Topics in Talmudic Logic, Lecture 21
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- The Ri’s question in Tosafot on Ketubot 56 and the explanation of “the condition is void but the act remains valid”
- Retroactive nullification versus “it never took effect,” and the basic assumption about conditions
- The standard view: *al menat* as effective from now, and as retroactive clarification
- Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s approach: “from now on, retroactively” and reverse causality in time
- Tosafot in Gittin, uncertain warning, and vows: Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s principle regarding a sage’s annulment
- The Jerusalem Talmud on “something that has a way to become permitted” in vows, and defining nullification as “from now on”
- The “two timelines” model and truth as dependent on point of view
- Applying the principle to conditions according to Rabbi Shimon Shkop, with support from the Ri
- “Both sides are pending”: both betrothed and unmarried
- The distinction between legal effects and properties in order to explain an apparent contradiction
- Practical proofs from the Savoraic rabbis, Maimonides, Ba’al Ha’Itur, Rashba, and Rosh
- Conclusion and continuation to the lectures on retroactive selection
Summary
General Overview
The lecture continues its discussion of the logic of time through the concept of a condition in Jewish law, starting from the Ri’s question in Tosafot on Ketubot 56 regarding the rule that “the condition is void but the act remains valid” in betrothal. A view is presented according to which a condition is a Torah innovation learned from the condition of the tribes of Gad and Reuven, in which speech can retroactively uproot an act only when it is formulated according to the formal laws of conditions. This explains the difficulty of how an act can take effect contrary to the will of the one stipulating the condition. The lecture then presents different views of the future-past relationship, contrasted with the standard view of a condition as retroactive clarification, and introduces Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s position, according to which a future event causally generates the earlier state retroactively (“from now on, retroactively”), with examples from vows, divorce documents, and betrothal, including apparently paradoxical implications and a conceptual way of handling them through the distinction between legal effects and descriptive properties.
The Ri’s question in Tosafot on Ketubot 56 and the explanation of “the condition is void but the act remains valid”
The Ri in Tosafot asks how it can be that when a person makes a condition not in accordance with the formal laws of conditions, the condition is void but the act remains valid, even though if the act obligates him in food, clothing, and conjugal rights, he does not want the betrothal at all. Rabbenu Tam answers that it is as though he was merely saying empty words, and the speaker says that is forced. The Ri, and many of the later authorities, explain that a condition is an innovation in which speech can uproot an act, and without the Torah’s innovation, speech cannot uproot an act. Therefore one needs the condition of the tribes of Gad and Reuven and all the formal laws of conditions in order to give speech the power of nullification. According to this, the person applies the betrothal in any case, relying on the condition to uproot it retroactively if the condition is not fulfilled. When he fails in the formulation of the condition, what remains is full betrothal, because the speech remains “ordinary speech,” which cannot uproot an act.
Retroactive nullification versus “it never took effect,” and the basic assumption about conditions
Kovetz Shiurim on Ketubot, along with other later authorities, describes that this view assumes that non-fulfillment of the condition retroactively uproots an act that already took effect, rather than saying that the act never took effect in the first place. The speaker sharpens that this is the subject of today’s lecture and frames it within different models of the future-past relation. He lists four levels: lack of knowledge about an existing fact; determinism, where the information exists in principle even if inaccessible; a future event dependent on human choice, so the information does not yet exist in the present; and a future event that serves as a cause producing the present state through reverse causality in time.
The standard view: *al menat* as effective from now, and as retroactive clarification
It is stated that anyone who says *al menat* is considered as though he said “from now,” and in the standard view (as in Beit Yishai by Rabbi Shlomo Fisher, section 35), a condition works as retroactive clarification. The speaker gives the example of a divorce document that says, “if rain falls on Sunday,” where “before Heaven it is revealed” whether rain will fall, so the information already exists even though people do not know it until Sunday. According to this, the status before the condition is clarified is only a halakhic doubt, handled through the laws of doubt. Nothing is moving backward in time; rather, there is merely later awareness of information that was already true.
Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s approach: “from now on, retroactively” and reverse causality in time
Rabbi Shimon Shkop disagrees and argues that conditions operate on the fourth level, where the future event causally generates the state retroactively, and the cause comes later than the effect. The speaker emphasizes that even in the legal realm there is a need for a sharp logical definition in order to use such constructions. He presents a basis for this through Rabbi Shmuel Rozovsky in Makkot, section 420, as a student of Rabbi Shimon Shkop, who applies this principle beyond conditions as well.
Tosafot in Gittin, uncertain warning, and vows: Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s principle regarding a sage’s annulment
Rabbi Shmuel brings from Tosafot in Gittin, who ask how a married woman who committed adultery can ever be put to death, since this is a case of uncertain warning: perhaps the husband will send her a divorce document and then cancel it, and then the betrothal will be uprooted retroactively. Rabbenu Tam answers that we follow the majority and preserve her presumptive status. Tosafot add a question from a Nazirite who drinks wine and becomes impure, since if he asks to have his Nazirite vow annulled, it will be uprooted retroactively and it will turn out that he never sinned. Rabbi Akiva Eiger asks that even according to the opinion that uncertain warning counts as a warning, there is still the concern that it will become clear retroactively that there was never any sin. Rabbi Shmuel answers on the basis of Sha’arei Yosher, Gate 2, chapter 9, by Rabbi Shimon Shkop, that a sage’s annulment is not retroactive clarification but rather “only now is yesterday’s prohibition being permitted.” So until the annulment there really was a prohibition, and only afterward is it uprooted retroactively. From this it follows that lashes on Tuesday can be fully justified even if later he goes and asks for annulment, but if he asks before the lashes are administered, then he is no longer lashed.
The Jerusalem Talmud on “something that has a way to become permitted” in vows, and defining nullification as “from now on”
The Rosh, chapter 6 of Nedarim, section 3, cites the Jerusalem Talmud asking how a vow can be considered something that has a way to become permitted, since the sage uproots it retroactively and it turns out there was never any prohibition. The Jerusalem Talmud answers: “He uproots it only from now on,” so that although he uproots it from its root, still it was prohibited until today, and therefore it counts as something that has a way to become permitted. From here Rabbi Shmuel infers that “only now is the prohibition being permitted retroactively,” meaning the permission is created as a later act that changes the past, not as the discovery of old information.
The “two timelines” model and truth as dependent on point of view
The speaker explains that according to “from now on, retroactively,” the legal status on Tuesday depends on the question from what point in time you are looking at it, so that Tuesday “as of Tuesday itself” differs from Tuesday “from the standpoint of Thursday.” He describes this as a function of two data points: the time being asked about and the time from which one asks, in terms of t and tau and two time axes. In that way one can understand a situation in which before the annulment the Nazirite really is forbidden, while after the annulment history is “rewritten,” so that from the later point of view, on Tuesday he is permitted.
Applying the principle to conditions according to Rabbi Shimon Shkop, with support from the Ri
From Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s novellae on Ketubot, section 1, it is brought that he concludes from annulment of vows that present actions can affect the past, and therefore in conditions as well a person can create a “legal effect of divorce that is hanging in suspension.” He presents the Ri’s words as a basis for this understanding, according to which the betrothal or divorce takes effect in any case, and the future event uproots it retroactively if the condition is not fulfilled, rather than the future event merely revealing what was always the case. This explains why the formal laws of conditions are required: only speech formulated in the pattern of the condition of the tribes of Gad and Reuven receives the power to uproot an act; this is not merely a matter of uncovering information.
“Both sides are pending”: both betrothed and unmarried
Rabbi Shimon Shkop adds that the precise formulation is that both sides are hanging in suspension, so that the woman is both betrothed and unmarried until the future event is decided. He himself writes in the language of “doubt,” but the speaker interprets this as a state of “both-and,” not as an ordinary doubt. It is said that each side is pending because the act of divorce or betrothal is not enough to create a legal effect without the addition of “there not being a side of nullification,” and therefore even the side of validity lacks a full cause until the condition is fulfilled. The speaker illustrates that according to this, the betrothal is “thin” or incomplete until fulfillment of the condition, and only from the fulfillment onward does it become fully complete.
The distinction between legal effects and properties in order to explain an apparent contradiction
The speaker relates a difficulty raised in the yeshiva in Yeruham: how can a woman be both divorced and a married woman? He explains that the contradiction exists between properties and descriptions, not between entities. He suggests seeing a legal effect as a real entity rather than as a description, using the image of a “pack” that a person carries, so there is no obstacle to two different legal effects resting together on the same woman. He argues that therefore each halakhic question is decided according to the relevant legal effect: for example, the prohibition for a priest because of the legal effect of divorce, and the prohibition of relations with others because of the legal effect of being a married woman, without needing to frame this as laws of doubt. He even notes a possible practical implication: the rule would not shift to *rabbinic-level doubt treated leniently*, because this is not a doubt but two real legal effects existing together.
Practical proofs from the Savoraic rabbis, Maimonides, Ba’al Ha’Itur, Rashba, and Rosh
The lecture brings the view of the Savoraic rabbis regarding a conditional divorce document, “on condition that she not drink wine all her life,” according to which after the husband dies she is allowed to drink wine. The speaker explains that this makes sense only if the drinking is a nullifying act that can no longer uproot the divorce after the husband’s death, and not if this is merely retroactive disclosure. Maimonides is brought from chapter 9 of the laws of divorce regarding a divorce document that says, “if I do not come within twelve months,” where if the husband dies after two months, she is still forbidden to remarry until the end of the twelve months. The speaker explains this on the basis that the non-arrival over the twelve months is the cause that generates the divorce, not a sign of it, so knowing that the husband died is not enough until the period of the condition has actually elapsed. The view of Ba’al Ha’Itur is also brought, that one can retract a conditional divorce document said “from now,” together with Rashba’s responsum that one cannot effect divorce before the condition in a betrothal “from now” has been clarified, and a responsum of the Rosh allowing cancellation of a condition in betrothal because “speech can cancel speech.” All of these are presented as proofs that a condition is not a mechanism of retroactive clarification but rather a mechanism of nullification and legal effect that depends on a future event that causally produces the result.
Conclusion and continuation to the lectures on retroactive selection
The speaker concludes that the goal was to show the idea of moving back in time in the context of conditions, and announces that in the two remaining lectures he will speak about retroactive selection and try to distinguish between retroactive selection and condition. He ends by saying this is food for thought for the week and by closing attendance.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, we’re in the middle of the logic of time, and after all the introductions I started talking a bit about the concept of condition. Just briefly, I’ll remind you, because this is the point from which I’m continuing. We saw the Ri’s question in Tosafot on Ketubot 56, where he asks: why, if a person makes a condition in a way that doesn’t fit the formal laws of conditions, is the condition void but the act remains valid? Say a man betroths a woman on condition that he has no obligation toward her for food, clothing, and conjugal rights. So the Talmud says that according to Rabbi Yehuda, his condition stands, because this is a monetary matter. But Rabbi Meir says the condition is void. Even in monetary matters, one cannot make a condition against what is written in the Torah, and therefore the condition is void but the act remains valid. Meaning: she is betrothed to him regardless of whether he will be obligated to provide her with food, clothing, and conjugal rights. And Tosafot asks about this: why? After all, if he will be obligated to provide her with food, clothing, and conjugal rights, then he doesn’t want to betroth her at all. How can you force a person to be married to someone he doesn’t want to be married to? He didn’t betroth her with that in mind. So I said that according to Rabbenu Tam, this is like someone speaking emptily, meaning he didn’t mean it seriously. I said that’s forced. The Ri’s approach in Tosafot is—and many later authorities basically go in this direction with the Ri—that a condition contains an innovation. The innovation is that speech comes and cancels an act. You made an act of betrothal, and now you attach a condition to it. It turns out that if something is not fulfilled, then the betrothal is canceled. But you performed an act; the speech of the condition can’t uproot an act. So the Ri says: right, in principle that’s true. That’s why you need the Torah’s innovation learned from the condition of the tribes of Gad and Reuven, that speech really can uproot an act. If you formulate it the way Jewish law defines it, then the speech receives power and it can uproot the act. So how exactly does that work? The assumption is that if, say, you want to betroth a woman on condition that it rains tomorrow, then there is really no way to do that, because speech can’t uproot an act. So decide: either you betroth her or you don’t betroth her. Speech can’t uproot an act. The Torah introduced a novelty: if you formulate the speech with the affirmative before the negative, and the condition before the act, and all the formal laws of conditions, then the speech will have the power to uproot the act. Fine, so what am I saying? I’m saying to myself: okay, I want to betroth the woman only conditionally; otherwise I don’t want her. How can I do that? Jewish law defines it: I have no other way to do it. How? I actually have to make the betrothal take effect in any case, and accompany it with a statement of condition that will uproot it if the condition is not fulfilled—if what I stipulated does not happen. There is no other way to achieve my goal. Okay? So if that’s the case, that is presumably what I mean to do. I mean to make the betrothal take effect in any case, and I say on condition that if something doesn’t happen, then my act will be uprooted. Except there was a malfunction: I didn’t say the speech according to the rules, meaning I didn’t construct it according to the formal laws of conditions. If so, then it turns out that I applied the betrothal in all cases no matter what, and the speech that I built doesn’t succeed in uprooting the act even if the condition is not fulfilled, because I didn’t formulate it properly, so it remains ordinary speech. Not the kind of speech for which the Torah innovated that it has the power to uproot an act. It’s just ordinary speech, and ordinary speech cannot uproot an act. And therefore we are left with the rule that the condition is void but the act remains valid, and she is his wife in every respect. We asked: how can that be? After all, he didn’t want her to be his wife if he had to provide her with food, clothing, and conjugal rights; he didn’t want her to be his wife at all. No—he betrothed her in any case, even on the possibility that she would have food, clothing, and conjugal rights. He was just relying on the condition to uproot it if it wasn’t fulfilled. Okay, but he didn’t formulate the condition correctly, so nothing succeeds in uprooting it, and it remains fully in place—she remains fully betrothed to him. What this conception is actually assuming—and Kovetz Shiurim talks about this there in Ketubot, and other later authorities as well—what this conception actually assumes is that the condition, or the non-fulfillment of the condition, uproots the act to which I attached the condition. Say I performed betrothal or divorce conditionally. Then non-fulfillment of the condition brings about a retroactive uprooting of the act of betrothal or the act of divorce, not that it never took effect. It did take effect, and was uprooted—but uprooted retroactively. I want to sharpen that point, because that’s the subject of today’s lecture. Usually the conception—if you remember, I’ll remind you again—I spoke about several mechanisms, or several types of relation, that can exist between future and past, as it were, things that happen backward. The first situation says that nothing works backward at all. Rather, there was simply some information that I lacked, time passed, and the information came to my knowledge. Right? A child was born to me, I was overseas, I came back to Israel, and I discovered it was a boy. He was a boy before too—I just didn’t know. But nothing from the future changed the past, right? In such a case, if I make something depend on an event that will happen tomorrow, then right now even the information doesn’t exist. It’s not like with the boy, where the information existed and I just didn’t know it. Nobody knows it. The information isn’t there. It will only be there tomorrow. But I said: right, in a deterministic situation, in a deterministic situation, someone with enough computational power can know the information about tomorrow. Meaning, if it’s a physical event and the laws of physics are deterministic, then the Holy One, blessed be He, can do the calculation and know whether tomorrow it will rain or not. The fact that we don’t know is just technical. But in principle that information already exists today. It’s just that nobody knows it. That’s the second level. And here too, apparently, nothing is happening backward in time. The third level was the same thing, only when the future event is a human choice. And in human choice, even the Holy One, blessed be He, cannot perform the calculation and know what a person will choose tomorrow. Right? Because it doesn’t depend on things that exist; it’s not deterministically dependent on things that exist today. Therefore, this is information that doesn’t exist today at all. So to make something today depend on something that will happen, on information that will come into being tomorrow—that’s the third level. The fourth level is when the future event is the cause that produces the present state. Not that something depends on it, but that what will happen in the future will generate a result in the present. Right? A causal relation reversed in time. That’s the fourth level. And what I basically want to say is this: usually a condition of “from now”—I said that whoever says *al menat* is like saying “from now.” Meaning, a condition phrased *al menat* is a condition of “from now.” In the standard view—for example, Rabbi Shlomo Fisher in Beit Yishai, that’s the name of his book, section 35, where he discusses the laws and issues of conditions at length—there he understands condition, and this is how it’s usually understood, as retroactive clarification. Meaning, it’s basically one of, let’s say, the first two mechanisms out of the four I described earlier. Like with my son, for example. Okay, a child was born in Israel and I’m in Australia. Now I came to Israel two days later, and it became known to me that it was a boy. Of course he was a boy two days earlier too; I just didn’t know it. So once it became known to me, it became known to me retroactively that when he was born, he was already a boy. Right? And of course there’s nothing paradoxical here; nothing happened backward in time. There was simply information I lacked, and after some time it came to my knowledge. People understand the mechanism of condition in that way. Basically I say this: you are divorced if it rains on Sunday. Fine? So you are divorced, and if not, then not. Now the claim is that before Heaven it is already revealed whether it will rain on Sunday or not. The Holy One, blessed be He, knows this. So the information really already exists today. The only thing is that I, and maybe nobody else either, know it. But that doesn’t matter. Practically speaking, the information exists; the information exists and is true. It’s just that nobody knows it. We wait until Sunday and then we’ll know. That’s all. Meaning, it’s only information that will come to our knowledge, but nothing will happen backward in time. In other words, assuming that on Sunday it really does rain, then the woman is divorced already from today. The fact that we don’t yet know this until Sunday comes is like with the child when I’m in Australia. The information exists, it is known, it’s there—the Holy One, blessed be He, so to speak, knows it; I don’t know it. It’s inaccessible to me. After a few days pass, then I’ll know it too. But this is just a matter of becoming aware of information. There is nothing in the future causally affecting an earlier time, or the present. Okay? Is that clear? That’s the usual conception of condition. Therefore the standard conception, as Rabbi Shlomo Fisher explains, is that the Holy One, blessed be He, knows whether it will rain or not on Sunday.
[Speaker B] But what about the legal status until the date arrives, until that day of the rain? A doubt?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Just a plain doubt.
[Speaker B] How are you supposed to conduct yourself? Say you tell me, “You get my field if in another week it rains.” Meanwhile, am I allowed to go in, take things?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying: a doubt. Laws of doubt. I’m in doubt. How should I act? Every time I don’t know some piece of information, there are laws of doubt in Jewish law. I act according to the laws of doubt.
[Speaker B] So if, say, the week passes and it doesn’t rain, could you then say I stole the fruit from the field? That I robbed it? Yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And therefore you need to take that into account when making decisions, because you may end up violating a prohibition. And that’s exactly the point. That’s why a Torah-level doubt is treated stringently, and a rabbinic-level doubt leniently. Fine, but there are laws of doubt and you have to take them into account. But that’s nothing unusual. There are lots of laws of doubt in the Torah. When I don’t know some information, then I’m in doubt. That’s all. There’s nothing special here. That’s exactly the point—maybe the sharpest formulation of the issue. There is actually nothing genuinely vague in reality itself. There is simply information that I don’t have. That’s all. In a few days I’ll wait and I’ll know it too. But when I know it, I’ll know the reality that was already there. It was there before exactly as it was; I just didn’t know. That’s all. And therefore, in the language of the Talmud, this is called “revealed before Heaven.” Meaning, it is revealed before the Holy One, blessed be He, what the reality will be now. I don’t know it because I’m human; I can’t know it. Okay, but this is just lack of information. That’s the standard conception of conditions. But Rabbi Shimon Shkop argues that this is not the correct conception of conditions. He argues that the correct conception of conditions is the fourth level. The future event generates the present state, causally generates it. Meaning, the cause comes later than the effect. That is the meaning of condition. And that’s why I gave all that introduction: how can one even define this consistently and understand it, with the models and the two time axes? Now here you can see exactly where this can be used, or how it actually comes to expression. As I said there, I don’t know whether in physics one can go backward in time. But even in the legal world—where of course legal constructs are given over to us and we can define them however we want—they still have to be defined in a logically clear way, even if they are only legal and not physical. And without defining it sharply, you can’t use it even as a legal construct. So the definition matters in any case. Now I want to clarify a bit more this idea of causality working backward in time—how exactly that works. Not just… well, I’ll come back to that in a moment after I show you… I’m putting on the screen a passage from the lectures of Rabbi Shmuel Rozovsky on Makkot, section 420. Rabbi Shmuel Rozovsky, as is known, was a student of Rabbi Shimon Shkop, the head of the Ponevezh Yeshiva, yes, he passed away in the 1970s, and he was a student of Rabbi Shimon Shkop. He learned many things from him. And here he explains a principle that was basically founded by Rabbi Shimon Shkop—not only regarding conditions, but also regarding conditions. So let’s read section 420 inside. It says like this: Tosafot in Gittin ask, how can a married woman who committed adultery ever be liable to death? But this is a case of uncertain warning, since perhaps he will send her a divorce document and cancel it, and then the betrothal will be removed retroactively. The rule is that if a person sends an agent to divorce his wife, the agent can divorce her on his behalf. Now after sending an agent, a person can also cancel the agency. He doesn’t want him to be his agent anymore, so he cancels him. Of course, once I’ve canceled him, he can no longer act on my behalf. Fine? Now what happens if I sent an agent overseas to divorce my wife? Let’s say she’s living in Australia. I sent an agent traveling to Australia, gave him the divorce document in hand, and told him: find two witnesses there, deliver the document to her in front of two witnesses, and be my agent to divorce her. Fine, the fellow flies to Australia. Meanwhile, I realize, you know what, I changed my mind. I don’t want to divorce my wife. I ask two witnesses to come, and I cancel the agency in front of those two witnesses. Fine, the agency is canceled. The fellow in Australia obviously knows nothing. The phone is off, airplane mode. He knows nothing. He gets to Australia, and of course the presumption is that an agent carries out his agency. He goes to the woman, delivers the divorce document, and she is divorced. She finds herself a partner and marries. When the whole story is actually a mistake, because I canceled the agency. The divorce is not a divorce, and now when she lives with the second man she is committing adultery, and the children are mamzerim. This creates insane problems. What did the sages do? This appears in the Talmud, this is from the law of the Talmud. The Talmud says that the rabbis removed… The rabbis say: if a person canceled an agent not in the agent’s presence—if it’s in the agent’s presence there’s no problem, because the agent knows—but if you cancel an agent not in his presence, and then the agent goes and carries out his mission, an agent for divorce, then the sages, the moment you canceled the agency, uprooted your betrothal. She is no longer your wife. And then if she marries someone else because she was divorced, nothing happened, because the betrothal is void and she is unmarried, and now she can marry whomever she wants, and the children are not mamzerim, and everything is fine.
[Speaker B] Can you take yourself back again only once in that whole story?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean?
[Speaker B] Say you sent him, then regretted it—can you regret it again? Or once you regretted it, the sages already canceled the betrothal?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s an interesting question. There’s an earlier question even before that, because I never even thought of that one. What happens to the woman if I regretted the regret? Because the question whether you can regret the regret is discussed in a responsum of the Rosh. There is a responsum of the Rosh where he talks about this: if I canceled an agent, can I cancel the cancellation? Cancel the cancellation and return him to being my agent—meaning, return him to being an agent altogether without a new appointment, in other words to renew the agency. Now he says that apparently that can’t be, because after you canceled him, the bond between you and him disappeared, right? So how does he suddenly become your agent again without your appointing him? What does it mean to cancel the cancellation? To create a new agency? The cancellation is not something active. The cancellation simply uprooted the agency, and that’s it. There is nothing there to cancel. If the cancellation were some thing, then one could cancel the cancellation. But cancellation is not some thing; it is the absence of something. You can’t cancel an absence. All you can do is create a new presence. You can appoint the agent again; you can’t cancel the cancellation. So on that, Kovetz Shiurim argues that perhaps maybe you actually can, I don’t know, all kinds of stories of that kind, which presumably assumes that the cancellation is some active act that keeps happening all the time. Meaning, the appointment was actually an appointment that persists constantly, and then in order to cancel it you need constantly to keep canceling. And if so, then maybe if you cancel the cancellation, it will stop continuing to cancel. On that side, you can ask: what would happen to the woman? After all, her betrothal was already canceled the moment I canceled the agency, and now I canceled the cancellation. Does that mean there never was a cancellation, or is it a correction of the state of cancellation? Interesting question, needs thought. In any case, that’s the background to what Rabbi Shmuel is saying here. Now Tosafot asks—really, Tosafot asks that a married woman who committed adultery can never be liable to death. Why? Basically this will always be uncertain warning. You know what uncertain warning is? Uncertain warning is this: someone committed a transgression; in order to make him liable to death or lashes, you need to warn him. Two witnesses come and say: know that this thing is forbidden by the Torah, it is written in this and this verse, and its punishment is such and such. And he has to say: yes, and knowing that, I am doing it. Without that, there is no punishment. Tosafot asks: how can it be that we ever… if there is uncertain warning—meaning, if you don’t know whether the person committed a transgression or not, you only think maybe—uncertain warning is not warning. There is a dispute in the Talmud; in practice we rule that uncertain warning is not warning. Meaning, if the warning was only on the basis of doubt, then one cannot punish the person. Tosafot asks: how can we impose the death penalty on a married woman who committed adultery? Say a married woman committed adultery and we sentence her to death. That is of course only if someone warned her first, right? Two witnesses. But that warning is uncertain warning. Why? Because perhaps the husband would send an agent to divorce her and cancel him not in his presence, and in such a case the sages would uproot the betrothal retroactively. Then it would turn out that she was never a married woman. If she was never a married woman, then what’s the problem with the fact that she committed adultery? There was no prohibition in it at all. Now we, the witnesses, obviously don’t know whether that will happen in the future or not. And since that’s the case, the warning we give the woman is uncertain warning. Maybe she won’t be liable to death? Maybe the act she is doing now is not a transgression? You don’t know. If such a thing happens in the future, then it will turn out that this act was never a transgression. So one can never execute a married woman who committed adultery. It’s always uncertain warning. And Rabbenu Tam answered, in a second answer, that in such a case it is not uncertain warning, because we follow the majority. In most cases a person does not send an agent and cancel him not in his presence, and we follow the majority. And additionally, we maintain her existing presumption, that she is presently married. She has a presumption that she is presently married, and therefore even if in the future it may turn out otherwise, for now we leave her in her presumptive status. For if you don’t say that—if you won’t say that—then a Nazirite who drinks wine and becomes impure, a Nazirite who committed transgressions that a Nazirite is forbidden to commit, drank wine or became impure from the dead, why does he get lashes? How can you lash him? But this is uncertain warning, since perhaps he will ask for annulment of his Nazirite vow. After all, if he goes to a sage and asks, the sage uproots it retroactively, right? Then it turns out that when he drank the wine or became impure, he didn’t commit any transgression at all. So you can’t lash that Nazirite, because after he committed that transgression, he can go to a sage, the sage will uproot the vow—and annulment of a vow, we already spoke about last time, is done retroactively. Okay? So basically it turns out that you can’t lash a Nazirite? And the gaon Rabbi Akiva Eiger commented there in Derush VeChiddush that Tosafot should really have asked even more strongly—that how can we lash him even according to the one who says uncertain warning does count as warning? Tosafot asked: according to the view that uncertain warning is not warning, how can you lash him? Rabbi Akiva Eiger says: leave that aside—even according to the view that uncertain warning is warning, you still can’t lash him. Why? Because perhaps tomorrow he really will ask, and then it will become clear retroactively that it was permitted and he was never liable to lashes at all. Let’s say uncertain warning is perfectly good warning, fine? So the person now is a Nazirite, about to become impure through the dead, and I warn him. I tell him: listen, you’re a Nazirite; a Nazirite is forbidden to become impure through the dead, it is written in this and this verse, and your punishment is lashes. And he says: yes, and knowing that, I am doing it. Fine? Now we know that afterward he can ask to have his Nazirite status annulled, right? And therefore it is uncertain warning. But there is an opinion in the Talmud that even uncertain warning is good, sufficient. Rabbi Akiva Eiger says: but even according to that opinion, it really may be that later he will ask, and if he asks later, then he truly committed no transgression. This has nothing to do with uncertain warning. Even if uncertain warning is valid warning, then the warning is there, but the transgression is not. After all, in order to receive lashes it is not enough that there be warning; there also has to be a transgression. So if uncertain warning counts as warning, then yes, the warning is there—but the transgression is not. After all, if he asks, then it becomes clear retroactively that he was not a Nazirite. If he was not a Nazirite, then what was wrong with his becoming impure through the dead? Okay? And one can answer, says Rabbi Shmuel now, based on what the gaon Rabbi Shimon Shkop explained—yes, his teacher—one can answer based on what the gaon Rabbi Shimon Shkop explained in Sha’arei Yosher, Gate 2, chapter 9, that truly in every sage’s annulment, this is not retroactive clarification that there was never any prohibition at all. Rather, only now is yesterday’s prohibition being permitted—but until now it really was prohibited. What is he saying? Rabbi Shimon Shkop claims this regarding annulment of vows. Usually people understand annulment of vows as one of the first two mechanisms out of the four I mentioned earlier. Meaning, when I go to a sage it becomes clear retroactively that I was never really a Nazirite, only until I got to the sage I didn’t know it. But after I got to the sage, the matter became known to me; still, that’s only retroactive clarification. Okay? Rabbi Shimon Shkop says: not true. A sage’s annulment doesn’t operate through retroactive clarification. A sage’s annulment does not reveal to me information that was already true and I simply didn’t know. The sage’s annulment is the cause that operates and uproots the Nazirite vow retroactively. Even though I go to the sage on Wednesday and I took the Nazirite vow on Sunday, when the sage uproots the Nazirite status on Wednesday, it is uprooted retroactively—from Sunday onward there was no Nazirite status. But he says: that doesn’t mean it became clear to me that I had just been living in error. I thought I was a Nazirite, but really I wasn’t. No, no—the truth is that I was a Nazirite. Only when I got to Wednesday was it uprooted retroactively. It’s not that information that already existed was revealed. The information was created. The information about Sunday was created on Wednesday. That is Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s claim.
[Speaker B] Can you sharpen that? It sounds a little illogical.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, so that’s our goal—that’s what I’m going to talk about today. I’ll sharpen it; that’s what the lecture is devoted to, to sharpen this. So let’s see. And as brought in the Rosh, chapter 6 of Nedarim, section 3, in the name of the Jerusalem Talmud, which asks: how do we count the prohibition of a vow as “something that has a way to become permitted,” given that the sage uproots the vow retroactively and it turns out there was never any prohibition at all, so there is no permission of a prior prohibition here? There is a law called “something that has a way to become permitted.” What does that mean? A rabbinic prohibition. A temporary prohibition. For example, a rabbinic prohibition on the Sabbath—something set aside on the Sabbath, okay? Now I have a doubt whether a certain thing is set aside. A rabbinic-level doubt is treated leniently in principle, although regarding doubt about something set aside there is a debate. But in general, a rabbinic-level doubt is treated leniently. But after the Sabbath, the thing stops being set aside, right? And then of course I can use it. The Talmud says: if it is something that has a way to become permitted—meaning, there will come a time when it will become permitted—then in a case of doubt, even a rabbinic-level doubt, one must be strict. Why? Because instead of eating it in a prohibited manner, eat it in a permitted manner. Why rely now on the leniency for a rabbinic-level doubt? Wait until after the Sabbath and use it with full permission. If it’s something forbidden forever and only doubtful, then in a case of doubt we tell you that you may be lenient. But here you have a solution that doesn’t require leniency in doubt. Wait until after the Sabbath and use it with no problem. Fine? So therefore in a case of something that has a way to become permitted, we are stringent even in a rabbinic-level doubt. And the same applies regarding nullification in a majority. When there is nullification in a majority, if it is something that has a way to become permitted, then it is not nullified in the majority. Wait until after the Sabbath, or whenever it is, and then eat it without needing the mechanism of nullification in the majority. That is the law of something that has a way to become permitted. Now the Talmud in Nedarim says that a vow is called something that has a way to become permitted. Why? Because you can go to a sage to ask about the vow. Usually, “something that has a way to become permitted” means something forbidden for a certain period—food on Yom Kippur, or something set aside on the Sabbath, or leavened food on Passover, or things like that—where it is a temporary prohibition until some time arrives when it becomes permitted. A vow is not exactly like that. In principle, a vow is a permanent prohibition, right? Only if I go to a sage can he uproot it. And the Talmud says that this is enough to define a vow as a prohibition that “has a way to become permitted,” something that has a way to become permitted. That’s what the Talmud says. The Jerusalem Talmud asks: how can that be? After all, when the sage uproots the vow, he uproots it retroactively. Say I vowed Nazirite status on Sunday, as I said before, and I went to a sage on Wednesday and he uprooted the vow. The vow was not uprooted on Wednesday; the vow was uprooted as though I had never vowed at all. I was never a Nazirite. So this is not something that has a way to become permitted. Something that has a way to become permitted is something that is forbidden for a fixed period, and then a certain time comes from which onward the prohibition dissolves and it is permitted. Here this is not something that has a way to become permitted. If I go to a sage, then it was never forbidden. If I don’t go to a sage, then it is forbidden forever. That is not something that has a way to become permitted in the sense that it is forbidden but only for a limited period. So what does this have to do with something that has a way to become permitted? That is the Jerusalem Talmud’s question. And it answers: “He uproots it only from now on.” Meaning, the main uprooting—yes, the nullification—is from now on, because it was forbidden until now. And even though he uproots it from its root, nevertheless it was forbidden until today; therefore it is considered something that has a way to become permitted. End quote. So what is he saying? Apparently he’s saying two contradictory things, right? He is basically saying that the vow was forbidden until one reaches the sage. But when I got to the sage and he uprooted the vow, he uprooted it retroactively. But since until I got to the sage it was forbidden, even though it was uprooted retroactively, this is called something that has a way to become permitted. What? I don’t understand. If the sage uproots it retroactively, then it was never forbidden. If it is forbidden until the stage of the sage, then it is already forbidden forever. How does it become something that has a way to become permitted? What does the Jerusalem Talmud mean to say? And it is explicitly clear, says Rabbi Shmuel, that only now is the prohibition being permitted retroactively. What is he saying? This is not retroactive clarification. We understand vow, like condition, like everything else—people usually understand it as a mechanism of retroactive clarification. What does that mean? You go to a sage and then a fact becomes clear to you that was always true—you just didn’t know it. Like my son who was born and I came back to Israel, the first mechanism. Basically, the information already existed, you didn’t know it, you came to the sage and it became known to you. But now what has become known to you is the status that was always correct. What was until now did not change. The only thing that changed was your knowledge of the situation, not the situation itself. That is how people usually understand it. Rabbi Shimon says: not true. A sage’s annulment is not retroactive clarification. Rather, this is what in the yeshivot they call “from now on, retroactively.” “From now on, retroactively.” What he writes here—“only now is the prohibition being permitted retroactively.” What does that mean? It was forbidden until I reached the sage—truly forbidden. Not that it was permitted and I just didn’t know. It was truly forbidden. And after I reached the sage, he uproots it retroactively. So now I ask you: say I vowed on Sunday, and on Wednesday the sage uprooted it for me. What was the status on Tuesday? Was it forbidden or permitted? Until now—
[Speaker C] It was forbidden.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It was forbidden. But on the other hand, the sage uprooted it retroactively. So what is the meaning of the fact that he uprooted it retroactively?
[Speaker C] This reminds me, in a certain way—sorry—of the mechanism of partnership. Some say a partnership is fifty-fifty. Some say you’re a partner in each and every part. So in some way it reminds me of that. If you’re a partner in each and every part, it resembles this reality a bit.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I don’t see the connection. There is an indirect connection that maybe we’ll get to when we get to the topic of retroactive clarification next time. But let’s come back here for a moment. His claim is as follows, and this is exactly the model of going back in time that I talked about. I ask you: what is the status of this person on Tuesday? A reminder: on Sunday he took a Nazirite vow. On Wednesday he went to a sage who uprooted it retroactively. Now I’m asking: what was this person’s status on Tuesday? The answer is—the answer is—it depends from what point in time you’re looking at Tuesday. Right.
[Speaker D] If from Wednesday, then on Tuesday he was…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] When you’re standing on Tuesday itself, then he is forbidden. When you’re standing on Thursday and looking from there at Tuesday, and you ask what was on Tuesday—the answer is: permitted. Meaning, this is a mechanism that rewrites history. History was one way—Stalin’s dream, right? History was one way, then you arrive at some future event, and history gets painted in a different color. In other words, when I ask the question what the law is at t = 3—Tuesday—the answer is: you can’t answer me. You also have to give me tau. Remember t and tau? You also have to give me the time from which I’m looking at the course of time, not just the time itself. You have to tell me the point in time from which you’re observing Tuesday. Are you observing Tuesday on Tuesday itself? Or are you observing Tuesday from the perspective of Wednesday or Thursday? That’s a different answer. Or, in other words, the answer is a function of two time axes and not one. You have to give me the time axis being discussed—that’s Tuesday, t = 3—and the time axis from which I’m looking at t = 3. Tau = 5 is Thursday, or tau also equals 3, which is Tuesday. And what comes out of this, basically, is that we have here a function that depends on two time axes. And t = 3, tau = 3 gives a different answer than t = 3, tau = 5. Even though it’s the same t. Since tau is different, the answer is different. And that’s exactly what Rabbi Shimon Shkop writes. I’m saying that without a doubling of time axes, you can’t define this consistently. It’s undefined. On Tuesday there are two opposite legal statuses simultaneously. How can that be? Okay? This is what’s called from-now-on retroactively. I’ll show you later what the practical differences are, and then you’ll understand. But he’s already saying it here. Look at the continuation. Mine gets stuck on me sometimes—it does this to me too much.
[Speaker D] Wait, so I understand regarding the Nazirite, for example. If the Nazirite sinned on Tuesday, committed that offense that carries lashes on Tuesday, and he comes to the religious court on Thursday after they released him from the vow—what would happen?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They would not give him lashes. They would not give him lashes. That’s what I’m saying now—that’s what we’re about to read now. Look at the lower highlighted section; I can’t get rid of the upper one. “From this it follows that when they give him lashes, he is indeed liable under the law, because so long as he has not inquired”—meaning, he didn’t go to a sage and inquire about the vow—“he remains under the prohibition. And only if he inquires before he is flogged, then we no longer flog him. And that is because from now on we judge him as permitted retroactively. But if he was flogged earlier, he was flogged lawfully.” Do you hear what he’s saying? He’s saying this: if a person was flogged on Tuesday—the Nazirite vowed on Sunday, took a Nazirite vow. On Tuesday he became impure through a corpse. On Wednesday he went to a sage who released the vow retroactively. Now the religious court is debating whether to flog him. It depends when the court sits. If the court sits on Tuesday, immediately after he violated the prohibition, the court can flog him and he truly deserves it. Even when we look back on that from Thursday, we won’t say the court acted improperly. It acted properly, because from its point of view the person really was liable to lashes. But suppose the court didn’t get around to convening, and he went to the sage who released him on Wednesday. On Thursday the religious court sits, witnesses come and say: so-and-so became impure through the dead; he was a Nazirite and became impure through the dead. He says: what are you talking about? I went to a sage who released my vow on Wednesday. The religious court of Thursday will not flog him. Why? Because from Thursday’s point of view, on Tuesday he was already not a Nazirite, because the sage uprooted the vow retroactively. There’s your practical difference. Meaning, if I flog him on Tuesday, I can flog him. But if I have to flog him on Thursday, then no. By Thursday, history has already been painted a different color.
[Speaker D] And that’s what they objected to—that there is here a concept of truth for its own time.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, exactly. “And that is what they objected to: that this should be a doubtful warning, for perhaps he will inquire about his Nazirite vow before the lashes, and then he will not be flogged.” That’s the objection from which he started—Rav Shmuel above. Right: how can you flog a Nazirite who violates his Nazirite status? It’s a doubtful warning. He says: no. On the possibility that he asks about his Nazirite vow before the lashes, then indeed he won’t be flogged. But if he asks about it after the lashes, that has nothing to do with it—the lashes were given as they were given.
[Speaker C] So the sage is actually changing reality?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. Not revealing that reality had been different, but turning it into something else. But what is more interesting is that he changes it backward in time. The sage’s action uproots a state of affairs—or creates a different state of affairs—retroactively. Okay? That’s the great novelty here in Rabbi Shimon Shkop.
[Speaker C] But why is that a novelty? Because that’s basically the plain meaning of this whole story of a sage’s retroactive uprooting. What? I mean, is that not the accepted view?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. The accepted understanding is that it is a matter becoming clarified retroactively. That when a sage uproots it, it turns out that it was always permitted, that he never actually vowed. According to all the medieval authorities and later authorities I know, everyone who discusses this says you can’t flog him until he goes to a sage.
[Speaker C] But a matter becoming clarified retroactively and what the sage does in practice—isn’t that basically the same thing? No!
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because you can’t flog him on Tuesday,
[Speaker C] because he’s actually changing reality. So it’s a matter becoming clarified retroactively in that he does…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you’re saying two contradictory things in the same sentence. Changing reality backward is not a matter becoming clarified retroactively; those are two different things. Changing reality backward means: reality until now was as we really understood it, and from now on it changes retroactively. A matter becoming clarified retroactively means that reality was different from what we thought—we were simply living in error, and now the true reality has become known to us. Like the first mechanism versus the fourth mechanism out of the four I mentioned. That’s exactly the difference.
[Speaker D] And in fact reality was, on Tuesday…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And the practical difference will be what happens if I want to flog him on Tuesday after he became impure through a corpse. According to most of the medieval authorities and later authorities, you can’t flog him. Why? Because if he inquires on Wednesday, it turns out he was never a Nazirite. How can you flog someone who isn’t a Nazirite for becoming impure? The fact that you lived in error is your problem, but the truth is that he wasn’t a Nazirite. Rabbi Shimon Shkop says not so. The truth is that he was a Nazirite, only that this truth was true for its time, and it changed on Wednesday backward in time. Therefore, you could have flogged him on Tuesday. That’s what Rav Shmuel—or Rabbi Shimon Shkop—is claiming, yes. Okay? Now let’s return to the issue of conditions. Basically, Rabbi Shimon Shkop claims the same thing regarding conditions. Look, I’m bringing his novellae on section 1 of tractate Ketubot. After saying this about conditions, he says: “Even though in every other place we do not find some cause acting in an earlier time”—that is, we don’t find a cause acting at a time preceding it—“nevertheless, since we also find this in the laws of the Torah, that things of the present act upon the past—for in the case of inquiring about vows, certainly one cannot say that asking a sage reveals that it had already been so, and that the inquiry is merely a sign to reveal what had already existed, like signs of thirty days in a person and eight days in an animal. Rather, this is the law of the Torah: that after the inquiry we treat the prior state as though it had not been a vow. Even though in truth the inquiry acts upon it, and it is the primary cause that brings about this law.” The inquiry causes this law; it doesn’t reveal that this was already the law. Rather, the inquiry changes reality. That’s what Rabbi Shimon Shkop is saying here. “And similarly we find regarding the halitzah of a pregnant woman,” etc. We won’t get into all those issues and their roots right now, but for our purposes what matters is the end. “So too shall we say concerning conditions: that when a person stipulates—and we learn this matter from the sons of Gad and the sons of Reuven—it is within a person’s power to do this, such that the legal effect of the divorce bill remains suspended and dependent.” Okay? Meaning, his claim is that in the laws of conditions, the mechanism is from-now-on retroactively and not a matter becoming clarified retroactively. Let me remind you again of what we saw in the words of Ri in Tosafot in Ketubot. That’s exactly what Ri is really claiming. When I divorce a woman or betroth a woman on a condition of “provided that,” of “from now.” Suppose I betroth a woman on condition that it rain tomorrow. Sorry. On condition that it rain tomorrow. Okay? The accepted view is that tomorrow’s rain reveals that the woman was already betrothed from today. Right? I just didn’t know it until tomorrow came and I saw that it was raining, but in principle that was the situation. I just didn’t know it; before Heaven it was already known—God knew it. Ri argues not that way. Ri argues that the woman is betrothed in any case, only if it does not rain, the betrothal will be uprooted retroactively. Uprooted retroactively. Exactly what Rabbi Shimon Shkop is saying here. By the way, Ri’s words are one of the examples on which he bases his view. He says that in Ri we see that the mechanism of a condition is not a matter becoming clarified retroactively, but from-now-on retroactively. That’s his claim. And that’s exactly what Ri says. That’s Ri’s novelty—this is how he resolves the difficulty. The difficulty of how the betrothal takes effect if it includes food, clothing, and conjugal rights—after all, he didn’t want her as his wife. The answer is no: he wanted her in any case; he just wanted the condition to uproot the betrothal if it wasn’t fulfilled. But you didn’t formulate the condition properly, so the condition doesn’t succeed in uprooting it; you remain with the woman and you’re obligated in food, clothing, and conjugal rights.
[Speaker D] Meaning, in order to activate mechanism number four, you need to make a condition like that of the sons of Gad and the sons of Reuven.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Exactly. That’s why you need the formal rules of conditions. You need the formal rules of conditions because without that, it would just be speech, and speech can’t uproot an action. According to the other commentators, it’s not clear why you need the formal rules of conditions. After all, the speech doesn’t uproot anything; it just says that it was never there in the first place, I just didn’t know it, and now it’s been revealed to me. That’s all. But it didn’t uproot anything. According to Rabbi Shimon Shkop, there is uprooting here. For speech to be able to uproot, it has to be strong speech. Only speech formulated like the formal rules of conditions that we learned from the sons of Gad—only such speech has the power to uproot an act. Now Rabbi Shimon Shkop says, and according to this—in the continuation of that same passage—when he made a condition in a divorce bill, both sides remain pending and dependent on the future case. And the future case causes the law for each of the two sides. Now he says something else, even stronger. He claims that if, for example, I betrothed a woman on condition that it rain tomorrow, and if it doesn’t rain then she isn’t betrothed, Rabbi Shimon Shkop says: until now we understood, like Ri, that what? That the betrothal takes effect in any case; the condition uproots, it doesn’t suspend. Remember I said this in the previous class. Meaning, the betrothal takes effect in any case, only if the condition isn’t fulfilled then it will be uprooted—provided I formulated the condition properly. Rabbi Shimon Shkop says even that formulation isn’t precise. What we really have to say is that both sides remain pending. The woman is both betrothed and not betrothed. And if it rains or doesn’t rain tomorrow, that will decide which of the two options we choose retroactively. It’s not that she’s betrothed and the condition will uproot it, or that she isn’t betrothed and the condition will effect it. Both sides are true. The woman is both betrothed and not betrothed, and the future condition is what will determine which of these two options is the correct one retroactively. That’s really like the interpretation of parallel universes in quantum theory. It’s exactly the same thing.
[Speaker C] If someone in the meantime betrothed her, what would happen? Again—if someone betrothed her in the meantime?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll see in a moment. We’ll see in a moment. We’ll see in a moment. So that’s Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s claim, and maybe let’s continue for a second. “Even though at first glance, how can it be that both sides need a cause? For whichever way you look at it, if the side of cancellation needs a cause that comes later, then the other side doesn’t need one.” Indeed, right? He’s saying: decide. Is she now betrothed or not? If she is betrothed, then all you need is cancellation; you don’t need to effect it, because you’ve already effected it. Only if the condition isn’t fulfilled is there cancellation. If she isn’t betrothed, then the future condition will betroth her, but you don’t need to cancel the betrothal because she isn’t betrothed. How can it be that both sides remain pending—not just one side pending and one side already existing? So he says: “Indeed, since the side of cancellation is possible, therefore the side of fulfillment also remains pending. Since the act of the divorce bill is not sufficient for the legal effect of the divorce bill except with the joining of there not being a side of cancellation, therefore even the side of fulfillment of the divorce bill is considered as though it still lacks a cause that sustains it.”
[Speaker D] So now, if someone betroths her—what? If someone betroths her, then according to this does the betrothal take hold?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, we’ll get to that in a moment. Now, I want to sharpen a bit more the meaning of this strange mechanism of from-now-on retroactively, and after that explain the statement he makes here that both sides exist. So let’s start with from-now-on retroactively. If you remember, in the introductions I brought you Rabbi Shem Tov Gefen’s explanation of the question of the world’s antiquity. Right, that our tradition says the world has existed less than six thousand years, while scientifically people arrive at the conclusion that it has existed for billions—fourteen billion or something like that—years. So Rabbi Shem Tov Gefen proposed a solution. He says: since space and time are only forms of our perception, not things that exist in objective reality, as Kant argued—and I said that the Talmudic passages imply not so, but that’s how he explains it—then before man was created, there was no time. Because time is only a human form of perception. If there are no human beings, there is no time. It’s not that time exists in the world and none of us perceives it. As long as there is no one to perceive it, there is no time. Time is a subjective category; it is only a form of human perception; it doesn’t exist in the world itself. Therefore, he argues, there is no question of how long the world existed before man was created. Before man was created, there was no time. The concept of “before” doesn’t apply when man doesn’t exist, because it is a temporal concept. There is no time before man was created. Okay? That’s his claim. And I said that I don’t agree with what he says. Why? Granted, it’s true that there was no time before man was created. But after man was created, and he already has temporal perception—these glasses of the time axis—he can also look back at history and ask: how many years ago did such-and-such happen? Right? I asked: can’t I ask on what date my grandfather was born? In order to ask that question, do I have to believe in objective time? No. Even if time is only my form of perception, now I am looking with that form of perception at the past and asking myself when my grandfather was born, even though I didn’t yet exist then and my time axis also didn’t yet exist then. Doesn’t matter. But now that it exists, it also goes backward into time, and I can ask when my grandfather was born. Okay? What does that really mean? That’s the mistake—Shem Tov Gefen thought that if time is created now, then you can only speak from now onward. According to his view, I can’t ask when my grandfather was born. That sounds strange. So I say: where is he mistaken? He didn’t understand the idea of from-now-on retroactively. Because what am I saying? True, before man there was no time, but after man is created and the time axis is created, then it is created all the way back to minus infinity—or at least to the Big Bang. And now I can also look at the past in terms of time. But true, I can do that only if my point of view is after I was born. Because before I was born there is no time. But after I was born, and there already is time, I am allowed to look also at events that happened before I was born. Do you see the resemblance to from-now-on retroactively? It’s the same thing. Meaning, when I ask a question about a certain time, in order to answer it I need two pieces of data, not one. A: what time is the question about? B: from what point in time am I asking the question? From where am I observing that time the question is about? And I keep showing you this from every angle, and it’s the same idea. Okay? That’s the idea of from-now-on retroactively. Now one more thing before I continue. How can it be that the woman is both divorced and not divorced, or both betrothed and not betrothed, simultaneously until the condition is fulfilled? That’s what he said in the last passage I read. So let me tell you an anecdote. I wrote an article about this, one of the first articles I wrote, in Tzohar 2. There I discussed the question: what is a legal effect? What is this thing called legal effect? Legal effect of ownership, legal effect of betrothal—what is this concept? So I said this. It started with some incident in a class in the yeshiva in Yeruham, the hesder yeshiva in Yeruham. So I told them this point of Rabbi Shimon Shkop about conditions, and I said to them that a woman who was divorced conditionally, for example—until the stage at which it becomes clear whether the condition was fulfilled or not—she is both divorced and a married woman at the same time. The people there stopped me and said, just a second. What do you mean, both a married woman and divorced at the same time? If she is divorced then she isn’t a married woman; if she is a married woman then she isn’t divorced. That’s a contradiction. What is this, a circular triangle? Is the triangle both a triangle and a circle? What does that mean? If she is divorced then she isn’t a married woman, and if she is a married woman then she isn’t divorced. What do you mean that she is both divorced and a married woman? How can there be such a situation as Rabbi Shimon describes here, where two contradictory states exist in the same object simultaneously? There can’t be such a thing. So I stopped for a second. It was a little embarrassing, because I had said it as though, from my point of view, it was obvious. What’s the problem? She’s divorced and also a married woman, and I thought I’d just keep going. What’s the problem? Suddenly they stop me: just a second, you’re uttering oxymoronic contradictions, internal contradictions.
[Speaker D] It’s obvious. Yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And one of the things that bothered me most was: how could it be that it didn’t bother me? To just say logical contradictions—that’s strange. In short, I thought for a moment, and then the penny dropped that… quantum mechanics? Well yes and no, but quantum mechanics comes later—we can get into that—but you don’t need quantum mechanics for this. My claim is basically the following claim. Once I asked a friend of mine—I have a good friend—whether he knew of anything that has no opposite. We like to philosophize together. So he told me, of course, there are lots of things: a bird, a cloud, a table, almost anything. What, are there not plenty of things that have no opposite? And I didn’t understand, because I had thought about this beforehand and couldn’t find anything that has no opposite. I didn’t understand how suddenly he was producing so many things with no opposite. Until I understood that I had been thinking about properties, and he had given me objects. Every property has an opposite, but objects don’t have opposites. There is no opposite of an object. There is an opposite of a property. Right? For example, salty is the opposite of sweet, but salt is not the opposite of sugar. Salt and sugar are just two things; they are not opposites. They have opposite properties. Oppositeness is a relation between properties or characteristics, descriptions. It is not a relation between objects. One object is not the opposite of another object. There is no relation of oppositeness between objects. Okay? Now let’s return to our issue. When I say that a woman is both a married woman and divorced, if I understand that as two characteristics of the woman, you can’t say such a thing, because those are contradictory characteristics. There is a contradiction between those two characteristics, and as noted, contradiction or oppositeness is a relation between characteristics. Something cannot be both salty and sweet. But it certainly can be that in a dish there is both salt and sugar, right? No problem whatsoever. You can’t say that the dish is both salty and sweet, but you certainly can say that it contains both salt and sugar. Okay? I claim that when Rabbi Shimon Shkop here says that the woman is both divorced and a married woman, or both betrothed and single—if you betrothed her conditionally or divorced her conditionally—he doesn’t mean to speak about her legal status. He means that two legal effects apply to her. The legal effect of being a married woman and the legal effect of being divorced. Two legal effects. Now, legal effects are entities. They are not attributes. That was my claim there in the article. And therefore there is no problem at all. It’s like saying that in the dish there is both salt and sugar. There is no problem at all saying such a thing. I cannot say that a woman is both a married woman and divorced, but I can say that two legal effects apply to her: the legal effect of a married woman and the legal effect of a divorced woman. In this dish there is both salt and sugar. Now of course I can ask myself: okay, and what is the taste of this dish? Will it be salty or sweet? It can’t be both—at least not both fully. It can’t be fully salty and at the same time also fully sweet. It can be something in between, a little salty, a little sweet, something like that. Okay? So in terms of characteristics, clearly a decision has to be made. Both cannot stand. They are contradictory characteristics. But in terms of entities, there is no problem putting entities with contradictory properties in the same place. And therefore, just as there can be both salt and sugar in the same dish, there can be both the legal effect of a married woman and the legal effect of a divorced woman on the same woman at the same time. The big question that arises is: what will be her halakhic status?
[Speaker C] How do we understand this brain-twister—what does “legal effect” mean? Two legal effects on the same woman?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How do I understand it? When I say that I own a certain object—usually in the legal world people understand that to mean I have certain rights in the object. And others, for example, are forbidden to take the object without my permission. Okay? I claim that the legal consequences are consequences of the concept of ownership; they are not the concept of ownership itself. The concept of ownership itself is a metaphysical bond that exists between me and the object. The result of that metaphysical bond is that I have rights in the thing.
[Speaker D] A legal effect—how do you define a legal effect, then?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I say: the legal effect of ownership means that there is a metaphysical connection between me and the object. My ownership legally applies to the object. The legal consequences—that I am permitted to use it and others are forbidden to use it without permission—those are consequences. But the concept of ownership itself is not the consequences. It is the metaphysical state from which the consequences derive. My claim is that the halakhic world, halakhic law, deals with reality. Not with personal obligations—what a person is permitted or forbidden to do. Those are derivatives of reality. First of all we have to determine what the state of reality is. So now I determine that the legal effect of my ownership applies to the object. There are many consequences to this: that you are forbidden to use it without my permission, that I am permitted to use it—but all of those are consequences. Those are consequences of the state that the legal effect of ownership exists. For example—wait, wait, one second—before two legal effects, let’s first understand one legal effect, then we’ll move to two.
[Speaker C] So—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now I’m saying this. For example, there can be a situation in which my legal ownership applies to an object without the consequences. Here’s the practical difference. Let’s say an object that I declared ownerless. Okay? But I didn’t declare it fully ownerless—I didn’t sever the bond between me and it. Rather, I renounced all the rights I have in the object. There’s an example of this: a slave whose deed of manumission is being delayed. So I abandoned him; he doesn’t belong to me in the sense that I have no rights over him. But he still isn’t Jewish until he receives from me a deed of manumission; the abandonment itself doesn’t make him Jewish. So in fact he is considered my slave even though I have no rights to use him. He doesn’t belong to me in any practical sense; I’ve abandoned the rights, but he is still considered my property, my slave. And this has practical consequences. For example, if someone injures him, he has to pay me, even though I lost nothing because in any case I can’t use him. So why should he pay me? In that article I argued, and showed it there, that he pays me because I am the owner. Not because the rights are mine—I have no rights here. Here I have only a metaphysical bond of ownership without the rights that usually accompany that metaphysical bond. But the metaphysical bond itself has practical consequences. For example, an animal that belongs to me has to rest on the Sabbath—that’s called the resting of one’s animal. And this has nothing at all to do with my rights of use in the animal. The very fact that it has a metaphysical bond to me—that it is my animal—means it has to keep the Sabbath, or I have to ensure that it keeps the Sabbath. Okay? Meaning, there are consequences to the fact that an object is owned by me that are not legal consequences in the sense of my right to use it or someone else’s lack of right—robbery, damages, things like that. I’m talking about consequences of the metaphysical state itself. That is what I call legal effect.
[Speaker C] A legal effect—half slave, half…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] …free man could come in here—over there that’s something a bit different, because that’s half a legal effect, not two legal effects.
[Speaker C] A free man is not a legal effect, it’s the absence of legal effect. Two legal effects applying to the same person?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—but with respect to himself, that’s not a legal effect, it’s the absence of legal effect. No one has ownership over him, so there is no legal effect. That’s why I say here it’s a combination of half a legal effect. I’m talking about two different legal effects, not half a legal effect. Two legal effects—for example, a slave who belongs to two masters—that is perhaps closer to two legal effects. Depends how you define partnership; someone mentioned partnership earlier, and here that could enter in. You mentioned it. Wait, but I want to come back to us. So do you understand the principle of the distinction between the legal effect itself and its legal derivatives? Now my claim is that if legal effect is a kind of object—think of it as some sort of backpack that this object carries on its back, the legal effect—then if my ownership applies to the object, it’s as though it carries a backpack marking that it is owned by me. The consequences are that others are forbidden to use it, and so on. Same with a woman to whom the legal effect of being a married woman applies. So she carries a backpack on her back saying, as it were, that she belongs—that she is my wife, okay? The consequences are consequences of that fact. Now I say there is no impediment whatsoever to a woman carrying two backpacks on her back: a backpack of the legal effect of being a married woman and a backpack of the legal effect of being divorced. The question of what her legal status will be—that’s a different question; we’ll talk about it in a moment. But there is no impediment, no contradiction, in her having both the legal effect of a married woman and the legal effect of a divorced woman on her back. No problem at all. Because legal effects are entities and not properties. That was essentially the message of my article there. My claim is that a legal effect is an entity, not a property. Therefore there is no impediment to there being—what?
[Speaker B] What exactly does that mean?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It means that this woman can have two backpacks on her at the same time: a backpack that she is a married woman and a backpack that she is divorced. Now I ask myself: what laws apply to her? Because that already means: is it salty or sweet—not whether there is both salt and sugar here, okay? Here there can’t be two laws. She won’t have both the law of a divorced woman and the law of a married woman. Rather what? Rabbi Shimon defines it as doubt, but actually that’s misleading, it’s not the right expression. It’s not doubt; it’s both-and. Therefore, if I ask whether she is permitted to marry a kohen, the answer is no. Why? Because she has a side that she is divorced. Right? From the side of being divorced, she is forbidden to marry a kohen. If I ask whether she is a married woman, then is anyone allowed to have relations with her? The answer is no. Because from the side of her being a married woman, she is married to the first man; no one else may have relations with her. For each question, only one of the backpacks will determine the answer. Both are on her back.
[Speaker B] Who is this first man?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Her husband who divorced her conditionally. Her husband divorced her conditionally, and now until the condition is either fulfilled or not fulfilled, she is both divorced and his wife. Now someone wants to have relations with her. She is also his wife, so from the side of her being his wife no one may have relations with her. This is not because of doubt; it is certain. It’s not that she is doubtfully a married woman and doubtfully divorced. She is both a married woman and divorced. So from the side of the married-woman aspect in her, no one may have relations with her. Suppose now that I died. Now the question is whether she is a widow or a divorcée. If she was married to me and I died, she’s a widow. If she was divorced and I died, she remains divorced. The practical difference is regarding an ordinary kohen, right? An ordinary kohen may marry a widow but may not marry a divorcée. Is she permitted to marry him or not? From the side of the divorced aspect in her, she is forbidden to marry him. Now there is no contradiction, because I say: after all, the very existence of two backpacks on her shoulders is not contradictory. Right? My whole problem was only that there cannot be two opposite laws. There are not two opposite laws. For each question you ask, one of the backpacks, one of the legal effects, will determine the answer to that question. There will never be a clash between the two backpacks. Therefore there is no contradiction at all, and one can say such a thing. This is the status that Rabbi Shimon Shkop says applies to a woman divorced conditionally until the condition is either fulfilled or nullified: that she is both a married woman and divorced. Meaning: two backpacks apply to her. Once the condition is either fulfilled or not fulfilled, one of the backpacks is thrown away and the other remains. Exactly like quantum collapse. I don’t want to get into that, but it’s exactly the same thing for those who know it. Now look at how many interesting implications Rabbi Shimon Shkop brings to prove his view. Rabbi Shimon—and this he does in his treatise on conditions, a treatise that appears at the end of his novellae to tractate Gittin, a long treatise dealing with conditions. The first example is the view of the Savoraic Rabbis. A man gave his wife a bill of divorce on condition that she never drink wine her whole life. If she ever drinks wine, the divorce is void retroactively. Okay? Fine. So he gave her this divorce bill on Sunday, on condition that she not drink wine all her life. That husband dies of a broken heart on Monday. Okay? Is she allowed to drink wine on Tuesday?
[Speaker D] On the side that she was married, then she became a widow.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If she drinks wine, then it turns out retroactively that she wasn’t divorced, right?
[Speaker D] Yes, that she was married, and as a widow she can.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m saying that it will turn out retroactively that the divorce bill wasn’t a divorce if she drinks wine, right? Right. Now let’s suppose maybe I omitted something, to sharpen this more. On Sunday she was divorced, on Monday she married someone else—she didn’t observe the three months of waiting—and on Tuesday the first husband died. On Wednesday she is considering whether to drink wine. Now if she drinks wine, then it will turn out retroactively that the divorce didn’t take effect.
[Speaker D] Then she becomes—and then—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then her second husband committed adultery with her, a forbidden sexual act, a capital offense. Right? This is basically adultery, because she is still married to the first one. If she drinks wine, then there was no divorce, the first divorce is void, she is the first man’s wife, her marriage to the second was sinful, and she has committed very severe transgressions there. Exactly. The Savoraic Rabbis say: if the first husband died, she may drink wine.
[Speaker C] Yes, of course—there’s no one to… Why? What do you mean, of course?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The simple view is that there is no permission at all to drink wine. If she drinks wine, it will turn out retroactively that she was not divorced on Sunday, right?
[Speaker C] So what if the husband died?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, what difference does that make?
[Speaker C] That isn’t—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Relevant if he is still alive. On Sunday when he divorced her, he was still alive, and he made it conditional on her not drinking wine. Now she drank wine, so the divorce is void, right? It will turn out retroactively that the divorce is void. Okay? So now she married the second man on Monday, so she is an adulteress. What do I care that on Tuesday the first husband died? What difference does that make? On Monday he was still alive, and she committed adultery with the second man. So how can she be permitted to drink wine?
[Speaker D] The question is from which day you look at it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So Rabbi Shimon Shkop says: you can’t explain the Savoraic Rabbis’ view—which Rabbi Akiva Eiger has two long responsa about—if we understand condition as a mechanism of a matter becoming clarified retroactively. Because if it is a matter becoming clarified retroactively, then even if she drinks on Wednesday after the husband has died, it will still turn out retroactively that on Sunday there was no divorce. Right. But if I understand that her drinking the wine is the causal factor that uproots the divorce of Sunday, then after the husband dies you can no longer uproot the divorce of Sunday. It is no longer relevant. That’s it, exactly. And therefore she can drink the wine. But that is only if we understand the—yes—but that is only if we understand the condition in the way Rabbi Shimon Shkop says, as from-now-on retroactively. Because if we understand it as a matter becoming clarified retroactively, then it makes absolutely no difference. If she drinks wine, then it will turn out that she was never divorced, and also… yes, then it will turn out that she was never divorced. That’s all. The fact that we didn’t know it—so what? But that was always the true reality. Therefore Rabbi Shimon says: no, she was completely divorced on Tuesday. Only you want her drinking on Wednesday to uproot the divorce. You can’t uproot the divorce once the divorcing husband has already died. Right. Therefore she can drink the wine. That is clear proof, says Rabbi Shimon Shkop, for his approach. Another proof—look, an even clearer one. Maimonides in chapter 9 of the laws of divorce discusses a case where a man gave his wife a divorce bill on condition that he not return within twelve months. Right, this is a kind of divorce intended to exempt her from levirate marriage. So he says: if I do not return within twelve months, you are divorced from now. Because if it isn’t from now, then it could be—there is no divorce after death. So it has to be from now. So: if I do not return within twelve months, you are divorced from now. Okay? Good. Now the fellow dies after two months. Am I, some other man, permitted to marry this woman?
[Speaker D] No! According to Maimonides, no, that I know.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maimonides says no. Correct. Maimonides says you have to wait until the year passes and only then it is permitted to marry her. Now notice.
[Speaker D] According to the view—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of a matter becoming clarified retroactively, this is completely incomprehensible. Because according to the view of a matter becoming clarified retroactively, why do we have to wait a year? We have to wait a year only in order to verify that the husband won’t come. But I know he won’t come—he died. Why do I have to wait a year? In this case I already know the information now. He won’t come. He died. Okay? So what’s the problem? So Rabbi Shimon Shkop says: exactly, because the mechanism of a condition is not a matter becoming clarified retroactively. The mechanism of a condition is from-now-on retroactively. What does that mean? The non-arrival of the husband in Maimonides’ case is what generates the divorce. True, it takes effect retroactively, but as long as the event that generates it hasn’t occurred, there is no divorce. Now if the husband dies after two months… what is the event that generates the divorce? Non-arrival for twelve months. Right? That’s the event needed to generate the divorce. Did that happen? No, because in the meantime there has only been non-arrival for two months. Right, I know with certainty that it will happen, but as long as it hasn’t happened—since this is a cause, not an indication. If it were an indication, it would be enough for me to know with certainty that it will happen, and then I’d already know the truth. But if it is a cause, not an indication, then the cause has to occur for the effect to be brought about. Therefore the person has to fail to arrive for twelve months, and that will generate the divorce retroactively. And as long as it hasn’t actually happened—that he failed to arrive for twelve months—the divorce hasn’t happened. True, after those twelve months the divorce takes effect retroactively, but the twelve months of non-arrival have to occur in practice, because they are what generate the result; they do not merely reveal information that already existed earlier. If the whole issue were only to reveal information to me, I know the information after two months—I already know he isn’t coming, because he’s dead.
[Speaker C] So if she got married after ten months, that’s actually a transgression.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, and after—
[Speaker C] after twelve months she’s in the clear.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] More than that. There would be a terrible absurdity here. Look, the man died, okay? Now she got married after ten months. She would apparently be liable to death as an adulteress.
[Speaker C] Right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Her husband is dead! She would be liable to death as an adulteress. But wait—if another two months pass and he has now not come for twelve months, then now it turns out retroactively that she was already divorced. From that point in time, the religious court would not execute her. But if the court sat to judge her after ten months, in principle it could have executed her. She is liable to death.
[Speaker D] A married woman!
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A married woman without a husband.
[Speaker D] What about levirate marriage?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean? Levirate marriage—
[Speaker D] Here in the meantime—suppose in the meantime she is obligated in levirate marriage. How does that enter this system?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What’s the problem? She is obligated in levirate marriage until the year passes. After the year passes, it turns out she was divorced, and she is not obligated in levirate marriage.
[Speaker D] Meaning, a levir could come and perform levirate marriage with her, but—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] to divorce her quickly, before the twelve months are up, because once twelve months arrive it will become clear that all along he was living in prohibition. Sounds… yes.
[Speaker B] It seems to me I’m missing some background knowledge here. If a woman becomes widowed, isn’t she immediately allowed to remarry?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] She is allowed. You’re right. It depends on additional assumptions that I didn’t bring in, that there is a waiting period after death, a Talmudic passage in Yevamot. But the claim is that as long as she isn’t divorced, she is basically still his wife, even though he already died. You’re right about your point; it requires various additional assumptions. What I said isn’t at all simple, but just to sharpen the point, I said it that way.
[Speaker B] Because supposedly, if someone wants to mess with some annoying guy a little so that his wife will never be able to remarry, then instead of saying twelve months he can say a hundred thousand months and that’s the end of the story.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. That’s the second example. A third example: the position of Ba’al Ha-Ittur. If a person makes a condition in a divorce from now—say he says, “I am giving you a divorce from now on condition that it does not rain for a month.” Okay? After two weeks he changes his mind and wants to cancel the divorce. Ba’al Ha-Ittur says he can; he can retract the divorce. Now what does that mean? But if it doesn’t rain for a month, it will turn out that she had already been divorced for a month. How can you change your mind about a woman who was already divorced and make her your wife again? She was already divorced. If the condition is just a matter being revealed retroactively, you can’t say such a thing. She is divorced. You just don’t know it yet—wait a month and you’ll know it. How can you change your mind when the woman has already been divorced for two weeks? It’s the same as if I give a woman an unconditional divorce, and that’s it, she’s divorced. Two weeks later I say to her, “You know what, I changed my mind.” What do you mean you changed your mind? If you want, marry her again; you can’t cancel the divorce. It’s like canceling the cancellation. So if it didn’t rain, then he’s right—what? If it didn’t rain in the meantime, then there’s no need to cancel at all, because she isn’t divorced anyway. The question is what happens if it did rain. Well? If it did rain, he says you can still cancel. Then it rains, and the divorce still does not take effect because he changed his mind. Why? But the fact that it didn’t rain only reveals that all along she had been divorced—so how can you retract? Because you don’t know the information? So what if you don’t know? But that’s the information: she is divorced. Wait a month and you’ll know. Rabbi Shimon says you see from this that it’s not just a lack of information, not just missing information; rather, the event of the rain creates the result. And as long as the thing that creates the result hasn’t happened, the result hasn’t happened. And as long as the divorce hasn’t happened, I can cancel it. Another example: a responsum of the Rashba. He rules that if someone betroths with a condition of “from now”—yes, I betroth a woman with a condition from now, on condition that it rains, or that it does not rain for a month. Fine? After two weeks I want to give her a divorce. I changed my mind. The Rashba says you can’t divorce her before then, even though the betrothal is from now. Let him wait a month, and then he can divorce her. By the way, I think that according to Rabbi Shimon Shkop, if he divorces her now on condition that it does not rain for another two weeks, that he can do. Because if it doesn’t rain for another two weeks, then both the betrothal and immediately the divorce will take effect. But that’s just a parenthetical remark to sharpen the point. To sharpen or to muddy it—you decide. But the claim is: why really? If the condition only reveals retroactively information that already exists, then what’s the problem? She is in fact already betrothed to me. The fact that I don’t yet know that she is betrothed to me—why does that prevent me from divorcing her? Later it turns out that she was betrothed and that I indeed divorced her. I’m only missing information—what’s the problem? Rabbi Shimon Shkop says you see in the Rashba that no, she really is not betrothed to you. But if it doesn’t rain, then she is already betrothed to me retroactively, and I’m standing two weeks after the act of betrothal, so what’s the problem? True—but it’s from that point onward, retroactively. What will happen in the future will create the consequences for the past. It won’t reveal what the consequences were; it will create them. One last example: a responsum of the Rosh. If I betroth a woman on condition that it does not rain for a month, and after two weeks I cancel the condition—I want to leave the betrothal unconditional, not dependent on whether it rains. Fine? The Rosh says you can, because speech cancels speech. Rabbi Shimon Shkop asks: what do you mean, speech cancels speech? After all, this isn’t just speech; it’s an act. On the possibility that it does not rain, she is already betrothed. And on the possibility that it does rain, it will turn out that she was never betrothed at all. You want to cancel the condition—meaning that even if it does rain, she should still be betrothed. But how? She was never betrothed. If it rains, then it turns out retroactively that she was never betrothed, so how do you want her to be your wife even on the possibility that it rains? That’s the meaning of canceling the condition, right? What is the meaning of canceling the condition? That she will be my wife regardless of the rain, right? But the condition says that if it rains, then she is not my wife. So I never betrothed her. Now I canceled the condition—so what makes her my wife? If it rains, there was never any act of betrothal, so how does she become my wife? Only if we understand that the rain creates the result and does not retroactively reveal that there was no act of betrothal. Rather, if the rain falls, I uproot retroactively the act of betrothal that was done. But an act of betrothal was done; I just uproot it retroactively if it rains. If the rain merely revealed that no act of betrothal had been done at all, then there would be no sense in canceling the condition. What is there to cancel? You can’t awaken betrothal that never took place. Impossible. You didn’t perform betrothal—so how will she be your wife if it rains? On the possibility that it rains, you performed no betrothal at all. Therefore he says no: if it doesn’t rain, that will uproot the betrothal—not that I never performed betrothal. And therefore, as long as that hasn’t happened, I can cancel the condition, and then the betrothal exists in any case. Does this remind you of the Ri? Because the Ri says that when I betroth or divorce conditionally, I am essentially betrothing and divorcing in both directions. Only if the condition is not fulfilled do I want to uproot what I did. That is exactly what is written here in the Rosh. The Rosh basically says: you betrothed her in any case, both on the possibility that it rains and on the possibility that it doesn’t rain. You only say that on the possibility that it rains, you want the betrothal to be uprooted. Fine, I canceled that. I canceled that condition before the month passed. But the betrothal took effect on both possibilities, and therefore she is my wife in any case. There are more examples like these. No, that’s a different part of the same book.
[Speaker C] Did you send us a book in English?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What?
[Speaker D] You sent us a book in English.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So it appears in that book. It’s not a book in English; it’s a book in Hebrew. It’s just that the pages you opened are in English—that’s the end of the book. It probably runs from back to front; look there. It’s a book in Hebrew. A very long book too, around six hundred pages.
[Speaker C] Where can I find these examples, Rabbi?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s pamphlet on conditions, at the end of his novellae to Gittin. Now here—this is the passage I mentioned to you earlier—Rabbi Shimon Shkop says that during the time until the condition is fulfilled or negated, there is a state in which both sides take effect. Look at this passage there in the pamphlet: “Rather, since he wants that if the condition is fulfilled she should be betrothed from now, and conversely she should be like an unmarried woman, then he wants that from now until the fulfillment of the condition she should be in a state of doubtful betrothal and divorce.” She is both betrothed and divorced. Again—and this is not a doubt, as I told you earlier.
[Speaker D] Here too he writes “doubt.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but that’s only a borrowed expression. What he means is definite and definite. Where would the difference be between an actual doubt and this? I’ll give you an example. Suppose this were betrothal and divorce on a rabbinic level, a rabbinic mechanism, okay? If this were the ordinary laws of doubt, then with a rabbinic doubt we are lenient. But I’m arguing that this is not a doubt. Rather, she is definitely divorced and definitely betrothed.
[Speaker D] So there are no doubts here?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then there are no doubts at all. You have to take into account the side of the betrothal and take into account the side of the divorce even though it’s rabbinic. That’s the difference. The expression “doubt” here is borrowed language. What he really means is that it is both this and that, like Schrödinger’s cat, yes—both alive and dead. That’s what he says: “And wherever one acts from the outset on the side of uncertainty with an acquisition and right, or the performance of a prohibition, in such a way that such an act exists on the side of uncertainty—accordingly, the matter of the condition he makes, that the betrothal or divorce should be from now, is only a weak betrothal and divorce, as in the law of doubt.” You see? It’s not really a doubt; it is betrothal and divorce together, and therefore they are weak because they are together, as in the law of doubt. “And when the condition is fulfilled, then they are completed fully; and when it is not fulfilled, they are completely nullified. It follows that even if the condition is fulfilled, nevertheless initially there was here only a weak betrothal, and only from the fulfillment of the condition onward was the betrothal completed entirely.” Entirely.
[Speaker D] Yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so that’s basically his claim. Okay. Good, we’ll stop here. I think we’ll stop here altogether with the whole issue of conditions. I tried to show you the going-back-in-time aspect in the context of conditions. In the two classes we still have left, we’ll talk about retroactive clarification, and I’ll try to show you the difference between retroactive clarification and a condition.
[Speaker C] Okay,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Just one second before you leave—wait, wait, before you leave.
[Speaker C] Food for thought for the week. Food for thought for the week.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. Just a week is fine—you’re quick. Good, that’s it, I copied the attendance. Thank you all.
[Speaker C] Thank you very much, Rabbi. More power to you. Thank you very much, good night. Wow, wow, wow.