Tractate Sotah, Chapter 5, Lesson 6 — Rabbi Michael Abraham
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- Introduction and the connection to tractate Sotah
- Whether “doubt treated stringently” is halakhic certainty
- The rule of Torah-level doubt treated stringently and rabbinic-level doubt treated leniently, and the dispute over its force
- Maimonides in the laws of corpse impurity and the claim that there is an incorrect text in brackets
- The suspended guilt-offering and the claim that a guilt-offering does not depend on a transgression
- Doubt concerning impurity in the public domain and the private domain in Maimonides
- Sha’arei Yosher on Maimonides and the proposal of “Scripture handed it over to the sages”
- Two conceptions of the rule that Torah-level doubt is treated stringently: a prohibition on “entering a zone of doubt” versus expansion of the prohibition
- Sha’arei Yosher on the Rashba and Maimonides regarding an additional prohibition in a case of doubt
- Doubtful mamzer status and the relation to Maimonides’ view
- Shev Shema’tata, Pri Chadash, and the discussion whether doubtful impurity is a proof or a difficulty
- The Maharit on doubtful mamzer status, contradictory double standards, and the question of two verses
- Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman, doubts in which the Torah is lenient, and the Ran on orlah outside the Land of Israel
- Returning to the doubt of Sotah and Rabbi Chaim’s inquiry into “doubt as certainty”
- Clarifying the meaning of the inquiry: practical halakhic guidance and not determination of reality
Summary
General Overview
The text presents a lecture that moves from the laws of a Sotah after warning and seclusion to a broader framework of the laws of doubts in Jewish law, centered on the question whether “treating a doubt stringently” means only stringent conduct or the creation of a status of halakhic certainty. The lecture lays out fundamental disputes among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and later authorities (Acharonim) over the force of the rule that a Torah-level doubt is treated stringently, over the status of doubtful impurity in the private domain and the public domain, and over the relationship between Sotah and doubts of impurity, through readings of Maimonides, Sha’arei Yosher, Shev Shema’tata, and hints to the views of the Rashba, the Ran, the Chatam Sofer, and the Rabbi of Brisk. The speaker argues that an incorrect wording entered Maimonides in brackets, proposes a conceptual solution to the difficulty of the suspended guilt-offering, and concludes by setting up Rabbi Chaim’s inquiry into the meaning of the novelty of Sotah and doubtful impurity, while emphasizing that the discussion concerns halakhic directives and not determination of reality.
Introduction and the connection to tractate Sotah
The speaker moves from discussing the prohibition upon the husband and the adulterer to a focused treatment of doubtful Sotah and doubts in general, within the framework of the Mishnah with occasional glances at the Talmud. The speaker presents the case in which a Sotah secluded herself after warning and suspicion of adultery arises, and states that the rule is that we treat it stringently even though there is no testimony to adultery. The speaker defines this as the source from which we learn the principle that doubtful impurity in the private domain is treated stringently.
Whether “doubt treated stringently” is halakhic certainty
The speaker asks whether, in the case of doubtful Sotah or doubtful impurity in the private domain, the stringency turns the situation into certainty, or whether the situation remains a doubt and we merely behave stringently. The speaker suggests practical ramifications, such as whether the husband would receive lashes if he had relations with her, and ties this to the question whether the prohibition is understood as a prohibition on definite adultery or as conduct in a case of doubt without lashes. The speaker states that later there will be a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) whether the novelty in Sotah is an obligation of stringency in a doubt or the creation of a relation of certainty.
The rule of Torah-level doubt treated stringently and rabbinic-level doubt treated leniently, and the dispute over its force
The speaker presents the rule that a Torah-level doubt is treated stringently and a rabbinic-level doubt leniently, and lays out a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) whether the obligation to be stringent in a Torah-level doubt is itself of Torah origin or rabbinic. The speaker attributes to Maimonides the well-known view that the obligation to be stringent is from the words of the sages, and presents this as a necessary introduction for understanding doubtful Sotah and doubtful impurity.
Maimonides in the laws of corpse impurity and the claim that there is an incorrect text in brackets
The speaker reads Maimonides in the laws of corpse impurity, chapter 9, law 12, where he rules that no one is impure by Torah law except one who became definitely impure, and that all doubts, whether in impurities, forbidden foods, forbidden sexual relations, or Sabbath matters, are only from the words of the sages. The speaker attacks the reservation appearing in brackets: “Even so, something for whose deliberate violation one is liable to karet, its doubtful case is forbidden by Torah law, since one who does it is liable for a suspended guilt-offering,” and says that it “has no basis” and that “Maimonides definitely did not write this.” The speaker explains that there is an internal contradiction, because Maimonides himself already included “forbidden sexual relations and Sabbaths” within the list of doubts that are only from the words of the sages.
The suspended guilt-offering and the claim that a guilt-offering does not depend on a transgression
The speaker explains that the addition in brackets was meant to solve the difficulty of how one brings a suspended guilt-offering if doubtful cases are permitted by Torah law, but argues that the difficulty is based on a mistaken assumption. The speaker states that a guilt-offering “does not require a sin at all in order to be brought” and that it is “brought because of the act itself, apart from the dimension of transgression in it,” and therefore there is no contradiction in saying that by Torah law one may be lenient in a doubtful case and yet still bring a guilt-offering. The speaker notes that he has spoken about the concept of guilt-offering and misuse of consecrated property, and about the students of Rabbenu Yonah concerning blessings, and parallels this with a remark about the opening of the laws of marriage in Maimonides.
Doubt concerning impurity in the public domain and the private domain in Maimonides
The speaker quotes Maimonides in chapter 16 of the laws of the other primary categories of impurity, who explains the purity of doubtful impurity in the public domain on the grounds that “the community offers the Passover sacrifice in impurity” and on the assumption that “its prohibition, like all doubtful cases, is from their words,” and immediately afterward asks, “Why were they stringent regarding doubt in the private domain,” tying it to a Sotah who secluded herself. The speaker points to a tension in Maimonides between presenting the laws of impurity as part of the regular rules of doubt and presenting the private domain as learned from Sotah, and suggests the possibility that Maimonides identifies doubtful impurity in the public domain with the general rule that a Torah-level doubt is treated leniently, while in the private domain there is a novelty learned from Sotah. The speaker cites the Rabbi of Brisk as arguing that according to Maimonides, doubtful impurity in the public domain is “just an ordinary case of a Torah-level doubt treated leniently,” and cites in the name of the Chatam Sofer a claim that according to views that a Torah-level doubt is treated stringently by Torah law, it would follow that doubtful impurity in the public domain should also be treated stringently, which the speaker describes as “very, very strange.”
Sha’arei Yosher on Maimonides and the proposal of “Scripture handed it over to the sages”
The speaker reads gate 1, chapter 3 in Sha’arei Yosher, which brings Maimonides’ wording and emphasizes that it implies that doubtful impurity even in the private domain is pure by Torah law, and asks: “Could it be that Maimonides holds that even in the private domain a doubtful case is pure by Torah law?” The speaker presents Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s proposal, introduced with “Were I not afraid,” that Maimonides means that the Torah “did not spell out” the laws of doubts and “left it to the sages to act according to what is needed,” that the sages were lenient in the public domain and stringent in the private domain “more than with all other doubtful cases,” and that “here they treated it as certainty” because of Sotah. The speaker notes an ambiguity whether the result under “Scripture handed it over to the sages” is rabbinic or Torah law, and then explains that the model resembles the Beit Yosef in the laws of Chol HaMoed, where “whatever the sages determine becomes Torah law.”
Two conceptions of the rule that Torah-level doubt is treated stringently: a prohibition on “entering a zone of doubt” versus expansion of the prohibition
The speaker presents an inquiry whether treating a Torah-level doubt stringently creates a separate prohibition of “entering a zone of doubt,” or whether it is only a warning out of concern for violating the prohibition itself, as an expansion of that same prohibition. The speaker describes the consequence that if it later becomes clear that the matter was permitted, then according to the prohibition of entering a zone of doubt one still violated a prohibition, whereas according to the expansion model one did not violate a prohibition if it turns out to have been permitted. The speaker explains that according to the expansion model, if it turns out that there really was a prohibition, then one violated the prohibition itself, except that one is not flogged because of a “warning in a doubtful case,” and brings an example from the Talmud in Shevuot 18 concerning one who has relations with his wife close to her expected menstruation, who is defined as “not coerced, but negligent,” and is liable for a sacrifice even though the laws of expected menstruation are rabbinic, because the rabbinic warning removes the claim of coercion regarding the Torah prohibition of a menstruant.
Sha’arei Yosher on the Rashba and Maimonides regarding an additional prohibition in a case of doubt
The speaker brings from Sha’arei Yosher that the Rashba understands that in every doubtful prohibition there is an “additional prohibition” that certainly applies to one who places himself in doubt, even if it later turns out that he did not violate the prohibition, whereas according to Maimonides “there is no additional prohibition at all,” and the person is “permitted and entitled” to place himself in doubt, except that he must know that if it turns out that he failed and violated the prohibition, he cannot claim coercion. The speaker also connects this to the question of lashes and warning in a doubtful case, and to the opinion that “a warning in a doubtful case counts as a warning.”
Doubtful mamzer status and the relation to Maimonides’ view
The speaker presents the Talmudic rule in Kiddushin that doubtful mamzer status is treated leniently, in the formulation “the Merciful One said a definite mamzer, and not a doubtful mamzer,” and describes the Rashba’s difficulty with Maimonides: if a Torah-level doubt is treated leniently anyway, why is a verse or derivation needed. The speaker states that for Maimonides this is not a difficulty but a source for his view, and explains that the verse itself is not special but simply a plain reading of the word “mamzer,” from which Maimonides infers a general principle: “the Merciful One said definite forbidden fat, and not doubtful forbidden fat.” The speaker mocks the conception that every verse teaches the opposite of what it says and presents that as a learned habit that is not required here, because, in his view, this is not a formal derivation but a “plain interpretive reading.”
Shev Shema’tata, Pri Chadash, and the discussion whether doubtful impurity is a proof or a difficulty
The speaker quotes Shev Shema’tata (first section), which organizes the dispute between Maimonides and the Ra’avad on one side and the Ran and the Rashba on the other concerning the force of the rule that a Torah-level doubt is treated stringently. The speaker brings from Shev Shema’tata the claim that one cannot prove anything for Maimonides from doubtful impurity in the public domain because of the possibility of a presumption of purity, but notes that Shev Shema’tata itself says that in several places in the Talmud they are lenient in the public domain even without a presumption of purity. The speaker emphasizes that Shev Shema’tata resolves that there is no difficulty for Maimonides from doubtful impurity in the private domain, because there “Scripture made a doubtful case in the private domain like certainty” and “it is a received halakhah from Sotah,” and from this presents the possibility that the dispute between Maimonides and the Rashba will express itself in the question whether the private domain is merely an obligation of stringency or a status of certainty.
The Maharit on doubtful mamzer status, contradictory double standards, and the question of two verses
The speaker brings an answer from the Maharit, according to which the Torah permits doubtful mamzer status “completely,” as a form of certainty, with the practical consequence that such a person is permitted to marry both an ordinary Jewish woman and a mamzeret at one and the same time, and no contradiction is created. The speaker presents Shev Shema’tata’s difficulty with the Maharit: if so, “why do I need two verses,” and suggests that elsewhere it might be possible to explain that the two verses themselves teach the broad permission.
Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman, doubts in which the Torah is lenient, and the Ran on orlah outside the Land of Israel
The speaker cites, in the name of Rabbi Hershel Schachter, an article by Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman in Merabbei Torah on a list of doubtful cases in which the Torah is lenient, such as doubtful mourning, doubtful mamzer status, doubtful firstborn status, doubtful orlah outside the Land of Israel, and doubtful impurity in the public domain. The speaker quotes an idea attributed to the Ran that doubtful orlah outside the Land of Israel is treated leniently to such an extent that one may feed a friend “definite orlah” when the friend does not know, and presents this as a severe difficulty from the standpoint of causing another to stumble. The speaker describes Rabbi Elchanan’s proposal that in these cases the prohibition is a subjective prohibition of “experience,” in the awareness of the individual, so that in the absence of knowledge “there is no transgression at all,” and not merely exemption from blame, and illustrates that this leads to an extreme possibility concerning mamzer status. The speaker defines the novelty as “far-fetched” and says he does not rely on it for practical Jewish law, but brings it “as a philosophical supplement.”
Returning to the doubt of Sotah and Rabbi Chaim’s inquiry into “doubt as certainty”
The speaker returns to the opening question whether in doubtful Sotah and doubtful impurity in the private domain “stringently” means halakhic certainty or conduct appropriate to doubt, and suggests that in the broader picture this appears to be a dispute between Maimonides and the Rashba. The speaker quotes Rabbi Chaim, who asks whether the Torah introduced that from a doubt “we regard the law as certainty,” in the sense of a determination that she really committed adultery, or whether it introduced that from a doubt “the laws” of a definitely adulterous woman are applied to her even without saying that she actually committed adultery. The speaker emphasizes that the discussion is not about punishments, because without two witnesses punishment is not imposed, but about consequences such as prohibitions and lashes.
Clarifying the meaning of the inquiry: practical halakhic guidance and not determination of reality
The speaker argues that the inquiry cannot be about reality, because reality remains doubtful, but rather about the mode of halakhic instruction, how to relate to doubt. The speaker compares this to inquiries about presumption—whether it clarifies reality or is a rule of conduct—and formulates the question as whether the Torah says, “assume the issue has been resolved,” or “behave as though the issue has been resolved,” and that without a practical halakhic difference there are no real two sides within rules of conduct. The speaker concludes that one has to find practical differences and try to resolve the inquiry, leaving the continuation of the passage for next time.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not yet, I hope not yet. Meaning, I hope people are keeping the proper order. First of all, get married, and only after that bring a grandchild. No, she’s the youngest, and there are still two sons older than her that we’re still waiting on. Looking for a rabbi to officiate at a wedding? It’s already recording. Okay, anyway, I want to talk a bit about doubtful Sotah and doubts in general.
[Speaker C] We already learned, what? From there we learned that a doubt in the private domain—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes. No, I mentioned the concepts and said that we learn impurity from Sotah, but now I want to get a little more into this whole issue of doubts. We talked about the prohibition to the husband and to the adulterer, and now I want to talk about the issue of doubts. Basically these things are still around the Mishnah, meaning we haven’t really left the Mishnah yet, even though every now and then we peek into the Talmud. So the topic is really dealing with the laws of a Sotah who secluded herself after a warning, and of course the suspicion arises that she committed adultery. And the rule is that even though this is only a doubt—we don’t know, we have no testimony about the adultery—as far as we are concerned, we assume that she committed adultery. Meaning, in this doubt we go stringently. And that’s what the Torah says—the Torah says that there is a Sotah. There’s no doubt here, or there is a doubt, we’ll soon see, but the Torah says that we go stringently. Okay? And from here we learn that doubtful impurity in the private domain is also treated stringently. Now one could discuss—what? Impurity by contact? No, no, impurity, doubtful impurity, corpse impurity or whatever it may be. Now, does this law—that doubtful impurity in the private domain, or doubtful Sotah, is treated stringently—mean that we view it as certain? Meaning that as far as we are concerned she really committed adultery? Or not? The rules are that we are supposed to behave stringently in the laws of doubt here, but it has not left the category of doubt. Okay?
[Speaker F] If she’s forbidden to her husband, then she’s forbidden to him.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A roof over one’s head is a different question, but to have relations—not. Meaning, she is forbidden to him. Now you can discuss the laws of seclusion and all kinds of things like that. So we’ll see later that there is probably a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) about how to understand this situation of doubt treated stringently. Does the Torah basically tell us there is no doubt here—meaning, treat it as definite adultery? Or does the Torah tell us no, this is doubtful adultery, only the rule is that in these doubts we act stringently? And there are various practical differences. Maybe I’ll already say one here: for example, if her husband has relations with her, yes—does he receive lashes? Because if I understand this as part of the laws of doubt, then he does not receive lashes. I have to be stringent, he is forbidden to have relations with her, but if he did, he violated a law of doubt; there are no lashes. Or do I say no—what they are telling me when they say one must be stringent means that we view her as though she definitely committed adultery. If so, then if her husband has relations with her, yes, he may not have relations with her after she became defiled; there is a verse, which is basically a prohibition, and then he is flogged. The verse speaks about a woman who actually committed adultery, not about a Sotah. Now the question is what happens with a Sotah. If I assume that she definitely committed adultery, then the prohibition on a husband having relations with a woman who committed adultery applies here too, and then he would be flogged. We’ll see that there is a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) about this, and apparently the dispute is about the question what the novelty in Sotah is: whether the novelty is that these are the laws of doubt, only we go stringently, or whether the novelty is that as far as we are concerned, she committed adultery. Meaning, we’ll see that later. But before that I want to introduce a few things in general about the laws of doubts. These are things that are known in principle, but I feel they’re not precise enough, and a lot of times there are formulations that in my view are problematic. So I want to give some kind of general introduction to doubts. So our rule in Jewish law is that a Torah-level doubt is treated stringently, and a rabbinic-level doubt leniently. The medieval authorities (Rishonim) disagree over the question of what force that rule itself has: is this rule itself of Torah origin or rabbinic? Is the obligation to be stringent in a Torah-level doubt itself an obligation by Torah law, or is it a rabbinic obligation, as in the well-known view of Maimonides? So maybe we’ll indeed open with Maimonides. Okay, so Maimonides, in the laws of corpse impurity, chapter 9, law 12: “It is a known matter that all these impurities and the like that arise due to doubt are rabbinic, and no one is impure by Torah law except one who became definitely impure. But all doubts—whether in impurities, whether in forbidden foods, whether in forbidden sexual relations and Sabbath matters—are only from the words of the sages.” Brackets: “Even so, something for whose deliberate violation one is liable to karet, its doubtful case is forbidden by Torah law, for one who does it is liable for a suspended guilt-offering.” Okay? “As we explained,” or “as we explained” refers to what came before the brackets, in the laws of forbidden relations and in a number of places. So Maimonides writes here that the law that a Torah-level doubt is treated stringently is itself a rabbinic law. It is not a Torah law; it’s a rabbinic law, yes, “from the words of the sages.” There is a qualification in brackets that this is only in matters for which one is not liable for a suspended guilt-offering. In matters for which one is liable for a suspended guilt-offering—that is, things for whose deliberate violation one incurs karet and whose inadvertent violation requires a sin-offering—then their doubtful case brings a suspended guilt-offering. And if so, this doubt cannot be merely rabbinic, otherwise it would be unconsecrated slaughter in the Temple courtyard—how can you bring a guilt-offering for something that in principle has no Torah prohibition at all to do? And therefore there’s this qualification. Why is it in brackets? Admittedly, square brackets, which makes us think maybe it is a sound version, but it isn’t—it’s an incorrect text. Why? Because I simply know it’s not correct. All the resolutions are resolutions because of a pressure that doesn’t exist, and therefore they added this here. You know there is an enactment of Rabbenu Tam not to emend inside the book itself, but rather like the glosses of the Bach—you put an aleph and then at the side you write what you think the correct reading should be. In the past they used to put the emendations into the text itself, and then you basically lose the original wording; everyone does whatever he wants with the text. Rabbenu Tam established that the emendations should be put in the margin. Meaning, you do not correct the text itself; you put it on the side and write what you think the proper reading should be, because sometimes you are mistaken, and then everyone who gets the book that you corrected thinks that this is the book’s version, and that’s not true—you corrected it, and you may even have been mistaken in what you corrected. So that’s the enactment. Here is a wonderful example of that. Here they inserted this reading—it has no basis, it is certain that Maimonides did not write this. In parallel sources this qualification does not appear—for example, in the laws of kilayim—and everyone asks how can that be, why does it appear here and not there? The question is not why it doesn’t appear there; the question is why it appears here. Someone inserted it here. Why? Because of this difficulty. The editor writes why he inserted it: “Even so, something for whose deliberate violation one is liable to karet, its doubtful case is forbidden by Torah law, for one who does it is liable for a suspended guilt-offering.” So here is the reasoning. It cannot be that Maimonides spoke about something for whose deliberate violation there is karet and for which one is liable for a suspended guilt-offering. Why? Because if it applied also to those things, then how could it be that one brings a suspended guilt-offering in a case of doubt? After all, you had no obligation at all to be stringent in the doubt, because the obligation to be stringent is only rabbinic. So how can you bring a suspended guilt-offering? Therefore they added this qualification. Why is it incorrect? First of all, it’s incorrect because Maimonides himself writes that it is incorrect, here in this very law itself. What does he say? “Whether in forbidden sexual relations and Sabbath matters.” Forbidden sexual relations and Sabbath matters are things for whose deliberate violation one incurs karet and whose inadvertent violation requires a sin-offering, and for which one is liable for a suspended guilt-offering. And about that Maimonides says that the rule of being stringent in a doubtful case is rabbinic, from the words of the sages. So what are you telling me afterward, that something for whose deliberate violation one incurs karet, its doubtful case is forbidden by Torah law? That is a contradiction within the very passage. So everyone twists themselves around and suggests resolutions and so on—maybe this is where a prohibition was already established and that is where it was not established—nonsense in tomato juice. No, just delete these brackets; they’re incorrect brackets. Now, how do you solve the problem that the brackets came to solve? After all, the brackets came to solve a problem. If there is no prohibition, then how is one liable for a suspended guilt-offering? And I’m claiming that even with Sabbath matters and forbidden sexual relations and things for whose deliberate violation one incurs karet and for which one is liable for a suspended guilt-offering, the obligation to be stringent in a doubtful case is only rabbinic. So how do you bring a suspended guilt-offering? Yes, according to Maimonides, I don’t know—
[Speaker G] If it’s money or a document when the woman becomes betrothed, the beginning of—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The laws of marriage begin with “from the words of the sages,” and even—
[Speaker G] Even so they would chain her to the marriage—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, you’re opening up a big topic here, I’m not going into it. I wrote a book about it.
[Speaker H] So at least tell him where the book can be bought.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Anyway, so this is “from the words of the sages,” it’s rabbinic in my view. Meaning, there are many commentators on Maimonides who want to claim no, it’s Torah law; it’s just that the sages introduced this Torah law, so the force of the law is Torah-level. That is not correct. One can show that it’s not correct. In any case, I’ll set that aside right now for purposes of the discussion; I don’t want to get into that whole topic. What? Oh, so how do you bring a guilt-offering? Right—if you had no obligation to be stringent, then how can you be liable for a guilt-offering? So the answer is that a guilt-offering doesn’t need a sin at all in order to be brought.
[Speaker F] It doesn’t need a sin? A guilt-offering is—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It appears—a guilt-offering is brought because of the act itself, apart from the dimension of transgression in it, and I think I spoke about this in one of the first lectures. I spoke about the concept of a guilt-offering and misuse of consecrated property, “trespass against a woman,” and about the students of Rabbenu Yonah on a blessing, blessings over benefit. Yes. What? Okay.
[Speaker J] Not exactly all the—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The whole time? No, you can’t bring one all the time. But its being brought does not depend on whether you committed a transgression. In all the guilt-offerings, one after another, I can show you that they are not brought for a transgression. And therefore this whole difficulty on Maimonides, and the need to make such a qualification—the version people insert into Maimonides—is based on an error. It’s simply not correct. A guilt-offering does not need a transgression, and therefore there is no problem with being lenient in a doubtful case by Torah law and nevertheless bringing a guilt-offering. Two different things. Now, oh—there is a problem here because Maimonides includes within his list also doubtful impurity. Now doubtful impurity is a special law of doubts; it is not the general rule that a Torah-level doubt is treated stringently and a rabbinic-level doubt leniently. We saw that in the private domain even a double doubt—everything is treated stringently—and in the public domain even a single doubt is treated leniently. Meaning that with doubtful impurities the regular rule of doubts does not exist. So why does Maimonides say—he brings this in the laws of corpse impurity in general. Meaning the whole thing speaks about impurities, and he only says “and also in Sabbath matters and forbidden relations and the other things,” but also in impurities. But with impurities there are different rules of doubt; this is not the regular rule of Torah-level doubt treated stringently and rabbinic-level doubt treated leniently. So why does Maimonides also include this thing here? So let’s leave that for a moment; in a minute I’ll comment on it. I want to show you another Maimonides, in chapter 16 of the laws of the other primary categories of impurity. That one was corpse impurity; here it’s the other primary categories of impurity, beginning of chapter 16, law 1: “Why did the sages declare doubtful impurity in the public domain pure? Because the community offers the Passover sacrifice in impurity when the impure are the majority. If definite impurity is set aside for them, then all the more so doubtful impurity, whose prohibition, like all doubtful cases, is from their words, as we explained in the laws of forbidden relations.” Meaning, doubtful impurity—how much more so are we lenient, because after all all doubts are prohibited only by rabbinic law. So doubtful impurity in the public domain is only rabbinic? Meaning, or the rules of doubtful impurity are only rabbinic? Look, he continues now: “And why were they stringent in a doubtful case in the private domain? Because a Sotah who secluded herself—even though the matter is doubtful—is impure to her husband until she drinks.” So is that Torah law or rabbinic? He says, “Why were they stringent.” “Were stringent” sounds rabbinic, no? It’s not written explicitly in the Torah; rather, we learn it from doubtful Sotah. Okay? So doubtful private domain means doubtful impurity. We learn that from doubtful Sotah. Now doubtful Sotah, on the face of it, is a Torah law. You learn doubtful impurity from there, right? So impurity too should be Torah law. Then what does “they were stringent” mean? Now the wording “they were stringent” is not so terrible in my eyes. “The sages were stringent” means this is a Torah law, but it’s a Torah law that the sages created; it’s not written explicitly in the Torah. Why did the sages understand that the Torah tells us to be stringent about doubtful impurity in the private domain? Because they learned it from Sotah. So I’m not alarmed by the term “they were stringent.” But what he says above, that doubtful impurity in the public domain is because a Torah-level doubt is treated leniently—that really does seem to identify the laws of doubtful impurity with the ordinary laws of doubt. It’s not some special law that doubtful impurity in the public domain is lenient. No—it’s the general rule that a Torah-level doubt is lenient. That’s what Maimonides seems to say. And if so, now I move to doubt in the private domain, and when it says “why were they stringent,” by itself I don’t know if I’d make a whole fuss out of that. But now in light of what we saw with the public domain, now I understand—apparently all this is rabbinic. In doubtful impurity in the private domain, they are stringent rabbinically, and in doubtful impurity in the public domain they are lenient, also because of that same rule that doubts are rabbinic. And then everything basically remains within the ordinary laws of doubt. There is some difference here: in the private domain we are not merely being stringent rabbinically in the usual way—there is a special rabbinic directive to be stringent—but as far as the core law is concerned, it remains the ordinary law of doubt. That is very strange in this Maimonides on the one hand, but on the other hand it fits very well with the Maimonides we saw earlier. Because the Maimonides we saw earlier includes impurities within the list of the ordinary laws of doubt, like Sabbath matters, forbidden relations, impurities. Meaning, it looks like these are ordinary laws of doubt. Now this whole issue—for example, indeed, the Rabbi of Brisk, yes, in his stencils on Nazir, argues there that according to Maimonides, doubtful impurity in the public domain is simply an ordinary case of a Torah-level doubt treated leniently; it is not a special law. It is simply a Torah-level doubt treated leniently. That’s all. Because fundamentally a Torah-level doubt is treated leniently. There is only a rabbinic obligation to be stringent, so here they did not impose stringency for some reason, because of the Passover sacrifice or something like that. But as far as the law itself is concerned, this is an ordinary case of a Torah-level doubt treated leniently. That is what the Rabbi of Brisk claims. And the Chatam Sofer says more than that: according to the views that a Torah-level doubt is treated stringently by Torah law—after all, there are medieval authorities (Rishonim) who disagree with Maimonides and claim that a Torah-level doubt treated stringently is a Torah law, not a rabbinic law. That’s the view of the Ran and the Rashba and the Beit Yosef and others. So according to those medieval authorities (Rishonim), it would follow that doubtful impurity in the public domain would have to be treated stringently, because all that was said—that doubtful impurity in the public domain is lenient—is because a Torah-level doubt in general is lenient. So that works only according to Maimonides. But according to the medieval authorities (Rishonim) who say that a Torah-level doubt treated stringently is a Torah law, then even in the public domain no special law was stated, so doubtful impurity in the public domain should also have to be treated stringently. And that is very, very strange. The simple assumption is that the Talmud says doubtful impurity in the public domain is lenient; this is not Maimonides’ own decision. Maimonides can explain that this follows from the ordinary laws of doubt, and maybe even bring from there proof for his own position, but the other medieval authorities (Rishonim) are supposed to agree with it. It is a Talmudic law—meaning that we act leniently. More than that now—one actually could have said—yes, I’m noting—
[Speaker L] That’s what he pointed out earlier.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what they pointed out earlier, and I said I disagree. “From the words of the sages” means rabbinic. Not in the other sense of rabbinic. It’s a dispute; most of the commentators on Maimonides say like you, but they’re not right. Fine, that’s another whole subject. Anyway, one could have said, look, the special law of doubtful impurity was stated only about the private domain. Then doubtful impurity in the private domain is treated stringently. That is a special law learned from Sotah. Okay?
[Speaker G] Wait a second—the novelty of the whole issue of Sotah, that itself is a novelty.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what?
[Speaker G] We don’t derive from a novelty—I don’t remember an example—there is—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A law from a novelty—but never mind. One could have said that, but the Talmud doesn’t say that. Fine, so what does it learn from Sotah? The Talmud says it doesn’t learn from Sotah; it essentially says that doubtful impurity is like Sotah, Sotah is an example of doubtful impurity. It’s not learning from here to there; it’s really the same thing. We talked about this in the first lecture of the semester. In any case, one could have said as follows: basically there is an underlying structure of the ordinary laws of doubt—according to Maimonides, I’m speaking now. So a Torah-level doubt is lenient, and there is a rabbinic obligation to be stringent, but fundamentally a Torah-level doubt is lenient. In doubtful impurity in the public domain, we leave that in place, as it was—just without the rabbinic obligation to be stringent—but as far as Torah law is concerned, doubtful impurity in the public domain is lenient. And rabbinically too they are lenient there, and there indeed it is exceptional. Why? Because it is learned from Passover for some reason, I don’t know, because of Passover. Okay? Doubtful impurity in the private domain is no longer part of the ordinary laws of doubt. With the ordinary laws of doubt, one should have been lenient by Torah law there too, right? There something new was introduced: it is learned from Sotah, where we are stringent. But what do we learn from Sotah? From Sotah we learn only what happens in the private domain. What happens with Sotah in the public domain I don’t know—there is no such thing, because if she’s in the public domain then she wasn’t secluded. So it’s not relevant. So he says: in the laws of the public domain, we take the ordinary laws of doubt; that remains in place. The novelty is only in the laws of the private domain, where it is learned from Sotah, and there it is stringent. So according to Maimonides one can definitely say that. Because according to Maimonides there is room for such a novelty. Why? Since under the ordinary laws of doubt we would have had to be lenient even in the private domain, because according to Maimonides a Torah-level doubt is lenient, right? Then the Torah comes and says yes, but not in impurity. That novelty we learn from Sotah—that in impurity it is not so—but in the public domain it truly does follow the ordinary laws of doubt. Then one could perhaps understand Maimonides this way, and then when it says “why were the sages stringent” in doubtful private domain, learned from Sotah—as I said before—“the sages were stringent” does not mean rabbinic law, but rather “they were stringent” means they determined that it should be stringent. The sages determined that it should be stringent because they learned it from Sotah. In the public domain it really is “from the words of the sages,” because in the public domain it follows the ordinary laws of doubt; it is not connected to Sotah, and there we remain within the ordinary laws of doubt. So one could also understand Maimonides that way. In Sha’arei Yosher… I moved this to a different place, I moved it to gate 1, chapter 3. One second, there it’s simple because that was already quoted earlier. Gate 1, chapter 3. Okay. “Maimonides in chapter 16 of the laws of the primary categories of impurity wrote as follows: ‘Why did the sages declare doubtful impurity in the public domain pure? Because the community offers the Passover sacrifice in impurity,’ etc., ‘for the prohibition of all doubtful cases is from their words, as we explained in the laws of entering the Temple.’ ‘Why were they stringent regarding doubtful impurity in the private domain? Because a Sotah who secluded herself—even though the matter is doubtful—is impure to her husband until she drinks.’ And from these words, the great later authorities (Acharonim) learned that he holds, holds, holds, that doubtful impurity in the public domain is not because it is a received halakhah, but like any doubtful prohibition, which is permitted by Torah law. See Shema’tata 1, chapter 1. And I am amazed—for also regarding doubtful impurity in the private domain he wrote, ‘Why were they stringent.’” Maimonides’ wording is “why were they stringent.” Meaning, it seems that there too it is only a rabbinic law. “From this it appears that even doubtful impurity in the private domain is only rabbinic. And likewise what Maimonides wrote in chapter 9 of the laws of corpse impurity, law 12”—that’s the first Maimonides: “‘It is a known matter that all these impurities and the like that arise due to doubt are from their words, and no one is impure by Torah law except one who became definitely impure. But all doubts, whether in impurities, whether in forbidden foods, whether in forbidden sexual relations and Sabbath matters, are only from the words of the sages, as we explained in the laws of forbidden sexual relations.’” By the way, notice: the brackets do not appear here. You notice? Here, in our edition of Maimonides, there are brackets. Here after this word there are brackets. He cites it straightforwardly. It could be that he too understood that these brackets are incorrect. In any case, that is what he says. “And behold, from this wording it is explicitly proven that he included every doubtful impurity, whether in the public domain or in the private domain—sorry, that he included every doubtful impurity, whether in the public domain or in the private domain—for his words are explicit: ‘No one is impure by Torah law except one who became definitely impure.’” That is Maimonides’ wording: “No one is impure by Torah law except one who became definitely impure.” “Could it be that Maimonides holds that even in the private domain a doubtful case is pure by Torah law?” So Maimonides basically holds that really, like every law of doubt, doubtful impurity in the private domain is pure by Torah law. The whole obligation to be stringent is only rabbinic, like every law of doubt. So then what do you learn from Sotah? Something here doesn’t work. So you don’t need to learn from Sotah; this is the ordinary law of doubt. A Torah-level doubt treated stringently is rabbinic. Fine. So what do you learn from Sotah? It does seem that this is a Torah law, not the ordinary law of doubts. So he says: “Were I not afraid of our holy teachers, I would say that Maimonides’ intention is that the Torah did not specify any of the doubtful cases, and left it to the sages to act according to the need they see in each and every matter. And the sages saw fit to be lenient regarding doubtful impurity in the public domain, because of the reason stated in the Tosefta, because impurity is set aside for the many regarding the Passover sacrifice.” That’s what Maimonides brings—or for the reason written by the Ra’avad, also found in the Tosefta. “And likewise regarding doubtful impurity in the private domain, they were more stringent than with all other doubtful cases, for with all doubtful cases they did not treat them as certainty, but here they treated them as certainty, for the reason they found in the Torah in the matter of Sotah, which is a doubtful case and the Torah treated it as certainty.” So therefore the sages made doubtful impurity like certainty, rabbinically. And all of this is rabbinic. Okay?
[Speaker A] And in every place where the sages turn it into that, when they’re stringent in a doubtful case, they don’t make it into certainty? Is that what I’m hearing from here? Again? Specifically in the private domain, where they learn from Sotah, the sages made the doubtful case into certainty, but everywhere else a doubtful case is not like certainty? Right. Yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And now another thing is also unclear in his view: is the result rabbinic or Torah law? Because “Scripture handed it over to the sages”—if that’s the mechanism he is talking about here—“Scripture handed it over to the sages” is a Torah law. Scripture itself says: you determine it; whatever you determine is what I want. So “Scripture handed it over to the sages” is a Torah law. Or not—maybe he means that Scripture left it open, and the sages did what they did, in which case it is rabbinic law. It’s not entirely clear what he means here. Then he goes on: “And according to his view, what we say in the Talmud, ‘it is a received halakhah,’ is not a halakhah to Moses from Sinai, for the Tannaim in the beginning of tractate Niddah do not disagree about this, and there we say that both of them learned only from Sotah. And according to this one may say that even according to Maimonides it is by Torah law.” You see? “Only it was handed over to the sages that they should conduct themselves according to their wisdom in every doubtful case, as the Beit Yosef wrote in the laws of Chol HaMoed.” That is the best-known example of “Scripture handed it over to the sages.” Yes, this is the Beit Yosef in the laws of Chol HaMoed. On Chol HaMoed, which labors are prohibited? The Torah doesn’t say. It only says that it is a festival period, meaning that labor has to be prohibited then. But who decides what is forbidden and what is permitted? It was handed over to the sages. But it is Torah law. Scripture itself says that whatever the sages determine—they will determine the character of the festival period. Whatever they determine becomes Torah law; only the ones who determine it are the sages. Okay? But it is a Torah law. Here he does explain what he means. Doubtful impurity in the private domain is Torah law, not rabbinic. So what is it? The sages are the ones who determine the laws of doubtful cases in each place. Here they made it into certainty; in other places they determined only rabbinic stringency; in places like the public domain, or with Passover, it is completely permitted—even rabbinically they are not stringent. Okay? “And therefore they were lenient, according to their wisdom, in every place where they were stringent; the law returned to being Torah law. But what can I do, since the medieval authorities (Rishonim) did not explain it this way—my opinion is nullified.” The sages made it so, and in the private domain they—
[Speaker E] Turned it into Torah law. Why did they turn it into that?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Torah left it to the sages to determine the laws of cases of doubt. Okay? The Torah left this open, so the sages can establish three different standards. One standard: be lenient in cases of doubt. For example, with a rabbinic-level doubt we rule leniently, or a doubt concerning impurity in the public domain is also treated leniently. Okay? Like on Passover, a Passover offering that was deferred. They can determine, in ordinary cases of prohibitory doubt, that there is an obligation to be stringent because of the doubt. And they can determine, as in the case of the sotah, that this is apparently a rabbinic obligation, maybe, yes, that’s what it seems to imply. And they can determine, as with sotah, that there is here a Torah-level obligation to be stringent. The Torah gave them the possibility of establishing an absolute obligation to be stringent. And in the case of sotah they established an absolute obligation. That’s basically what he’s suggesting. But as he says, the plain sense of Maimonides does not seem to go that way, and the commentators on Maimonides did not understand him that way either. All this is a discussion within Maimonides. Whoever doesn’t… if it’s not Maimonides, then leave all this aside; everything becomes much simpler. If it’s not Maimonides, then we learn the laws of impurity: a Torah-level doubt is treated stringently in general by Torah law. Doubt concerning impurity is a new passage; we learn it from sotah, it is a tradition preserved in the Talmud, that with impurity in the private domain we are stringent even in a double doubt, meaning not like an ordinary doubt, and with impurity in the public domain we are lenient against the ordinary rules of doubt. So according to the other commentators, unlike Maimonides, the picture is quite simple. All the complications of Rabbi Shimon Shkop and the other interpretations are complications within Maimonides’ view. Why? Because according to Maimonides, a Torah-level doubt is lenient according to the basic law. So then the question is: what did we learn from sotah regarding the private domain? Apparently we learned that it is stringent, against the normal rule, which is lenient. But he says: yes, but it says “by the words of the sages,” and therefore he says it could be that Scripture handed this over to the sages, and the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and later authorities (Acharonim) disagreed with him—when he says they disagreed with him, he doesn’t mean they disagreed with him in the Talmud; they disagreed with him about Maimonides’ view. Meaning, when he says the medieval authorities didn’t interpret it this way, he means they didn’t interpret Maimonides this way, not that they didn’t interpret the Talmud this way. In the Talmud, he also agrees that no one interprets it that way. He’s only trying to explain Maimonides. Okay? In any case, in Maimonides this really is a strange matter, not entirely settled.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now I want—Rabbi Shimon Shkop, Rabbi Shimon Shkop, yes. Now another topic I want to present in the laws of doubt, in this introduction to doubts, when we talk about the rule that a Torah-level doubt is treated stringently. Let’s leave aside for the moment whether that’s rabbinic or Torah-level; let’s talk about it in general. What does this rule say? Does it say that there is a separate prohibition regarding cases of doubt? If you have a piece that is doubtfully forbidden fat or permitted fat, or doubtfully pork or kosher meat, then you’re forbidden to eat it because there is a prohibition on entering a state of doubt. You’re not allowed to enter a place that is doubtful. That’s one possibility. A second possibility: no—the prohibition is because of the concern that you might violate the very prohibition you are worried about. Meaning, maybe you’ll eat pork. So here it’s not a separate prohibition; it’s simply an extension of the prohibition of pork. If there is concern that you might violate the prohibition of pork, then the prohibition of pork extends and says: even in a doubtful case, I want you to be stringent and not eat. Okay? Those are two possibilities.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I could put it even more sharply. If the prohibition is entering a state of doubt, then suppose I ate that thing—I violated a prohibition. I ate it, and in the end witnesses came and told me: it was kosher meat. There was no problem. I still violated a prohibition. Because the prohibition is not due to the prohibition of eating pork, but due to entering a state of doubt. I was in doubt; I wasn’t allowed to go there. I’m forbidden to enter a situation in which I fear a prohibition, and that itself is a prohibition. It’s not the prohibition of pork; it’s prohibition number 294, okay? It’s a new prohibition. Okay? In contrast, if I understand it as only the concern that I might eat pork—okay, so then I have a problem taking the risk. I took the risk, and in the end it turned out it wasn’t pork, it was beef. So fine, I took the risk and won. The only question is if it turns out in the end that it really was pork. Then I can’t say: look, I was under compulsion, I didn’t know it was pork. No! Because they warned you and said: look, even if you’re in doubt, you have to be concerned that perhaps it’s pork. Now, if you took the risk, that was maybe improper—but if in the end what you ate was kosher, then you took the risk, but in the end you didn’t violate any prohibition, because there is no other prohibition besides the prohibition of pork. And as for the prohibition of pork, you can’t say you violated it—you didn’t violate the prohibition of pork. What? Violated what?
[Speaker M] What is the prohibition?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Is the prohibition entering a state of doubt, or the concern over the prohibition itself? So I’m saying: if the prohibition is entering a state of doubt, then there’s no reason to flog him, because you don’t—you’re flogged for the prohibition of pork, but we haven’t found flogging for the prohibition of entering a doubtful state. There may be such a prohibition, but you can’t be flogged for it; there’s no flogging for it. It’s not counted among the 613 commandments, it—
[Speaker N] No, there’s no flogging.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, no, no—independently of warning, independently of warning. On the contrary, for the prohibition of entering a state of doubt there’s no issue of warning at all; one could warn him: know that there is a doubt here and you are forbidden to enter it. It’s not a warning problem. The problem is that it’s not a formal prohibition. It’s not an enumerated prohibition, there is no scriptural warning for it, and you can’t administer flogging—there’s no punishment unless there is prior warning, okay? According to the second conception, in principle, of course one doesn’t get flogged for entering a state of doubt, because there is no such prohibition. But if in the end it turns out that you ate pork, then there would be room to flog you—not for a prohibition of doubt, but for the prohibition of pork. In practice he won’t be flogged, because this is a doubtful warning. When you entered that situation, the witnesses could not warn you that it was pork, because they didn’t know—we were in doubt, right? So in principle you should have been flogged. It’s only that you are not flogged because, under the general laws of flogging, one is not flogged on the basis of a doubtful warning. Okay? That’s all. But what is clear is that if in the end you ate pork, you violated the Torah prohibition of pork. You won’t be flogged because of the laws of flogging, since there was a doubtful warning here, but you did violate the Torah prohibition of pork. Will you say you were under compulsion because you didn’t know, or inadvertent, or something? No! Because they warned you about the doubt. They told you: know that there’s a chance this is pork; you have to be careful. You took the risk—live with the consequences.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We find something like this in the Talmud in Shevuot 18. The Talmud there talks about someone who has relations with his wife close to her expected menstrual time. Someone who has relations with his wife on the dates when she is expected to see blood. Okay? Now he had relations with her; he didn’t know whether she would see blood or not; he had relations with her, and she did see blood. During intercourse, say, or something like that—she saw blood. The Talmud says: he is not under compulsion but inadvertent. He has to bring an offering. Now understand: fixed menstrual times are rabbinic. These dates are a rabbinic prohibition—not to have relations with one’s wife close to her expected time. When the woman actually saw blood, then it’s a Torah prohibition. But the designated dates, the dates on which she is expected to see, that’s rabbinic.
[Speaker N] No, no—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So again: if she is a menstruant, then relations with her are a Torah prohibition. But the obligation to be careful on the days when she is expected to see blood is rabbinic. Okay? But one brings an offering for this. How can one bring an offering if it’s rabbinic? And this is a sin-offering, not a guilt-offering; it has to involve an actual prohibition. The claim is that it is a Torah prohibition if she saw blood. It’s a Torah prohibition, and you can’t say you were under compulsion, because the sages told you that on that date you have to be careful. They warned you. So notice: the prohibition on having relations with her close to the expected time is a rabbinic prohibition. It’s like the prohibition on entering a state of doubt. It is rabbinic—but it functions in another way too. It also serves as a warning against the prohibition of menstrual impurity itself. And menstrual impurity is Torah-level. Therefore you bring an offering for the menstrual impurity, and you can’t say you were under compulsion, because someone under compulsion doesn’t bring an offering. You can’t say you were under compulsion, because the sages warned you—even though the warning is a rabbinic prohibition. But that rabbinic warning removes your status from compelled to inadvertent. What? There is no warning? He isn’t punished; he brings an offering. An offering doesn’t require warning—warning is relevant to intentional transgression. So that’s the kind of thing I want to say here.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, there may be a prohibition of entering a state of doubt, and then the prohibition is an independent prohibition. But if there is no prohibition of entering a state of doubt, then the rule that a Torah-level doubt is treated stringently functions like the laws of expected menstrual time. And that means: be careful, because there is a chance here that you will violate a prohibition. What practical difference does it make? It’s only a warning; it’s not a prohibition in itself. The practical difference is that if I violate the prohibition, I won’t be able to say I was under compulsion, because I was warned. By the way, there is an interesting little piece in Kli Chemdah, in the portion of Vayechi. He says there—he brings Yeshuot Malko, I think; he brings Yeshuot Malko there, Yehoshua of Kutna, who wants to argue that any time there is a rabbinic prohibition and you violated it, and in the end you wound up violating a Torah prohibition, then you are not under compulsion—you violated a Torah prohibition. And his proof is from this Talmud in Shevuot. Again: you violated a rabbinic prohibition and as a result wound up in a Torah prohibition, like with expected menstrual time.
[Speaker H] Like with expected menstrual time.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So the Torah prohibition into which you were drawn by compulsion—you are not under compulsion; you are inadvertent. Because there was a rabbinic prohibition. And Kli Chemdah says: no, that’s not correct. There is no proof from expected menstrual times, because there the whole idea of the prohibition concerning expected times is to warn you that there may be a prohibition of menstrual impurity here. But if you violated some ordinary rabbinic prohibition that isn’t related, and because you violated it you then wound up violating a Torah prohibition—then no, you can still claim that you were under compulsion. You violated that rabbinic prohibition, and you were under compulsion with respect to the Torah prohibition into which you were drawn. Only where the whole point of the rabbinic prohibition was to warn you of the concern that you might come to a Torah prohibition—there you cannot claim that you were under compulsion with regard to the Torah prohibition. Huh? Sounds like a good answer.
[Speaker O] Yes, exactly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Say you went out carrying, I don’t know what, you committed a rabbinic carrying prohibition, okay? Doesn’t matter what. And as a result something happened and you wound up in a Torah prohibition. So no—regarding the Torah prohibition you would still be under compulsion, because the rabbinic prohibition you committed is not a prohibition whose purpose is to warn you away from the Torah prohibition; it’s just an ordinary rabbinic prohibition. So Yeshuot Malko, Yehoshua of Kutna, wants to say that it’s the same thing, but Kli Chemdah correctly says that it isn’t true; it’s not the same thing.
[Speaker P] Is this like “it began in negligence and ended in compulsion”? If I lit gas with something rabbinic, and I have a rabbinic prohibition to do that, and then I ignite gas, which is a Torah prohibition.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—what is the fire?
[Speaker P] It’s electronics; I’m igniting gas.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so you’re saying that’s a rabbinic prohibition, let’s say. Fine—then what? And what happened in the end?
[Speaker Q] I have a rabbinic prohibition with the igniter. Okay, and what happened in the end? And I ignite, I kindle the gas, which is a Torah prohibition.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How? No, that’s rabbinic, not Torah-level. What? If you ignite it with the electronic igniter, that’s rabbinic; there’s no further prohibition after the fire already exists. The prohibition is the prohibition of kindling.
[Speaker O] The start of the kindling is with the electronic igniter, which is a rabbinic prohibition by mistake.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, you mean the igniter itself is rabbinic, and using it to light the gas is Torah-level. Yes, but that’s not the same thing, because here it’s not that through the first thing you wound up in the second; you yourself did this and then you did that. That’s not the same thing. Here I mean I violated the first, and then the second came upon me—meaning, simply because I violated the first, the second came upon me. Here no: I did the first, and then I used it to do the second as well. That’s not the same thing. Okay, in any case, for our purposes, what I want to say again is that all this is just an example—an example of how I understand the rabbinic prohibition, the rabbinic obligation to be stringent, sorry, in a doubtful case. One can understand that the rabbinic obligation to be stringent in cases of doubt is merely a warning: know that you may wind up violating a Torah prohibition. But there is no prohibition on someone who was not stringent in a doubtful situation. That itself is not forbidden. That is Shaarei Yosher there in the same chapter. Expected menstrual times are only—
[Speaker A] Rabbinic? But the verse says, “And you shall guard My charge.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, let’s not get into that now. Expected menstrual times are rabbinic. Torah-level?
[Speaker A] Rabbinic? All the medieval authorities rule that way.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes, expected menstrual times are rabbinic, but let’s leave it; that’s not the topic. Fine, it’s not our topic now. Okay, Shaarei Yosher says this: he ties it to the dispute between Rashba and Maimonides. And according to Rashba, in every doubtful prohibition there is an additional prohibition—that is, besides the prohibition itself, which depends on the factual reality of whether he actually encountered the transgression or not. Wait… And according to Rashba, in every doubtful prohibition there is an additional prohibition. Rashba is the same one who disagrees with Maimonides and says that a Torah-level doubt is treated stringently by Torah law. Okay? But according to Maimonides it is rabbinic. So he says: according to Rashba, in every doubtful prohibition there is an additional prohibition—that is, besides the prohibition itself, which depends on the reality of the matter, whether he actually violated it or not, there is also an additional prohibition because he brought himself into a doubtful prohibition. And this additional prohibition is a definite prohibition. It is not a doubtful prohibition, because you definitely entered the doubtful situation. Meaning, even if he did not actually violate the underlying prohibition—if in the end it turns out that it wasn’t pork, it was kosher meat, whatever—still, by the very fact that he entered the doubtful state, in any case he violated this additional prohibition, because he acted against the will of the Merciful One by bringing himself into a state of doubt.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And according to Maimonides, there is no additional prohibition whatsoever regarding a doubtful prohibition, because the Merciful One did not warn against that. Nowhere do we find that the Torah warned against such a thing. And the choice is given to a person—if he wants to put himself into a doubtful situation, he may, and he is entitled to do so. But he should know, he must know, that if he does not actually encounter the underlying prohibition, then he is clean of all punishment. Yes, he can’t claim compulsion—meaning, he was warned. So you can’t say you were under compulsion. So you see: entering a state of doubt, according to Maimonides, is not forbidden. All there is here is a warning lest you violate the underlying prohibition itself. Okay? I think that rabbinically they also imposed a prohibition on entering a state of doubt. But at the Torah level, where there is no prohibition concerning the laws of doubt, it’s something else. It only means that this is not the will of the Holy One, blessed be He, because you may violate the underlying prohibition itself. Okay? But the actual entry is not forbidden. And both sides are possible and evenly balanced. And therefore, according to the view that a doubtful warning counts as a warning, he is liable even to court-imposed punishment, and so on. Yes—there, that’s exactly what he says. If a doubtful warning counts as a warning, and you now ate pork, then you would be flogged. Because the reason you are not flogged is only because a doubtful warning is not considered a warning. It’s not because you didn’t commit a prohibition. You did commit the prohibition. It’s only in the laws of flogging that the question is whether there was a valid warning. And a doubtful warning is not a warning. But there is an opinion in the Talmud that a doubtful warning is also a warning. And according to that view, you would even be flogged for the pork. You ate something that was doubtfully pork and doubtfully kosher meat, you didn’t know, and then in the end it turned out it was pork—they would flog you. Why would they flog you? According to the view that a doubtful warning is a warning, because here there was a doubtful warning. They told you: listen, there’s a doubt whether this is pork or not. And if you understand that such a thing counts as a warning, then when in the end he ate the pork, he violated the prohibition of pork. He is not flogged for the prohibition of entering a state of doubt. There is no flogging for that. He is flogged for the prohibition of pork. Okay?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now, there was a case we ran into here in an ordinary—
[Speaker A] A doubtful warning, or maybe a doubt of compulsion, right? Where there isn’t concern that you’ll come to some future reality—say, a doubt about the past. Is that similar to the case where a woman is married to two men?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Flies, for example—on the Sabbath, when you close a container, the question is whether there are flies inside it.
[Speaker A] But here there isn’t some added possibility that something will happen. It’s fixed and remains; that’s its essence.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but there you’re mixing things up. There it’s in the laws of an unintended act. And the question whether it is a doubt or not a doubt is not discussed under the laws of doubt; it is discussed under the laws of an unintended act. Because if there is no doubt, then it is an inevitable result, and therefore the fact that it is unintended still doesn’t exempt you.
[Speaker A] The woman where you don’t know whether she is married to… I have a case here involving two brothers, and there the doubt is in reality, meaning…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but that’s an ordinary doubt. It’s not an unintended act. Right. Ah, you mean—I understand—you mean betrothal that does not permit intercourse. One who married one of two sisters. Okay.
[Speaker A] And he came and said, “I betrothed one of them”?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there it is a definite prohibition. A definite prohibition, but a tenuous prohibition. Because basically each woman is a tenuous wife. Each one of them is definitely a tenuous wife. There there is no doubt. It’s definite. One of the proofs is that according to Maimonides, the whole discussion there never gets started. Because according to Maimonides, a Torah-level doubt is treated leniently. So why isn’t this a case of betrothal that does not permit intercourse? Because it does permit intercourse. He can have relations with her by Torah law. Only rabbinically it is forbidden. You see that according to Maimonides, in such a case by Torah law he cannot have relations with her. Why? But this is a doubt, and according to Maimonides a doubt is treated leniently. Because it’s not a doubt. It is definitely a tenuous betrothal; it is not doubtful betrothal. What?
[Speaker C] Many say that a half-measure is a prohibition in itself.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. Same idea. The same thing.
[Speaker C] There too there is the same conceptual investigation.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Whether it is an independent prohibition or whether it is an extension of the prohibition of pork. Only there, of course, it is not a warning lest you come to the prohibition of pork, but perhaps an extension of the prohibition of pork—depending on how you understand it. Actually even that’s not quite right, because there are two explanations in the Talmud in Yoma for a half-measure. One is, “Any amount of forbidden fat is forbidden fat”—they derive it from a verse; doesn’t matter. And the explanation brought there is that it is “fit to combine.” A half-measure—if there is another half-measure, then you reach the full measure. The question is how you understand that. Rabbi Shimon Shkop claims that this is only an indication. It is not a decree lest. Meaning, it is not that you are forbidden to eat a half-measure because maybe you’ll eat another half-measure and reach the full prohibition. Rather, he argues that since in the full prohibition… since in a half-measure there is the quality of the prohibition just as in the full prohibition, only the quantity is lacking, therefore there is clearly a definite prohibition here. You won’t get punished because the quantity is lacking. But then it really isn’t a protective decree. It isn’t a concern. For example, if you ate a half-measure at the very end of Yom Kippur, at the very last moment, there’s no concern that you’ll eat another half-measure within that Yom Kippur. According to Rabbi Shimon, you still violated the Torah prohibition of a half-measure. Because the half-measure itself contains the quality of the prohibition. I don’t need there to be any practical possibility of eating another half-measure. That’s only a hypothetical test case. Since if you eat another half-measure you will violate the actual full prohibition, that is an indication that even when you eat a half-measure, you have violated the prohibition.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Anyway, in the first section—so far we’ve spoken about the laws of doubt in general, and I noted the issue of doubt concerning impurity. Now in the second section he speaks about exceptional doubts. There are two types of exceptional doubts. Doubt concerning impurity is one, and we discussed above whether it is really exceptional or not; according to Maimonides it seems that it is not exceptional, fine. And doubt concerning a mamzer. The Talmud in Kiddushin says that a doubtful mamzer is not a mamzer; a doubtful mamzer is treated leniently. “The Merciful One said a definite mamzer, and not a doubtful mamzer.”
[Speaker R] And that’s enough from the verse—
[Speaker C] “A mamzer shall not enter”—not a doubtful mamzer.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, as we said: the Merciful One said a definite mamzer, and not a doubtful mamzer.
[Speaker R] What is a doubtful mamzer?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, whether he is a mamzer or not.
[Speaker R] Whether she committed adultery or not?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand. You don’t know whether he is his father’s son or the son of someone who committed adultery with his mother, for example. So let’s say there is no presumption here, never mind that for the moment, because often there are presumptions and so on. In any case, a doubtful mamzer is not a mamzer—that’s what the Talmud says. I’ll perhaps add another introduction.
[Speaker F] There are—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Already among the medieval authorities, and also later authorities, many argue—Rashba, for example, argues against Maimonides from the sugya of the doubtful mamzer. Because Maimonides says that Torah-level doubts are treated leniently according to the basic law, right? By Torah law it is lenient; only rabbinically must one be stringent. And if so, why do we need a verse about a doubtful mamzer to be lenient? In all doubtful cases we are lenient. What is special about a doubtful mamzer that requires a verse? According to Rashba, who says that a Torah-level doubt is treated stringently, then regarding a mamzer there is a verse that says that here the doubt is lenient. But according to Maimonides, for whom all Torah-level doubts are lenient, why do we need a verse about a doubtful mamzer?
[Speaker C] Why bring it? It’s for its own matter, and from it we learn the teaching; that doesn’t mean it’s entirely unnecessary.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand.
[Speaker C] They say, “A mamzer shall not enter the congregation of the Lord.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but why—
[Speaker C] The Torah brings a verse—why does the Talmud bring a verse?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not why Scripture says it, not why the Torah wrote it—that’s not the question I’m asking. I’m asking why the Talmud learned from this verse that a doubtful mamzer is treated leniently. There is a general rule that a Torah-level doubt is treated leniently—a general rule, not something that pertains specifically to a mamzer. I’ll tell you what Maimonides would answer. It’s interesting, because the medieval and later authorities ask this against Maimonides and there are mountains of answers—soon you’ll also see in Shev Shema’tata how Maimonides is reconciled, okay? But in Maimonides’ own responsum there is an explicit treatment of this question. And not as a question at all. He brings this sugya in Kiddushin as a source for his position. Not only is it not difficult for his position—it is the source. Why? Think about what the Talmud says there: “The Merciful One said a definite mamzer, and not a doubtful mamzer.” So by that logic, everywhere else too: the Merciful One said definite forbidden fat and not doubtful forbidden fat; definite pork and not doubtful pork. What is special about the verse regarding mamzer that isn’t true of every other verse? It says “mamzer”—that’s what it says. What are you telling me? A definite mamzer and not a doubtful mamzer? Meaning, every concept that appears in the Torah—you are basically telling me that it applies only when it is definite, but not when it is doubtful, right? There is nothing special in the verse. So Maimonides says, on the contrary: this Talmudic statement teaches us the general rule that a Torah-level doubt is treated leniently. That is my source, says Maimonides.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is an interesting question why one needs a source. Because what’s the problem? As long as it wasn’t forbidden, it’s permitted. Why do you need a source that a Torah-level doubt is lenient? You need a source to say it is stringent, not a source to say it is lenient.
[Speaker C] A doubtful transgression. I didn’t understand. If it’s a doubtful transgression—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The question is whether relations with him are forbidden—whether relations with him are forbidden, that’s the question. So Maimonides basically says that this Talmudic statement is really his source. Not the verse. The verse itself says nothing at all. The verse just says “mamzer,” that’s all. The Talmud understands that it means a mamzer and not a doubtful mamzer. Why? Because the Talmud assumes that a Torah-level doubt is treated leniently. It assumes it; it does not derive it from the verse. On the contrary—because of that assumption, it says: a definite mamzer and not a doubtful one. So it’s not a midrashic derivation at all; it’s simply the general rule that a Torah-level doubt is treated leniently. Okay? That’s what Maimonides says in a responsum. You can say many things, but Maimonides goes the other way. After all, what is the question against him? That this is not something special. Because according to Maimonides, a Torah-level doubt is lenient everywhere, so why do I need a verse about mamzer as if it were something special? It isn’t special. Here too we go leniently, just like throughout the Torah. What’s the problem? So Maimonides says: correct, it really isn’t special—that is my source; I learn it from there.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, this—we spoke about it once, I think, I don’t remember where. Because in the yeshivot too they think that everything that is written—meaning, every verse teaches the opposite of what it says. That’s the rule. Why? Because if it says that a doubtful mamzer is treated leniently, that proves that generally a doubt is treated stringently. Therefore you need a verse to teach that a doubtful mamzer is treated leniently. Maimonides says: what are you talking about? If there is a verse saying a doubtful case is lenient, then the rule is that doubtful cases are lenient. Why assume that every verse teaches the opposite of what it says? Yes, now—I’m joking a bit about this, because in the Talmud itself there are sometimes derivations like that and derivations the other way. And I explained that there are places where it is correct to do that; there are places where, when a derivation is brought to you, you understand that it is exceptional and therefore needed a derivation, and generally the law is not that way, yes? Abraham and Sarah—that’s the example I always bring, right? A dear young scholar argues with his wife. So his wife tells him: after all, it says in the Torah, “Everything Sarah tells you, listen to her voice”—you have to listen to me. So her husband says to her: fool of the world, why did the Holy One, blessed be He, tell Abraham, “Everything Sarah tells you, listen to her voice”? Because generally one does not have to listen to women. Therefore a special novelty was needed that our father Abraham does have to listen to Sarah. Yes, that’s the yeshiva style of reasoning.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So in short, I think this depends on the question of what you would have said without the verse. But all this doesn’t concern us. And why not? Because the derivation “a definite mamzer and not a doubtful mamzer” is not a derivation at all. There’s no—what is this, a verbal analogy? What is it? What is written in the verse is “mamzer.” That’s what is written. What are you deriving there? This is not a derivation; it is a straightforward interpretation of the text. If it says “mamzer,” then it means a definite mamzer and not a doubtful mamzer. That’s all. It’s not a derivation at all. So there is no need to ask whether it came to teach an exception or whether it came to teach the rule. It didn’t come to teach anything. It simply comes to tell you how to read a verse. Read every verse that way. There is nothing here. I think Maimonides is the simple plain meaning, and everyone gets tangled up with this, and they built all sorts of elaborate structures around the issue—and in a moment you’ll see, Shev Shema’tata will also discuss this. I return to Shema’tata:
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Let it be clarified regarding a Torah-level doubt”—he wrote this at age thirteen, after all; respect—the initial version of Shev Shema’tata. “Let it be clarified regarding a Torah-level doubt in prohibitions, doubt concerning impurity in the private domain, doubt concerning impurity in the public domain, and double doubts. We hold that a Torah-level doubt is treated stringently, and the view of Maimonides in his great code, in several places, is that it is stringent only by the words of the sages, and by Torah law all doubts are permitted. And so too is the view of Raavad in the laws of kilayim. And Ran and Rashba disagree on this. Where, by the way, is Rashba? Kiddushin 73, on this very Talmudic statement of ‘a definite mamzer and not a doubtful mamzer.’ Rashba raises the difficulty from there against Maimonides. They disagree on this and proved that what they said—that a Torah-level doubt is treated stringently—is by Torah law. Pri Chadash in Yoreh De’ah discusses this at length,” and so on. “See what Pri Chadash wrote, and from the law that in a doubt concerning impurity in the public domain its doubtful case is pure, one cannot infer from it support for Maimonides’ view.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does he mean? A doubt concerning impurity in the public domain is pure—apparently that is proof for Maimonides. That’s what Pri Chadash says. Why is that proof for Maimonides? I would have said the opposite. If there is a special rule that a doubt concerning impurity in the public domain is pure, then apparently in general we needed this novelty; apparently in general doubt should have been treated stringently, right? What? Yes, by Torah law. You don’t need a verse to exempt from a rabbinic rule. So why does Pri Chadash here raise the claim that from here there is proof for Maimonides? So first of all, as I said before, it’s not true that every law necessarily teaches the opposite of what it says. But here it’s even more than that, because the special law in cases of impurity doubt—this is why I gave the introduction—the special law in cases of impurity doubt is, plainly speaking, the law of impurity in the private domain, not the public domain. Impurity doubt in the public domain is the ordinary rule. Impurity doubt in the private domain is learned from sotah. Okay? So basically what one should have said is this: doubt in general is treated leniently, and impurity doubt in the public domain is like all other doubtful cases—it too is lenient. And in the private domain there is a special novelty learned from sotah, that we go stringently. And if so, that really is proof for Maimonides. Because we see that the ordinary laws of doubt are lenient, and the law of impurity doubt in the public domain is simply part of the ordinary laws of doubt, as we saw in Maimonides, while impurity doubt in the private domain is a special novelty that came to teach only about itself and not about the general rule: in impurity doubt in the private domain, we go stringently. That really is a special law learned from sotah, a Talmudic tradition. Okay? And therefore Pri Chadash says that this is apparently proof for Maimonides: that impurity doubt in the public domain is pure. Why is there no difficulty against Maimonides from impurity doubt in the private domain, where you are impure? Because there we know that it is exceptional. On the contrary—from there Maimonides will indeed say that although generally in the laws of doubt we go leniently, the Torah introduced a novelty that impurity doubt in the private domain is exceptional—there we go stringently. Because the novelty really was said about the private domain; the novelty was not said about the public domain. The public domain is the ordinary rule of the laws of doubt. It’s just that the novelty learned from sotah in the private domain was not said there, that’s all. Okay? So in that sense Pri Chadash is correct in his initial assumption, yes, that from here there is proof for Maimonides. That’s the simple reading. Now he says—but there is no proof. Why?
[Speaker A] Because why does Maimonides need the reasoning from Passover? What?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why did Maimonides need the reasoning from Passover? Because, as Rabbi Shimon Shkop said, it comes to tell you why here they did not say that you should still be stringent rabbinically. Only rabbinically. That’s what Rabbi Shimon Shkop says: that we really learn it like in Passover, but it’s a rabbinic rule. Indeed, what the Pri Chadash wrote and so on—it cannot be inferred from there in support of Maimonides’ reasoning, because one could say that there it is different, since he has a presumption of purity and we leave him in that status. A person about whom there is a doubt whether he became impure in the public domain—beforehand he was pure, he has a presumption of purity, and now a doubt arose; you don’t know whether he became impure or not. So there you maintain his prior status. But without a presumption, if you just have ordinary laws of doubt, it could be that you would go stringently and not leniently. Therefore, you can’t prove from there like Maimonides.
And also, it cannot be inferred so as to raise a difficulty against Maimonides from doubtful impurity in the private domain, where the doubt is treated as impure. Now that’s the other side of the coin. There is no proof for Maimonides from doubtful impurity in the public domain—but is there an objection to Maimonides from doubtful impurity in the private domain? Because there we see that the doubt is treated as impure, and Maimonides says that a Torah-level doubt is treated leniently. So he says no. Even according to Rashba, the verse regarding impurity would still be difficult—why do I need it? After all, even according to Rashba, who holds that a doubtful prohibition is stringent by Torah law, then why do I need a verse for doubtful impurity in the private domain? Just derive it from the fact that whenever there’s doubt, you have to be stringent. Why is a special verse needed?
What Rashba challenged Maimonides with from the case of a doubtful mamzer is difficult for Rashba himself from doubtful impurity in the private domain. What would Rashba answer? He would answer that regarding impurity there is a novelty: this doubt is treated as certainty, unlike other doubtful prohibitions where you have to be stringent, but it’s not certainty. We’ll later see the practical difference, but that’s how Rashba would answer. And if Rashba can answer that way, then Maimonides can also answer that way.
Is there a difficulty for Maimonides from doubtful impurity in the private domain, where obviously we are stringent? We’re stringent because it’s a special rule. It comes to teach that here you must be stringent, even though ordinarily in a case of doubt you should be lenient. According to Rashba, it comes to teach that it is like certainty; according to Maimonides, it comes to teach the very fact that one must be stringent here, because ordinarily one need not be stringent in doubtful prohibitions. But it’s the same logic, and therefore you can’t challenge him from doubtful impurity in the private domain.
Rather, the verse was needed so that you should not say: place him on his prior status and say he is pure. It therefore teaches us that this is a scriptural decree: even though there is a presumption of purity, in the private domain he is impure. And so too according to Maimonides—even though the Merciful One permitted every doubt—here, regarding doubtful impurity in the private domain, it is a scriptural decree that the doubt is impure.
And if you ask: let us derive it from the suspected adulteress, who is forbidden because of doubt—there’s no difficulty, because there there are grounds for suspicion. You can’t learn from the suspected adulteress to the rest of the world, because there we have grounds to suspect, some reason to be concerned, and therefore we are stringent. You can’t infer from there that ordinary doubts require stringency.
Now, as for what the Pri Chadash wrote—that you can’t infer anything from doubtful impurity in the public domain, because there it is different since there is a presumption of purity—it is clear in several places in the Talmud that in the public domain a doubtful case is pure even when there is no presumption of purity. So the Pri Chadash is not correct. We find in the Talmud in many places that with doubtful impurity in the public domain, even when there is no presumption of purity, we go leniently. The sources he brings aren’t important right now, but that’s his point. And if so, you can’t say what the Pri Chadash says—that there we only say it when there is a presumption of purity, so yes, there we go leniently, but you can’t learn from there that every doubtful prohibition is lenient, because that’s only when there is a presumption of purity. That’s not true. We see in the Talmud that doubtful impurity in the public domain is lenient even without a presumption of purity. So if that’s the case, then yes, one can learn from there that doubt is treated leniently, and it is indeed evidence for Maimonides.
And what he wrote—that from doubtful impurity in the private domain there is likewise no challenge to Maimonides—that really isn’t difficult in any case. For even though all doubts are permitted by Torah law, regarding doubtful impurity in the private domain this is not because of doubt; rather, Scripture made the doubt in the private domain into certainty. And this is a halakhah learned from the suspected adulteress, that it should be treated as definite impurity. What is he saying? There is no objection to Maimonides from doubtful impurity—exactly. Really, regarding Maimonides you don’t even need to say this. In my opinion it would make more sense to write this about Rashba, not about Maimonides. Because for Maimonides there’s no need to say that. What do you mean? Ordinary doubtful prohibitions are treated leniently by Torah law, so what does it mean that doubtful impurity in the private domain is treated stringently? Because there is a verse saying that there one must be stringent. The verse doesn’t teach that it is certainty; it teaches that there one must be stringent.
According to Rashba, who says that ordinary doubtful prohibitions are stringent anyway, then what is special about doubtful impurity such that the verse tells me to be stringent? That’s true everywhere. So there the novelty is that it is treated as certainty. According to Maimonides, it is enough to say that the novelty is that one must be stringent, not necessarily that it is certainty. From here it emerges that maybe the dispute between Rashba and Maimonides is over how I really relate to doubtful impurity. According to Rashba, I relate to doubtful impurity as certainty, because that itself is what was newly taught in the case of the suspected adulteress and in impurity: that in a doubtful case, even though ordinarily we are always stringent, here there is a special novelty in impurity and the suspected adulteress—that doubtful impurity in the private domain is not merely something where you have to be stringent, but is treated as certainty. Whereas according to Maimonides there is no need to say that, because according to Maimonides an ordinary doubt is lenient. So what did the Torah newly teach from the suspected adulteress—that doubtful impurity in the private domain is stringent? Very simply, the very fact that one must be stringent, not that it becomes certainty.
So if I continue this line of thought, then apparently there is a dispute between Maimonides and Rashba as to how to relate to a doubtful suspected adulteress or doubtful impurity in the private domain. Is it an obligation to be stringent by Torah law, or is it regarded in our eyes as certainty? That’s the other approach in the case of the suspected adulteress, okay?
And what he wrote—that Radbaz raised a difficulty from the suspected adulteress, but the suspected adulteress is different because there are grounds for suspicion—according to that, you’ll have a difficulty, because all doubtful impurity in the private domain is learned from the suspected adulteress, so how can you derive from the suspected adulteress if it is different because there are grounds for suspicion? So “grounds for suspicion” play no role at all. Rather, we do not learn from the suspected adulteress in that sense, because there it is a scriptural decree regarding impurity, and one does not learn prohibitions from impurity. And then he brings the challenge to Maimonides from the doubtful mamzer.
And they asked on Maimonides—let’s read it anyway: they challenged Maimonides from doubtful mamzerhood, where the Merciful One explicitly permitted it, as is known in the chapter “Ten Lineages.” And why do I need a verse? Since all doubts are only rabbinic. What everyone challenged Maimonides with—yes, Rashba and others. Why is a verse needed to permit a doubtful mamzer? All doubts are permitted by Torah law anyway. So we already discussed that this is Maimonides’ source. But I said that the commentators on Maimonides didn’t know that answer of Maimonides; it appears in a responsum of Maimonides. Those later authorities didn’t know the responsa of Maimonides, and so all the medieval and later authorities all engage in intricate discussion about this.
The Maharit, in Yoreh De’ah, answered that when the Merciful One permits a doubtful mamzer, He permits him completely—so that he should have the status of certainty and not merely the status of doubt. And the practical difference is that he would be permitted both to an ordinary Jewish woman and to a mamzeret at the same time. Because if it were only by reason of doubt, then you’d have a contradiction: you can’t permit him both to an ordinary Jewish woman and to a mamzeret. A doubtful mamzer is a doubtful Israelite. On the side that he is an Israelite, he is forbidden to a mamzeret; on the side that he is a mamzer, he is forbidden to an ordinary Jewish woman. So you would have to forbid him to both of them at once.
And he says: if you hold that the impurity is definite impurity—that is, he is definitely treated as certainly valid, a doubtful mamzer is certainly valid—then you would forbid him to a mamzeret, but you would not forbid him to an ordinary Jewish woman. If you forbid him to both, that means the obligation is merely an obligation to be stringent, but he is not regarded as a definite mamzer. Okay? Even though that creates a contradiction, see there.
And it is difficult: if so, why do I need two verses? One to permit a mamzer with a shetuki, and one to permit a shetuki among Israelites. Yes—a shetuki is a doubtful mamzer. Why do I need two verses—one for a mamzer with a shetuki and one for a shetuki with an Israelite? One verse should be enough, because that one verse would basically tell me that here we are dealing with doubt, and because of doubt you would also have to forbid a shetukit to an Israelite and a shetuki to an Israelite woman—yes, a mamzer with a shetukit and a shetuki among Israelites. So he says: why do I need two verses? Rather, it is to permit him with an ordinary Jewish woman and with a mamzeret. And if so, from one verse both laws would follow, and from two we learn this. Okay?
He says that because there are two verses, apparently you see that a doubtful mamzer was not defined as “not a mamzer”; rather, he was defined as a case of doubt in which you can be lenient, but not that he is definitely a valid Israelite. Because if he were definitely a valid Israelite, then he would be permitted to an Israelite woman; he would not be forbidden to an Israelite woman. Actually, we’ll see a similar difficulty later in Rabbi Chaim on our Gemara, and I’ll say there why I don’t agree with the logic of this difficulty. But yes, that’s what he says.
And there is a difficulty with the words of Maharit, who answers that the verse was needed in order to permit a doubtful mamzer as certainty. Maharit said that the need to permit a doubtful mamzer is to tell you that a doubtful mamzer is permitted as certainty, not because of doubt. According to Maimonides, all Torah prohibitions are permitted in doubt; with mamzerhood the novelty is that it is certainty. In Maimonides this doesn’t really fit; it’s mistaken in terms of Maimonides. And that’s how Maharit explains Maimonides, okay? So if it is as certainty, then why do I need two verses to permit him with an Israelite woman and with a mamzeret? Why do I need two verses to permit him with an Israelite woman and with a mamzeret, since from one verse both laws would follow?
All right, we’ll see this later, because I think it may be that we learn it from that very fact—that they brought two verses. You ask me, why are two verses needed? Really, if there had been one verse, that would be enough. But once they brought two verses, I would have thought not; the second verse comes and says no, no, he is entirely fine, he is an Israelite in every respect. And therefore you do need both verses to teach me that very point. Fine, we’ll see that later in our topic and then I’ll explain it more.
In any case, maybe one more comment still on the general laws of doubt. I once heard this from Rabbi Hershel Schachter, the rosh yeshiva at Yeshiva University. He once came to Yerucham and gave us a lecture there. I heard it from him, and since then I have not found the source he cited, but I assume he certainly had some source. He brings an article there by Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman in Merbei Torah, the journal that Rabbi Elchanan edited in Baranovich. He has an article there about all the laws of doubt in which the Torah itself says to be lenient. There’s a whole list of such cases: doubtful mourning leniently, doubtful mamzer, doubtful firstborn, doubtful orlah outside the Land of Israel, doubtful impurity in the public domain—a whole list of doubts that are Torah-level, and nevertheless one may be lenient.
Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman wants to argue—he brings a Ran at the end of the first chapter of Kiddushin—that the Ran says there that if I take definite orlah outside the Land of Israel, I am allowed to feed my friend definite orlah. Even though orlah outside the Land of Israel is forbidden by a halakhah given to Moses at Sinai, if I now take orlah—definite orlah, not doubtful orlah, okay?—I can feed my friend definite orlah. Why? Because doubtful orlah outside the Land of Israel is lenient. Again: definite orlah is stringent, doubtful orlah is lenient. The Ran says that if I take definite orlah and feed it to my friend, that is fine, it is permitted for me.
[Speaker H] To feed your friend and yourself?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Myself, no, because I know that it’s orlah. Definite orlah is forbidden.
[Speaker H] The point here regarding your friend isn’t about…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? Because my friend doesn’t know that it’s orlah, so for him it’s doubtful. And doubtful orlah is permitted. I think it’s definite orlah, and therefore it’s forbidden for me. But if I feed it to my friend, he doesn’t know that it’s orlah—it’s doubtful for him—therefore it is permitted for me to feed him.
Now understand: this is almost impossible to say, because after all this is definite orlah. From my perspective it is definite orlah, so I am violating the prohibition of causing him to stumble. It doesn’t matter what he knows; I know that this is definite orlah, and I am feeding my friend a prohibition.
[Speaker A] Is this talking about “these and those,” if someone speaks of a transgression, causing someone to stumble…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Someone, yes, maybe it will connect to that. But here it’s not that he thinks it’s permitted; he is simply missing factual information. It’s not a halakhic dispute. There it is very hard to say such a thing in the simple sense. Therefore Rabbi Elchanan suggests an approach that may be even harder to say—but in order to explain this, that’s what he claims.
Again, I haven’t seen the text inside; I heard it in Schachter’s lecture already, I don’t know, 25 years ago, something like that. Yes, it stuck in my head because it was interesting. So he claims that the prohibition in mamzerhood or in all these cases, or in orlah outside the Land of Israel, is not a prohibition on the orlah at all. Rather, the prohibition is on the subjective experience of the individual when he eats orlah. What is forbidden to you is not eating orlah; what is forbidden to you is undergoing the experience of eating orlah. When you put orlah into your mouth, what you subjectively undergo is the prohibition itself. Therefore doubtful orlah is permitted. Why is doubtful orlah permitted? An ordinary doubt now, not connected to feeding someone else. A regular doubt: I now doubt whether this is orlah or not—why is it permitted? Because I do not know that this is orlah; I am in doubt, I do not know. If I don’t know, then there is no prohibition here. It’s not a doubt—there is no prohibition at all. Because the entire prohibition is only if I know that this is orlah and I eat it.
But if that is the understanding, then it is also permitted to feed you definite orlah. Because if you don’t know that it’s orlah, then as far as causing someone to stumble is concerned, of course that’s “do not place a stumbling block.” But if you don’t know that it’s orlah, and the prohibition is not in eating orlah at all, then eating orlah is permitted. What is forbidden is to undergo the experience of eating orlah, and you did not undergo that experience because you don’t know that it’s orlah. If you didn’t commit the prohibition, then I didn’t cause you to stumble. The experience—the person’s knowledge—is part of the definition of the prohibition itself. Not just a condition regarding whether you are acting intentionally or unintentionally, to what extent you are… Usually a person’s knowledge is relevant on the plane of culpability. Meaning: whether you violated a prohibition or not does not depend on what you know. If you ate pork, you ate pork. Wait a second—but if you didn’t know it was pork, then you’re not culpable, you’re an unwitting sinner or something like that. Meaning, the question of what you know is not connected to whether you committed the transgression; it is not part of the definition of the transgression itself. It belongs to the circumstances that determine the degree of your guilt in the transgression you committed.
And his claim is that in prohibitions of this kind, your knowledge is part of the definition of the prohibition itself, not just a condition of culpability. If there is no knowledge, there is no transgression at all. Not that you are not guilty of a transgression, but rather there is no transgression—you didn’t commit one. What?
[Speaker U] With all the knowledge—the force isn’t there at all, there’s no transgression.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not like one under coercion. Under coercion there is a transgression, you’re just not guilty. Here you’re not under coercion—you didn’t commit a transgression. You ate orlah, but there is no prohibition of eating orlah; there is a prohibition of knowing that you are eating orlah and eating it. That didn’t happen here, so you didn’t violate anything. And if you didn’t violate anything, then there is also no prohibition on the one who caused it—you didn’t cause him to stumble into a prohibition. Because “do not place a stumbling block” is not about experiences; it is a prohibition on actions. The prohibition of orlah is about experiences, but “do not place a stumbling block” is not. Knowledge is part of the definition of the prohibition.
[Speaker K] Yes. Why? I don’t know.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly—that’s the… no, that’s exactly what Rabbi Elchanan is trying to solve, that’s the question he’s trying to solve.
[Speaker K] Without Rabbi Elchanan’s premise, you…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] are right. So what if you don’t know? I do know. This is definite orlah. Why in the world should it be permitted for me to feed it to you? It’s not doubtful, right? So he says no: the issue here is not the laws of doubt; it’s in the definition of the prohibition itself. There are certain prohibitions that are defined according to the subject. The subject’s experience defines whether he violated a prohibition or not. So it doesn’t matter at all whether your lack of knowledge counts as some kind of doubt; I’m not discussing the laws of doubt here. This isn’t a discussion about the laws of doubt. It’s a discussion about the definition of the prohibition. And if you don’t know, there is no prohibition.
By the way, according to this—and this is, in my opinion, the big challenge to him—we have now found a solution to all mamzer status and all mamzerim in Israel. A doubtful mamzer is treated leniently, right? True, there is a rabbinic stringency in matters of lineage, but by Torah law a doubtful mamzer is treated leniently. A definite mamzer, not a doubtful mamzer, right? So I can take a woman who is definitely a mamzeret and arrange a match between her and my friend, an ordinary kosher Jew, dance at the wedding, and even officiate the marriage ceremony, without telling him a thing. Why? Because the prohibition of mamzerhood too, like doubtful orlah outside the Land of Israel—like orlah outside the Land of Israel—is also a subjective prohibition, because this same rule is said about it, that even though it is Torah law, we still go leniently. So if he doesn’t know she is a mamzeret, there is no prohibition. Even though I know with certainty that she is a mamzeret—she is not a doubtful mamzeret, she is definitely a mamzeret.
No—Rabbi Elchanan, the Ran says this about orlah. Rabbi Elchanan claims that in all prohibitions whose doubtful cases are treated leniently by Torah law, that is what is being said: that basically these are subjective prohibitions. And in the end, he did commit a prohibition. What?
[Speaker C] There is truth. No, there isn’t truth. The truth is that she is a mamzeret, so what?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course she is a mamzeret.
[Speaker C] But there is no prohibition against marrying a mamzeret.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Where is there a prohibition against marrying a mamzeret? There is a prohibition against undergoing the experience of marrying a mamzeret. And when I know she is a mamzeret and I marry her—
[Speaker H] —I violated a prohibition. If I don’t know she is a mamzeret, then I didn’t violate a prohibition.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] At all. That’s not the point. It doesn’t depend on whether the truth is that she is a mamzeret. Yes, the truth is that she is a mamzeret—that’s obvious. I didn’t understand.
[Speaker C] I thought the “experience” idea was only for “do not place a stumbling block.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The opposite—it’s not for “do not place a stumbling block,” the opposite. For “do not place a stumbling block,” it doesn’t help that the prohibition is merely experiential. But because for the person being caused to stumble the prohibition is experiential, and no such experience occurred, there is no prohibition—and therefore there is also no “do not place a stumbling block.” Not that “do not place a stumbling block” applies only to experiences. Rather, once there was no experience, there was no prohibition, and therefore there is no “do not place a stumbling block.” There is no such definition in “do not place a stumbling block” that if it is only experiential then there is no issue. No—that was said only about those prohibitions whose doubtful cases are treated leniently.
[Speaker C] So that’s the novelty? To violate with a mamzeret like that? That’s a new interpretation of “experience.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes.
[Speaker C] Only someone whom you…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] know is a mamzeret, and you marry her anyway—that’s when you violated a prohibition.
[Speaker C] And if you don’t…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] know she is a mamzeret, it’s not that you violated a prohibition unintentionally; you didn’t violate a prohibition at all. Because if you don’t know, it isn’t defined as a prohibition. And does the mamzeret herself violate? That depends whether she knows or not. If she knows, then yes. But does the mamzeret violate? No—and let’s say for the sake of discussion that she also doesn’t know she is a mamzeret. I know she is a mamzeret; she doesn’t know.
So perhaps doubtful impurity in the public domain is also like this. Maybe doubtful impurity in the public domain is also some kind of subjective prohibition. Then in a case of doubt—and the practical difference would be that I would be allowed to make someone impure with definite impurity in the public domain as long as he doesn’t know that the thing is impure.
[Speaker V] I don’t know, it’s hard for me. They told me. Who says that it’s a doubt?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying it’s not a doubt. What did you think? It’s not a doubt—I answered you earlier. You’re right, it’s not a doubt. But still, you don’t know. So if you don’t know, you didn’t violate a prohibition. Not because of the laws of doubt, but because if you don’t know, you didn’t violate a prohibition. That’s it.
[Speaker S] But when would you say that this applies only…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] To prohibitions that are not subjective prohibitions? With pork. The prohibition of pork is not against the experience of eating pork; the prohibition is against the act of eating pork. So now, if I cause you to eat definite pork, then of course I violated “do not place a stumbling block,” even if you don’t know it is pork. Because with pork, your knowledge is not part of the definition of the prohibition. At most, if you didn’t know, then you are not culpable because you committed the prohibition under coercion, by mistake, or something like that—but you still committed the prohibition. So if I caused you to do it, I violated “do not place a stumbling block.”
[Speaker T] Here Rabbi Elchanan—Rabbi Elchanan is lenient in cases of doubt.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He explains that they are subjective prohibitions. Yes, knowledge is part of the definition of the prohibition. That’s his claim. In my eyes it’s a stunning innovation. I certainly would not rely on it in any way for Jewish law; this innovation is far-fetched. I’m only mentioning it as a philosophical supplement. Yes, there’s a whole philosophy here. What? One can study these things as philosophy, again.
[Speaker W] Analytical learning is naturally that way.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Analytical learning, generally speaking, could be taught in a philosophy department. That’s because these are philosophical topics—almost all the analytical topics.
Okay, one second, that’s all. So now I want to return to the question with which I opened, and I no longer have much time to deal with it, so we’ll continue next time. The question is: when I speak about a doubtful suspected adulteress—yes, a doubtful suspected adulteress—or doubtful impurity in the private domain, we are stringent. We learn that from the suspected adulteress. Why, or what is the definition? What does “stringent” mean? Does “stringent” mean she is definitely treated as one who committed adultery? Or does “stringent” mean that I have to act stringently because of the laws of doubt? It is doubtful whether she committed adultery or not, and I have to act stringently as if she certainly did, but all that is only because of doubt.
I already said that we certainly do not punish her as a definite adulteress, because if there are not two witnesses, then we do not execute a person, even if I know he committed the offense. Without two witnesses, I will not kill him. So take punishment off the table. I am not dealing with punishment; I am dealing with other implications.
So one might have wanted to tie this to everything we saw earlier, right? Because we have a special novelty that a doubtful suspected adulteress in the private domain is impure, doubtful impurity in the private domain is impure, and we learn it from the suspected adulteress. According to Maimonides, the ordinary laws of doubt are lenient, so here, in the case of the suspected adulteress, it was newly taught that here we go stringently, right?
[Speaker S] But…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If we follow Maimonides—yes—but “we go stringently” means that it was not newly taught that it becomes certainty; rather, it was newly taught that we go stringently, because ordinarily we do not go stringently. But according to Rashba, what was newly taught here? After all, in every doubtful prohibition we already go stringently anyway. So what was newly taught in the doubtful suspected adulteress, doubtful impurity in the private domain? That it is like certainty and not like doubt. So in the straightforward sense it seems that this is the dispute between Rashba and Maimonides.
This question is discussed by Rabbi Chaim. In Rabbi Chaim’s stencil edition, on the beginning of this chapter, he asks the following question: Here, essentially, the Torah’s novelty is that a doubt is like certainty. We may ask: does this mean that the Torah taught that from doubt we treat the law as certainty—for example, in doubtful impurity, that from doubt we treat it as though she actually had intercourse, and consequently she has the law of a married woman who committed adultery? Or did the Torah teach that because of doubt all the laws of a married woman who certainly committed adultery apply to her, but not that she actually committed adultery?
The question is: when the Torah tells me to treat her as if she committed adultery, does it mean that from my perspective she really did commit adultery—that this is the conclusion, that she committed adultery? Or does it mean no—I still remain in doubt, I don’t know whether she committed adultery or not. After all, the matter is doubtful; I don’t know. But halakhically I must apply to her all the laws stringently as though she committed adultery. We’ll soon see.
So what he is asking here—I already said that in my view, based on the analysis of Shev Shema’tata, and I think generally this is very plausible—it is simply a dispute between Maimonides and Rashba, okay? We will indeed see that Maimonides views it as doubt and not as certainty. We’ll see that later, so that will fit well with his approach.
But I want to say one more thing about this, and maybe with that I’ll finish, because afterward we’ll already have to enter the topic itself. You asked: what practical difference does it make? What difference does it make? In the end, if you ask me whether she committed adultery, obviously I am in doubt, right? You can’t tell me that in reality it is clear to me that she committed adultery. In reality I am in doubt; there are grounds for suspicion, I am not sure. But the instructions of Jewish law do not change my perception of reality. My perception of reality is that I am in doubt whether she committed adultery. So what is this whole conceptual inquiry about? Suddenly the whole inquiry empties out. Because what is it saying? It is basically asking whether I merely impose upon her the laws of an adulteress, or whether I really see her as an adulteress. Clearly she is not really an adulteress—that’s only the laws. What, really?
[Speaker X] Circumstantial proof here. What? Fine, we’re talking here about circumstantial proof.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’re talking here—
[Speaker X] —about circumstantial proof. That’s not the question.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The question is how I relate to that circumstantial proof. Does it resolve the doubt for me, or does it merely tell me to be stringent because there are laws of doubt? What practical difference does it make? It’s obvious that we’re talking only about legal rules. We’re not talking about reality. In reality itself, it is not like that.
For example, when people discuss whether a presumption resolves uncertainty or is only a rule of conduct—all these funny conceptual inquiries in the yeshivot—obviously it’s a rule of conduct. What is there to argue about? The fact that there was an original presumption means that now too it’s like that? It’s a rule of conduct that says: you continue the prior state until you have evidence that it changed. So what is this inquiry? And you can bring proofs this way and that way. I’m not denying that there is such an inquiry, but the way it is usually presented is nonsense.
Rather, the inquiry is about how the Torah told me to relate to it. Not an inquiry about reality. The Torah itself can tell me to relate to this under the laws of doubt, where one must go stringently; and the Torah can tell me that I must relate to it as though there were actual certainty here. The Torah does not tell me that there was really certainty. The whole inquiry is about what the rule of conduct is. Does the rule of conduct tell me: assume that the issue was resolved because there is an original presumption? Or does the rule of conduct tell me: act as if the issue was resolved? But it is all about rules of conduct. It is an inquiry between two kinds of rules of conduct.
The same thing here. Doubtful impurity in the private domain, or a doubtful suspected adulteress, is still a doubt. Why should I care that it’s in the private domain? In the case of the suspected adulteress there are at least grounds for suspicion, but with impurity I’m simply in doubt. Why in the world should I assume that this is definitely impurity? What kind of nonsense is that? In reality there is no definite impurity here; it’s a doubt. So what is there to discuss and say “definite impurity”? Obviously not. The question is whether the Torah, in its legal instruction, tells me: treat it as though it were definitely impurity. That is a legal instruction. Or whether the legal instruction says no—you must be stringent legally, but do not treat it that way. We’ll see later where the practical difference comes in. Okay? There is a halakhic practical difference here.
But I’ll say again: this does not touch reality. Why is it important to understand this? Because now it is clear that when I ask Rabbi Chaim “what practical difference does it make?” he cannot answer “for marriage betrothal.” Here that won’t help. There has to be a halakhic practical difference. Because if there is no halakhic practical difference, then there are not two sides to the inquiry. Do you understand? You can say: is she definitely an adulteress, or is it only that halakhically I see her as an adulteress? That could have a practical difference regarding betrothal, because in reality those are really two different things. Either she really committed adultery, or I only halakhically regard her as an adulteress. Even if there were no practical consequence, there would still be a question with two sides.
But if the question is entirely within the realm of legal conduct—meaning, obviously she did not definitely commit adultery. Factually it is doubtful, not certain. Is doubtful impurity in the private domain certain? Rather, what? I have two possible ways to understand a rule of conduct. But if those two possibilities say the same thing, then the rule of conduct is the same rule of conduct. So there are not two possibilities. So here it won’t help to answer: here’s a nice example of an inquiry where it won’t help to say that the practical difference is in betrothal. Apparently it seems that in every conceptual inquiry one can say that. No—in an inquiry like this, one cannot say that. Okay? It’s an interesting logical catch.
Anyway, we need to find practical differences and also see whether this question can really be resolved. So I’ll leave you in suspense.