubtful impurity. “However, one who does not have understanding to be questioned, even though he is in a private domain, his doubt is pure. For we know that doubtful impurity in a private domain is impure from sotah, who has intelligence and whose mouth can be asked,” etc. “And according to this principle it says that a deaf-mute, an incompetent person, and a minor, if they are found in an alley in which there is impurity, they are pure, because they do not have understanding to be questioned.” We’ll talk more about this issue of being capable of being questioned.

Now, he understands, and he says, that the intention of Maimonides here—that the Torah wrote doubtful sotah in the language of “and she became impure,” meaning that she is like certainly impure, and to teach the law of impurity—he claims that this Maimonides is a source for his position. I didn’t understand why. Maimonides says that we learn this from doubtful impurity because it is doubtful impurity, and we see that from the fact that it says there “and she became impure.” And from the fact that it says “and she became impure,” we learn that sotah is doubtful impurity—not that this is some sort of indirect “if it is not needed for itself” derivation. Meaning, sotah is a prohibition, and from the fact that it says “and she became impure”—again, according to his view, I say once more—the halakhic conclusion should have been different. In doubtful impurity in a private domain I would render impure like sotah. But why is doubtful impurity in a public domain pure? In sotah, doubt in a public domain is pure, but how will you learn that for doubtful impurity? Why? “And she became impure” is talking about when she became impure in a private domain. If you are telling me that there is some categorical identity here, that doubtful impurity is doubtful sotah and doubtful impurity, then all the laws of doubtful impurity should follow from the laws of sotah, both in private domain and in public domain. If you say that it’s only some indirect derivation because the Torah used the phrase “and she became impure,” that extra wording was written only for private domain; it wasn’t written for public domain. So why do you compare the laws of impurity to the laws of sotah also regarding doubt in a public domain? Very strange. Therefore it is clear that there really is a resemblance here; this really is considered doubtful impurity. It’s not just some indirect derivation. Okay?

So it seems to me that his approach doesn’t really work. But his explanation only reflects the fact that there is some difficulty here that needs explanation. And since the only explanation available is his explanation, and his explanation is forced, that only brings me back even more to what I said earlier: that warning turns it into doubtful impurity. And then “I found an open entrance” or because she claimed “I was coerced” is simply irrelevant.

[Speaker H] If that’s the reverse, then what is the novelty in private domain? I didn’t understand. If public domain is the great reverse of private domain, then what’s the novelty in private domain? What do you mean it’s not the reverse?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It is the reverse.

[Speaker H] Is sotah the same thing?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s not the same thing.

[Speaker H] What’s the novelty in private domain where

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] there is no basis?

[Speaker H] To say it needs to be different? It’s not the same thing. Who said it’s the same thing?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In sotah, doubtful impurity in a private domain is impure; in a public domain it is pure. Now I want to learn from that to impurity in general. Now if you tell me that in sotah I simply understand that this is doubtful impurity, then whatever is said about sotah is said about every doubtful impurity. So I understand that this includes both the stringency for private domain and the leniency for public domain. It’s the same thing. But if you tell me, no, what are you talking about—sotah is prohibition, not impurity. And this prohibition has a novelty: that doubt in a public domain is pure and in a private domain impure. Fine. A novelty. Now it says “and she became impure”—from that I understand that doubtful sotah in a private domain is like doubtful impurity in a private domain, and there too one must be stringent. I understand. But where did you get that in a public domain one may be lenient in doubtful impurity? That isn’t what “and she became impure” says; on the contrary, there she did not become impure. Okay? Good. So that’s it. That’s it for now. Stop here.