Reasons and Rationales of the Commandments, Lesson 13

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The verse in Jeremiah and the Targum as the basis for the category of “the will of God”
Types of reasoning: interpretation, generating a new law, and the will of God
The passage of “and your offering shall be reckoned for you” and the difficulty of estimation and intention
Rashi, the Mishnah in Terumot, and Maimonides in his Commentary on the Mishnah: reversing the direction of the derivation
The problem of “if it is not relevant” as a mere textual support, and understanding “and they connected this to the word of God”
An attempted solution through Tosafot Rid: a minimum for giving, and the essential difficulty
Maimonides and Nachmanides on Principle 12: giving as part of the commandment or a separate commandment, and the status of terumah gedolah
The main proposal: the measures of terumah as a “rabbinic estimate of the Torah’s intent,” and a Torah-level measure that is not explicitly commanded
Estimation rather than measurement: the prohibition of measuring as an implementation of the Torah’s intent
Comparison to challah and the practical implications today
The Jerusalem Talmud on Pe’ah and the claim that terumah does have a measure
Mesillat Yesharim and the trait of piety as listening to the will of the Commander

Summary

General Overview

The text presents a new kind of reasoning that counts as Torah-level reasoning. It is not built on human logic about what is “right” or “moral,” but on identifying “the will of God” from the language of the Torah and the indications it creates. It grounds this in a verse in Jeremiah and in the distinction made by the Targum between “that I did not command in the Torah,” “that I did not send through My servants the prophets,” and “that was not My will.” It develops the idea through the topic of terumah: although the Torah did not give a binding measure for terumah gedolah, and even one grain exempts the whole pile, it nevertheless expects a broader giving “from the generosity of the heart.” The Sages therefore set three measures not as a merely rabbinic ordinance, but as an estimate of what the Torah expects, while still leaving room for personal choice. At the end he connects this to Mesillat Yesharim, which defines piety as giving pleasure to one’s Creator through understanding the tendency of His will, even beyond what we were explicitly commanded.

The verse in Jeremiah and the Targum as the basis for the category of “the will of God”

The verse in Jeremiah says, regarding the worship of Baal, “which I did not command, nor did I speak, nor did it arise upon My heart.” Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman, in Kuntres Divrei Sofrim, cites the Targum there: “that I did not command in the Torah, nor did I send through My servants the prophets, nor was it My will.” The text interprets the three levels as an explicit command in the Torah, a prophetic message through the prophets, and a third level of “My will” that is neither command nor prophecy, but still expresses a divine expectation. From here it formulates a category of reasoning in which the very knowledge or indication of God’s will obligates action, even if a person would not have arrived at that by his own logic.

Types of reasoning: interpretation, generating a new law, and the will of God

The text defines two familiar kinds of reasoning: interpretive reasoning, which explains the Torah through the rationale of the verse and the rules of exposition; and reasoning that generates a new law, such as blessings over enjoyment and saying grace before eating, where Pnei Yehoshua and Tzelach disagree whether this is Torah-level reasoning. It explains that these forms of reasoning “have their basis in me” and rely on what seems logical or reasonable to a person; and in exegetical derivations, reasoning serves as a tool for deciding what to include when the verse demands inclusion. Opposed to these, it presents another type: “the will of God” is an obligation that stems from understanding that the Holy One, blessed be He, expects a certain behavior even when a person himself would not have chosen it on grounds of logic or morality.

The passage of “and your offering shall be reckoned for you” and the difficulty of estimation and intention

The baraita in Gittin 30 cites Abba Elazar ben Gamliel on the verse “and your offering shall be reckoned for you” as referring to two offerings, and concludes that just as terumah gedolah is taken by estimation and intention, so too terumat ma’aser is taken by estimation and intention. The text raises the difficulty that terumah gedolah, by Torah law, has no fixed measure, and one grain exempts the pile, so it is unclear what exactly is being estimated there. On the other hand, it is hard to derive from it to terumat ma’aser, which does have a fixed measure of one tenth. It adds a broader difficulty: the baraita assumes that estimation in terumah gedolah is obvious, but gives no source that measuring is forbidden; and seemingly there is no justification for estimation where there is a measure, and no meaning to estimation where there is no measure.

Rashi, the Mishnah in Terumot, and Maimonides in his Commentary on the Mishnah: reversing the direction of the derivation

Rashi explains that the estimation in terumah gedolah applies to the Sages’ measure of “one in fifty,” because if one errs there is no prohibition, since by Torah law there is no measure and one grain exempts the pile. The Mishnah in Terumot states, “One may not separate by measure, by weight, or by count,” and Maimonides in his Commentary on the Mishnah explains that it is forbidden to separate terumah gedolah by measure “since Scripture did not mention any measure for it at all.” He connects this to “and your offering shall be reckoned for you” and to the exposition “you separate by thought and not by anything else.” Maimonides emphasizes that the verse speaks about terumat ma’aser, but he uses the principle “if it is not relevant to terumat ma’aser, apply it to terumah gedolah,” because in terumat ma’aser “its measure is known, and the Torah was exacting about its measure, saying: a tithe from the tithe.” The text highlights that this yields the reverse picture from the baraita in Gittin: instead of learning from terumah gedolah to terumat ma’aser, Maimonides transfers the verse from terumat ma’aser to terumah gedolah through “if it is not relevant,” and this creates the fundamental question of how such a derivation can serve a law connected to a rabbinic measure.

The problem of “if it is not relevant” as a mere textual support, and understanding “and they connected this to the word of God”

The text argues that “if it is not relevant” by its very nature cannot be a regular mere textual support, because it begins from a difficulty about what the verse is speaking of and demands a real resolution; therefore the result cannot be only a rabbinic law. It connects this to Maimonides’ approach in the second principle, according to which “words of the Sages” can include laws derived through exegetical methods, and explains that the expression “and they connected this to the word of God” is not necessarily “a mere textual support” in the usual weak sense, but rather an exegetical link that is not “fully Torah law” and yet still emerges from the verse. Even so, the tension remains so long as the measure of terumah is understood as only a rabbinic measure.

An attempted solution through Tosafot Rid: a minimum for giving, and the essential difficulty

The text cites the view of a few isolated medieval authorities (Rishonim), such as Tosafot Rid in Kiddushin (quoted by Mishneh LaMelekh in the laws of gifts to the poor), who distinguish between the measure for separation, which has no limit, and the measure for giving to the priest, below which it is not considered a real gift. It explains that even if this solved the question of “what is being estimated,” a problem would still remain: the measure for giving is not stated explicitly, and according to most medieval authorities (Rishonim) there is no measure even for the giving itself. It adds that this solution does not explain the contrast with terumat ma’aser, because if terumah gedolah also has a measure, even if only in the act of giving, then once again it is unclear why estimation would apply there and not in terumat ma’aser.

Maimonides and Nachmanides on Principle 12: giving as part of the commandment or a separate commandment, and the status of terumah gedolah

The text presents a dispute between Maimonides and Nachmanides over whether giving is part of the commandment or a commandment in its own right, and notes that Nachmanides distinguishes between “gifts that affect the produce” like terumah, where there is both a rectification of the pile and a gift. It brings linguistic evidence from Maimonides’ Sefer HaMitzvot: with first-fruits, first tithe, terumat ma’aser, and challah, Maimonides writes “to separate and give,” whereas with terumah gedolah he writes only “that we were commanded to separate terumah gedolah,” without “and give it to the priest.” The text concludes that according to Maimonides there is no commandment of giving at all in terumah gedolah; rather, the priest “takes what is his,” and the act of separation transfers the item to the “treasury of Heaven,” linking this to the issue of whether the benefit of choosing the recipient has monetary status or not.

The main proposal: the measures of terumah as a “rabbinic estimate of the Torah’s intent,” and a Torah-level measure that is not explicitly commanded

The text proposes that the measures of one in forty, one in fifty, and one in sixty are measures for separation, not for giving, and that their root is Torah-level, not rabbinic, but that the Torah deliberately does not command a measure in order to preserve the dimension of “the generosity of the heart.” It presents “one grain exempts the pile” as the minimum fulfillment needed for rectification, but the Torah’s language of “offering” and the law of giving “with a generous eye” create an expectation to give more even without an explicit command, and the obligation therefore stems from “the will of God.” It explains that the Sages do not establish a single fixed measure, so as not to destroy the voluntariness the Torah wanted; instead they set a three-part scale that lets a person place himself between generous, average, and stingy, thus preserving choice as part of the Torah-level message.

Estimation rather than measurement: the prohibition of measuring as an implementation of the Torah’s intent

The text explains that the prohibition “not by measure, not by weight, and not by count” is not just technical advice, but follows from the idea that the Torah wanted a gift that is not “calculating” but generous. Therefore one must separate by estimation so that “more will come out” and this will express a generous eye. It argues that in this way two questions are solved: there is something to estimate, because there is a desirable measure from the outset, one in forty/fifty/sixty; and there is no fear of loss regarding the rectification of the pile, because after the fact one grain exempts it. It formulates that the measure “not less than one in sixty” functions as the desired minimum, and estimation creates a tendency to give beyond the minimum, in keeping with the purpose of terumah.

Comparison to challah and the practical implications today

The text notes a precise difference in Maimonides’ wording: in the laws of terumot he says, “Preferably, one should separate only according to the measure the Sages gave,” whereas in the laws of challah Maimonides first says there is no Torah-level measure, and only afterward says, “By rabbinic law,” one separates one in twenty-four so that there be “enough of a gift for the priest.” It concludes that for challah, the measure is a true rabbinic enactment connected to making it a gift for the priest, whereas in terumah the measure describes the preferable fulfillment of the Torah’s intent through the Sages’ determination. As a practical consequence, he notes that according to Maimonides today terumah is burned, so one separates any amount at all, while for challah one still separates the regular measure even though it too is not actually given, and he explains this as the difference between a preferred practice stemming from expectation and a binding rabbinic law of giving.

The Jerusalem Talmud on Pe’ah and the claim that terumah does have a measure

The text cites the Jerusalem Talmud at the beginning of Pe’ah, which asks why the Mishnah does not list terumah among “these are the things that have no measure,” even though with terumah one can seemingly always add more, and there is a commandment in that addition. It suggests that the answer is that terumah is not really a case of “no measure” in the full sense, because it does have a minimum measure of one in sixty within the framework of expectation and estimation, even if the Torah did not write this as an explicit binding measure. It notes that the Jerusalem Talmud itself does not in fact give this answer and leaves the question open.

Mesillat Yesharim and the trait of piety as listening to the will of the Commander

The text concludes with a passage from Mesillat Yesharim, chapter 18, which states that the root of piety is “giving pleasure to one’s Creator,” and that love of the Creator causes a person not to be satisfied with exemption from the explicit obligation, but to reason from “an indication of intent” to discover what the Commander wants and to broaden one’s action beyond what was formally stated. It compares this to a son who loves his father, understands from hints what gladdens his father, and acts beyond explicit instruction; and it defines the whole of piety as expanding the fulfillment of the commandments “in all the aspects and conditions that are fitting and possible.” It presents terumah as a clear example of this move: the Torah’s language of “offering” and “generosity of the heart” creates a divine expectation that does not stem from human moral reasoning but from understanding the will of God, and the reasoning that obligates here is simply recognition of that will.

Full Transcript

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I want

[Speaker B] to finish

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the

[Speaker C] series

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] on types and kinds of reasoning, and today I want to focus on another kind of reasoning, which can also be treated as Torah-level reasoning within the framework of what I discussed in previous sessions, but it’s a different kind from the forms of reasoning people usually know. A source for this can be brought from the verse in Jeremiah, where it says like this: “They built the high places of Baal to burn their sons in fire as burnt offerings to Baal, which I did not command, and I did not speak, and it did not arise upon My heart.” So what is the difference between “I did not command,” “I did not speak,” and “it did not arise upon My heart”? Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman, in Kuntres Divrei Sofrim, brings the Targum there. The Targum says: “that I did not command in the Torah, and I did not send through My servants the prophets, and it was not My will.” Yes? I did not command in the Torah, I did not send through My servants the prophets, and it was not My will before Me. What is this “My will” here? What is this third thing? So I think the claim is that there is some different category of reasoning here from what we usually know. Usually, up to this point, we encountered reasoning on two planes. There is interpretive reasoning, where we can talk about the rationale of the verse or not the rationale of the verse, everything we discussed in that context. That reasoning interprets for us what is written in the Torah, and of course that’s something we do all the time by expounding the rationale of the verse, where we already discussed what that rule means. There is also reasoning—and here Pnei Yehoshua and Tzelach disagree, as we discussed in Berakhot—a reasoning that creates a new law, like blessings over enjoyment, saying grace before eating, and there Pnei Yehoshua claims that it is Torah law, Tzelach disagrees with him, and I said that I’m not sure the disagreement is really as polarized as it appears. In simple terms, it’s like Torah law, only there is no explicit command, so it isn’t completely Torah law. That is the kind of reasoning under discussion according to Pnei Yehoshua; about that too one says “Torah-level reasoning.” According to Tzelach, reasoning is Torah-level only when it interprets. But what I’m talking about now is something else. This is not reasoning where I understand that this is what is right. The kinds of reasoning I discussed until now are reasonings whose basis is in me. My logic says this makes sense, this is right, this is proper to do, and things of that sort. The will of God is a reasoning that tells me: this is how the Holy One, blessed be He, expects me to act—not necessarily because I think it makes sense or because it is moral; maybe it isn’t. But if I have some indication—and I’ll still discuss how these indications are formed—but if I have some indication that this is what the Holy One, blessed be He, expects, then there is some obligation to do it regardless of whether I understand its benefit, or why it makes sense, or why it is right. The reasoning that the Sages bring in the context of saying grace before eating—they say that it is forbidden to enjoy this world without a blessing. That is reasoning of the first type, reasoning that says this sounds logical: you receive something, say thank you, bless, or ask permission. Whether it means say thank you or ask permission, in any case this is some kind of reasoning that I understand as the logical thing to do. Okay? Also the reasonings I discussed in the context of derivations—I mentioned that every derivation is also fundamentally based on reasoning. There is some trigger in the text, and that trigger causes us to activate reasoning. Let’s say, “You shall fear the Lord your God”—the word “et” tells us to include something. What are we including? The reasoning decides what to include. What kind of reasoning? What sounds logical to me—or in that context, as I mentioned, what sounds least illogical to me. As opposed to foundational reasoning, reasoning in the context of interpretation is basically only a process of elimination, because it says that something has to be included—it doesn’t come from reasoning; the verse says to include. I only have to decide what to include. Sometimes nothing sounds logical to me, so I choose what sounds least illogical, because something has to be included here. Okay? But that is still reasoning that speaks about how I think, what seems reasonable to me. What I’m talking about here is a different kind of reasoning. The will of God—“it was not My will,” as the Targum says in the verse. The will of God means that I have some indication, in some form—how exactly is not important right now—that the Holy One, blessed be He, expects me to act this way, even though on my own I would not have thought that this is the right way to act or the proper thing to do. But if I have an indication that this is what the Holy One, blessed be He, expects, then there is some obligation to do it. That is another kind of reasoning that I want to discuss here. I’ll bring—and focus on, I think, a particularly clear example of this—and that is the section of terumah. There is a baraita brought in Gittin 30, and it says as follows: “As it was taught, Abba Elazar ben Gamliel says: ‘And your offering shall be reckoned for you’—Scripture is speaking of two offerings.” This is said about a verse that deals with terumat ma’aser. “Scripture is speaking of two offerings: one is terumah gedolah and one is terumat ma’aser. Just as terumah gedolah is taken by estimation and by intention, so too terumat ma’aser is taken by estimation and by intention.” Right, terumah gedolah is the offering separated from produce—some amount at all; one grain exempts the pile. By Torah law it has no set measure, but at least the accepted view is that by rabbinic law there is a measure—three measures: one in forty, one in fifty, and one in sixty: a generous eye, an average eye, and a stingy eye. That is terumah gedolah. And terumat ma’aser is a tithe from the tithe—that is, from the tithe that the Levite receives, he has to separate one tenth for the priest. But that one has a measure, right? It is a tenth of the Levite’s tithe. So Abba Elazar ben Gamliel expounds the verse “and your offering shall be reckoned for you” to mean that just as terumah gedolah is separated by estimation and by intention, so too terumat ma’aser is separated by estimation and by intention. What does that mean? There is some kind of comparison here. Why is terumat ma’aser called terumah? Terumah gedolah is also called terumah. Why is terumat ma’aser called terumah? Because it too is some kind of terumah. In what sense? Of course, both are given to priests, but the Gemara says it is also called terumah in this respect—that it is separated by estimation and by intention exactly like terumah gedolah. Like terumah gedolah, so too terumat ma’aser. Rashi there writes—the matter is of course very difficult—what does it mean that terumah gedolah is separated by estimation and by intention? In terumah gedolah there is nothing to estimate. Terumah gedolah has no measure; one grain exempts the pile. If they had told me: look, take a tenth of this pile and give it to the priest—fine, then there would be room for this. I would need to say: I have a kilo, so I need to measure out one hundred grams from the kilo. But they tell me: no, don’t measure, estimate. Meaning: don’t measure exactly, do it approximately. The commentators say: so that it will come out to more. Do it approximately instead of measuring, not precisely, so that it will come out to more. But all that only makes sense where there is, fundamentally, a measure. Fundamentally there is a measure, and then one can tell me to separate it precisely, or tell me no, do it by estimation. But with terumah gedolah there is no measure at all—one grain exempts the pile. What kind of thing is that? And from there they derive to terumat ma’aser, which of course raises a second difficulty. Because if terumah gedolah is separated by estimation, that may be because it has no measure—because I am not required to give a specific amount. How can you derive from that to terumat ma’aser, where I have to give a tenth? If I estimate, I may miss it. Who says that there too—what is the logic of learning from terumah gedolah to terumat ma’aser? More than that: how do I know that in terumah gedolah it is separated by estimation? Is there some custom?

[Speaker C] There is a custom—from zero up to one in forty? They don’t take it exactly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Zero up to one in forty isn’t a custom. You separate however much you want. By rabbinic law there are the measures one in forty, fifty, and sixty. There is no one in forty by Torah law. Maybe what you give is one in forty, yes, but there is no

[Speaker C] as much as you want.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what, that’s not estimation? But let’s say somehow we manage to define some sort of estimation there. How do we know that one must separate by estimation? This verse assumes that with terumah gedolah you separate by estimation. It learns from terumah gedolah to terumat ma’aser. But in terumah gedolah itself, how do we know that you separate by estimation? So Rashi writes there: “The one in fifty that the Sages stated is separated by estimation, for if he erred there is no prohibition here, since by Torah law one grain exempts the pile, because the Torah did not give it a measure, but only ‘the first of your grain.’” Why do you separate by estimation? How does estimation apply to terumah gedolah? There’s no choice but to say that it is with respect to the rabbinic measure of one in fifty—that is what is estimated. Why indeed is it estimated there? Because there is no problem—even if you err, by Torah law you have fulfilled it, since one grain exempts the pile. Right? And now from this they make a comparison to terumat ma’aser. First of all, again, what is the connection? Here there is no concern, so you estimate. In terumat ma’aser you can miss the required amount. That’s one thing. Second, are you making a comparison using a rabbinic law? There is a rabbinic law that one must separate one in fifty—fifty. And therefore it can be separated by estimation, because by Torah law in any case you’ve fulfilled it. And from that you make a comparison to terumah gedolah—that in terumah gedolah the measure is a Torah-level measure. A tenth. Where do we ever find such a thing, that a comparison is made between a rabbinic law and a Torah law? Terumat ma’aser, as I said. How do you make a comparison from a rabbinic law to a Torah law? It’s really a strange issue.

[Speaker C] But I answered the question of why you estimate a measure that isn’t really a measure—it’s an estimate applied to the rabbinic measure.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rashi answered. Rashi feels the difficulty, so that’s why Rashi answers, but he doesn’t really answer it. Because either way: if you tell me that this is a rabbinic law, then how can you make a comparison to terumat ma’aser, which is a Torah law? And if it’s a Torah law, then the original question returns: what are you estimating, and how do you know that you estimate? Both questions remain, right? What is there to estimate if there is no measure? And second, even if somehow you had defined for me what to estimate—how do you know not to measure, but rather to estimate? The Gemara doesn’t bring any source for the fact that in terumah gedolah this is done. It’s obvious from reasoning. From there it learns to terumat ma’aser. What reasoning is there here? Either way—if there is a measure, then measure it. And if there is no measure, what are you estimating? Fine, so Rashi doesn’t really answer the difficulties. In the Mishnah in Terumot it says as follows: “One may not separate by measure, by weight, or by number.” Meaning not only do they recommend separating by estimation; it is an obligation to separate by estimation. It is forbidden to separate by measure, number, or weight. And Maimonides writes there in his Commentary on the Mishnah as follows: “It is forbidden to separate terumah gedolah by measure, since Scripture did not mention any measure for it at all.” Seemingly like Rashi: since Scripture gives no measure, terumah gedolah has no measure, and therefore it is forbidden to separate it by measure. But here that is already strange, because in our Gemara it says you separate by estimation, so Rashi says: you can separate by estimation because why not? So what does it mean that it is forbidden? If Scripture didn’t assign a measure, then where does the prohibition come from? It’s not that you must estimate; rather, it shouldn’t be forbidden not to estimate. Okay. “But one measures the item that is obligated in terumah and separates from it by estimation.” Meaning, you measure the thing obligated in terumah—the whole pile. Let’s say you have a kilo, so that you measure in order to know exactly how much you have; but the portion from it that you separate as terumah, that you estimate. You don’t measure it. Another question: why do you need to measure the original item at all? It doesn’t matter—one grain exempts the pile—so the size of the whole pile makes no difference. So why do you need to know the total size of the pile? “And they connected this to the word of God”—I continue in Maimonides—“‘and your offering shall be reckoned for you.’ And they said: by thought you separate, and not by anything else.” They learn it from the verse “and your offering shall be reckoned for you,” that you separate by thought and not by anything else. “And although this verse speaks of terumat ma’aser, the known principle in legal reasoning is applied here: if it is not relevant to terumat ma’aser, apply it to terumah gedolah. And why do we not apply this verse to terumat ma’aser? Because its measure is known, and the Torah was exacting about its measure, and said: a tithe from the tithe.” Very good. So Maimonides says the opposite of our Gemara, right? Maimonides says that although the verse “and your offering shall be reckoned for you” speaks about terumat ma’aser, in terumat ma’aser estimation doesn’t apply. The Torah gave a measure—a tenth—you can’t just estimate, because you might miss it. The whole idea of terumah gedolah is that you can estimate because you won’t miss it: by Torah law one grain exempts the pile. In terumat ma’aser estimation doesn’t apply, but the verse is written about terumat ma’aser. So if it is not relevant to terumat ma’aser, apply it to terumah gedolah, where estimation can apply. Fine? The questions still remain: what is there to estimate there? But at least now we understand the source that it is enough—or that it is required—to estimate in terumah gedolah. Because we asked in the Gemara, what is the source, and here there is a source. The second question still remains: what exactly are you estimating?

[Speaker C] But why is estimation of a known quantity ruled out? I didn’t understand. You say: if it is not relevant to terumat ma’aser, then it applies to terumah gedolah. That sounds like Maimonides is ruling out the possibility that we estimate a known quantity. But in your second question you yourself say that you can’t estimate an unknown quantity. So you can’t estimate anything. A known quantity I can’t estimate—that’s not how estimation works.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the other side of the same coin. I agree with every word.

[Speaker C] No, it contradicts it. If estimation exists, it necessarily applies either to a quantity or to not-a-quantity. I think estimation applies to quantity. So what he’s saying is that it doesn’t apply to terumah.

[Speaker B] It’s the other side of the same coin. It’s the same difficulty I raised, just the other side of it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I asked: how can you estimate something that has no measure at all? Estimation makes sense only with something quantitative. So first, it’s unclear why we estimate in terumah gedolah, and second, it’s unclear why estimation is ruled out for terumat ma’aser.

[Speaker C] Either way. “And your offering shall be reckoned for you.” “Shall be reckoned” means estimation. There is a quantity, but you only estimate it—you don’t measure it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The simple meaning of the verse, “shall be reckoned for you,” is straightforward.

[Speaker C] So why throw that over to terumah at all?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, I accept that. I’m saying: it’s the same difficulty I raised, just the other side of the same coin, the same difficulty. As for the matter itself, I think the difference between Maimonides’ explanation here and the baraita brought in Gittin is that there is a tannaitic dispute in the Sifra. The Sifra brings two tannaim and they disagree precisely on this point. In other words, the question is whether we learn from terumat ma’aser to terumah gedolah—that just as terumah gedolah is separated by estimation, so too terumat ma’aser is separated by estimation—that is our Gemara. And the second tanna says that if it is not relevant to terumat ma’aser—that is, terumat ma’aser cannot be separated by estimation because it has a fixed measure—then apply it to terumah gedolah. More than that, I’ll perhaps add another point about the claim that Maimonides follows here. When we speak about “if it is not relevant,” it always means that you learned some law from a verse, but now it turns out not to fit the subject about which the verse was written, so apparently it comes to teach about another law. Right? That is the rule of “if it is not relevant.” Now how can “if it is not relevant” teach a rabbinic law? What I asked earlier about the comparison in the Gemara in Gittin, I am now asking about this second approach in Maimonides’ Commentary on the Mishnah. “If it is not relevant” by definition comes to solve a problem. That is, you have a verse and you don’t know what it is talking about. So fine—what is it talking about? A rabbinic law? Then it is obvious that the verse is not talking about that. So if indeed it is not relevant to terumat ma’aser, then explain to me why it is relevant elsewhere—what is the verse talking about? Don’t just tell me it’s a textual support. Regarding a comparison you could still say it’s only a textual support. The comparison isn’t really a comparison; they just made it a support. But “if it is not relevant” is much stronger, because it starts with a difficulty in the verse, and you have to explain what the verse is speaking of. And there you cannot explain that it is speaking of a rabbinic law. What rabbinic law?

[Speaker C] The measure of terumah is a rabbinic measure.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Is it talking about the measure?

[Speaker C] It’s talking about the very idea of estimation, and that is indeed Torah-level.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Estimation of what? What are you trying to estimate? One grain and the pile is exempt? To estimate—not measure—that you have one grain?

[Speaker C] That has nothing to do with rabbinic law.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It does have to do with rabbinic law, because he too is talking about one in fifty.

[Speaker C] That’s what the Gemara says there—there’s nothing else to estimate here. So how do we learn that one grain exempts the pile? What do you mean, how do we learn it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Never mind. There is no measure. The Torah gave no measure. “Measures, interpositions, and partitions are a law given to Moses at Sinai.” Okay? There is no measure. The Torah itself doesn’t speak…

[Speaker C] Maybe if such an amount really existed, they wouldn’t have brought there that it should be…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] estimation. There is no measure. No, no measure appears anywhere. There is neither a law given to Moses at Sinai nor a verse. For ma’aser there is a verse—the verse says a tithe. Other measures come from “measures, interpositions, and partitions are a law given to Moses at Sinai.” Here there is neither a law given to Moses at Sinai nor a verse. So to say that one grain exempts the pile—you don’t need a source that one grain is enough; you need a source that says it isn’t enough. Okay? In Maimonides, Laws of Terumot, chapter 3, halakhah 4, Maimonides writes: “This terumah is not separated by measure, nor by weight, nor by count, because no measure was stated for it. Rather, one estimates and separates in his mind, like one in fifty.” Here it is already written explicitly—I think in the Commentary on the Mishnah he doesn’t say this explicitly—here it is written explicitly, like Rashi, that the estimation is with respect to the rabbinic measure of one in fifty. And that completes what we saw in Maimonides’ Commentary on the Mishnah: when the Gemara speaks about estimating what you separate as terumah gedolah, it means the measure established by the Sages, one in fifty. And that of course strengthens what I objected to earlier. I’ll just make perhaps one more remark. In the Commentary on the Mishnah he says: “And why do we not rely…” wait… “And they connected this to the word of God, ‘and your offering shall be reckoned for you.’” Seemingly you would say this is only a textual support. But as I said earlier, “if it is not relevant” cannot be mere textual support. “If it is not relevant” starts with a question on the verse, so the answer cannot be mere support. A comparison, a verbal analogy—those can all be mere supports. But “if it is not relevant” is perhaps the clearest case of something that cannot be just that. Because it begins from a difficulty: what is the verse talking about? And you propose a solution. If you turn that into mere support, then we are left with the original difficulty—it is not relevant to terumat ma’aser, so what is the verse itself talking about? Leave aside textual support—what is the verse talking about? Right? Therefore, what does it mean, “and they connected this to the word of God, ‘and your offering shall be reckoned for you’”? According to Maimonides’ approach, we need to remember—and we already discussed this—that in his second principle Maimonides says that laws derived through exposition are “words of the Sages.” For Maimonides, when he says textual support, he does not necessarily mean what we usually call a textual support—a rabbinic law merely hung on a verse. Rather, “textual support” may mean something that is perhaps not fully Torah law, but still emerges from the verse, say through exposition. Okay, I think that is how we need to understand the term “and they connected this to the word of God” here. Okay, so how are we to understand all this after all? It is difficult both for the view brought in our Gemara in Gittin and for the second tannaitic view Maimonides brings in the Commentary on the Mishnah. Both are difficult: what does it mean to estimate in terumah gedolah? And if it does apply, then why estimate? What is the difference between this and terumat ma’aser, and so on. Good. One possible answer might be this: there is the view of a few isolated medieval authorities (Rishonim). There is Tosafot Rid, for example, in Kiddushin, and Mishneh LaMelekh brings him in the laws of gifts to the poor. According to that view, there is indeed no measure for separating terumah—one grain exempts the pile—but there is a measure for giving. When you give to the priest, there is a certain minimum amount below which it is not considered a real gift. And since with terumah you have to separate from the pile and also give to the priest, then in the giving there is indeed a measure. In terms of separation, if you separated one grain, you exempted the pile; but you cannot take that one grain and give it to the priest—that is not called a gift. You need some minimal amount, and one can discuss there exactly what the amount is, but we won’t get into that now. One could have said that yes, whatever the measure of giving is—decide what you decide, it doesn’t matter right now what the measure is—but that is the measure that is estimated. And in terumah gedolah you estimate not the separation, because for separation one grain exempts the pile, but the giving. But even according to Tosafot Rid this is problematic, because that measure is stated nowhere. If you can invent it, you can decide it by one kind of reasoning or another, but I would have expected them to say something explicit. In simple terms, if anything is meant here, it is really the one-in-fifty measure, which is the usual measure mentioned in the context of terumah. Therefore to say that we are measuring the amount needed for giving, when it is not even clear what its source is or how much it is, is a bit difficult even according to Tosafot Rid. And according to most medieval authorities (Rishonim) there is no measure even for the giving of terumah, so in any case the difficulty remains for the other views.

[Speaker C] Maybe giving really is a different commandment, then? What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The giving. That’s another question—I’m about to get to it—whether that is a different commandment or the same commandment. In simple terms, maybe I’ll already speak about it now: there is a dispute between Maimonides and Nachmanides on this matter. In Principle 12, Maimonides says as follows—he is discussing parts of an action, that one does not count each part of an action as a separate commandment. He says: “And it is clear that the priest’s taking what he is to take is one part of the commandment, as we explained regarding the burnt offering.” Fine. There are priestly gifts, so the hide of the burnt offering is part of the priestly gifts. Maimonides says that the giving is not a commandment in its own right; it is part of the specific gift-commandment in question—terumah, ma’aser, the hide of the burnt offering, or whatever, challah, and so on. “Likewise with the first shear: the entire commandment is that we separate the first shear and give it to the priest.” He says this is one commandment, not two. “And likewise, that we separate the first tithe and give it to the Levite.” Nachmanides there, in his glosses on Principle 12, disagrees. He argues that it depends which gifts we are talking about. There are gifts that affect the produce and gifts that do not. Terumah is a gift that affects the produce: as long as you haven’t separated it, the rest is tevel, forbidden to eat. Other gifts do not render the rest permitted to you; there is only an obligation to give them to the priest. In the gifts that affect the produce, Nachmanides says, there are two things: first, the separation that rectifies the pile; and second, the giving to the priest. So it is commonly understood—there is a dispute here between Maimonides and Nachmanides regarding the counting of the commandments—whether giving is at all a commandment in its own right or not. So if I go back now to Tosafot Rid: when he says that there is a measure for giving, then there are arguments both ways. According to Maimonides’ view, one could indeed say that these are two different commandments: there is a measure here, while in the separation there is no measure—one grain exempts the pile. But then it would be difficult why estimation should apply in the separation. So separate, separate, separate—and once you already have all the terumah you separated, when you come to take it to the priest, then make sure to estimate that you have enough for it to count as giving. Beyond that, of course, as I said earlier, the whole idea that one can estimate in terumah gedolah is because no measure was stated there. You can’t use Tosafot Rid and say: okay, there is a measure in the giving, so that is what gets estimated. If there is a measure in the giving, then what is the difference between that and terumat ma’aser? Terumat ma’aser also has a measure, and that’s why you told me that estimation doesn’t apply there, because there is a measure and the Torah wants a specific amount. Now if you explain it like Tosafot Rid—that there is a measure in the giving, and that is what is estimated—you haven’t gained anything. True, now there is something to estimate, but then what is the difference between this and terumat ma’aser? Here too there is a measure and there too there is a measure. So what is the difference? Thus according to Maimonides, for whom the giving and the separation are one commandment, it is harder to say what Tosafot Rid says—that there is a measure in the giving that is not a measure in the separation. Because the commandment is to take from here and give to the priest. Even though the priest’s receiving belongs to that same commandment, there is still some sort of measure involved. You can’t just go knock on the priest’s door and give him a single grain of wheat.

[Speaker C] So what do you do then? Gather separations from other places.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] When you come to give—after all, the rectification is not dependent on giving it to the priest. The rectification depends on designating it as terumah. I designated it as terumah, put it aside, and it waits. Once enough accumulates, I give it to the priest.

[Speaker B] According to Tosafot Rid, the giving isn’t just quantitative—you have to give something that has the status of a gift.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There we’re talking about an actual measure. We’re talking about an actual measure. There is a measure. Less than that is not considered giving. We’re talking about real measures. There’s a whole discussion there about what exactly the measure is, but it’s a perutah’s worth, an olive-bulk, various things. So I’m saying, this Tosafot Rid does not solve the problem in any case, whichever way you go here. It doesn’t solve the problem. I’m saying, because as I said earlier, this is the difficulty of the “either way” argument. Either way, if you’re talking about the separation, separation has no measure, so I understand that estimation belongs here more than in terumat ma’aser, but I don’t understand the phrase “what is there to say.” If you’re talking about the giving, then I understand that there is “what is there to say,” I just don’t understand why you estimate in the separation when really what you need to estimate is what you give, not what you separate. And I certainly don’t understand: if there really is a measure here in the giving and that’s what you estimate, then what have you gained over against terumat ma’aser? In terumat ma’aser there is a measure, and therefore you didn’t want to apply estimation there, because there there is a measure. Fine, but in the giving of terumah gedolah there’s also a measure? So why there do you set up the estimation? In short, this whole business doesn’t work.

By the way, just parenthetically, I looked a bit at Maimonides on this issue. It seemed strange to me in the twelfth root when I read Maimonides earlier; it seemed strange to me because he says: “And it is explained that the fact that the priest takes what he is to take is part of the components of the commandment, as we mentioned regarding the burnt offering; and so too the first shearing is part of the commandment, and so too that one takes out the first tithe and gives it to the Levite,” and so on. My instinct just said: why doesn’t he say terumah? The first terumah would be the first example I’d bring… It’s not a difficulty, just an observation. Right, he says “and so on,” meaning all the others. But if you give examples and then say “and so on,” why bring first shearing and tithe? Bring terumah. Terumah is the most basic priestly gift. The first thing you do. Maimonides doesn’t mention terumah. That already raised a first suspicion for me, and then I looked in Sefer HaMitzvot, and look at something interesting.

Commandment 125 is part of a sequence of commandments one after another. 125 is about first-fruits, “that we were commanded to take out the first-fruits and bring them to the Temple.” To take out the first-fruits means to take the first-fruits, designate them as first-fruits, and bring them to the Temple. It was explained there that they are the property of the priest, meaning the fruits of the first-fruits. Commandment 127: “that we were commanded to take out the tithe from the produce of the land,” and Scripture already explained that this tithe belongs to the Levites. 129: “that the Levites were commanded to take out a tithe from the tithe that they take from Israel and give it to the priests.” 133: “that we were commanded to separate challah from our doughs and give it to the priest.” So everywhere, according to his approach, he says the commandment is one thing: to separate and to give. Right? Then you get to commandment 126, which I skipped before: there, “that we were commanded to take out terumah gedolah.” That’s it. Why not “and give it to the priest”? Really striking—look at it. Commandment after commandment. In terumah gedolah: “that we were commanded to take out terumah gedolah.”

[Speaker C] The priest takes it; he doesn’t give it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It seems to me that according to Maimonides, it’s not just that the commandment of giving is part of the commandment of separation—there is no commandment of giving in terumah. He takes it. The priest acquires it from the table of Heaven. Meaning, you don’t have to give it to the priest; in effect you give it to the Holy One, blessed be He. Not to the priest. The Holy One, blessed be He—how do you give it to the Holy One, blessed be He? Throw it up into the sky? What exactly am I supposed to do with it? The Holy One, blessed be He, says: give it to the priest, he’ll keep it for Me. Meaning it’s not… the giving is done through the separation. The separation itself is already the giving. You have already transferred it; wherever it exists, it belongs to the treasury of Heaven.

[Speaker C] Meaning I can still decide which priest I want?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, I can still do that.

[Speaker C] If you’ve already separated it and it already belongs—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —to something closer to the Holy One, blessed be He. Even the name of the priest to whom you’ll give it. There’s no contradiction there; the fact is that you can. By the way, this is exactly the debate whether benefit-of-choice is monetary property or not, because it really isn’t truly your property. But the fact is that I can decide, and that has monetary value, because if I decide that it goes to you or not to you, you’re willing to pay for that. So therefore it is property.

[Speaker C] In terumat ma’aser didn’t you read that there is giving? What? In terumat ma’aser, there is giving.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. “He commanded the Levites to take out a tithe from the tithe that they take from Israel and give it to the priests.” Yes?

[Speaker C] Only in terumah gedolah. How is that different from terumah gedolah?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know. Maimonides says that in terumah gedolah there is no commandment to give; in terumat ma’aser there is a commandment to give.

[Speaker C] Talmudic text.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now you can decide whatever you want; I’m reading his language. From the language of Maimonides it seems that not only does he disagree with Tosafot Rid that there is no measure in the giving, and not only does he disagree with Nachmanides that this is… in terumah, according to Maimonides there is no commandment of giving at all, not even as part of the commandment of separation. You give it to the priest because the Holy One, blessed be He, said it belongs to him. So don’t throw it away. Yes, exactly. The priest can in principle come and take it. Of course, you can always say: why not that priest, why not that priest, and that is the benefit-of-choice. But in principle, the priest can come and take it; you are not supposed to perform some commandment of giving to the priest here. The priest takes what is his. So that’s only regarding this point; that completely shuts the door on the possibility of saying that the estimation is an estimation of the measure of giving. According to Maimonides there is no measure of giving, because there is no commandment to give at all. It simply belongs to the priest—let him take it. You really can take one grain of wheat to him and give him that. It sounds ridiculous, but there is no halakhic impediment to that, because all in all you are transferring to him what is his; you are not really giving him anything.

All right, I want to propose an explanation of this matter. My claim is the following: the measure that the Sages established—one-fortieth, one-fiftieth, and one-sixtieth—is a measure in the separation, not in the giving. In the giving too, but fundamentally it is a measure in the separation. It is a Torah-level measure, not rabbinic. There is some initial assumption in the passage in Chullin that this is so; they learn it from verses in the Prophets, it doesn’t matter, but there it is straightforwardly rejected, and therefore it is considered a rabbinic measure. In my opinion, from the passage here, and especially from Maimonides’ view, it emerges that this is a Torah-level measure: one-fortieth, one-fiftieth, and one-sixtieth. So then what does it mean that one grain exempts the whole pile? Because the Torah does not want to command us to separate according to a fixed measure, and therefore it tells us that one grain exempts the whole pile. Of course, we are supposed to understand on our own that we need to… By the way, one of the laws written regarding terumah is that you should separate it generously. Yes? What does “generously” mean—a large grain? What? One grain exempts the whole pile, so what does generosity mean? So this whole story is strange. My claim is that from the Torah’s perspective, the Torah expects us to give more. It doesn’t want to define how much to give. It says: one grain—if you want to render the pile fit, one grain exempts the pile—but it expects us to give more. How much more? I don’t know, give more. At some point the Sages come and try to estimate—yes, estimate—what would be a reasonable measure of giving from the Torah’s standpoint?

[Speaker C] Separation-giving. Separation, yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What would be a reasonable measure of separation? One-fortieth for a generous eye, one-fiftieth for an average eye, one-sixtieth for a stingy eye. But this is not a rabbinic law. It is a rabbinic estimate of what the Torah expects us to do. Like “Scripture handed it over to the Sages,” like what people say regarding the laws of Chol HaMoed and in disputes in the Talmud in other places where the Torah leaves it to the Sages to determine what the definition of the Torah law will be. So here too, essentially, it’s the same thing. It’s just not fully Torah law in the sense that I am obligated. I’m not obligated. One grain exempts the pile, and there is no commandment of giving. In terms of separation, one grain is enough, and there is no commandment of giving according to Maimonides, so there is no actual obligation to give. There is an expectation that we give. An expectation that we give more. How much more? Each person could have decided for himself. At some point the Sages come and say: now we will set it—one-fortieth, one-fiftieth, and one-sixtieth.

One of the indications for this is the triple measure that the Sages established. Why did the Sages give a measure of one-fortieth, one-fiftieth, and one-sixtixtieth? If you want to set a measure, say one-fiftieth; everyone has to give that, end of story. Whoever wants to give more, no problem. Why do you need to tell me how much to give more? I’ll give more, he’ll give more; you can add to terumah. As long as you don’t give the whole thing—if you give the whole bundle, then it is no longer terumah—but you can give as much as you want. So if the Sages want us to give more, let them say: one-fiftieth is mandatory, and if you add, Heaven will reward you. Why do they have to establish one-fortieth for a generous eye, one-fiftieth for an average eye… They’re giving me various measures, and what if I want one-fifty-fifth? Or one-seventieth? Or one—I don’t know—thirtieth? What, what? Is that bad? No, the Sages establish a triple measure. What’s the idea there? What’s the logic? It seems there is a logic here.

[Speaker D] It also has to be connected to the needs of the population, the needs of the—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, then let each person decide for himself. Why does it need to be fixed for him?

[Speaker D] Because it’s an obligation. Meaning, maybe here, this year there’s more need, there this year there’s less need.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, then let’s establish a measure. No, then let’s establish a minimum measure. And one-sixtieth you need to set, to give—that’s what the Torah expects. Whoever can and feels it is appropriate to give more should add, and he’ll be rewarded—but—

[Speaker D] What about the side of the recipients? The need? It’s like—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are no recipients. Who are the recipients? There are no recipients. The priests. No, they’re not recipients. The Holy One, blessed be He, receives. We separate it for the Holy One, blessed be He; He says give it to the priests, because I want them to eat it, but it’s not a gift to the priests. And the whole point in Maimonides is that it’s not according to—

[Speaker D] —their needs.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not in terumah. No. To supply their needs from one grain of wheat—that’s not much. They’d have to go on a pretty serious diet. In any case, my claim is that the triple measure testifies exactly to this point.

How do we know? And here I return to our topic. Our topic is basically a different kind of reasoning: the will of God. I’m claiming that terumah is an example of this. With terumah, I don’t know whether by pure reasoning I would say that one needs to separate some portion of one’s grain—whatever—to the priests or to the Holy One, blessed be He, whatever it may be. Maybe I would recite a blessing beforehand, because with blessings over enjoyment, before I eat I recite a blessing. But why take something and give it? Especially if it’s to the Holy One, blessed be He. Does the Holy One, blessed be He, need it? So reason doesn’t say that. But the Torah calls it terumah. And on the word terumah, Rashi at the beginning of the Torah portion Terumah brings that terumah means “from the generosity of the heart.” What is given from generosity of heart is called terumah. And how does generosity of heart make sense when one grain is enough? So it is clear to us from the language of the Torah—it’s not a command, but from the language of the Torah it is clear to us—that it expects us to give more. Who will say how much? One grain is enough. But from the language of the Torah it is clear that it expects more. And therefore each person gave what he gave. Then the Sages come and set a measure for it. Why didn’t the Torah give the measure? Because it wanted us to do this on our own initiative. If it had given a measure, then we would give it because the law obligates it. But the Torah says: no, no, I want this to come from generosity of heart; that’s why I call it terumah. So if you want to fulfill your obligation, one grain exempts the pile—that’s enough, no problem. But listen, I called it terumah; you need to understand on your own that more is expected of you. Okay? Therefore the Torah intentionally does not set a binding measure here.

Now when the Sages nevertheless—and often it is like this—the Sages nevertheless set a measure, even where the Torah left it open, because they still want to explain to people or make clear to people that more is expected of them. But if they had set one measure, one-fiftieth, then people would separate one-fiftieth because that’s the rabbinically required measure, and that would be it. Then they would be throwing out the baby with the bathwater. Because what the Torah wanted was precisely that we not do it that way. If the Sages set the measure here, they ruin what the Torah was trying to build. That the Sages do not do. If the Torah did not set a measure and the Sages are stringent and require a measure, I understand. But if the Torah expects us to give more, and therefore it did not set a measure, because it wants you to do it voluntarily, and therefore it intentionally did not bother to write a measure—then what are you, the Sages, doing by stepping in here and setting a measure? So what the Sages do is set a triple measure. And that basically tells me: listen, even after we set a measure, I’m leaving room for the voluntary dimension. And you still have to place yourself—where are you? One-fortieth, one-fiftieth, or one-sixtieth. Because the Sages did not want to destroy the Torah law; they only wanted to give it boundaries, they only wanted to clarify for us roughly what is demanded of us. Therefore they establish a triple measure. That’s the idea.

It seems to me that I once said this when I spoke about the Hanukkah lamp. There too there is a triple measure. There is one lamp per man and his household, mehadrin, and mehadrin min hamehadrin. Right? Why establish three? There were really two difficulties here, from Pnei Yehoshua and Beit Yosef, and I brought that Rabbi Yogel… The question was why this was needed, because impurity is permitted in public service, so why do we need the miracle of the flask of oil if impurity is permitted? And a second question is: what kind of enhancement is this, when it’s more than a third? The Talmud in Bava Kamma 9 says that enhancement of a commandment is up to a third—whether in one direction or another—but enhancement of a commandment is only a third. And in the Hanukkah lamp the enhancement is eightfold. Eightfold, fivefold. So yes, thirty-six candles, or according to Beit Shammai, instead of eight candles, one candle each day. Okay? So four and a half times. That’s still more than a third. How does that fit the category of enhancement? There are those who say it’s even forbidden to do more than that—more than a fifth, more than a third. So the claim—what I said there—was that since the miracle was basically intended, and Rabbi Yoel wrote, that the miracle was intended to enable us to light in an enhanced way. Right, impurity is permitted in public service, but it is still more beautiful to light with pure oil. So what the miracle did was not enable us to light—we could have lit even without it, because impurity is permitted in public service. It enabled us to light in an enhanced way. Therefore what we establish for future generations is enhancement. This is not from the ordinary law of enhancing a commandment, “This is my God and I will beautify Him,” but rather the enhancement is an essential part of the commandment. So why wasn’t that established as an obligation? Why did they establish one lamp per man and his household, but then mehadrin and mehadrin min hamehadrin? Because otherwise it wouldn’t be enhancement; otherwise you’d simply be doing what is obligatory. Right? So they had to convey a complex message. On the one hand, one lamp per man and his household; but it’s clear that you are expected to enhance. How much to enhance? You have mehadrin, and you have mehadrin min hamehadrin—choose. Three levels, exactly like terumah. So these three levels always tell you that the Sages are basically doing something here that is, so to speak, against the will of the Torah, so they don’t want to completely destroy the will of the Torah, and therefore they leave you a range of possibilities so that the choice remains in your hands.

[Speaker C] And that measure is Torah-level? Which one? You said that—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, wait, wait—regarding terumah?

[Speaker C] Forty, fifty, sixty? That’s Torah-level? Yes? So then it’s rabbinic?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, wait, just a second, just a second. The claim is this: basically, the measure is a Torah-level measure. That’s the point. Only what? Obviously one grain exempts the pile, not because there is giving and separation. It’s a measure in the separation. In the separation itself, if you only want to exempt the pile, one grain is enough. If you want to give terumah to the Holy One, blessed be He—not to the priest, to the Holy One, blessed be He—then give more. How much more? The Sages come and tell you: one-fortieth, one-fiftieth, one-sixtieth. Now the Talmud asks: how does one separate it? At one-fiftieth? Rabbinically? Supposedly? No, not rabbinically; now we understand that it is Torah-level. How does one separate it? One separates it by estimation. Why? Because I want you to give generously. Right, that is how the medieval authorities (Rishonim) explain it there: I want you to give generously. It’s not just that they want you to give generously. That is the entire essence of terumah. The whole idea of terumah not being given a measure is so that you will give generously. Therefore, from the fact that the Torah did not specify a measure—I asked how do we know from here that one may not separate by exact measure? Maybe you don’t need to, because there is nothing to estimate? But what is this that Maimonides says, that from the fact that the Torah did not specify a measure, therefore one may not separate by exact measurement? Answer: one may not separate by exact measurement, because the whole point of the Torah not specifying a measure is so that you will do it voluntarily. Therefore one may not separate by exact measurement.

And therefore the Talmud says: then this measure should be separated by estimation. Rashi and Maimonides say: which measure are we talking about? The one-fiftieth. But one-fiftieth is a rabbinic measure? What are you talking about? It is a Torah-level measure. It is a Torah-level measure, only the Torah did not establish it explicitly so that we would separate based on estimation. And that is what must be estimated. Determine what kind of eye you have—one-fortieth, one-fiftieth, and so on. You need to determine your measure, and that you separate by estimation. This is a Torah law, not a rabbinic law. Therefore even according to the Tannaitic view brought in the Jerusalem Talmud/Mishnah, where it says there “if it is not needed for this matter,” I asked: how can they use “if it is not needed for this matter” on a rabbinic law? “If it is not needed for this matter,” and the conclusion is a rabbinic law? What are you talking about? It is a Torah law, not a rabbinic law. From here exactly one can learn that the measure of terumah is a Torah law and not a rabbinic law.

[Speaker B] It reminds me a bit of what they say about Chol HaMoed—there are views that it’s Torah-level or rabbinic—and they say, what does it mean…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I mentioned that earlier, I mentioned—

[Speaker B] —that earlier, “the Torah handed it over to the Sages.” Right. So here too, the Torah says the Sages should come and tell us how—

[Speaker C] —to fulfill the—

[Speaker B] —Torah law.

[Speaker C] Yes. Okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Is there such a Torah law in the Torah where the Torah writes it so that one should fulfill it generously? That’s what is written. No, but in the Torah itself, it wasn’t written—

[Speaker C] What is written in the Torah portion Terumah itself—in the portion Terumah, there too no measure was stated for what to give to the Tabernacle, right? Right. And there it says “everyone whose heart moves him,” everyone should give his—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, so “everyone whose heart moves him”—from there we learn exactly this point, that the concept of terumah itself means giving. No, obviously, but I’m saying from there it’s a paradigm for every place. Every place where it says terumah, the meaning is from generosity of heart. And therefore I’m telling you: now that really is what the Torah writes; by calling it terumah, it teaches us that it expects us to give more. So this is what, if I go back to what I said earlier, basically what we have here is a different kind of reasoning, which is called reasoning about the will of God. From the language of the Torah, from one interpretation or another—but the language of the Torah, not in the context of what I am obligated in, but from the Torah’s way of relating to it I understand that the Holy One, blessed be He, expects this—that is the will of God. If this is the will of God, then reason says that one must do it. So it is a kind of reasoning that does not tell me that the thing itself is logical; rather the reasoning is interpretive, telling me that the Holy One, blessed be He, expects me to do this, and therefore I am obligated to do it.

There are several implications of this. First of all, why in fact is the measure a percentage measure and not a fixed measure? If it were like Tosafot Rid, I would expect the measure to be fixed, not percentage-based. This is giving to a priest; you can’t, on a Torah level, give him a single grain. Even if you only have fifty grains, that’s all, so one-fiftieth is fine in terms of percentage measure—you separated one-fiftieth—but you can’t give such a thing to a priest. If it were a measure of giving, I would expect it not to be a percentage measure but a real measure of how much you bring to the priest. According to what I’m saying here, no—it’s a measure in the separation, not in the giving.

By the way, in challah, for example, where there really is a commandment to give to the priest, there it’s a bit mixed: one twenty-fourth and one forty-eighth, for a baker or for a homeowner—that’s the measure. So first, there it’s not three measures, it’s one, because for a baker this is the measure and for a homeowner that is the measure; it’s one measure. Therefore the whole move does not exist in challah. Even though it is a percentage measure. Second, the measure is not entirely percentage-based, because in challah there is a minimum amount of dough from which one separates challah. So even when you say, for example, one twenty-fourth, that’s one twenty-fourth out of a dough that already has a minimum size, so in practice there is a quantitative measure here. There is a minimum. Exactly, there is a quantitative minimum, which does not exist in terumah. Therefore this whole move applies only to terumah; it does not apply to challah. Even though regarding challah, in several places, “from the first of your doughs you shall raise up terumah to God,” challah is also called terumah. It also has some laws of terumah. But in this context, terumah stands alone, just as we also saw with terumat ma’aser. Terumat ma’aser also doesn’t enter this discussion, and challah doesn’t enter this discussion either. It’s only terumah gedolah. Okay.

Now let’s see one or two implications. Maimonides in the Laws of Terumot, chapter 3—I’ll show you a difference between how Maimonides describes terumah and how Maimonides describes challah. They are quite parallel, and pay attention to the differences. In the Laws of Terumot, chapter 3, law 1, it says this: “Terumah gedolah has no measure from the Torah, as it says, ‘the first of your grain’; any amount, even one grain of wheat, exempts the pile. But ideally one should separate only according to the measure that the Sages gave.” Okay. And how much is the measure that the Sages gave? That’s law 2. “And how much is the measure that the Sages gave? A generous eye: one-fortieth; an average eye: one-fiftieth; a stingy eye: one-sixtieth; and one should not give less than one-sixtieth.” Okay.

By contrast, in challah, law 1 of the Laws of First-fruits, chapter 5, law 1: “It is a positive commandment to separate terumah from the dough for the priest.” That does not appear in terumah, and I already discussed that. “As it says: ‘From the first of your doughs you shall raise challah as terumah.’ And this first portion has no measure from the Torah; even if one separated like a barley grain, he exempted the dough.” That’s it. In terumah there was a continuation: “But ideally one should separate only according to the measure that the Sages gave.” Here there isn’t. It has no measure. Law 2: “And by rabbinic enactment one separates one twenty-fourth from the dough, so that there will be enough for a gift to the priest.” Here this is already a measure in the giving, as you wanted to say in Tosafot Rid regarding challah. And why? Because here the measure is not purely percentage-based, as I said earlier, and also there are not three measures but only one. “So that it be a gift,” as it says, “you shall give him”—give him something fit to be called a gift. “And a baker separates one forty-eighth, because his dough is large and in this measure there is enough for a gift.”

What is the meaning of this difference? It is entirely clear that what I said earlier is exactly what is written in Maimonides. Maimonides says, “ideally one should separate only according to the measure that the Sages established”—this is not a rabbinic enactment. The rabbinic measure in challah is a rabbinic measure, and therefore in law 1, which deals with the Torah law, no measure appears at all. In law 2: “By rabbinic enactment, separate according to the measure of one twenty-fourth.” Right. In terumah, in defining the Torah law, Maimonides says: the Torah gave it no measure, and ideally one should separate only according to the measure that the Sages gave. This is an ideal-versus-after-the-fact rule within Torah law; where do we ever find in Maimonides, “ideally one should separate only according to the measure the Sages handed over”? It’s not ideal practice; there is a rabbinic law that one must separate this measure. What does that have to do with ideal practice? It is an ideal standard within Torah law—except that the Sages are the ones who determined what that means.

[Speaker C] So “according to the measure the Sages established” is not a rabbinic law, but rather the Sages established what the ideal measure is, which one needs to do on the Torah level.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] After the fact too, one grain exempts the pile. In challah there is a rabbinic law that appears only in law 2, unrelated to law 1, that by rabbinic enactment you separate according to the measure of one twenty-fourth. Therefore I think it is pretty clear that this level of distinction is written in Maimonides.

[Speaker C] And then in challah and terumah there is this law, that in challah you can’t gather several challahs together week after week. Why not? Why not?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Challah—set that aside. No, nowadays I can separate challah, put it aside, then separate another challah, put that aside too, and give it to the priest when it accumulates.

[Speaker C] But you can’t, week—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Week after week gather the—why not? Fine, you mean technically, like it spoils, okay, that’s a technical issue. But there’s no halakhic problem with my accumulating it. So if I do it in other places with a gap of a few minutes, it doesn’t matter, I can accumulate it. Nothing prevents me, there’s no halakhic problem with that. Maybe slightly technical. In the end it comes out to a measure, it comes out to a measure.

[Speaker C] In the end the later authorities (Acharonim) wrote that one estimates. Okay. And in the Torah you need to give the measure.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, and that measure is estimated, not measured exactly.

[Speaker C] Here you solved—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —the two questions I raised earlier. There is a measure here, and therefore there is something to estimate, and that measure is not measured exactly but estimated. Now you also don’t have a problem, you’re not taking a risk, because as far as the pile is concerned, one grain exempts the pile. But beyond the issue of risk, the Torah did not give a measure—the point is not just that you’re not taking a risk. The Torah did not give a measure so that you would do it by estimation.

[Speaker C] And then—

[Speaker B] If one estimates and gives the measure, it turns out for us—

[Speaker C] —that the measure one needs to give is higher. Yes. The problem in Maimonides is that the estimate should not be less than one-sixtieth. Right? That’s one of the formulations.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no.

[Speaker C] You estimate, and he and I and he—it’s the opposite, exactly the opposite.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The minimum is one-sixtieth. But estimate it, don’t measure it exactly. Now when you estimate, and you know that you’re not allowed to go below one-sixtieth, you will give more. That’s why they do it, exactly for that reason they do it; that’s the point of estimating. Now the claim that it can also be one-fortieth?

[Speaker C] It can also be the average, one-fiftieth, it can be the—if he gave less than that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then he did not fulfill the commandment. So he may simply have separated terumah in some technical sense; it could still be tevel. Okay. So the question is what one needs to do. I’m not trying to catch offenders here, it’s not—

[Speaker C] If he gave one grain, he exempted the pile. So he did exempt it—did he fulfill it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. He fixed the tevel, yes. But he did not separate terumah. It is permitted to eat the tevel that remains—well, the produce that remains—but the terumah is lacking. What does “he did not separate” mean? It means the terumah is lacking. It’s not a complete commandment. That’s what Maimonides means when he says, “ideally one should separate only according to the measure that the Sages established.” That’s ideal and after the fact. It’s not rabbinic versus Torah-level.

By the way, the implication goes, for example, in the opposite direction from what one might infer. For instance, the measure in challah is indispensable. If you did not separate one twenty-fourth, it’s not challah. Even though that measure is rabbinic. Because rabbinically it has to be done that way. If you did not separate one-sixtieth in terumah, you fixed the tevel, even though that’s Torah-level. It’s not rabbinic. Here the rabbinic law is actually stronger than the Torah law. In the Torah law it’s an ideal standard, so it’s not indispensable after the fact. But the rabbinic law is a full-fledged law, so rabbinically you did not separate properly. Therefore, for example, in Ma’adanei Eretz this point is noted, and indeed Rabbi Shlomo Zalman says—in Ma’adanei Eretz, in Zera’im—that in challah the measure is indispensable, while in terumah the measure is not indispensable, because here it says “ideally,” and there it doesn’t say that one needs to separate. But he doesn’t explain this whole point, that this is basically Torah-level. He only says that from the language of Maimonides one sees that here it is indispensable and there it is not indispensable. Now it is very, very clear.

[Speaker C] Terumah too is with a blessing? Terumah too one recites a blessing? What? One-fortieth—why not just say the minimum is one-sixtieth?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because they want to… no, because they want to tell you—they gave you these three levels in order to say that we expect you to give more. If they had said one-sixtieth, you would say: one-sixtieth, I’ll give one-sixtieth.

[Speaker C] You’d give the minimum, and then maybe by mistake you’d give less.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s how it’s said, that’s how it’s said in halakhic language, that you have three levels. Obviously you can also give one-thirtieth, but one-fortieth is already considered a generous eye. You want to give even more? Then it’s an extremely generous eye. Fine.

There is a contradiction that the later authorities (Acharonim) also asked about in Maimonides’ words between the law of challah and terumah nowadays. Maimonides writes that nowadays, since terumah is not given to the priest but burned, one should separate any amount. There is no need to separate one-fortieth, fifty, or sixty. In challah, one must separate the full measure.

[Speaker C] Not today. What? Today? Yes. The measure?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. In challah one must separate the measure even today, even though it is burned; it is not given to the priest. So the later authorities already ask why—what is the difference? According to what I’m saying, the difference is obvious. True, in challah it’s a rabbinic law and in terumah it’s a Torah-level law, but in challah it’s a full-fledged law. That’s no longer relevant now—true, the reason has fallen away, since you no longer give it to the priest—but you still have to perform the law. The law is to give one twenty-fourth. In terumah it’s only an ideal standard; basically you effect the separation even with one grain. Ideally, give more. If it’s not going to the priest, then there’s not much point to it; it’s just burning it. And rightly so, one grain is enough already—do not waste—just do it with one grain. So there is a difference between challah and terumah that also emerges from this whole point.

Maybe one last comment in the context of terumah. In the Jerusalem Talmud at the beginning of Pe’ah it asks: among “these are the things that have no measure,” why was terumah not brought? “These are the things that have no measure: pe’ah, first-fruits, appearing, acts of kindness, and Torah study”—why didn’t they include terumah? And it also asks why they didn’t include the soil of the sotah, the ashes of the red heifer, the saliva of a yevamah, and all sorts of other things. So regarding the ashes of the red heifer, the soil of the sotah, the saliva of a yevamah, and also the blood of the bird of a metzora, it—

[Speaker C] —says no—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —“our Mishnah deals only with things to which one may add and there is a commandment in doing them. These, even though one may add to them, there is no commandment in doing them.” Meaning, the things the Mishnah brought are things where, if he adds to them, there is still a commandment. Here these are things where you can take as much as you want, but there is no commandment in what you add. But that leaves us with the question: why was terumah not included? Because with terumah, clearly, the more you add, there is a commandment in it. So why didn’t they bring it? I think the answer is that in terumah there is a measure. “These are things that have no measure”—terumah has a measure. The measure is a minimum of one-sixtieth. The Torah did not set it because it wanted us to give it on our own, but there is a measure. You can’t include it among things that have no measure. The Jerusalem Talmud itself brings the question about terumah and does not answer it. It answers them with something else, some various distinctions, but it doesn’t answer with this point, that they don’t include here something where one adds to it. Perhaps one last comment to add on this topic—but really one last comment. I’ll read you a passage from Mesillat Yesharim.

The trait of piety in Mesillat Yesharim, chapter 18: “The trait of piety truly requires great explanation. But the very existence of piety is a profound matter to understand correctly, and it is founded on great wisdom and the refinement of action to the utmost, which is fitting for every wise-hearted person to pursue, for only the wise can truly attain it. And so our Sages of blessed memory said: an ignoramus cannot be pious. And now we will explain this matter in order—what does it mean to be pious? Behold, the root of piety is what our Sages of blessed memory said: fortunate is the man whose toil is in Torah and who gives pleasure to his Maker. And the matter is this: the commandments incumbent on all Israel are already known, and the extent of their obligation is known. However, one who truly loves the Creator, blessed be His name, with true love, will not try and intend merely to exempt himself with what is already publicly known as the obligation upon all Israel in general. Rather it will be for him as it is for a son who loves his father: if his father reveals to him only slightly that he desires one of certain things, the son will already increase in that matter and do it as much as he can, even though his father said it only once and in half a sentence. For that son, it is enough to understand where his father’s mind inclines, to do for him even what he did not say explicitly, since he can judge on his own that this matter would give him pleasure, and he will not wait until he is commanded more explicitly or told a second time. And this matter we see with our own eyes, that it arises at all times and every hour among every lover and friend, between husband and wife, between father and son—in short, among all those whose love for one another is truly strong. They do not say: I was not commanded any further; it is enough for me what I was explicitly commanded. Rather, from what they were commanded they infer the will of the one commanding and strive to do whatever they can infer would please him. And similarly it happens to one who also loves his Creator with faithful love, for he too is among those who love. The commandments that He commanded him, revealed and publicized, will then be for him only as a revelation of intent, to know toward what matter His blessed will and desire incline. And then he will not say: enough for me with what is explicitly stated, or I will exempt myself with what is incumbent upon me in any case. On the contrary, he will say: since I have already found clear evidence that His blessed desire inclines toward this, it will be for me as eyes to increase in this matter and broaden it in every direction that I can judge His blessed will desires. And this is what is called giving pleasure to his Maker. Thus the principle of piety is the widening of the fulfillment of all the commandments in all the directions and conditions that are proper and possible.”

Okay? “And the main root of piety is of the same kind as abstinence, except that abstinence…” Abstinence concerns prohibitions, and piety concerns positive commandments, yes, adding more in positive commandments; and abstinence means narrowing oneself more regarding prohibitions, being stricter with oneself. “And both are one matter: to add beyond what is explicit what we can judge, from the explicit commandment, would give pleasure to his blessed Maker.” You have to pay close attention: this is not ordinary reasoning. Reasoning is what I think is proper to do. Say, morality—suppose we were not commanded, but this is morally right, so it is fitting to do it, so I do it—that’s reasoning. Here he is talking about something else. Here he is talking about something revealed to me through the words of the Holy One, blessed be He, or of a father, or of a friend, or of husband and wife and so on—that this is what he would want, regardless of whether I think this is intrinsically right. That is what you must do, and this is called the trait of piety. The example of terumah here is a good example of this point. That’s it.

Reasons and Rationales of the Commandments, Lesson 13

Table of Contents

Summary

General Overview

The verse in Jeremiah and the Targum as the basis for the category of “the will of God”

Types of reasoning: interpretation, generating a new law, and the will of God

The passage of “and your offering shall be reckoned for you” and the difficulty of estimation and intention

Rashi, the Mishnah in Terumot, and Maimonides in his Commentary on the Mishnah: reversing the direction of the derivation

The problem of “if it is not relevant” as a mere textual support, and understanding “and they connected this to the word of God”

An attempted solution through Tosafot Rid: a minimum for giving, and the essential difficulty

Maimonides and Nachmanides on Principle 12: giving as part of the commandment or a separate commandment, and the status of terumah gedolah

The main proposal: the measures of terumah as a “rabbinic estimate of the Torah’s intent,” and a Torah-level measure that is not explicitly commanded

Estimation rather than measurement: the prohibition of measuring as an implementation of the Torah’s intent

Comparison to challah and the practical implications today

The Jerusalem Talmud on Pe’ah and the claim that terumah does have a measure

Mesillat Yesharim and the trait of piety as listening to the will of the Commander

Full Transcript

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Table of Contents

Summary

General Overview

The verse in Jeremiah and the Targum as the basis for the category of “the will of God”

Types of reasoning: interpretation, generating a new law, and the will of God

The passage of “and your offering shall be reckoned for you” and the difficulty of estimation and intention

Rashi, the Mishnah in Terumot, and Maimonides in his Commentary on the Mishnah: reversing the direction of the derivation

The problem of “if it is not relevant” as a mere textual support, and understanding “and they connected this to the word of God”

An attempted solution through Tosafot Rid: a minimum for giving, and the essential difficulty

Maimonides and Nachmanides on Principle 12: giving as part of the commandment or a separate commandment, and the status of terumah gedolah

The main proposal: the measures of terumah as a “rabbinic estimate of the Torah’s intent,” and a Torah-level measure that is not explicitly commanded

Estimation rather than measurement: the prohibition of measuring as an implementation of the Torah’s intent

Comparison to challah and the practical implications today

The Jerusalem Talmud on Pe’ah and the claim that terumah does have a measure

Mesillat Yesharim and the trait of piety as listening to the will of the Commander

Full Transcript

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