Reasons and Rationales for the Commandments – Lecture 4
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- The reasons for the commandments and scriptural decree
- Using reasons to define the boundaries of the commandment and “the reason of the verse”
- The concern about emptying the concrete command of content, and the distinction between plain meaning and exposition
- Maimonides in the fifth root: the reason for a commandment is not a commandment in itself
- “He shall not multiply wives for himself, lest his heart turn away,” Maimonides’ reading of the Mishnah, and a third approach
- Maimonides’ interpretation: the mistake is not in the reason but in its meaning and halakhic implication
Summary
General Overview
The text assumes that behind the system of commandments there are reasons and purposes, even when the Sages call a commandment a scriptural decree, and it presents Maimonides’ position that denying reasons makes the Holy One, blessed be He, less rational than human beings, relying on the verse “for this is your wisdom and understanding in the eyes of the nations,” while also expressing some reservation about the strength of that proof. From there the question arises whether the reason for a commandment can be used to shape its halakhic boundaries, and it turns out that Jewish law is decided in accordance with the view that we do not expound the reason of the verse (like Rabbi Yehuda), which sharpens the difficulty דווקא if the reasons are true and accessible to us. The discussion proceeds through analysis of “you shall not take a widow’s garment as security” and the concern that making the reason primary empties the concrete command of its content, through Maimonides in the fifth root on not counting reasons for commandments as independent commandments, and on to the topic of “he shall not multiply wives for himself, lest his heart turn away,” which leads to understanding Maimonides as holding that there is also a third approach (the anonymous first opinion) according to which we do not expound the reason of the verse even when the reason is written explicitly in the Torah. In the end, a Maimonidean direction is proposed according to which the problem is not an error about the reason itself but an error about its meaning and implications, because the Torah’s wording is precise, and if the reason leads to a halakhic result that contradicts the language of the command, that is a sign that the reason was not understood correctly.
The reasons for the commandments and scriptural decree
The author argues that behind the commandments there are reasons and purposes that the commandment is meant to achieve, and he sees this as a basic assumption even regarding what is called a scriptural decree. He presents a view found in the literature according to which specific commandments do not have binding reasons and the Holy One, blessed be He, could just as well have commanded the opposite, while distinguishing between “there are no reasons” and “the commandments in themselves have no importance.” He brings Maimonides’ claim that denying reasons makes the Holy One, blessed be He, “worse than His creatures,” and cites “for this is your wisdom and understanding in the eyes of the nations” as proof that the commandments carry a reason that can be understood, though he qualifies how easy it is to see that wisdom by simply looking at Jewish law. He concludes that, in the view of most commentators, there are reasons behind the commandments and they are not said for no reason, and even when the Sages themselves defined commandments as scriptural decree, principled explanations are still found for them, even if at times “I said, I will become wise, but it is far from me.”
Using reasons to define the boundaries of the commandment and “the reason of the verse”
The author formulates the central question: can the reason for a commandment serve as a halakhic interpretive tool for determining what is permitted and forbidden and what the commandment requires? He illustrates this with “you shall not take a widow’s garment as security,” as though the reason were not to burden someone in difficult circumstances, from which one would conclude that one should distinguish between a poor widow and a rich widow. He compares this to purposive interpretation in law and to the example of a traffic light at two in the morning, where purposive logic conflicts with the wording of the law. He presents the tannaitic dispute over whether we expound the reason of the verse, where Rabbi Yehuda says we do not, and Rabbi Shimon says we do, and notes that Jewish law is ruled in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda that we do not expound the reason of the verse. He sharpens the point that this ruling creates a difficulty if the commandments really do have purposes that are accessible to us, and he tries to clarify what lies behind the refusal to turn the reason into the tool that defines the boundaries of prohibition and obligation.
The concern about emptying the concrete command of content, and the distinction between plain meaning and exposition
The author shows that when one expounds the reason of the verse, one may arrive at a situation in which the commandment is not “you shall not take a widow’s garment as security” but an abstract principle like “do not worsen the condition of a poor person,” and then the verse is treated as a casual illustration rather than a concrete command. He says that in such a case one could expand the verse into any similar moral obligation, to the point of deriving the duty to help someone in the street from that same verse, because the prohibition has become the reason rather than the written act. He distinguishes between expansion by way of exposition, as in the example of “do not place a stumbling block before the blind” and the discussion of the Minchat Chinukh, and a stronger claim that the reason is the plain meaning of the verse itself and therefore no expositions are needed. He presents the usual halakhic conception according to which first of all “what is written in the Torah” is the prohibition and obligation, whereas purposes and expansions can gain standing through exposition, and from that he reformulates the question: why should we not accept Rabbi Shimon’s position as the most natural one if the reason is what really matters?
Maimonides in the fifth root: the reason for a commandment is not a commandment in itself
The author brings Maimonides’ words in the fifth root of the Book of Commandments, according to which one should not count the reason for a commandment as a separate commandment. He illustrates this with verses such as “her former husband who sent her away may not take her back… and you shall not bring sin upon the land,” “do not profane your daughter by making her a prostitute, lest the land become licentious,” “you shall not take ransom for the life of a murderer… and do not pollute the land,” and “the priest shall not leave the Sanctuary and not profane.” He explains that Maimonides sees phrases like “and you shall not bring sin upon the land” as the reason for the preceding prohibition, not an additional prohibition, and he cites the Sifrei, “Scripture teaches that bloodshed pollutes the land,” as proof that this is a reason and not another command. He points to two possible ways of understanding Maimonides: one possibility is that the problem is duplication in the counting of commandments, and another is that the reason is not formulated as a command verse but as an explanatory verse, and so it does not fall under the formal linguistic rules that define a prohibition. In any case, he stresses that the conclusion is that even when the reason is written explicitly in the Torah, the reason itself is not counted as the primary command in the enumeration of the commandments.
“He shall not multiply wives for himself, lest his heart turn away,” Maimonides’ reading of the Mishnah, and a third approach
The author presents the Talmudic passage that parallels the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon over “you shall not take a widow’s garment as security” with the Mishnah in tractate Sanhedrin on “he shall not multiply wives for himself,” where it seems that the roles are reversed: Rabbi Yehuda permits multiplying wives if they do not “turn his heart away,” while Rabbi Shimon forbids even many wives “even like Abigail.” He brings the Talmud’s answer that the difference is whether the reason is explicit in the verse, so that according to Rabbi Yehuda, when the reason is written we do expound it, while according to Rabbi Shimon, when the reason is written it is understood as adding another command. He brings Nachmanides’ objection to Maimonides, namely that Maimonides treats the reason written in the Torah as explanation only, whereas according to the Talmud it has a halakhic role either in interpretation or in adding a command. He shows that Maimonides, in his commentary on the Mishnah, briefly says “the Jewish law is not in accordance with Rabbi Shimon nor with Rabbi Yehuda,” and in the Laws of Kings rules that a king may marry up to eighteen wives and concubines only, and receives lashes if he adds even one more, regardless of their righteousness or wickedness. From this he concludes that Maimonides reads the Mishnah as containing three opinions rather than two. He interprets the anonymous first opinion as a third approach according to which we do not expound the reason of the verse even when the reason is written explicitly, and Jewish law is ruled in accordance with that anonymous first opinion.
Maimonides’ interpretation: the mistake is not in the reason but in its meaning and halakhic implication
The author cites Maimonides in the Book of Commandments, who says that the reasons for the king’s three prohibitions (horses, wives, and silver and gold) are explained in Scripture, and that the story of Solomon teaches that even knowing the reason for the commandment can lead to “deviation from the religion” when a person says that it is enough to guard against the result and not against the command itself. He emphasizes that Maimonides is not claiming that the reason is false when it is written in the Torah, but that the mistake lies in misunderstanding the meaning of the reason and deriving halakhic consequences from it against the wording of the command. He proposes that Maimonides understands “lest his heart turn away” as applying even when many righteous wives are involved, because involvement with them itself turns the king’s heart away from his duties, so the reason does not narrow the prohibition but explains it in line with the Torah’s precise wording. He concludes that the basic direction is trust in the precision of the Torah’s language, and therefore if the reason leads to a halakhic conclusion different from what is written, that is a sign that the reason was interpreted incorrectly. In that way, the position that we do not expound the reason of the verse even when the reason is stated explicitly becomes understandable.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’re dealing with the reasons for the commandments, and in the chapter up to now we were dealing with the concept of scriptural decree, but really through that I was trying to argue that behind the system of commandments there are reasons. Meaning, there are some purposes that the commandment is meant to achieve. On the face of it, that sounds like a trivial statement—well obviously, I mean what else? What is this whole business for otherwise? But at least on the theoretical plane, it’s not treated as a trivial statement. I think that almost anywhere you read or learn about the reasons for the commandments, they’ll present the different options for relating to this whole world of reasons for the commandments, and one of the options is that the commandments have no reasons. Meaning, the Holy One, blessed be He, imposed some kind of scriptural decrees on us for various reasons—maybe because only that way can one serve Him, otherwise how would we have any connection or bond to Him, or whatever, or in order to train us in obedience, I don’t know.
[Speaker B] I’ve already seen all kinds of views that the thing itself is its own purpose.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, no no no, that’s what I’m saying. There is a reason here, but not a reason for these specific commandments. He could just as well have commanded the opposite too, and it wouldn’t change anything. That’s what I mean in that sense. I don’t think anyone argues that there’s absolutely nothing to it, that it’s just a whim—that doesn’t seem likely to me. But still, the claim is that the commandments as such have no importance. Maimonides’ argument—I mentioned this at the beginning, I think—Maimonides’ argument is that that can’t be, because then you make the Holy One, blessed be He, worse than His creatures. Human beings don’t do things without a reason, and the Holy One, blessed be He, just does random things? And there he brings the verse, “for this is your wisdom and understanding in the eyes of the nations.” So Maimonides says: if there weren’t some reason behind the commandments—and not only a reason, but a reason that can be understood by anyone who looks at them—then how would it be our wisdom and understanding in the eyes of the nations when we observe Jewish law? Fine, it’s a nice argument. I’m not sure it really holds up, I have to say, because when you look at Jewish law—even if I’m not some great and mighty gentile but just an ordinary person who observes it—I don’t really see the great wisdom and understanding in every aspect of Jewish law just from a simple glance.
[Speaker C] Even without that, after all the Sages relate this to the calendar.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, that’s the Sages, that’s—
[Speaker C] The Sages.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Knowing the calendar. But Maimonides brings a proof from there; apparently he says it’s an exposition, but the plain meaning is speaking about the Torah as a whole. Anyway, Maimonides’ conclusion is indeed a conclusion accepted, I think, by most commentators: that there are reasons behind the commandments, they were not said for no reason. And in the previous part of this series I talked about the fact that even what is called scriptural decree—which is supposedly the clearest expression of a commandment with no reason behind it, or at least no reason accessible to us—even commandments that are defined by the Sages as such, not just that they seem that way to us, but that the Sages themselves said are scriptural decree—even there there are explanations. And not only are there explanations, but they are explanations that we too can arrive at, at least on the principled level. Sometimes we understand more, sometimes less; I quoted, “I said, I will become wise, but it is far from me,” right? So the Sages bring several things that even King Solomon did not understand, but on the principled level the assumption is that there are reasons behind the commandments, and that they are accessible to us as well. Meaning, we can get there. And that brings me to the next stage. Up to here, that’s what I’ve done so far. At the next stage I want now to discuss: okay, so there are reasons behind the commandments—what does that mean now? Can I use the reason in order to shape the boundary of the commandment? To learn from it what I may and may not do? Seemingly yes—what could be more natural than that? Meaning, if I’m told, say, “you shall not take a widow’s garment as security,” right, you’re forbidden to take collateral from a widow, then I understand that this is simply because the woman is in a difficult situation and you may not take collateral from her because she needs her property, the items she uses. And if so, then for example a wealthy widow who has no such problem, who has enough clothes and utensils that she needs—in her case you could take collateral. Right? That’s basically the obvious conclusion. Because if behind—I’ll say again, why this connects to the first part—if behind the commandments of the Torah there is some set of little katas, right, like karate or whatever, some collection of acts you have to do that have no connection to any purposes whatsoever—they are not meant to achieve anything—then there’s no point in looking for interpretations about a poor widow, a rich widow, and so on. But if the claim is that behind these acts sit certain purposes, meaning they are intended to achieve something, then let’s see: let’s use the purpose they are meant to achieve to determine when and what one may, must, or may not do. That’s the most natural thing.
[Speaker D] Like if there’s a traffic light in the middle of the night, two in the morning, there’s not a single car—do I need to stop there or not?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So you’re asking according to the law or according to logic? According to logic, you don’t need to stop there. Obviously not.
[Speaker D] But I don’t want to leave that in the hands of—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, so now you have meta-legal considerations, considerations—
[Speaker D] —that I’ll get stopped because I don’t trust someone who’s—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. So I’ll ask: if you don’t trust everyone, I trust myself. I have no problem with crossing on the principled level. The law forbids it. It’s not that if a police officer is there he’ll stop me or give me a ticket—but fine. But if there’s no concern, there’s no concern. In any case, the obvious conclusion from the fact that there are reasons behind the commandments is that we should really use the reasons in order to interpret the commandments, in order to understand what exactly is imposed on us, what we are forbidden to do and what we must do. But on this issue, as is known, the tannaim disagreed on the question whether we expound the reason of the verse or do not expound the reason of the verse. Rabbi Yehuda says that we do not expound the reason of the verse, and Rabbi Shimon says that we do expound the reason of the verse. And the verse around which their dispute revolves—the one they bring—is “you shall not take a widow’s garment as security.” Rabbi Yehuda, who does not expound the reason of the verse, says that one may not take collateral even from a wealthy widow, while Rabbi Shimon, who says that we do expound the reason of the verse, says only a poor widow—a wealthy widow is permitted, because there’s no issue. So Rabbi Yehuda’s view really needs explanation. What’s the problem? If the commandments are really meant to achieve certain purposes, then why shouldn’t we interpret what is required of us—what is forbidden, permitted, or obligatory—according to the purpose? Meaning, the purpose should determine what yes and what no. That’s exactly what’s called today in the legal world purposive interpretation. The reason of the verse is the Talmudic term for what we call purposive interpretation in the legal world. So let’s see what the commandment is meant to achieve, and from that derive what it actually says, what it forbids, what it requires, and so on. More than that: in this dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, Jewish law follows Rabbi Yehuda, that we do not expound the reason of the verse. Meaning, Jewish law was ruled on this issue: we do not expound the reason of the verse. So not only is there such an opinion, but that is the opinion ultimately accepted in practice. And of course that sharpens the difficulty even more: why? Why not, really? Again, if there were no reasons—and without all the preliminaries I gave, fine, there are no reasons—then what reason-of-the-verse is there to expound? These are all scriptural decrees and we need to perform some collection of actions because that’s what the Holy One, blessed be He, wanted, not because there is some kind of rationale behind it, not because it is meant to achieve something. But if there are reasons behind these things, then what’s the problem? Why shouldn’t we interpret them according to the reasons? King Solomon? Okay, we’ll get to that in a moment. I’ll come to that later, but I want to look at it from a slightly different angle. Let’s take a moment to look at “you shall not take a widow’s garment as security.”
[Speaker F] At that verse itself.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Basically, according to Rabbi Shimon’s approach, who expounds the reason of the verse, Rabbi Shimon says: it says “you shall not take a widow’s garment as security,” but really behind it sits the idea or purpose of not making her condition even harder. Meaning, she is in a bad situation and one has to make sure it doesn’t get even worse, and therefore: do not take a widow’s garment as security. Now the question arises: so what is the commandment here? Is the commandment here not to take a widow’s garment as security—is that the prohibition? Or is the prohibition to cause a widow hardship? If in fact the second possibility is the correct one, then it doesn’t really say here not to take a widow’s garment as security at all. What it says here is: do not cause this widow to be in too difficult a situation. And why specifically a widow? Anyone who is in a difficult situation—one should not make his condition even harder. And then he says that this commandment has basically been emptied of concrete content. When it says “you shall not take a widow’s garment as security,” that is just a random illustration. Meaning, really the claim is: take care of poor people, don’t worsen their condition. And then what happens is, I don’t know, if someone needs help walking down the street, you could derive the obligation to help him from “you shall not take a widow’s garment as security.” Because “you shall not take a widow’s garment as security” is not really talking about widows or their garments or anything of the sort. It is an illustration of a general principle that one has to care for people in difficult circumstances.
[Speaker E] And not collect from him—and that’s “do not place a stumbling block before the blind,” that’s exactly what we do. “Do not place a stumbling block before the blind” is something general with all kinds of—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, although there—right—although there that is an exposition. Although there that is an exposition. I once mentioned, I think—just a second—I once mentioned that the Minchat Chinukh wanted to claim regarding “do not place a stumbling block before the blind” that there is no prohibition against literally tripping a blind person on the road. He says that after all the Sages expound from it not to give bad advice and not to cause someone to sin. The Minchat Chinukh wants to argue that there is no prohibition against tripping a blind person in the road; there are only those two. Well, that’s absurd. Obviously there are both, and what does it mean that there are both? It means that the plain meaning of the verse really is not to trip a blind person on the road. There is an exposition, and the exposition says not to give unfair advice or not to cause him to commit a transgression. That’s something different, because you’re not saying that that’s what the verse commands. The verse commands not to trip a blind person on the road. Now you make an exposition. Some would maybe even call it merely an allusion, but never mind—even if not, you are making some kind of exposition on the level of exposition, and we once discussed the relation between plain meaning and exposition. On the level of exposition it expands. Here I’m making a stronger claim. Independently—we didn’t receive from Sinai, just one second—we didn’t receive from Sinai the whole world of exposition. It has nothing to do with that. There is no exposition here. I want to know what the verse itself says. And according to the approach I mentioned before, the verse itself says not to give unfair advice. No expositions are needed; that would be the plain meaning of the verse itself. Since in essence the verse is just giving an example, but the real idea is the purpose of that example, and that is really the prohibition. And then it comes out that the prohibition is not what is written in the Torah at all. The prohibition is really the reason for what is written in the Torah. The main thing is missing from the text. In the Torah a certain act is written, but the Torah is not really interested specifically in that act. That act is there to illustrate an idea, and the prohibition is the idea. Now you can see the implication, and it already does seem a bit problematic, at least to anyone used to the halakhic mode of thinking—just a second—to anyone used to the halakhic mode of thinking, this does seem a bit problematic. It says “you shall not take a widow’s garment as security,” and that means: do not take a widow’s garment as security. After that you can make expositions, you can say it can be expanded in this or that way, but first of all it’s clear that when you do that act, you have violated the prohibition. Meaning, we are already used to this way of looking at things, and it’s an interesting question why. We are used to this view that first of all, when the Torah writes something, that is the prohibition—not our ideas and interpretations and the purposes we find behind things. Purposes are nice, but first of all, what is written in the Torah. It could be that purposes will also have halakhic standing, as you mentioned earlier, if we make an exposition or something like that. But basically, before expositions and before everything else, what is written is what is forbidden or obligatory. And that’s what Rabbi Shimon says—no, Rabbi Yehuda: we do not expound the reason of the verse. The interesting question is why. Why do we not expound the reason of the verse? Because at first glance Rabbi Shimon’s opinion is the obvious one. Meaning, if that is the reason, then really why not? After all, if the Torah’s reason in “you shall not take a widow’s garment as security” is not to worsen the condition of a poor person, then really the Torah is saying: do not worsen the condition of a poor person. It is not saying: do not take a widow’s garment as security. “You shall not take a widow’s garment as security” is just an example. So then the commandment really is not limited to widows; it concerns worsening the condition of a poor person, that’s all—that’s really the commandment. That is not the accepted halakhic conception. Yes.
[Speaker G] It’s a bit like what he’s saying—there are other verses too that are commandments, supposedly, from which they expound all sorts of things in the same way, beyond the plain sense of what’s written. Things like that. Because there are places where they expound things not even from the meaning of the verse. So why here can’t you say there’s another meaning underneath?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you can say there is another meaning. That’s why I said, like I said earlier about “do not place a stumbling block before the blind.” But that additional meaning requires some sort of exposition. Meaning, the plain meaning is first of all what is written plainly in the verse. It could be that we will expound it, and it could be that we need some indicators in order to expound it, and it isn’t automatic because we do not expound the reason of the verse. Meaning, if this were really not an exposition but simply the interpretation I would make of the verse, then essentially I would be following Rabbi Shimon, who expounds the reason of the verse, and we do not rule in accordance with him. So clearly here there is some other trigger that leads us to make an exposition and expand the matter. But still, the plain meaning of the verse remains what is written in it. Even when—even if—we expand it, what I’m saying remains true. Yes.
[Speaker F] But maybe there could be a case where the reason of the verse is not exclusive. Meaning, you can detail—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, okay, so we’ll get to that. King Solomon was mentioned earlier—we’ll talk more.
[Speaker H] Yes. Why is there actually a contradiction? Huh? Why is there actually a contradiction? After all, it’s obvious there are commandments that have no reason and we understand—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Where is that obvious from? The red heifer—it’s not that it has no reason; we don’t understand it, as I said. At our level. There are things—three things—that the Sages, say, listed as examples where the reason may exist but is not accessible to us. But everything else, even things that are defined as scriptural decree—
[Speaker H] “And you shall serve the Lord your God…” that depends on a dispute—that’s something else. No, I’m saying there are commandments where you see that as they were given they have no social reason, say, or no sociological reason. Right, or maybe they have some other—expounded reason. Faith-related one. Okay, that contradicts it: the commandment was given. First of all, as it is written, that’s how it must be done. Now the Sages, as those who received the authority of the Oral Torah to teach us, came to expound and add.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but I’m not talking about adding. It has nothing to do with adding, again. I’m talking about what is written in the verse. Why according to the simple meaning? Why according to the simple meaning? But after all I know that it comes to bring us to the purpose that we not worsen the condition of—
How do you know? How do you know? Ah, so you’re saying I don’t know. Good. So you’re offering an answer. And we’ll get to that answer. In a moment we’ll see whether I know or I don’t know. But I’m saying: you’re offering an answer. So that joins what was said here earlier. You’re basically saying: maybe you don’t know the reason well, or you don’t know the correct reason. But suppose Elijah the prophet came and told me what the correct reason is, okay? Suppose. There is a reason. Wait, wait—no no—again, that’s not right. If you say there is a concern that we may err about the reason, that’s one issue. We’ll get to it. I’m jumping ahead because it came up among you, so I’m addressing it already. But if I say no, there’s no concern about the reason—and still, what is written in the Torah is what obligates, even though the reason is indeed the correct reason. I’m not worried that I misinterpreted the reason. About that I’m asking: why? Why? After all, if I didn’t make a mistake, and the commandment really does come to achieve that goal, then what’s the problem?
[Speaker H] Who told you that that’s the purpose of the commandment?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I said again: if you’re concerned there’s an error in the interpretation, I understand.
[Speaker H] Who says that’s true? Who says at all that—true in what sense? That we need reasons at all?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re taking me back now to the whole discussion. That’s what—
[Speaker H] Because there is no such contradiction.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But that’s why I mapped out the whole picture up to here. I started with the claim that the commandments have reasons. They have reasons. That’s what all the meetings until now were devoted to. And then I said: if they already have reasons—precisely in order to block these claims—then why not use them? After all, those are the reasons. So here you’re offering suggestions in different shades: maybe we got confused, maybe we didn’t hit on the right reason. In a moment we’ll see whether that’s a good suggestion or not. But assuming we have the right reason—Elijah the prophet told us, okay? There’s no concern that we’re mistaken—then does the question still exist? Yes, it does. Okay? So that’s why I’m saying more than that: forget Elijah the prophet. There are places where you don’t need him. The Torah itself states the reason. “He shall not multiply wives for himself, lest his heart turn away,” right? So the Torah says that the king shall not multiply wives for himself—why? The Torah itself explains: so that his heart not turn away. So what’s the problem? There surely I should expound the reason, right? Because the Torah itself said it. In a moment we’ll see whether in such cases one does or does not expound the reason.
[Speaker G] Why can’t you use the reason to define the commandment? We always look at the words, at the meaning of the words, and then you use the reason. So you say, okay fine, it’s a widow. But how do you define exactly what a widow means? When does it apply?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m not claiming that we don’t use reasoning. We certainly use reasoning. We use reasoning.
[Speaker G] But how do you define the commandment itself?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But not by way of the reason. Why not? That’s exactly what I’m asking—why not? Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda disagree, and we rule like Rabbi Yehuda, that we do not expound the reason of the verse. That’s exactly what I’m asking: why not? You’re saying even more—not only “why not,” but basically we do in fact do it when we formulate the—
[Speaker G] We see that we do it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Fine, I’ll get to that too. When we do it, and why, and how that fits with ruling like Rabbi Yehuda that we do not expound the reason of the verse—I’ll get to it. Good. So this is the next stage. Meaning, after we reached the conclusion that there are reasons behind everything, including scriptural decrees—except perhaps for a few specific cases the Sages list, where there are reasons but they are not accessible to us—then let’s talk about the other cases, not those three. In those three we are concerned that we didn’t understand the reason. Fine.
[Speaker E] But in places where we do understand the reason—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —and we have no doubt that that’s the reason, the question still is why… we still do not expound the reason of the verse, because we rule like Rabbi Yehuda, and the question is why. Maimonides, in the fifth root—again, I’ve already mentioned the roots several times—in the fifth root Maimonides writes: “Sometimes, in the reasons for the commandments, there appears something resembling prohibitions, and people think that they should be counted separately among those counted individually.” That’s maybe the heading: it is not proper to count the reason for a commandment as a commandment in itself. Meaning, you do not count the reason for a commandment as a commandment in itself. So he says: sometimes in the reasons for commandments there appears something that resembles a prohibition, meaning there are verses that are the reason for a commandment and they look as if they are themselves commanding or forbidding something, and people think they should be counted separately in their own right. So some people will think: all right, that verse should be counted as a separate commandment, on its own. There is the commandment and there is its reason; one should count the commandment and count the reason. Those are two different commands. “As in what it says in the portion of Ki Tetze: ‘Her former husband who sent her away may not take her back again… and you shall not bring sin upon the land.’” That’s how the verse reads. So he says: “and you shall not bring sin upon the land”—that phrase is a reason for forbidding what came before, as if to say: if you do this, you will increase corruption in the land. Meaning, the verse comes to explain. The first part of the verse commands: “her former husband who sent her away may not take her back.” And the second part explains the command, meaning gives the reason. Right? That’s what Maimonides says. So there are those who would count two prohibitions in this verse: one prohibition is “her former husband may not take her back,” and the second is “and you shall not bring sin upon the land,” meaning there is a prohibition against bringing sin upon the land. Now that may sound strange, but in light of what I said earlier it’s really not strange at all. It’s really not strange, because after all, why may the former husband not take back the woman he divorced? Because that brings sin upon the land. So the prohibition is not taking back the woman he divorced. The prohibition is bringing sin upon the land; taking back the woman he divorced is simply one of the ways in which one brings sin upon the land, that’s all. But if you ask me what the Torah is really forbidding here, it is forbidding bringing sin upon the land. It is not forbidding taking back one’s divorced wife, okay? Meaning after she has married someone else, of course. So the claim that the second part of the verse is also a command and should also be included in the count of commandments is not far-fetched at all. On the contrary—the question is why not count only the second part. Meaning, what Maimonides says here is that there are those who counted both commandments, meaning both “her former husband may not take her back” and “you shall not bring sin upon the land.” And I’m saying: usually people don’t understand why on earth one would count the second part; the second part is only the reason for the commandment. But I’m claiming: I don’t understand why count the first part. The second part is really the commandment, not the first.
[Speaker D] Without the first part we wouldn’t understand that this brings sin upon the land. No, fine, I didn’t say it’s unnecessary in the Torah. The Torah wrote it, fine, in order to explain to us that it brings sin upon the land.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But now when I ask, in the Book of Commandments, should we enter two commandments—both the first and the second? Why? Only the second. Now I already know, after the Torah taught me, that taking back one’s divorced wife brings sin upon the land, and that falls under the prohibition against bringing sin upon the land. Fine. But not to count it as two commandments. And similarly: “Do not profane your daughter by making her a prostitute, lest the land become licentious.” He says that “lest the land become licentious” is a reason, as if to say that the reason for this prohibition is so that the land not become licentious. And likewise: “do not defile yourselves through them and become defiled through them,” after mentioning the prohibition of species whose consumption is forbidden. It gives the reason for that and says: “do not become defiled by eating them,” as if to state that doing what He warned against is defilement of the soul. And in explanation they said in the Sifrei, on the verse that comes after the warning against taking ransom for the life of a murderer: “and do not pollute the land.” That’s what the verse says: “you shall not take ransom for the life of a murderer… and do not pollute the land.” The Sifrei says: “Scripture teaches that bloodshed pollutes the land.” So the Sifrei itself tells us explicitly that what is written later in the verse is the reason for what was written earlier; it is not another command. And from this he brings proof against those who count here two different commands. It has already been clarified that this prohibition is the reason for the earlier prohibition, and not a separate matter. And likewise they said: “The priest shall not leave the Sanctuary and not profane”—again, the prohibition is “he shall not leave,” and the reason is that if he leaves, he profanes the service, the priest. “And others have also erred in this root and counted all these prohibitions without reflection—gross reflection.” Meaning, as if he didn’t think through the simple point that he counted two prohibitions where in fact there is only one. And this is the author of Behag, of course. “And one who counted them should be ashamed,” meaning, that person ought to be embarrassed, “if he is asked: from what act does this prohibition warn? What does this prohibition actually do?” And then he will have no answer at all. What can he answer? What does this prohibition actually prohibit? And through this the invalidity of his count becomes clear, and that is what we undertook to explain in this root. So he says this can’t be; it makes no sense. What does Maimonides really mean here? There are two possibilities. Two possible ways to understand the idea behind what Maimonides is saying. One possibility is what I said earlier: basically this is a kind of duplication. If the first part—well, maybe sorry, before the two possibilities: first of all, one should note what Maimonides is talking about. Maimonides is talking about places where the reasons are written in the Torah, right? All the examples he brings are places where the Torah itself stated the reason, okay? Now, in places where the Torah did not state the reason, there it is the dispute of Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda whether one expounds the reason of the verse or not. The question is whether one expounds it or not, but obviously no one suggests counting two commandments there. Say, “you shall not take a widow’s garment as security”—there the reason is not written. The Sages say the reason is not to worsen her condition, for the sake of the discussion—not exactly, but let’s say. So that reason is not written in the Torah. There nobody even imagines counting two prohibitions: not to take a widow’s garment as security, and not to worsen the condition of a person in distress, okay? There’s no such thing, because the second one isn’t written. What is not written in the Torah we do not count. There we count one. There I only asked: okay, we count one, but really what should be counted there is only the reason, not the prohibition. True, we don’t count two, but count the reason, not the prohibition. But Maimonides is not talking about such situations here. He is talking about cases where now one might think: if the Torah wrote the reason, then in fact there are two commands here, and one should count two commandments—the prohibition and the reason. Those are the views he brings. Yes.
[Speaker I] I think there’s a Talmudic passage that says that regarding the commandment of sending away the mother bird, or slaughtering the mother and offspring on the same day—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It says: “Your mercies extend to a bird’s nest”—such a person is silenced.
[Speaker I] And you’re not allowed to give a reason—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For that.
[Speaker I] The Talmud there—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s Rabbi Yehuda saying—not to give the reason of the verse in general. And more than that, there it’s even stronger. There it says not even to give a reason—not as interpretation of the commandment, but at all, not to explain it. That goes even further. We’ll get to that too.
[Speaker D] In a law book, are the reasons also written inside it? In a law book? No no, I mean a general law book of a state. It’s not written anywhere.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you look at the parliamentary discussions, at the give-and-take around the law—then in the Torah the legislative discussion is also documented.
[Speaker D] Yes, but the reasons in the legislative proposals, so to speak—the proposals ultimately have no connection to the law itself.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s a matter for the court, or for an interpretation statute, whatever. But on the principled level, fine, we’ll adopt a different interpretation law. So that’s not important.
[Speaker D] If you say that the Torah is a code of commandments, right? Then compare it to a normal code of laws. If you have something one is forbidden to do—if it’s forbidden to go through a red light, then it says it’s forbidden to go through a red light. There is a general duty of care later on, to drive carefully and not carelessly, but for every commandment you don’t need to write its reason too. Why is it forbidden to go through a red light? So that someone won’t come from the side.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The fact that the law takes that route—why should that obligate the Torah? The Torah does sometimes give reasons. What’s the problem? I don’t understand what the problem is.
[Speaker D] Today in a legal system, what to write and what not to write—the Mishnah, as you said, writes specific cases and from them you learn the rule, but it doesn’t write the rule; sometimes it says what comes to include.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now I’ll ask you the question you asked me: and in a law code do they write? In a law code they write the rules. So where is the Mishnah—why doesn’t the Mishnah write the rules?
[Speaker D] Most laws don’t deal with rules.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course they deal with rules. The specific law not to go through a red light contains within it a kind of rule.
[Speaker D] In tort law everything is built on specific cases of don’t do this and don’t do that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, those aren’t specific cases, those are the rules. In the Mishnah it’s not written that way. In the Mishnah it writes cases. Right. An ox that gores pays such-and-such. Right. In a law code it doesn’t say that. In a law code it says: if your property damages another person’s property, you pay such-and-such. That’s a rule. I don’t care that it’s a particular kind of rule—there are broader rules—but law is built as rules, not like the Mishnah. The Mishnah talks about cases; it’s casuistic. So on the contrary, I’ll ask you the same question you asked me.
[Speaker D] If you make those comparisons—the reasons.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I say, fine—if the Torah is supposed to be written like a law book, then I ask, according to your view, it still isn’t written like a law book. And even according to your view, why are cases written and not the rules? In any event, a different method was chosen here from the ordinary law books we know, so I don’t think that’s necessarily a difficulty for what I’m saying here. So Maimonides is really talking about situations where the Torah itself defines the reason, and that is what leads the Behag to count both the reason and the commandment as two prohibitions—and only in those places. That has nothing to do with deriving the reason of the verse, even though I opened with that. We’ll come back to it and to the connection between the things, but here we’re talking about a case where the Torah itself states the reason. And about that Maimonides says, what are you talking about—why would you count two commandments? He would be embarrassed if they asked him: what does this thing warn against? It warns only against what is written at the beginning, so why count it again? Now here, in that last sentence I said, I really said two different things. One thing is the problem of duplication. Meaning: why count the same prohibition twice? Once you tell me the prohibition, once you tell me the reason—basically that’s duplication, it’s simply unnecessary. There’s no principled problem with that, only it’s not two prohibitions, it’s one, since both warn against the same thing. And in fact, if I had to count only one—if the problem is duplication and I had to count one—then I would count only the reason, not the command itself but only the reason, because the reason is really broader, and the other is just duplication; the command is just duplication. On the other hand, you could explain that Maimonides means something else, and we’ve already discussed this in the past: when the Torah commands something, the verse that does it is not a descriptive verse, not an indicative verse—it is a command verse. What does that mean? When the Torah says, “Do not steal,” the Torah is not telling me that the Holy One, blessed be He, is not interested in my stealing. That’s not a command. A command means an instruction: do not steal. Obviously from that I also understand that He doesn’t want it. But understanding that He doesn’t want it is not enough to create a command. To create a command there has to be an instruction. Even in grammar we distinguish—somehow this gets classified as tense—the imperative mood. There’s past, present, future, and imperative. A verse that commands something is a different structure from a verse. In the Torah, when we see a verse, even if it tells me something about what the Holy One, blessed be He, expects from me, that does not make it a commandment unless it is written as a command. With prohibitions there is an explicit rule like this in the words of the Sages: “Take heed,” “lest,” and “do not” indicate a prohibition. But when there is a verse phrased in the language of “take heed,” “lest,” or “do not,” then you know that it is a prohibition. If there is a verse that tells you, “I would be very happy if you did such-and-such,” that is not a prohibition or a positive commandment. It is a description of expectations—what the Holy One, blessed be He, would want. Therefore Jewish law is based on verses that are command-verses, not descriptive verses. If so, then Maimonides’ eighth root is basically entirely devoted to that distinction. He brings all kinds of verses in which the word “not” appears, and he shows that those verses are not intended to command, but rather what he calls negation of obligation, and therefore it is not a commandment. And there the discussion is really about this issue of the imperative form. If so, then maybe what Maimonides is saying here is something else. He says: the verse giving the reason does not come to command in terms of its linguistic structure. It is not a command verse; it is an explanatory verse. It is a verse intended for Torah study, not for instructions. It is not part of the law book. It is not the verse that tells me what to do; it is the verse that teaches me what the goal was, what the Holy One, blessed be He, wants—but it is a verse that contains no command. If it contains no command, you cannot count it as a commandment, because only command-verses are counted as commandments. If that is Maimonides’ claim, then obviously the alternative he proposes is to count the first part and not the second part. If his problem is duplication, then Maimonides is really saying: you should count the second part, the reason; there is no point in counting the command itself. But if Maimonides’ problem is that we count only commanding verses, then obviously the alternative he proposes is to count the command and not the reason. Okay? So these are really two different claims. When Maimonides says, for example—I’ll give you an example in his own language—when he begins this root, he says: “Sometimes, among the reasons for the commandments, there will appear something that makes one think and imagine that they should be counted separately.” The Behag, who errs, whom Maimonides attacks—what is his mistake? That he counts it separately, on its own. Meaning, Maimonides attacks him over the duplication, not because there is a verse here that commands nothing, so what are you counting it for? And at the end of the root, literally the last sentence: “Indeed, one who counted them will be embarrassed when they ask him and say to him: this prohibition—against what does it warn? And he will have no answer at all.” It warns against nothing. That seems to point to the second interpretation—that there is a verse here that does not command, so what are you putting it into the Book of Commandments for? True, the final sentence, the second sentence, is ambiguous
[Speaker D] And why do you need the same thing twice…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. It warns against nothing not because by its nature it is not a warning verse, but because we are already warned about it. So therefore it doesn’t warn. That’s why in Maimonides himself it isn’t entirely clear which of the two meanings he intended, but you have to understand: these are two different meanings. Now there are all kinds of indications—I’m not getting into the indications right now—but it seems to me that there are various indications of what exactly Maimonides means here. But if we understand—what matters to me is this point. Now I want to know, really…
[Speaker D] Please look at this clock, what? No, another twenty minutes, not more. Okay, maybe less than twenty. In any case, so what
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] we see here is that even in a place where the reason is written explicitly, we do not see the reason as the main commandment that gets counted. Either because of duplication or because it commands nothing, but in the end—even there—it is not the reason. Which sharpens even more what I asked before: if in a place where the reason is not written we do not derive the reason of the verse, then you can come and say, as several people here said, fine, maybe we made a mistake, maybe we didn’t interpret the reason correctly. But in a place where the Torah itself explicitly states the reason, then there is no concern that we made a mistake—the Torah said what the reason is, we didn’t reach that conclusion ourselves. There I would have expected that yes, one would derive the reason of the verse, right? That doesn’t contradict Maimonides, because if that’s really the case, then fine, we will derive the reason of the verse, and therefore we will count—but only one commandment, just the reason as the commandment. Right? That doesn’t contradict it. We’ll derive the reason of the verse, we’ll say it applies only to a wealthy widow and not to a poor widow—but when we count it in the enumeration of the commandments, we won’t count two commandments, we’ll count only one. Which one? Only the reason. Right, because we derive the reason of the verse. But as we’ll see in a moment, in the sugya itself you see that this is not so. There is an explicit passage in the Talmud dealing with this—two parallel passages—and it says there no: we do not derive the reason of the verse even in a case where the reason is explicitly written in the Torah. There is in the Talmud in Bava Metzia and also in… yes?
[Speaker I] A moment before you moved on, you said you hadn’t proved this Maimonides here. Maybe it’s a consequence too? Because maybe it’s not the reason but the result—because the peoples before you did this and the land vomited out the peoples.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I understand, but still…
[Speaker I] No, no, even if
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] it’s the result, I agree—but even if it’s the result, the result is the reason. No? What else? If that’s the result, then what?
[Speaker I] Because the Torah isn’t saying why the Holy One, blessed be He…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s true, and that’s the reason for all the commandments,
[Speaker D] So it isn’t connected to this commandment.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In all the commandments we would obey the Holy One, blessed be He. But when He says to me here, “and do not cause the land to sin,” that is what Maimonides certainly writes. So according to Maimonides, it’s certain—and “do not cause the land to sin,” true, they’re telling me what the result is, but they’re telling me what the result is in order to explain the rationale of the commandment. Meaning, if you do this, you will cause the land to sin, and therefore don’t do it. They’re not just telling me. It’s not like “Honor your father and your mother so that your days may be lengthened.” There I fully accept what you’re saying. Meaning, I’m not supposed to honor
[Speaker I] my parents so that my days will be lengthened—that’s not the reason
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] why I need to honor my parents. That’s the result. The result will be that my days will be lengthened. But here it’s not like that. Maybe there is some reason that we don’t understand. So that’s something else, that’s
[Speaker F] already been discussed, and I’ll get to that. A reason we don’t understand—but here in this case that isn’t relevant, because the Torah itself states the reason. And if the Torah itself states the reason, then what’s the problem? There’s no concern that you’ll make a mistake; it itself writes it. Wait, if you say the commandment is to heed that result? What? Then why the redundancy? It’s already redundant.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well, accordingly, that’s the same question. The same question. That’s Maimonides’ question of duplication. He can say, fine, the duplication question says not to count both. Why write both in the Torah? Because they wanted to explain it to me. What do you mean—what’s the problem? They tell me, for example, this thing: don’t do such-and-such, because the problem will be such-and-such. That’s not so terrible.
[Speaker F] But for example it’s redundant, because why, for example?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, the Torah really does bring many examples. “If one man’s ox gores the ox of his fellow”—that’s an example, because in principle for all monetary damages we are obligated to pay. They bring an example; sometimes an example clarifies more. That doesn’t bother me. Anyway, in the Talmud itself, the Talmud disputes, as I mentioned earlier, between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda regarding “You shall not take a widow’s garment as collateral.” “You shall not take a widow’s garment as collateral”—so Rabbi Shimon says: only with a wealthy widow; and Rabbi Yehuda says: whether poor or wealthy. Why?
[Speaker J] And why both poor and wealthy? It’s not only material concern. Why can’t you move to the emotional side? Don’t take a widow’s garment as collateral, because a widow is in an emotional state like that, so then it no longer matters whether she is wealthy or not wealthy.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re going back—you’re going back to the question whether the reason we don’t derive the reason of the verse is because of concern over error. Because what you’re really saying is: here, I’m showing you an example
[Speaker J] that if we were concerned…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What you’re really saying is that if we derive the reason of the verse, we’ll make a mistake. Since that same reason could also apply to a wealthy widow. But that’s not what the Talmud says. In a moment we’ll see. Okay? The Talmud says that we do not derive the reason of the verse; it doesn’t say that from your reason Rabbi Shimon would also get wealthy widows.
[Speaker J] Why don’t we derive it? Because of the specific thing here.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not specifically here. Again: specifically here, you’re telling me your reason is a correct reason, what you’re saying, Rabbi Shimon. The problem is not to hurt a person in distress. Then Rabbi Yehuda could say, fine—but a wealthy widow is also in distress. So that’s no problem; it’s not a principled problem with deriving the reason of the verse, you’re just mistaken in the application. But that’s not a general statement. The Talmud presents it as a principled dispute whether one derives or does not derive the reason of the verse.
[Speaker B] Maybe if it’s the verse “and do not defile the land”—his breadstaff was broken all at once? So? And therefore? And therefore it isn’t fair that someone who has a breadstaff versus someone who doesn’t have a breadstaff. Ah, fine.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that is the reason for the commandment, and therefore Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda disagree about whether one uses the reason in order to interpret the verse. That is exactly the dispute. So the Talmud brings there in Bava Metzia, it brings the Mishnah in Sanhedrin: “He shall not multiply wives for himself beyond eighteen.” Poor guy—only the king can’t have more than eighteen; you have to stop him at a small number, no choice. Rabbi Yehuda says: He may multiply them for himself, provided that they do not turn his heart away. Yes, meaning you can take thirty-two also, as long as they’re righteous women. Okay. Rabbi Shimon says: Even one who turns his heart away—he may not marry her. Meaning, even one single wicked woman is forbidden, because she turns his heart away. If so, why does it say “He shall not multiply wives for himself”? Even like Abigail. Meaning, a large number of righteous women. But wicked women who turn his heart away—even one, no. Okay? That is Rabbi Shimon’s claim. Rabbi Yehuda says no: you may increase, you can increase up to eighteen, and you may take whichever you want, wicked or not wicked. Above eighteen it is forbidden to take wicked ones. Meaning, if they are wicked and turn his heart away, then don’t take them. So here the Talmud… asks that Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda have basically switched roles. Rabbi Shimon, who ordinarily derives the reason of the verse, in this case does not derive the reason of the verse. What does that really mean? That it is forbidden for him to multiply wives beyond eighteen even if they are righteous like Abigail. Why are you deriving the reason of the verse? After all, they won’t turn his heart away, so if they are righteous, they won’t turn his heart away—what’s the problem? That’s Rabbi Shimon. And Rabbi Yehuda again—Rabbi Yehuda is the reverse. Rabbi Yehuda, who ordinarily does not derive the reason of the verse, here actually says yes, he may multiply them as much as he wants if they do not turn his heart away. So they switched roles. So the Talmud says: actually, Rabbi Yehuda generally does not derive the reason of the verse, but here it is different because the verse itself explains: “He shall not multiply wives for himself, and his heart shall not turn away.” What is the reason that he should not multiply wives for himself? Because his heart should not turn away. And Rabbi Shimon? Since generally we derive the reason of the verse—even when the Torah does not write it. The Merciful One should have written only “He shall not multiply,” and then we would not need “and his heart shall not turn away.” Since we would derive on our own that it is so that his heart should not turn away, because we derive the reason of the verse even when it is not written. So why did the Merciful One write “and his heart shall not turn away”? Even one woman, if she turns his heart away, he may not marry her. So the Talmud says: it’s not reversed. The dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda concerns a case where the Torah itself does not write the reason and we infer the reason. So Rabbi Shimon infers the reason and Rabbi Yehuda says no, we do not derive the reason of the verse. But when the Torah itself states the reason, then things reverse. Why do they reverse? Because according to Rabbi Shimon, since we derive the reason of the verse, the question arises: why did the Torah write it? In all the places where it does not write it, we interpret on our own what the reason is. So why here did it bother to write it? So Rabbi Shimon says: we have no choice but to say that it comes to command us with an additional command, because otherwise why was it written? And therefore specifically here he does not derive the reason of the verse; rather, he sees this as two commands. And Rabbi Yehuda says no—since I ordinarily do not derive the reason of the verse, then there is no question why here the Torah wrote the reason: it wanted to tell me that here we do use the reason. And so Rabbi Yehuda here does derive the reason of the verse, because the Torah wrote the reason here in order to tell me that here you should derive the reason of the verse, whereas ordinarily I do not derive the reason of the verse. So this does not contradict their general views—on the contrary. And then it comes out as follows: Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree in places where the Torah did not state the reason and we decide it on our own based on our interpretive considerations. Rabbi Shimon says to derive; Rabbi Yehuda says not to derive. If the reason itself—but of course no one says to count two commandments. But if the reason is written explicitly, then here the situation reverses. According to Rabbi Shimon, since it is redundant, apparently this is another command—so there are two commandments here, which is the source for the Behag’s view: really two commandments. And according to Rabbi Yehuda, who does not derive the reason of the verse, here there is a command and a reason—but here too one derives that reason. It’s not just some intellectual point; one derives that reason. That’s why the Torah wrote it, so that we should derive the reason of the verse. It’s not just an abstract lesson, let’s see what this is about. Why is this important? Because notice now that according to both approaches, both Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda, when the Torah writes a reason, it is not for an intellectual lesson but for a halakhic lesson. According to Rabbi Shimon, it is to add another command besides the prohibition—another command. One command not to multiply wives, no matter what kind; the second command that they not turn his heart away—even a small number of wives, if they turn his heart away, then no. Two different commandments, or two details within one commandment—it doesn’t matter to me right now what the practical difference is between the commandments, but these are two different commands. Okay? According to Rabbi Yehuda too—Rabbi Yehuda also agrees that the second part has halakhic significance. It comes to instruct us to derive the reason of the verse and to say that “you shall not take a widow’s garment as collateral” speaks only about a poor widow and not a wealthy widow—a poor widow and not a wealthy widow, if that were written, and there it is not written. With the king it is written. So what does that come to say? That only wives who turn his heart away are forbidden to multiply. Beyond that he may multiply, because here he derives the reason of the verse. Now what happens is that Nachmanides brings this Talmudic passage as an objection to Maimonides. Why? Because Maimonides, in the Book of Commandments and elsewhere—and after all, this is what Maimonides is discussing—deals with verses where the Torah itself writes the reason for the commandment. And about that Maimonides says: clearly there are not two commandments to count here, because the second verse comes only to give a reason for the verse of the commandment, the first verse or the first part. Okay? Nachmanides says: that does not fit either of the two opinions in the Talmud. Rabbi Shimon really loves the two-commandment model—that fits the Behag, right? Two commandments, directly against Maimonides. Now someone will say, fine, Maimonides doesn’t rule like Rabbi Shimon; we rule like Rabbi Yehuda, who does not derive the reason of the verse. But Rabbi Yehuda also does not say what Maimonides says. Rabbi Yehuda claims that when the reason is written in the Torah, we use it to interpret the halakhic instruction, because the Torah writes the reason in order to tell me that here I should derive the reason of the verse. Maimonides says no, it has no significance whatsoever: you take the verse, and the reason was said in order to tell you what the reason is, but it has no bearing on the matter; you do not derive from the reason.
[Speaker D] Maimonides writes in our root.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In our root Maimonides says that the reason came to tell you what the rationale for the command is. According to this Talmudic passage, that’s not true. Rabbi Yehuda says that the reason came for a halakhic purpose, so that we should derive the reason of the verse, that we should draw a halakhic conclusion from it. I’m saying: that fits Maimonides’ claim that there is only one commandment here.
[Speaker D] But the rationale—if Maimonides counts as the commandment “he shall not multiply wives for himself,” doesn’t he also write the reason?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, I’m getting to Maimonides on “he shall not multiply wives for himself”; there are surprises there. Fine. But that is what Nachmanides argues. Nachmanides argues: Rabbi Shimon flatly contradicts Maimonides—according to Rabbi Shimon these are two commands. But Rabbi Yehuda also does not fit Maimonides. Because Rabbi Yehuda also does not say that the reason appearing in the verse only explains the command. No—the reason comes to interpret the command. Here we derive the reason of the verse. It is not something that comes only for intellectual purposes; it comes for halakhic purposes. Maimonides writes otherwise, and therefore Nachmanides says this cannot be; it goes against the Talmud.
[Speaker F] Five minutes ago you said that Maimonides’ view isn’t clear whether it’s this or that, right? According to the end of his statement, according to his wording.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I said it isn’t clear which of the reasons explains why he doesn’t count them as two commandments, but it is clear in Maimonides that the second part comes only to explain the command. Now the question is—and therefore what? So you can explain: therefore we don’t count both commands, but which one do we count? Either only the command or only the reason. Those are the two possibilities.
[Speaker F] But he didn’t say which.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. But that isn’t connected to what I’m saying here. What I’m saying here is that Maimonides claims that the rationale explains the command. It has no halakhic purpose; it only comes for an intellectual purpose, to explain the command. That Maimonides certainly writes. My question in light of that is why Maimonides attacks the Behag and says that only one commandment should be counted. Here there are two possibilities: either count only the command or count only the reason. That’s a different discussion; that’s not here. Now, what is written when you look at Maimonides is in the roots. In the fifth root, Nachmanides in his glosses attacks Maimonides there—that’s what I just said. When you look at Maimonides, in his Commentary on the Mishnah in Sanhedrin there, on the dispute about not multiplying wives for himself, Maimonides concludes—he writes five words, six: “The law is neither like Rabbi Shimon nor like Rabbi Yehuda.” Seven words. That’s it. He doesn’t elaborate at all, explains nothing. The law is like whom? Like me? What do you mean not? There’s a dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda, and “the law is neither like Rabbi Shimon nor like Rabbi Yehuda.” Strange. Very terse.
[Speaker F] What? Very terse. There? That what’s written in that margin there, that’s Chai Peshuta. No, that’s the commentary of the Meiri, not Maimonides’ commentary.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So
[Speaker F] Maimonides—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the Laws of Kings, when he brings this law, chapter 3, law 2: “He shall not multiply wives for himself.” By oral tradition they learned that he may take up to eighteen wives; including wives and concubines, altogether eighteen. Only? Only eighteen, yes. Don’t we learn from David and all those things there are? And if he added one and had relations with her—the Talmud brings this—yes, he is lashed. And he may divorce one and marry another in place of the one he divorced. If he divorces one, poor fellow, he only has seventeen; that’s dangerous too—let him take another so he’ll have eighteen. But that’s it. Now what does Maimonides write? Eighteen. Right? Not wicked, not righteous—eighteen. There is no such opinion in the Mishnah. So he is consistent with what he writes in the Commentary on the Mishnah: “The law is neither like Rabbi Shimon nor like Rabbi Yehuda.” It fits neither Rabbi Shimon nor Rabbi Yehuda. Because according to Rabbi Yehuda, it is permitted to multiply beyond eighteen if they are righteous—not written in Maimonides. According to Rabbi Shimon, it is forbidden to marry even one wicked woman—not written in Maimonides. So in Maimonides he is indeed consistent in his view that the law is neither like Rabbi Shimon nor like Rabbi Yehuda. But how does that work? What does that mean? So he invents his own opinion? Against the Mishnah?
[Speaker D] He doesn’t write “and his heart shall not turn away”; he doesn’t write the reason of “and his heart shall not turn away” either, as it were.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In a moment we’ll see—in the Commentary on the Mishnah, in the Book of Commandments he does write it. I think we need to go back to the Mishnah and read it again. Let me read you the Mishnah—pay close attention now.
[Speaker D] Thank God, a little…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes? Okay. “He shall not multiply wives for himself, so that his heart shall not turn away.”
[Speaker F] How many may he multiply?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rather: “He shall not multiply wives for himself beyond eighteen.” Rabbi Yehuda says: He may multiply them for himself provided they do not turn his heart away. Rabbi Shimon says: Even one that turns his heart away—he may not marry her. If so, why does it say “He shall not multiply wives for himself”? Even like Abigail.
[Speaker I] Are there three opinions here or two opinions? There are three opinions here, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Nachmanides read the Mishnah this way: there is a heading—“He shall not multiply wives for himself beyond eighteen”—and now there is a dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda about how to interpret this prohibition. Maimonides says, what are you talking about? There are three opinions. The first tanna says: “He shall not multiply wives for himself beyond eighteen.” Rabbi Shimon says his move, and Rabbi Yehuda says his move. There are three opinions here. And therefore Maimonides adds not a single word: “The law is neither like Rabbi Shimon nor like Rabbi Yehuda,” because he reads the Mishnah plainly as three opinions. He doesn’t need to add a word. The law is simply like the anonymous first tanna. And what does the first tanna say? Exactly what Maimonides rules too—already in the Mishneh Torah: eighteen, period. I don’t care about wicked, righteous, anything—eighteen. That’s it. What is the idea behind this? The idea in terms of deriving the reason of the verse is that the first tanna argues against both Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda that we do not derive the reason of the verse even in a place where the reason is explicitly written in the Torah. Okay? That fits neither Rabbi Shimon nor Rabbi Yehuda. There is a third approach here, and people don’t always notice this when they discuss the sugya of the reason of the verse. They bring the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda, but in fact this is a three-way dispute among the tannaim. The opinion of the first tanna—and it was ruled as law, at least according to Maimonides—that opinion that nobody brings. Maimonides says there is a third opinion: you do not derive the reason of the verse even when the reason is explicitly written in the Torah. It is explicitly written in the Torah: “He shall not multiply wives for himself, and his heart shall not turn away.” Doesn’t interest me—eighteen, that’s it. I don’t care if it’s a few wicked ones or many righteous ones; the first is permitted, the second is forbidden.
[Speaker D] Why is the reason written?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] To tell you why the prohibition exists.
[Speaker D] A widow is a widow.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, father says that that is the reason; he only says it has no halakhic significance. We do not derive the reason of the verse even when the reason is explicitly written in the Torah. A widow is a widow—what difference does it make whether she has… no, with a widow the reason is not written. Seemingly, if the reason is not written, then of course it would be forbidden.
[Speaker D] Obviously, according to Maimonides, obviously—but
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to Nachmanides, with the widow—
[Speaker D] you also don’t derive the reason of the verse according to Nachmanides, because with the widow the reason isn’t written.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But Nachmanides here says: when the reason is written, then there you do derive. Maimonides says no—even when the reason is written, you do not derive. Okay? Now what really emerges from here?
[Speaker K] Maimonides also writes, I think in Guide of the Perplexed, that if he thinks this is the reason for the commandment, he may still be mistaken. So what matters more is the commandment itself.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’re returning to what people here already said, meaning that there may be a concern over error—especially when it’s written explicitly in the Torah, that’s difficult.
[Speaker I] There is another commandment close to this, the commandment of the widow: if someone takes a garment or covering as collateral, he has to return it in the evening.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s the same thing; it’s the same commandment.
[Speaker I] It’s the same commandment?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s the same commandment—quite the opposite. The reason they give for why not to take from a wealthy widow is that with a wealthy widow you don’t have to return it to her in the evening. And since you don’t have to return it to her in the evening, they won’t suspect that he comes to her in order to do all kinds of…
[Speaker I] Is collateral only for a poor person or for anyone?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, only for a poor person. You return it in the evening only for a poor person, and because of that you don’t take it. And because of that you don’t take it—because of this prohibition. That is exactly what Rabbi Shimon says. In any case, so really there are three tannaitic opinions. Rabbi Shimon’s opinion is that we derive the reason of the verse, and therefore if the reason is not written—and if the reason is written, then apparently that is another command, because there was no need to write it. Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion: we do not derive the reason of the verse, but when the reason is written, then yes, we do derive. The first tanna’s opinion: we do not derive the reason of the verse, period. It doesn’t matter whether it is written or not written—even if it is written. That of course brings us back to the question: then really why not? If the reason is written and there is no longer any concern that we’ll get confused, right? That we’ll make a mistake in interpretation. So why not? What’s the problem? So I think the claim is the following. This takes me back a bit to the possibilities that were mentioned earlier. Maimonides basically argues that the reason for the prohibition on multiplying wives is that his heart should not turn away. That is explicitly written in the Torah, and that really is the reason. As I said at the beginning, if that really is the reason, then it makes no sense not to interpret the command in light of the reason, because that really is the reason why the king was forbidden to multiply wives. So what’s the problem? Why not use that reason to understand the contours of the prohibition? So Maimonides says simply: because if you multiply righteous wives, they won’t turn your heart away? A person who has thirty wives like Abigail is still occupied all his life with his wives instead of occupying himself with the things he needs to occupy himself with. And therefore that turns his heart away regardless of whether the wives are wicked or good. Meaning, the first tanna claims that if indeed the rationale is “his heart shall not turn away,” the question is what that means. The fact that the prohibition on multiplying wives is so that his heart should not turn away can be interpreted the way Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda interpret it—that righteous wives may be multiplied. And he says no: if that is the rationale, and it says simply “he shall not multiply wives for himself,” apparently the rationale explains the instruction. What does that mean? The instruction was said: more than eighteen, regardless of what kind of wives. The rationale is that his heart shall not turn away. What does that mean? Apparently even more righteous wives turn his heart away, and therefore the rationale is a true rationale, and I can even use it to understand the commandment—but it won’t change anything: above eighteen is forbidden. That is Maimonides’ claim. I’ll give you an example. Maimonides writes in his Book of Commandments
[Speaker D] when he
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] brings this commandment, he says as follows. He says regarding prohibitions 363 through 365—those are the three prohibitions on a king: to multiply horses, wives, and wealth, respectively. “And God, exalted be He, has already explained in Scripture the reason for these three commandments, that is, ‘He shall not multiply horses for himself,’ ‘He shall not multiply wives for himself,’ and ‘Silver and gold he shall not greatly multiply for himself.’ And because their reason and cause became known, there resulted from them the deviation from religion that has become well known from the story of Solomon, peace be upon him, despite his great rank in prophecy and wisdom and his being beloved of God. They said that in this there is a hint and a warning to people that if they knew all the reasons for the commandments, the same deviation would happen to them—the slippery slope. For if that one, complete in wisdom and great in stature, already imagined in this matter and thought that this action was not necessarily a cause of that transgression, what will be the case with the intellect of the masses in its weakness? They will think about them and say: was this thing forbidden, or that commanded, only because of such-and-such? I will guard myself against the matter for which the commandment was given, and I will not pay attention to the commandment itself. Then the uprightness of religion will be corrupted, and therefore God, exalted be He, concealed their reasons. Yet there is not even one among them that does not have a reason and a cause.” Now this is very strange, because here Scripture did not conceal their reasons. You’re explaining to me that ordinarily Scripture conceals the reason so we won’t get confused. Fine—but here, where Scripture did not conceal the reason, that is exactly what Rabbi Yehuda says: here Scripture did not conceal the reason, therefore we need to derive the reason of the verse. Because here there is no problem—after all, it’s written. Apparently there was no concern we would get confused; He Himself wrote the reason. And Maimonides himself brings this. Therefore I think Maimonides does not mean that. I think Maimonides means that we will get confused not in the sense that this reason is incorrect. This reason is certainly correct; it is written in the Torah. The question is: what are its halakhic implications? Because in fact—exactly. The fact is that Rabbi Shimon says: if I have thirty righteous wives, then my heart will not turn away, and therefore I may multiply them. Right? But Maimonides says: but it says “he shall not multiply wives for himself,” it doesn’t say wicked wives. So that means every kind of wife is forbidden to multiply. So why is the reason “that his heart shall not turn away”? You see, even thirty righteous wives turn the heart away. Okay? Now how is this connected to the slippery slope he talks about in the commandment?
[Speaker G] The Torah is teaching us something new about reality. Again? The Torah is teaching that looking at this reason—that’s
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] reality.
[Speaker G] Meaning, you think it’s only eighteen, but really it’s even…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, or that it’s a different kind of turning of the heart. You could say it’s a different kind of turning of the heart. Here it’s leading to transgressions, and here it’s leading to being occupied with things that are not matters of governing the kingdom. Okay? Now we would have thought that turning of the heart means dealing with transgressions, so the Torah says no, no—the turning of the heart that I mean…
[Speaker G] So why not interpret it? Same thing. So why not interpret it? What? If in the end we still don’t really know the reason because we’ll get confused.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s what Maimonides says—only for an intellectual reason alone. Only in order to explain to me the idea underlying the prohibition…
[Speaker G] Fine, but he says intellectual knowledge, and in truth he understands the end of the matter. Why do you really understand the end of the matter here, and then it would affect things?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maimonides says no, no—it does not affect things. That is Maimonides’ claim. I’ll get to that in a moment—next time. But what Maimonides claims is that it won’t affect things in any case. I’ll say already now—look, in my view what Maimonides says is this: we do not derive the reason of the verse because it has no practical implication. The wording of the Torah has to be precise. If the Torah says “he shall not multiply,” beyond eighteen, once we’ve interpreted that as eighteen, then it has to mean eighteen, period. There are no slips in the Torah. The Torah is not that the Holy One, blessed be He, phrased it imprecisely, so that if it says eighteen and there is no hint whether righteous or wicked—eighteen, period. Then afterward you have a reason, and now the reason seemingly leads you to a different conclusion—that thirty is also possible if they’re righteous. So he says: then you made a mistake. But not that you made a mistake because the reason is wrong, as people usually think—maybe you interpreted it incorrectly. Because here the reason is written in the Torah, so it cannot be that you were mistaken about the reason. You were mistaken about the meaning of the reason. And if the reason of “his heart shall not turn away” contradicts the command for you, that means you didn’t apply it correctly. Because turning of the heart is not committing transgressions, but being occupied with unimportant things. That is called turning of the heart. And therefore, Maimonides says, we do not derive the reason of the verse—not because we don’t need to, but because it will never lead you to a different conclusion. Because his assumption is that the Torah’s wording is precise wording. And what you learn from the Torah’s wording is the law. And if the reason takes you to a different conclusion, you simply got confused. That’s all. Because he has confidence in the precision of the Torah’s wording. That’s the point. Therefore we do not derive the reason of the verse. That’s a completely different explanation—but we’ll get to that another time.