Tractate Sotah, Chapter 5, Lesson 5 — Rabbi Michael Abraham
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- The Ketubot passage: Bathsheba, an “open door,” and whether the prohibition to the husband and the adulterer are interdependent
- The answer involving a bill of divorce and “whoever says David sinned is simply mistaken”
- The basis of the prohibition: adultery versus damage to the marital bond, and the Maharik on inadvertence
- Why two answers are needed and whether they disagree: practical legal implications
- Ran in Sanhedrin and the model of “what was, was” as a practical halakhic implication
- The language of the Shulchan Arukh: “since” versus “just as,” and the limits of linguistic precision
- “Improper conduct” without prior warning: rabbinic prohibition, circumstantial grounds, and practical dependence on the husband
- Rema’s “and the same law applies” and Beit Shmuel’s explanation: a priest’s wife who was raped and the adulterer is an Israelite
- Helkat Mehokek, the Jerusalem Talmud, and Tosafot in Sotah: “just as” versus “since” as an actual dispute
- Logical models of correlation: Leibniz, the second Passover offering, and a necessary but insufficient condition
- The exposition of “she became defiled” in Sotah and Hatam Sofer’s responsum: dependence of the verses versus their independence
- Tosafot in Yevamot: priesthood and terumah versus the adulterer, and the logic that the adulterer depends on the husband
- A second adulterer: Maharsha, Shevut Yaakov, and whether “you destroyed a home” is a result or an act
- The husband’s knowledge, the adulterer’s repentance, and the implications of prior consent
Summary
General Overview
The text builds the Bathsheba passage in tractate Ketubot as the basis for clarifying the foundation of the prohibition to the husband and to the adulterer, and presents two answers in the Talmud for why Bathsheba was not prohibited to David: coercion, or a bill of divorce, since every man who went out to the wars of the House of David gave one to his wife. The text argues that the first answer assumes a necessary dependence between the prohibition to the husband and the prohibition to the adulterer, even where logic might have required prohibiting the adulterer even more, and suggests that the focus of David’s sin, according to the parable of the poor man’s ewe lamb, is robbery and damage to the marital bond more than formal adultery. It then examines a practical legal implication: whether rape of an Israelite’s wife prohibits her to the adulterer even when it does not prohibit her to the husband. The discussion develops through the language of the Shulchan Arukh and Rema, the dispute between Beit Shmuel and Helkat Mehokek, the expositions of netme’ah in Sotah, Hatam Sofer’s responsum, and Tosafot in Yevamot, all the way to implications such as a second adulterer, the husband’s knowledge versus the adulterer’s knowledge, and modern questions of consent and deception.
The Ketubot passage: Bathsheba, an “open door,” and whether the prohibition to the husband and the adulterer are interdependent
The Talmud in Ketubot asks why Bathsheba was not prohibited to David and gives a first answer: that she was coerced. From this it builds an assumption that since Uriah was not a priest and she was therefore not prohibited to him in a case of coercion, she is likewise not prohibited to David. The text emphasizes that this assumption ties the prohibition to the adulterer to the prohibition to the husband, even though simple logic might have said that the adulterer is more severe in coercion because he is the one forcing her. And yet “the sinner profits,” because if there is no prohibition to the husband, there is no prohibition to the adulterer either. The text clarifies that where there are witnesses to adultery there is a death penalty, but in the case of Sotah and in the case of an “open door” there are no witnesses to intercourse, so the discussion concerns the prohibitions to the husband and adulterer, not punishment.
The answer involving a bill of divorce and “whoever says David sinned is simply mistaken”
The second answer states that Bathsheba was not prohibited because she was not a married woman, since everyone who went out to the wars of the House of David gave his wife a bill of divorce, and therefore David did not violate the prohibition of relations with a married woman. The text explains that “whoever says David sinned is simply mistaken” refers to the formal sin of relations with a married woman, not to the claim that David was righteous, and presents David’s act as a problem of robbery and severing a marital bond more than adultery. The text explains that Nathan the Prophet’s parable of the poor man’s ewe lamb points to robbery, not adultery, and fits the assumption that Bathsheba was formally divorced but David “stole” her from Uriah by sending him to his death, emphasizing that once Uriah died it became clear retroactively that from the moment she received the bill of divorce she had been divorced.
The basis of the prohibition: adultery versus damage to the marital bond, and the Maharik on inadvertence
The text raises an inquiry: is the prohibition to the adulterer based on the severity of adultery, or on damage to the existing marital bond with the husband? It connects this to the idea of “stealing” a relationship rather than merely committing adultery. The Maharik distinguishes between two kinds of error: a factual error, where the woman thought this was her husband, in which case she is not prohibited; and a legal error, where she knew it was not her husband but did not know it was forbidden, in which case she is prohibited, because this is called “to commit a trespass against a woman,” as an interpersonal wrong against the marital bond. The text concludes that according to the Maharik, the foundation of the prohibition to the husband and the adulterer lies in theft/damage to the relationship, not in the prohibition of adultery itself, and therefore the David and Bathsheba passage fits into the discussion even when the formal answer says she was not a married woman.
Why two answers are needed and whether they disagree: practical legal implications
The text formulates a broader question: when the Talmud gives two answers, one must clarify whether they disagree and what exactly the second answer found unsatisfactory in the first. It suggests that the second answer may reject the linkage between the prohibition to the adulterer and the prohibition to the husband that appears in the first answer. The text notes uncertainty in the assumption of “coercion”: does it mean physical coercion, or the kind of power imbalance involved with a king? That strengthens the question of why the divorce answer was needed. The text stresses that the question is not historical but halakhic / of Jewish law, and presents a practical implication: if an Israelite rapes another Israelite’s wife, is she prohibited to the adulterer even though in a case of coercion she remains permitted to her husband? According to the first answer she is not prohibited, while according to one understanding of the second answer she may be prohibited. The ruling may depend on principles such as “the law follows the latter version,” if this really is a dispute.
Ran in Sanhedrin and the model of “what was, was” as a practical halakhic implication
The text cites Ran in Sanhedrin on the question “how many judges judged the ox at Sinai?” and his question, “What practical difference does it make?” Ran answers that a practical implication can arise through a condition in a vow of naziriteship or in betrothing a woman based on one side of a conceptual inquiry. The text uses this to justify that the discussion about David is not merely “what was, was,” but has contemporary halakhic implications concerning the prohibition to the husband and the adulterer.
The language of the Shulchan Arukh: “since” versus “just as,” and the limits of linguistic precision
The Shulchan Arukh describes a Sotah who had prior warning and seclusion but did not drink the bitter waters, and was therefore prohibited to her husband and thus also prohibited to the suspected man. It then continues with the wording, “by oral tradition they learned that just as she is prohibited to her husband, so too she is prohibited to the adulterer.” The text presents this as two possible approaches: “since” as causal dependence, versus “just as” as a comparison that is not necessarily dependent. The text argues that there is no reverse causal direction in which the adulterer’s prohibition creates the husband’s prohibition, and that neither logic nor Scripture suggests such a structure. The text warns against building elaborate structures on subtle linguistic differences in the wording of medieval and later authorities and the Shulchan Arukh, and says that the exception is Maimonides, where there is reason to assume precision of formulation. By contrast, in the Shulchan Arukh itself, the appearance of both “since” and “just as” in the same sequence shows that no doctrinal position can be proven from this.
“Improper conduct” without prior warning: rabbinic prohibition, circumstantial grounds, and practical dependence on the husband
The Shulchan Arukh rules that where there are witnesses to seclusion without prior warning, and in addition there is “improper conduct” as judged by the court, if the husband divorces her then “she may not marry the suspected man,” but if she did marry him and has children, “she need not leave him.” The text interprets the husband’s ability to divorce her not as an obligation but as permission based on circumstantial grounds, and notes that without prior warning there is no drinking of the bitter waters. The text concludes that from this it appears the prohibition to the suspected man here is basically rabbinic, because “if she married, she need not leave” proves it is not of Torah-level / of biblical origin. Therefore, fundamentally there is reason to say that if she is not prohibited to the husband, she is not prohibited to the adulterer either, and the prohibition here arises from the husband’s and the system’s exercise of judgment, not from a definite determination of adultery.
Rema’s “and the same law applies” and Beit Shmuel’s explanation: a priest’s wife who was raped and the adulterer is an Israelite
Rema adds: “And the same law applies if because of him she became prohibited to her husband, she is prohibited to him.” Beit Shmuel says this gloss seems puzzling, since it appears merely to repeat the Shulchan Arukh, and explains that the novelty is a case where her husband is a priest and an Israelite had relations with her by force. Beit Shmuel concludes that since we hold that “where she is prohibited to the husband, she is also prohibited to the adulterer, and likewise the reverse,” therefore if she became prohibited to her priestly husband because of this intercourse, she is also prohibited to the adulterer even though he is an Israelite. He notes that Helkat Mehokek is uncertain about this ruling. The text lays out the possible initial thought that one might have seen the adulterer as analogous to the “husband” for purposes of coercion in the case of an Israelite, and then the point Beit Shmuel teaches us: the prohibition to the adulterer is derived from the status of the prohibition to the husband, not from the identity of the adulterer.
Helkat Mehokek, the Jerusalem Talmud, and Tosafot in Sotah: “just as” versus “since” as an actual dispute
The text explains that Helkat Mehokek learns from the first answer in Ketubot that if she is not prohibited to the husband in a case of coercion, she is also not prohibited to the adulterer, and from there applies this to the case of a priest’s wife who was raped by an Israelite. Beit Shmuel cites the second answer in Ketubot and concludes that “according to this, one can say that in a case of coercion she is prohibited to the adulterer, since he had relations with her willingly.” He adds that Tosafot tends to treat the first answer as primary, but the Jerusalem Talmud and Tosafot in Sotah at the beginning of the chapter ke-shem indicate that the adulterer can be prohibited even when the husband is permitted, because the adulterer acted intentionally even though the woman sinned unintentionally or the husband remains permitted. The text adds that the Tur, in siman 20, with the phrase “whether by force or willingly, the coercer is exempt and the one who acted willingly is liable,” presents each party as judged on his or her own terms, and that creates a real possibility of disconnecting the husband’s prohibition from the adulterer’s prohibition.
Logical models of correlation: Leibniz, the second Passover offering, and a necessary but insufficient condition
The text presents a logical analysis of relationships using Leibniz’s clock analogy: either the husband causes the adulterer, or the adulterer causes the husband, or a third factor synchronizes them, or the correlation is accidental. It then adds another model from tractate Pesahim concerning the second Passover offering, where the relation is not “failure to bring the first offering obligates the second,” but rather “bringing the first exempts one from the second.” So the relationship is negative rather than positive. The practical implication shows up in cases like a minor who reached adulthood or a convert who converted between the two Passovers. The text applies this to the husband-adulterer question as a possibility in which the absence of prohibition to the husband exempts from prohibition to the adulterer, but the existence of prohibition to the husband is not necessarily a sufficient condition for prohibition to the adulterer.
The exposition of “she became defiled” in Sotah and Hatam Sofer’s responsum: dependence of the verses versus their independence
The text mentions the tannaitic dispute in Sotah over whether the prohibition to the husband and the adulterer is derived from “she became defiled, she became defiled” or from “and she became defiled, and she became defiled,” and connects this to the two directions of “just as” versus “since.” Hatam Sofer, in responsum siman 26, cited in Pithei Teshuvah siman 11, argues that the matter depends on the dispute at the beginning of chapter ke-shem: according to Rabbi Akiva, the prohibition to the adulterer is learned from the extra vav in “and she became defiled,” and therefore it does not arise without defilement vis-à-vis the husband, and this matches the first answer in Ketubot, “for she was coerced.” According to Rabbi, these are two separate verses, one for the husband and one for the adulterer, and they are therefore independent, so that “even if she did not become defiled with respect to the husband, nevertheless she became defiled with respect to the adulterer.” Hatam Sofer concludes that practically the law follows Rabbi Akiva against Rabbi, and therefore “where she is not prohibited to her husband, she is not prohibited to the adulterer as a matter of law,” apart from a possible penalty as Maimonides wrote. This allows one to rule like the first answer even if the second answer exists.
Tosafot in Yevamot: priesthood and terumah versus the adulterer, and the logic that the adulterer depends on the husband
Tosafot in Yevamot asks: if “and she was not seized” teaches that in a case of coercion she remains permitted to her husband, why is she disqualified from the priesthood? After all, the prohibition of defilement includes husband and adulterer and terumah and also priesthood, so seemingly “if she is permitted to her husband, she should also be permitted for priesthood.” Tosafot distinguishes: “she was not seized” deals only with the husband’s defilement, while the later “and she became defiled” teaches the prohibitions of terumah and priesthood. And since in the case of a priest’s wife she is prohibited even in coercion, one cannot distinguish between coercion and willingness with respect to terumah and priesthood, even in the case of an Israelite’s wife. The text emphasizes that Tosafot adds that regarding the adulterer, “logic dictates that she is not prohibited to the adulterer unless she is prohibited to the husband,” so the dependence on the husband is learned from logic, not from the extra vav, and this raises the question what logic justifies such dependence even where the verses do not force it.
A second adulterer: Maharsha, Shevut Yaakov, and whether “you destroyed a home” is a result or an act
The text brings a practical case of an Israelite’s wife who had willing relations and thereby became prohibited to her husband, after which another adulterer had relations with her. The question is whether she also becomes prohibited to the second adulterer. Maharsha, in Torat Emet, holds that if the second act of intercourse does not prohibit her to the first husband because she is already prohibited, then it also does not prohibit her to the second adulterer. This is a sharp consequence of understanding “since” as dependence on the result of destroying the home. Shevut Yaakov brings proof from the Talmud in Sanhedrin and disagrees. The text suggests one can understand this not as a penalty for the result, but as a response to the act of “destroying homes,” even if the home is already destroyed, similar to the discussion of a priest who is already impure but is still forbidden “to become impure” again, because the prohibition is on the action, not only on the state of impurity.
The husband’s knowledge, the adulterer’s repentance, and the implications of prior consent
The text notes another discussion: what happens when the husband does not know and there are no witnesses, while the adulterer does know and has repented and now wants to marry her? Does the adulterer’s knowledge alone create a prohibition for him even if no prohibition was actually generated for the husband? The text brings up the question of “open marriages” and prior consent, and presents a possibility that is rejected regarding the basic prohibition itself, but considered in relation to whether the foundation is damage to the husband in the interpersonal sense. If so, consent might neutralize the claim of harm, even though the prohibition itself still stands. The text connects this to the Maharik, who grounds the prohibition in damage to the marital relationship, and cites Rabbi Daichovsky’s article in Tehumin about Ezra Sheinberg of Safed, who claimed that the women were not prohibited to their husbands. It even raises the possibility that according to the Maharik as well, they were not prohibited if, in their own minds, they did not intend to harm the husband but believed the act would bring redemption, while noting that this is a major difficulty and that perhaps they could be treated as mentally incompetent to the point that the marriage might be dissolved on the basis of a “spirit of folly.”
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Last time we dealt a bit with the passage in Ketubot about King David, an opening, really the “open door” passage, and the question of what the relationship is between that and the prohibition to the husband and the adulterer in a case of adultery or Sotah. And in the end the Talmud asks there why Bathsheba was not prohibited to David, and it brings two answers. One of them is because she was coerced, meaning she didn’t do it willingly. And there the assumption is that since she was coerced and Uriah was not a priest, then she was not prohibited to Uriah. And if she was not prohibited to Uriah, then she was also not prohibited to David. Meaning, there’s some assumption here that the prohibition to the adulterer goes together with the prohibition to the husband, even though from the standpoint of logic I wouldn’t have expected that. Because if she wasn’t coerced, meaning if she did it willingly, then she becomes prohibited to the husband, right? And then automatically also to the adulterer. Now when she was coerced, what comes out is that the adulterer was actually worse. Meaning, not only did they not do it willingly, but he forced her to do this thing, and דווקא there the sinner comes out rewarded. Meaning, she isn’t prohibited to him, only to the husband. And that sharpens even more the assumption underlying this answer, that despite that logic there is some necessary connection between the prohibition to the husband and the prohibition to the adulterer. Meaning, that’s why even though there is logic to prohibit her to the adulterer, since there is no prohibition to the husband there also won’t be a prohibition to the adulterer. Meaning, that’s the… that’s the…
[Speaker B] Is someone who rapes liable to punishment?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Adultery—what do you mean? The punishment is death. In adultery, of course. If it’s Sotah, in Sotah there are no witnesses to the intercourse, so you can’t execute him. But in the case of an open door we don’t know at all who he was. Meaning, we only suspect, okay? But where there are witnesses to adultery, then yes, there’s a death penalty. So that’s the first answer. The second answer says that she wasn’t prohibited because she wasn’t a married woman at all. Anyone who went out to the wars of the House of David gave his wife a complete bill of divorce, and therefore when David came to her she wasn’t a married woman at all, and therefore she wasn’t prohibited, and “whoever says David sinned is simply mistaken,” and all those things.
[Speaker C] Who says he sinned?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, so I said—I think I mentioned this, I don’t remember anymore whether I mentioned it—the prophet Nathan speaks in the parable of the poor man’s ewe lamb. When you look at that parable, you see that it doesn’t illustrate the sin of adultery. It illustrates the sin of robbery, right? Meaning, that’s really the focus. Now notice, this is not by chance. It fits very well with the Talmud’s statement that anyone who went out to the wars of the House of David gave his wife a bill of divorce. Because in practice there was no adultery there. She wasn’t a married woman on the formal level, but obviously he stole her from Uriah—
[Speaker B] By—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] by sending him to die in order to take her.
[Speaker B] Only Uriah had already died.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. No. Because once Uriah died, it became clear retroactively that from the moment she received the bill of divorce she was divorced. That’s exactly the point. I didn’t understand.
[Speaker D] What’s the difference—what difference does it make?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well, yes, it may be that the Holy One, blessed be He, didn’t like this act because of the robbery in it. That doesn’t matter. At the end of the day, the claim is that when they say “whoever says David sinned is simply mistaken,” they mean formal sin. Meaning, he didn’t violate the prohibition of a married woman, and nobody says he was righteous. The Talmud in a million places says he wasn’t. What do you mean? The Hebrew Bible (Tanakh), the Prophets, the Talmud, nobody disputes that. When they say “whoever says David sinned is simply mistaken,” it’s a kind of Lithuanian-style perspective that says: there was no prohibition of a married woman here. There’s no actual robbery in a woman, but the idea of robbery is what’s problematic here, right?
[Speaker F] Yes, exactly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You took the poor man’s ewe lamb even though you had the power to do it as king, okay, but it was still wrong. Meaning, the claim… yes, exactly. And therefore that’s the parable Nathan the Prophet gave; that’s the plain meaning of the verses. When you look at it that way, you see that when they say “whoever says David sinned is simply mistaken,” understood in that sense, that is the plain meaning of the verses. There’s nothing forced here. It’s completely clear, that’s what comes out of the verses. Otherwise Nathan the Prophet gives a very unsuccessful parable if the problem was adultery, okay? It’s not the poor man’s ewe lamb—meaning, it’s not even… it’s adultery. What does that have to do with the poor man’s ewe lamb? By the way, this connects very strongly to what we’re dealing with, because the prohibition to the adulterer—and this is what we’ll discuss—is really about what its basis is. Is its basis, since you asked already—I’m just saying all this parenthetically—is its basis the adultery… the adultery involved, meaning the grave prohibition that he committed or she committed, or is its basis the damage to the marital bond she currently has with her husband? And that isn’t about prohibition at all; it’s much more like robbery than adultery. Do you understand what I’m saying? What I brought from the Maharik. Do you remember the Maharik? I said that the Maharik argues that generally in Jewish law there are two kinds of inadvertence. Say, the Mishnah at the beginning of Kelal Gadol says there’s an error where you don’t know the facts and there’s an error where you don’t know the law. For example, someone who selected on the Sabbath: it could be he didn’t know that today is the Sabbath—that’s a factual error. Or it could be that he didn’t know it’s forbidden to select on the Sabbath—that’s a legal error. From a halakhic standpoint there’s no difference. Both are inadvertent acts; same liability, sin-offering, everything is the same. But the Maharik says that regarding a woman who committed adultery, her prohibition to the husband and to the adulterer will depend on these two kinds of inadvertence. Ordinary inadvertence—if she’s the wife of an Israelite—ordinary inadvertence does not prohibit her, right? She isn’t prohibited. But, says the Maharik, what kind of inadvertence? Inadvertence where she didn’t know that it was forbidden—rather, she didn’t know that this wasn’t her husband. She thought it was her husband; she simply made a mistake, okay? Then she isn’t prohibited. But if she didn’t know that it was forbidden—a legal error, not a factual one—then she is prohibited. She knew it wasn’t her husband, but she didn’t know adultery was forbidden. Then she is prohibited. Why? Simply because this is called “to commit a trespass against a woman.” “To commit a trespass against a woman” means not that you violated the severe halakhic prohibition of adultery, but that the offense is interpersonal. Meaning, you harmed the marital bond between you and the husband. Therefore it’s much closer to that dimension of robbery than to the dimension of adultery. Right? So the Maharik is essentially saying that the basis of the prohibition to the husband and the adulterer is the robbery in it, not the prohibition in it. And if that’s so, then it makes much more sense that they bring King David into this discussion, because really “whoever says David sinned is simply mistaken,” and he gave his wife a bill of divorce, and she wasn’t a married woman at all. And still the Talmud asks: wait, so why wasn’t she prohibited? Because conceptually she should have been prohibited. Right, in practice she wasn’t prohibited for the reasons the Talmud gives, but in principle she should have been prohibited, because after all King David dissolved the marital bond that existed between Uriah and Bathsheba, and this has nothing to do with the question of the prohibition as such. The question is one of robbery. The Talmud says: fine, but since she was coerced, since there was a bill of divorce, all kinds of things like that, in the end, no. But why does this even connect to this discussion? It fits very well because what we’re really dealing with is the dimension of robbery and not the dimension of adultery. So that’s the Talmud’s first answer. The Talmud’s second answer, as I said, is that she wasn’t a married woman at all because she received a divorce. The question is why a second answer is needed. That’s always a question that comes up in these Talmudic contexts: when the Talmud brings two answers, you always have to ask yourself, first, do the answers disagree? And second, if so, what was it about the first answer that the second answer was unhappy with? Why did I feel I needed to bring a second answer? Something in the first answer didn’t seem right to me, okay? Many times the question is also why the first answer wasn’t happy with the second, but that comes up more naturally… what? Yes, exactly. Naturally, from the standpoint of the sugya’s editorial structure, you usually ask it about the second answer. What was unsatisfactory to you in the first answer, since it was already brought? Even though in principle you can also ask about the first answer—after all, there is a second answer. It just hasn’t been brought yet in the course of the passage, but still, why wasn’t that answer satisfactory to you? It’s always a question: which answer is the more obvious one? Which answer is the more natural one? If there’s a natural answer, I’ll always ask myself: wait, then why did you bring the other one? If there’s no natural answer, you can say: fine, here are two answers; they wanted to say that it can be resolved in two ways. Is there something that is completely natural? Then the question always comes up: then why did you bring that other one? Now here, in this context, I’m saying: I don’t know how natural the answer “she was coerced” really is. Because what do you mean, coerced? If it was actual coercion, then who says it was coercion? Maybe the other answer doesn’t agree that it was coercion. If it means a power imbalance, so to speak—because he was king, not because he physically forced her, but because he was king that counts as coercion, like what you say about a minor or something like that—then there’s a power relationship that essentially turns this into coercion. There it really is more natural on the simple level, and then the question arises even more strongly: why do you need the second answer? In any case, first, we’ll have to ask ourselves whether the answers disagree. Second, we need to ask what the second answer doesn’t accept in the first. Why is that important? Because for our purposes, regarding the prohibition to the husband and the adulterer, it could be that if the second answer disagrees with the first, and if that’s really because there was something it didn’t like in the first answer, then maybe—or really, quite plausibly—what it didn’t like in the first answer is exactly this: that the first answer ties the prohibition to the adulterer to the prohibition to the husband. And it says that if the prohibition to the husband didn’t exist, then there is also no prohibition to the adulterer. And that, precisely, the second answer is not willing to accept. That’s what was unsatisfactory in the first answer. Why is that important? Because now the question is, in conclusion, what do we say? There’s a practical halakhic implication here between the two answers. It’s not a question of what happened with King David. The question is—yes, “study it and receive reward”—there’s a practical halakhic implication here. Is the prohibition to the adulterer… dependent on the prohibition to the husband? And if I understand that this is what the two answers are arguing about, then I ask myself: which answer does the law follow? Okay? So there’s a practical implication here too. Yes, it’s a Talmud in Sanhedrin 15. The Talmud asks: how many judges judged the ox at Sinai? The ox at Sinai—how many judges? “Whether ox or flock, they shall not graze opposite the mountain,” right? “Whoever approaches the mountain shall be put to death.” So also the cattle—how many judged it? Since the death of the owner is like the death of the ox, and the death of the owner is judged by 23 judges, so maybe the ox also has to be judged by 23, or not? The Talmud discusses there how many judges judged the ox that approached Mount Sinai. Okay? So Ran asks there: what practical difference does it make? Fine, what was, was.
[Speaker E] Is that all just perspective—was it relating to the Holy One, blessed be He?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not at all. It’s a punishment for the ox—you have to kill that ox. Certainly. Yes, that’s what the Talmud says. And even 23 judges, “the death of the owner is like the death of the ox,” so 23 judges. Ran asks: what practical difference does it make? Why do I care about what was, was? So he brings two practical implications there. I don’t remember the second one, but the first is a practical implication for a Nazirite. If someone takes a Nazirite vow on condition that if the ox at Sinai required 23, then he’s a Nazirite. Yes, that’s the source for the practical implication people in yeshivot always mention with betrothing a woman. When you say something that has no practical implication at all—what practical implication? For betrothing a woman. Meaning, if on one side of the conceptual inquiry I betroth the woman on the condition that that side of the inquiry is correct, then is she betrothed or not? Very important practical implication. So you can take a question with no practical implication and basically turn it into a halakhic question. This Ran is the source. So here too—why should I care now why King David was not prohibited to her, whether it was because she was coerced or because they gave a bill of divorce? What was, was. No. If I really understand it this way, then there’s a halakhic question in the background. And that question is relevant today too, not just “what was, was.” The question is whether if someone has relations with an Israelite’s wife by force, is she prohibited to him or not? According to the first answer, she is not prohibited to him, because if she is not prohibited to the husband then she also is not prohibited to the adulterer. According to the second answer, she is prohibited to him, and that’s why there they had to say there was a bill of divorce. But in a case where there was no bill of divorce, and an Israelite rapes another Israelite’s wife, the question is whether she is prohibited or not prohibited to the adulterer. To the husband she is not prohibited in a case of coercion. And to the adulterer? So that’s a dispute between the two answers. So it’s a major practical implication in law. This is no longer just the question of how many judged the ox at Sinai, right? “What was, was.” There’s a halakhic question here. The question is whether that’s really what the answers disagree about. I understand.
[Speaker F] Once the rule is that the law follows the latter version. What? Once the rule is that the law follows the latter version. Okay.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. So now you’ll discuss it the way you discuss how we decide the law according to which version or which answer, but that will lead to a practical legal implication. Meaning, you can draw conclusions from it. Of course, for that you have to assume that the two answers actually disagree at all, because maybe they’re both saying that both are true. Meaning, fine, both answers were correct. He both gave a bill of divorce, and the Talmud also wanted to say that even if he hadn’t given a bill of divorce, since she was coerced—sorry—therefore she was not prohibited. Okay? But really both answers are true. And if that’s so, then both answers agree in the direction of the first answer, that the prohibition to the adulterer depends on the prohibition to the husband. And it’s not a dispute between the answers. And according to that, the law would be that there is dependence between the prohibitions. By the way, that is the accepted view among the halakhic decisors, that there is dependence between the prohibitions. So Beit Shmuel writes as follows. Siman 11. A woman suspected while being a married woman—if there was prior warning and seclusion and she did not drink the bitter waters—I’m talking now about the Shulchan Arukh, this is not Beit Shmuel yet, right?—and she did not drink the bitter waters, since she became prohibited to her husband because of him, she is prohibited forever to the one with whom she secluded herself, just as she is prohibited to her husband. The moment she is prohibited to her husband… if she drank, then the waters already test her. If she didn’t drink, she becomes prohibited to her husband after warning and seclusion. If she is prohibited to her husband, she is also prohibited to the adulterer. From this formulation it seems that he makes it dependent. Meaning, because she became prohibited to her husband, therefore she also becomes prohibited… “since she became prohibited to her husband,” therefore she also becomes prohibited to the adulterer. And if he transgressed and married her… did she have relations with adulterers? As long as she wasn’t divorced, obviously. But after she was divorced—not.
[Speaker B] No, she wasn’t divorced.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If she wasn’t divorced, then she’s a married woman, what?
[Speaker B] No, she is prohibited to her husband.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But she hasn’t left him. She has to leave with a bill of divorce. She is prohibited to her husband but she is still his wife. She has to receive a bill of divorce.
[Speaker B] So the novelty is that she’s prohibited to the adulterer.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there’s also a novelty that even after the divorce she can’t marry the adulterer. No, obviously—that’s the whole novelty, otherwise we wouldn’t have said anything. Yes. And if he transgressed and married her, they remove her from him with a bill of divorce even if she had several children from him. By oral tradition they learned that just as she is prohibited to her husband, so too she is prohibited to the adulterer. That’s already different wording. Here it’s no longer “since” but “just as.” Just as she is prohibited to the husband, so she is prohibited to the adulterer. Now I don’t know whether to infer precisely from the wording of the Shulchan Arukh; that’s a bit pilpul, so I don’t intend to infer from the Shulchan Arukh’s wording. I intend to use these two formulations to present two sides, okay? And the two sides are whether we are really dealing here with a result—since she is prohibited to the husband, therefore she is prohibited to the adulterer, that’s the reason—or whether it’s only that just as she is prohibited to the husband, so too she is prohibited to the adulterer. Not “since she became prohibited to the husband, she became prohibited to the adulterer,” but “just as she became prohibited to the husband, so too she became prohibited to the adulterer.” That is a legal determination that just as there is a prohibition to the husband, so too there is a prohibition to the adulterer. The difference between them will of course be the question whether there is dependence between the two things. If I had relations with a woman by force, the wife of an Israelite, then she did not become prohibited to the husband. Now if you say “since,” then if she did not become prohibited to the husband, she also does not become prohibited to the adulterer. If you say “just as,” then just as there is a prohibition to the husband, there is also a prohibition to the adulterer. Now each case stands on its own. And with an Israelite husband, if she was coerced then she is not prohibited to him, but that permission was not stated regarding me. I had relations with her; if I had done so willingly she would have become prohibited, right? So the fact that I did it by force shouldn’t make things easier. So as far as I’m concerned she would indeed become prohibited. So the question is whether it is “just as” or “since.” Okay? Now again, the Shulchan Arukh writes this in the same sentence, so if I were being precise, that itself would be proof that one should not be precise with the wording of the Shulchan Arukh.
[Speaker F] Meaning there is no causal correlation. Yes, exactly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Causal, not circumstantial. Yes.
[Speaker F] Causal means it doesn’t work only in this direction, meaning husband and then adulterer—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Certainly not adulterer and because of that husband. I don’t see any logic in that, nor any proof for it. Meaning, no one makes the dependence that if she is not prohibited to the adulterer then she also won’t be prohibited to the husband. It always starts with the discussion about the husband, and the question is whether that determines the status of the adulterer or whether it is independent. But the reverse direction doesn’t seem to me to emerge either from logic or from Scripture. Meaning, I don’t think there is such a view.
[Speaker F] Causal logic says yes. Meaning, if a woman cheated on her husband, there is a point in her not continuing with that same man. Meaning, from social considerations, to say she’ll be prohibited to him but not to the husband—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t say she’s more or less. No problem, she can be prohibited to the adulterer without being prohibited to the husband—that’s also what I’m saying. But the question is, when she is prohibited to both of them, who is the cause and who is the result? That’s the question.
[Speaker F] What you’re saying is the opposite, meaning that the adulterer is the reason to think she would be prohibited to the husband.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not more of a reason—that’s not what it means. But then leave her prohibited to the adulterer. Leave her prohibited to the adulterer, but why do you need to prohibit her to the husband?
[Speaker F] I’m telling you there’s a causal connection here that’s not only about prohibition—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, you mean a reason because of the sin? So he’s saying your explanation doesn’t explain reverse causality; it explains why to prohibit her to the adulterer. There’s a lot of logic in that. You’re right. Now the question is whether from that you need to derive the prohibition to the husband—that’s a different question. Not only is it not obvious, he’s not talking about causality at all; he’s talking about the reason to prohibit her to the adulterer. There’s a good reason to prohibit her to the adulterer, agreed. But now the question is whether from that you have to derive the prohibition to the husband—why? What does that have to do with it? So the…
[Speaker B] If she isn’t prohibited to the husband… it was coercion. Okay. So because of the coercion she is permitted to her husband. To the adulterer she’ll be permitted after the divorce, right? Then of course she’s already prohibited to her husband after the divorce.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] After the divorce she is not prohibited to her husband; she’s just not permitted to him. There’s no prohibition on relations with an unmarried woman. I mean, she was—
[Speaker B] His former wife, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, there’s no prohibition on relations with an unmarried woman—
[Speaker H] Simply if she wasn’t married to another man.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, if she was married to another man, that’s a different story. So “just as”… yes, so I’m saying, these inferences from the wording of the Shulchan Arukh—not only do I not intend to build on them, this is proof that it is not correct to build on inferences from the wording of the Shulchan Arukh. Because you see that the first half of the sentence begins with “since” and the end concludes with “just as.” So he’s just writing. In general, one needs to know: inferences from the language of medieval authorities, later authorities, the Shulchan Arukh and the like—that’s pilpul. It is not right to infer sharply from the language of commentators and halakhic decisors. The one exception is Maimonides. With Maimonides, one of the rules is that we do infer precisely from his wording. Because Maimonides… yes. The question is what the writer’s assumption was. If the writer writes in ordinary human language, then there’s no point in inferring precisely. Not because he was stupid or careless, but because the context of the writing, the assumption behind the writing, was that I write what I think without thinking through every word and where exactly I place it. With Maimonides there was an assumption—also grounded in what he himself said—that he was very precise in the formulation and in where he placed the law and so on. Therefore with Maimonides there is justification for inferring from the wording. Even there you have to be careful… but there is justification for it. Inferences from the wording of medieval and later authorities are usually pilpul. Meaning, look at what he said; leave the fine inferences aside. Now obviously, where the wording clearly leans in a certain direction, fine, that’s not a tiny inference. But where you build a whole structure on the fact that the authority phrased it this way and not that way, that’s pilpul—that’s not it. So I’m using these formulations here only to present two possibilities; I’m not trying to argue that this is the Shulchan Arukh’s actual view. No, in the Shulchan Arukh there is no difference. There is a difference in meaning, but from the Shulchan Arukh I wouldn’t derive any actual difference. “And the same law applies if because of him she became prohibited to her husband: she is prohibited to him”—the view of the Rabbi. What is that supposed to be? You see the sentence with the underline—it repeats the same thing. What does it mean, “and the same law applies if because of him she became prohibited to her husband, then she is prohibited to him,” meaning to the adulterer. Obviously, that’s what you just wrote, no? That if she became prohibited to her husband, then she also… so it’s not obvious; we’ll see in a moment. But if there was no prior warning, and witnesses came that she secluded herself with this man—he came without prior warning, there was only seclusion—and he came and found an improper thing, for example they entered after him and found her standing over the bed and she was wearing trousers and girding her belt, or they found saliva above the canopy, or they saw shoes turned over in place, or they were coming out of a dark place, or one was lifting the other from a pit, and things like that, or they saw him kissing the opening of her garment, or they saw them kissing one another, or they entered one after the other and closed the doors, etc. So all these things are basically—it was prior warning…
[Speaker B] There was no prior warning, no—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There were witnesses to the seclusion, but they saw all kinds of other indications. Okay? So in such a case, all these are just examples of how it becomes clarified… there were witnesses and no prior warning—the opposite. There were witnesses to the seclusion and there was no prior warning. So what’s the law in such a situation?
[Speaker F] Are these things considered seclusion?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there were witnesses to the seclusion—that was in any case—there just wasn’t prior warning. Now, if you did more than merely have testimony to seclusion, there are also indications that something happened there, that to some extent replaces the prior warning, giving some circumstantial basis instead of the prior warning. We talked about the role of prior warning, and it also functions to create circumstantial grounds. So here there are other things that create circumstantial grounds; what about them? What happens? So the Shulchan Arukh says: and things like these, according to what the judges see fit—if the husband divorced her because of such improper conduct, that is up to the husband’s decision. He is not obligated to divorce her, but he can decide that he believes it, that he thinks there was a problem here, and he divorces her. Fine? But if the husband decided to divorce her, then she may not marry the suspected man. And if he transgressed and married her, and he had children from her, she need not leave him.
[Speaker J] Wait, and if he divorced her, does he have to pay
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] her ketubah? Again? The husband? I don’t remember right now; we can check. I don’t remember at the moment. I assume yes, because circumstantial grounds are what you think—it’s not… oh no, sorry, no. When you yourself are suspicious, that’s something else; there he certainly pays the ketubah. But here there are objective circumstantial grounds, meaning we all are concerned, not only you. So that—I don’t know, I don’t remember right now.
[Speaker C] Is the suspected man in a higher status than the adulterer…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again?
[Speaker C] The alleged adulterer is in a higher-status position…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the alleged one is the adulterer.
[Speaker C] At the moment we don’t know for certain…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, we don’t know, and even so the claim is that if there are grounds for suspicion, then the husband can decide whether to divorce her or not. We don’t obligate him, because there was no warning. But if he divorces her, she can’t go and marry the man she committed adultery with. Now why? Seemingly, the prohibition to the husband and to the adulterer is when there was warning and seclusion, or witnesses, and then we know she committed adultery. Here the husband can keep her; she wasn’t fundamentally prohibited to the husband. She wasn’t prohibited to the husband—he just has the right to divorce her if he decides that he nevertheless suspects her, okay? But here she becomes prohibited to the adulterer even though she was not prohibited to the husband.
[Speaker K] If she married him she does not have to leave… fine. If she married him she does not have to leave,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But she should not marry the alleged adulterer, yes. By the way, that’s only if he had children from her; if he didn’t have children from her then she would also have to leave. And if he had children, then she would not have to leave.
[Speaker B] And here’s another sentence we skipped. This is basically circumstantial evidence.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Warning is also circumstantial evidence.
[Speaker B] Right. Can the judges determine that adultery happened here? No.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So here, as I said, the judges can determine that there are grounds for suspicion here in place of warning, and therefore he can divorce her. They won’t determine that adultery happened here and execute her—they can’t determine that. They can determine that there are grounds for suspicion here as though there had been warning. That depends on the judges’ evaluation, because they have to decide how significant these grounds for suspicion are.
[Speaker B] Instead of making her drink?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What?
[Speaker I] Is there an issue of making her drink?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, the law of seclusion applies in any case.
[Speaker B] Even if they decide to make her drink on the basis of the suspicious circumstances?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there is no making her drink without warning.
[Speaker C] A warning by the husband himself. Of course. Yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So therefore the point is, therefore the point is that there’s something here that gives us some kind of indication when we make the connection between the husband and the adulterer. Because on the one hand, here she was not prohibited to the husband, but there are suspicious circumstances that allow him to divorce her. Okay? Now if they—if he divorced her—then she cannot go and marry the adulterer, and even if she did marry him she has to leave him; only if she has children from him then she does not leave the adulterer. What does that mean? For example, if the husband wasn’t bothered by it and didn’t divorce her, but afterward they decided to divorce for other reasons—they decided to divorce. From the Shulchan Arukh it sounds like in that case she would be permitted to the adulterer. Only if the husband decided to divorce her because of those suspicious circumstances, then it is as though the husband sees her as prohibited, and consequently she also becomes prohibited to the adulterer. And it’s not that she truly became prohibited to the adulterer in that sense. More than that: from the fact that if she married him she does not have to leave, it’s quite clear that this is a rabbinic law, not a Torah-level law. Therefore, in practice, what is written in the Shulchan Arukh is that if she was not prohibited to the husband, she is also not prohibited to the adulterer.
[Speaker B] But don’t the children prove that she really is prohibited?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, children prove nothing. She married the adulterer afterward and had children. Yes. No, no, that’s what’s being discussed. We’re talking about children—it’s not twins. Meaning, one act of intercourse produces one child at most, if any. We’re talking about a case where there were children—they got married. So if that were proof,
[Speaker F] Is that the meaning of the husband being able to divorce her? That’s what I’m trying to understand. What’s the significance of his being able to divorce her? Any husband can divorce his wife.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not like that. It could be that in this case it would be without the ketubah, it could be that he can divorce her against her will despite the ban of Rabbenu Gershom, all sorts of things.
[Speaker F] But we didn’t see any such heading,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That he may divorce her. I don’t know for what purpose he writes that. I don’t know. In any case, the claim is that it is not certain that a ketubah payment is required here, because this is not merely his personal suspicion—that he has rendered it a self-imposed prohibition. And a self-imposed prohibition applies only to me; her rights cannot be harmed because I decided that this is a prohibited piece. But here there are objective grounds for suspicion; everyone suspects that intercourse happened here, this is not some personal whim of mine. It’s just not unequivocal enough to obligate me. So here, therefore I say there is room to deliberate whether he owes the ketubah or not. There is no obligation to divorce her, so seemingly that would mean with a ketubah. On the other hand, the reason to divorce her—the fact that it is justified—is not merely a self-imposed prohibition. In other words, there is something objective here. I don’t know, we’d have to look; it’s surely written somewhere.
[Speaker F] But it has an implication—the implication is that she is prohibited to the adulterer.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Or that he can divorce her against her will, as I said earlier, despite the ban of Rabbenu Gershom, and so on. In any case, for our purposes what I want to say is: despite what seems to emerge from the Shulchan Arukh, when you look closely it’s quite clear that what follows from here is that if she is not prohibited to the husband, she is also not prohibited to the adulterer. She is not prohibited to the adulterer, even though it says she should not marry him and if she married him she must leave—it’s all rabbinic. All rabbinic. Meaning, it is not the core law; the prohibition to the husband and the adulterer is, of course, Torah-level. So therefore, if she married him and does not have to leave, that basically means this is only a rabbinic law, and therefore fundamentally she is not prohibited to the adulterer. And why? Because fundamentally she is also not prohibited to the husband. He can divorce her, but she is not prohibited to him. So specifically from this Shulchan Arukh you cannot bring proof that one can sever the prohibition to the husband from the prohibition to the adulterer—there is a connection between them. That’s how it seems. In any case, that’s the story. Now this strange passage that he writes there with the line, “and the same applies: if she became prohibited to her husband on his account, she is prohibited to him”—do you see that? So here it’s not clear what he added; that’s what you just said until now. If she became prohibited to the husband then she also became prohibited to the adulterer. So Beit Shmuel says: “and the same applies if she became prohibited.” The words of this gloss are seemingly puzzling. What did this add to the words of the author? Right? “And the same applies: if she became prohibited to the husband, then she became prohibited to the adulterer.” What does “and the same applies” add? That’s everything the author already said earlier—that if she became prohibited to the husband, she also became prohibited to the adulterer. And one can force an explanation and resolve it, but it seems that this is what he means: if her husband is a priest and an Israelite had intercourse with her by force, and in the case of an Israelite forced intercourse does not prohibit her, and if her husband had been an Israelite she would have been permitted to the husband and to the adulterer, as Tosafot wrote in the next chapter—that Uriyah’s wife was permitted to David since he had relations with her by force, like the first answer basically—nevertheless, if her husband is a priest and she became prohibited to her husband, she became prohibited to her husband, and then what?
[Speaker G] And according to the first answer, also to her husband.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Let’s go back, let’s go back again to the wording. Look, the wording is strange, yes? There is here—yes—the woman suspected with a married woman, yes? Prohibited to the husband, prohibited to the adulterer, and so on. Right? And if he transgressed and married her, they make her leave him, and everything is fine. Yes. By oral tradition they learned: just as she is prohibited to her husband, so she is prohibited to the adulterer. “And the same applies if she became prohibited to her husband because of him: she is prohibited to him.” What—fine, that’s what you just said until now, and then “and the same applies”—what the author said until now—what is the Rema adding here? This is the Rema. What is the Rema adding here? And what the Rema is adding here is that if she became prohibited to her husband, she is prohibited to him even in a place where you would think she would not be prohibited to him. When? When he rapes the wife of a priest, and he himself is an Israelite. So she became prohibited to her husband, because in the case of a priest even a raped wife is prohibited to him. Since she became prohibited to her husband, she is also prohibited to the adulterer, even though the adulterer is an Israelite, and from the standpoint of an Israelite she would not be prohibited to him if she had been raped. That is what the Rema comes to add. Okay? “And the same applies if she became prohibited to her husband”—and there would have been room to say that she would not become prohibited to the adulterer—no. If she became prohibited to her husband, then necessarily she also became prohibited to the adulterer. And then according to his approach, what is written in the Rema is that there is dependence. Meaning, if she becomes prohibited to the husband, then she also becomes prohibited to the adulterer. And there is room to discuss whether the reverse dependence is also true. If she does not become prohibited to the husband, does that mean she is not prohibited to the adulterer? Say, I don’t know, for example, a priest who rapes the wife of an Israelite. So she does not become prohibited to the husband, because a raped wife does not become prohibited. But from the standpoint of a priest, if his wife had been raped she would be prohibited to him, right? So there would be room to say that she is prohibited to him, even though she is not prohibited to the husband.
[Speaker B] She is prohibited because she’s divorced?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it has nothing to do with being divorced, what are you talking about. Her husband died; she’s not divorced, she’s a widow. Never mind. So there would be room to say that she would become prohibited to the priest, because from the standpoint of a priest even rape is an act of intercourse. But on the other hand she did not become prohibited to her husband. And if there is such a rule—that only prohibition to the husband creates prohibition to the adulterer—then here there is no prohibition to the adulterer. Now, I don’t know. For the time being, as we’ll soon see further on, he’s not talking about that yet. He explains the Rema only in one direction: that if she became prohibited to the husband, then she also becomes prohibited to the adulterer. Okay? If her husband is a priest and she was raped, then she also becomes prohibited to the adulterer. Now he says, “And this is difficult for me”—ah, sorry—“and we hold.” And we hold that wherever she is prohibited to the husband, she is also prohibited to the adulterer, and likewise vice versa. Therefore, if she became prohibited to her husband who is a priest because of this act of forced intercourse, she is also prohibited to the adulterer, even though the adulterer is an Israelite. Fine? That is his explanation of the Rema. And the Chelkat Mechokek is uncertain about this law. There is a dispute among the halakhic decisors here: what really happens with a priest’s wife who was raped? Right? Does she become prohibited to the adulterer when he is an Israelite? If he is a priest then clearly she becomes prohibited to him. If he is an Israelite—by the way, what is this discussion? There is some kind of perspective here. Let’s say, look at a case where she is the wife of a priest and the one who raped her is an Israelite. Fine? So basically I would have thought she would be permitted to the Israelite, because from the standpoint of an Israelite rape does not prohibit. But since that is what the Rema innovated—that because she became prohibited to the priest, her husband, she therefore also becomes prohibited to the Israelite. What would have been the initial assumption otherwise? If the husband had been an Israelite and she had intercourse by force, she would not have become prohibited to him. But why is that relevant to the fact that the adulterer is an Israelite and had intercourse with her by force, such that she would not become prohibited to him? What does that have to do with it?
[Speaker B] You could say that in this case it is not the act that determines things, but the status of the husband.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but the husband is a priest, and we’re talking about the adulterer. Permitted—
[Speaker B] To the adulterer. She is prohibited to the adulterer because the husband is a priest. I understand, but what is the side that says she should not be prohibited to the adulterer? What’s the novelty? Isn’t it obvious? What’s the novelty? Because it’s not the act that determines whether she is prohibited—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Or permitted—but rather the status of the husband. Well then, so what?
[Speaker B] Therefore there was an initial assumption that even though she is prohibited to the husband because he is a priest, and not because of the act itself, she would be permitted to the adulterer. So they say no.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why?
[Speaker B] But—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The husband’s status is what determines it, so he is a priest, so she becomes prohibited, and therefore she also becomes prohibited to the adulterer.
[Speaker B] But the husband’s status should not determine it; what should determine it is the act.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand. Here he’s talking about an Israelite who raped the wife of a priest. Fine?
[Speaker B] Now there is an Israelite here—and wait—the husband is an Israelite too, and the rapist is also an Israelite.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so that is the discussion in our Talmudic passage.
[Speaker B] And there she is permitted to her husband; she is also permitted to that one,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to the second answer—the first.
[Speaker B] Meaning, the act determines that she is permitted. Permitted to both. Okay. When the husband is a priest, the difference is not the act but the status of the husband. I get it. What? What?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There too it’s the status of the husband. What do you mean? Therefore the status of the husband—in the first case too it’s the status of the husband. She doesn’t need to—why is she not prohibited to the adulterer in the first case? She is not prohibited because she is permitted to her husband. So what? And you say the husband’s status determines. So you’re saying the identity of the husband determines in the first case too, not only in the second case. The husband always determines the status. That’s what you’re saying. Fine. So here too I say the same thing. So if the husband is a priest, the husband is a priest and therefore she becomes prohibited to him, then she should also become prohibited to the adulterer. Why do I care that he is an Israelite? And if he were a priest then she would be prohibited to him—so what do I care who the adulterer is? She became prohibited to the husband. Why in the world exempt the adulterer? So why should I care? Why exempt the adulterer, and why should it depend on whether he is a priest or an Israelite? There’s some hint here—I’m just thinking out loud—that we see the adulterer as the husband. The prohibition to the adulterer is because we—the Torah tells us to look at the adulterer as though he were the husband. And therefore she is prohibited to the husband and to the adulterer. It’s as though both of you want to be her husband. You had intercourse with her even though she is a married woman, right? So both of you basically want to be her husbands. Okay, that’s what you wanted; that’s what you cooked, that’s what you’ll eat. Now both of you are considered her husbands. And then it comes out that your wife committed adultery. Your wife committed adultery—both of your wives. Okay? Then I say: if I am an Israelite and she committed adultery by force, then she should not— I am the adulterer, yes?—then she should not become prohibited to me, because if I am viewed as the husband whose wife was raped, then she does not become prohibited to me. But if I am a priest and my wife was raped, she does become prohibited to me. So that was probably the initial assumption. In other words, that’s the discussion here. The discussion here is whether, if the adulterer is an Israelite and the husband is a priest, then she is prohibited to the husband, and still I have a question why she should become prohibited to the Israelite. He says: from here there is proof that the law of the adulterer is derived from the law of the husband. No, that’s not proof of anything. It’s proof that she becomes prohibited—why shouldn’t she become prohibited? He says no, there is a side that says she should not become prohibited. There is a side that says that the prohibition to the adulterer is not derived at all from the prohibition to the husband. Rather what? The Torah imposed a penalty at the Torah level—it’s not a rabbinic penalty. The Torah penalized both of them to be considered her husbands, both the husband and the adulterer. And now your wife was raped or had intercourse, okay? And now I judge each one as though his wife had intercourse. So if the adulterer is an Israelite and his wife had intercourse by force, then she is not prohibited to him. He himself raped her, yes? It’s a little strange, but she is not prohibited to him because the wife of an Israelite who was raped is not prohibited to him. That was the side that said that even though she becomes prohibited to her husband who is a priest, she would not become prohibited to her husband who is an Israelite. We are therefore taught that this is not so. If she is prohibited to the priest, she is also prohibited to the Israelite. And why? What is the novelty here? That the prohibition to the adulterer is not because we see the adulterer as a husband, but rather it is derived from the prohibition to the husband. If there is a prohibition to the husband, then you yourself are also prohibited from her. Maybe it is even a consequence. The reason she becomes prohibited to you is recompense, a penalty, because you made her prohibited to her husband. In return, we prohibit her to you as well. Some kind of penalty like that. And then of course it depends on whether she became prohibited to her husband. But it makes no difference at all who I am, whether I am an Israelite or a priest. If she became prohibited to the husband, then that’s that. And if so, then it really works both ways: if I raped the wife of an Israelite, then after all I did not make her prohibited to the Israelite, right? So now even if I am a priest, for example—I am a priest and I raped the wife of an Israelite—then if we see both of them as husbands, then true, she will not become prohibited to him, but to me she will. That is the example of what you wanted to say earlier. To me she will, because my wife as a priest was raped. But according to the conclusion of Beit Shmuel, that is not so. The prohibition to you is a penalty or punishment because you made her prohibited to her husband. So here, since she is the wife of an Israelite and she did not become prohibited to him, then even if I am a priest she will not become prohibited to me. Okay? That, in short, is the discussion in Beit Shmuel: whether the prohibition to the adulterer is a result of the prohibition to the husband. Is it “since” or “just as”? That is the question, right? Is it “since”—since she became prohibited to the husband, therefore she became prohibited to the adulterer. Then if she did not become prohibited to the husband, we do not prohibit her to the adulterer, and it makes no difference at all whether he is a priest or an Israelite. Or is it “just as”—just as she became prohibited to the husband, so she became prohibited to the adulterer. Then that means that even if she did not become prohibited to the husband, if the reason for prohibition exists with respect to the adulterer as well, then he will be prohibited even without her having become prohibited to the husband. That is exactly the doubt of Beit Shmuel. And his claim is that the Rema comes to decide that the correct understanding is “since” and not “just as.” “Since.” If she did not become prohibited to the husband, then she did not become prohibited to the adulterer. And if she did become prohibited to the husband, then she becomes prohibited to the adulterer. And it makes no difference whether the adulterer is a priest or an Israelite. And the Chelkat Mechokek is uncertain about this; the Chelkat Mechokek disagrees with him, meaning that the Chelkat Mechokek really raises the possibility—meaning that the Chelkat Mechokek really raises the possibility—that the prohibition to the adulterer is not a result of the prohibition to the husband, but rather it is “just as,” not “since.” These are basically the two formulations in the Shulchan Arukh—that’s the Chelkat Mechokek and Beit Shmuel.
[Speaker I] But what you’re saying is, he says we’re talking here about two completely separate things.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, right, there’s no causal connection here. So the Chelkat Mechokek learns this from our Talmudic passage. In our Talmudic passage regarding Uriyah, after all, it says in the first answer that if she did not become prohibited to the husband because it was by force, then she also did not become prohibited to the adulterer, namely King David, right? So from here the Chelkat Mechokek learns—what do we see? That the prohibition to the adulterer is not because it is considered as if his wife committed adultery—he too is a husband and his wife committed adultery—but rather it is a result of the prohibition to the husband, and therefore if there was no prohibition to the husband there is also no prohibition to the adulterer. From that he learns to the opposite case. What happens when I raped the wife of a priest and I myself am an Israelite? Here too there was room to discuss it, because here she became prohibited to the priest. So if the prohibition to the adulterer is a punishment for your having prohibited her to the husband, then you have to prohibit her here. But if the prohibition is an independent prohibition—I am an Israelite; an Israelite whose wife was raped is not prohibited from her. Okay? So he says that since in the first answer in Ketubot we learn that it is “since” and not “just as,” then in the opposite practical implication as well, in the case of an Israelite’s wife who was raped, the same thing we will say in the case of a priest’s wife who was raped. In the case of a priest’s wife who was raped, if she is prohibited to the priest then she is also prohibited to the adulterer even though the adulterer is an Israelite. Okay? Now if I say that this is a dispute between the answers in the Gemara in Ketubot, then it is definitely possible that this dispute between Beit Shmuel and Chelkat Mechokek parallels the dispute between the answers in the Gemara in Ketubot. The question is whether I rule like the second answer or like the first answer. If that really is the dispute. Beit Shmuel can always say: what are you talking about? The second answer agrees with the first answer; there is no dispute between them. But the Chelkat Mechokek must—if Beit Shmuel’s proof from the first answer is correct—then he must say no, they disagree, and they disagree on this point, and I rule like the second answer. Certainly if the rule is that we rule like the second answer, then Beit Shmuel must say: I do not rule like the first answer; rather, the second does not—
[Speaker F] Disagree with the first on this, I—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rule like the second.
[Speaker F] And the Chelkat Mechokek—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Says they disagree and I rule like the second. All this assumes the legal premise that if an unmarried priest and an unmarried woman—he raped her—what happens? He is forbidden to marry her. Meaning, do you consider a woman raped by a priest as though she were his wife? No, only if she is a married woman. Only if you raped a married woman did you break up a home, right? Then we will also relate to you as someone whose home was broken up; we’ll break up your home as well.
[Speaker F] If you isolate the claim of “married woman,” you might say here maybe it’s simply because of the priest, since we said that to the priest she is prohibited, whereas to an Israelite apparently, under the laws of coercion and consent—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Are you talking about the side that says it is “just as” or that it is “since”?
[Speaker F] In both directions. In the case where a priest raped the wife of an Israelite, she becomes prohibited to him as a raped woman. Clearly she was raped; she is prohibited to him. But she was raped by him himself. No, no, first of all she was raped from the standpoint of the Israelite.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now the question is what the priest’s law will be—that depends on the understandings we discussed here. It depends on whether it is “just as” or “since.” With respect to the priest, is she considered raped? So I say, if the whole discussion is only if you’re talking about the “just as,” yes, then you can say that just as she is prohibited to him, so she is prohibited to him. But if you say that it is “since,” then basically I say if you—
[Speaker F] Destroyed—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That home, then we will destroy your home. Okay? But that’s all only if you destroyed that home. So I don’t care whether she counts in relation to a priest, because you did not destroy that home. Because an Israelite’s wife was not prohibited to him. Is she not considered raped? I’m with you—she is not considered raped, because if you didn’t destroy a home then the discussion doesn’t even arise. The discussion arises only if you destroyed a home; then we see you as married to her, and then we ask whether your wife committed adultery by force or willingly. Do you understand? But that’s all only if you destroyed a home. And if you didn’t destroy a home—just ordinary intercourse—then why in the world? A priest who has intercourse with a woman did not destroy a home, so we do not impose a penalty whereby we see it as though he too has a home and his home too was destroyed. Okay. And all this is the above approach of Tosafot. And likewise the words of the above Tosafot: if an Israelite had intercourse with her by force, she is permitted to the husband and to the adulterer. And this is learned from the discussion in the first chapter of Ketubot, where it says there: Why was Bathsheba not prohibited to David? Because it was by force. It follows that if it was by force, she is permitted even to the adulterer, even though he had intercourse with her willingly. What about the second answer? You proved it from the discussion in Ketubot, but that is the first answer; what about the second answer? I assume he says that it probably does not disagree with it. Right? Meaning, there is an opinion—many times when we—we often bring proof from an initial assumption, or bring proof from an opinion not ruled as Jewish law. That is always in a case where the conclusion, as against the initial assumption or the competing opinion that was ruled as Jewish law, does not disagree with that initial assumption or with that opinion on this point, and their dispute is about something else. Then I say: I can bring proof for my view even from an opinion not ruled as Jewish law or from an initial assumption. And that happens a lot. Okay? Now of course whoever is troubled by this proof, whoever the conclusion attacks, will always say no, no—that is precisely the point of dispute. True, that was the initial assumption, but that is exactly what the answer did not accept, or what the opinion ruled as Jewish law did not accept.
[Speaker B] After all, this whole discussion is about whether she is permitted or prohibited to side A or side B. What about the penalties fixed by law? What law? What do you mean, penalties fixed by law? A man who committed adultery with a married woman—so what about King David?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well, if there had been witnesses to it they would have killed him—what do you mean?
[Speaker B] I’m saying, maybe the second answer comes to explain why they didn’t kill him.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They didn’t kill him because there were no witnesses. No witnesses. If there had been witnesses, then the whole discussion would not arise. If there had been witnesses to the intercourse, then the whole discussion would not arise. There is no question of prohibited to the husband and to the adulterer—they would kill them. If there are witnesses, I don’t care whether she is prohibited to him—
[Speaker B] Or—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not prohibited to him—he’s in the grave. The whole discussion is about warning and seclusion. With warning and seclusion there are no—no—no witnesses that would allow me to execute the adulterer, nor the woman. Then the question arises whether she is prohibited to the adulterer or not prohibited to the adulterer. If they are executed, then they are executed. I don’t think—
[Speaker E] There are witnesses.
[Speaker B] Maybe the second answer—the second answer comes to explain why David was not punished, or maybe the punishment mentioned in the Gemara is actually intercourse, intercourse. So I said, I—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Don’t think that’s correct, because there are no witnesses to it. If there had been witnesses to it, then the whole discussion would not arise. If there had been witnesses to it, then they would have killed them. Yes, obviously. We have no witnesses—what is this, a doubt? We have no witnesses to the intercourse. They did not see the brush in the tube. Now of course there are witnesses to seclusion, witnesses indicating intercourse, fine—that’s what all the Tosafot there is discussing. And it says there another answer, says Beit Shmuel: and there is another answer there, because Uriyah had written a bill of severance to his wife. According to this, one can say that in a case of force she is prohibited to the adulterer, since he had intercourse with her willingly. What is he saying? No—the answers really do disagree. The second answer does not accept the first answer. According to the second answer, one can say—not that he proves it conclusively, but at least one can say—and you cannot prove from the Gemara otherwise, okay?—that in a case of force she is prohibited to the adulterer, since he had intercourse with her willingly. The adulterer had intercourse with her willingly. The fact that she was raped means she is not prohibited to her husband, but that is not a reason to exempt him himself. Therefore she becomes prohibited to him, according to the second answer. That is exactly what the second answer did not accept from the first answer. Right? Meaning, it could be that the answers disagree precisely on this point. And we must say that Tosafot holds the first answer to be primary. But in the Jerusalem Talmud it says—and Tosafot in Sotah at the beginning of the chapter “Just as” brought it—that it was taught there: if he was unintentional and she intentional, she is prohibited, since she leaves because of him; if he was intentional and she unintentional, she is permitted to her husband, and if he divorced her she is prohibited to this man. It sounds like she is prohibited to the adulterer forever, whether he had intercourse with her unintentionally or intentionally, and even if she is permitted to her husband, nevertheless she is prohibited to him because from his side it was intentional. So he infers from the Jerusalem Talmud and from Tosafot that they really hold that she is prohibited to him even though she is not prohibited to the husband. If he had intercourse with her by force, then to the husband she is not prohibited. But you yourself were not forced to do this; therefore to you she is prohibited. So here we see clearly that the conception is “just as,” not “since.” “Just as she becomes prohibited to the husband, so she becomes prohibited to the adulterer.” Now each one is judged on his own. So I say: the husband was under compulsion—fine—she does not become prohibited. But that has nothing to do with you. If you did it willingly, then to you she does become prohibited. Okay? Therefore it is not nourished by the question of what happens with the husband. And now, “just as” means that the prohibition to the adulterer is essentially a punishment for your having made her prohibited to her husband, not for the transgression itself. It is a consequence of the fact that you made her prohibited to her husband. “Just as” means that because you broke up a home here, we also see you as though you built a home with her, and we punish you in the same way. And now the result may be different. To the husband she may not be prohibited, while to you she may be prohibited. Each case is judged on its own. All this belongs to the “just as” conception. Because “just as” basically says that once you destroyed that home, from our standpoint we also see you as someone who has a home and it was destroyed. But it is not because of this result that that result also occurs. Okay? Yes, and one must say that he holds the last answer in the Talmud to be primary: Uriyah’s wife was permitted to David because he had written a bill of severance. And that is the second answer, which disagrees with the first answer. And the fact that Tosafot goes with the first answer may be because he thinks the two answers do not disagree. And those—meaning the Tosafot in Sotah or the Jerusalem Talmud—who do say that there is no dependence between the husband and the adulterer, then as for the first answer, that certainly exists there. So they will explain that apparently the second answer disagrees with the first precisely on this point, okay? And there is also further distinction on this from what the Tur wrote in section 20: whether one acted by force or willingly, the one under compulsion is exempt and the one acting willingly is liable. So once again he infers from there that the Tur too goes in the direction that each one is judged on his own. The prohibition to the adulterer is not a consequence of the prohibition to the husband. As I said, it could be that the answers do not disagree, and then of course… In practice, the decisors usually permit her to the adulterer if she is permitted to the husband; that is the view of most decisors. That if she is permitted to the husband, then she is also permitted to the adulterer, like the first opinion in our Gemara. And the second answer probably does not disagree with the first answer on this point, or does not disagree with it at all. Two possibilities. Either it does not disagree at all and only says there was a bill of divorce there, so there is no need to reach that point. Or it does not disagree on this point, but on something else. In any case, when we look at the connection between the husband and the adulterer—if I want to summarize it for a moment—I would claim that there are several mechanisms I can raise here, several possibilities for the connection between the prohibition to the husband and the prohibition to the adulterer. One possibility is that the connection between the prohibition to the husband and to the adulterer is causal: she becomes prohibited to the adulterer because he prohibited her to the husband—that is “since,” okay? Then one who raped the wife of an Israelite is not prohibited from her, and an Israelite who had forced intercourse with the daughter of a priest would be prohibited from her, even though he is an Israelite. Those are the conclusions. A second possibility: the connection is one of likeness, comparison. It is not “since” but “just as.” Just as she becomes prohibited to the husband, so she becomes prohibited to the adulterer, perhaps even for the same reason—it doesn’t matter, that one can still deliberate about. Then of course there is no necessary connection between the two sides, and one can say it in several ways. If I say it is “just as” and not “since,” then that means that if I had intercourse by force with the wife of an Israelite, then to me she becomes prohibited, because I did not do it under compulsion but willingly. So to me she becomes prohibited even though to him she does not. What happens if I raped the wife of a priest and I am an Israelite? The opposite case. There I raped the wife of an Israelite; now I’m raping the wife of a priest. If I rape the wife of a priest, then what will the law be with respect to me? Simply put, she is permitted to me, despite the fact that I prohibited her to the priest, since the prohibition to me is not a consequence of the prohibition to the priest; rather each one is judged on his own, and I am an Israelite, and from my standpoint a woman who was raped is permitted. But that is not exact, because the woman was indeed raped, but I did it willingly, not by force. Okay? So there is room for deliberation here. This opens up two possibilities. It is not clear that both implications automatically follow just from saying that this is “just as” and not “since.” There could be another possibility: that she is prohibited to the adulterer only if she became prohibited to the husband. But not because she became prohibited to the husband. Without her becoming prohibited to the husband, she will not be prohibited to the adulterer, but if she did become prohibited to the husband that still does not necessarily mean she will become prohibited to the adulterer. So for example, an Israelite who raped the wife of a priest: to the husband she became prohibited because he is a priest, but it could be that to the Israelite she does not become prohibited. But on the other hand, if I raped the wife of an Israelite, then to the husband she was not prohibited, so there is nothing to discuss—to me she would not become prohibited either, because that is a necessary condition. If she was not prohibited to the husband, there is nothing to discuss. If she was prohibited to the husband, then there is room to discuss it. If I were a priest, say, and I raped the wife of a priest, then to the husband she became prohibited, so if I were a priest she would become prohibited to me as well. If I am an Israelite then she would not become prohibited to me, because they see me as her husband, okay? Therefore there can be all kinds of possibilities here; it depends on a logical question. When I see a connection between two things—prohibition to the husband and prohibition to the adulterer—and this is a general lesson: when I see prohibition to the husband and prohibition to the adulterer, there is what is called Leibniz’s parable of the clocks. Leibniz gives a parable about two clocks running on the wall—he’s talking about body and soul. He says we see some kind of connection, some kind of correlation, between body and soul. He says this can be explained in three ways. Either the body affects the soul, or the soul affects the body, or there is something third that affects both and synchronizes them, okay? The parable for this is two clocks. Two clocks are running and you see perfect coordination between them. Now clock A is not the cause of clock B’s showing the time, right? It’s not that this is the cause and that is the effect. And not the reverse either. So apparently there is a third cause, the clockmaker, who synchronized them both and causes them to match. So whenever I see correlation there are always three possibilities: either A caused B, or B caused A, or something third caused both A and B. Theoretically there could also be a case where the correlation is accidental. Meaning, there really is no cause behind all this; it’s correlation but not causation. Okay? But if the correlation is strong, then apparently there is some factor behind it. It could be that the factor is a third one; neither of them is the cause of the other, nor the other the cause of the first. Those are Leibniz’s three possibilities. There is another possibility that says: although without the one the second would not occur, that does not mean the first is the cause of the second. An example of this: there is a dispute among the tannaim in tractate Pesachim, page 90 I think, about the second Passover offering. We know that one who did not bring the first Passover offering brings the second Passover offering. One who brought the first does not bring the second, right? Meaning, the correlation exists—or anti-correlation exists. Meaning, your not bringing the first Passover offering is a condition for your being able, or being obligated, to bring the second Passover offering, right?
[Speaker F] The Gemara about someone who converts between the first Passover and the second,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the Gemara I’m talking about, that’s the Gemara I’m talking about. There is a dispute among the tannaim about what happens with a minor who comes of age between the two Passovers, or a convert who converted between the two Passovers. So if I say that the second is compensation for the first, then he does not need to bring the second Passover even though he did not bring the first. Why? Because he was not obligated at all, so he doesn’t need to make up anything. But if I say that this is not compensation for the first, then he must bring the second. Now what does it mean that it is not compensation for the first? After all, it is obvious that the one who brings the second is only someone who did not bring the first. No one disputes that, right? The Torah says this: only one who did not bring the first brings the second. So how can one understand that the second is not compensation for the first? The answer is that the fact that there is anti-correlation here—that only one who did not bring the first is obligated to bring the second—does not mean that failure to bring the first is the cause of your being obligated in the second. It could be that bringing the first exempts. Bringing the first exempts; it is not that failure to bring the first obligates, but that bringing the first exempts. We are all obligated in the second Passover offering; everyone is obligated in the second Passover offering. Whoever already brought the first Passover offering is exempt. Now do you understand where the practical difference is? In a minor who came of age between the two Passovers, or a convert who converted between the two Passovers. If I understand that the second is compensation for the first, he was not obligated in the first, so why should he have to make it up in the second? But if I say everyone is obligated in the second, then once, by the time of the second Passover, you are already a proper Jew and an adult, you are obligated in the second Passover. Had you brought the first Passover, you would have been exempt. He did not bring the first Passover. Because he did not bring the first Passover, he was not exempted.
[Speaker H] The Gemara says that only in a case of impurity he has to bring the second Passover, and in other things…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not talking about impurity; never mind, what difference does that make right now. Let’s say the Gemara doesn’t—the Torah says impurity and a distant journey; the Gemara extends this to any compulsion. Anyone who did not bring the first Passover—even if he did not bring it intentionally—is deferred to the second Passover. That is an extension of the Oral Torah. So what do we see there? This is just a logical lesson that is important to keep in mind, for life too, not only for the Gemara. A lot of times, when we see correlations, we have a tendency immediately to draw causal conclusions. But no, not necessarily, not necessarily. Yes, the example I always bring in this context is a letter from some professor at the Technion that he once wrote to the newspaper—I saw it—in which he says that it is very worthwhile for the State of Israel to increase its investment in academia, in academic research. Why? In higher education. Why? Because we see in the world that countries that invest heavily in research, in the academic world, in higher education, have a high GDP. It improves the economy. Now of course one can give the opposite interpretation: countries that have a high GDP can afford to invest in higher education. That does not mean that investment in higher education brings about high GDP. It could be that high GDP is the cause, and investment in higher education is the dependent variable, not the independent variable. No, fine, you’re talking to me about Abu Dhabi or those who have oil, okay. In any case, I’m saying the problem is that you’re drawing causal conclusions from correlation. Now it could be because the correlation runs in the opposite direction—not from education to GDP but from GDP to education. It could be that the cause is altogether some third cause that brings about both of these things. Right? For example, if we see a correlation between smoking and cancer mortality, say. Does that mean smoking is unhealthy? Not necessarily at all. It could be, say, that I checked two groups: one group of smokers… not necessarily. It could be that people who are sick with cancer have a tendency to smoke more cigarettes. It gives them some greater desire to smoke cigarettes, and therefore in the group of cigarette smokers there is more cancer mortality. But the cigarettes are the independent variable, not the cancer mortality.
[Speaker E] From the end to the beginning? Huh? From the end to the beginning.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Right? So it could be that there is some third thing that causes both the cancer and the desire to smoke cigarettes. It’s not that the cancer causes cigarette smoking, but rather there is some third thing that causes cancer and also happens to be responsible for the desire to smoke cigarettes. That can also happen, right? And now in the Gemara in Pesachim I bring a fourth possibility—third, fourth, I don’t remember anymore, I’m not counting. The fourth possibility says that many times the correlation is a negative correlation and not a positive one. Meaning, it’s not that A is the cause of B, but that the absence of A means that B will also not occur. Right? For example, that is the difference between “it began in negligence and ended in unavoidable circumstances” and causation, as opposed to total negligence. I buried coins—that’s an important lesson, so I’m expanding on it a bit. I buried coins in the ground. Okay? And I’m a guardian. I received coins as a deposit and I buried them in the ground in the forest, in a thicket in tractate Bava Metzia on page 42. Okay? Now this is good guarding against thieves. No thief goes searching in the forest for coins. But against fire it’s problematic—maybe a fire will break out and burn the coins. Okay? So I buried them there, and what happened? They got burned. No, suddenly—this is an important lesson. Thieves came and stole them. If they burned, then they were exposed to fire.
[Speaker D] No, thieves came and stole them.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now, with respect to theft, I guarded it properly; everything is fine. I was negligent, but I was negligent with respect to fire, not with respect to theft. So I’m arguing: what’s the difference between… So in the case of negligence at the outset and an unavoidable accident at the end, the Jewish law is that he is liable. Why? Because if you hadn’t hidden it in the forest, thieves wouldn’t have stolen it. But hiding it in the forest is not negligence vis-à-vis thieves; it’s negligence vis-à-vis fire. Against thieves, that’s good guarding. So why should I care that if you hadn’t hidden it in the forest, it wouldn’t have been stolen? You violated the agreement. No, not because of that. Rather, the point is… the question is why that counts as violating the agreement. And the answer is that the formulation has to be negative. It’s not that because you hid it in the forest, therefore it was stolen. That’s not true. Causation at the legal level here is not causation. That’s not correct. Because hiding it in the forest is good guarding against thieves. So you can’t say that hiding it in the forest was negligence with respect to the theft. Rather, what can I say? I can say that if you hadn’t hidden it in the forest, the thieves would not have come. The relationship is negative, not positive. Now, since hiding it in the forest was negligence with respect to fire, one can come to me with claims: why did you hide it there? And now what? Now one can say, “Look, if you hadn’t hidden it, the thieves wouldn’t have come.” Because if they can come to me with claims for why I hid it, then could they have just sued me, even without any connection to thieves—why did you hide it? Pay me. Right? No. If there is no connection, say, between the negligence and the unavoidable accident—the money just deteriorated, fine? just deteriorated on its own—could they sue me for why I hid it, since that’s negligence against fire? No. When there is no connection between the negligence and the unavoidable accident, you can’t sue over the accident. So what is this connection? Is there a connection or not? There is a connection, but it is negative. If you hadn’t hidden it, then the thieves wouldn’t have stolen it. The positive connection would be if in the end there had been a fire. What’s the difference? If in the end there had been a fire, then I have no argument that you’re liable. Here, why in negligence at the outset and unavoidable accident at the end is he exempt? Why? Because there the connection is positive: because of the hiding in the forest, it burned. But when thieves came, the connection is negative. The connection is only that if you hadn’t hidden it there, it would not have been stolen.
[Speaker B] And on that—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is a dispute whether in negligence at the outset and unavoidable accident at the end one is liable or exempt.
[Speaker B] But where would you have kept it—in something inferior to the pit?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—something better, which helps both against fire and against theft: in my house, in a safe place. Okay? So I’m saying this is exactly like Second Passover. With Second Passover, I don’t say that failure to bring the first Passover offering is the cause obligating me in the second one. I say that if I brought the first Passover offering, then I’m exempt. Meaning, I’m basically obligated in Second Passover in any case; it’s only that if I brought the first Passover offering, then I’m exempt. Right? That’s really the point—it’s a negative connection, not a positive one. So here too I’m saying: it could be that the fact that she was not forbidden to her husband exempts me from the prohibition for the adulterer. That does not mean that the prohibition for the adulterer is the reason that she becomes forbidden to the adulterer. Only if I was not forbidden to the husband, then the whole discussion doesn’t arise, and I am already exempt from the prohibition of the adulterer. And the practical difference will be exactly what we said earlier—it will distinguish between the two cases. Why? Because if I raped the wife of an Israelite, right? If I raped the wife of an Israelite, then if the prohibition to the husband is the reason for the prohibition to the adulterer, then here there is no such reason, because she was not forbidden to the husband, and so she is also not forbidden to the adulterer. But if… so here it goes like this: if the prohibition to the husband is the reason for the prohibition to the adulterer, then I would be liable, because she was forbidden to the husband. But if the prohibition to the husband is not the reason, rather the absence of prohibition to the husband is what would exempt me, then there is no absence of prohibition to the husband—she is forbidden to the husband, because he is a priest. So then there is no exemption here. Now discuss, if you want to obligate me, because let’s say I’m also considered like her husband and I’m an Israelite and so on, then I really would be liable, because I don’t have the exemption that she was not forbidden to the husband. So for example, in the case of raping a priest’s wife, there will be a distinction between these two assumptions—whether it is a positive condition or a negative condition. If you raped the wife of an Israelite, according to both assumptions there would be no prohibition on you. Meaning, that would distinguish between the two possibilities. If I say that there is a condition that links the prohibition to the husband with the prohibition to the adulterer, then there is no difference. In both practical cases the same result comes out. You always compare the husband and the adulterer; it’s the same status. If you say that it is a negative condition, not a positive one, then one implication will remain but the other implication will not. Right? Exactly.
[Speaker F] A necessary condition, but not a sufficient one.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, a necessary condition but not a sufficient one, exactly. Meaning, the prohibition to the husband is a necessary condition; without it you cannot impose liability, but it is not a sufficient condition. Meaning, it could be that she is forbidden to the husband, but still she would not be forbidden to the adulterer, okay? Now, one can connect these two conceptions to the exposition. To the exposition. Where do we know that she is forbidden to the husband and to the adulterer? You remember, in our Talmudic passage there is a dispute among the Tannaim in tractate Sotah—not in Ketubot, yes? There is a dispute among the Tannaim about where we derive the prohibition to the husband and to the adulterer from. What? One possibility is that it says, “she was defiled, she was defiled.” The second possibility is “she was defiled and she was defiled.” Right? With the vav, “and.” What’s the difference? If you say there are two instances of “she was defiled,” one for the husband and one for the adulterer, okay? Then there are two prohibitions—just as to the husband, so too to the adulterer. There are simply two sources, two prohibitions, and that’s it. There is no necessary connection between them. More than that, one could say that “she was defiled, she was defiled” basically means that the adulterer is treated as some kind of new marital counterpart, and then really each matter is judged on its own. It’s as though you are her husband and that other man is also her husband, and I will judge each of you independently. This comes from the first “she was defiled,” and that comes from the second “she was defiled,” because in fact the term “she was defiled” is also used regarding the adulterer. When she is defiled only to her husband, she is not defiled forever, okay? So we understand that the Torah relates to the adulterer as a kind of husband. As a penalty, doesn’t matter, but we see that she is also viewed as some kind of husband. And then the conception of “just as.” I read “she was defiled, she was defiled”—that is the conception of “just as.” When I say “she was defiled and she was defiled,” then what am I saying? Added onto the first, right? I’m saying: just as she was defiled to that one, since she was defiled to the husband, and—there is also the implication that she is defiled to the adulterer. So there is a connection between the defilement to the husband and the defilement to the adulterer. Now one can discuss: a positive connection, a negative connection. Of course, this doesn’t force any one of the conceptions I mentioned, but it does show that there are two directions. One direction is “since,” and the other direction is “just as.” Okay? So this will basically depend on the question of how I interpret the verse. Now in this context, there is here in the Chatam Sofer—yes? Look at this now. The Chatam Sofer, in a responsum, brought by Pitchei Teshuvah there in section 11 that I mentioned earlier: “Also in the responsum of Chatam Sofer, section 26, he wrote that what the Beit Shmuel and the other later authorities (Acharonim) bring as proof from Tosafot in Bameh Behemah—from there nothing is proven. Rather, it seems that this depends on the dispute at the beginning of the chapter ‘Just As.’” “Just As” is our chapter in Sotah, yes? “For according to Rabbi Akiva, who says there that the prohibition to the adulterer is derived from the extra ‘and’ in ‘and she was defiled,’ if so, the prohibition to the adulterer was not included where there is no defilement to the husband.” Right? You’re saying that the vav basically means: in addition to the prohibition to the husband, know that the same prohibition also extends to the adulterer. I include the prohibition to the adulterer on the basis of the prohibition to the husband, so here you have the conception of “since.” Fine? So the husband’s prohibition is basically the cause, and it drags along with it the prohibition to the adulterer. “And this is like the first answer in the first chapter of Ketubot, for there it was a case of rape.” Meaning, he links the two derivations—the dispute among the Tannaim in Sotah—to the dispute between the two formulations in the Talmud in Ketubot. In the Talmud in Ketubot, in the first answer, they tie the prohibition to the adulterer to the prohibition to the husband. He says, why? Because they learned it from “and she was defiled and she was defiled”—from the vav, sorry, from the vav. And therefore where there is a prohibition to the husband, there is a prohibition to the adulterer; where there is no prohibition to the husband, there is no prohibition to the adulterer. The second answer, which disagrees with this—or at least that is how the Chatam Sofer understood it, that the second answer disagrees with this—then apparently understands it like “she was defiled, she was defiled,” not like the vav. Then each one is its own prohibition. “But Rabbi holds that two verses are written, ‘and she was defiled’—one for the husband and one for the adulterer—thus they are not dependent on one another, and even if she was not defiled to the husband, nevertheless she was defiled to the adulterer.” And according to this, it is simple—now there is a halakhic conclusion—“that in practice the Jewish law follows Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Zechariah ben HaKatzav against Rabbi. And if so, wherever she is not forbidden to her husband, she is not forbidden to the adulterer by strict law. If not for a penalty,” as Maimonides wrote—there is a rabbinic law that perhaps nevertheless she would be forbidden—but by strict law there is dependence between the prohibition to the husband and the prohibition to the adulterer. And by the way, this also releases us a bit with regard to the rules in the Talmud in Ketubot, because it comes out like the first answer in the Talmud in Ketubot, that there is dependence between the prohibition to the adulterer and the prohibition to the husband. Now, usually we say the second answer, right? Why? But since there is a dispute among the Tannaim—and in a dispute among the Tannaim the Jewish law follows Rabbi Akiva against his colleague—so we have a ruling that does not depend on the structure of the Talmud there; rather, we rule like Rabbi Akiva. So therefore it could be that this explains why one can go like the first answer even if the second answer disagrees with it. You don’t need to explain that the second answer does not disagree, but rather… okay? So that is the Chatam Sofer; he basically makes the two passages depend on each other.
And Tosafot in Yevamot—Tosafot in Yevamot writes as follows: “But Ri found it difficult: since impurity is not written concerning the wife of an Israelite who had relations under coercion, as it is written, ‘and she was not seized’—from which we infer: if she was seized, she is permitted.” Seized means coerced; from here we learn that if she was coerced, then she is not forbidden. “If so, why is she disqualified from marrying a priest? For the general prohibition of impurity includes husband and adulterer and terumah and also priesthood, and if she is permitted to her husband, she should also be permitted with respect to priesthood.” Why is the wife of an Israelite who was raped forbidden to a priest? Let’s say her husband died; now she is a widow, but she was raped while married to him, so she becomes forbidden to a priest. Even though she is not forbidden to her husband, she is forbidden to a priest. Okay? Tosafot asks: she becomes forbidden to a priest. So he says, why? After all, we learn everything from that same verse. And if the verse says “she was not seized,” from which we learn that she is not forbidden to her husband, then from that same verse we also learn the prohibition to a priest. So then with respect to a priest too, you should say that only if she was not seized is she forbidden to him, but if she was seized—if it was under coercion—then she is not forbidden to a priest. How do you make this split between two things learned from the same verse? So he says: “And Ri said that that verse, ‘she was not seized,’ speaks only about the impurity with respect to the husband alone, for the first ‘she was defiled’ we establish as referring to the husband, and with regard to the husband, coercion in the case of an Israelite is permitted. But from the second ‘and she was defiled,’ from which we derive the prohibition regarding terumah and priesthood, since we find in the case of a priest’s wife that even under coercion she is forbidden, we have no basis to distinguish between coercion and willing consent with respect to terumah and priesthood, even in the case of the wife of an Israelite.” Right? In the case of a priest’s wife, there is no difference between coercion and consent, so also in the case of the wife of an Israelite, with respect to the question that concerns priesthood, we do not distinguish between coercion and consent. Fine? So what this means is: on the one hand he says these are two… from the first “she was defiled” we learn the wife of an Israelite, and from the second “she was defiled” we learn the prohibitions regarding terumah and priesthood and so on. Okay? And if she was raped while married to her husband and he is an Israelite, then why is she forbidden to a priest? I didn’t understand. You said the wife of an Israelite was raped, and she is permitted to her husband, right? Then you said afterward that she becomes forbidden to a priest? If her husband dies, she will not be able to marry a priest. Yes. He asks why. So he says—notice—he does not say what the Chatam Sofer said, that the first “she was defiled” is the prohibition to the husband and the second “she was defiled” is the prohibition to the adulterer. No. He says the first “she was defiled” is the prohibition to the husband and the adulterer. But from the second “she was defiled” we learn various laws connected to priests. Okay? And if we learn various laws there—for example, a priest’s wife, where even if she was raped she is forbidden to him—then from reasoning we learn that apparently with respect to a priest it makes no difference whether she was defiled under coercion or willingly. Willingly. So also in the first “she was defiled,” from which comes the prohibition to the husband and the adulterer, we make a distinction. With respect to the prohibition to a priest, it makes no difference whether she was coerced or had relations willingly. That is what he says later; he says: “But with regard to the adulterer, although ‘she was not seized’ is not written about him, one should distinguish between coercion and consent in the case of the wife of an Israelite, for it stands to reason that she is not forbidden to the adulterer unless she is forbidden to the husband.” And he says that although this is not really a distinction you can make by force of the verses, it is a distinction that emerges from reasoning. With respect to priesthood, coercion or consent makes no difference. That distinction emerges from reasoning. So he does not make the Chatam Sofer’s distinction between the two instances of “and she was defiled.” Ultimately, when he decides that if she is not forbidden to the husband, she is not forbidden to the adulterer, he does not say it is because there are two verses and not two verses but rather an extra vav—no, no, these are two verses. He learns it from the two verses, not from the extra vav. But still there is a connection between the prohibition to the husband and the prohibition to the adulterer by way of reasoning. This of course raises the question: so what is the reasoning here? Where is the reasoning? If you learn it from the verse, I understand, but where does this reasoning come from? Apparently the reasoning is one of the things we said earlier: maybe he understands that the prohibition to the adulterer is a punishment for the prohibition to the husband; that’s how he sees it. Because you broke up their home, therefore we also will not let you build your home with her. If that is the reasoning, then obviously that applies only if you broke up his home. And then you really do have to get into reasoning here. Earlier I said this after saying that it is “just as,” “she was defiled, she was defiled.” Now I ask myself what the idea behind this really is, and the idea behind it is that they also see you as a kind of husband or something like that. But that is an idea behind a derivation when the derivation comes from the verses. But here Tosafot says it doesn’t come from the verses at all. On the contrary, from the verses it comes out the opposite. The reasoning here is so strong in Tosafot’s eyes that it even goes against what emerges from the plain meaning of the verse. And he does say that just as she is forbidden to the husband, so too she is forbidden to the adulterer, and therefore she will not be forbidden if there is no prohibition to the husband—even though to a priest she will be forbidden. To the priest she will indeed be forbidden—that is the biblical passage—but the prohibition to the adulterer will not be here, because by reasoning it is clear that this goes only together with the prohibition to the husband. So what I said earlier as a possible explanation for things that emerge from the verses—in Tosafot’s view, it is probably one of those things, it is probably pure reasoning. Meaning, a compelling reasoning even against what emerges from the straightforward reading of the biblical verses. There is another discussion—maybe we’ll get to it—about a second adulterer.
[Speaker F] Also in the responsa of Rabbi Aryeh—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They made—
[Speaker F] —a distinction between this question, between prohibitions on the one hand and impurity and purity on the other, as two categories. Why in the case of a priest is she forbidden to him even through coercion—perhaps because this is a higher level of holiness—and what is the essence of coercion? Is that some kind of explanation for why this is so?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why this is connected to the fact that we tie it to impurity and not to prohibition, and therefore with a priest there is more—
[Speaker F] Because of surplus holiness, and coercion perhaps being something of a different essence.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Interesting comment; I hadn’t thought of that. Could be.
[Speaker F] At least when the husband is a priest.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, it does sound interesting. It might actually support this conception of impurity a bit. Okay. Just to define what coercion is—
[Speaker F] Why is she not forbidden to the husband in a case of coercion? We need to distinguish why, for an Israelite, there is a difference between coercion and consent.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And maybe we said that if it is under coercion, then she is not acting treacherously against her husband, so she has not harmed the marital bond, which is holy, and consequently impurity is not created. Fine? But then you’re saying: if impurity is not created, if impurity is not created, then why in the case of a priest is it created? So apparently impurity is created, but an Israelite is not sensitive to impurity, whereas a priest is more sensitive to impurity from a halakhic standpoint. More sensitive to impurity, and therefore with respect to him this impurity is enough to forbid her to him. Something like that, but it needs thought. I hadn’t thought about the connection to impurity here.
Some later authorities (Acharonim) start discussing, kind of out of the blue, another question that once came up to me in practice. Someone once asked me this in practice—an actual case happened to me. A woman had relations willingly, the wife of an Israelite had relations willingly, and… she became forbidden to her husband, she became forbidden to her husband, sorry—and now another adulterer came and had relations with her. Or she is in rebellion. Is she forbidden to the second adulterer? Forbidden to the second adulterer. To the first adulterer she became forbidden, just as to the husband and to the adulterer, yes? Now the second intercourse did not forbid her to her first husband, right? Because he was already forbidden; she was already forbidden beforehand. So the question is whether she becomes forbidden to the adulterer. So they argue no. In intercourse—the Maharsha holds in Torat Emet—he says that if this act of intercourse does not affect the husband, does not forbid her to the husband, then it also does not forbid her to the adulterer. This is a very strong implication of the “since” conception, right? Meaning, this is basically a penalty for what you caused, not for the transgression itself. The transgression itself—you fully violated the prohibition of a married woman—but this is a penalty for the consequences of what you brought about here, what you did here. You destroyed a home. What practical difference does it make? Did you destroy a home? The home was already destroyed; I didn’t destroy anything. So what do you want from me? Right? I think there is a very clear conception here of this penalty, or of this “since.” Since you destroyed their home, we destroy your home as well.
[Speaker F] When we say “forbidden to the husband and to the adulterer,” does that mean the husband has to give a bill of divorce, or does it happen automatically?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce.
[Speaker F] To give her. In a case where there wasn’t—yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s what he argues. The Shevut Yaakov brings proof from a passage in tractate Sanhedrin, which on the face of it is an excellent proof. In the Talmud in Sanhedrin it says that witnesses concerning a betrothed young woman—it doesn’t matter, I won’t get into the proof now—but he argues that no, meaning that she is forbidden even to the second adulterer. What does he hold? Clearly this is not because of the result that you destroyed the home there, right? But it could still be that this is not simply “just as” in the plain sense; rather it is “since.” But this “since” is not because you destroyed the home there; rather, “since” because you did an act that could have destroyed the home there, an act like that also destroys your home. More than that: your act also destroyed the home there, except that the home was already destroyed. But you did destroy it. Meaning, let’s put it this way: when this woman now remains with her husband, she violates two prohibitions—she is forbidden to him both because of the first adulterer and because of the second adulterer. There are two grounds of prohibition. There is no practical difference because she was forbidden anyway, but on the conceptual level you did in fact forbid her to her husband; you did forbid her, it’s just that it has no practical consequence because she was already forbidden. It is like, say, if I am a priest who is already impure, and now I touch a corpse. What about that? Did I violate a prohibition? So there is the Raavad and others who discuss this. Why today is it forbidden for priests to enter a cemetery? After all, we are all impure from corpse impurity, right? So why is it forbidden for them to enter a cemetery? They are already impure anyway. Because there is a prohibition against becoming impure, not a prohibition against being impure. Now that is one novelty, but it is not enough. You also have to say that this is called an act of becoming impure even though in the end it does not create a state of impurity. It is considered that you violated the prohibition of becoming impure. And therefore it is forbidden for you to do it, because you really did become impure, and maybe it even created impurity—only it has no consequence because you were already impure. But now you are basically impure twice. It has no consequence, but then it could be that this is truly the “since” conception. Since you destroyed his home, they destroy your home as well. True, the home was already destroyed—so what? Meaning, the penalty conception is actually harder here, because as a penalty you didn’t do anything, from the standpoint of result you didn’t do anything. This is not interpersonal damage; you didn’t destroy his home, the home was already destroyed anyway. But if you understand it not as a penalty but as essence—if you performed an act that destroys homes, then we will destroy your home as well—we look at the act, not the result. And if so, then maybe the Shevut Yaakov holds that way, and not simply “just as.” There is also a dimension of “since” here, not only “just as.” But it is a “since” that comes not from the result but from the act. Okay? So that is the… there are various rejections of how they reject that proof from Sanhedrin and things like that.
Just one more comment—I really need to finish—one more comment, and after that I’ll send you the summary. I don’t want to continue further with this passage, so I’ll send you the summary and you’ll be able to see some more points there. There is one discussion about the question of what happens if the husband does not know. Yes? He has no witnesses, he does not know; maybe he suspects, and in any case he suspects her, but he doesn’t know. Does that create a prohibition? Say, the adulterer does know. The adulterer knows—he had relations with her, he knows that he had relations with her. The husband doesn’t know. Is she forbidden to him? Nobody complains. Is she forbidden to the adulterer? He has repented and now wants to be righteous. Is she permitted to him or forbidden to him? He knows that he had relations with her. So there is a discussion among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and the later authorities (Acharonim)—you’ll see it here in the passage and in my summary.
And a final comment. Someone once asked me this on the website, and they brought—I think—something that Rabbi Moshe Feinstein raises as a possibility and rejects, but I think afterward I saw some discussion somewhere. What happens if… of course this does not help with respect to the prohibition. It does not help with respect to the prohibition. But the question is whether this thing could prevent her from becoming forbidden to the adulterer. By the way, this has practical relevance today for many things. There are those with open marriages. Yes, they allow, permit between spouses, yes, all kinds of things like that. The question is whether in such a situation the woman becomes forbidden to the husband and to the adulterer. And in such a situation there was a claim that says that in the end, if you are talking about the interpersonal aspect of the act—the sense that you harmed the husband—he agrees, so there is no problem here. This does not touch the prohibition at all; the prohibition remains fully in force. But I think this is a very extreme presentation of the conception that says I go after the result, after the harm to the husband, the interpersonal aspect.
[Speaker H] Yes, it’s a certain shade—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —a certain version of going after the result. You destroyed a home. You destroyed a home, so we’ll destroy your home. Why? Because you harmed the husband. The destruction of the home is simply interpersonal damage. If so, fine—if he agreed, then there is no problem at all. But if you say no—you destroyed a home, and the Holy One, blessed be He, demands this of you, not the interpersonal aspect. You destroyed a home, so we’ll destroy your home. But that will depend on this. One can bring a bit of proof for this from the Maharik that I mentioned earlier. The Maharik says that if she knew that this was not her husband—even though she acted inadvertently, she knew that it was not her husband, okay? She acted inadvertently with respect to the prohibition—she would still become forbidden to her husband. Why? Because the fact that she becomes forbidden to her husband is due to the harm she caused him. Fine? So here clearly she harmed him; it doesn’t matter that she did not intentionally violate a prohibition, she thought she was not violating a prohibition, but she harmed him. The moment she harmed him, she becomes forbidden. So if you continue this a bit further—it is not necessary, but if you take the Maharik and continue him a bit further—you can also arrive at such a conception. Some mention the article by Rabbi Daichovsky; he once wrote in Techumin about Ezra Sheinberg from Safed. Yes, that one who seduced various women and explained to them that they were bringing the Messiah, or I don’t know exactly what, and committed adultery with them. And the question was whether they became forbidden to their husbands. So he argued no—Rabbi Daichovsky—and he said more than that: even according to Maharik, they did not become forbidden to their husbands. Because there you can say they were inadvertent. Women who act inadvertently are not forbidden to an Israelite. To a priest-husband, yes, but to an Israelite husband, if they acted inadvertently they are not forbidden; they thought it was permitted. But according to Maharik, it is not enough to think it is permitted; after all, they knew that Ezra Sheinberg was not their husband. According to Maharik, even if they act inadvertently regarding the prohibition, they would still be forbidden. So Rabbi Daichovsky argues no—even according to Maharik, they did not become forbidden here. Now, this is a bit hard to accept, but it could be that really, in their own view, they were not actually harming the husband. They were doing something that would bring redemption to the Jewish people and to the husband, in their view. They were mistaken about that. So they themselves also did not intend to harm the husband. Maharik is speaking about a situation in which they commit adultery—they want to harm the husband, they just do not know it is forbidden. They know that this is not their husband and they have a romantic relationship with him. So they certainly want to harm the husband. Here they do not want to harm the husband. If the husband knew, he would surely bless them for it, because after all they are bringing the Messiah, in their view, yes? So consequently they are considered inadvertent, and they are not forbidden to the husband, at least if he is an Israelite. If he is a priest, that is much harder. If he is an Israelite, it is far from straightforward, but if he is a priest then certainly. Fine, I think with such fools it could be that the betrothal does not even take effect, so there is nothing to discuss anyway.
[Speaker K] A spirit of folly.