Tractate Sotah, Chapter 5, Lesson 7 — Rabbi Michael Abraham

This transcript was produced automatically through artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

🔗 Link to the original lecture

🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, with Sarah: “Whatever Sarah tells you, listen to her voice,” exactly. So what’s going on here? Basically, Rabbi Chaim says to me like this: from the fact that we need three verses, it’s clear that what’s new here is not that she was definitely violated. Because if she had definitely been violated, one verse would have been enough. You know she was violated, so automatically all the consequences follow: she’s forbidden to her husband, forbidden to the adulterer, forbidden from terumah, and everything else, right? Therefore, from the fact that three verses are needed, it’s clear that this isn’t certainty but doubt. Okay? In other words, what is he saying? From the fact that there are three verses saying you have to be stringent out of doubt, we learn that you don’t have to be stringent out of doubt. Meaning: only in these three written cases and not in all the others. Right? Only Sarah—therefore a novelty was introduced that only with Sarah; so in general, don’t listen to your wife. Right? That’s the… But that’s not correct. After all, it could be that that itself is what was introduced. Why did they say these three verses? To tell you not to think like Rabbi Chaim. If there were only one verse, you’d say, okay, maybe it’s an obligation to be stringent out of doubt. But when you have three verses, what are they telling you? Apparently the woman was definitely violated, not only possibly violated. And therefore in all these consequences you have to go stringently. In other words, Rabbi Chaim takes the initial assumption and builds from it, derives conclusions from it. Take the conclusion of the Talmud—the conclusion of the Talmud may say exactly the opposite. Three verses were needed because there was an initial assumption like Rabbi Chaim. So they wrote three verses to tell you: no, this is a law of certainty. It’s not a stringency because of doubt. Again: Rabbi Chaim says if it were a law of certainty, three verses wouldn’t be necessary. If you told me one verse saying that she’s forbidden to her husband, okay, I’d learn from there that she’s forbidden to the adulterer and also forbidden from terumah, right? Because if it’s certain, that means she was actually violated. And a woman who was violated is also forbidden to the adulterer and forbidden from terumah. That’s obvious, right? So what? From the fact that three verses are needed, apparently we aren’t saying that she was definitely violated. Rather, we need to be stringent out of doubt. And if that’s so, then wherever it’s written we’re stringent, and where it isn’t written we aren’t stringent, because we never decided that she was actually violated—we’re only being stringent because of doubt. Okay, but all that is only in the initial assumption—meaning, why do we need three verses? But after the three verses were written, maybe that itself is what they came to teach. Come see: in all these aspects you have to be stringent; apparently the assumption is that she really was violated, and that’s why in all these three aspects you have to be stringent. That itself is what the Torah came to teach with those three verses. Yes, you always learn things from the initial assumption, but you always have to take into account that maybe that itself is what changed in the conclusion. You’re bringing me proofs from the initial assumption. Sometimes you can do that, but it isn’t simple; sometimes you can say that that itself is what was newly introduced.

[Speaker E] According to the idea that keeps recurring here, that these are two separate matters—the issue of impurity and the issue that she’s forbidden to her husband are two separate matters—then Rabbi Chaim’s question also isn’t relevant, his argument isn’t relevant, because you need all three since each one speaks about a different matter. Meaning, even if it were certain, you’d still need three, because each one teaches a different element.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but if it’s certain, then that means she was violated. If she was violated, then she’s forbidden—

[Speaker E] —to her husband, forbidden to the adulterer, and she doesn’t eat terumah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Violated, fine—but who says that…

[Speaker E] And who says that…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Those are all results of the fact that she was violated; it affects the issue of impurity, which affects the issue of marriage, which affects… No, no, no. I’m saying again: if the assumption is that she was violated, then all the laws apply to her just as they do to a woman whom I know, based on two witnesses, was violated. Now there, in the case of a woman with two witnesses, I know she’s forbidden to her husband, forbidden to the adulterer, forbidden from terumah, the whole package deal. If you tell me that the sotah is considered like one who was definitely violated, then go to the laws of a woman who was definitely violated and apply them all to the sotah.

[Speaker E] So there are two issues here, but it’s really a package deal.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s his side in the conceptual inquiry. He says these are the two possibilities: either you tell me each matter stands on its own, and then each is a separate novelty—you have to be stringent regarding the husband, stringent regarding the adulterer, stringent regarding terumah, and so on—or you tell me, no, everything being said here is that we regard her as if she was violated, even though in reality it’s only a doubt, but we regard her as if she was violated. If that’s the answer, then obviously it applies to all possible consequences. She was violated, so now she’s like any other woman who was violated.

[Speaker F] On the other hand, she’s considered as if she was violated.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that raises a different question—regarding punishment, nobody says that. Obviously we don’t execute her as someone who was violated, but that’s probably in the laws of punishments. Because a woman who was violated is not liable for death. A woman who was violated, and there are two witnesses against her, and an ordained religious court—that’s when she is liable for death. The act itself does not make her liable for death. This is Rabbi Akiva Eiger in Makkot 5a. There’s a very interesting long Rabbi Akiva Eiger there on Tosafot. He says there that he proves from the Talmud—though it’s against Tosafot—that a person who murdered is not liable for death. The liability for death is created by the court’s ruling sentencing him to death; the murder does not create the liability for death. A practical difference, for example: someone who murders today—there’s no ordained religious court, no two witnesses, no warning, no ordained court, okay—is he liable for death? Is he liable for death and there’s just nobody to execute him, right? No. He isn’t liable for death at all. He isn’t liable for death. By the way, that’s what underlay the controversy over ordination in the sixteenth century in Safed. Do you know why they wanted to renew ordination? They wanted to renew ordination after the forced converts and the expulsion from Spain, so that there could be an ordained religious court able to give lashes to offenders and thereby cleanse them from karet. Those liable for karet who were flogged were released from their karet. They simply wanted a way to exempt people from karet. Now, you can’t do that if you flog them outside an ordained court. Now, on the face of it, why not? They’re liable for lashes, so flog them—you can compel it—but if you flog them, everything’s fine, they’ll be exempt from karet. No. If there is no ordained court, then they are not liable for lashes at all. When you flog them, they aren’t actually liable for lashes. You don’t have the option of flogging them and exempting them from karet. In other words, liability for punishment—that’s what Rabbi Akiva Eiger proves there in Makkot—liability for punishment is created by the court’s ruling. The court’s ruling does not reveal the liability; it creates the liability. Not in monetary law, no. In monetary law, if I borrowed, then I have to repay, and when the court rules that I have to repay, it doesn’t create the liability, it only reveals that the liability exists. And that has implications there for conspiring witnesses—that’s what Rabbi Akiva Eiger is discussing there in Makkot—the practical difference if you are disqualified as a conspiring witness in monetary cases or in capital cases. But in capital cases, Rabbi Akiva Eiger says there’s no liability at all until there has been a verdict. The liability is created by the verdict. How did we get to this? Right—you asked why I thought of it, how I got there. Someone asked: if according to that side in Rabbi Chaim she was definitely violated, then why don’t we execute her? After all, she’s a married woman who committed adultery. But no—we don’t execute her because there are no witnesses and no ordained court. You can’t. Execute her. In other words, regarding the laws of capital punishment, there are legal requirements for how it is carried out. It has nothing to do with whether she was violated. The mere fact that she was violated still doesn’t make her liable for death. You need witnesses and warning and an ordained court and everything else, and only then is the liability for death created—not that only then can it be carried out, but that only then is the liability itself created; without that, there is no liability.

[Speaker E] A practical difference in the reasoning of the law of the pursuer—if it’s because he’s going to be executed by the court, then today, when there is no court-imposed death penalty, maybe it would be forbidden to kill him? Right. And if it’s based on the logic of rescue?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, exactly so.

[Speaker B] And Yohanan the High Priest lived a hundred and five years and served as High Priest—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And only if there is an ordained court. And if there is an ordained court, then their lashes really are lashes, because then he is liable for lashes and he receives the lashes, and then he’ll be exempt from his karet. That’s what is written in the pamphlet on ordination by the Maharlbach. At the end of the responsa of the Maharlbach there is a long pamphlet dealing with the controversy over ordination. And after all, the Maharlbach was the head of the faction from the sages of Jerusalem that opposed the renewal of ordination. In Jerusalem. And in Safed they wanted to renew ordination—Rabbi Yaakov Beirav and Rabbi Yosef Karo.

[Speaker F] Are today’s religious courts ordained?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, obviously not, there is no ordination. The Shulchan Arukh himself was ordained. Rabbi Yaakov Beirav was ordained. His students ordained him in Safed. Yes, there were students who ordained him based on Maimonides—that the agreement of the sages of the Land of Israel is sufficient—so they ordained him, and he ordained five students, among them Rabbi Yosef Karo. Rabbi Yosef Karo was ordained, and he himself supported the ordination process, and if you look in the Beit Yosef he writes, “Nowadays there are no ordained sages.”

[Speaker E] What—

[Speaker B] does he say?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Nowadays there are no ordained sages.”

[Speaker E] We don’t have an ordained religious court.

[Speaker B] The committee for appointing judges won’t manage to…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. The committee for appointing judges won’t manage to produce ordained judges even in an era in which there could be ordination. That’s to their disadvantage. It’s not that they don’t have the authority; they have an authority not to. And that’s for the worse. Even if ordination became possible, they still wouldn’t be able to do it. Anyway—there’s some interesting logic there. The Maharlbach even writes this. Really, I’m drifting a bit into other places, but the rule there is what Maimonides says: that if all the sages of the Land of Israel agree, then ordination can be renewed. Fine? So the Maharlbach says to them: look, I disagree with you. The Jewish law is not like Maimonides. You think the Jewish law follows Maimonides, but even according to your own position, you still need the agreement of all the sages of the Land of Israel, and I too am one of the sages of the Land of Israel, and I do not agree. So now it doesn’t matter whether I convinced you or not; the mere fact that I disagree with you prevents you from renewing ordination. So they argued that a majority is enough too—you don’t need everyone. That’s another dispute, but it’s an interesting logic. I once collected cases like this, where the very existence of a dissenting opinion prevents the other side from acting according to its own method. There’s a Rabbi Shimon like this on an uncertain inevitable consequence, and there are several nice examples of this kind of thing. Right—so Maimonides is basically saying that ordination will not be renewed, if you say it has to be all of them. Because the sages of Safed really argued that a majority is enough. Fine. And that’s what happened, I don’t know. In Safed they were all students of Rabbi Yaakov Beirav; once he decided it was legitimate, I assume they simply joined his view. Fine, so that’s straightforward—that’s the explanation of why, even according to the side that treats her as if she was definitely violated, she still does not receive punishment. Because in the laws of punishments, that’s a different matter. But regarding the consequences in cases of uncertain prohibition, the question is whether all doubts are the same. When you look in the passage—the passage Rabbi Chaim brings, on our page 28: Rabbi Yehoshua said, this is how Zecharyah ben HaKatzav would expound. The Rabbis taught: three times it says in the section “and she became impure,” “and she became impure,” and “and she became impure”—why? Why does it need to say it three times? One for the husband, one for the adulterer, and one for terumah—these are the words of Rabbi Akiva. Right? This is the Talmud Rabbi Chaim mentioned. Rabbi Yishmael said: it can be derived by an a fortiori argument. If a divorced woman, who is permitted to eat terumah, is forbidden to a priest, then this one, who is forbidden to eat terumah, all the more so should be forbidden to a priest. Right, so from here it’s clear that you don’t need a source to forbid a sotah to a priest, because I have an a fortiori argument. Who said anything about forbidding the sotah to a priest? Fine, the Talmud later explains, but as it stands, Rabbi Yishmael seems to attack Rabbi Akiva over a law he never even stated. But never mind—Rashi says that later in the Talmud this will be clarified. But for our purposes, Rabbi Yishmael says it’s an a fortiori argument. So what do we do with the verse “and she became impure” and “and she did not become impure”? So he says like this: what does Scripture teach by saying “and she became impure” and “and she did not become impure”? If she became impure, why does she drink? If she did not become impure, why do they give her to drink? Scripture teaches you that the doubt itself is forbidden. The third “became impure”—that’s what the third “became impure” comes to teach. Now, what does it mean that she has to be forbidden because of doubt? Fine, forbid her—it doesn’t matter. What does that mean? That the doubt is apparently treated like certainty, right? That’s what this verse says. Because the earlier verses already said that one must be stringent in cases of doubt.

[Speaker F] No, but here it would acquit her. What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but if she didn’t drink, then the doubt remains. If she drank, then the doubt is resolved. And if she didn’t drink, then she is forbidden because of doubt. Okay? So now, what comes out here is that Rabbi Yishmael argues that there is a verse saying that in the case of a sotah, the doubt is like certainty—that merely because of doubt she is forbidden. That’s what the third verse says according to Rabbi Yishmael. So what does Rabbi Akiva say? No—we are only being stringent in the laws, in these three laws. “And she became impure,” “and she became impure,” “and she became impure”—in these three laws we are stringent because of doubt. So it turns out that this conceptual inquiry of Rabbi Chaim is really a dispute between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva. Fine? And then it would follow that the conclusion he drew applies only according to Rabbi Akiva and not according to Rabbi Yishmael. According to Rabbi Yishmael, it’s certainty. But that isn’t right, because Rashi—look at Rashi here on the spot. Rashi says like this: “What does Scripture teach by saying ‘and she became impure’?” This is the correct reading, and we do not read “if so.” “If so, what does Scripture teach by saying ‘and she became impure’?” Why not? Because this is a self-contained matter. And it is the extra “and she did not become impure” that is the subject of inquiry, for we expound it. And Rabbi Yishmael did not say this alone; rather it is anonymous. And the verse is being expounded continuously in context. What is he saying? Let’s go back to the Talmud for a moment. I remind you: Rabbi Yishmael says the third “became impure” is learned through an a fortiori argument. So we don’t need it, for eating in… for the prohibition to marry a priest. So we don’t need the third “became impure”; that is learned by an a fortiori argument. And then I said, when I read the Talmud, fine—so now Rabbi Yishmael asks himself: then what does the third “became impure” say? It says that because of doubt she is forbidden, that doubt is like certainty. Rashi says no: the last part of the Talmud is not explaining what Rabbi Yishmael does with the third “became impure”; it’s a new exposition. It is unrelated to that issue. The third “became impure” is expounded for something else. It is a separate matter in its own right. Therefore it doesn’t say here “if so, what does Scripture teach by saying ‘and she became impure’?” It’s not “if so.” Now, Rashi has a proof—what, out of nowhere? It’s not the plain meaning of the Talmud. Why is it so? Look: it says, “What does Scripture teach by saying ‘and she became impure’ and ‘and she did not become impure’? If she became impure, why does she drink? If she did not become impure, why do they give her to drink?” Why give her to drink if he doesn’t think she became impure? And if she became impure, then why does she drink? In other words, there is some difficulty here because of which we say we’re dealing with a case where she didn’t drink, and we still say that she becomes forbidden because of doubt. Right? So you can see that this is not just deriving something from the extra word “became impure”—which according to Rabbi Yishmael is extra because we already have an a fortiori argument and so there’s an extra word to expound. No. We see that this is an exposition in its own right, a new exposition. Because we don’t understand this “became impure”—if she drinks, if she doesn’t drink, “and she became impure”—there is some issue here because of which the exposition is made. Therefore Rashi says this is not a statement of Rabbi Yishmael; it is a separate matter in its own right, and Rabbi Akiva agrees with it too.

[Speaker F] It doesn’t matter—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why?

[Speaker F] —why she didn’t drink, whether she refused or the husband refused.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t matter, no—

[Speaker F] They want—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —to make her drink.

[Speaker F] If she refuses, then the doubt is already half neutralized by that fact.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t matter, but you still have no witnesses; you still can’t say she was violated. Fine, it’s still a doubt.

[Speaker F] Logically the doubt is much weaker.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but you’re still in the laws of—

[Speaker F] —doubts, and her husband doesn’t want to give her to drink.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But that doesn’t matter. We’re still in the laws of doubts, and the Talmud says that because of doubt she is forbidden. In this case, where she didn’t drink. A weaker doubt, in your view, doesn’t matter—but that’s still what they derive from there. Okay? So what does that mean? It means that this final exposition is according to everyone; it isn’t only Rabbi Yishmael’s. But then Rabbi Chaim becomes difficult again. Because what emerges, if so, is that the doubt is like certainty both according to Rabbi Akiva and according to Rabbi Yishmael. Exactly what I said above. According to Rabbi Akiva, who brings three verses, Rabbi Chaim asks: why do you need three verses if it’s certainty? One verse should suffice. And that itself is what those three verses are saying. If there were one verse, I would say maybe it’s only stringency out of doubt. Then the three verses come and say no—in all these aspects you have to be stringent. Why? Because I assume she was definitely violated. That’s what the three verses teach. Why are you bringing me proofs from the initial assumption, from the fact that three verses were required? Fine, they were required—but now they were actually given. What did the three verses teach? They taught that it is certainty. And here we see that both Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael agree that the doubt here is like certainty.

[Speaker E] Is that what Rashi said—that she is forbidden because of doubt—or that it’s certainty?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Otherwise, what does it come to teach?

[Speaker E] No, maybe it only comes to define why sotah is a case of doubt. Meaning, it comes to establish the structure of sotah as a doubt.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Everybody knows it’s a doubt; otherwise what are the first two teachings about? Because she was violated—because there is a doubt that she was violated. Rabbi Yishmael says the Torah states what the case is: he warned her and she secluded herself.

[Speaker E] He warned her and she secluded herself—and then it doesn’t tell us how exactly we define this whole chain of events?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean? Then why is she forbidden to her husband and to the adulterer?

[Speaker E] She was violated, says Rabbi Yishmael—a woman who did not become impure, if so she became impure, she did not become impure—rather, it’s a woman who is in doubt.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, again. Obviously you’re talking about a case of doubt, because we’re dealing with a woman who didn’t drink. And about that they tell you that you have to be stringent in this doubtful case.

[Speaker E] And this is the special case where she didn’t drink.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’re talking about a woman who didn’t drink. A woman who drank is not in doubt. The doubt has been resolved. We are talking about a woman who did not drink. A woman who did not drink—we have a doubt whether she was violated or not, and about that the Talmud says you must be stringent regarding this doubt as if it were certainty.

[Speaker E] Fine. The basic definition of sotah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Good. So that means we are before the drinking.

[Speaker E] Before the drinking—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I’m saying: she is forbidden to her husband and to the adulterer—this too is before the drinking, that she is forbidden to her husband and to the adulterer. Not because of the drinking. The drinking is where, from the bitter waters, she dies. Or she emerges pure, and then there’s no problem and she returns to her husband. Everything we are discussing here about her being forbidden to her husband and to the adulterer concerns the woman who did not drink. Fine? We are in doubt about her. So you don’t need to tell me it’s a doubt—I know that. That’s what the whole discussion is about: that it is a doubtful case. So what are you coming to tell me, that because of doubt she is forbidden? That doubt is like certainty. Look at Rashi. Rashi says here, after the Rashi I read before: “What does Scripture teach by saying ‘and she became impure’ and ‘and she became impure’?”—which implies that she definitely became impure. “And what does Scripture teach by saying ‘and a spirit of jealousy passed over him’ and ‘she did not become impure’?” If it is obvious that she became impure, why does she drink? And if it is obvious that she did not become impure, why do they give her to drink? Scripture teaches you that because of doubt she is forbidden. And this is what the verse is saying: this woman—perhaps she became impure, perhaps she did not become impure—and the verse tells you to give her to drink in order to clarify the doubt, and if he does not give her to drink, she is forbidden. Meaning, if he does not give her to drink, she is forbidden even though it is only a doubt. So what are you really telling me? You already said this above—that she is forbidden to her husband and forbidden to the adulterer; that already came from “and she became impure.” So what does this third “and she became impure” say? Apparently that she is forbidden with certainty, not merely under the ordinary laws of doubt, because we already know the laws of doubt. Right? We know that a Torah-level doubt is treated stringently even without this. So what is this coming to tell us? That the doubt is like certainty. Right? So what emerges is that the conclusion of the Talmud at the end, at least according to Rashi—but that also seems to be the plain sense of the Talmud—is that the doubt in sotah is like certainty, and not only that, but that this is true both according to Rabbi Akiva and according to Rabbi Yishmael. Which directly contradicts Rabbi Chaim. Because Rabbi Chaim—not only is this against Rabbi Chaim, Rabbi Chaim actually proves his thesis from this very Talmud. But from this very Talmud itself it turns out he is not right, both according to Rabbi Akiva and according to Rabbi Yishmael. Now look—Tosafot actually raises this question here. It says as follows: “What does Scripture teach by saying ‘and she became impure’?” according to Rashi’s text, and this is how it concludes: to teach you that they only ever give her to drink in a case of doubt. “And if you say: does a verse really need to forbid a doubt?” What are you trying to tell me—that because of doubt she is forbidden? I know that already: a Torah-level doubt is treated stringently. Why do I need a verse to say that? “It may be said that the verse forbids her before the drinking as though it were certain.” Rabbi Chaim’s side, right? As though it were certain. Meaning, they forbid her as a matter of certainty, not as a matter of doubt, because if it were only as a matter of doubt, I would know that even without the verse, because a Torah-level doubt is treated stringently. Rather, it makes her like certainty, not just doubtful. “And even though there are no lashes,” as is proven in the first chapter of Yevamot—we’ll get to that. “Still, there is a prohibition implied by a positive commandment. And even if she is pure, he is punished by the heavenly court if he has relations with her, like one who violates a positive commandment, and not like other doubtful cases, such as doubtful forbidden fat and doubtful permitted fat, where one ate it and it later became known that it was permitted fat. Even though he requires atonement and forgiveness, still it is not as severe as those liable for a positive commandment.” What is Tosafot saying? It says like this: first of all, a verse is needed to teach me that she is forbidden like certainty and not like doubt. Why? Because even without the verse, I would know that one must be stringent out of doubt. Why? Because a Torah-level doubt is treated stringently. Tosafot is like the Ran and Rashba, that a Torah-level doubt is treated stringently. Therefore, what are you telling me, that a verse is needed in order to be stringent with her because of doubt? Everywhere in the Torah I’m stringent in cases of doubt. So we have no choice but to say that the verse comes to say that we are stringent with her as if she were definitely so. Right? Like the side Rabbi Chaim rejected. Not like Rabbi Chaim, but the side Rabbi Chaim rejected. And this applies both according to Rabbi Akiva and according to Rabbi Yishmael. Good. Now Rabbi Chaim could perhaps say his words according to Maimonides. Because according to Maimonides, Tosafot’s question never arises, and one could say that the novelty of the Talmud here—sorry, the novelty of the Torah here—was that in sotah, doubt is treated stringently, since elsewhere doubts are treated leniently by Torah law. Therefore Tosafot and Rashi apparently assume like the Ran and Rashba, that a Torah-level doubt is treated stringently on the Torah level. And then indeed it isn’t clear what you need to tell me—that because of doubt she is forbidden—I would know that even without the verse. So you have to say that because of doubt she is forbidden with certainty. We assume she was violated. Fine? But according to Maimonides, who holds that a Torah-level doubt is treated leniently, then one can read the Talmud as saying that here the doubt is treated stringently, and not that it is like certainty, but that doubt is treated stringently. Okay? Now there is a continuation in Tosafot here, what I read. Up to this point, the verse was needed to forbid the doubt in order to say it is as though she were certain. “And even though there are no lashes.” What does “even though there are no lashes” mean? Whom would we lash? The woman? For what would I lash her? If she committed adultery, then I would have to execute her, not lash her. There are no lashes for that. It’s a prohibition tied to a capital warning. If I have no proof, then I don’t lash either. Nothing.

[Speaker B] You also do nothing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For what—for what are there lashes here? Which prohibition? What are we talking about? We’re talking about the husband having relations with the sotah. After all, the sotah becomes forbidden to her husband. Now the husband has relations with her even though she is forbidden, right? Indeed, if you tell me that this is treated as certainty—meaning she was violated—then if the husband has relations with her, he should receive lashes. Because if she was violated, she is forbidden to the husband and to the adulterer. “After she has been defiled”—he cannot have relations with her after she has been defiled, right? So there is a prohibition here. So if there is a prohibition and the husband has relations with her, he should get lashes. Tosafot says yes, but in Yevamot it is proven that he does not receive lashes.

[Speaker F] But here there’s no doubt.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] She—

[Speaker F] —is forbidden to him before it has been proven whether she was violated or not. Right. She is forbidden to him by virtue of the warning and the seclusion. Under the laws of sotah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Under the laws of sotah, she is forbidden by the law of doubt. I have a doubt whether she was violated or not, and she becomes forbidden.

[Speaker F] She becomes forbidden even before there is a doubt whether she… No, no—not before, because of the doubt.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is a doubt whether she was violated, and the Torah says that because of this doubt she becomes forbidden.

[Speaker F] I understood that she becomes forbidden the moment there is warning and seclusion. Exactly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. Tosafot did not understand it that way. In a moment I’ll get to that possibility—it’s an interesting possibility. But Tosafot didn’t understand it that way. Tosafot says as follows: the Talmud in Yevamot proves that if the husband has relations with her, he does not get lashes. At this point. If he has relations with her after she became a sotah—there was warning and seclusion, she didn’t drink—then in that state of doubt she becomes forbidden to her husband and to the adulterer, right? We saw that above. Now the husband transgressed and had relations with her. Does he get lashes? The Talmud in Yevamot says no. Fine? What does that mean? If I had assumed that after warning and seclusion she is treated as definitely violated, as Tosafot said above, then it should follow that the husband should also get lashes. Because there is a prohibitory commandment against relations with her after she “has been defiled,” and I know she was violated, right? Tosafot says: so this doubt is like certainty, even though in Yevamot we see that the husband does not get lashes. And I would have expected him to get lashes if this were certainty. No, he does not get lashes. Fine? And nevertheless, Tosafot says, this doubt is like certainty even though the husband does not get lashes. And then it says: “And even though there are no lashes, as is proven in the first chapter of Yevamot, still, there is a prohibition implied by a positive commandment. Even if she is pure, he is punished by the heavenly court if he has relations with her, like those liable for a positive commandment.” What does that mean? It means there is a prohibition implied by a positive commandment if he has relations with her. There is no direct prohibition here, because you don’t know that she was violated. Only if you know she was violated is there the prohibition of “her husband cannot take her back after she has been defiled.” Right? But you don’t know—you are in doubt. But there is still a prohibition against relations with her, and that prohibition is one implied by a positive commandment. What is that? “And she became impure.” “And she became impure” is phrased like a positive commandment, as if you are to treat her as impure. And there is a prohibition implied by a positive commandment—what does that mean? That you are forbidden to have relations with her as if she is impure. I’ll maybe clarify the concept a bit more. A prohibition implied by a positive commandment, in the halakhic sense in the Talmud, is a positive commandment. It’s a positive commandment.

[Speaker B] A prohibition—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —implied by a positive commandment is a positive commandment. Yes. For example? “To a foreigner you may lend on interest.” What does that mean? It is forbidden to lend on interest, but to a non-Jew one may lend on interest. Fine? Not merely permitted—sorry, a commandment: “To a foreigner you may lend on interest.” Fine? On the plain reading, Maimonides says that, but in the plain sense in the Talmud it says “to a foreigner you may lend on interest.” But the accepted view among the medieval authorities, aside from Maimonides, is that there is no commandment to lend on interest to a non-Jew. Rather, if you lend on interest to a Jew, then besides violating the prohibition of interest, you have also violated the prohibition implied by the positive commandment of “to a foreigner you may lend on interest.” Only to a foreigner you may lend on interest, not to a Jew. In every prohibition implied by a positive commandment, you should mentally add the word “only” beforehand. When it says “to a foreigner you may lend on interest,” it doesn’t mean it’s a commandment to lend on interest to a foreigner, but rather only to a foreigner may you lend on interest. Meaning, if you lend on interest, then only to a foreigner. And if you lend on interest to a Jew, you have cancelled the positive commandment of “to a foreigner you may lend on interest.” It’s not a prohibition. Fine? You can’t really fulfill that positive commandment. If you lend on interest to a foreigner, you haven’t fulfilled a positive commandment.

[Speaker B] Is sending away the mother bird the same thing?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? There there is an actual commandment to send away.

[Speaker B] “Do not take the mother together with the young; you shall surely send away.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you sent her away, you fulfilled a commandment to send her away. So why? But there are many prohibitions implied by positive commandments. For example, checking the identifying signs of birds and fish. There is no commandment to check the signs. Rather, if you ate without checking—meaning you ate something not kosher—then you cancelled the positive commandment of checking. That’s a prohibition implied by a positive commandment. Okay? There are many such prohibitions… “To eat it and not for commerce” with Sabbatical-year produce. Right? Aside from Maimonides’ position—which I think even he doesn’t say this—the accepted view is that there is no commandment to eat Sabbatical-year produce. But if you engage in commerce with it, then you have cancelled the positive commandment of “to eat it.” “And the produce of the land shall be for you to eat”—to eat it and not for commerce. Because the formulation is in the language of a positive commandment: “the produce of the land shall be for you to eat.” But what we derive from it is a prohibition. There is no commandment to eat; there is a prohibition on trading.

[Speaker E] But the question is: why is cancelling a positive commandment not just a prohibition implied by a positive commandment? What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why is cancelling a positive commandment not a prohibition implied by a positive commandment? Yes, it’s the same thing. It’s just that in an ordinary positive commandment, besides cancelling it, you can also fulfill it. In a prohibition implied by a positive commandment, you can only cancel it; you can’t really fulfill it. Fine? But from the standpoint of cancellation, it’s the same thing.

[Speaker E] And you don’t get lashes for it—meaning, you don’t get lashes for cancelling a positive commandment?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And you don’t get lashes for this prohibition either? No, you don’t get lashes for cancelling a positive commandment, because lashes are only for a prohibition, not for cancelling a positive commandment. A prohibition implied by a positive commandment doesn’t incur lashes because it’s like cancelling a positive commandment, not like violating a prohibition. Okay, so here he says that with us it says “and she became impure.” From this we learn that she is forbidden—forbidden to the husband. Now this prohibition is one implied by a positive commandment; there is no direct prohibition here. It doesn’t say “do not have relations with her.” It says “and she became impure,” meaning you have a positive commandment to treat her as impure. That’s a prohibition implied by a positive commandment—meaning you are forbidden to have relations with her, because if you do, that means that in your eyes she did not become impure. Okay? So you have cancelled the positive commandment to treat the woman as impure. That is a prohibition implied by a positive commandment. So he says: therefore there are no lashes here, because it’s a prohibition implied by a positive commandment. But in the heavenly court you are punished, because you have committed a transgression. People are also punished in the heavenly court for cancelling a positive commandment, like those liable for positive commandments. “And not like other doubtful cases, such as doubtful forbidden fat and doubtful permitted fat, where one ate it and it later became known that it was permitted fat. Even though he requires atonement and forgiveness, still it is not as severe as those liable for a positive commandment.” That’s a fascinating remark; you could talk about it a lot. What is he saying? He says this is not like an ordinary doubt. Here we have a doubt whether she was violated or not, and there is a prohibition implied by a positive commandment against having relations with her—not because of the general rule of a Torah-level doubt treated stringently, but because of a prohibition implied by a positive commandment against relations with her. Okay? Now he says this is not like a regular doubt. Doubtful forbidden fat, doubtful permitted fat—you ate it, and in the end it turned out to be permitted fat, not forbidden fat. What happened? Did you commit a transgression? Why not? A Torah-level doubt is treated stringently. Hm? Which positive commandment? No, that’s a prohibition, not a positive commandment. But I didn’t eat forbidden fat; I ate permitted fat. In the end it turned out to be permitted fat, what I ate. But when I ate it, I didn’t know. It was doubtful forbidden fat, doubtful permitted fat. So we discussed in the previous class, if you remember, what this obligation to be stringent in cases of doubt means. Is there a prohibition on entering a state of doubt, right? Or is it only a warning that if in the end it turns out you ate forbidden fat, don’t tell me you were under compulsion—we warned you. Okay? Tosafot appears to understand it like the second possibility. Tosafot says that if in the end he ate permitted fat, he needs atonement and forgiveness because it wasn’t good behavior, but at the end of the day he didn’t actually transgress anything. Right? In contrast, here—say he had relations with her, fine? And in the end it turned out she was not violated. Say suddenly witnesses arrived and she was not violated. Fine? Did he violate the prohibition that a sotah is forbidden to her husband? Right? But this doubt is more severe than an ordinary doubt, because here there is a prohibition implied by a positive commandment against having relations with her. And apparently that prohibition implied by a positive commandment exists even if in the end she was not—meaning even if it later turns out she was not violated—because it’s not based on the ordinary laws of doubt; it’s based on a prohibition implied by a positive commandment. There is a special prohibition, implied by a positive commandment, in the case of sotah, not because of the concern that maybe she was violated. Because if it were because of the concern that maybe she was violated, then it would be like the ordinary laws of doubt. If it turns out she was not violated, then nothing happened; he needs atonement, but he didn’t transgress a prohibition. Okay? Like the concern that one might eat pork but it turns out he ate lamb—the Talmud says he needs atonement, fine? He ate lamb; there’s no prohibition here. Fine? He just didn’t act properly, so he needs atonement. So that means that what Tosafot is apparently saying here is that one who has relations with this sotah while things are still doubtful—in terms of the ordinary laws of doubt, the question whether she was violated or not, regarding the prohibition against relations with a married woman who was violated, that is a direct prohibition, so this is a doubtful prohibition. Tosafot says that from the side of the doubtful prohibition, it’s like any other doubtful prohibition—there’s no issue here. Fine? So if it later turns out she wasn’t violated, then he didn’t transgress a prohibition. Fine? But from the side of the prohibition implied by a positive commandment. The prohibition implied by the positive commandment of “and she became impure”—after all, the moment she strayed, they tell you that you have to declare her impure. She has a status of impurity. Now that means there is a prohibition against relations with her, and if you had relations with her, that is a prohibition implied by a positive commandment. That is more severe than an ordinary doubt that maybe she was violated, where there is no actual prohibition—it’s just a doubt, and in a doubt you take a risk but there’s no prohibition. Here there is an actual prohibition, so it’s more severe, right? That’s what Tosafot says. Do you agree? But it doesn’t fit with what he says at the beginning. Because what does he say at the beginning? He basically says, look, this is really like certainty; she was definitely violated. Even though in Yevamot there are no lashes—why are there no lashes? There are no lashes because this is not a direct prohibition but only one implied by a positive commandment. Meaning, Tosafot is basically saying that we do not decide she was violated, because if we decided she was violated, then there would also be a direct prohibition: he had relations with his wife after she was violated. One who has relations with his wife after she was violated, after she became defiled, violates a direct prohibition—he gets lashes. So you tell me no, he doesn’t get lashes because what we have here is not the direct prohibition, but only the prohibition implied by a positive commandment. Which direct prohibition could there even be here? The direct prohibition against relations with his wife who became defiled—that direct prohibition isn’t here. Why isn’t it here? Because she wasn’t defiled; I cannot decide that she was defiled. I don’t know; I’m in doubt. True, there is a prohibition implied by a positive commandment, because even without my knowing whether she was defiled or not, the very fact of seclusion after warning defiles her, and now in effect there is a prohibition implied by a positive commandment against having relations with her. But that is not because of the doubt that maybe she was defiled, because if it were because of the doubt that maybe she was defiled, then this would just be a doubtful prohibition under the regular prohibition against relations with one’s wife after she has been defiled—that is, after she was violated. So what he says at the beginning contradicts what he says at the end. At the beginning he says, look, this is basically like certainty, right? That’s the novelty—that they’re really telling you this is like certainty; she is as if definitely violated. So why doesn’t she get lashes? He could have told me she doesn’t get lashes because there are no witnesses to the act, even though I am sure she was violated; but for lashes you need witnesses. Which is what I brought from Rabbi Akiva Eiger—that unless the conditions are met, there is no liability to punishment, so she doesn’t get lashes. But Tosafot doesn’t say that. Tosafot says she doesn’t get lashes because there is no direct prohibition here, only a prohibition implied by a positive commandment. But if she was violated, then there is a direct prohibition. There is a direct prohibition against relations with one’s wife who was violated. So what—you say no, I don’t know if she was violated, it’s a doubt. All you can say is that there is a prohibition implied by a positive commandment, because even in the doubtful status of a sotah there is still a prohibition implied by a positive commandment against having relations with her, regardless of the doubt whether she was violated or not—not on the assumption that she was violated; even if she was not violated, the very fact that she is in this state means it is forbidden to have relations with her; there is a prohibition implied by a positive commandment. But if that’s so, then what? Then you cut off the branch you were sitting on. You said at the beginning that this doubt is basically like certainty—that she was definitely violated—even though there are no lashes, and I would have expected him to say: why are there no lashes? Because there are no witnesses. She did violate a direct prohibition, but without witnesses there are no lashes; there are rules about how punishment works, you need witnesses in order to punish. And they didn’t see “like a brush entering a tube,” right? We don’t know there was intercourse by testimony; we know there was intercourse by a scriptural decree, because they tell me to treat this sotah as if she was violated. So everything would have been fine in Tosafot—but Tosafot doesn’t say that. Tosafot says: this is really like certainty, even though he doesn’t get lashes when he has relations with her, and ostensibly you would expect him to get lashes because if she was violated, he should get lashes. He says no, he doesn’t get lashes. But why doesn’t he get lashes? Because there is no direct prohibition here. Why is there no direct prohibition? But she was violated—there is a direct prohibition. You could say he doesn’t get lashes because there is no testimony that she was violated, but you are telling me no, he doesn’t get lashes because he didn’t violate a direct prohibition; he violated only a prohibition implied by a positive commandment. Why didn’t he violate the direct prohibition if she was definitely violated? Then he certainly did violate the direct prohibition. There’s some kind of problem here. And Tosafot assumes—there’s probably one assumption here, maybe that’s what Tosafot means, I don’t know, it’s very strange—but I think maybe what Tosafot means is that the prohibition implied by a positive commandment against relations with a doubtful sotah is because of the concern that she was violated. Meaning, the Torah imposes a special prohibition here, but because of the concern that she was violated, this prohibition is special. It’s not a separate prohibition. There is the prohibition against relations with one’s wife after she committed adultery, and there is the prohibition against one’s wife after she secluded herself following a warning—that’s how I understood it until now—and then these are two different things. She was not really violated, halakhically; it’s a doubt, I can’t determine that she was violated. But seclusion after warning also creates a prohibition, a prohibition implied by a positive commandment, and that is a separate prohibition. And that is what he violated, and for that there are no lashes because it is a prohibition implied by a positive commandment. Fine? That’s how I would understand Tosafot. But Tosafot above says no—this doubt is like she was definitely violated, and even though there are no lashes because this is a prohibition implied by a positive commandment. So then she is not definitely violated, because there is here only a prohibition implied by a positive commandment and not a direct prohibition. If she were definitely violated, then there would be a direct prohibition. You can say there are no lashes, but you can’t say there is no direct prohibition—of course there is a direct prohibition. He had relations with his wife after she was violated and committed adultery. Do you understand what I’m saying or not?

[Speaker E] Fine. Right, so if that’s so, then even if we assume from the outset that it’s certain—how do we know that it’s certain? What statement do we have here? Because she was definitely violated, then there is a direct prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can say—

[Speaker E] —that there are no lashes, but can you say there’s no direct prohibition here? Of course there is a direct prohibition. He had relations with his wife after she was violated, after she committed adultery. Do you understand what I’m saying or not? Fine? Right—but that too is only if we assume from the outset that it’s certain. How do we know that it’s certain?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do we have here as some kind of thing in the Torah? Here is the verse: “and she became defiled.” In a case of doubt, I would have been stringent even without the verse. No, but where do we learn this from? From the word “and she became defiled”? Already at this stage he knows that everything starts from “and she became defiled”? No, but I’m saying: I would understand that from “and she became defiled” you infer that it’s as if it were certain, meaning that she had relations, and therefore all the laws of a woman who had relations apply to her. So there is a prohibition regarding a woman who had relations. That prohibition isn’t written here. The prohibition is written elsewhere. But “and she became defiled” only tells me that the sotah also belongs to that prohibition, because she became defiled; it is as though it is certain that she had relations. It’s not that the prohibition comes from here. The prohibition does not come from here. What comes from here is that the status of a sotah, even though it is doubtful, really belongs to that category. She is, so to speak, defiled; she had relations; and whoever had relations, there is a prohibition for anyone to have relations with her. And in Tosafot—so I’m saying, the only possibility by which I can understand Tosafot is that Tosafot apparently understands that the positive-commandment-derived prohibition regarding a sotah is really a strengthening of the laws of doubt. It is basically saying: in essence, she certainly had relations. That is our assumption. I can’t know that, but in reality she certainly did not have relations, because we do not have certainty; we are in doubt about the facts. But they tell me to treat it as certain. Yet to treat it as certain is only on the level of a positive-commandment-derived prohibition; you do not give lashes, it is not on the level of a full prohibition. That’s what Tosafot is saying. Meaning, what comes out is that the positive-commandment-derived prohibition is only there to bring that prohibition back into the framework of doubt, just to lower its level from a full prohibition to a positive-commandment-derived prohibition.

[Speaker E] And that’s a procedural logic, meaning generally, within the framework of the rules of prohibition and doubt and so on, that’s how we define it. To say that she is certain—that’s a substantive statement, meaning a statement about how we actually relate to her.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but on the contrary.

[Speaker E] Tosafot says that we have procedural limitations here in the rules of prohibition. So what is Tosafot saying then?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That in essence she really did have relations. Yes, really.

[Speaker E] She remains—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —with that throughout—

[Speaker E] —the whole way.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But there is no prohibition. But there is no prohibition.

[Speaker E] Why?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If she had relations, then whoever has relations with her violates a prohibition. Okay. Why is there no prohibition? Because we are in doubt. But no—Tosafot says it is like certainty, not doubt. So why is there no prohibition? So I think Tosafot says: no, it is doubt. It is a state of doubt, but the Torah told me to relate to it as certain through the word “and she became defiled.” It told me to relate to it as certain, but not in the sense that she definitely had relations and now she belongs to that prohibition, that whoever has relations with her is like one who has relations with an adulterous woman. Rather, it is like certainty, but on a lower level, on the level of a positive-commandment-derived prohibition. And there is a question.

[Speaker F] Isn’t the prohibition intensified if they don’t make her drink? By having relations with her, he is essentially causing them not to make her drink.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I didn’t understand.

[Speaker F] After all, if he has relations with her, then they no longer make her drink. Why not? Because it says there.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? If he has relations with her, then he violated a prohibition. What does that have to do with it? There is no connection at all.

[Speaker F] Why? It says that at the time they come to make her drink, if he had relations with her then they do not make her drink.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Where does it say that? In the Mishnah? On the first page?

[Speaker B] No, because the water won’t work, as it were. It won’t have an effect.

[Speaker F] It won’t have an effect—that’s the result. But on page 2 it says there that they do not make her drink; the water will not work.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait a second, I don’t remember exactly, let me take a quick look.

[Speaker B] And it’s written, it’s written.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, the water, the water—

[Speaker B] “And the man shall be cleared from iniquity, and the woman…” There is a verse there. The Mishnah there is correct. Yes, there is a Mishnah here, right. The water does not work. The water does not work. The water does not work. “And the man shall be cleared from iniquity.” One who prevents purity. It says one who prevents her from the water and from purity. One who prevents her from the water and from purification from doubt. One who prevents her from the water and from purity.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You mean that if he is in sin, the water checks her because of him—“and the man shall be cleared from iniquity.” Wait a second, the water does not check her. In the end they do not—

[Speaker B] —make her drink.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, right, yes—if he had relations with her after she secluded herself, right. In the Gemara, not in the Mishnah. Okay. In the Gemara?

[Speaker F] So he is basically causing it to be impossible to resolve the doubt. After all, the water is supposed to resolve the doubt.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. So—

[Speaker F] If she says, “I don’t want to,” then clearly she is more culpable; the doubt goes against her. Okay. But here he is causing it. Right. So why doesn’t that change the resolution of the doubt, in that it cannot be resolved—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I am asking: what transgression did he violate when he had relations with her? I’m talking about the act of relations itself, not what the status is afterward.

[Speaker F] The act of relations is that after the seclusion there is a prohibition; she becomes forbidden to him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? Because of the concern that perhaps she had relations. Good, so there is a doubt here.

[Speaker F] But—but the doubt is resolved by making her drink.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it is not resolved at all; the doubt remains. She won’t drink at all. Now, now he has relations with her, so this is a doubtful prohibition. In short, what comes out here in Tosafot is that really it is sort of like what Rabbi Chaim says—that it is certain—but it is not really a certain prohibition. It is not that she certainly had relations. Rather, there is some rule of a positive-commandment-derived prohibition: treat it as though it were certain. But that “as though” means not a full prohibition, only a positive-commandment-derived prohibition. Okay? It is like saying that for a Torah-level doubt one must be stringent, so treat doubtful pork as though it were really pork. But that does not mean you would receive lashes now for having eaten the pork; rather, you just have to treat it as though it were really pork and not eat it. But still, the prohibition remains a doubtful prohibition; it is not on the level of a certain prohibition. So here too, basically the same thing. So this already empties Rabbi Chaim’s inquiry of some of its content—whether it is doubt or certainty, and we treat it as though it were certain, or whether it is really certain. It is certain on a lower level. So it’s like saying: they tell you to be stringent in a case of doubt. So what difference is there, really? Now look, Rabbi Chaim himself brings this Tosafot. Maybe even before that. There is a practical difference for what Tosafot says, which I found in Rabbi Elyashiv’s notes. So he says: Scripture teaches you that in doubt she is forbidden. And Tosafot asked: do we really need a verse to prohibit a doubtful case? Right? Do we need a verse in order to be stringent in doubtful cases? And Tosafot answered: Scripture prohibited her as though she were certainly prohibited. And even though there are no lashes, and even if she is pure, if her husband had relations with her he is punished by the heavenly court, like one liable for a positive commandment. And it is not like other doubtful cases, where it depends on what it turns out to have been in the end—whether it was fat forbidden to eat or permissible fat. Here it does not depend on that. The very fact that he had relations with her while in a state of doubt—that itself is the prohibition. Okay? That’s what he says. That is not exactly what Tosafot says. Because if I am right about the contradiction between the two parts of Tosafot, then what Tosafot is saying is no, this is only on the side that in the end she really had relations, because after all this belongs to the laws of doubt. Only, we say that these laws of doubt are reinforced, and now this is not merely a doubtful prohibition, but a certain positive-commandment-derived prohibition. Fine. But all this remains within the category of the laws of doubt. He understands, the way I originally read Tosafot in its plain sense before comparing it to what Tosafot wrote at the beginning—this really is the plain sense of Tosafot. The plain sense of Tosafot is that what Tosafot says—a positive-commandment-derived prohibition—has nothing to do with a doubtful prohibition. It is a positive-commandment-derived prohibition, and therefore it does not depend on the question whether she had relations or did not have relations. And incidentally, this very much strengthens what I said then—do you remember?—that the warning and the seclusion in themselves create a prohibition, not because of the concern of actual relations. The warning and seclusion are not only there to serve as circumstantial indication that there were relations; rather, once she secluded herself after the warning, that in itself is a betrayal of the marital bond, because he told her not to seclude herself. He warned her—he said, I do not want you to damage our relationship and go off with someone else—and she did it. Now, regardless of whether she ultimately had relations, that itself is already damage to the marital bond. That is how I explained why this is a doubt of defilement and not merely a doubtful prohibition. Okay? Even though in the case of an “open door,” where there was no warning and no seclusion, that is a doubtful prohibition and not a doubt of defilement. Remember, with the Shitah Mekubetzet in Ketubot? So I’m saying: according to Rabbi Elyashiv’s reading of Tosafot, that is indeed what comes out. And that is the plain sense of Tosafot: that by positive-commandment-derived prohibition he means a prohibition on the state of doubt itself, not because of the concern that perhaps she had relations. Even if she turns out to be pure in the end, even if it becomes clear that she did not have relations, it makes no difference—he violated a prohibition. And that very much strengthens what I said. Meaning, it basically says that there is a prohibition on the very fact that she secluded herself after the warning. That is what makes her forbidden to her husband; it makes no difference at all whether in the end she had relations or not. If in the end she had relations, then it is even worse; she is also liable to death. But I’m saying that as far as the damage to the marital bond is concerned, that damage was done even without regard to whether she had relations. Right? That is basically… Now, in Tosafot itself I think this does not fit so well. Because Tosafot itself is basically saying—he sees this as if a law of certainty was stated here. But no law of certainty was stated here; this is simply a different prohibition on the seclusion, not a prohibition on the relations. When you tell me that it is stated as certainty, you are basically saying as though she certainly had relations. What Rabbi Elyashiv says is not that at all—not because she had relations; even if she did not have relations, it is prohibited. And that is simply another prohibition. It is a prohibition on the fact that she secluded herself, regardless of the concern that perhaps she had relations. Right? So I think it is hard to fit that into Tosafot. But that is what he says, and he brings a practical difference from it, so that is why I am bringing him. And apparently it seems that all this is when it is a case of doubt. So the Torah innovated that doubt is like certainty. And it is like a certain prohibition that requires atonement, even though in truth she did not commit adultery. And if so, it would seem that with respect to the woman herself, if she knows with certainty that she did not commit adultery, then with respect to her there is no doubt here. And the Torah did not innovate in such a case that doubt is like certainty, because she has no doubt. Therefore she herself may eat terumah, since the court does not know or see. For if the court sees, they prevent her, because from their perspective there is doubt. But for her herself there is no prohibition at all, because it is not a doubtful case of which the Torah innovated that it is treated as certain. What is he saying? He says: the woman herself knows whether she had relations or not, right? So she is not in doubt. So it should come out that if this is an independent prohibition—the state of “she became defiled”—then it makes no difference. Then it really makes no difference, right? Because in the end she becomes forbidden to her husband because she secluded herself. It has nothing to do with the question whether she became defiled, whether she had relations or did not have relations, right? So it really makes no difference whether she is in doubt or not in doubt, because my whole problem is the doubt whether she had relations or not. That is his assumption. But if that is not my problem at all, and rather the very fact that she secluded herself creates the defilement, then she secluded herself—that is certain. There is no doubt about that. So what do I care that she knows she did not have relations? Right? But if I understand this as belonging to the laws of doubt—if I understand it as belonging to the laws of doubt, only that it was strengthened like a positive-commandment-derived prohibition, and they said you have to be stringent in this doubt as though it were certain, except that it is not a certain full prohibition, it is a positive-commandment-derived prohibition—okay, but then you must be stringent in this doubt. Okay? If so, then everything depends on whether you are actually in doubt. So the husband or the court, who are in doubt—the Torah tells them: treat this as certain on the level of a positive-commandment-derived prohibition. But the woman is not in doubt at all. So with respect to her, this positive-commandment-derived prohibition was not said either. Do you understand that this is exactly the practical difference between the two ways I suggested reading Tosafot? If we read Tosafot the way I suggested, then Rabbi Elyashiv is right here. Rabbi Elyashiv also has a contradiction between his beginning and his end, because at the beginning, when he was speaking, he spoke as though he had read Tosafot in its plain sense, not the way I said earlier—that the positive-commandment-derived prohibition is an independent prohibition on the very act of secluding oneself, regardless of the doubt as to whether she became defiled. According to that, it should come out that the woman too is forbidden—what difference does it make that she is not in doubt? And then he says yes, but it seems logically that if the woman herself is not in doubt, then no. And why? In the end he is right. Because Tosafot really does not mean what he said there in Tosafot. Tosafot means to say that this belongs to the laws of doubt, the positive-commandment-derived prohibition. The positive-commandment-derived prohibition tells you, imposes upon you, an obligation to be stringent in this doubt. So everything depends on whether you are in doubt. If you are not in doubt, then nothing happened. So in that sense, I think that in the end Rabbi Elyashiv reads Tosafot correctly. I just do not understand how that fits with what he says at the beginning. In terms of the practical difference, he reads it correctly, and that really is the proper practical difference for distinguishing between the two readings of Tosafot. Do you see this as an independent prohibition upon one who secluded herself—and then it supports what I said there, that the warning and the seclusion themselves create a problem, and that is the plain sense of Tosafot—but that is not really what Tosafot means, because it does not fit with what he says at the beginning. And therefore the practical difference really comes out in the case where the woman herself is not in doubt: does this positive-commandment-derived prohibition apply to her as well? Okay? An interesting thing comes out here, by the way: if the husband has relations with her, then he himself violated a positive-commandment-derived prohibition, but she did not. He is talking about eating terumah, that she may eat terumah quietly when the court does not see. If the court sees, they will stop her. But if she eats quietly without anyone seeing, everything is fine, because she knows there is no prohibition. What about the act of relations itself? After all, she is forbidden to her husband. And the rule in Jewish law is that in cases of forbidden sexual relations the prohibition is always symmetrical, except for a designated maidservant. The prohibition is always symmetrical, meaning if you violated it, she violated it too. There is no situation where you violated it and she did not, except for a designated maidservant. Here, though, we have such a case. Because there is a prohibition, but she is not in doubt, so this positive-commandment-derived prohibition was not said about her. But he does not know whether she had relations or not. So with respect to him there is the positive-commandment-derived prohibition. So if he has relations with her, he violated a prohibition, but she did not. Yes, in the case of a married woman, in the case of forbidden relations, the prohibition is always on both sides. There is no prohibition on one side without the other. If the prohibition is an independent one, then yes, then the prohibition applies to the woman too even if she is not in doubt, obviously. So it remains symmetrical. Fine? Just look here for a moment. What remains here? A prohibition on the level such that in the heavenly court it would remain? What does the heavenly court do? In reality it became clear—no, in reality she ate—no, that is exactly the point, no. For the heavenly court, from their perspective, if I was in doubt, I should have been stringent. The fact that they know my doubt was mistaken changes nothing. Because it is like why they punish me for possibly eating pork. I was in doubt about pork and I ate it; the heavenly court will punish me for the doubt, right? Why? After all, they know it was not pork. Fine, but I did not know, and I should have been stringent. The discussion is from my perspective. Like a woman who made a vow even though her husband annulled it, and “the Lord will forgive her.” Yes, that is apparently because in truth she already violated no vow at all, but the Lord still must forgive her because… Yes, but it is the opposite of the case of a woman who made a vow, because there, in truth she really did not violate a prohibition, because her husband annulled it. But here, in truth he did violate a prohibition, even though the heavenly court knows that she did not have relations. No—the husband annulled it and she did not know, so she intended to do something prohibited; she wanted to do something prohibited, and in the end it turned out not to have been prohibited because the husband annulled it. And about that it says “the Lord will forgive her.” Why must He forgive her? That is the atonement we discussed there. Only atonement; it is not a prohibition. There is no prohibition there because she did not violate the vow; the vow was annulled. I am speaking about the opposite situation: here there is an actual prohibition. The heavenly court will call him to account for a prohibition, for a positive-commandment-derived prohibition. Why? Because from his perspective—and that is the difference—there the prohibition is determined objectively: the question is whether the vow was annulled or not; it makes no difference what she thought. Here the prohibition itself is determined by what the person thinks. If the person thinks there is doubt here, he had to be stringent, and there is a prohibition upon him—a positive-commandment-derived prohibition. A definite obligation to be stringent. Okay? So that is the practical difference. He has some proof from the Gemara in Yevamot, an interesting proof, but I will not go into it here. Fine, I’ll stop here, because this already takes us onward. Thank you very much. Thank you, thank you. Good luck. Goodbye. From where does a person light Hanukkah candles if he has no house? What? A homeless person. How does he light Hanukkah candles? He publicizes the miracle the most. He goes out in the street and publicizes the miracle. Like soldiers in the field. How do soldiers in the field light? In their own four cubits, literally. The area where he is standing. I need a study partner. What do you need? A study partner. A study partner. Yes. Too bad you’re saying it now, because I could have asked people here. It’s worth asking when people are around, because I want to see who is attending the lesson. Maybe next lesson? Fine. So how are you managing in the meantime? The Hebrew doesn’t… That’s exactly why I’m asking. But you manage with the lesson? To understand? Do you understand? You know English? Yes, English is better. You understand the lesson? Half-half, and I can go back to Google Translate and understand the documents. You’re a student here? Yes. What do you study? Jewish thought. Yeah, I’ve been here six years. I just discovered the study hall, so… I just learned all, all of… Me? It’s your first year here at Bar-Ilan? Yeah, six years. But at Bar-Ilan, yes, it’s the first year. Six years at Bar-Ilan. And the first year I found here. I found it, so happy, because I want to learn Torah. So really want to learn Torah. And where do you live? Jerusalem. My son has autism, so he had a school there, Jewish religious schools. Okay. That’s total. But this is a bit complicated, so I wonder if you can treat such lessons. It’s good. I read a bit of Mishnah and try to understand, yeah, so step by step. But I enjoy the process—you teach, and you teach with passion, so it’s beautiful. So okay, thank you. So I want to learn more, and a study partner, so it can be very helpful. Okay, so maybe in the next lesson we will ask if somebody can. Okay. It totally limited my Hebrew because it’s very half, so I try to improve my Hebrew. Yes. Thank you very much. Thank you. If there is any problem or something, you can come and speak. Okay. You are invited. Thank you very much. Here it’s also a bit about language gaps and also a very high level of—that is, it’s the sort of thing that happens once or twice. Something more subtle. Have a good week, everyone. In this week’s Torah portion, Vayishlach, we encounter the famous meeting between Jacob and Esau. Our forefather Jacob returns after twenty years in Laban’s house, and he understands that the confrontation with his brother is unavoidable. He sends messengers, and Rashi says: actual angels. Why does he send actual angels? He wants to show Esau that he has spiritual power, that he did not return only with material wealth. The main message Jacob conveys to Esau is: “I sojourned with Laban.” Rashi brings the well-known interpretation: “I sojourned” has the numerical value of 613. That is, although I lived with wicked Laban, I kept the 613 commandments and did not learn from his evil deeds. And here the question is asked: why would Esau care? Esau is far from that world of commandments. Rather, Jacob wants to tell him: do not think I changed. I remained Jacob. The word “I sojourned” is related to being a stranger; I was there only as a guest, I did not settle there in my soul. This is the secret of Jewish existence in exile. We are in this world, the world of matter, but we need to feel ourselves as strangers. The true home is spirituality. The portion continues with the description of the mysterious nighttime struggle: “And a man wrestled with him until the break of dawn.” The sages say this was Esau’s angelic prince. That struggle is the constant struggle between body and soul, between the desire to invest in the material and the aspiration toward spirit. At the end of the struggle, Jacob wins and receives the name Israel. “For you have struggled with God and with men and prevailed.” This is the power given to each of us: the ability to overcome difficulties and find our true essence. May we always merit to remember that we are only sojourners in this world, and to focus on what is essential, on Torah and commandments. When we build a house, the right angles are what determine its shape, its precision, and that is what gives it stability. Precision in the right angles is what makes it possible for the Divine Presence to dwell within the Tabernacle, within the house we built. Hello. Yes, hello. In just a moment—I’m on my way now—my sister is in the hospital, and I’m about to join them. There is some chance that she will be discharged today, but it’s not clear; a lung doctor still needs to see her. We still don’t even know the diagnosis. Obviously, when we know, we’ll update. Yes, that’s obvious. Yes, okay. Yes, all right. Yes. Hello, hi Ephraim. There is some chance that she will be discharged today, but it’s not clear. A lung doctor still needs to see her; we still don’t even know the diagnosis. Obviously, when we know, we’ll update. Yes, that’s obvious. Yes, okay. Yes, all right. Yes, thank you. Goodbye. We are in chapter 6 of tractate Berakhot. In the previous lesson we finished the Mishnah dealing with various kinds of snacks, the fourth mishnah. We reached the fifth mishnah: “If there were many kinds before him.” This mishnah deals with the laws of precedence in blessings. Rabbi Yehuda says: if one of them is from the seven species, he recites the blessing over that. And the sages say: he recites the blessing over whichever one he wants. This is a fundamental dispute that appears here in the Mishnah regarding the order of precedence in blessings when a person has several kinds of food before him.