Tractate Sotah, Chapter 5, Lesson 10 — Rabbi Michael Abraham

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One is leavening and one is leavened food, meaning both are prohibited. Even though leavening isn’t fit for eating, that’s a difficulty, but it doesn’t matter; the Torah told us that there is nevertheless a prohibition, both on leavening and on leavened food, but it’s the same prohibition. Leavening isn’t more severe than leavened food. So why is leavening prohibited in an olive-bulk, while leavened food is in a date-bulk? Leavening isn’t more severe. It’s just more concentrated. So if it’s a more concentrated form of leaven, then even in a small measure you violate a prohibition. With ordinary leavened food, which isn’t leavening, according to Beit Shammai you need a date-bulk. You need a date-bulk because the prohibition is less concentrated, so naturally you need a larger measure in order to violate it. But the difference is not a difference in severity. There’s no difference in severity here. If you ate leavening or you ate leavened food, you violated the same prohibition. It’s not a more severe prohibition. So what is it? With leavening it’s easier to reach the state of prohibition because it’s more concentrated, so already with an olive-bulk you reach a state of prohibition. With leavened food you need a date-bulk in order for there to be a prohibition. I’m saying all this according to Beit Shammai; this is not the Jewish law ruling. And with leavened food you need a measure of a date-bulk, which is a larger measure, in order to reach the prohibition. Why? Because it’s less concentrated. So this is very similar to what I said here. It’s not a question of the severity of the prohibition. It’s a question of how easily you reach the halakhic status under discussion. It’s like the leaven in the heart. Yes, yes. I have a whole lecture on that issue; I’m not going into it now. This whole issue of being fit for eating or not fit for eating. Yes, that’s the… I won’t get into it here now. So in fact this a fortiori argument is not an a fortiori argument that speaks about relationships of leniency and stringency, but rather about the question of how easily I apply the halakhic status under discussion. Let me formulate this now in a slightly different way. If there is something that applies both in inadvertence and in duress, say like corpse-creeping impurity, that says something about it. What does it mean if I don’t care whether you acted intentionally or not? It means this is a result of reality, right? It’s not connected to the person. In other words, the question is what happened in practice. If in practice you touched a creeping creature, you are impure. Right? By contrast, if something happens and there is a difference between whether it happens intentionally or inadvertently or under duress, that means the person matters, not just the object. In other words, the question is to what extent, how much is the person involved here? To what extent is this an act of the person? Intentionally, it’s an act of the person. Inadvertently or under duress, it’s not his act. So the fact that it happened in reality doesn’t matter, and there are cases where the person is an essential part of the definition of the matter.

Maybe I’ll give an analogy for this, which is also a whole lecture I won’t get into here. For example, a guilt-offering is brought both for intentional and inadvertent acts. All guilt-offerings except the guilt-offering for misuse of sacred property, and that one also isn’t really exceptional, but I won’t get into that now. But all the other guilt-offerings are brought for intentional acts just as for inadvertent ones. Why? What does that say about a guilt-offering? Why with a sin-offering is it brought only for an inadvertent act, while a guilt-offering is brought for both intentional and inadvertent acts? Because exactly: with a sin-offering, the sins in question are basically sins of the person. Now, if the person acted inadvertently, then there wasn’t really a full-fledged sin here, so you can’t impose punishment on him. He brings an offering in order to atone for the sin of the person, okay? Because he sinned inadvertently. And in duress he is entirely exempt, because there was no transgression of the person here, so why bring anything? If it was intentional, there was a transgression of the person, so then he really needs punishment—lashes, death; with a sin-offering it’s always death. Or karet or death. But in inadvertence there was still some delinquent dimension of the person here, negligence, let’s say, a small-scale delinquency, so you bring a sin-offering. In duress there was no delinquency of the person at all, and therefore you are exempt. So everything is focused on the person. By contrast, with a guilt-offering I don’t care whether you acted intentionally or inadvertently. The question is what happened. If in the end what happened happened, why should I care whether you were intentional or inadvertent? The question is reality, the result. So you understand that I want to say something similar here too. Impurity is essentially parallel to the guilt-offering, right? Sotah is parallel to the sin-offering, impurity is parallel to the guilt-offering. Why? Because what do you see in impurity? That it doesn’t matter whether the person acted intentionally, inadvertently, or under duress. What does that mean? That the impurity is only a result of the action, of the reality in the world. If you touched a creeping creature, you are impure. I don’t care, it doesn’t matter how guilty or not guilty you are, whether there was negligence or not, none of that interests me. It’s a factual question. Okay? So that is really parallel to the guilt-offering.

By contrast, with Sotah, I’m saying the fact is that in inadvertence and duress she is not forbidden. So that means it’s similar to a sin-offering, meaning it is something that depends on the delinquency of the person. Okay? And therefore there really was no place to compare the impurity of a creeping creature to Sotah. And if I do compare them, then I am in effect saying: with Sotah too, I do not view her impurity as a sanction on the person, but rather as some level of imposing a state. And if you do not impose this state except in an intentional case but not in inadvertence or duress, that means it is harder to impose this state than in the impurity of a creeping creature. Maybe I’ll give an example, because what I really said here is that what the Talmud is doing here is comparing the laws of equivalence between inadvertence and intention—inadvertence and duress versus intention—to the laws of doubt, right? If inadvertence and duress are like intention, then in doubt too it will be the same. And if inadvertence and duress differ from intention, then I’d be less inclined to apply it to doubt. In Sotah they still apply it to doubt, but they make an a fortiori argument to the creeping creature. In other words, the more intentional action and inadvertence and duress are regarded like intention, the more I would say the same about doubt as well. Right? That’s what the Talmud is assuming here. And in fact we found a line of reasoning like this. In Netivot, section 234, he says there that if someone violates a rabbinic prohibition inadvertently, he does not need to repent; there is no transgression here. Kovetz Shiurim. It may be that Kovetz Shiurim brings the Netivot; I don’t remember.

[Speaker B] I think that’s well known.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] As the Netivot, in section 234, between the person and the object of prohibition.

[Speaker B] Yes, meaning—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Netivot basically says, let’s say that you—yes, where did I discover this Netivot? Once I was lying in the hospital, and it was the Sabbatical year, and I drank some kind of fruit drink. Then my yeshiva lecturer comes to visit me. Suddenly I see that this drink can is from the sale permit. At the time I did not eat or drink produce based on the sale permit. Today I do eat and drink it, but then I didn’t. The question whether the sale takes effect or doesn’t take effect depends on what problem you see in the sale permit. If you understand that the sale doesn’t take effect because there is no agency for a transgression, for example, and so on, then yes, it is a transgression. If you say that it is only forbidden to sell, but practically if they sold then they sold, then it’s like produce of a non-Jew, so no. In any case, I asked him, so what do you say about this—my yeshiva lecturer—what do we do with it? So he said to me: don’t worry, there’s the Netivot. What do you mean, the Netivot? The Sabbatical year in our time is rabbinic, and since you didn’t know, you were inadvertent, then at most you violated a rabbinic prohibition inadvertently, and therefore there is no problem. That’s how I learned about this Netivot; that’s where I got to know it. In any case—again—so in inadvertence only Torah-level, but in rabbinic law even intentionally? That sounds strange to me. Do you have any source for that? I don’t remember. Okay. In any case, because in inadvertence I understand, but even intentionally regarding rabbinic law—that’s strange. Well?

[Speaker B] We saw in the chapter on handwashing that—how did they check the Jews in Rome, that they didn’t perform handwashing? They saw that they didn’t do handwashing because they weren’t able to, because of a decree lest there be… but after that they had to be careful about it. That seems to imply that there too it could have been…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not sure. It could be that handwashing is a special law. Fine, we need to look into it.

[Speaker B] There’s this, you—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re reminding me—there is a responsum of the Ben Ish Chai, in Sod Yesharim. He was rabbi in Baghdad; his grandfather was also rabbi in Baghdad. He tells there that an emissary from the Land of Israel arrived in Baghdad and stayed with them for some time. Suddenly he noticed that all the people in the synagogue were laying phylacteries that were not sharp-cornered, meaning the corners of the phylacteries were rounded. So he came to the grandfather of the Ben Ish Chai, who was the community rabbi, and told him: listen, your phylacteries are invalid; the phylacteries need to be square. He was astonished. Apparently he too had phylacteries like that; everybody there did. Those were your phylacteries. He entered into study with him, learned the relevant passages, checked it, and came to the conclusion that it was true. All the phylacteries for generations in that community had been invalid. And that whole community were people with a bare skull who do not lay phylacteries. So the Ben Ish Chai there asks: what, should we entertain the thought that all the Jews here are people with a bare skull who do not lay phylacteries? So he says that we have to say that it is considered as though they did lay phylacteries, because they thought the phylacteries were valid. Now that is strange, because I understand that duress is not a transgression, but duress is not as though one acted. In other words, the fact that you were under duress doesn’t mean that you did something; it only means that if you committed a transgression under duress, it’s not a transgression. But if you failed to perform a positive commandment under duress, that doesn’t mean that you did perform it; it means that you are not guilty for not performing it, and you can’t say that it is considered as though you did. So that’s a strange thing—duress is not as though one acted.

[Speaker D] Maybe the law was not about—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not about failure to fulfill the positive commandment but about nullifying it, and in nullifying you don’t have that. I don’t know, maybe.

[Speaker D] Even though he didn’t lay them at all, from the standpoint of the obligation of nullification. Okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In any case, so they too were probably people with a bare skull who do not lay phylacteries.

[Speaker D] And there are also many cases in the opposite direction: people lay phylacteries but don’t intend anything or don’t believe, and then it has no significance. Is there even anyone who claims that people who perform commandments but don’t intend…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s a different passage; that’s the opposite case.

[Speaker D] Commandments require intention, maybe—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In general that needs to come first. Fine, the question is with every day and so on.

[Speaker D] There are some who in general—

[Speaker B] Don’t agree.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right.

[Speaker C] Once they told us something—did they lay phylacteries every day? What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Did they lay phylacteries every day?

[Speaker C] Who?

[Speaker B] Christians? Of course not.

[Speaker C] No.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously, there is no source for saying that one has to lay phylacteries every day.

[Speaker F] But Rabbenu—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Tam. A friend of mine, Yaavetz—Rabbi Yaavetz—wrote an article together with someone else on this issue. They bring some hints for it, maybe, but there is no real source that one must lay phylacteries every day.

[Speaker F] That Torah scholars would lay—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that they laid them all the time is something else. The question of how much of the day one should wear them is a different discussion. But the question whether there is any obligation at all every day—there are those who claim it is simply a continuous obligation, not an obligation each day. You have to wear phylacteries all the time, and therefore they wore them every day all day. But fine, if they had the practice regarding phylacteries—what?

[Speaker B] There’s great doubt about that, in that nowhere in the literature is it mentioned that it is a commandment to lay them every day.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, obviously. In any case, let’s return to our matter; we’re drifting. In any case, what am I saying? So basically the Netivot argues that someone who violates a rabbinic prohibition inadvertently did not commit a transgression. Okay? Now why? Because a rabbinic prohibition is based, say according to Maimonides at least, on “do not deviate.” Even according to Nachmanides you could say this, but according to Maimonides it is based on “do not deviate.” So what follows? In practice, when you eat poultry with milk, you did not do something intrinsically prohibited. The whole problem here is that you deviated from the words of the Sages. That’s the whole problem. Poultry with milk in itself contains no issue; it is not an object of prohibition, there’s no problem in it, it is not prohibited, because otherwise it would be prohibited by the Torah. All you need to do is obey the Sages who told you not to eat poultry with milk. And if you ate poultry with milk, then you did not obey the Sages. Okay? Meaning yes—but if you were inadvertent, then you did not know that the Sages prohibited it, so there is no rebellion against the command of the Sages here, and therefore there is no prohibition at all. In a Torah prohibition, when you ate meat with milk, then in inadvertence there is no dimension of disobedience to the Torah because you did not know that the Torah prohibited it. But in practice there is an object of prohibition here—you ate meat with milk—so therefore there is a transgression even in inadvertence. You’re not guilty, and therefore you bring only an offering or whatever; you are not punished. Okay? But in a rabbinic transgression there is no object-dimension, there is only the person-dimension. And if you are inadvertent, then even the person-dimension is absent, so there is nothing.

And Rabbi Shlomo Zalman and also Rabbi Shimon Shkop, in somewhat different formulations—Rabbi Shlomo Zalman in his commentary on Shema‘ateta, first shema‘ateta—they discuss the question why in a rabbinic doubt one rules leniently. After all, there is “do not deviate” according to Maimonides, so this is basically a Torah-level doubt, right? The famous difficulty; Nachmanides already asks this against Maimonides in his glosses to the first root. So in their formulations, in different wordings, but they say something similar, like this Netivot. What do they mean? Since you are in doubt, you don’t know if this is poultry with milk or not—maybe it’s soy with milk. So you actually don’t know that the Sages prohibited it. If you don’t know that the Sages prohibited it, then if you ate it there is no rebellion against the command of the Sages, and so there is no prohibition. For them, doubt is like inadvertence, because in both cases you do not know, or do not know with certainty, that there is a prohibition. So therefore, since the whole matter is only in the person and not in the object, and in the person the obligation is an obligation of obedience, and you do not know that there is a command, then there was no disobedience. If there was no disobedience, it is not prohibited. And therefore they argue that this is the explanation for why a rabbinic doubt is ruled leniently. In other words, the explanation for why a rabbinic doubt is lenient is the same explanation for why inadvertence in a rabbinic prohibition is not a transgression, because doubt and inadvertence are the same thing. Because doubt and inadvertence are two cases in which you do not know that there is a command prohibiting it. So basically doubt and inadvertence have the same foundation.

Now this is basically what we see here. What are they saying to me? That with a creeping creature, since there is no difference between inadvertence and intention, or between inadvertence and duress and intention, what does that basically mean? That doubt too will be the same. Because it really makes no difference whether you know or don’t know. The point is a factual point, not a command the person has to obey, but rather the question of what happened in reality. By contrast, with Sotah, where she becomes forbidden only intentionally but not under duress or inadvertently, there one could say that it depends on the person and is a question of obedience or disobedience, so in doubt too maybe I would be lenient. Therefore, if with Sotah I am stringent, then all the more so with the impurity of a creeping creature I will be stringent. Because with Sotah there was room to be lenient, since with Sotah there is a difference between duress and inadvertence versus intention, but with a creeping creature, where there is no difference, then there it is obvious that doubt too is prohibited. So once again we see that there is some kind of relationship here, but now this is already a different formulation from what I said earlier. Earlier I said it is only a question of how easily you apply the status. Here I am giving a substantive basis for the comparison. I’m saying that a state of doubt is like a state of inadvertence. If you are in doubt, then you are basically a kind of inadvertent actor. You don’t know there is a prohibition here; you’re not certain there is a prohibition here. So that is basically a kind of inadvertence. Okay? So if with inadvertence regarding a creeping creature it is prohibited, then certainly in doubt it will be prohibited. If with Sotah in inadvertence she is not forbidden, then I would expect that in doubt too she would not be forbidden. We see that nevertheless she is forbidden, so if Sotah is forbidden, then certainly a creeping creature will be forbidden, right? That’s the a fortiori argument.

So why in fact are they stringent with Sotah in a case of doubt? After all, in inadvertence and duress she is not forbidden, and we saw that inadvertence and duress are like doubt. So why are they actually stringent with Sotah in a case of doubt? I don’t know. It could be that you tell me that in this case the Torah introduced a novelty; it is a textual decree. The Torah introduced the novelty that in this case doubt is not like inadvertence. Because inadvertence is a state in which you don’t know at all. In doubt, you know that such a possibility exists; you’re just not certain. It’s not a complete equation between doubt and inadvertence. There is a similar element; in doubt too you do not know with certainty. But there is at least some side saying yes; it’s not that you know nothing. In inadvertence you know nothing; you have no guilt whatsoever. Maybe negligence, but there is no side here that this thing really is prohibited. So it is not a clear comparison. So the Torah said: no, in this case inadvertence is not like doubt. In doubt I am stringent even though in inadvertence I am not stringent. And maybe in fact. And maybe in fact that is why this novelty was needed, because we asked why the novelty was needed that doubt regarding Sotah is ruled stringently. Because with Sotah there was room to say that her doubtful case should be lenient, since in inadvertence and duress too we do not forbid. So in such a case I would say that even the doubtful case I would be lenient. Therefore we need that novelty. Now the Talmud says: an a fortiori argument. If with Sotah, where in inadvertence and duress she does not become impure, still the Torah obligated her in a case of doubt—meaning, in doubt it did forbid her—then all the more so with a creeping creature, where even in inadvertence and duress you become impure. There it is obvious that you will be prohibited, because there it is not connected to your awareness at all. And in doubt, the whole reason to be lenient in doubt is because your awareness is incomplete. You don’t know whether there is a prohibition here or not. In a place where awareness plays no role, that is irrelevant. If with Sotah, where awareness does play a role, they tell me that even a doubtful awareness is prohibited, then in a place where awareness plays no role at all, obviously I don’t care whether you are in doubt. What difference does it make to me? At most it only means the awareness is partial, but awareness plays no role with a creeping creature. Therefore all the more so it is prohibited.

[Speaker D] This matter in which we compare inadvertence and doubt—is that said only regarding a rabbinic prohibition, where what we have in hand is only obedience, and with respect to obedience you’re inadvertent and you can say that you didn’t disobey, and on that we compare it to doubt? But with Torah matters, no. But that’s the whole idea.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But you see that Sotah, even though it is Torah law, in inadvertence and duress it doesn’t apply. You would expect it to apply, because Torah law depends on reality and not on the person. No, it’s the same reasoning. No, it’s not the reasoning of rabbinic law. It creates a state like rabbinic law. Again: you don’t learn it from rabbinic law. It is a Torah law; it’s unrelated. But this particular Torah law is exactly like rabbinic law because you see that in inadvertence or duress here too it does not apply, like in rabbinic law. So if so, its laws of doubt should also be like the laws of rabbinic doubts.

[Speaker D] Why really are they exempt in inadvertence and duress?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly because this is a law in the person. Because here too it is a law in the person. Not because it’s like rabbinic law. Because here too it is a law in the person. Not because it is rabbinic, but because here too it is a law in the person. And just as in rabbinic law in inadvertence it is not prohibited because it is a law in the person, who did not disobey, and therefore—

[Speaker D] He is exempt in inadvertence because it isn’t called disobeying. And here how are you now jumping to Torah law, to Sotah, which is Torah law and not merely obedience?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because she did not know. It doesn’t matter—factually, she did not know, so in doubt too she did not know. What difference does it make? Leave obedience aside. Doubt is like not knowing—that’s the claim, right? Doubt is a kind of not knowing.

[Speaker D] And that is relevant in places where lack of knowledge exempts, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And with Sotah, lack of knowledge exempts. After all, in inadvertence or duress she is exempt, so doubt is like inadvertence and duress. It doesn’t matter for what reason. It makes no difference whether this is obedience or not obedience. Again, it doesn’t matter—obedience doesn’t matter.

[Speaker D] I—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll explain again: it has nothing to do with obedience at all. I’m not going through obedience. Obedience is the explanation for why in inadvertence or duress in rabbinic law you are exempt, because the whole issue is an issue of obedience, okay? But the comparison to doubt has nothing whatsoever to do with obedience. The comparison to doubt says that if you are exempt when you do not know, then doubt too is a state in which you do not know. I don’t care why you are exempt when you don’t know. Is it because it’s lack of obedience? Fine, I don’t care. The comparison is that doubt is like not knowing. That is the comparison. Now let’s move to Sotah. In Sotah too, when you do not know, she is not forbidden, right? In inadvertence or duress. Well then, doubt is like not knowing, so in doubt too she should not become forbidden.

[Speaker B] Why? Because in Sotah there is knowledge and will, because in inadvertence and duress, due to the matters in Sotah or in impurity. Well, that’s the a fortiori argument.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s not the a fortiori argument.

[Speaker B] Because simply, there, there it doesn’t exist at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] From there comes the a fortiori argument. Because there, even though knowledge plays a role, nevertheless the Torah says that in doubt you need to be stringent—even though you would expect that if it depends on knowledge, the Torah should have been lenient—and nevertheless the Torah says to be stringent. So in a place where it doesn’t depend on knowledge at all, then certainly in doubt I will be stringent, because why should I be lenient? It doesn’t depend on knowledge at all. After all, the Torah says—

[Speaker B] About—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] About Sotah. But the a fortiori argument is for the creeping creature. With a creeping creature there is no decree of the Torah. Regarding doubtful impurity from a creeping creature—where do you have a decree of the Torah? About doubtful impurity from a creeping creature. You don’t know the law of doubt there; you learn it by an a fortiori argument from Sotah. The distinction that the Torah did not—

[Speaker B] Write. Fine, understood.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are basically, yes, basically three situations. There are laws that are pure person-laws. That’s like rabbinic laws, and there both inadvertence and doubt are permitted. There are pure object-laws, like impurity, where the whole law concerns the object and is not connected to the person at all. Therefore both in inadvertence and duress and in doubt you are stringent. And there are object-laws that depend on the act of the person, like Sotah. Okay. Now with Sotah, since it depends on the act of the person, there was room to say that in doubt it should not apply, like in inadvertence and duress. Yet the Torah introduces the novelty that it does apply. Why? Because if the woman strayed, then she becomes impure. Right. Now, true, when she strays she becomes impure only intentionally, but once she did it intentionally, then even if I am in doubt she will be impure. And this the Torah introduced as a novelty. Since the state is a result of the action of the person. So regarding inadvertence and duress, indeed she will not be forbidden, but regarding doubts, yes. Because in doubts it’s not really inadvertence and duress. In doubt you know that there is some side pointing to prohibition; in inadvertence you don’t know. So it is not completely similar to inadvertence. What do you mean, public domain? Wait, wait, we haven’t gotten to public domain yet. We’ll get there in a moment. Now Tosafot asks: “But one could ask, why do we not refute it by saying: what is unique to Sotah? That there are grounds for suspicion, since he warned her and she secluded herself, as we refuted above at the beginning of chapter one.” Yes, after all you can refute it: what is unique to Sotah is that there are grounds for suspicion. In Sotah there are grounds for suspicion; she secluded herself after a warning, and the warning created grounds for suspicion. Okay? We talked about the role of the warning, but then it created grounds for suspicion. So what are you doing making an a fortiori argument from Sotah? Sotah is more severe because there are grounds for suspicion. Therefore they are stringent in doubtful cases. Can you say the same about a creeping creature, where there are no grounds for suspicion, and there perhaps they are not stringent? Okay.

Now, if this is not an a fortiori argument of leniency and stringency, but only about the application of a law, then it is not entirely clear to me that it matters whether there are grounds for suspicion or not. What difference does it make? I’m not speaking here about leniency and stringency. I’m speaking here about how easy it is to apply the law. So what difference does it make whether there are grounds for suspicion or not? In a state of doubt, do I apply the law or not apply the law? The question is whether it is said concerning doubtful states or not said concerning doubtful states. There is probably a point here, namely the following point. Look, Tosafot apparently understands that this really does speak in terms of leniency and stringency, if I understand correctly. And then he says, what’s going on? There is the question of leniency and stringency, and that is determined by the question whether it happens also in inadvertence and duress. In Sotah it does not happen in inadvertence and duress, therefore it is lighter. In a creeping creature it happens also in inadvertence and duress, therefore it is more severe. But Tosafot says: yes, but the level of doubt is also different; it is not the same level of doubt in both. So even though the prohibition in Sotah is lighter, the doubt in Sotah is more severe. Think of it not as a doubt but as seventy percent, not fifty-fifty. True, the prohibition is lighter, but the doubt is a seventy-percent doubt. By contrast, with a creeping creature the prohibition is a severe prohibition, but the doubt is only fifty percent. So even if you make an a fortiori argument from the standpoint of the severity of the prohibition, there are differences here in the strength of the doubt. So who says you can make an a fortiori argument from Sotah to a creeping creature? Okay.

[Speaker D] What do you mean? “Grounds for suspicion” is about the matter itself, and in practical terms the issue is whether it’s seventy or fifty percent certainty, the level of doubt. But if something is severe, then less should suffice for us. Fewer percentages, less.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, here there is the rule of “it is enough.” There is “it is enough.” What? Less should suffice for you—meaning less than seventy percent. How much less? What? So how much less? I’m asking you. How much less? Sixty-nine? Sixty-eight? Fifty? How much?

[Speaker D] That it has to be pure, basically, that there not be any dirt here that maybe…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s “it is enough.” That’s the “it is enough.” In a moment we’ll see—the “it is enough” here is learned from the source from which you came; never mind. The “it is enough” says: right, it should be somewhat less than seventy, but I don’t know how much less than seventy. So at seventy I stop. I don’t know how far to go below seventy. Right? That’s the “it is enough.” Like half-damages in the injured party’s property. I say: an ox’s goring is more severe than tooth and foot, right? So if—sorry, yes—goring is more severe than tooth and foot. So if tooth and foot are liable in the injured party’s property, then goring is certainly liable in the injured party’s property. But if you say that the injured party’s property is more severe than the public domain—not goring versus tooth and foot, but rather the injured party’s property is more severe than the public domain—we see that tooth and foot are liable there, while in the public domain they are exempt. So goring, which is liable for half in the public domain, will certainly be liable in the injured party’s property. How much will it be liable for? In Jewish law, half, right? Like the Sages against Rabbi Tarfon. Half. Why half? But it’s more severe than tooth and foot… meaning, the injured party’s property is more severe than the public domain. If in the public domain it is half, then perhaps full damages? No—“it is enough for what comes from an inference to be like the original case.” If it is half—right—it should be something more, I just don’t know how much more, so I stop at half. So here too, same thing. The doubt is a seventy-percent doubt. He says: it should be less, because the creeping creature is more severe. How much less? I don’t know, so “it is enough for what comes from an inference to be like the original case”—seventy percent. Because if you tell me that the doubt in the creeping creature case is lighter, an evenly balanced doubt, then you can’t learn that there too you need to be stringent. Okay? The creeping creature is more severe, but with respect to the Temple. I didn’t understand.

[Speaker B] The creeping creature is more severe with respect to the Temple, and Sotah is also with respect to her husband.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s another reason it’s severe; it won’t change anything. Fine. Tosafot says: “And one can say that the seclusion following the warning in Sotah is like a doubtful contact with a creeping creature, for without the warning there would have been no doubt at all regarding mere seclusion, since people are not suspected of sexual prohibitions. Therefore the warning causes the doubt. And so they explained in tractate Niddah”—never mind.

[Speaker C] What is he saying?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He’s saying that the grounds for suspicion do not increase the strength of the doubt. What did he ask in the question? That the strength of the doubt in Sotah is seventy percent and not fifty percent, because there are also grounds for suspicion. With a creeping creature the doubt is fifty-fifty—you don’t know whether he touched it or didn’t touch it—so it’s a fifty-fifty doubt. He says no, because in Sotah she has a presumption of fitness. Every person has a presumption of fitness, so in principle you should have assumed she did not become impure. Since there are grounds for suspicion, that arouses the doubt, so the grounds for suspicion cancel out the presumption of fitness, and what remains is a fifty-fifty doubt. Therefore the doubt of a creeping creature and the doubt of Sotah are the same level of doubt.

Now one has to understand that this very strongly reinforces what I said before, because usually in an a fortiori argument we do not cancel out stringencies. If, for example, I am learning B from A by an a fortiori argument, and now A has a certain stringency, but B has another stringency opposite it relative to A, then that is a refutation, right? You cannot make the a fortiori argument. We don’t say: okay, let’s offset the stringencies. This one has one stringency and that one has another stringency, so let’s offset them. Once we offset them we’ll surely learn B from A. Or by common denominator, or analogical construction—or even if we say that one stringency is lighter than the other and therefore on net it is still more severe, so let’s make an a fortiori argument. We don’t do that. For an a fortiori argument, it is enough that there be a refutation; it is enough that there be a stringency there. Even if there is a stringency here and a stringency there, it is still a refutation. We do not offset stringencies. The one example is in Bava Metzia, “principal without an oath is preferable to double payment with an oath”… how does it go there? “Half without an oath is preferable to double with an oath”… “principal without an oath is preferable to double with an oath.” Yes, that is like an offsetting of stringencies, but that is the one example and it needs to be discussed separately. Usually there is no offsetting of stringencies.

Now what are you telling me here? You are telling me that on the one hand Sotah has the stringency that there are grounds for suspicion, and on the other hand Sotah has the leniency that she has a presumption of fitness. Practically speaking, you cannot learn the creeping creature from Sotah because there is also a side of leniency, not only a side of stringency. So it is enough that there be a side of stringency; there is no offsetting of stringencies. So why, how does Tosafot nevertheless think that this rescues the a fortiori argument? The answer is that this is not offsetting stringencies. The stringency is clear: the creeping creature is more severe than Sotah. Here we are discussing only the level of doubt. What is the level of doubt? And if the level of doubt is equal, then very good, then we can make the a fortiori argument. This is not offsetting stringencies in the sense of whether there is a refutation or not; it’s not about refutations at all. You are talking about the question of what the level of doubt is. So you tell me that after offsetting those two things, the level of doubt in Sotah is the same as the level of doubt in a creeping creature, so it is fifty-fifty. The relations of stringency remain as they were: a creeping creature is more severe than Sotah because it exists also in inadvertence and duress. That is unrelated. This reinforces what I said before, that the question of the level of doubt does not enter into the a fortiori argument; it is not a refutation of the a fortiori argument. You tell me that this is more severe than that—I agree that this is more severe than that—but still, the level of doubt here is different, so how can you learn from it? The answer is: not so; the level of doubt is not different. It is the same level of doubt, and therefore since this is more severe than that, one can learn. That is another indication of it.

That is, the parameters I am talking about here—grounds for suspicion and the presumption of fitness—do not speak on the plane of which is more severe than which. They speak about the question of what the level of doubt is. And when it comes to the question of what the level of doubt is, you have to get to the bottom line. In the end, what is the level of doubt? It is like the creeping creature case, so there is no problem; you can make an a fortiori argument. Okay. As I said earlier, Tosafot assumes that we are dealing here with relations of leniency and stringency, and therefore he raises all sorts of refutations. But according to what I said earlier, it is not at all certain that we need to get involved in this discussion, since we are not learning relations of leniency and stringency at all. The question is when the law takes effect. So if the law of Sotah takes effect in such a situation, then he says it takes effect, and if not then not. It’s not a question of who is more severe than whom. It’s a question of definition: when does the law take effect and when does it not take effect? So what difference does it make whether there are grounds for suspicion or not? You’re not playing games of leniency and stringency here. Okay?

And then it could be that the whole question never arises. Look, for example, at the Tosafot HaRosh. Something similar also appears in Tosafot Shantz. “And from here you infer regarding a creeping creature, and just as with Sotah where it was not made the same in inadvertence…” I have a difficulty, because here it implies that doubtful impurity in the private domain is learned by an a fortiori argument from Sotah. But in the first chapter of Chullin we say that it is a received law. And it seems to me that certainly it is a law given to Moses at Sinai. They don’t learn the creeping creature from Sotah at all. Doubtful impurity in the private domain being stringent is a law given to Moses at Sinai; it’s not from Sotah. “And this a fortiori argument is not a full a fortiori argument. And I will show you that it is learned from a law given to Moses at Sinai and not from Sotah, because the a fortiori argument itself is problematic.” Why is it problematic? “Because one can refute it by saying: what is unique to the impurity of a creeping creature? That it has purification in a mikveh. Therefore we should also be lenient with it, not to render impure in doubt.” Fine? So the a fortiori argument cannot work. The relations of leniency and stringency here do not work. It is not an a fortiori argument. But from the standpoint of the Tosafot HaRosh, this is not a refutation. Notice: Tosafot raised this as a difficulty, right? After all there are grounds for suspicion, or after all it has purification in a mikveh—he asks, it doesn’t matter, it’s the same idea. Later he will also bring what Tosafot says. But Tosafot asks it as a difficulty and answers with some answer that offsets it. The Tosafot HaRosh is not bothered by it at all. He brings it as proof that this is not an a fortiori argument in the first place. What do you want? If it were an a fortiori argument there would be refutations against it, so it is simply not an a fortiori argument. So what is it? It is learned from a law given to Moses at Sinai, and this is some sort of disclosure of the matter. See further on.

He says: “And therefore we should be lenient, and moreover bodily injuries will prove it, for there they made inadvertence like intention and duress like willfulness, and yet they did not make doubt like certainty.” So there too perhaps you should make an a fortiori argument that in doubt we should be stringent. “And moreover, what is unique to Sotah? That there are grounds for suspicion, since he warned her and she secluded herself.” That’s what Tosafot said, right? Only again, in Tosafot it arose as a difficulty because Tosafot understood that we are dealing with an a fortiori argument. But he claims that it is not an a fortiori argument at all, and the proof is Tosafot’s very question. So he does not need to answer Tosafot’s question. Tosafot answered the question because he understands there is an a fortiori argument here. So he says: the level of doubt is the same level of doubt and the creeping creature is more severe than Sotah, and therefore you can make an a fortiori argument, and the level of doubt is the same level of doubt. He says: leave it, it’s not an a fortiori argument at all. Leave me alone with all the refutations and offsets; it’s irrelevant. What? So he says: in the first chapter of Chullin we say that it is a received law. There the Sages—yes. That means it is a law given to Moses at Sinai. “Rather, certainly it is a law given to Moses at Sinai to render doubtful impurity in the private domain impure, and they attached it to the verse ‘and she was hidden, and she became impure,’ to make doubtful impurity like the seclusion of Sotah. And the a fortiori argument was stated merely for expansiveness.” But it is not really an a fortiori argument.

Now that fits very well with what I said earlier, right? I said that Tosafot assumes there is an a fortiori argument here, involving relations of leniency and stringency. I say: leave all his questions and answers and the Talmud in Chullin and the refutations of the a fortiori argument. When you look at the a fortiori argument, you see that it is not an a fortiori argument. It is not about relations of leniency and stringency. It is about relations of how easy it is to apply or not apply. It is not relations of leniency and stringency, and therefore leave me alone with leniency and stringency. The question is where the thing is defined as applying and where it is defined as not applying. It is a question of definition, not a question of leniency and stringency. With a creeping creature there is no transgression at all, so what does stringency even mean? What stringency is there? You did not commit a transgression when you touched a creeping creature. Okay? Therefore I say that when looking at the a fortiori argument itself, I think you can see that it is not an a fortiori argument. He brings proofs and indications for this and so on, but basically then it fits very well. Therefore I think Tosafot really does read the Talmud as if it were an a fortiori argument, and then he makes refutations and offsets here. But the Tosafot HaRosh and Tosafot Shantz really say: leave it, it isn’t an a fortiori argument at all.

And it seems that later on it is a bit hard to say that. Because in the end, what exactly is the role of it? So the a fortiori argument doesn’t work, right? So a law given to Moses at Sinai—for what purpose did they bring it? Is this just some sort of mere textual support? He says even more than that: after all they learn it from “and she became impure and was hidden,” and so on, so they do learn it from the verse here; only it is not by an a fortiori argument. Well then, why do you need a law given to Moses at Sinai? So they learn it from the verse but not by an a fortiori argument. Then why do you need a law given to Moses at Sinai? Something isn’t clear. It could be that what he wants to say is that the law given to Moses at Sinai tells me to make an a fortiori argument even though there are not really relations of leniency and stringency here. But the law given to Moses at Sinai tells me nevertheless to treat it as though it emerges from Sotah. Why? In a moment you’ll see. Before that—well, in just a moment I’ll get to it—but Rashba is a third direction. Rashba in Ketubot—we already saw this Rashba in the third lecture. He says, even though every doubtful impurity in the private domain is also impure and we learn it from Sotah, even though there are no grounds for suspicion there—for after all, in impurity even if there are no grounds for suspicion we say doubt is ruled stringently; he is alluding to Tosafot’s question—generally Sotah is not because of a claim of grounds for suspicion, because doubtful impurity means there is no one saying with certainty, “she did not become impure.” But with Sotah, where she secluded herself and her claim is made with certainty, were it not for the grounds for suspicion we would not render her impure. And every doubtful impurity the Merciful One compared to Sotah, whether there are grounds for suspicion or whether there are not, and so on. What is he saying? He is basically saying: with Sotah, true, there are grounds for suspicion as Tosafot says, but on the other hand there is also her own statement, that she says, “I did not become impure.” With a creeping creature you don’t know, you have a doubt. But here there is a woman who says, “I did not become impure.”

[Speaker D] A presumption of fitness, which is somewhat related?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the presumption of fitness is without her making any claim. A presumption of fitness means that we assume that as long as—right, it’s a similar idea and the direction is also similar. Meaning, he goes in the direction of Tosafot in the sense that he resolves the objection, and he also apparently understands that this really is an a fortiori inference, unlike Tosafot Shantz and the Tosafot HaRosh. The only consideration is not circumstantial indication, but the presumption of fitness. Fine, but the logic is the same logic. Now, why am I saying this? Because look, later in the Talmud the Talmud says: “And from the place you came from: just as in the case of the sotah it is in a private domain, so too with a creeping thing it is in a private domain; and just as in the case of the sotah it is something that has intelligence to be asked, so too with a creeping thing it is something that has intelligence to be asked. From here they said: in the case of something that has intelligence to be asked, in a private domain its doubt is impure; in a public domain its doubt is pure. And for something that does not have intelligence to be asked, whether in a private domain or a public domain, its doubt is pure.” What does “from the place you came from” mean? “From the place you came from” is the analogy to dayo. When you learn B from A, every limitation that exists on the law in A will also exist in B, because “from the place you came from.” Meaning, you came from there; you have no evidence for more than what you found there. That’s like dayo, okay? Only here it’s a dayo that speaks not about quantities—dayo is usually about quantities: liable for half damages, liable for full damages. Here it speaks about external limitations. So in the case of the sotah we’re talking about a private domain, not a public domain. More than that: we’re talking there about a woman, who has intelligence, she has intelligence to be asked—you can ask her whether she became impure or did not become impure. So he says, then in impurity as well, the rule that doubtful impurity in a private domain is treated stringently was said only: A, in a private domain, like the sotah; B, only in a case where there is intelligence to be asked. That there is someone of sound mind whom you can ask. For example, if someone touched a creeping thing or did not touch a creeping thing, and we have a doubt—he has intelligence to be asked. You can ask him whether he touched the creeping thing or not. In such a situation we really will go stringently. A doubt in a private domain we’ll treat stringently. But if, for example, a creeping thing passed next to pure items, or maybe a dead creeping thing was somehow brought near the pure items and maybe they became impure, maybe not—here there isn’t anyone who can tell me yes or no. The pure items don’t know how to speak. So I have no one to ask. That is called something that does not have intelligence to be asked. In such a situation we do not learn from the sotah; its doubt is treated leniently even in a private domain. Okay? So this basically means that the laws of doubtful impurity we learn from doubt in the case of a sotah. And then what? “From the place you came from”—all the limitations that apply to a doubtful sotah will also apply to doubtful impurity. What are the limitations? The Talmud says two limitations. A, it is only in a private domain; B, it is only where there is intelligence to be asked. Fine, those two things. And then it turns out that in practice both requirements are needed. In order to be stringent you need: A, that it be in a private domain, and B, that there be intelligence to be asked—both things. Meaning, if there is no intelligence to be asked, then even in a private domain it is pure. If it is in a public domain, I don’t care whether there is or is not intelligence to be asked—it will be pure. Only when both requirements are fulfilled, only then is it impure. Exactly like the sotah. Okay? That’s what the Talmud says. Now I ask: according to what we saw above, Tosafot HaRosh and Tosafot Shantz do not learn this from the sotah at all. It’s merely a disclosure of the matter, right? A law given to Moses at Sinai. So what is this “from the place you came from”? If the source is the sotah, then you tell me “from the place you came from.” You learned it from there; you have only its specific novelty. What was innovated in the sotah, you apply to doubtful impurity. But if it’s not a real derivation, it’s only a disclosure of the matter—really it’s a law given to Moses at Sinai—then what is “from the place you came from”? What does that have to do with anything? It’s not learned from there at all. An asmachta, I don’t know exactly what it is. How can you create halakhic limitations because of an asmachta?

[Speaker D] But here you heard that the law given to Moses at Sinai says to do it, exactly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s why I’m saying—therefore they were also careful to formulate it this way. When you look there, what you see is that the a fortiori inference is only a disclosure of the matter. What does that mean? It’s not really an a fortiori inference, because there are objections against it, but why is the law given to Moses at Sinai needed at all? To tell me to make an a fortiori inference. After the law given to Moses at Sinai said it, it said: don’t pay attention to the objections; make the a fortiori inference even with the objections, even though there are objections. So in the final analysis I am still making the a fortiori inference, and it is indeed learned from the sotah, and therefore they say that we learn it from “she secluded herself and became impure.” Tosafot Shantz and Tosafot HaRosh also say this, only the a fortiori inference is merely a disclosure of the matter, but they learn it from “she secluded herself and became impure,” they learn it from the sotah, they do learn it from the sotah. The law given to Moses at Sinai says: don’t get worked up over the fact that there are objections to the a fortiori inference. Why? Because doubtful impurity in a public domain is pure regardless of the a fortiori inference, from a law given to Moses at Sinai.

[Speaker B] Again, it depends how you learn it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m speaking according to Tosafot Shantz and Tosafot HaRosh.

[Speaker B] But even not according to them, even according to the a fortiori inference, the same law comes out. Meaning, whether they disagree or not, their conclusion, their results are—clearly, that’s the law,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The law is that it is only in a case where there is intelligence to be asked and only in a private domain. That’s clear. The only question is how to learn it. So Tosafot, who learned it by way of an a fortiori inference—then clearly, “from the place you came from.” So if in the sotah it is only in a private domain where there is intelligence to be asked, then so too in doubtful impurity, because from his perspective he sees it as an a fortiori inference. But Tosafot HaRosh and Tosafot Shantz do not learn it by way of an a fortiori inference; it is a law given to Moses at Sinai. So how can it make sense to say “from the place you came from” and say that also in doubtful impurity there has to be intelligence to be asked and a private domain? So I’m saying that apparently even according to their view, the law given to Moses at Sinai said to make an a fortiori inference. And in the final analysis it is indeed learned from the sotah.

[Speaker D] That is also the plain meaning of the Talmud in Niddah, at the beginning of Niddah; I’m not getting into that now. I’ll just say now two—The a fortiori inference that Tosafot HaRosh brought is not connected to Tosafot. First of all, he resolved the third question, the question of circumstantial indication. The second question he asks is: what about tortfeasors? So here too, there too, in places where—so Tosafot understands that with the sotah too both cases are a transfer of status, and then everything really—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but Tosafot apparently understands this as a relation of leniency and stringency, and not a transfer of status. That’s why I say that there it’s a bit more problematic. The answer of Tosafot HaRosh and Tosafot Shantz is exactly this: that it’s not an a fortiori inference but a transfer of status. That’s exactly what they answer. But Tosafot, who does not answer this way, seems to remain with the conception that it really is an a fortiori inference, and he only resolves the problem of circumstantial indication and leaves it as an a fortiori inference.

[Speaker D] Tosafot is the one who moved to doubt and certainty, that we apply here a status of doubtful certainty and then she is exempted.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A different Tosafot. We saw that there are other Tosafots; we saw that there are Tosafots that say this and Tosafots that say that. We saw there in the lecture that there is one Tosafot like this and another like that. I don’t know, but that really doesn’t fit with the comment I made earlier, that according to Tosafot this really is an application of status.

[Speaker D] The eighth question, about the mikveh—also for the sotah there is her water, the bitter waters; also for the sotah her immersion is in a mikveh. The drinking.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The drinking, which is on the assumption that she did not become impure, and if she did become impure then she is not purified.

[Speaker D] I have here some mechanism that simply exempts her—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On that side, it simply reveals to me that she did not become impure; it does not purify her. It simply clarifies that she was never impure in the first place, because I didn’t know that. It’s like something that has a permitting alternative. The Rosh in Nedarim asks—he brings the Jerusalem Talmud, which asks—why is terumah considered something that has a permitting alternative? After all, when you go to ask about the terumah or a vow—why, when you go to ask about a vow, is it clarified retroactively that you never vowed at all? That is not called something that has a permitting alternative. When the sage releases the vow, he releases it retroactively. So basically that means that—or annulment of vows, sorry—the husband, not the sage, the husband annuls the vow, he annuls it retroactively. If he annuls it retroactively, then it is not something that has a permitting alternative. Something that has a permitting alternative means it was forbidden, and from a certain point onward it is permitted. So the same thing here—

[Speaker D] The waters reveal it to me retroactively.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The waters reveal that she did not become impure. After all, that’s what the waters say—that she did not become impure. Right? They resolve the doubt; they do not say that from now on she is permitted. They simply say: until now I was stringent because I didn’t know, but now that I know, it turns out that I was stringent for no reason; really she did not become impure. It’s the same law. By the way, the very fact that they say “from the place you came from” and not dayo is also an interesting point. Maybe that too hints that this is not an a fortiori inference. With an a fortiori inference they say dayo. But if it is a derivation—I learn from the sotah—then it is not an a fortiori inference, “from the place you came from.” Meaning, not “it is enough for that which comes from a law to be like the source case.” This is not about an a fortiori inference. I don’t know, maybe yes, maybe no. In any case, look at what the Talmud says further on: Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav: in a case of something that has intelligence to be asked and something that does not have intelligence to be asked—I wanted to make one more comment, one note, sorry. When I learn that there is something that has intelligence to be asked or a private domain, why don’t I learn that someone who touches a creeping thing also drinks bitter waters? Or that a woman becomes forbidden to her husband, as I said earlier? Why do I learn specifically “has intelligence to be asked,” and why did they specifically choose these two? This is a point I’ve already made several times, and I’m repeating it again. People think these things are scriptural decrees. They cannot be scriptural decrees. There has to be some reasoning here. There has to be. Because if there were no reasoning here, why did they latch specifically onto these two parameters: intelligence to be asked and private domain? Why not that it applies only to women? Like the sotah—it applies only to women. So maybe doubtful impurity in a public domain should also apply only to women? “It is enough for that which comes from a law to be like the source case,” “from the place you came from.” Because there’s no reasoning to say it would apply only to women. What difference is there, with respect to impurity, between women and men? But there is reasoning regarding intelligence to be asked and private domain. So that means that the fact that we learned it from “the place you came from” does not exempt us from thinking about why the Sages really learned specifically this. There must be a reasoning that tells me why intelligence to be asked and the type of domain—private domain and public domain—are relevant parameters regarding doubtful impurity. Why is that important? Why specifically are these two parameters the reservations that were learned?

[Speaker C] What? Private domain—the opposite.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You have no chance of clarifying it, because in a private domain they hid themselves, that’s why they’re there. In a public domain, the opposite—someone else could have seen them. In a private domain they go in so that no one will see. So that is exactly the place where you cannot clarify. If it were possible to clarify, then they didn’t do the job—they wanted to hide. In any event, so the continuation of the Talmud: Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav, “Something that has intelligence to be asked and something that does not have intelligence to be asked—from this verse does it emerge? ‘And the flesh that touches anything impure shall not be eaten’—it is specifically definite impurity that may not be eaten; but doubtful impurity and doubtful purity may be eaten. Say the end of the verse: ‘And as for the flesh, anyone pure may eat flesh’—it is specifically definite purity that may eat flesh; but doubtful impurity and doubtful purity may not be eaten. Rather, must we not conclude: here it is where there is intelligence to be asked; here it is where there is not intelligence to be asked.” And we find another source for this—that doubtful impurity is treated stringently only where there is intelligence to be asked and in a private domain—from these verses, from Rav Giddel in the name of Rav. So it is not learned from “the place you came from” of the sotah. The Talmud says: and Rav Giddel in the name of Rav was needed, and it was needed to say to learn from the sotah. For if it were only from Rav, I would have said whether in a private domain or in a public domain—yes, nothing explicit at all is written there about private domain and public domain. You would learn that it applies whether in a private domain or a public domain, so you need the sotah. And if it were only from the sotah, I would have said that there must be intelligence of both the toucher and the one touched; therefore it is necessary. Because with the sotah there are two people. In the case of one who touches a creeping thing, the intelligence to be asked is the intelligence of the person. It is not the intelligence of the creeping thing. Okay? So therefore these two sources are both needed. But for our purposes, what does that mean? Again, when they make a tzrikhuta, that means that the derivation from the sotah is really a derivation from the sotah; it is not just a mere disclosure of the matter. It is a law given to Moses at Sinai and a disclosure of the matter from the sotah. Because if that were the whole story, then what is there to make a tzrikhuta between Rav Giddel in the name of Rav and the derivation from the sotah? There is no derivation from the sotah; it’s just a disclosure of the matter. Once again, you see in the Talmud that yes, the derivation from the sotah is truly a derivation from the sotah. So what did they mean there by “mere disclosure of the matter”? The intention is that the a fortiori inference is merely a disclosure of the matter. The derivation from the sotah is not a derivation by an a fortiori inference. It is another kind of derivation. But it is still clear that we learn it from the sotah. Therefore also “from the place you came from”—the whole flow of the Talmud says this. You can’t say otherwise. Tosafot HaRosh and Tosafot Shantz cannot be read literally as if there is no derivation from the sotah at all. That can’t be, because in the Talmud you see that it is not so. Rather, the a fortiori inference is merely a disclosure of the matter. Why? Because it really is not a relation of leniency and stringency, as I said earlier. Maybe one more remark. In the Rashba we saw above: why indeed does circumstantial indication not create stringency regarding a sotah? Because she herself claims that she did not become impure. So that pulls toward leniency. And there is circumstantial indication, so that offsets it, and it remains an even doubt. Okay? So you see that the fact that she has intelligence and can make claims is specifically a reason to be lenient. Right? A reason to be lenient, because she claims she is pure, so that is a reason to be lenient. The circumstantial indication is a reason to be stringent, and they offset each other. In contrast, in our case, “has intelligence to be asked” is a reason to be stringent. If there is intelligence to be asked, then in a case of doubt we go stringently; if there is not intelligence to be asked, then in a case of doubt we go leniently, even in a private domain. So how does that fit? It’s pretty clear that “has intelligence to be asked” is not talking about the question whether I asked her and she answered. It’s the very fact that one can ask, that there is some intelligent person here, that there is someone whom one can ask—that is the requirement. Not that I ask him and he says something. On the contrary, if I ask him and he says something, that is a reason to be lenient, if he says he did not become impure. But the very fact that we are dealing with a person whom one can ask. Now I want to get into—as much as we’ll manage, we don’t have much time left—I want to get into the question of why, what is the meaning of what I said earlier: after all, we need to understand what difference it makes to me whether there is intelligence to ask or not, what difference it makes whether it is a private domain or a public domain, and there has to be a reasoning. The fact that we learn it from the sotah does not mean there is no reasoning here. I said this many times. For example: “You shall fear the Lord your God”—to include Torah scholars. So the word “et” comes to include Torah scholars. Does that mean this is a scriptural decree and we do not expound the reason of the verse and there is no point asking why to include Torah scholars? Of course not. “We do not expound the reason of the verse” applies only to laws explicitly written in the Torah. Laws learned by interpretation—of course we do expound the reason of the verse. Why? Because the interpreter himself created it on the basis of the reason of the verse. It says, “You shall fear the Lord your God”; something needs to be included. What should be included? Standards? What should be included? You activate your reasoning, and you say: Torah scholars—that is what is most similar, or least dissimilar, to the Holy One, blessed be He, right? Meaning everything is built on reasoning. The “et” only tells you to include; it doesn’t tell you what to include. And when you discuss the question of what to include, you activate your reasoning. Always. When you have a verbal analogy between a slave and a woman, right? So I need to compare the laws with regard to what? Maybe let’s write the woman with an ayin, from Moab? No, because there’s no reasoning to change the spelling, right? Or perhaps one can marry a slave just as one can marry a woman. No, because there’s no reasoning. So what yes? “To her” and “to him,” yes, never mind, various things about going out by document or things like that, all the things learned from the verbal analogy between slave and woman. So what does that actually mean? That obviously our reasoning tells us with regard to what a slave and a woman are being compared. The verbal analogy only tells us that there is a comparison here. What to do with that comparison—that is determined by reasoning. Or “You shall fear the Lord your God”: the “et” comes to include; that is a rule of interpretation. But the interpretive rule only says: here you must include, here you must compare, here you must exclude. What to include, what to exclude, what to compare—that is all from reasoning. So here too, the same thing. You tell me I learn from the sotah regarding doubtful impurity. Okay. And now you tell me, yes, but that is only if there is intelligence to ask, only “from the place you came from,” meaning all the characteristics that exist in a doubtful sotah must also exist in doubtful impurity. Right? Now which characteristics? That it applies only to women, for example? Because sotah is only with a woman, as I asked earlier. No. Why not? Because reasoning dictates that with impurity, why should there be a difference between women and men? And we activate our reasoning. Now if that is so, we need to ask ourselves: so what reasoning of the Sages stood at the basis of the Sages’ derivation that says intelligence to ask is a relevant parameter, and that the domain is a relevant parameter? What is the connection between them, and why specifically those two? There must be some reasoning here. What is that reasoning? The fact that there is a source that learns it from “the place you came from,” and so on, does not exempt us from thinking about the reasoning. Why in fact are specifically these two parameters relevant? Yes, as I said, in the yeshivot they are used to thinking that if something comes from a verse then you don’t need reasoning, so it has no reasoning, and certainly one needn’t look for reasoning. Not true. Meaning: first, there is always reasoning here, even if it comes from a verse. And in an interpretation you also need to find the reasoning, because the reasoning determines the boundaries of the law, since the interpretation itself is based on reasoning. If you want to understand what the interpreter said, you need to understand what his reasoning was, because they operated on the basis of reasoning.

[Speaker D] It will be harder than the “et” of “et,” because with “et” you know that you’re dealing with forms of honor, the same context of honoring and all that and all that, but here, how will you connect it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, I’m looking, I want to know. We need to look for a reasoning. You’re telling me it will be hard—okay, so it will be hard. But still we need to look for a reasoning why the parameter of intelligence to ask or the domain is relevant to impurity, and how they are connected.

[Speaker D] That reasoning is not necessary.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re not objecting; you’re just telling me—warning me—that it will be hard for me. Fine, I’ve noted the warning. But we still need to look.

[Speaker D] It’s not necessary.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s not necessary. It could be that there is reasoning that is necessary; it depends what I find.

[Speaker D] We’ll sit on the sotah and on the laws of the sotah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, exactly. When you compare the sotah and the creeping thing, there has to be a reason why indeed intelligence to ask is a relevant parameter. If we find such a reason, then we find it; if not, then not. I don’t know. But if we do find it, everything is fine, no?

[Speaker D] And everything depends on impurities.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, otherwise why learn a creeping thing from sotah? Because both are impurity. I talked about that in the first lecture of the semester, I think, or the second, I don’t remember anymore. What the similarity is. Because in betrothal too it is an injury to holiness, therefore it is impurity. As distinct from niddah, for example, where her prohibition to her husband is a prohibition, it is not impurity. Because it is not an injury to the betrothal. Even though she is also a menstruant and impure, her prohibition to her husband is not connected to her impurity; that is an addition. Bava Kamma 11. What? An answer.

[Speaker B] It’s only their name, that the Torah called this impurity and that impurity.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, since they belong to the category of impurity, these are the rules that apply accordingly. Okay, I think we’ll stop here because I need to go into another topic now, so we still have more to complete next lecture.