Authority and Change in Halakha, Lesson 13

Table of Contents

• Suspension and change in Jewish law according to the needs of the time and the authority of the sages
• The level of necessity, the limits of suspension, and consensus among the sages
• Analytical framework: necessity, authority, mechanism
• Rosh Hashanah in the Torah as a “day of sounding” and the difficulty of canceling the shofar blast
• The Mishnah: sounding in the Temple and in a religious court, and the ordinance of Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai
• The Sifra: “The sounding of Rosh Hashanah does not override the Sabbath… except in a religious court alone,” and the question of “overrides the Sabbath”
• The Jerusalem Talmud: “day of sounding” versus “remembrance of sounding,” and the suggestion that there is no commandment on the Sabbath
• The Babylonian Talmud: an opening exposition like the Jerusalem Talmud and then the shift to the decree “lest one carry it four cubits”
• “Remembrance of sounding” as an essential foundation: verses of remembrances, Rashi, Nachmanides, and Shibbolei HaLeket
• Conclusion regarding suspension: not emptying the day of its content, and a substantive condition for change

Summary

General Overview

The text draws a distinction between changing Jewish law on the basis of disagreement with an earlier religious court and suspending it on the basis of the needs of the time. It argues that in the case of suspension there are no formal requirements of a Sanhedrin, but practical authority and consensus among the sages of the generation are still required. It illustrates the mechanism through the topic of sounding the shofar on Rosh Hashanah when it falls on the Sabbath, and emphasizes the difficulty of canceling a commandment that is the very essence of the day, since the Torah describes it as a “day of sounding.” It sets up the tension between the Babylonian Talmud, the Jerusalem Talmud, and the Sifra, and suggests that understanding “remembrance of sounding” as an essential goal may explain how a rabbinic decree can suspend the sounding without emptying the day of its content.

Suspension and Change in Jewish Law According to the Needs of the Time and the Authority of the Sages

The text states that suspension “according to what the time requires” can apply both to Torah-level laws and to rabbinic laws, and that when there is no Sanhedrin there are no formal requirements for suspension, because “only I exist here,” meaning the sages of that generation. It limits this by saying that such a change cannot rest on disagreement with an earlier religious court, its interpretation, or its legislation, because the mechanism of disagreement belongs to Jewish law A and Jewish law B, where a Sanhedrin is required, and in rabbinic law also one that is “greater in wisdom and number.” It adds that some medieval authorities (Rishonim) speak of “suspension through positive action,” where “the rabbis uproot something from the Torah through positive action where the time requires it,” and it brings the example of the law of an informer and killing an informer, which appears in the Talmud and is understood as a later enactment apparently not made by a Sanhedrin.

The Level of Necessity, the Limits of Suspension, and Consensus Among the Sages

The text argues that the division between change due to disagreement and suspension due to necessity is not sharp, because when there is a feeling that the original religious court erred or that “it is not right to do it,” the need of the time can join in and make change easier. It raises the question of what “level of necessity” justifies a change and whether the need has to be “acute,” and stresses that it cannot be that everyone does whatever they want when there is no religious court. It concludes that some kind of consensus is required, or “the agreement of all the sages,” and connects this to Maimonides in laws A and B, where “greater in wisdom and number” is explained so that “in number” means “the agreement of all the sages of that generation who join the decision of the Sanhedrin.”

Analytical Framework: Necessity, Authority, Mechanism

The text presents a breakdown of the considerations involved in halakhic change into three planes: the necessity of the change and the source of the problem, whether disagreement or harm; the question of authority; and the question of mechanism. It says that the discussion of mechanism is “in the middle” and will return later. It points toward using a current example related to Rosh Hashanah to demonstrate the mechanisms and show that behind the dispute between the Babylonian Talmud and the Jerusalem Talmud stand “more fundamental considerations” that shed light on the topic of change.

Rosh Hashanah in the Torah as a “Day of Sounding” and the Difficulty of Canceling the Shofar Blast

The text states that what has been poured into Rosh Hashanah as a “Day of Judgment” and other contents is not explicitly anchored in the Torah, where the day is presented as a “sacred occasion” and “a day of sounding shall it be for you.” It emphasizes that the Torah does not explicitly say “to sound the shofar,” but defines the character of the day as a day of sounding, and the sages learn that the sounding is with a shofar from sources such as the Jubilee year. It cites Maimonides in positive commandment 170 and in the laws of shofar chapter 1 law 1. It argues that the wording “day of sounding” sharpens the puzzle of how the sages cancel shofar sounding on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath, because this is “the only thing there is in Rosh Hashanah” according to the Torah, and therefore canceling it seems to empty the day of its content.

The Mishnah: Sounding in the Temple and in a Religious Court, and the Ordinance of Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai

The text cites the Mishnah in Rosh Hashanah 29a: in the Temple they would sound on the Sabbath, but not in the rest of the country, and after the Temple was destroyed Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai instituted that they should sound in every place where there is a religious court, with a dispute whether the ordinance applies “in Yavneh alone” or in every place where there is a religious court. It notes the distinction between Jerusalem and Yavneh with respect to cities that “see and hear and are near and can come,” and in Yavneh “only in the religious court.” It sees this law as a “strange law” and asks how it fits with the Torah’s definition of the day, and why the permission or obligation depends on the Temple, its destruction, and the existence of a religious court.

The Sifra: “The Sounding of Rosh Hashanah Does Not Override the Sabbath… Except in a Religious Court Alone,” and the Question of “Overrides the Sabbath”

The text cites the Sifra in Parashat Behar, which derives that the Jubilee overrides the Sabbath “throughout your land,” whereas “the sounding of Rosh Hashanah does not override the Sabbath throughout your land except in a religious court alone.” It emphasizes that the Sifra seems to present this as an exposition from the verses and therefore as Torah law, but it raises a difficulty about the language “overrides the Sabbath,” because the term overriding implies that in principle one really should have sounded on the Sabbath. It argues that it is not plausible that the Sifra is referring to the concern “lest one carry it four cubits,” because that is a rabbinic concern, and also that sounding the shofar itself is not prohibited labor but “it is a skill and not labor.” So it is unclear what prohibition is being overridden or not overridden.

The Jerusalem Talmud: “Day of Sounding” Versus “Remembrance of Sounding,” and the Suggestion That There Is No Commandment on the Sabbath

The text cites the Jerusalem Talmud, which poses a fundamental difficulty: if this is a Torah matter, then it should override also outside the Temple precincts; and if it is not a Torah matter, then it should not override even in the Temple. It then brings the solution of Kahana: “One verse says ‘day of sounding’ and one verse says ‘remembrance of sounding’—on a weekday it is ‘day of sounding,’ and on the Sabbath it is ‘remembrance of sounding’: one mentions it, but does not sound.” It suggests that the Jerusalem Talmud implies that the Torah itself defines that on Rosh Hashanah which falls on the Sabbath there is no commandment to sound, but rather there is “remembrance of sounding,” and that whether it is permitted or forbidden to sound is not the issue; the issue is the very definition of the commandment. It notes that the Jerusalem Talmud nevertheless uses the language “does not override,” and it asks whether this is just standard phrasing or a hint at a background prohibition. It later suggests that the Jerusalem Talmud introduces the possibility of “in a place where they know that it is on the first of the month,” and the question of doubt about the day of the festival as a factor explaining the difference between the Temple and the rest of the country.

The Babylonian Talmud: An Opening Exposition Like the Jerusalem Talmud and Then the Shift to the Decree “Lest One Carry It Four Cubits”

The text cites the Babylonian Talmud in Rosh Hashanah, which opens with a similar exposition: “a rest day, a remembrance of sounding” versus “a day of sounding,” and distinguishes between Sabbath and weekday. But Rava objects that if the distinction is Torah-based, then “how do we sound in the Temple?” It adds the statement of “the school of Samuel” that “shofar sounding and removing bread from the oven were singled out because they are a skill and not labor,” and concludes with Rava that “by Torah law it is fully permitted, and it is the rabbis who decreed against it” because “lest one take it in his hand and go to an expert to learn and carry it four cubits in the public domain,” paralleling lulav and the Scroll of Esther. It presents the conclusion as a retreat from the exposition distinguishing between day of sounding and remembrance of sounding, and stresses that this returns the original difficulty: how can a rabbinic decree cancel a Torah-level positive commandment that is the essence of the day.

“Remembrance of Sounding” as an Essential Foundation: Verses of Remembrances, Rashi, Nachmanides, and Shibbolei HaLeket

The text suggests that the way to reconcile the cancellation of the sounding is to see the sounding as instrumental to achieving “remembrance of sounding,” so that on the Sabbath, when the sounding is suspended because of a rabbinic concern, the essence of the day can be achieved in another way, and one cannot say that the day has been emptied of its content. It suggests that “remembrance of sounding” may be interpreted as the verses of remembrances, similar to the structure of a means-for-remembrance as with fringes, “and you shall remember all My commandments.” It mentions a preliminary assumption in the Talmud on 30b about a special intention of remembrance of sounding. It cites Rashi, who explains “remembrance of sounding… verses of sounding should be recited,” and Nachmanides, who objects by arguing that there cannot be remembrances without kingship verses, and that in the Talmud on 32a the verses of kingship, remembrances, and shofar are rabbinic, while noting the dispute between Nachmanides and the Ritva over how to understand Rashi. It adds evidence from the Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chayim 582, which distinguishes in the wording of kiddush and prayer between weekday (“day of sounding”) and Sabbath (“remembrance of sounding”), and from the Mishnah Berurah and the Pri Chadash, who write that after the fact, if one said “remembrance of sounding” on a weekday or “day of sounding” on the Sabbath, one does not repeat it, because “the Torah writes ‘remembrance of sounding,’” even though “by Torah law sounding is permitted on the Sabbath.” It cites Shibbolei HaLeket, who asks, “Why do I need Rabbah’s decree? Two verses are already written,” and answers that “Rabbah himself explains those verses: why did the Torah say ‘remembrance of sounding’? Because of the decree lest one take it to an expert to learn,” presenting this as proof that the exposition remains a meaningful structure even when the mechanism is a rabbinic decree.

Conclusion Regarding Suspension: Not Emptying the Day and a Substantive Condition for Change

The text concludes that the example of shofar on the Sabbath is a suspension of a Torah-level law because of what appears to be a rabbinic need, but argues that a move that empties the verse and the day of their content cannot be possible. It presents this as an additional dimension that must be considered in any change or suspension in Jewish law, so that the change must leave the essence of the matter standing and not dismantle the “backbone and framework” of the day or the commandment.

The issue of the Sanhedrin, and then necessity when necessity arises, and he speaks both about Torah-level laws and about rabbinic laws, according to what the time requires. And I said that on the face of it, this actually somewhat empties all the requirements for change of their content, because as I said earlier, since there are no requirements in this context, and such a suspension can of course continue forever, nothing is more permanent than the temporary. But still, there is a limitation, and that is that apparently the change can be made only if there is a need. Meaning, it cannot be a change based on the fact that we disagree with an earlier religious court, or with its interpretation or its legislation, whether Torah-level or rabbinic. The fact that we disagree—that is the mechanism of change discussed in Jewish law 1 and Jewish law 2. And there, in order to disagree, I need to be a Sanhedrin; in rabbinic laws I need to be greater in wisdom and number. But in order to suspend, because some need has arisen now in my own period—and here only I exist, there is no one else, meaning the sages of that generation—then here there are no formal requirements. The sages of that generation can do what is needed: nullify, suspend Torah-level laws, rabbinic laws. I said there are medieval authorities (Rishonim) who speak about suspension by positive action, meaning the rabbis uproot something from the Torah by positive action where the time requires it. I gave as an example the law of an informer, killing an informer, which appears in the Talmudic text and apparently was not done by the Sanhedrin; it is a later enactment. And therefore there is in fact a possibility of making changes, but not where I disagree with the previous interpretation or legislation, rather where the thing is needed. Meaning, if it is harmful, if it can lead to some problematic result, things of that kind. At the end I noted that obviously in a place where I think the original religious court was mistaken, or where I disagree with it, that too will in some way meet up with making the suspension. Meaning, it can combine. In a place where I understand that this is not the right thing to do, then if the time requires it I will be more able to change it. Meaning, the division between these two things is not sharp, not unequivocal. The question is: what level of need justifies such a change? One can argue about how acute the need has to be. I assume there also has to be some sort of consensus; where there is no religious court, it cannot be that everyone does whatever he wants. Clearly this requires some kind of authority, although not formal authority; we are not talking about a situation where there is a Sanhedrin. Some kind of consensus, agreement of all the sages. By the way, we saw that this also has weight in Jewish law 1 and 2 in Maimonides, the agreement beyond the religious court. Maimonides explains what it means for a religious court to be greater in wisdom and number—what does “in number” mean? Every religious court is seventy-one. So how can a certain religious court be greater in number than the previous one? So Maimonides writes that this means the agreement of all the sages of that generation who join the decision of the Sanhedrin. Meaning, the consensus of the sages in that generation has standing even where there is a Sanhedrin, and certainly where some decision is made without a Sanhedrin, then it apparently has to be some sort of consensus or agreement. Now, after that I began talking about the mechanisms of change, about the need for change, and I tried to break down the considerations accompanying change into several planes. One plane is the necessity of the change—am I disagreeing with someone, or is it harmful, or what is really the source of this problem? After that comes the question of authority, then the question of mechanism. I’m in the middle of that issue, and maybe I’ll return to it next time. We do have another session, right? Until Sukkot, so maybe even twice. We’ll finish the subject of changes, in any case, by Sukkot, I hope. So what I want to do today is deal with something connected to Rosh Hashanah, but it is also a good illustration of the mechanisms I’ve described until now; it illustrates quite a few things. And there is apparently a dispute between the Babylonian Talmud and the Jerusalem Talmud here, but I want to show that behind the discussion there are more fundamental considerations that shed light on the topic of change in some way. So this is also a good opportunity both to deal with something seasonally relevant and within this framework of discussing changes in Jewish law. Apparently what we have here is a suspension because of need—the matter of blowing the shofar on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath. Apparently this is a suspension because of need, lest someone carry it four cubits in the public domain in order to go to an expert and learn. I’m going to try to show that it’s not like that, or not only like that. And that is exactly the kind of combination I was talking about. Okay, so let’s start with the verses. It just seems like a very strange rationale. What? That this is the reason for suspending it. Yes, that’s the starting point of the discussion, I’m getting to that. Right, I completely agree. Isn’t the weirdness because of some historical accident? I mean, isn’t it because when they enacted the enactment, the meaning was that they would blow only in a certain place, and only over time, when that was canceled… What do you mean, in the religious court? I don’t know, it doesn’t seem that way from the Talmud. Why not? So it wasn’t in the religious court? In a place where there was a religious court they blew, in a place where there wasn’t a religious court they said not to blow; they didn’t say, go to a place of religious court and blow there. They didn’t obligate everyone to gather in a place where there was a religious court; they forbade blowing in a place where there was no religious court. But then was there only one religious court, sort of in one place, or were there many such religious courts? In a central place; it wasn’t everywhere, not everyone heard. Meaning, this is defined as a prohibition against blowing in a place where there is no religious court, not as an obligation to go to a religious court in order to blow there. That’s different; that would have been a positive commandment, not a prohibition. The matter of the religious court seems secondary—there, the problem doesn’t exist, so there they leave the obligation to blow. Anyway, let’s start from the beginning. When the Torah speaks about Rosh Hashanah, it says: “And in the seventh month, on the first of the month, there shall be a holy convocation for you,” this is two pages, it doesn’t say here one, two… one page, yes. “And in the seventh month, on the first of the month, there shall be a holy convocation for you; you shall do no laborious work; it shall be a day of blowing for you.” So yes, it’s common knowledge that the contents we pour into Rosh Hashanah are not really anchored in what is written in the Torah. In the Torah itself, this festival is somewhat hidden. Meaning, the other festivals have explanations—agricultural explanations, other kinds of explanations, all sorts of explanations. Rosh Hashanah: a holy convocation, a day of blowing. What does “a day of blowing” mean? To blow the shofar. The Sages derive that “a day of blowing” means to blow the shofar; they derive it from the Jubilee, there are all sorts of sources. That too is not stated explicitly here, but the content of this day is a day of blowing. We need to blow. Not the Day of Judgment and all the contents that we in fact pour into this day. I’m introducing this because it obviously sharpens things even more. I’m going to talk about Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath, and within that also about Rosh Hashanah in general. I’m introducing this because if in the Torah this day is defined as being a day of blowing, then it is all the more difficult to accept that the very essence of the day—the only thing required on that day—the Sages cancel. The only thing there is on that day. They didn’t cancel the judgment taking place in the heavenly court. Fine, they canceled blowing the shofar, but in the Torah that’s the only thing there is in Rosh Hashanah; there’s nothing else. And more than that, it’s not even defined as the commandment to blow the shofar, but rather as the character of the day: it is a day of blowing. From there they derive the blowing of the shofar. Look, here is Maimonides in positive commandment 170: commandment 170, that He commanded us to hear the sound of the shofar on the first day of Tishrei, and this is what He, may He be exalted, said: “It shall be a day of blowing for you.” And the laws of this commandment have already been explained in tractate Rosh Hashanah, and women are exempt, and so on. So the Torah does not even say to blow the shofar; the Torah only defines the character of the day. It says this day is a day of blowing, that is its definition; of course it follows that one must blow, because that is the essence of the day. But that very wording sharpens the difficulty even more: how can it be that the Sages cancel this on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath? That is the essence of the day. Did they cancel the day? From then on there’s nothing. In our context… This of course raises the question, in the considerations for making a change or a suspension in this case, or a change later on—but a change or suspension in this case. The change is supposed to take into account that you don’t throw out the baby with the bathwater. You can change a detail in Jewish law, you can think that this law is incorrect, everything is fine. But to suspend—you can’t suspend a certain law and in effect empty the whole day of its content. So then what remains? Especially since I talked about the fact that the authority of the sages to do this is something they took upon themselves. A little like the Supreme Court, yes, exactly. There is, it doesn’t—it has no source, at least not one I remember. There is no source brought for the authority of the sages to do this, and it is a matter of reasoning. Especially since the Mahari ties this to punishment not according to the formal law, so it is pretty clear what the reasoning is. The reasoning is that there has to be order, meaning someone has to manage things here and prevent problems and so on—that is the role of the religious court. So within that framework, the religious court can also suspend laws. But to throw out the baby with the bathwater? Meaning, to throw the entire essence of this day into the trash? And we’ll see later whether it’s only because of the concern that someone may go to an expert to learn; that’s unbelievable. It really is unbelievable. This enactment is a very strange enactment: canceling a Torah-level positive commandment because of the concern lest someone carry it four cubits in the public domain to an expert. And what Mahari said earlier could perhaps have been a solution. They should have obligated everyone to gather in certain places, say a place where there is a religious court, and there not decree this prohibition, and blow there. But no—they forbade blowing. In the laws of shofar too, in chapter 1, Jewish law 1: “It is a positive commandment of the Torah to hear the sounding of the shofar on Rosh Hashanah, as it says, ‘It shall be a day of blowing for you.’ And the shofar blown on both Rosh Hashanah and the Jubilee is the curved horn of rams. And all shofars are valid except the horn of a bull. And although the Torah does not explicitly state blowing with a shofar on Rosh Hashanah, it says in the Jubilee, ‘Then you shall make the shofar sound a blast.’ By tradition they learned: just as the blast of the Jubilee is with a shofar, so too the blast of Rosh Hashanah is with a shofar.” In the Torah it doesn’t say that it is a shofar, but it does say that it is a day of blowing. The fact that it is a shofar is learned from the Jubilee. There is another verse in the portion of Emor. That first verse is in the portion of Pinchas, and the second verse is in the portion of Emor. “And the Lord spoke to Moses, saying: Speak to the children of Israel, saying: In the seventh month, on the first of the month, there shall be for you a rest day, a remembrance of blowing, a holy convocation. You shall do no laborious work, and you shall bring a fire-offering to the Lord.” So here too it is defined around the blowing, but here it is “a remembrance of blowing” and not “a day of blowing.” Fine, but in the Torah there are sometimes different wordings. I wouldn’t necessarily derive this difference between “day of blowing” and “remembrance of blowing.” Bottom line, the essence of the day is somehow connected to blowing, so one has to blow.

Now, the Mishnah in Rosh Hashanah 29 says this: “When the festival of Rosh Hashanah fell on the Sabbath, they would blow in the Temple but not in the province. After the Temple was destroyed, Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai instituted that they should blow in every place where there is a religious court. Rabbi Elazar said: Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai instituted this only in Yavneh alone. They said to him: both Yavneh and every place where there is a religious court. And Jerusalem had yet another advantage over Yavneh: any city that could see, hear, was close by, and could come—they would blow there. But in Yavneh they would blow only in the religious court itself.” Those are already details of exactly in which cities, in which places, one may blow. But basically Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai instituted that they should blow in every place where there is a religious court. Fine, only in this case. As I said earlier, this law—I don’t yet know whether it is an enactment; we’ll soon see—but this law is a strange law. In the Torah itself it seems that this is the essence of the day; this day is a day of blowing. How can it be that they in effect cancel it, or enact that they blow only in certain places, only partially? And why is it connected to the Temple? “After the Temple was destroyed”? So there was no place to blow in the Temple. No—only in the Temple did they blow? In the Temple, when there was a Temple, they blew only in the Temple and not in the province. So in the Sifra on the portion of Behar they discuss this and we find the following: “By day and not by night; on Yom Kippur, even on the Sabbath: ‘you shall make the shofar sound throughout all your land’—this teaches that every individual is obligated. You might think that the blowing of Rosh Hashanah also overrides the Sabbath; therefore the verse says, ‘throughout all your land.’ ‘Then you shall make the shofar sound a blast in the seventh month, on the tenth day of the month, on Yom Kippur’—it need not have said ‘on the tenth day of the month, on Yom Kippur.’ From the fact that it says ‘on Yom Kippur,’ do I not know that Yom Kippur is on the tenth day of the month? If so, why does it say ‘on the tenth day of the month’? Rather, ‘on the tenth day of the month’ overrides the Sabbath throughout all your land, but the blowing of Rosh Hashanah does not override the Sabbath throughout all your land, only in a religious court.” Meaning, the Sifra derives here from verses some exposition from which it emerges that the blowing of Rosh Hashanah does not override the Sabbath except in a religious court, but not in all other places. Here we need to understand two things. First, from the Sifra it seems that this is an exposition, meaning that this is Torah law. Not now getting into Maimonides, where perhaps these are rabbinic words and expositions under the second principle—but this is not an enactment or decree, rather an exposition. On the other hand, the wording is that the blowing does not override the Sabbath. What does “does not override the Sabbath” mean? The terminology “override the Sabbath” means that in principle one should have blown on the Sabbath too. The only problem is that there is some issue with it, I don’t know exactly what, and that issue is not overridden. Meaning, blowing on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath is not overridden. The term “override,” especially in the Talmud when we talk about “set aside” and “permitted,” “impurity is set aside for the community,” “impurity is permitted for the community”—so “overrides the Sabbath” is terminology that clearly speaks of a situation in which they really were supposed to blow even on the Sabbath, only this does not override it for one reason or another. What is there here to override? So everyone knows this, I already mentioned it—the Babylonian Talmud talks about going to an expert to learn, lest one carry it four cubits in the public domain. But that is a rabbinic concern. And the question is whether the Sifra is talking about that; it’s unlikely. It’s unlikely that the Sifra is talking about that because a verse cannot refer to a rabbinic decree. To a rabbinic decree lest one carry it—four cubits in the public domain is of course a Torah prohibition, not rabbinic. But the concern lest one carry it four cubits in the public domain is a rabbinic concern. And when I blow the shofar on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath, I transgress a rabbinic prohibition that exists because of the concern lest I carry four cubits in the public domain, which is a Torah prohibition. But the blowing itself is only a rabbinic prohibition. So it cannot be that the Sifra brings an exposition from a verse saying that blowing does not override the Sabbath when the overriding in question is really the concern lest one carry it four cubits in the public domain. So what is being discussed? The blowing itself. “Blowing the shofar is a skill and not labor,” the Talmud says. “Removing bread from the oven and blowing the shofar are skills and not labor.” Meaning, it is a rabbinic prohibition, perhaps because of making sound—there are disputes about whether blowing the shofar is prohibited because one might repair a musical instrument, as with making sound in music, or whether this is some other prohibition. But in any case it is some rabbinic prohibition: it is a skill and not labor; there is no labor prohibition here on the Sabbath. So again, the Sifra cannot be talking about that. Is this matter agreed with certainty? It seems to me yes. I don’t see how not. I mean, under which primary category of labor would you put it? What primary category could blowing the shofar belong to? More than that, the Torah says—the Torah says to blow on Rosh Hashanah, including when it is the Sabbath. Yes? Which means it’s not labor. Wait, it could be labor on the Sabbath—say I blow the shofar on an ordinary Sabbath. The Torah also obligates offering additional offerings on the Sabbath; taking life is labor on the Sabbath, a Torah prohibition. Because it is permitted. Obviously. The Torah said to do it even though it is labor—that does not mean it is not labor. It is labor; if you slaughter on an ordinary Sabbath, you transgressed a labor prohibition on the Sabbath. But clearly, if it is a labor built into the act of blowing the shofar, not some secondary concern or another, then the whole thing is unclear in itself, because as you say, the Torah itself said it is unconcerned that this is labor, even if it were some sort of labor. The Torah said to blow on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath. So what? Why would the sages have to be more concerned about this prohibition than—or not the sages, but this exposition—what is this exposition about? And this language that it overrides the Sabbath—is that about not separating the Sabbath from the festival day? The festival of Rosh Hashanah is now really happening; what I’m doing is the festival, that’s the main thing, and that therefore overrides the Sabbath. And festivals usually override. From Yom Kippur we have something parallel like that: on Yom Kippur we observe Yom Kippur and not the Sabbath, the Sabbath is overridden. But there too it overrides the Sabbath—what do you mean? What is that? There too it overrides the Sabbath—what do you mean? There is affliction and acts that really make it Yom Kippur. Even clearer, even clearer—there it should have been even more forbidden. No, there you erase the Sabbath entirely on Yom Kippur. Obviously Yom Kippur overrides the Sabbath. Obviously. But Rosh Hashanah also overrides the Sabbath. So Rosh Hashanah overrides the Sabbath, and that’s the conclusion? I didn’t understand. I mean that in blowing the shofar, you emphasized Rosh Hashanah more than the Sabbath. I understand what you’re suggesting; I’m only saying that usually that is not the meaning of the term “override.” And I also think that—why doesn’t this question arise with Yom Kippur? Why does Yom Kippur override the Sabbath? If there were some issue with the mixing of a festival with the Sabbath, then it should arise elsewhere too. Maybe there’s a verse here that says no, a verse there that says yes, but such a discussion should have arisen if it was really troubling the Talmud. I don’t think that’s the meaning. I hadn’t thought of that possibility, but I don’t think that’s the meaning. Again, I don’t have a better answer; I tried looking a bit too, and I don’t know an answer. In what sense does this override the Sabbath? Everyone deals with this in complete serenity. “Overrides the Sabbath” means that on the Torah level one really need not blow. The term “override” isn’t that. The term “override” means that it overrides. Therefore the Babylonian Talmud in Rosh Hashanah in fact interprets it differently. But in the Jerusalem Talmud, soon, and in the Sifra, it is strange. In the Jerusalem Talmud there may be another option, but on the face of it I don’t really understand the meaning of overriding here. Well, maybe it’s just conventional wording, and it simply means they do not override according to Torah law. Maybe. It could be. Sometimes there are also textual mixtures; this would require academic research into the development of the text of this Sifra, because often such midrashim actually preserve, or contain within them, earlier remnants. It may be that the expression “override the Sabbath” remained from the Babylonian Talmud, which speaks of overriding because of the concern lest one carry it four cubits in the public domain, and therefore they use it also in the Sifra even though the Sifra is really talking about not blowing in the first place, not because of overriding. Only the expression “override the Sabbath” was borrowed because people are used to formulating it that way in light of the Babylonian Talmud. Maybe, I don’t know. Reasonable suggestions. What? The Sifra brings a verse for such a thing. Yes, I said—it’s just terminology, conventional wording. The Sifra… No, the concept of override. The meaning is: they don’t blow on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath because of the verse. And why did they use the expression “does not override the Sabbath”? Because, following the Babylonian Talmud, people are used to saying that it doesn’t override the Sabbath—that when they don’t blow on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath, the meaning is that it does not override, because the Babylonian Talmud really explains it that way. But according to the Sifra, why don’t they blow on the Sabbath? Because they don’t need to; there is an exposition from the verse. They don’t need to; from the outset the Torah did not intend that we should blow. So there is a dispute here between the Sifra and the Babylonian Talmud. Yes, I’m only saying that the wording in the Sifra—if it had not said “override the Sabbath,” it would be clear that there is a dispute, fine, there is a dispute. But it says “override,” so the meaning is that the Sifra too understands that this applies even to Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath. Only they don’t blow; there is some verse or another. Why not say that the verse is, say, an asmachta, a textual support, to say that… Maybe, possible. That it’s rabbinic and still… It still reflects the importance of the commandment. Because even though it’s rabbinic, the verse referred to it as support. No, the verse didn’t refer to it—you’re saying it’s just an asmachta. Fine. Okay. There is always the possibility of seeing an exposition as an asmachta, but again, it is presented here as a verse being expounded in its straightforward sense. If this were about the prohibition lest one repair a musical instrument—the prohibition in the blowing itself—even though that is a rabbinic prohibition—but even if we assume it is, then they should simply prohibit blowing the shofar in general. Why specifically on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath? What about ordinary Rosh Hashanah? It too would be forbidden. What about blowing beyond the required blasts? We blow beyond the required blasts today; there is no prohibition against blowing the shofar beyond the required blasts. If it were a prohibition that was permitted only because of the commandment of blowing the shofar, then I would expect it to be forbidden for the other blasts, after you’ve already fulfilled your obligation. In short, this whole matter here is really unclear.

The Jerusalem Talmud writes as follows: “The festival of Rosh Hashanah,” and so on. Rabbi Abba bar Pappa said that Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish were sitting and asking: “We learned: when the festival of Rosh Hashanah fell on the Sabbath, they would blow in the Temple but not in the province. If it is a Torah matter, then let it override even in the borders. If it is not a Torah matter, then let it not override even in the Temple.” If this is Torah law, then let it override everywhere; if it is not Torah law, then let it not override anywhere. Rav Kahana passed by. They said: “Let us ask this great man.” They came and asked him. He said to them: “One verse says, ‘a day of blowing,’ and another verse says, ‘a remembrance of blowing.’ How so? When it falls on a weekday: a day of blowing. When it falls on the Sabbath: a remembrance of blowing. We mention, but we do not blow.” This is a different exposition from the Sifra, and also based on the two verses I quoted above. In one it says “a remembrance of blowing,” in the other “a day of blowing.” So the Jerusalem Talmud expounds: “a day of blowing” is a Rosh Hashanah on which one must blow, and there is another day which is “a remembrance of blowing,” where we only remember the blowing but do not actually blow, and that is Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath. By the way, it is very interesting that the second verse, from the portion of Emor, says in the first clause: it is defined as “on the first of the month there shall be a holy convocation for you; you shall do no laborious work.” In the second clause it says: “there shall be for you a rest day, a remembrance of blowing, a holy convocation.” It could be that the Jerusalem Talmud is also relying on the wording of the verse—that the second verse is talking about the Sabbath, Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath. “When it falls on the Sabbath, there shall be for you a rest day, a remembrance of blowing,” meaning you only remember the blowing and do not blow, “a holy convocation.” Fine, maybe, I don’t know. In any event, these two verses are expounded, one for ordinary Rosh Hashanah and one for Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath. In one they blow, in the other it is a remembrance of blowing.

Here it is already quite clear that this is not about overriding at all. Not the Sifra and nothing of that sort. It is simply the Torah itself, as the Sages understood or expounded it. The Torah itself speaks—I’m not even sure this is an exposition, by the way; it may be the meaning of the verses. The Sages understood that the Torah itself says to blow only on ordinary Rosh Hashanah, not on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath. More than that: according to the Jerusalem Talmud, this is not even a prohibition to blow. It is not that it does not override the Sabbath; there is simply no commandment. If you want, blow. It does not say it is forbidden; only the commandment is defined only on ordinary Rosh Hashanah, not on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath. Right? That is what emerges from the Jerusalem Talmud. Meaning, “they would blow in the Temple but not in the province”—that is, in the Temple but not in the province—the meaning is not that they were not fulfilling the commandment because there is no commandment. Not that they would not blow because of a prohibition, or because it does not override the Sabbath, but simply that there is no commandment. What is the difference between the Temple and the province? According to each view we have to understand the relation between Temple and province. The question is whether this was Torah law or rabbinic law—that in the province they would not blow, only in the Temple. The source is unclear. No—that according to Torah law one should blow even in the province, and there was already an early enactment, from the time when the Temple still existed, that in the province they did not blow. According to the Babylonian Talmud, because of the concern lest one carry it four cubits in the public domain, and that was already there—an early enactment. And after the Temple was destroyed, now the question is: so what remains? What remains at the end? That they should not blow at all? No, but that’s not relevant—in a place where there is a religious court they blow, in a place where there is no religious court they do not blow. In the province they do not blow, regardless of the Sabbath? No, no—what do you mean regardless of the Sabbath? “When the festival of Rosh Hashanah fell on the Sabbath, they would blow in the Temple but not in the province.” Not on ordinary Rosh Hashanah. According to the Jerusalem Talmud, what is the explanation for the distinction between Temple and province? What? According to the Jerusalem Talmud, what is the explanation for Temple and province? Honestly, I don’t know. That’s why I’m saying: according to every such view, there is no explanation here. According to every such view. If it is total exemption, then what has the Temple got to do with it? What? If it is complete exemption. So I’m saying maybe that exemption applies only in the province. I don’t know. Is there some discussion in Tosafot there? Yes, that it applies only in the Temple, I don’t know. Maybe. Maybe in that sugya in the Jerusalem Talmud this is clarified; I don’t remember some such thing where they explain this issue. In any case, for our purposes, the Jerusalem Talmud claims that there is a difference between ordinary Rosh Hashanah and Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath. The commandment applies only on ordinary Rosh Hashanah and not on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath. Then the colleagues came and… and heard the voice of Levi expounding, and it was impossible that he would begin teaching and not… in short, they eventually arrive. And he said before them: “One verse says, ‘a day of blowing,’ and another verse says, ‘a remembrance of blowing.’ How so? When it falls on a weekday: a day of blowing. When it falls on the Sabbath: a remembrance of blowing. We mention, but we do not blow.” Ah, here it is—afterward, in that Rabbi Zeira section, yes? Now they ask: “If so, then even in the Temple it should not override.” Again—what does “should not override” mean? What is the question here? In the Jerusalem Talmud there is no commandment, this is not overriding. I emphasized that in contrast to the Sifra, right? What does “should not override” mean? Again, this somewhat strengthens perhaps the claim I made above regarding the Sifra, that “should not override” is just conventional wording. It means they should not blow; that’s what “should not override” means. It could be perhaps more than that. Maybe this is better: once there is no commandment, then the rabbinic prohibition that it is a skill and not labor does not get overridden. “Does not override” means it is forbidden to do it; there is a prohibition. Had there been a commandment, fine, then this rabbinic prohibition would not interfere—a rabbinic prohibition. But once you tell me, according to the Jerusalem Talmud, that there is no commandment on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath, then by definition it also does not override. Again, not really “override,” but the meaning is: there is indeed a prohibition. The language of overriding still doesn’t sit here properly. The prohibition? No, not that prohibition—perhaps the prohibition of making sound. Yes, that is what appears in the Babylonian Talmud, or the prohibition brought there. Since there is no commandment on the Sabbath, then according to the Babylonian Talmud the prohibition applies? No, obviously. So I’m saying the Babylonian Talmud goes in that direction. But in the Jerusalem Talmud—what is the problem of overriding? And maybe the issue is concern lest one carry; and maybe the issue is the making of sound itself. But first of all, the Jerusalem Talmud says there is no commandment at all. Once there is no commandment, it says there is also a prohibition in it. I’m saying that the language of overriding still doesn’t settle properly here, because overriding means there is a commandment and the question is whether it overrides the prohibition or not. Here I’m saying “override” in the sense that there is a prohibition here, not merely no commandment. That’s what I mean to say—that I can explain. But why does the concept of overriding suddenly appear here? That is unclear. “On the first of the month”—there is some interpretive method here, that “on the first of the month” means on the first of the month. “On the first of the month”—that means do it in any case on the first of the month, even when it falls on the Sabbath. And again the question is: then why specifically in the Temple? “On the first of the month” appears in both verses, both in the verse in Pinchas and in the verse in Emor. Never mind—they derive from a verse that in the Temple they do blow. So that is probably what I said earlier, that in the Jerusalem Talmud I don’t understand why—apparently that explanation also holds for the earlier statement. What is the answer to “if so, then even in the Temple it should not override”? “On the first of the month.” No—that is the answer. “On the first of the month” means: once it is the first of the month, you blow, I don’t care whether it is the Sabbath or not the Sabbath; therefore it overrides—in the Temple it does override. Okay? Why specifically in the Temple from “on the first of the month”? I don’t know. “On the first of the month” appears in both verses. In the place where they know. What? The meaning is the place where they know. Where? In the place where they know that it is the first of the month, it overrides. And now here: “If so, then even in a place where they know it is the first of the month, let it override.” What does that mean? That is also outside the Temple. What does it mean, “they know it is the first of the month”? Who doesn’t know it’s the first of the month? The sanctification of the month—the religious court sanctifies the month, and that usually happened in Jerusalem. Right? And because of that all the messengers would go out, and because of that you need the two weeks. And Rosh Hashanah is a problem with the messengers, because you sanctify the month and immediately the festival falls. It’s not like Sukkot and Passover—a problem is created. Here suddenly a new topic enters the Jerusalem Talmud: uncertainty about the day. You don’t know if this is the first of the month, and so maybe that is the problem of overriding. Until now that had not been mentioned at all. And that is the difference between Temple and province. Yes. It may be that the problem of overriding is simply uncertainty about the day. You don’t know if this is Rosh Hashanah, so what permission do you have to blow? Now right, what is the problem with blowing? It still remains in the background that it is a rabbinic prohibition. Fine—but in a place where there is uncertainty about the day, perhaps even a rabbinic prohibition prevents the blowing because you are not sure there is an obligation. Sometimes the sages strengthened their words even more than the Torah. And then here suddenly some new element enters, not mentioned in the sugya until now, that the problem is really only uncertainty about the day. And then the question of overriding is not speaking at all about ordinary Rosh Hashanah. It speaks only about a place where there is uncertainty about the day. So in a place where they know what the first of the month is, there is no problem—blow. Why not? There is no prohibition. No Torah prohibition, at least. And if it is clear that if you know that it is the first of the month, then the rabbinic prohibition will not stand in the way of that blowing. Therefore the Talmud says: in a place where they know it is the first of the month, let it override. In every place? Could that also be in the province? Yes, in every place, if they know. Yes. But then why distinguish between Temple and province? Again—because they know. That’s what the Talmud asks. The Talmud asks why you distinguish between Temple and province if so; in every place where they know, let them blow. That is exactly the question. The distinction is not between Temple and province but between a place where they know and a place where they don’t know. And more than that—even the place where they know needs explanation. What does it mean “a place where they know”? The messengers would go out, say, and reach some area beyond the Temple, but of course still very close—it’s the first twenty-four hours, the first day itself of Rosh Hashanah. But perhaps “they know” means they know by calculation. That too, perhaps. Because true, there is uncertainty about the day, but if you have a calculation that says when Rosh Hashanah is, perhaps you can rely on the presumption that the religious court established it on that day. And if not, then not. But I’m saying, it’s no longer a complete doubt, though it’s not a balanced doubt either. Because after all, you do have a calculation. So if there are Torah scholars who know how to calculate the calendar—or not the calendar, rather the sanctification of the month—then in a place where… then one can blow. And then a place where they know is of course broader than just the twenty-four-hour radius of where the messengers could travel or something like that. Anyway, here suddenly this uncertainty-about-the-day rabbit comes out of the hat. “It was taught: Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai [derived from] ‘And you shall offer’—in the place where offerings are offered.” What happened? Suddenly the… what? That’s just the initial assumption, not the end. No, on the face of it that is the problem. The Talmud asks: if so, then why only in the Temple? In any place where they know. That implies to us that only in the Temple do they know. And indeed, the meaning is places where they know. But only in the Temple naturally, in the normal course, only there do they know. So at this point we still know nothing. “Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai taught”—if this is the conclusion, then apparently we really have moved away from that. “In the place where offerings are offered.” “And you shall offer”—in the place where offerings are offered. And this is interesting because it really is a verse taken from the portion of Emor. Fine? “And you shall offer.” And if I am speaking about the portion of Emor, which is Rosh Hashanah falling on the Sabbath, then they blow only in the place where you offer. The first suggestion was “on the first of the month”—that in any case, even on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath, one should blow. That “on the first of the month” appears also in the verse in Pinchas and also in the verse in Emor. But this verse that Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai brings is really only in the verse in Emor: in the place where offerings are offered. And then again the question is: so have we dropped the whole issue of uncertainty about the day? So it is no longer connected to uncertainty about the day; rather the Torah says: in the place where offerings are offered. But then the question returns: so what is the prohibition? Why not blow? It says above why not. Because there is no commandment. Right? In the Jerusalem Talmud it remains that there is no commandment; it is not about prohibition. Rather there is no commandment on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath. Fine. So why in the Temple yes? Because “And you shall offer”—in the place where offerings are offered. It may be that this joins with “on the first of the month” that appears above; it may be that it doesn’t. “On the first of the month”—do it in any case, but only in the place where offerings are offered. Fine, of course one can play with the verses here in all kinds of ways. But bottom line, what emerges from the Jerusalem Talmud is that the distinction between Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath and ordinary Rosh Hashanah is a Torah-level distinction. The Jerusalem Talmud understands that the verse in Pinchas speaks about ordinary Rosh Hashanah, and the verse in Emor speaks about Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath.

Maybe the Jerusalem Talmud holds that the rabbinic prohibition of blowing on the Sabbath, of blowing the shofar on the Sabbath, is not about the decree lest one carry it four cubits in the public domain, nor lest one repair it. Even though it is a rabbinic prohibition, it is not a rabbinic prohibition like, say, washing hands—something new that in some generation they decided to decree that people should not act one way and should do so also here. Right? Rather it is something that from the outset was problematic but was regarded as less severe. Meaning, from the outset on the Torah level it was not forbidden. So then something that is an ancient rabbinic prohibition? No, not just an ancient rabbinic prohibition—rather something that… already when the Torah was given, this was something people did not do, but it was less problematic. Why? What is the problem? What problem is there? You need some source for such a prohibition. No, it’s all because it is part of the whole framework of labors. I had thought of Nachmanides in the portion of Emor. Nachmanides talks about shevut prohibitions, and he says the shevut prohibitions are forbidden by Torah law. Shevut usually means rabbinic Sabbath prohibitions, but Nachmanides says that “you shall rest” implies a Torah-level shevut prohibition. And Ritva also brings this in Rosh Hashanah. So maybe, if we go a bit in the direction Ari suggested just now—if there is some activity that is not labor but in some sense harms the character of the day, like giving shofar concerts, or weekday-type activity, opening stores on the Sabbath for example, or things like that—which are not labor in the sense of a primary category of labor or a derivative of one, but simply inappropriate, what in Yiddish they call pas nisht—it’s just not what you do, this is not what the Sabbath looks like. If you desecrate the character of the day, that is a Torah prohibition even though it is not a labor prohibition. If that is really so, then perhaps one could understand this issue. Though again, you’d still have to understand why blowing the shofar is so substantial that it destroys the character of the day when we are talking about a case where the Torah itself says to blow the shofar. It’s not that someone just felt like blowing the shofar now and putting on a concert—some Shlomo Gronich shofar show, there are such things people do. The point is that it is only in the Temple, so according to the Jerusalem Talmud it works out. No, if that’s built in from the outset, then you don’t need anything. And if from the outset you say there is a Torah source that this applies only in the Temple and not in the province, then there is no commandment in the province, and you don’t need to look for prohibitions. There is simply no commandment. But the rabbinic prohibition is tricky; you don’t need to look for something else. I am looking for something that would explain the language of overriding while still keeping this on the Torah level. And the Babylonian Talmud speaks in the language of overriding, like the Sifra. So I’m saying: if this were a matter of shevut, and shevut too is on the Torah level, then although it is only overriding, the commandment is still defined on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath. It’s not that the commandment itself is not defined. And yet there would still be a Torah-level overriding here. Why Torah-level overriding? Because this is a shevut prohibition. Again, this is difficult both logically and conceptually. I mean, why is this called destroying the character of the day or turning it into a weekday? Especially if you assume there is such an obligation from the Torah. The Torah itself says to blow, and then you tell me: no, that destroys the character of the day? That is a strange formulation.

Anyway, this whole matter is really a mystery. I think this question is rooted somewhere, apparently, in a historical question. We need to understand what exactly was troubling them there, why this happened. It is more historical research than conceptual analysis. It feels like there was something here that the conceptual analysis simply doesn’t manage to grasp. And maybe an additional meaning entered in—after all, the shofar was no longer the only thing; the Day of Judgment. But on Rosh Hashanah the Torah says “a day of blowing”; what do you mean, “an additional meaning entered in”? But to add additional meanings beyond those in the Torah—that is obvious, good question. But the Torah says “a day of blowing”—what do you mean, an additional meaning entered in? You also don’t put on tefillin on the Sabbath. What? Tefillin as well—not on the Sabbath. Right, and they derive that because this is a sign and that is a sign, so one does not put them on on the Sabbath. So they say that… I have no problem with the Sages making an exposition and saying: the commandment that the Torah did not distinguish, we in fact distinguish. Because the exposition teaches us that this is not on the Sabbath but on a weekday. I have no problem if there were an exposition here—that would be completely fine. The exposition would say that there is no commandment to blow on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath. Everything would be fine, like tefillin. But when you talk about overriding, you are basically saying: there is a commandment to blow, but it does not override. Now I ask: first, why does it not override when the Torah said to blow? And second, what is the problem that needs overriding? What is prohibited there? In the Babylonian Talmud it says this: “From where are these words derived? Rav Levi bar Lahma said in the name of Rabbi Hama bar Hanina: one verse says, ‘a solemn rest, a remembrance of blowing,’ and one verse says, ‘it shall be a day of blowing for you.’” Now note here, by the way, that we didn’t pay attention to this: in the Babylonian Talmud, this citation is really parallel to the Jerusalem Talmud. Right? “One verse says, ‘a solemn rest, a remembrance of blowing,’ and one verse says, ‘it shall be a day of blowing for you.’” “There is no difficulty: one speaks of a festival falling on the Sabbath, and one of a festival falling on a weekday.” It is exactly the same exposition that appears in the Jerusalem Talmud, but the wording of the verse… here it says “a solemn rest, a remembrance of blowing.” That means it does indeed seem that the Babylonian Talmud understands that the wording “a solemn rest” as opposed to “a holy convocation,” which is the wording of the verse above—yes, “a holy convocation”—apparently hints that this is speaking of Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath. In the Jerusalem Talmud they cited it in the same form: this is “a day of blowing” and this is “a remembrance of blowing.” They did not mention the word “rest.” Fine? But in the Babylonian Talmud the word “rest” is mentioned, and that may indeed strengthen the exposition. In any case, the Babylonian Talmud at first goes in the direction of the Jerusalem Talmud. After that, Rava said: “If this is by Torah law, then how do we blow in the Temple?” If you tell me that this is really Torah law, then why do they blow in the Temple? What is “by Torah law”? Not a prohibition. There is no prohibition. There is no obligation to blow. So why do they blow in the Temple? Yes, so far nothing has been written here about any prohibition to blow, right? Only the idea that there is no commandment to blow, because on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath the commandment is not defined. And about this he asked: “How do we blow?” Why do we blow? What? Why does “How do we blow?” mean “Why do we blow?” What’s the point? “Why do we blow,” I think he means to say. Why do we blow—is it a transgression? So why are they blowing? What? It could even be that “How do we blow?” means from the standpoint of the rabbinic prohibition, because after all it is forbidden in the Temple too, but the rabbinic prohibition doesn’t fit, because after all there is no commandment. So on what rabbinic prohibition are you allowed to transgress? Fine, but apparently that is the point, because so far no prohibition has been mentioned. “And if this is by Torah law, then how do we blow in the Temple? Moreover, it is not labor that a verse would be needed to permit it. As the school of Ishmael taught: ‘You shall do no laborious work’—excluding the blowing of the shofar and removing bread from the oven, which are skills and not labor.” Now suddenly the prohibition enters. Until now it was presented as there being no commandment. Now suddenly the prohibition enters, but that assumption is not clear. Who spoke about prohibition? What does “Moreover, it is not labor” mean? Who spoke to you about prohibition? I was talking to you about there being no commandment to blow on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath. From the wording of the Jerusalem Talmud it seems he understood that from the outset this was already about a prohibition. Right? Then he asks: wait, but what prohibition is there here? It is a skill and not labor. Who spoke about prohibition? He apparently understood that the exposition in the Jerusalem Talmud, which is brought here, that on Rosh Hashanah falling on the Sabbath one does not blow, is because of a prohibition being overridden. That strengthens what I said also about the Jerusalem Talmud and the Sifra when they speak there about overriding. All of these do not mean to say that they don’t blow because from the outset there is no commandment to blow; rather that there is a prohibition. Fine. And then he says: but what prohibition is there? After all, it is a skill and not labor. Rather, Rava said: “By Torah law it is entirely permitted, and it is the rabbis who decreed concerning it.” And therefore there is no Torah prohibition here; it is a rabbinic prohibition. And of course he abandons the distinction in the exposition between “day of blowing” and “remembrance of blowing.” He drops it entirely. Like Rava elsewhere said: “All are obligated in blowing the shofar, but not all are expert in blowing the shofar; therefore a decree was made lest one take it in his hand and go to an expert to learn, and carry it four cubits in the public domain. And that is the reason for the lulav, and that is the reason for the Megillah.” Exactly the same explanation is applied to lulav and Megillah. Does lulav also override Torah law? What? Was it also canceled on the Sabbath? In the Temple. Right, the same thing. Lulav and Megillah. No, it does not override Torah law. Yes, they cancel the Torah prohibition because of the concern lest one carry it four cubits in the public domain. Ah, you mean Megillah is rabbinic. Right. Here we have Torah prohibitions and also rabbinic prohibitions. The conclusion of the Babylonian Talmud completely drops the whole thing. It is not an exposition of “day of blowing” versus “remembrance of blowing,” nor anything like that, but rather a decree lest one carry it four cubits in the public domain.

Now I return to the starting point. At the starting point I said that if indeed the essence of the day is defined as a day of blowing, and there is no commandment at all to blow from the Torah’s perspective—it is not brought as a commandment to blow; rather the character of the day is that it is a day of blowing—then now this already makes sense. If you tell me there is an exposition that there is one day that is a day of blowing and another day that is a remembrance of blowing, then I understand that the Torah itself defines these days differently. We need to understand what “a remembrance of blowing” means. What is this matter of “a remembrance of blowing”? We have to understand it. And I’ll sharpen it further: according to the Jerusalem Talmud and the first exposition in the Babylonian Talmud, there is an exposition of “day of blowing” and “remembrance of blowing.” What does “remembrance of blowing” mean? It means that on that day one need not blow, only remember the blowing. So now we have to understand what it means to remember the blowing. What do you actually have to do? You have to refrain from blowing—but what do you do positively? And we have to understand: when I say “remembrance of blowing,” there is some positive commandment here. This is not a prohibition against blowing—it does not say here that it is forbidden to blow. What it says is that these two days are defined differently. One day is defined as a day of blowing, and one day is defined as a remembrance of blowing, a day on which we remember the blowing. Whether it is permitted or forbidden to blow is unrelated; that is another question entirely. So we are talking about the commandment. What commandment is there? Here there is a commandment to blow, and here there is a commandment to remember, not to blow. What is this “remembrance of blowing”? Maybe that is why the Talmud really asks what labor there is here, because the Talmud understands that this is not defining the character of the day; rather “remembrance of blowing” is a hint—at least that is how the Babylonian Talmud seems—that “remembrance of blowing” is a hint that this is not a commandment of remembrance of blowing in place of the commandment of blowing. The commandment is blowing, but it says “remembrance of blowing” in order to teach you that it does not override the Sabbath. Just remember. And in effect, by implication, this is not a positive commandment. It is not a positive commandment to remember the blowing, but a prohibition against blowing. Don’t blow—just remember. Why not blow? Because of the prohibition, not because the commandment does not exist on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath. That at least is how it seems from the Babylonian Talmud, right? And therefore it asks: after all, what labor is there here? It understands that even in the exposition between “day of blowing” and “remembrance of blowing,” the issue was overriding some prohibition, and then it asks: what prohibition? Because on the face of it, it did not seem that way. But if indeed that is the case, then again I ask: what is happening here? But the Torah defines this as a day of blowing. “Remembrance of blowing”—what is that? Is it only a hint to some labor prohibition that is present, where in fact there is no labor prohibition because it is a skill and not labor? Or is it really a different type of characterization of the day? It is a day that is “a remembrance of blowing,” and the positive commandment on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath is to remember the blowing and not to sound it. In the conclusion of the Babylonian Talmud this does not emerge in any case, but in the exposition—and still more in the Jerusalem Talmud, and even in the Babylonian Talmud until the question comes and asks what labor there is here—it does seem that these are really two different characterizations of the day. Wait, so according to the exposition in the Babylonian Talmud at the end, how does it explain the exposition? It doesn’t explain the exposition; it drops it. But there is still a difference in… He says the exposition teaches something else—we’ll soon see, I’ll comment on that. But in the plain sense it seems that the Babylonian Talmud abandons it. “Day of blowing” and “remembrance of blowing” are not expounded, or at least that’s how it seems. It may be that one can expound them differently. Rashi brings that it refers to the verses of remembrance. By the way, we say the verses of remembrance both on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath and on ordinary Rosh Hashanah. In Rashi it seems this is Torah law; he derives it from the verse “a remembrance of blowing.” He simply no longer divides things so that the first verse speaks about ordinary Rosh Hashanah and the second about Rosh Hashanah on the Sabbath. Both verses speak about all Rosh Hashanahs: one must both blow the shofar and say the verses of remembrance—“a day of blowing” and “a remembrance of blowing.” By rabbinic law, on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath they canceled the obligation to blow and left only the remembrance of blowing. Here Nachmanides disputes Ritva. In short, what I’m saying now is that if indeed according to the Babylonian Talmud’s conclusion this is only a rabbinic decree, then they actually emptied the day of its content. This is the whole content of the day, this day here. On the other hand, the exposition that could perhaps explain it—that says it is not that, rather that it is a different kind of day—is rejected. In the Babylonian Talmud even initially it seems it was really speaking about overriding because of a prohibition and not because of a different character of the day. In short, this whole matter seems a little unclear.

So there are various explanations among later authorities and among the medieval authorities—mainly among later authorities—as to how exactly one can do such a thing. That the remembrance of blowing is, as it were, the non-blowing because of the Sabbath; that this is precisely the fulfillment of the commandment of blowing the shofar. We’ll return to that issue of the… What? Why are they canceling it? What? Why are they canceling it? That supposedly canceling the blowing of the shofar—if refraining from blowing on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath is the fulfillment of the commandment of blowing for that particular Rosh Hashanah. It’s a kind of pilpul. What’s the problem? What is it trying to solve? The sages? I think what it’s trying to solve is what I said. Because it’s disturbing. Yes, that is the essence of the day. Meaning, because of that concern? No, no—this way you still fulfill the “day of blowing.” Fine. It could be that… it could be that… does this sound like something? Yes, it could be that this and that. And when you hear something like that, you take the question mark and turn it into an exclamation point. That’s the “answer.” You didn’t actually give an answer now, you just stretched the question mark and turned it into an exclamation point. There are all sorts of explanations like that—that observing the Sabbath brings you the spiritual benefit that the blowing could also have brought. Again, the whole thing is strange. If the Babylonian Talmud said it’s because of the concern lest one carry it four cubits, then not because you can obtain that benefit in another way. Otherwise, you could obtain that benefit also on ordinary Rosh Hashanah even when it does not fall on the Sabbath—just remember the blowing, and I’ll attain the benefit in the same way. A bit strange. What I said earlier—I think there’s no choice but to say that even in the Babylonian Talmud, where the issue is the decree lest one carry it four cubits, the exposition is not discarded. We still read these two verses as “day of blowing” and “remembrance of blowing.” Now we need to understand how that fits together. But there is a day of blowing and there is a remembrance of blowing. The essence of the day on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath is different—it is not a day of blowing, it is a day of remembrance of blowing. Then the sages say: true, in principle one should blow, but the blowing on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath is meant to achieve not the blowing itself but the remembrance of blowing. So the sages said: since I have a rabbinic problem, as emerges in the Babylonian Talmud, I have a rabbinic problem lest one carry it four cubits in the public domain, therefore I forbid the blowing. I asked: how can you empty the day of its content? They are not emptying the day of its content, because the whole purpose of the blowing was to produce the remembrance of blowing. So I will produce the remembrance of blowing in another way. I will achieve the goal of the commandment, the substantive goal of the commandment—perhaps even actually fulfill the commandment, in a more extreme formulation—but even if not, I will achieve the basic goal of the commandment without this, because of the prohibition. Were it not for the prohibition, I would say blow. But since on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath, the whole point of the blowing—not only on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath, sorry, on every Rosh Hashanah—the point is not the blowing but the remembrance of blowing. Okay? So on ordinary Rosh Hashanah one blows, because that is how one achieves the remembrance of blowing—through the blowing itself. Fine? That is the optimal way of achieving the remembrance of blowing. On Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath too, by Torah law, we would have had to blow in order to achieve the remembrance of blowing. But because of the problem lest one carry it four cubits in the public domain, the sages suspend that and forbid blowing on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath. They are not emptying the day of its content because even when one does blow, even on ordinary Rosh Hashanah, the goal is the remembrance of blowing. Therefore they allow themselves to suspend the obligation to blow on the Sabbath. That is basically the move in… What? What is “remembrance of blowing” without a shofar? I don’t know, I’ll get to that in a moment. I’ve only sketched the structure. I think this is an explanation without which it is very hard to understand the Babylonian Talmud. I mean, the essence of the day has to remain. It cannot be that because of this side concern, they dismantle the backbone and the whole format—it’s not plausible. Rather, they obviously understood the matter differently.

Now when I claim that they understood the matter differently, I mean even more than that: it is not that one verse speaks about Rosh Hashanah and one verse speaks about Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath. They both speak about both, about every Rosh Hashanah. It is both a day of blowing and a remembrance of blowing, and this comes to teach you that the blowing is instrumental, not a value in itself. It comes to achieve something called “remembrance of blowing.” Fine? So if you have some problem, even a rabbinic one, you can suspend it; the sages have authority to suspend the obligation to blow on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath, and that’s not so terrible, because you haven’t emptied the day of its content—you can somehow achieve the result of remembrance of blowing in another way. So what is this remembrance of blowing? Again, I can only offer conjectures; I don’t know. “Remembrance of blowing” means the verses of remembrance. Meaning that we are remembered before the Holy One, blessed be He; we remember Him. In the end, that is probably what the shofar is supposed to make us remember. And what is the Torah-level link to the blowing? What? It’s the link to the blowing. Through the shofar, we are brought to remembrance. No, but you’re saying there is a remembrance of blowing without a shofar. The shofar is meant to remind us… Exactly! No—the shofar is how we fulfill the law of remembrance of blowing. What is the law of remembrance of blowing? To be remembered before the Holy One, blessed be He, to remember the Holy One, blessed be He—the whole set of verses of remembrance. And the shofar is meant to bring us to that. Like tzitzit: “and you shall remember all My commandments.” Why do I wear tzitzit? Because the blue thread leads to white, blue resembles the sea, the sea resembles the sky, and that reminds one of all My commandments. So tzitzit too, in principle, according to what is written in the Talmud and in the Torah, is instrumental—it is only a means to remember the commandments. The Talmud in Rosh Hashanah raises an initial assumption—that the Bach infers from the Tur regarding Sukkot, the first night of Sukkot, that there, remembering the Clouds of Glory or the booths that the Holy One, blessed be He, made for us in the wilderness—that according to the tanna’im, this is a case where the commandment requires a special intention for sukkah. That is what the Bach infers from the Tur. The Mishnah Berurah also brings this. That on the first night, when one eats the olive-sized portion of bread in the sukkah, one must intend it as a remembrance of the Clouds of Glory or of the booths that the Holy One, blessed be He, made for us. Beyond the ordinary law that commandments require intention. It is part of the definition of the commandment itself, not just the general law that commandments require intention. In the Talmud this appears specifically regarding blowing the shofar as an initial assumption. In the initial assumption, with regard to blowing the shofar, the intention of “remembrance of blowing” is indispensable. The Talmud says, in some passage… here it is in Rosh Hashanah 30b, with the initial assumption that intention is indispensable—even apart from the general dispute whether commandments require intention or not. There is a special intention here of remembrance of blowing. Now, the claim about the… What? What intention? To remember. It is not explicit in the Talmud, that there is some special intention that is indispensable. I’m saying that according to what I’m saying now, that is very clear. Even if that is rejected, it doesn’t contradict what I’m saying. It only means that in the end, if you actually blew the shofar itself, then even if you didn’t have this intention, you still fulfilled your obligation. And that doesn’t mean—like the ordinary question of whether commandments require intention—according to all opinions commandments require intention. The dispute is only whether it is indispensable. Okay? So here too, basically, one is supposed to blow the shofar. The purpose is in order to remember. True, in a case where you do blow, then if you did not have the intention, according to the Talmud’s conclusion you still fulfilled your obligation. But that definitely fits with what I said earlier, that the shofar is seen as some kind of means of remembrance and of “remembrance of blowing.”

Now I see I’m running a bit late, so I’ll do the end quickly. There is a Rashi in Rosh Hashanah on the second page you have there. “Remembrance of blowing”—Rashi says: “and not actual blowing, but rather one should recite verses of blowing.” Rashi learns from the verse “remembrance of blowing” that one should recite the verses of remembrance of blowing. And Nachmanides indeed challenges him. Look at Nachmanides immediately after that. “Rashi’s wording: and the rabbi should also have brought the verses of kingship from the midrash, and it is impossible that the verse should mention only the verses of remembrance and not mention kingship. And they expounded it from the verse ‘and they shall be for you as a remembrance before the Lord your God,’ for there is no need for the verse to say ‘the Lord,’” and so on. In short, everywhere that you say remembrances, you place kingship alongside them, as appears in Torat Kohanim, and so on. In short, he rejects Rashi. He says it is not Torah law, because after all there is a Talmud in Rosh Hashanah 32 that says the verses of kingship, remembrance, and shofar are rabbinic. And according to Rashi, remembrance is Torah law. Nachmanides says that everywhere remembrance comes together with kingship and shofar, and the whole thing is rabbinic. I think what Rashi says is exactly what I’m saying. Only remembrance is Torah law. Only remembrance is Torah law. There is a rabbinic law to pair it also with kingship and shofar, but remembrance is Torah law. How do we know that? From the verse “remembrance of blowing.” Rashi writes from the verse “remembrance of blowing.” Now I’ll say more than that: from the Talmud on page 32 it indeed sounds as if even the verses of remembrance are rabbinic—and that is true in a place where they blow. On ordinary Rosh Hashanah, when we blow the shofar, there is no Torah law requiring us to recite the verses of remembrance, because we achieve the remembrance of blowing with the shofar. But on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath, when we do not blow, then the law of remembrance of blowing is Torah law. And then what comes out is that this “remembrance of blowing,” this exposition of the Jerusalem Talmud and the initial assumption in the Babylonian Talmud, remains in the conclusion. “Remembrance of blowing” speaks about Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath, and there there is a Torah law of remembrance of blowing. Then too it is no longer difficult why they canceled the blowing, because the essence of the day remains. The essence of the day is remembrance of blowing. Usually one arrives at remembrance of blowing by means of the blowing, but if there is a problem, then cancel the blowing as long as you recite the verses of remembrance, because through that you achieve the remembrance of blowing.

But we have to understand this well: the exposition does not remain in the sense that one verse speaks about Rosh Hashanah and the other about Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath. I claim both verses speak about every Rosh Hashanah. That is the point. Rather, on every Rosh Hashanah the obligation to blow is in order to achieve remembrance of blowing; even the verse “remembrance of blowing” speaks about ordinary Rosh Hashanah, not about Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath. Fine? And usually when you blow, you achieve remembrance of blowing through the blowing. On Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath, because of the rabbinic law according to the Babylonian Talmud’s conclusion, that they canceled the blowing, the sounding, this has practical implications. Because now by Torah law you need to say the verses of remembrance. On ordinary Rosh Hashanah those verses would be rabbinic. Why? Because you achieve the remembrance of blowing through the blowing. But on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath, where the blowing has been canceled, then the verses of remembrance must be said by Torah law. In principle this too is Torah law on every Rosh Hashanah, only on every Rosh Hashanah if I do the blowing, then I have already fulfilled the Torah requirement. So I no longer need to say the verses. On Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath, where they canceled the blowing, the verses remain. And precisely because of that, the Sages allowed themselves to cancel the blowing. They allowed themselves to cancel the blowing because one can fulfill the remembrance of blowing in another way. It doesn’t empty the day. Of its content. I brought the Zohar here, but never mind, we won’t get into it now. There too it says that basically the main thing is to understand what the remembrance of blowing means, not the physical blowing of the shofar itself. Maybe that explains the decree? What? Maybe that explains the decree. Of what? That because it is such an important matter, that’s why people would go after it, that’s why they would go to learn. No—you simply go to learn how to blow, the technique of blowing. The idea of the blowing, for that you don’t need to take the shofar. So maybe what happened was that… No, the blower needs to learn the blowing, but beyond that he needs to learn what the blowing of the shofar means. So I don’t think that going to the sage to learn Torah from him requires me to carry the shofar; the shofar can just stay at home. I don’t know. By the way, even in Jewish law, in the Shulchan Arukh 582, there by you, do you see? “If it falls on a weekday one says, ‘a day of blowing, a holy convocation,’ and if it falls on the Sabbath one says, ‘a remembrance of blowing.’” Why? The exposition was rejected, wasn’t it? Why on weekdays do we say “a day of blowing,” and on the Sabbath “a remembrance of blowing”? The exposition was rejected, wasn’t it? So “remembrance of blowing” no longer speaks about the Sabbath. This is the explanation of the side that on the one hand that is the reason it overrides, but the fact that this… what I said earlier? What I’m claiming. No, it was not rejected. There is remembrance of blowing; it exists on every Rosh Hashanah. But on ordinary Rosh Hashanah you fulfill it through the shofar; on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath it is only remembrance of blowing, you do not have the blowing, and therefore you say “remembrance of blowing.” And even according to the conclusion of the Babylonian Talmud, the Shulchan Arukh rules like the Babylonian Talmud, that the reason they do not blow is the concern lest one carry it. So what does that have to do with remembrance of blowing? You see directly from this that the exposition of remembrance of blowing remained even according to the Babylonian Talmud. Now look at the Mishnah Berurah there. “Even in the evening prayer and in kiddush, although one does not blow at night, nevertheless the day is a day of blowing, and tomorrow they will certainly blow. And later authorities wrote”—this is basically the Pri Hadash—“that after the fact, if one said on a weekday ‘a remembrance of blowing’ and finished the blessing, he does not repeat it, because in the Torah it is written ‘a remembrance of blowing,’ even though by Torah law blowing is permitted on the Sabbath. And so too on the Sabbath, if one said ‘a day of blowing,’ he also does not repeat it.” What does that mean? That in fact there is no difference. Even according to the conclusion there is no difference between Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath and ordinary Rosh Hashanah; both are a day of blowing and a remembrance of blowing, both. It is only by rabbinic law that they do not blow. Therefore, you can say “remembrance of blowing” on a weekday and still fulfill your obligation, exactly as I said earlier, because the verse “remembrance of blowing” does not speak about Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath; it speaks about every Rosh Hashanah. Only on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath, because they do not blow, only that dimension of Torah-level remembrance of blowing remains. The exposition was indeed dropped in the sense of the division between Sabbath and weekday; it was not dropped in the sense that there really is such a thing as remembrance of blowing. On every Rosh Hashanah there is this element.

By the way, the Pri Hadash makes a distinction. He says if on a weekday you say “remembrance of blowing,” you have fulfilled your obligation. If on the Sabbath you say “a day of blowing,” he wonders whether you have fulfilled your obligation or not. That is even stronger, because remembrance of blowing exists everywhere. “A day of blowing” on the Sabbath—after all, they no longer blow, and even if that is rabbinic, they still no longer blow. So that is the debate. In the end one does fulfill his obligation, because after all by Torah law it is indeed a day of blowing. But the rabbis said not to blow. There was an initial assumption that if on the Sabbath you say “a day of blowing,” you have not fulfilled your obligation. But to say “remembrance of blowing” on a weekday—of course one would think you would not fulfill your obligation. Why is that obvious? On a weekday, after all, it is blowing and not remembrance of blowing, and this whole matter of remembrance of blowing was dropped. No, it was not dropped in the conclusion; it remains in the conclusion too. I won’t have time to read it now—look at Shibbolei HaLeket. Later authorities bring him and raise major difficulties on him. Shibbolei HaLeket follows the Babylonian Talmud that it is a rabbinic prohibition, and brings the exposition of the Jerusalem Talmud. He says: “And if you say: Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath—in the Temple they would blow but not in the province. After the Temple was destroyed, Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai instituted that in every place where there is a religious court they should blow. And Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai’s enactment came, and in all places of Israel the simple custom is not to blow on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath. And we say in the Talmud: From where are these words derived?” Then they bring the exposition: “There is no difficulty…” and in the conclusion: “Rava said: By Torah law it is entirely permitted, and it is the rabbis who decreed concerning it because of Rabbah.” “And some wonder: why do we need Rabbah’s decree? Two verses are written: ‘a remembrance of blowing’ and ‘a day of blowing.’” There is such a question. But we moved away from that! That is exactly what the Talmud says—we moved away from “remembrance of blowing” and “day of blowing”; we remained with Rabbah’s exposition. What is the wonder he is expressing? “And they explain: one can say that Rabbah himself interprets the verses. Why did the Torah say ‘a remembrance of blowing’? Because of the decree lest one carry it to an expert to learn.” This is astonishing. The decree lest one carry it to an expert to learn—the rabbinic prohibition—is the explanation? Not because of that. It’s the reverse: the decree lest one carry it to an expert to learn tells me that there really is, in the background, this notion of remembrance of blowing; otherwise the Sages would not have done this. That, I think, is what he wants to say here. So basically he says that this exposition remains even according to the Babylonian Talmud’s conclusion that it is only a rabbinic decree. And for our purposes—I’ll finish with this—what I want to say is that when we now look at suspension, this is basically an example of suspension according to the Bah, according to what we saw in Maimonides’ laws of change. This is a suspension of a Torah-level law. The Sages said: lest one carry it four cubits in the public domain. A secondary concern is enough to suspend a Torah obligation, but without emptying the verse of its content. You don’t do things like that. You can’t empty the verse of its content. That is another dimension one has to take into account when coming to change Jewish laws.