Messianism, Lesson 11
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- Sectarianism, messianism, and metaphysical considerations in decision-making
- Joseph and Nachmanides: fulfilling dreams versus morality and Jewish law
- A dream fast and dream amelioration as psychological treatment
- Hezekiah and Isaiah: “What have you to do with the hidden things of the Merciful One?”
- Moshe Rabbenu, “He saw that there was no man,” “as he is there,” and the tension around future outcomes
- Deviation from expected conduct as a test for messianic behavior
- Metaphysics as support for a commandment versus metaphysics as grounds for deviation
- Religious Zionism, verses of redemption, and signs as a basis for policy
- Dreams, “the words of dreams neither raise nor lower,” and excommunication in a dream
- “We do not pay attention to a heavenly voice” as a model: truth versus truth, and separating the metaphysical from decision
- Why were signs of redemption given if we do not use them for decision-making?
- Preparing for the possibility of redemption without contradicting ordinary considerations
- Two planes of critique: the reliability of the metaphysical source versus its practical relevance
- Involvement in history versus the laws of nature: medicine, miracles, and a vain prayer
- Criticism of prayer as intervention, and the claim that the Sages thought differently because of ancient science
- A practical compromise: prayer mainly when there is no natural solution, and commitment to the wording of the Sages
Summary
General Overview
The speaker connects messianism with sectarianism in Religious Zionism and argues that a central feature of messianic conduct is bringing metaphysical or meta-historical considerations into decision-making in place of halakhic, moral, and practical considerations of realpolitik. He brings sources that seem to show that the Sages and commentators warn against making “calculations of the Holy One, blessed be He,” but also points to places where commentators do accept the use of a prophetic consideration, so the conclusion is not categorical but rather has a “messianic smell” to it. Later he sharpens the claim that even if a metaphysical consideration is true, it may still be forbidden or inappropriate to bring it into public decisions, and he broadens the discussion to the larger question of whether the Holy One, blessed be He, actually intervenes in history in ways that go beyond the laws of nature, with a critical discussion of the meaning of prayer, miracles, and the modern scientific worldview.
Sectarianism, messianism, and metaphysical considerations in decision-making
The speaker says that the connection between sectarianism and messianism is expressed in the fact that a messianic approach tends to incorporate metaphysical considerations into decisions, such as “the plans of the Holy One, blessed be He” and an evaluation of the historical stage, whereas traditionally decisions were made on the basis of halakhic and practical realpolitik considerations. He presents this as a messianic feature that is not entirely conclusive, but “starts to smell similar” when a deviation from expected conduct stems from a metaphysical consideration. He emphasizes that he is not claiming an unambiguous conclusion, and even in the context of Religious Zionism he presents it as a reasonable intuition but not a categorical one.
Joseph and Nachmanides: fulfilling dreams versus morality and Jewish law
The speaker cites Nachmanides, who explains that Joseph did not send word to Jacob because he wanted to fulfill his dreams that his father and brothers would bow to him, and stresses that Nachmanides offers this as a non-critical explanation. The speaker says that people attack Nachmanides because even if the dream was prophetic, that does not justify Joseph “helping the Holy One, blessed be He, carry out His plans,” and Joseph should have acted according to Jewish law, morality, and practical considerations. The speaker concludes that the criticism of Nachmanides indicates that the prevailing approach is not to mix in metaphysical calculations when they lead to violation of a strong moral duty or a possible halakhic duty such as honoring one’s father and mother.
A dream fast and dream amelioration as psychological treatment
The speaker presents a dream fast as dealing with a metaphysical problem that is not the same as making life decisions against Jewish law or realpolitik. He argues that the simple understanding is that a dream fast and dream amelioration are mainly meant to address a person’s fear and anxiety, and therefore they look like psychological treatment by the Sages rather than a mechanism for determining reality or policy. He says that if someone who is not bothered does not need to perform dream amelioration, that strengthens the idea that this is a subjective response to distress and not a requirement to adapt decisions to a metaphysical world, and he raises the possibility that today alternative psychological treatment might make it unnecessary.
Hezekiah and Isaiah: “What have you to do with the hidden things of the Merciful One?”
The speaker brings the Talmudic passage in Berakhot about Hezekiah and Isaiah, and the compromise made by the Holy One, blessed be He, by means of suffering, and the interpretation of “for you shall die and not live” as death in this world and loss of the World to Come. He quotes the reason, “because you did not engage in procreation,” and Hezekiah’s claim that he refrained because “I saw through the holy spirit that children unworthy would come from me,” and Isaiah’s answer, “What have you to do with the hidden things of the Merciful One? What you were commanded, you ought to do.” The speaker suggests that the phrase “the hidden things of the Merciful One” hints that the problem is not necessarily the knowledge itself but the fact that the consideration is drawn from a prophetic-metaphysical world that is not supposed to decide against a halakhic command, and he presents the accepted interpretation as a call to do what is incumbent upon you and not to enter into heavenly calculations even if they are true.
Moshe Rabbenu, “He saw that there was no man,” “as he is there,” and the tension around future outcomes
The speaker cites Rashi’s interpretation that Moshe “saw that there was no man” when he saw that no convert was destined to descend from the Egyptian, and notes that Rashi brings this as a legitimate consideration without criticism. The speaker says that this has already been challenged from the law of Ishmael, “as he is there,” and that there is a tension here between judging on the basis of a prophetic future and ignoring it, so there is no uniform rule. He concludes that the sources show that this is an “issue” and not something categorically invalid, but the very possibility that a metaphysical consideration decides an action raises difficulty.
Deviation from expected conduct as a test for messianic behavior
The speaker says that a messianic movement is defined by the fact that it involves actions that are not “the expected conduct,” whether against Jewish law, against realpolitik, against morality, or against accepted tradition. He argues that studying Torah “day and night” in order to bring the messiah is not messianic behavior because that is in any case fulfillment of a commandment, whereas messianism is expressed when a metaphysical consideration causes an action that otherwise would not have been done. He explains that the criticism of Joseph and Hezekiah is connected to the fact that metaphysics was used to justify problematic conduct, and he claims that this is precisely the mode of operation of messianic movements.
Metaphysics as support for a commandment versus metaphysics as grounds for deviation
The speaker distinguishes between verses and aggadic teachings that reassure a person to fulfill commandments without fearing harm, such as “tithe so that you may become wealthy” and the Sabbatical year, and using metaphysics to deviate from a proper path. He argues that these promises are not the reason to fulfill the commandment but support for someone who is afraid, and therefore they are not similar to justifying a breach of Jewish law or morality in the name of a “process” or a “plan.” He returns to his own innovation, that even if the metaphysics is true, it still may be something that should not be taken into account, because that is the role of the Holy One, blessed be He, not the role of man.
Religious Zionism, verses of redemption, and signs as a basis for policy
The speaker gives as an example the use in Religious Zionism of verses such as “But you, mountains of Israel, shall shoot forth your branches and bear your fruit” and signs such as the ingathering of exiles, and he is willing for the sake of discussion to assume that they are correct. He argues that even if this is correct, it does not necessarily justify problematic steps or steps that would not have been taken were it not for the messianic consideration, and that the question of the relevance of the consideration is separate from the question of its truth. He says that the binding considerations ought to be Jewish law, morality, and realpolitik, and the realization of the processes should be “left to the Holy One, blessed be He.”
Dreams, “the words of dreams neither raise nor lower,” and excommunication in a dream
The speaker brings a Talmudic passage about someone who finds money following a dream that appears verified in reality, and yet it is still said that “the words of dreams neither raise nor lower,” and he presents a dispute as to whether this stems from doubt or from a halakhic determination even when the dream is true. He says that in Maimonides it appears to be a principled halakhic determination that a dream has no status in objective halakhic decision-making even if it is true. He notes that on the other hand there is a law that excommunication in a dream requires release before ten people, and he proposes a distinction between subjective law touching the person’s inner world and objective law with public significance, where dreams belong to the private domain and not to rulings with general halakhic consequences.
“We do not pay attention to a heavenly voice” as a model: truth versus truth, and separating the metaphysical from decision
The speaker compares his claim to “we do not pay attention to a heavenly voice” and the Oven of Akhnai, and says that the principle is not that the heavenly voice is not true, but that halakhic decision is not determined through a metaphysical declaration, even if it is right. He says that this is “truth facing truth,” and that “My children have defeated Me” shows that the Holy One, blessed be He, Himself confirms that legal rulings are determined according to human rules of decision. He presents this as parallel to the claim that in decision-making and policy as well, one should not subordinate the decision to metaphysical considerations, because that sphere is not man’s role.
Why were signs of redemption given if we do not use them for decision-making?
The speaker presents the claim that signs of redemption in the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh) and in the Sages were given so that we would use them, but replies that there is an interpretive difficulty in drawing conclusions from verses, and that homiletic readings can change their meaning. He says that perhaps the signs were given as “study and receive reward” or as an interesting diagnosis of a historical situation without any practical implication, and he emphasizes that even if one may see in them a diagnosis, that does not grant permission to turn them into a consideration that justifies deviation from ordinary conduct. He says that the question “why did they send me this dream” parallels the question “why were the signs written,” but knowledge does not obligate action.
Preparing for the possibility of redemption without contradicting ordinary considerations
The speaker says that if an action does not contradict Jewish law, morality, or reasonable considerations, there is no problem with it even if it is done מתוך thinking about redemption, and he gives as an example the activity of the Temple Institute as a kind of preparation that is not problematic. He emphasizes that the problem begins when the metaphysical consideration is what causes the deviation from the path that would have been chosen without it. He mentions that Zionism has costs and problems, such as cooperation with secular people, aspects involving secular courts, and other consequences, and he presents this as the space in which the question arises whether the messianic consideration justifies what otherwise would not have been done.
Two planes of critique: the reliability of the metaphysical source versus its practical relevance
The speaker sums up that the messianic discussion takes place on two planes: suspicion toward the reliability of the metaphysical source and its interpretation, and the separate question whether, even assuming the interpretation is correct, one may take it into account in decision-making and policy. He says that the second question rests on a broader assumption about the involvement of the Holy One, blessed be He, in history. He concludes by raising a new question: does the Holy One, blessed be He, actually “do anything here” in the sense of intervention that goes beyond the laws of nature?
Involvement in history versus the laws of nature: medicine, miracles, and a vain prayer
The speaker argues that the human intuition is to explain events by real causes rather than metaphysical ones, and illustrates this through medicine, where drugs work through chemistry and biology. He distinguishes between belief that the Holy One, blessed be He, created and sustains the laws of nature and the claim of intervention that breaks the laws of nature, and he casts doubt on whether people really live as though such intervention is the ordinary mode of affairs. He cites the Mishnah at the end of Berakhot about prayer during a fire as a “vain prayer,” and the Talmudic passage about praying to change the sex of a fetus as invalid, and asks why one does not pray if the Holy One, blessed be He, can do it, presenting this as proof that prayer to change the past or to alter nature is seen as illegitimate.
Criticism of prayer as intervention, and the claim that the Sages thought differently because of ancient science
The speaker argues that every request in prayer is a request for intervention in the laws of nature, because if the result would occur anyway, the request has no meaning. He brings an empirical claim from medical research practice: there is no balancing between the sample group and the control group according to the “distribution of people praying,” and yet even God-fearing doctors use studies, and from this he concludes that we do not relate to prayer as a real causal factor in the scientific sense. He explains that the Sages lived within the framework of “ancient science,” and therefore did not see nature as a complete deterministic legal system, whereas modern scientific thinking looks for a natural cause for every deviation and neutralizes placebo through double-blind experiments, and he argues that from this emerges a sharp theological tension around requests in prayer.
A practical compromise: prayer mainly when there is no natural solution, and commitment to the wording of the Sages
The speaker says that he cannot claim with certainty that there is never intervention, and therefore proposes a more moderate position according to which where there is a natural solution there is no point in praying, and where there is no natural solution one can pray on the basis of a remote possibility of intervention. He says that he is obligated to pray because of Jewish law and the wording established by the Sages, but he struggles with the request sections and notes that most of prayer is not requests but praise and contemplation. He describes a formative personal event involving Nachshon Wachsman, in which mass prayers from the entire public did not prevent the outcome, and presents this as something that deepened his doubt regarding the effectiveness of prayer as intervention in the natural course of events.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Last time I dealt with sectarian characteristics of certain parts of Religious Zionism, and that was in some sense a continuation of the discussion I had done earlier regarding messianic characteristics that I talked about. There’s a connection between sectarianism and messianism. Very good.
[Speaker B] Every week?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Come, no problem.
[Speaker C] Without making a vow, I’ll bring you more.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll use a kohen and we’ll be in trouble. In the end, if I return to our central discussion, which dealt with messianism, the claim is that the main characteristic that can perhaps be connected to messianism is taking metaphysical considerations into account when making decisions. Traditionally, it seems to me at least, it was not accepted to do that. Decisions were made on halakhic and practical grounds, realpolitik if you will. The moment you bring into decision-making metaphysical or meta-historical considerations—plans of the Holy One, blessed be He, what stage we are at, what He wants to achieve, and all kinds of things of that sort—that is basically some kind of messianic characteristic, although, as I said, it’s not completely conclusive, but it starts to smell a bit similar. Exactly. In this context I want to continue from that point, because that point takes me to several sources that also deal with this question. Meaning, I thought I needed to ground a bit more this claim about taking metaphysical considerations into account. Why do I see that as a problem? So here… no, no, thanks. There’s a well-known Talmudic passage here in… maybe I’ll start before the Talmud. There’s what I mentioned, the famous Nachmanides on Joseph—why Joseph didn’t send word to his father that he was still alive. Once he was already on his feet and had become viceroy in Egypt, he could have updated his father. He knew that his father didn’t know what was going on, or thought he was dead. And Nachmanides, in one of his two explanations, suggests that Joseph wanted to fulfill his dreams. And his dream was that his father and mother and brothers would come bow before him, and the way to fulfill the dreams was to leave things as they were. Then I said that people attack Nachmanides over this interpretation, because even if this dream was a prophecy sent by the Holy One, blessed be He, from there to conclude that Joseph was supposed to contribute to the fulfillment of the dream—that’s a big leap.
[Speaker E] To help the Holy One, blessed be He.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. How do you help the Holy One, blessed be He, carry out His plans? Meaning, if it wasn’t a prophecy at all and not a dream, then there’s nothing to talk about. But even if it was a prophecy and this dream was sent by the Holy One, blessed be He, the claim still is that he’s not supposed to help the Holy One, blessed be He, carry out His plans—leave that to the Holy One, blessed be He. He should conduct himself according to the two criteria I mentioned before: realpolitik and Jewish law. The practical considerations of how a person should conduct himself in the world. The moment he mixes in metaphysical considerations, that becomes problematic. Now, Nachmanides says that this is what he did, and Nachmanides does not say it critically—on the contrary. So already there you can see that it’s not unequivocal. Nachmanides himself accepts such behavior. But the fact that many attack Nachmanides on this issue means, it seems to me, that this is not the prevailing approach. The accepted view is that we are not supposed to do such a thing. We are supposed to conduct ourselves as Jewish law says, as realistic considerations say, and according to Jewish law or morality or normal considerations that a person is supposed to use. So if you know that your father thinks you’re dead and you’re alive, then you should inform him. The calculations of the Holy One, blessed be He—how He will fulfill the dreams He sent you—leave that to Him; it has nothing to do with you.
[Speaker F] And the whole matter of a dream fast—there there is taking the metaphysics of the… into account. Meaning, there’s some kind of prophecy here, let’s say, and you fast in order to prevent the decree or something like that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And there’s an interesting question whether you do that to prevent the decree, but first of all, I’m not making life decisions as a result of metaphysical considerations. I’m treating the metaphysical problem. Meaning, it’s not the same thing. In other words, there aren’t some realpolitik or halakhic considerations here telling me to do one thing and because of the dream I do something else. Fine. Beyond that, I think the simple understanding there is not to prevent the fulfillment of the dream, but to deal with your anxieties, your fear. So that’s basically the psychological treatment of the Sages in a dream fast. That’s why it’s also called dream amelioration—meaning, it’s basically to improve your state and get you out of the states the dream has put you into. But someone who isn’t bothered by it doesn’t need to do dream amelioration. So in that respect it definitely sounds more like psychological treatment and not life decision-making. On the contrary, if anything, maybe it’s even evidence in the opposite direction. Because otherwise they should have obligated me to do it—the dream is telling me something, and the metaphysics supposedly tells me what will happen in the world. So why does it depend on whether I’m worried or not? So quite the opposite: it seems that really I’m not supposed to worry. Rather, people who undergo such an experience can be thrown into pressure, fear, problematic psychological states—fine, so they’re given psychological treatment. To the point that, for example, if that really is the conception, then assuming we believe that today there is alternative psychological treatment—yes? Alternative, meaning ordinary psychological treatment, maybe that’s the alternative, I don’t know—then maybe one really doesn’t need to do this. Maybe there is no halakhic obligation today to do such a thing. Actually, I hadn’t thought about it; I’m only thinking of it now. It could be that there really is no obligation to do such a thing. Go to a psychologist and let him try to treat you if you’re under stress; then do proper treatment. Why specifically go with the psychology of the Sages, just as we don’t go with the medicine of the Sages.
[Speaker B] Does anyone today do a dream fast?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think people do, yes. Whoever it bothers. Whoever it bothers, though fewer people today are bothered by dreams, but there are some, yes. The Sages are a psychologist. What? Yes, it’s cheaper than a psychologist, and I think it helps no less—if you ask my personal opinion.
[Speaker E] In your personal opinion, neither of them…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. No less, also no more—neither helps at all. I don’t know. Actually, psychologically maybe the dream fast does help, I don’t know, maybe it somehow helps a person solve his problems with himself. I don’t know. My view of psychology is very, very limited, let’s say. Okay, how did he allow himself
[Speaker C] to cause his father so much suffering for so many years?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s exactly the question. So that’s what they attack Nachmanides for in this interpretation—that it’s not reasonable. Or at least, if that is the interpretation, then Nachmanides should not have accepted it but should have criticized it. But Nachmanides seems to accept it. So that’s why I say that already there, true, it’s not a bad source and it comes somewhat close to what I’m saying, but on the other hand Nachmanides says otherwise, meaning we see that it’s not something unequivocal. And therefore I said, also here in the context of Religious Zionism, it’s an intuition that I think is a reasonable intuition, an intuition many would feel. To say that it’s unequivocal and categorical and clear that there’s a messianic dimension here? No, I don’t think I can say such a thing. Another, more explicit example appears in the Talmud in Berakhot, a well-known passage. The Talmud says: “Who is as the wise man, and who knows the interpretation of a thing?” Who is like the Holy One, blessed be He, who knows how to make a compromise between two righteous people, between Hezekiah and Isaiah. Hezekiah said: Let Isaiah come to me, for so we find in the case of Elijah, that he went to Ahab. As it is said, “And Elijah went to appear to Ahab.” Isaiah said: Let Hezekiah come to me. And Isaiah argued that Hezekiah should come to him, not he to Hezekiah. For so we find in the case of Jehoram son of Ahab, that he went to Elisha. What did the Holy One, blessed be He, do? He brought suffering upon Hezekiah and said to Isaiah: Go visit the sick one, as it is said, “In those days Hezekiah became mortally ill, and Isaiah son of Amoz the prophet came to him and said to him: Thus says the Lord of Hosts: Set your house in order, for you shall die and not live.” Fine. So the Holy One, blessed be He, maneuvered between these two Jews here, between Isaiah and Hezekiah, and then the Talmud begins to discuss this verse. What is “for you shall die and not live”? You shall die in this world and not live in the World to Come. After all, Hezekiah had become mortally ill—meaning the Holy One, blessed be He, had brought suffering upon him—he was near death, and Isaiah comes and says: from this you won’t get up, meaning this is the illness from which you are going to die. But not only that—you also won’t merit the World to Come. He said to him: Why all this? What is all this strictness against me? Why? He said to him: Because you did not engage in procreation. You did not have children, you did not engage in procreation, you refrained from bringing children into the world. He said to him: Because I saw through the holy spirit that children unworthy would come from me. I saw through the holy spirit that the children who would come from me would be wicked children, not good people, and therefore I preferred to refrain from bringing them. He said to him: What have you to do with the hidden things of the Merciful One? What you were commanded, you ought to do, and what is pleasing before the Holy One, blessed be He, let Him do. Meaning, “What have you to do with the hidden things of the Merciful One?” Why are you entering into the furnace, as it were, of the Holy One, blessed be He? Don’t make His calculations. If He wants to deal with your wicked children, He’ll deal with them. You need to do what you were commanded. You were commanded regarding procreation, so bring children into the world. Don’t make all kinds of calculations about what will come out and what kind of children they are and things like that. The hidden things, yes, the furnace of the Holy One, blessed be He, is His business. Now here this is a very interesting point, because what does it mean? Is it only because it was revealed to him through prophecy? If, I don’t know, he had some realistic assessment that a wicked son would come from him, then should he indeed have refrained? Meaning, is the problem only that this is “the hidden things of the Holy One, blessed be He” in the sense that it’s only some kind of prophecy and metaphysics, and you’re not supposed to take metaphysics into account in decision-making? Or no, it’s not related—even if you know, if the doctor told you, the psychologist—we talked about that before—the psychologist said that from you and a woman like your wife only a wicked son will come out, nothing else will come out. We once talked about Moshe Rabbenu in parashat Shemot, where it says, “He turned this way and that way and saw that there was no man,” and Rashi says that he saw that no convert was destined to come from him. And I said that he saw the future, not the present. So Isaiah says to him: What have you to do with the hidden things of the Merciful One? This language of “the hidden things of the Holy One, blessed be He” kind of hints that the problem is not simply that it’s an illegitimate consideration. The fact that your son will come out wicked is an illegitimate consideration for exempting yourself from procreation—that itself could be that it would have been a legitimate consideration. But the fact that you draw it from the hidden things of the Merciful One, meaning you take it from dreams—we do not take dreams into account. “What have you to do with the hidden things of the Merciful One?” Meaning, things that belong to the hidden domain of the Holy One, blessed be He, that He revealed to you some hidden secrets one way or another, sent you dreams—those are not things you are supposed to take into account. What you were commanded, that is what you are supposed to do. That’s at any rate how I think people usually interpret this. Meaning, the claim is that you need to do what you were commanded and not take into account all kinds of metaphysics—not because they are not true, that’s not the point; they may well be true—but you are not supposed to make that calculation. It ended up coming true with Manasseh, so in that sense it was correct.
[Speaker G] It sounds like in the case of violating a commandment that the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded. But in things that don’t involve violating what the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded, then why really not take it into account?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so this is the next point I’m getting to, and that’s a correct remark. So here too it seems that the Talmud really is saying that one is not supposed to take metaphysical considerations into account when making decisions. And now that I think about it, in fact what I said about Moshe Rabbenu—“He turned this way and that way and saw that there was no man”—that’s not a parenthesis, it’s another example. There too Moshe Rabbenu basically took some sort of prophecy about what was going to be with that man, right? That no one destined to convert would come from him, and on that basis made a decision about what to do with him.
[Speaker B] He made a calculation of the Holy One, blessed be He?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, exactly. He too basically made some sort of calculation of the Holy One, blessed be He, and there it is brought in Rashi as a legitimate consideration. Rashi doesn’t bring it critically. It’s a legitimate consideration. Again, the point is not simple, and people already challenged it from Ishmael, where the Talmud says “as he is there.” If Ishmael is judged “as he is there,” then what later came out from him and all kinds of things—that’s not your business; you have to judge him as he is there, which is exactly the opposite. Meaning, there is some tension around this whole issue of taking future outcomes, dreams, metaphysics into account when making decisions. It’s not absurd; the fact is there are places where we see that yes, it is done.
[Speaker D] After all, Moshe sees an Egyptian who needs to be killed. Moshe Rabbenu says, wait, maybe some convert will come from him, so I…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I brought that up when I discussed it then, that it is indeed an explanation, truly a possible explanation. But still, even if you accept that explanation, there is some taking of metaphysics into account here, this time leniently. So if he deserves to die, then why do you care what will come from him? He deserves to die, so you should kill him. Why the consideration of metaphysics or of what will happen in the future, prophecies, evaluations of one kind or another?
[Speaker B] It’s not relevant, that’s the opposite consideration, the opposite consideration. Yes, if he needed to die, if…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Interpret it this way or that way—whether the decision to kill him stemmed from that, or whether the decision not to lighten his punishment stemmed from that—at the end of the day there was a decision there that depended on some sort of prophecy or prophetic assessment, not on the considerations you were supposed to use. Therefore, by the way, this Rashi too is somewhat challenged. It’s not Rashi, it’s a midrash, but Rashi’s commentators already raise this there and deal with it—why suddenly is this a legitimate consideration? So that’s why I say that from all these places you can see that it’s an issue. Meaning, it’s not simple. But I cannot say that categorically it is invalid. The fact is there is Rashi here and Nachmanides there; there is room here to hesitate. It’s not categorical. Now really, the point you raised earlier: in these places, both with Joseph and here with Hezekiah, we’re talking about a situation in which—let’s start with Hezekiah—with Hezekiah there is a positive commandment of “be fruitful and multiply,” so Hezekiah didn’t just take metaphysics into account and that was the claim. The claim was that he nullified a positive commandment because of metaphysical considerations. Now that’s a somewhat different claim. That doesn’t mean that you are not supposed to make a metaphysical consideration; rather, that this is not a justification for nullifying a positive commandment. If a positive commandment applies to you, you have to fulfill it. Make your calculations in the realm of what is optional, not where you have obligations or prohibitions or things like that. And then it somewhat blunts the sting, because it basically says that the whole claim here was because it went against Jewish law, not because of the very act of taking metaphysics into account. With Joseph too you can say something similar—maybe less unequivocally, but I think overall very similar. Your obligation to tell your father that you’re alive even though he thinks you’re dead—that is perhaps a halakhic obligation of honoring your father and mother, I don’t know exactly. Even if it’s not a halakhic obligation, clearly it is a very strong moral obligation. So obviously the expected behavior was different behavior, and the metaphysics caused you not to behave that way. Meaning, therefore this too belongs more or less to the same family of considerations as Hezekiah’s, and that’s also why people do not accept Joseph’s conduct. Let’s say those who go against Nachmanides can still tie it to the fact that he behaved in a blatantly immoral way, or even against Jewish law, say, of honoring your father and mother, and therefore the criticism there is not only because he resorted to metaphysics, but because the metaphysics caused him to violate Jewish law or morality, and that is not justified. Meaning, then there still is no statement here that the very taking of metaphysics into account is problematic. But I only want to remind you that exactly the whole discussion we had about messianism, a messianic movement, also involved such behaviors. And when I tried to characterize a messianic movement, I said that I set out some kind of hierarchy of criteria and I said that it would apparently have to involve actions that are not the expected conduct. Now at what level? Sometimes it can be against Jewish law, sometimes against realpolitik, sometimes against morality, against accepted tradition—but it is supposed to be something that is not the expected behavior. Meaning, if you do—say you study Torah day and night in order to bring the messiah—no one would call that messianic behavior. Why? Because studying Torah day and night is a commandment: “You shall meditate on it day and night”; you are fulfilling what you have to fulfill anyway. You’re doing it for metaphysical reasons? Fine. That, I think, is hard to call messianic conduct. Therefore messianic conduct always involves some behavior that ordinarily, were it not for the messianic and metaphysical considerations, I should not have done—either because of Jewish law or because of realpolitik; I already listed all the possibilities we discussed. So therefore these examples that I brought here are indeed relevant examples. True, both examples—both with Hezekiah and with Joseph—are cases where the complaint against you is not because of the very resort to metaphysics, but because you are using metaphysics to conduct yourself in a way you are not supposed to conduct yourself. But that is exactly what also happens in a messianic movement. In a messianic movement too, it’s not that you want to bring the messiah. That is not messianic movement. Rather, you want to bring the messiah—and in that maybe Leibowitz, or whatever, I mentioned there the midrash—but the simple understanding is not like that. The simple understanding is that you do acts that in principle you should not have done, either because they are against tradition, against morality, against sensible realistic political considerations, or even against Jewish law. Shabbetai Tzvi—and I brought that whole scale. Now, if so, then I return and claim that taking metaphysical considerations into account in order to do those things is certainly similar to these examples, and notice—even that is probably not unequivocal. Because with Joseph, for example, Nachmanides accepts it. Meaning, Nachmanides accepts that metaphysics can be a consideration—let’s say, assuming you are a prophet. Meaning that the metaphysics is solid. Because if someone just imagines something, then there’s the problem of whether it’s even true. But if you are a prophet, then the assumption is that it’s true. But even if it’s true, who says that it justifies harm to Jewish law? And to that I say: that is the messianic smell that I smell. But as I said, it has not gone beyond the level of a smell. Because Rashi or Nachmanides—the fact is they are willing to accept such conduct. Therefore I say: the messianic smell is there, and still, it’s just a smell.
[Speaker H] The question is whether the Torah doesn’t educate us to be metaphysical. After all, when the Holy One, blessed be He, says, for example, “Tithe so that you may become wealthy.” What difference does it make that I’m giving out money—supposedly you’ll become wealthy, that’s fine.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you have to give money because there is a commandment of tithing.
[Speaker H] That’s all—wait, but what does Jewish law say? Jewish law says fine, but you need to tithe, meaning you need to transfer it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Jewish law doesn’t say that. Jewish law says to tithe. “Tithe so that you may become wealthy” is aggadah.
[Speaker H] True, but the Torah, let’s say—the Torah, sorry, another example—during the Sabbatical year. The Torah says keep the Sabbatical year because in the sixth year you’ll receive. Not because—the Torah says because.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, not because. That’s not correct.
[Speaker H] The Torah promises you so that you won’t worry.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again, you observe it not in order to receive. You observe it because you have to observe the Sabbatical year. Now you’re afraid? Don’t worry, I’ll calm you down. That’s something else.
[Speaker H] But that’s metaphysical.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the metaphysics is telling you to do the commandment, not to refrain from a commandment.
[Speaker H] Wait, but the Torah educates you.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Educates you to what? That if you do the commandments, you won’t be harmed.
[Speaker H] That if you do good deeds, then you won’t be harmed.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s all, perfectly fine. But if you do bad deeds in order to profit, is that also permitted? Who said so?
[Speaker H] No, it’s like honoring father and mother, “so that your days may be lengthened.”
[Speaker B] You have to do it even without that “so that.”
[Speaker H] Also from the side of…
[Speaker B] What did they say? Also from the side of sending away the mother bird.
[Speaker H] No, but that’s the opposite direction.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I agree that here too there is some intrusion of the metaphysical into life, but it’s the opposite direction. I’m talking about bringing in metaphysics in order to deviate from the proper way one should conduct oneself. You’re talking about metaphysics as reassurance: don’t worry that if you act properly you’ll get burned by it; don’t worry, you won’t get burned by it. That’s something else.
[Speaker G] Assuming that it’s
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] true, why can’t you include it among the realistic considerations? What? Assuming it’s true, why can’t a person include it? What I’m saying—the innovation—is that even if it’s true, it may still be the case that you’re not supposed to do that. So what if it’s true? Is it true that the dream has to be fulfilled? The Holy One, blessed be He, will take care of that.
[Speaker G] I’m saying also throughout the generations the problem is that many didn’t believe that things would happen that way. No, that’s what I’m claiming, I’m claiming no.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m claiming that even if it’s true, there is a problem with it. Therefore, when I—let’s jump for a moment to the end—to Religious Zionism, for example. They bring proofs from verses in the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh) and so on, yes, “But you, mountains of Israel, shall shoot forth your branches and bear your fruit,” meaning that the land is returning and the return to Zion, that the ingathering of exiles is happening and the like. There are not bad signs for this being fulfilled. Now let’s say it’s true. I think one can argue, but let’s say it’s true, okay? Is that enough to justify problematic steps, or steps that I would not have taken were it not for that? That itself is already problematic. The claim is—therefore I distinguished at the beginning, when we started talking, I said I’m not talking about the question whether it’s true or not. That’s one question, and it’s worth discussing; I’m not claiming it’s definitely true. But I want, for the sake of discussion, to assume that it is true. Even then there is room to hesitate whether, even if it’s true, it is a relevant consideration. What have you to do with the hidden things of the Merciful One?
[Speaker G] What stands behind that—if it’s true, then why not?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because that’s the Holy One’s role, not yours.
[Speaker G] But it will happen—what’s the problem?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It will happen, fine, let it happen. But I don’t need to help it happen. After all, there’s no problem. If it’s going to happen, it will happen; the Holy One, blessed be He, will see to it that it happens. What does that have to do with me?
[Speaker G] So what’s the problem?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Build a house there—if it doesn’t contradict anything, then build whatever you want.
[Speaker G] But within the political considerations of some people…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But if you wouldn’t have done it were it not for the messianic consideration—that’s what I’m talking about. If you do it because, as it happens, you can do it, then what do you care if you build a house there? Build a house. Perfectly fine, no problem. But if you’re making a calculation such that only because of it you do this action—that is, otherwise you wouldn’t do it—then there’s already some messianic smell here. And I’ll say again: even though that may be true, because the problem is not that it isn’t true, or only part of the problem is maybe it isn’t true, but I’m saying there’s also another problem beyond that, and that’s what I want to sharpen here: even if it’s true, that’s the role of the Holy One, blessed be He, not yours. And you’re supposed to behave as you’re supposed to behave: Jewish law, morality, and realpolitik. That’s what you need to do. And the rest, leave to the Holy One, blessed be He. Even if it’s true, He’ll do it Himself. He’ll realize the dreams, He’ll see to it whether his son turns out wicked or not wicked. In the case of Moses our teacher, no one came out of him who converted—leave the Holy One, blessed be He, to deal with that. Are you supposed to kill him because of that? Or all kinds of things of that sort. In other words, these are considerations that are… I’ll maybe bring an example—I think I once spoke about this a long time ago, years ago already—about the halakhic status of dreams. I spoke about it once, I don’t remember when here. Around Joseph’s dreams, I think in the Torah portion of Miketz, one year when I gave a class upstairs there with the kollel, one year with the Haredi kollel that studies here, so I gave them a class once a week together with our group. One year it worked out that way, and that year in Parashat Miketz I gave that class. Because in the Talmud, in several places, you can see that dreams have some status. I won’t go into all the sources; I don’t remember them. But in several places you can see that dreams have some status. There’s a Talmudic passage in Sanhedrin, I think on page 30, where the Talmud says that someone sees in a dream that money is buried in some place, and the dream figure tells him it’s second-tithe money. Now he goes to that place and finds money there in the exact amount they told him in the dream. Meaning, that indicates this dream wasn’t just nonsense but something real. And the dream also said it was second-tithe money. So now what do you do? He can only eat it in Jerusalem now—that is, take it to Jerusalem and buy fruit with it and so on—or that the money belongs to charity for the poor, yes, there are two such cases in the Talmud. Or not? So the Talmud says: dream statements neither add nor detract. Now notice: this is a dream with indications that it’s true. I mean, I dreamed, I had no idea there was some amount there, I dreamed it, I dug like Ezekiel—yes, we once spoke about that, about the fox among the chickens with the treasure chest in the Galilee. And I dug and found exactly the amount, so this dream is apparently a real dream, and they told me it’s second tithe. Can I ignore that? So there are some of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) who want to say that you can’t have a dream without nonsense in it, and that really operates on the level of maybe it isn’t true. Because the Vilna Gaon is also known—someone once asked the Vilna Gaon, and he said, I don’t remember in what context, that angelic messengers and things like that are all from the other side, and it’s forbidden to listen to them. So they asked him about the Maggid Mesharim of Rabbi Yosef Karo, who wrote a book with all the things the maggid told him, and he said: that was in the Land of Israel. In the Land of Israel the maggidim are purer. But outside the Land, maggidim always have all kinds of chaff mixed into the grain; you can’t know what’s true and what isn’t. So if in Maggid Mesharim so much is mixed in there, then if that’s what’s pure in the Land of Israel, I don’t know what goes on outside the Land. In any case, what I’m saying is: you can’t dream without nonsense, just as you can’t have chaff without grain, you can’t have a dream without nonsense. That’s Hazal, in the Jerusalem Talmud I think. So there are medieval authorities (Rishonim) who want to say that because of that we don’t heed a dream. Meaning, you found an amount, fine, you found it—but who says that this detail, that it’s second tithe, is also true? Fine, but there’s a question here, so maybe we should discuss it as a case of doubt? Can a person now simply decide for sure that it’s not second tithe or that it doesn’t belong to the poor? It’s a doubt; it needs discussion. And there really are medieval authorities (Rishonim) who want to say it’s only a doubt, and then we have rules of doubt regarding gifts to the poor and rules of doubt in charity and all kinds of topics of that sort.
[Speaker B] But the Talmud doesn’t present it as a doubt.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Talmud says we don’t heed it. The question is whether “we don’t heed it” because of the laws of doubt, or whether we don’t heed it as a matter of certainty.
[Speaker B] We don’t heed it—you can eat it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but it could be that under the laws of doubt I’m also allowed to eat it. It’s enough for it to be a doubt in order to allow me to eat it. Some of the medieval authorities discuss that maybe the laws of doubt are sufficient. No, the practical difference would be if I have a dream in which, from the standpoint of the laws of doubt, there would be consequences toward stringency—then I’d have to take it into account. The Talmud doesn’t say not to pay attention to dreams at all; that’s how some of the commentators say it. But in Maimonides, I can show in several places, in Maimonides it doesn’t seem that way. In Maimonides, Maimonides apparently says quite clearly that even though this dream is a true dream, and we’re not worried about chaff in the grain, we still don’t heed it. Dream statements neither add nor detract—that’s a halakhic statement, not a factual one. It’s not saying that dreams contain mistakes, but rather that even if the dream is right, it doesn’t matter. In Jewish law we don’t take dreams into account. Now there are other places where we do take dreams into account. For example, if excommunication appears in a dream, you need ten; you need to gather ten in order to release him. There too there’s some room to discuss it, because there are those who say it’s like a dream-amelioration ritual and it’s only if you’re troubled by it. But the plain meaning of the Talmud, and that’s also how it seems in the halakhic decisors, is that it’s always so. If you see ten people excommunicating you in a dream, then when you wake up—not in the dream—when you wake up, you need to take scholars and do a release of excommunications, a release from excommunication.
[Speaker C] And what’s the difference between that and this?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, so now the question is what the difference is between that and this. My claim is that Maimonides makes a distinction—and Maimonides also brings this—my claim is that Maimonides distinguishes between subjective law and objective law. Laws that concern me internally, within my personal world—subjective law—I can also take dreams and subjective experiences into account there. But where I’m dealing with halakhic questions that also concern others, the public domain, dream statements neither add nor detract. Dreams belong to the private domain. I’ll say again: the assumption is that the dream is true. Therefore the point isn’t whether the dream is false—if it’s false there’s nothing to distinguish; it’s false, that’s it. If the dream is true, then Maimonides is basically making a halakhic determination that a dream, even though it’s true, has no halakhic status. I don’t take it into account even though it’s true. And all this is when we’re talking, say, about me and myself. Or gifts to the poor—there too it has implications, because there are prohibitions involved if it’s second tithe. So anything that is Jewish law in the objective sense, an objective law with public significance, I don’t take dreams into account at all, even if they’re true. In places where I’m trying to remedy an excommunication I experienced in a dream, I’m trying to solve a problem for myself—that’s on the level of my personal sphere—then there I can also take dreams into account, assuming dreams have some substance. Okay? So yes, I’m bringing this as an example. One could elaborate on it; I don’t remember all the sources and calculations and exactly what the proofs from Maimonides are, but I have it written up—if you want, I can send it to you. It’s there in the synagogue, in the book The Participation of One Person in Rebellion. In any case, as an analogous example, what I want to say is this here too: even if the metaphysical consideration may be true—dream or whatever such metaphysical consideration it may be—still that doesn’t automatically mean you can take it into account. I’m saying at least in a place where that consideration leads me to act in a way I wouldn’t have been supposed to act were it not for that consideration. In such a situation, maybe this is what is meant by: why should you involve yourself in the hidden matters of the Merciful One? Meaning, you should do what you’re supposed to do based on the regular realistic halakhic and practical considerations. And metaphysical considerations are not supposed to intervene here—not because they’re not true, but despite the fact that they are true, even if they are true. Because that’s the Holy One’s calculation; that’s the role of the Holy One, blessed be He. It has nothing to do with your decision-making. It’s a bit reminiscent of: we do not heed a heavenly voice.
[Speaker F] Right, right, you could say that, yes, that’s a similar example.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because the heavenly voice too—we spoke about this once, I think—the claim that we do not heed a heavenly voice does not mean the heavenly voice is wrong, or that someone deceived us and it’s not the Holy One, blessed be He. On the contrary, the Holy One, blessed be He, says, “My children have defeated Me.” Meaning, the Holy One, blessed be He, spoke; the heavenly voice spoke in His name—and nevertheless we do not heed the heavenly voice. Why? Because metaphysical matters are not supposed to take part in our halakhic decision-making. In our halakhic decision-making, our own reasons enter in, even though it’s obvious to us that the Holy One, blessed be He, is right. Meaning, He gave the Torah and He tells us what the law is concerning the segmented oven, yes, the oven of Akhnai. And a heavenly voice comes out and tells us what the Holy One, blessed be He, says about it—yes, that really is a very good example. And they say: we do not heed a heavenly voice; it is not in heaven. It is truth against truth.
[Speaker G] So it doesn’t matter how I know whether it’s true or not.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There, you see—no, maybe that it’s a matter—
[Speaker G] That in the way halakhic rulings work, it doesn’t matter to us what the Holy One, blessed be He, ruled. Even if we’re mistaken, that ruling stands as our mistake. So we’re mistaken. But earlier you asked: if it’s true, then why should I care?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because in the case of second tithe it’s also a matter of truth. Why? There too it’s a matter of truth.
[Speaker G] I want to know what the Jewish law is,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] and the Holy One, blessed be He, tells me what the Jewish law is. The Jewish law is not what the Holy One, blessed be He, said, but what we ruled.
[Speaker G] Why?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why did you decide that? Because you decided that metaphysical things—what the Holy One, blessed be He, said—do not pertain to decision-making. That’s exactly what I’m deciding here too.
[Speaker G] I could answer you the same way. By the same token, I could decide that if I rule one thing and a rabbi tells me something else,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] then I should do according to what I rule and not according to what the rabbi says. An approach I know from somewhere. Yes, that’s not because the rabbi is metaphysical. No, no, obviously not. You can make such decisions in other contexts too. But I’m saying, regarding metaphysics, you’re assuming something that isn’t correct. After all, there too you can ask exactly the same question. The truth is what the Holy One, blessed be He, said. So what do you mean—what difference does it make now that this is metaphysics and this is the Holy One, blessed be He? You say, no, no, because Jewish law is outside metaphysics. Fine, so I’m also saying: decision-making is outside metaphysics. So what’s the question? But why should I care—after all, that’s the truth. There too it’s the same question. What’s the difference? Why? What—
[Speaker G] What’s the difference between Jewish law and decision-making?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? What’s the difference?
[Speaker G] Why are other decisions dependent on reality? Why?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Jewish law too depends on reality. Why, why? That’s exactly the question—what’s the difference? That’s exactly the point. So what do you say? That one thing is the role of the Holy One, blessed be He, and the other is our role. Our role is to use our own heads, and not metaphysical things and other things. And if the Holy One, blessed be He, wants to realize dreams, that’s perfectly fine; the gates of creativity have not been locked. Meaning, let Him do what He understands and realize what He needs to, what He wants. I’m supposed to do what I was commanded. That’s all. Or what the reasonable considerations say I need to do. It’s not because it isn’t true, but because it’s the role of the Holy One, blessed be He, and not my role. Exactly parallel to the oven of Akhnai. That is the Jewish law even though it is not the truth. Because my halakhic role is to formulate Jewish law according to what I understand, even though it’s not the truth. I think it’s very similar.
[Speaker B] But there are rules for that. What? There are rules for that—how one may formulate Jewish law, how that’s done. It’s not just that anyone says whatever he says, and a rabbi says this.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s a different topic. I said—I already spoke about the fact that I think everyone has to make decisions for himself. But obviously it must be done responsibly. Meaning, it has to be a person who is capable of making decisions. Not just anyone who decides casually, “this is how it seems to me,” and starts making decisions. But someone who really is capable—then even if he’s not the leading sage of the generation, and even if he may be mistaken, my decisions are mine to make, not anyone else’s. But that’s already a subject for another discussion. Okay, so that’s just one comment to reinforce this point: going after a metaphysical consideration, even if it’s true, carries some messianic smell. In other words, it’s a certain novelty. So I brought these examples only to show that it’s not—certainly not absurd. In my view it’s even reasonable. Though I agree, it’s not necessary and not completely agreed upon. Even today it’s not agreed upon. I said that both the ideological anti-Zionists and the ideological Religious Zionists—neither of them agrees with this conception. Both of them basically mix metaphysical considerations into their decision-making. One more comment connected to this matter: if I’m now returning to Religious Zionism, there are all kinds of signs of redemption. The Talmud in Sotah even brings them: “in the footsteps of the Messiah, insolence will increase,” and so on. There are signs in the Hebrew Bible itself: “And you, mountains of Israel,” which I mentioned earlier. The ingathering of the exiles, all kinds of things like that. So does that mean that, ostensibly, the Torah or the Bible itself, or even Hazal, are actually telling us: yes, use metaphysical tools? After all, they give us metaphysical signs so that we can assess whether redemption is taking place here or not. Why are we given this? If we aren’t supposed to make use of it and take it into account in our decision-making, then why give us those signs? Yes, that too is a very common argument. It’s come up for me more than once when I’ve spoken with people about this issue, and it really is a good question. I’m just not sure on two levels. First, on the level of how real these signs actually are.
[Speaker H] What? You don’t see the ingathering of the exiles? What? It’s something you can see with your eyes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can see with your eyes that there’s an ingathering of exiles, but I can’t see with my eyes that it is necessarily a sign of redemption. In other words, the question is how certain you can be that this is the process. Who says? There are all kinds of things. Even Alroy did a bit of ingathering of exiles. How far do you take it?
[Speaker H] What? What?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Alroy too, and all kinds of false messiahs whose deeds we described.
[Speaker H] When in the last 2,000 years was there an ingathering of exiles?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not this large. Not this large. That’s exactly the question: where does the line pass?
[Speaker H] Did anything come close to what we have today?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Came close, didn’t come close—so what? And if there was a small ingathering of exiles, would that be enough for this or not? Where’s the line? Who told you this won’t reverse in another 50 years and we’ll all be scattered back to the four corners of the earth? I don’t know. Huh? Yes, there are already about a million, I think, who have dispersed from here. I don’t know. Again, I agree that if I had to bet, I’d bet that yes, it’s a significant sign. But to tell you that I build on that? I don’t know, I’m not sure.
[Speaker C] Where—where do these signs appear?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are signs at the end of tractate Sotah in the Talmud, in the Prophets, scattered in various places. So that’s why I’m saying: first of all, even on the level of the truth of the matter—I said that on both levels this needs discussion—I’m not completely sure. I’m very careful about drawing conclusions from verses. After all, the verse says “an eye for an eye” and Hazal derive monetary compensation from it, so if it says “And you, mountains of Israel, shall yield your branches,” then I’ll say, yes, your branches of the world to come. In other words, I can make homiletic interpretations from anything to anything. And in general, making decisions from verses is, in my view, super dangerous. Dangerous in the sense of whether it’s true—I’m not yet even talking about the second level of, assuming it’s true, whether it’s permitted or appropriate—but first of all, what do the verses even mean? What are the verses intending? “Happy are you and it is good for you”—happy are you in this world and it is good for you in the world to come. “The righteous man suffers,” so what does “happy are you and it is good for you” mean? And what about “Test Me now in this,” where it says, “Bring the entire tithe into the storehouse”—yes? That in this matter you may test the Holy One, blessed be He, namely in tithing. One may not test the Holy One, blessed be He, except in tithing. Is everyone who gives tithes wealthy? I don’t think so. If anything, it’s almost the opposite. I think the people who are careful about tithing generally do not belong to the wealthiest strata of the population. Most of them. There are some who do, but if I had to make a correlation. And conversely, among those who are not careful about tithing there are also very wealthy people, and I don’t see there necessarily more poverty than in the population that does tithe. So what does that mean? Fine, you can find explanations, but to tell you that I can draw a conclusion from that statement—in my view that’s really not correct. I said—once we spoke about Bible study—so I said that I generally have reservations about studying the Hebrew Bible because you can’t learn anything from it. Meaning, I don’t feel you can learn anything from Bible study. You can do whatever you want with anything there, so why study it? If I can’t derive anything from it.
[Speaker F] There are actually opposite statements from Hazal here, it seems to me, that say the Messiah will come like a found object or like a scorpion, something like that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Unawares, yes.
[Speaker F] Yes, unawares, that there aren’t signs for it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe “a generation entirely guilty” or “a generation entirely meritorious,” so now go figure. We’re not a generation entirely this or entirely that. I think there are some like this and some like that. And maybe we’re a generation entirely guilty and we’re already close to that. We’re in enough overdraft to be called a generation entirely guilty. Or maybe “mostly” counts as “entirely.” So that’s why I say: first, there’s the question on the level of whether this is the truth. But I’m saying that’s not the interesting discussion right now. I’m saying that even if it is the truth, I’m not sure we should make use of it. So why was it written? That’s the question. After all, Hazal wrote it, the prophets wrote it. I don’t know, yes, maybe so that you’ll know where you stand. No—and then I’d say that even “so that you’ll know where you stand” can be understood on two levels. First, simply in order to tell people: know what will happen in the end of days. We study it for “study it and receive reward.” Second, it may even have been written as a present diagnosis. Meaning, so that you’ll see that you are now in the process of redemption, but even that still doesn’t mean you’re allowed to take it into account in decision-making. Those are two different things. Meaning, it could be that I’m even allowed to use it as a diagnostic tool to determine that I am now on the path to redemption. There’s no practical consequence to that, but if someone finds it interesting, then fine. But that still doesn’t mean—and according to my view it has no practical consequence—because I’m saying that still doesn’t mean I’m allowed to consider it and make use of it when I make decisions. That’s an additional step. Okay? And it’s like Hezekiah or Joseph asking themselves: why was this dream sent to me? That’s the same question as why those verses or those Talmudic passages were written. Why did they send me this dream if they don’t want me to do anything with it? “Study it and receive reward”—they sent you the dream so you’d know what will happen. Who said you have to take it into account when you make decisions? So here too, same thing. Therefore there are several steps here that are a bit of a leap. Meaning, even if I accept the predictions that emerge from Hazal and from the Hebrew Bible regarding what is supposed to happen in the future, even if I take it as a true interpretation, there is still some leap involved when I come and take it as a consideration in my own decision-making. That’s regarding the forecasts.
[Speaker H] Suppose now that you think we are in a process of redemption, okay? The beginning of redemption. But there’s a point—and suppose that the Temple, whether it descends from heaven or is built by human beings, will be built. Shouldn’t we prepare for that? Have priestly garments ready, know the laws of the Temple, things we haven’t dealt with for, I don’t know, the last 2,000 years?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] As I said earlier, if you’re doing things that are not problematic in everyday life—
[Speaker H] If you think it’s a process… exactly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then there’s no problem.
[Speaker H] No, but because—but—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For example, I think that what Rabbi Yisrael Ariel does at the Temple Institute—there’s no problem with it at all. He’s just preparing. I’m not sure one is obligated to do that—that I don’t know—but it certainly isn’t something problematic, because he isn’t doing anything that contradicts either Jewish law or logical and realistic considerations. So there’s no issue at all. That’s why I say—that’s why I prefaced all the prefatory remarks. In a case where you make these considerations and because of them you deviate from the path you otherwise should have followed, then the question of taking metaphysics into account arises. I’m not talking about people who—as I said earlier—someone who studies Torah all day in order to bring the Messiah, I have no problem with that. Meaning, I’m not sure it will help him, but it certainly isn’t problematic to do that; it’s not a messianic issue. Therefore all the prefatory remarks were to say it has to be an action that is somewhat problematic in certain respects, halakhically or otherwise, before we even start discussing it. Otherwise, no. Now, I mentioned—we already spoke a bit about the question of how problematic Zionism is. So it’s hard to put your finger on it exactly, but there are still problematic dimensions here. You cooperate with secular people, you pay heavy prices for this matter. So is that a halakhic transgression, or just something we wouldn’t have been supposed to do were it not for messianic considerations? But at least in the second formulation I think it does come in. We talked about civil courts and I spoke about all kinds of such aspects. Okay, that’s basically the end of the messianic discussion. What I want now is just to add one concluding remark that touches on this point. In the messianic discussion, we really dealt with it on two levels. One level is suspicion regarding the reliability of the metaphysical source—whether in the Hebrew Bible, or in a dream, or prophecy, or civil courts, whatever it may be. Maybe what you think isn’t true; maybe the interpretation isn’t correct regarding the metaphysics, or the verses, or whatever. And the second level: even if the interpretation is correct, are you allowed to take it into account among these considerations when you come to formulate decisions and policy? There’s a broader question here, and that is: to what extent is the Holy One, blessed be He, involved in history at all? And when you assume that the Holy One’s involvement in history stands behind these processes, and then you draw conclusions and say what is incumbent upon me to do or not to do—am I allowed to reason this way? Do I need to reason this way? Is it forbidden to reason this way? All this assumes in the background an assumption I now want to put on the table, and the assumption is that the Holy One, blessed be He, is involved here in these matters. Meaning, He is moving things around here. Until now I assumed yes, and the question was how far I’m allowed to interpret what He is doing and take account of what He is doing in my decision-making. Now I want to raise the question of whether He is doing anything here at all. Because I’m not at all sure.
[Speaker B] I’m sure.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so apparently we see it differently. What I basically want to say—I’ll say it on a few levels. My basic problem is that it seems to me our intuitive way of looking at things is not like that. Our intuitive way of looking at things is that things happen because of some realistic causes, not metaphysical causes. Meaning, if I have a fever and I take acetaminophen, then I recover not because the Holy One, blessed be He, helped me but because the acetaminophen performs the chemical action it performs and lowers my fever. Or if I take another medicine for an illness, I recover because the medicine works. There is chemistry, there is biology, and that is the explanation for why the thing works—not because the Holy One, blessed be He, healed me by means of the medicine. “Healed me by means of the medicine”—again, maybe I need to sharpen this—He may have healed me by means of the medicine in the sense that He created chemistry and biology and sees to it that the world operates according to the laws of chemistry and biology.
[Speaker B] That’s not what I mean.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I mean that the Holy One, blessed be He, intervenes here and heals me; that is, this was not supposed to happen according to the laws of chemistry and biology, but only because of the Holy One, blessed be He. So here I say—even someone who says what Yitzhak said before so emphatically—I sometimes tend not to believe him. I have to say. Not believe him about what, or in general? No—even someone who says it, I don’t believe that he himself believes it; not that I don’t believe in it. Because in practice, sometimes he isn’t aware that he doesn’t believe it. He thinks he believes it, and it’s not really a lie; rather, he isn’t correctly deciphering himself when he says he believes.
[Speaker B] I believe very much in naivete. No, but—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but try to be a little sophisticated and think: when you take acetaminophen and it lowers your fever, do you think the Holy One, blessed be He, lowered your fever or the acetaminophen did?
[Speaker B] I think that every time I breathe now, every breath, I think the Holy One, blessed be He, is involved in it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, what does “involved” mean? I say “involved” in the sense that He’s involved by operating chemistry and biology—that I have no problem with. I’m talking about involvement in the sense of a deviation from natural operation; otherwise it’s not involvement.
[Speaker B] Wait, but how can one—how can one discuss such a thing? I’m asking you. I think it can’t really be discussed. Meaning, you take acetaminophen and for one person it helped, for another it didn’t. The same acetaminophen. No, no, some people die.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, obviously people die, but fevers go down. If you take acetaminophen, the fever goes down. And if it doesn’t, you’ll look with a stethoscope and go to the doctor and go—
[Speaker B] Never mind, never mind—in principle, the same treatment helped one and didn’t help another.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s because chemistry is not an exact science.
[Speaker B] Not because chemistry is—there, that’s it… no, chemistry is not an exact science.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I’m saying—
[Speaker B] Again, I’m saying someone intervened and decided that this one will live and that one will die.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And I’m saying that if your fever doesn’t go down, you’ll go to the doctor, you won’t pray.
[Speaker B] I’ll go to the doctor and I’ll do everything—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’ll go to the doctor—but someone intervened and did this, so how will the doctor help you?
[Speaker B] Never mind, that same one who intervenes tells me: you should behave naturally.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does “behave naturally” mean? But if this is intervention by the Holy One, blessed be He, how can the doctor help?
[Speaker B] But it’s like that story with the guy when there was a flood, it was raining, and rescuers came and said they’d help him, and he told them no, the Holy One, blessed be He—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And then He says: I sent you the rescuer and the boat and the airplane, and you didn’t want them.
[Speaker B] Right, so that’s—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s a nice joke, but all in all—
[Speaker B] It’s not a joke.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s a nice joke, and I’ll tell you why: because ultimately, when we talk about the Holy One’s involvement in the sense I mean here, we mean a deviation from the laws of nature. If you’re talking about the operation of the laws of nature, which the Holy One, blessed be He, runs, I have no problem with that; that’s not what I’m talking about. The Holy One, blessed be He, can run the laws of nature, no problem. I’m talking about whether there is involvement that causes a deviation from the laws of nature. In other words, what is the regular ongoing conduct of the world?
[Speaker E] I’ll ask a simple question. Do you believe there could be one case in a billion—not a million, a billion—where a person walks under some building and a brick falls from there, and falls right on his head, and out of a billion such cases there could be one case where that brick would not fall according to Newton’s laws but would move so that he wouldn’t be killed?
[Speaker B] No, it’ll fall according to the laws, but whether you’re killed or not killed—the Holy One, blessed be He, will decide that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’ll fall on your head—why wouldn’t it kill you? Why do you prefer the laws of gravity over the laws of chemistry and biology? I don’t understand.
[Speaker B] No, no, also on—no, same thing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So if the brick falls according to the laws, why wouldn’t your biology also work according to the laws?
[Speaker B] No, same thing. I think the Holy One, blessed be He, is involved and decides what will happen with—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that same chemistry and that same stone.
[Speaker B] Right, so does He also decide gravity?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. So could there be one case where the stone won’t act according to gravity and will move so as not to kill him?
[Speaker C] No, there are no—
[Speaker B] Today there are no open miracles; you’re talking about miracles.
[Speaker E] No, no, no—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Open miracles.
[Speaker B] There are no open miracles. Everything goes according to nature, so to speak, but someone decides whether the stone falls on you.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then He doesn’t decide; then it’s not going according to the laws of nature. If He decides, then they’re not laws. The laws of nature mean that the circumstances determine what will happen—that’s what laws of nature are.
[Speaker B] But I’m saying it’s like, supposedly, laws of nature. What?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s as-if laws of nature.
[Speaker B] So why is it as-if?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the end, does it work or not—that’s what I’m asking. If He wants, surely He can. The question is whether He wants to, whether He does it. I’m not talking about whether He can; of course He can. He created nature, so He can freeze it too.
[Speaker B] I’m talking about the question whether—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] whether He makes use of that ability, not whether He has that ability. I claim that at least almost never. Maybe here and there yes, but… What is the meaning of what you’re saying? The meaning of what I’m saying is that the Holy One, blessed be He, is not involved. Unless what you mean is that He’s involved in that He arranged the laws of nature, He created nature. Yes. There’s also “my power and the might of my hand” in the verse. It says there “my power and the might of my hand,” and people always say—those who watch over such things say—“my power and the might of my hand,” do you think the army wins the war? The Holy One, blessed be He, wins the war, prayers win the war. But the verse says, “for it is He who gives you strength to make war.” Meaning, the verse says that we win the war and not the Holy One, blessed be He, except that the Holy One, blessed be He, gives us the strength to win the war. But in the end we win the war with that strength, not with something else. Meaning, the Holy One, blessed be He, operates the laws. That’s how the Derashot HaRan explains it, by the way. Derashot HaRan says that everything proceeds by natural means; the Holy One, blessed be He, operates nature. Fine, He gives you strength to make war, but obviously you win the war. If you don’t fight properly, you’ll lose; it’s not the Holy One, blessed be He, and not anything else. Rather, you receive from the Holy One, blessed be He, the strength to make war. So that’s basically saying He isn’t involved. It’s saying that He runs the laws of nature. Let me give you another example: a Talmudic passage at the end of Berakhot, in the Mishnah at the end of Berakhot—someone who says, “May it be Your will that these not be members of my household,” when there is a fire in the city—that is a vain prayer. Why is it a vain prayer?
[Speaker B] Because He doesn’t hear? It already happened.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It already happened. There’s already a fire. So what, you want the Holy One, blessed be He, to move the fire from here to there? Now I’ll ask you: what’s the problem? Can’t the Holy One, blessed be He, move the fire from here to there? After all, He can do miracles, right? So why shouldn’t I pray to the Holy One, blessed be He, that He move the fire so that they not be members of my household? That a tree burn—not on other people, but let the tree next to the house burn and not the house. You see? We don’t want open miracles, right? What do you mean, “we don’t want”? The Holy One, blessed be He, says He doesn’t do open miracles, only hidden miracles. The Talmud brings another example there. The Talmud brings a prayer that the child be a male. A woman is pregnant, and the Talmud says one does not pray for that because it too is a vain prayer. That too is prayer about the past. Now I ask: there the miracle isn’t open anymore. There was no ultrasound in those days, right? You don’t know whether you have a male or female. What’s the problem? Let the Holy One, blessed be He, now switch it from male to female and that’s it. What’s the problem? Why can’t one pray for that?
[Speaker G] Because it’s against the laws of nature.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, so you can’t pray against the laws of nature? Meaning, the Holy One, blessed be He, doesn’t intervene in the laws of nature? Well then, that proves my point. Meaning—no, that’s it. Every prayer you pray, you want the Holy One, blessed be He, to intervene in the laws of nature and do something that wasn’t supposed to happen, right? That’s the meaning of prayer. But if you can’t pray that the Holy One, blessed be He, act against the laws of nature, then what exactly are you praying for?
[Speaker D] They got angry at the Givati commander before the entry into Shema Yisrael.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And they were right.
[Speaker E] Why were they right?
[Speaker B] His remark wasn’t—
[Speaker E] it wasn’t—he wasn’t doing theology there.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he had prayed that the Holy One, blessed be He, should help, nobody would have complained.
[Speaker E] But he was trying to encourage—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the people, to create a religious atmosphere around the war, and that was the problem.
[Speaker G] You’re saying there is heavenly assistance in certain things and that a doctor will succeed more in a certain situation.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So why can’t one pray regarding the fetus? That’s what I’m asking.
[Speaker G] What’s the difference between the fetus and an illness? But wait—this idea that the doctor will succeed more, that’s not against the laws of nature.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That a surgeon succeed more in a particular case—that’s not against the laws of nature.
[Speaker B] Everything is the laws of nature. That’s the mistake. In the end it’s all laws of nature; you just don’t see it. But why do we pray every day, three times a day, all the “Heal us” and “Return us”?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Even if you—
[Speaker D] If you’re committing suicide, you still have to say “Heal us.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll comment on that in a moment. But first I want to bring—you’re leading us toward Leibowitz, yes? That’s what it reminds you of. Fine, yes. Again, I can’t say this categorically, that it never happens. I only want to claim that this is not the regular mode of operation. It could be that there are cases where He intervenes—you can’t know. You can’t know whether each and every thing happens exactly according to the laws of nature.
[Speaker B] If you can’t know, then what is there to discuss?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there is something to discuss, because we—
[Speaker B] are talking about something where either yes or no.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That—
[Speaker B] is to say, I could be right and you could be wrong.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What, you can’t be right?
[Speaker B] I’m sure I’m right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe you are right, but you can’t know that you’re right. No, I’ll tell you—the point is this. Look, if we really thought that the regular ongoing operation—I’m talking about the regular ongoing operation, not sporadic interventions from time to time that you can’t detect and can’t know about—if in the regular ongoing operation of what happens, when we take the result of a medical study, okay? So in a medical study, even a God-fearing Jew who is a medical researcher and is testing some medication, he takes a sample group and a control group. I have never once heard of a Jew making sure that the distribution of people who pray is equal in the two groups. And on the other hand, I have never heard of a God-fearing Jew who doesn’t use the results of those studies, even though nobody balances the prayer factor between the two groups. Why not? After all, if in the end we recover by virtue of prayers and not by virtue of medications, then such a study has no meaning at all. What does such a study say? It says nothing. With a certain medication, more people in a certain group recovered because there were more people praying there, or more righteous people, or people with greater merit, or something like that. Who knows? You can’t infer anything from any experiment about anything. So why do we draw conclusions from them? And again I say: medicine is not an exact science. Obviously we can’t draw deterministic conclusions, but we do attribute importance to it, and we don’t even try to neutralize this prayer dimension. Why not? Because we don’t really believe in it. Let’s be honest.
[Speaker F] You could say that the percentage of righteous people is evenly distributed between the two groups.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, take care of that. Make sure it’s uniformly distributed. The other things you don’t make sure are uniformly distributed, but you do make sure they actually happen. You need some kind of righteousness-meter. And that’s the thing that’s most—maybe apparently the most influential thing. The only thing that influences. So that you won’t neutralize? If you don’t neutralize that, then what’s left? I’d give up on the research altogether—after all, only prayer helps. So why do the research? You even have to balance the groups. There are lots of things here that are now—so you’ll say the Sages themselves said yes, to pray. Yes, if you can’t even pray over a fetus, which is a hidden miracle—because as I said before, first of all prayer is prayer for a hidden miracle. When you pray, what are you really saying? You’re saying… nature is about to do something like this to me, and I’m asking the Holy One, blessed be He, that it not happen. Right? Because if naturally it would happen anyway, then what is there to pray for? Meaning, prayer by definition is prayer for intervention in the laws of nature. Right? But if prayer for intervention, even hidden intervention, in the laws of nature is forbidden, then what is prayer? So I argued—and I’m saying it again, it’s pretty far-reaching, but to me it’s just one plus one. I argued that the Sages really didn’t see it that way, but they were mistaken. Because the Sages were not equipped with the lenses of modern science. They didn’t know it. So they really thought what many people still think today—those who aren’t immersed in the scientific way of thinking. To this day people think that the laws of nature don’t really determine what happens. After all, sometimes people are healed by the medicine and sometimes not. But if you ask a doctor or a researcher or a scientist or someone immersed in scientific thinking, he’ll tell you: what are you talking about? Of course they do. There’s no such thing. The laws of nature do everything. Except what? We simply don’t know the laws of nature all the way through. Meaning, we still don’t know all the medical or biological information. In biology maybe we’ll never know it all. Fine, that’s not the point. But on the principled level there are laws of nature, and if we knew all of them, then everything would be deterministic. And therefore, for example, if a certain medicine doesn’t work, we don’t say, ah okay fine, here it just didn’t work. No—we immediately go into research to check why it didn’t work, because there has to be some natural reason that explains why it didn’t work. Because everything runs according to the laws of nature. That’s exactly the point.
[Speaker D] That’s how people relate to psychosomatic aspects.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And the laws of nature—what’s the problem?
[Speaker D] A person’s psychosomatics, according to the book, in terms of the science of freedom, is something that works not independently of that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Psychology itself. But the effect of psychology on the body is a clear scientific fact. Placebo, by the way, is one of the proofs. When you do an experiment with a sample group and a control group, you have to neutralize the placebo effect. That’s why the experiment has to be double-blind—controlled and double-blind. Meaning, there has to be a control group and a sample group, but neither group can know who is the control and who is the sample. Because if the group knows whether it is the control or the sample, that itself will affect the results. Why will it affect them? It will affect them because of psychology. So in experiments today we neutralize psychosomatics, placebo. Why? Because placebo is a scientific fact. Why don’t we neutralize prayer? Because we don’t believe it has an effect. And by “we” I mean God-fearing doctors too. I’m not talking about doctors who don’t believe—I certainly understand why they don’t neutralize it. It’s just that then religious Jews shouldn’t say to use their studies, because their studies would be worthless. And all of us do use them. And if it doesn’t work, we’re very surprised and go back to the doctor again to see why it didn’t work. What’s the problem? Because you didn’t pray? What kind of question is that? To me there’s some kind of double life here. With the Sages, what happened is that they lived in ancient science. That’s how they thought; in the scientific world they weren’t any more advanced than their time. And in ancient science people thought there were things that were open-ended. They didn’t grasp that nature is deterministic, because they didn’t have enough information. Today we know the laws in much greater detail, and therefore today we have—again, not completely, but we have some kind of very strong conception or intuition that basically, if we knew the laws all the way through, then everything would proceed according to the laws. It’s just that we don’t know everything. The Sages understood not only that we don’t know everything; they also didn’t grasp that there is an entire system of laws that determines everything. Rather, there are things that really the Holy One, blessed be He, decides whether they’ll work or won’t work, and about those—pray. The fetus, no. If it’s already a male, then it’s already a male, so there’s nothing to pray for. But if today we’ve changed our scientific outlook, then on this issue I see no reason not to disagree with the Sages. Scientific outlook—we know science better than they did. So if in my scientific outlook today I’ve reached the conclusion that the laws of nature basically determine everything—on the macro level, I’m speaking, leave quantum and all those things aside—then now I have to go back and say: okay, so if the Sages said I’m forbidden to pray for a change in the laws of nature, even a hidden change, and today I think every intervention is a change in the laws of nature, then in that case there really is no more room for requests. Except what? Since I can’t say categorically that the Holy One, blessed be He, never intervenes and the laws of nature always work—that would be an arrogant statement, I don’t think I can say such a thing. So I say, maybe what needs to be said is something a bit more moderate or balanced. To say: look, if you have no natural solution, then pray. What can happen? Maybe the Holy One, blessed be He, will intervene anyway; maybe sometimes He does intervene. But where you do have a natural solution, there’s no reason to pray. Take the pill and go home. That’s all.
[Speaker B] The pill is simple. You’re also undermining various laws. For example, we say about an inadvertent murderer—he may be struck down.
[Speaker D] Let’s tell the synagogue officials that anyone asking for a prayer for a sick person should give a shekel. If he’s willing to pay two hundred shekels or five hundred for a specialist doctor, then at least—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let him donate two hundred shekels to the synagogue. Two hundred shekels to the synagogue? Yes, exactly. Five minutes of a doctor costs how much?
[Speaker B] And still you all pray. You come and pray, don’t you? Or don’t you pray? Do you come to synagogue?
[Speaker D] I pray,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yitzhak, which synagogue?
[Speaker B] Because what? Because what? Why? Why are you obligated? You say “Heal us,” you say “Bring us back,” you say “Redeem us.”
[Speaker D] I’m crazy about that,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yitzhak, but not the whole prayer is requests.
[Speaker B] Why? It doesn’t help, so it’s just pointless.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Prayer—but most of the prayer is not requests, Yitzhak.
[Speaker B] Requests—the Eighteen Blessings—most of the prayer is not requests, Yitzhak.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Amidah? No, what do you mean—most of the prayer is the Eighteen Blessings?
[Speaker B] No, that’s the main part, that’s the main part.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Amidah is the main part. When you come to synagogue, you’re not coming for the Amidah.
[Speaker B] Then what does he come to synagogue for?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course he comes to synagogue for the verses of praise, for the blessings of the Shema, the Shema, the blessing after the Shema, prayer, Ashrei and Uva LeTzion, Aleinu LeShabeach, and There Is None Like Our God.
[Speaker H] But when people say “prayer”—
[Speaker B] They mean the Amidah, the Eighteen Blessings.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can say whatever you want, but when you come to synagogue, you come for half an hour, of which three minutes are requests.
[Speaker B] Wait, so three minutes of requests—we’ll give that up?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying yes, indeed,
[Speaker B] The requests need analysis.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We don’t need the Eighteen Blessings? It needs analysis.
[Speaker B] Oh come on. The requests need analysis. This undermines all the foundations of Judaism. Fine. Let’s see Judaism differently.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But why pray for…
[Speaker D] Of course, they obligated you to pray.
[Speaker B] Enough, enough—they obligated you to pray.
[Speaker D] Also most of the Eighteen Blessings is—
[Speaker B] Prayer—prayerfulness—a movement of contemplation. If that’s your approach, I’m telling you: if that’s your approach, don’t come pray.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not? What are you talking about? Since there is a commandment to pray. What is the commandment?
[Speaker B] A commandment to pray. Not to make requests? Just for nothing?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What kind of service is that? Just standing there? Not requests. To pray is not requests, Yitzhak.
[Speaker B] The Eighteen Blessings, those three minutes are requests.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Those three minutes are requests.
[Speaker B] And what are you doing? They’re requests.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Guys, this too—it’s semantics. What difference does it make right now? I come to synagogue for half an hour, out of which three minutes—
[Speaker B] —are requests. Wait, wait, and what—
[Speaker I] What’s the most important blessing in the Eighteen Blessings, such that if you didn’t say it with proper intention, according to Maimonides—if you didn’t say it with proper intention, you have to repeat the prayer?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not just Maimonides—everyone, all the halakhic decisors.
[Speaker I] The Fathers. The Fathers, yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does that have to do with anything?
[Speaker B] What does it have to do with anything? So don’t say the rest.
[Speaker I] No, but that’s the main thing and that’s the important thing.
[Speaker B] But what you’re saying is just pointless. So don’t say the prayer because it’s pointless. Then that’s already another question.
[Speaker I] If—
[Speaker B] If in nature there’s no intervention, what are you praying for at all?
[Speaker I] And if Tannaim and Amoraim and sacrifices—
[Speaker B] The sacrifices too wouldn’t have been done this way and that.
[Speaker I] What are you saying?
[Speaker F] Sacrifices are… let me tell you, let me tell you practically.
[Speaker I] No, practically—what does that mean? Are sacrifices requests? What are you answering me now? What does it mean? That if you said the requests and didn’t have intention, meanwhile you were thinking about your business, you don’t have to repeat it. But if you said the first blessing without intention, you do have to repeat it. What does that mean?
[Speaker H] That the Amidah has a structure. The first three blessings are praise, the three blessings… but leave the structure aside.
[Speaker I] But leave aside importance. I’m not talking about the structure, I’m talking about importance. The central thing is in the middle. The central thing is in the middle.
[Speaker B] And because of that, because of the importance, you don’t—
[Speaker I] —pray like that?
[Speaker B] What? Why? The first blessing?
[Speaker I] Why pray for things that are less important? Like Aleinu LeShabeach? What? Why? Why?
[Speaker B] By the way, why do we say Aleinu LeShabeach? Why do we say all the verses of praise? He created the world, us. Not the world—because He intervenes all the time. For what He did before… yes, of course.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—what He is doing now in parallel. Why does the Acamol work? Because He created biology and chemistry. That’s why the Acamol works. So I thank Him for that.
[Speaker F] Listen, it’s not that central; it’s only a rabbinic enactment. Meaning…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He shot some arrow billions of years ago. According to Maimonides, after all, prayer is Torah-level.
[Speaker G] That formulation doesn’t…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I’m saying more than that: since I can’t cancel the requests—if it were entirely up to me, I would cancel them.
[Speaker B] No, no, don’t cancel them for everyone, cancel them for yourself.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For myself I can’t cancel them. I’m also subject to Jewish law. But what? The Jewish law is to pray.
[Speaker H] Right, this is the text the Sages established.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. So what then? I say that these requests I direct toward those who are in such distress that they have no practical solutions, and there maybe the Holy One, blessed be He, will intervene there, though the chances are probably small.
[Speaker H] I don’t think the Holy One, blessed be He, renews every day, continually, the act of creation.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes—He renews every day, continually, the act of creation. Of course. The verses… certainly. The laws are working all the time, of course. What—He gives you the power to succeed.
[Speaker E] There’s no law that says these have to be the laws.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying again, look, you can object to this. It certainly contradicts—
[Speaker B] I don’t want to object. You can’t—you can’t prove what you’re saying. You can’t prove what—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —I’m saying, except that all of us agree with it.
[Speaker B] No, I don’t.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m showing you that you do agree. I behave this way…
[Speaker H] No, I’ll tell you what I think. In my humble opinion, you’re mistaken. When I pray, okay—when I pray, I’m not praying that the Holy One, blessed be He, change the laws of nature. That really is some sporadic moment. Not true. Not true. Suppose now, like Shmuel gave the example, with a brick falling. The brick falls because of gravity and all that. I pray that the Holy One, blessed be He, cause me not to pass there at that moment—neither me nor you. But that too contradicts the laws of nature. Why? Why does that contradict the laws of nature?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because why should the Holy One, blessed be He, cause you not to pass there? Because without His causing it, you would pass there. Right? That’s why you pray. You don’t know, so you pray. You pray only for the possibility that without His intervention you would pass there—otherwise there’s nothing to pray for. So that means the laws of nature cause you to pass there, and you want Him to intervene and cause you not to pass there.
[Speaker E] By definition.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s always like that. Prayer by definition—there is no other kind of prayer, no other kind of request—only intervention in the laws of nature. There is no request that isn’t a request for intervention in the laws of nature.
[Speaker H] There’s no such thing, never was and never will be. Maybe. There’s no such thing. Every request is a request for intervention in the laws of nature. That’s exactly the mistake of people who aren’t aware of this scientific way of thinking. If I was ten seconds late and the brick fell on me because my wife asked me to take out the trash, okay? So? What then?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And that you asked from the Holy One, blessed be He? The trash—without praying to the Holy One, blessed be He?
[Speaker H] I don’t know, I’m saying that the Holy One, blessed be He, arranged it so my wife did ask.
[Speaker E] Excellent. Two possibilities.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Two possibilities.
[Speaker E] So you’re praying that the Holy One, blessed be He, take away her free choice? Yes, exactly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If she were asking—there are a million ways. Every one of those ways is a deviation from nature, every one of them. Because what you’re saying is: if this would have happened anyway even without the prayer, then there’s nothing for you to pray for. Rather, you pray for the possibility that without the prayer it wouldn’t have happened, right? But if without the prayer it wouldn’t have happened, then for the Holy One, blessed be He, to cause it to happen is intervention—it’s changing the laws of nature.
[Speaker F] Actually that area is not—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —deterministic because of choice, what you suggested on the site—human choice. So that really is a suggestion Oren made on the site, that maybe I can pray, although I told you there too that I think that’s intervention as well—it’s intervention in a person’s choice. And in my view I don’t know whether that’s such a great gain compared to intervention in the laws of nature. You hope it happens. No, I’m saying: but the assumption is that in the laws of nature too He can intervene without my noticing. So I say, I can pray requests because I say, look, sometimes it could be that He intervenes and I don’t notice. So I say: I pray on the chance that maybe He’ll intervene. If someone is in trouble I ask: Holy One, blessed be He, intervene for him. Maybe it’ll work and maybe it won’t work—probably it won’t, but maybe it will. So on that level I’m willing to say this even regarding the laws of nature; you don’t need free choice. And on the principled level, I have as much difficulty with intervention in choice as with intervention in the laws of nature, when I don’t see such a big advantage here. Okay, I see that we—
[Speaker E] It is softer, really, than the laws of nature.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but again, it’s softer only because it’s less visible. That’s not the point—that this too is in nature. This too is intervention, because we were given free choice, so it means we’re supposed to choose and not Him. So He intervenes. Basically you want Him to intervene. Part of the laws of nature is that people have choice; that too is part of the nature of the world, let’s call it that. So in any case it’s intervention in the nature of the world. That’s what people don’t understand, and in my opinion that’s also what the Sages didn’t understand. Therefore the Sages spoke about prayer in this sense, while on the other hand they forbid prayer that is a request to intervene in the laws of nature, as with the fetus—changing the sex of the fetus. Because sex-reassignment surgery—the Holy One, blessed be He, can’t do sex-reassignment surgery? Today even a doctor can do that. So what’s the problem? No, because one does not intervene—the Holy One, blessed be He, does not intervene in the laws of nature.
[Speaker B] But before she became pregnant, could he pray?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Before—
[Speaker B] Before she became pregnant, certainly—according to the Sages, yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And I ask, according to the Sages. According to my position, no; according to my position there isn’t this—
[Speaker B] —thing. Before everything, it’s all a deviation from the laws of nature.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If the Sages had understood that everything is basically determined by the laws of nature, not only the conspicuous things, then the obvious conclusion would be that basically you can’t ask the Holy One, blessed be He, for anything at all. Because every request is a request for intervention.
[Speaker B] Fine, that’s the point.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying again: prayer was instituted by the Sages; we’re obligated by what the Sages instituted; the Talmud has authority. I find myself some kind of way out that I’m not comfortable with. This realization clicked for me—or at least started to click—because of Nachshon Wachsman. Because for me the Nachshon Wachsman event was traumatic. You remember Nachshon Wachsman—they searched for him for several days there. Those were several days in which I thought I was living in a dream; I couldn’t believe the reality I was seeing around me. The entire Jewish people prayed. Secular, religious—unbelievable. The most unlikely people organized mass prayers on the radio, at the Western Wall—things that had never even come up. Today that happens a bit more on the radio; there’s more Yiddishkeit on the radio today, things have changed a bit, but then it was simply absurd, unbelievable. I said: if now the Holy One, blessed be He, does not cause us really to win, then prayer doesn’t help—don’t sell me stories.
[Speaker B] No, but that’s the effect of faith.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Forget it—it didn’t help at all, it didn’t help at all. Now you’ll tell me, people just tell me, yes, yes, prayer never returns empty, and you can’t make the calculations of the Holy One, blessed be He, and what Racheli Shapircher said too—that He doesn’t work for us—all true, all nice consolations. But when we make the calculation, let’s be honest: we don’t believe it.
[Speaker B] We—I do believe it. We really do. Nachshon Wachsman—why don’t you go to the Holocaust?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What Wachsman?
[Speaker B] He’s one pawn.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, Wachsman not because of the horror of the act, but because of the prayers that were made to prevent the act.
[Speaker B] And what do you know—how much did people pray in the Holocaust?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know how much they prayed in the Holocaust.
[Speaker B] But, but, but also in general we see there are processes. So? Just as there was the Holocaust, now there is redemption. We—meaning, regardless of whether one believes or not, there is some sort of process. You see some changes in the world, you see certain things.
[Speaker E] Certainly. Those changes—what causes them?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The law of gravity is a change in the world. Look, it falls downward.
[Speaker B] What does that have to do with God? We cause it.
[Speaker C] That’s—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the question, that’s exactly the question.
[Speaker B] The establishment of a state, the ingathering of exiles—that’s a process that didn’t happen in the past.
[Speaker C] There was an interview with the chief of staff on the program Uvda. Yes, I saw it. He was the one who sat there and was responsible for locating the house and the planning,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And the planning was absolutely perfect.
[Speaker C] It was just completely clear that they were going to rescue him.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They had complete information. They had captured one of the terrorists and got from him all the information about the layout of the house, and everything was organized—
[Speaker C] —completely, and he was simply just waiting for it to happen and be over. And when it didn’t happen, it was simply the greatest trauma of his life. So what did prayer do here? I don’t know, but the people who had to act did act, and it failed.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again, that’s not proof, of course—one case.
[Speaker C] I’m only saying that it made me think—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —again about the whole issue. It’s not proof by itself.
[Speaker C] What happened before that?