Uncertainty and Statistics – Lesson 10

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, okay, not criticism of him, I’m just noting it. Right. Now, even in a neighborhood where there is a secular majority and a decision is needed about when the local pool will be open for separate swimming for men and women, the majority principle could lead to the pool never being opened for separate swimming. Most of us would see the majority principle in this case as an injustice toward the minority. About that I have a few innovations for him. It seems to me that most of the public in this country does not see this as an injustice, because that’s the situation here. Remember Silman’s decision—Idit Silman—with the nature reserves, swimming in nature reserves, where she decided to have certain hours or days, I don’t know, certain times in which those nature reserves that do have pools where people bathe would be open for separate swimming. And there would be days when they wouldn’t. I assume roughly in proportion to the size of the public or the demand for it. Everyone fought about it as if this were exclusion, religious coercion—it’s just insanity. The most basic, obvious, sensible, proper decision I can think of. What do people want from them? What do they want from her? A completely reasonable decision. And they shout at her as if—of course this comes together with all the other madness in this government, so I can understand why people already see a red flag every time there’s a religious issue. But in this case we’re talking about a decision that is completely called for, and people protest it as if it’s religious coercion. He writes here exactly about this situation. And he says that most of us would see it as an unjust decision always to yield to the majority. So here, for some reason, judging by the voices, it doesn’t sound like that’s the case. The situation here suffers from madness, and of course both sides are guilty of it. And there are decisions that this government makes that really are correct, and that doesn’t stop people from coming out against them as if the Temple had just been destroyed. Now true, there are all kinds of horrors in this government, and that probably gets swallowed up and people no longer distinguish what is and isn’t—they’re in a world war, it’s a red flag. This situation is very problematic. You can’t talk. It’s awful. You can’t conduct an argument in a situation like this. In any case, there are many more examples, by the way. In any case, Had’s claim is basically that this is an injustice toward the minority. Right? Again, the language—the language is that tyranny of the majority is an injustice toward the minority. Meaning, you have a moral duty to take the minority into account even though in principle you have the right, because you are the majority. In other words, he is speaking in the language of morality. Don’t engage in tyranny of the majority because it is an injustice. I’m saying this because I want to argue that this doesn’t belong to morality at all. It has nothing to do with morality. This is how one ought to behave because those are the rules of democracy, not because there is some moral issue here. It’s part of the democratic structure itself. This is not a demand of the majority to give up its rights— the majority has no such right. In a moment I’ll explain why. And I’m just trying to show you that the accepted view, the common wisdom, is not like that. The accepted view is that this is some kind of consideration for the minority, so as not to be such terrible villains. So that is the claim. Now, by the way, also regarding David Levy, think for example about the David Levy effect, or three children with a game where two are always against one, always the same two against the same one. What is he really saying? That it isn’t fair. What do you mean it isn’t fair? Why isn’t it fair? The majority decides. Why isn’t it fair? Because the minority got shafted? Every time the majority decides, the minority gets shafted. What bothers him is not that the minority got shafted, but that the minority got shafted disproportionately. Meaning, if they decided in favor of the majority in two thirds of the cases and in favor of the minority in one third of the cases, then true, in most cases you still go with the majority, but it wouldn’t be perceived as an injustice. That would be okay, right? Meaning, what bothers him is that in every case you go with the majority, and that’s not okay, that’s an injustice. I’m emphasizing this because in a moment I want to argue that this is not correct. Meaning, the claim that in one third of the cases you should go in favor of the minority is not because otherwise it’s an injustice, but because that is what democracy says. In other words, it is the right of the minority—not that it is the duty of the majority to waive its rights because one ought to be moral. The majority has no such right at all. So he says—I’ll keep reading so it will be easier to demonstrate this through him—We need to learn from the family and neighborhood examples, the examples he brought above, that under no circumstances should the decision-making method according to majority rule be accepted as sacred, and that at times it violates moral principles no less important than satisfying the preferences and values of the majority. You see the statement now? On the one hand, following the majority is itself a moral value, yes? And he says moral principles no less important than what? Than the moral principles of satisfying the preferences and values of the majority. In other words, following the majority is a moral principle, and taking the minority into account, sorry, that too is a moral principle. So one needs to know that there are moral principles on both sides. I claim he is mistaken in both statements. Following the majority is not a moral principle, and taking the minority into account is also not a moral principle. Maybe also, but not only. There is something more fundamental. Okay? That is the claim. Altogether, majority rule is an efficient strategy for social decisions in certain conflict situations, but it does not express the will of the people. The will of the majority is not the will of the public but only the will of its majority. If the government purports to represent the good of all citizens, it cannot suffice with majority decision. Now this is very interesting. I’m carrying out a detailed discussion here, maybe a bit excessive relative to the article, though he is a philosopher, so I do demand precise wording from him. There is a transition here in the middle of the passage. The passage begins with saying there are moral principles that support going with the majority, and there are moral principles supporting taking the minority into account, and that is the conflict. But later on he is not speaking about morality at all. Later on he is speaking exactly in my language. He says majority rule is only a strategy for making social decisions in situations of conflict, fine, but it does not express the will of the people. Because the will of the people is disputed. Some want this, some want that. The majority is only some kind of primitive representation of what is called the will of the people. It is not really the will of the people because there is no such thing here as the will of the people. So in the absence of something I can straightforwardly call the will of the people, the majority is the simplest model. That is already exactly what I argue. But notice that he writes this as some kind of necessary continuation or natural continuation of the first passage where he spoke about minority principles. Because this principle is not a moral principle. This principle is the technical infrastructure of democracy. It does not belong to morality. The claim is that the majority has no right to be followed, not that it has a right but it would be proper for it to waive it. It has no right at all. It cannot impose its will on the minority in places where this is tyranny—I’ll define that a bit more in a moment—it cannot impose on the minority at all. The minority has a right not to have things imposed on it; it is not asking for favors or for kindness to be shown to it. So the claim actually in the end—never mind, I won’t keep reading here. Maybe one more passage. The advantage of a method that combines majority rule with protection of the rights of the individual and the minority is that it brings government decisions closer to ones that reflect the public interest, what the people want. Okay? That really is my argument. But somehow he mixes it together with the moral argument. By moral I mean, you can say that the government acting as the public wants is a moral duty of the government. Fine, but that is not what we’re talking about. The claim is that this is the definition of democracy, that the state behaves as the public wants. That has nothing to do with morality—we’ve already gone past morality. At this point we have already accepted upon ourselves the rules of democracy. So it follows from the rules of democracy; it is not morality. Now here he claims—he moves immediately as though after speaking above about morality, again he says this reflects the public interest, what the people want, which is correct, that is my formulation, but it is not a moral formulation. And now look, he goes on and suddenly a third formulation, and this too comes right after that: In this way it also strengthens solidarity among the various groups that make up the public and their ability to accept the government’s action even when they are not pleased with each and every decision. This is already an entirely consequentialist, utilitarian argument, right? He is basically saying that if you take the minority into account and don’t have tyranny of the majority, then there will be greater social solidarity, the minority will agree to accept the rules of the game. It is more effective, more beneficial, to conduct oneself this way. This is no longer a question of morality and no longer a question of the rules of democracy, but a question of utility. In the sense that I can always ask: if you are speaking to me about utility, then please don’t explain to me what utility I want. If I, as the majority, want to realize my rights to the fullest, you can warn me: look, you’ll pay a price for that, because social solidarity will be harmed. Okay, I’m willing to pay the price. What’s the problem? In other words, if you’re speaking to me on the utilitarian level, then in the end utility is my decision. When you speak in utilitarian language, you are basically saying: look, the rights are yours, but take into account that there are costs if you realize your rights. Yours meaning the majority’s. Right? So I say okay, I’ve taken that into account, and I still want it. So your claims are finished, right? Meaning, he cannot make a utilitarian argument when I say no, my utility function is different. You can’t tell me what my utility function is. Okay? Therefore these arguments are somewhat problematic, and certainly it isn’t correct to mix them together. All three are correct. Meaning, it is true that there is a price in solidarity, it is true that there is a moral duty not to abuse the minority—I agree, I do not dispute that. I only claim that those two are the second and third floors; there is also the first floor, which he too mentioned. And the first floor means that the government should behave according to the will of the people. That is the definition of democracy, not because of rights and not because of pitying the minority and nothing of the sort. And what is the will of the people? So as I said at the beginning, the simplest model is to go with the majority when there are disagreements, but one really has to understand: the majority has no right that we should go with it. This is a completely different conception. It doesn’t follow from the fact that the majority has rights to determine the decision. These are not rights at all; it has nothing to do with rights. Rather, this is a model we propose for the public will. In fact it is not a good model, as Arrow and Condorcet say. It is not a good model, but the better models are not practicable. We choose this model. This sharpens the point even more. People somehow speak, even today in the current arguments, with the feeling that the majority has a right to decide what will happen. Not true. It has no such right. The fact that the majority decides does not derive from rights of the majority at all. It derives from the agreement among us that the public will will be represented by the majority when there are disagreements, because that is what is called the public will. But in the end, when the government acts this way, it is because the minority wants it too. Because the minority signed on to an agreement that when there are disagreements, then the public’s opinion is the majority. But this does not derive from the majority having rights. It derives from the entire public deciding that when there are disagreements, the one who will represent the public will is the majority. And that is a very important point. It sounds similar, but it is really not similar. And in a moment I’ll explain why. So basically the claim is this: think about—well, before you think about it, look. The claim—I’ll try to say it briefly—is basically that following the majority is grounded not in rights of the majority, but in the agreement of the public as a whole. Because the government—remember Rabbeinu Tam? Decisions should be made unanimously. Only if the whole public agrees, only then does the government have legitimacy to act. Fine, but that doesn’t allow, as the other medieval authorities (Rishonim) say, any decisions ever to be made that way. So what do we do? We—the minority as well as the majority—agree that when there are disagreements, what the public wants will be represented in the model of the majority. It’s a simple model, not precise, not always fitting, but it is the simplest model, we have no better option, so that is what we agreed. But in the final analysis, what the government does is not because the majority wants it, but because one hundred percent of the public instructed the government to do it. It told it: go and do what the majority says. The minority joined that demand as well. And only because of that does it work. Think, for example, what the condition for this is.

[Speaker C] After all, in the laws of mixtures,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] when I talk about a majority nullifying a minority, a minority that is nullified in the majority. That is only when the minority and the majority are mixed together in one mixture. Right? A mixture. There is no nullification by majority if we are not talking about a mixture. Okay? And when there is one mixture, then the majority nullifies the minority, and it is as if it is not there. There are certain conceptions, at least—not everyone agrees with this conception—there are certain conceptions according to which the law of nullification by majority is actually connected more to “the greater part is like the whole” and not to following the majority. What am I basically saying? Suppose I have a mixture of nine kosher pieces of meat and one non-kosher piece in a pot, and they are mixed together and I don’t know what is what. The claim is: what is nullification? Nullification means that I now need to decide what the entire mixture is—kosher or non-kosher. Because I have a mixture; I can’t decide about each piece separately, so I decide about the whole mixture. Now, deciding about the whole mixture—but there is kosher and non-kosher here, there isn’t one status for the entire mixture. What do we do? The status of the entire mixture is the majority; whatever the character of the majority is, that is considered the status of the whole mixture. Consequently the minority is nullified. The minority isn’t nullified—this is not some kind of metaphysics that erases the minority—but rather the majority is simply perceived as representing the character of the mixture as a whole. And now, from my perspective, the whole mixture is kosher meat, and therefore of course every piece in the mixture is kosher meat. That is the mechanism of nullification—not according to all views, but according to some views. So this is basically some kind of “the greater part is like the whole.” You ask yourself: what is the mixture, what is the character of the mixture? If nine pieces are kosher, then the mixture is kosher because the majority determines the character. I need to decide on one character for the mixture, kosher or non-kosher. If I decide on one character, it makes sense to go with the majority. This is my model—you see that it is exactly the model of democracy. I ask what does the majority want, what does the public want—sorry, not the majority, what does the public want? Now there are ninety percent who want one way and ten percent who want another, so I say okay, the ninety percent is what the public wants. It’s a model, that needs to be understood. The majority does not have a right to decide; there are no such rights. Rabbeinu Tam claims that in practice too this doesn’t exist. The other medieval authorities (Rishonim) say yes, because it cannot be otherwise—not because they really have a right to decide. And what does “it cannot be otherwise” mean? Because all of us, all one hundred percent, agree that we live in one society. We are a mixture, the majority and the minority. We are one unit and we need to act as one unit. And we make our decisions together. You can’t make decisions for each one separately; that doesn’t work. We need to make a joint decision. A joint decision goes according to what the public wants, and the public is divided, so the majority determines what the public wants. You see, this is exactly the same thing as nullification. What is the practical difference? Look, for example, at what happens when there is a large state and next to it a small state. Now by large state I mean one with many inhabitants. Now the large state says to the small state: look, we are the majority, and therefore we have decided that the tax rate in your place and in ours should be such-and-such, or only in your place. We are the majority; one should go by the majority. Does that sound reasonable? The small state will say okay, we’ll pay taxes as you dictate to us because you are the majority? It’s not reasonable, right? Why not? Because this is not a mixture, because these two states are two separate units. This is not a majority and minority that belong to the same collective, to the same mixture, but rather there is a large group next to a small group. That is not a mixture, so why on earth should the minority accept the view of the majority? What does one have to do with the other? And when there is a mixture, why yes? Or when we are in one state and there are disagreements between a majority and a minority, why do we go with the majority? Because we are a mixture. Because we are one unit that has to make one decision, and the model for what the public wants is the majority. That’s all. But this exists only when we are one unit. Now what does that actually mean? The Talmud says that the discerning people of Jerusalem would check who was sitting with them at a meal. They would not sit at a table to eat unless they knew who the others present were. Of course this is a metaphor for a religious court. When you go to be a judge in a religious court and you join two other judges, check very, very carefully whether you are prepared to sit with them on the same panel. Because there may be a situation in which those two judges will be the majority opinion, you will be the minority opinion, and all three of you will have to sign the ruling. Now if you do not trust them, if you think they are idiots or dishonest or not God-fearing, whatever the reason, and you truly would not be prepared to sign a ruling they reached by majority opinion because you think it’s nonsense, you do not trust them at all—then don’t sit with them in the first place. If you are not willing to sign as the minority opinion, don’t sit down to the meal, don’t enter into judgment together with such a panel. The same thing in democracy. If you are not prepared to accept majority rule, don’t enter this state, this social contract, in which decisions are made according to the majority. Because you will not always be in the majority; sometimes you will be in the minority, and therefore you have to check very carefully whether this is an agreement you are prepared to accept so that there will really be validity—validity to the majority’s decision. But if I do not accept this majority and I am not willing to enter into a common agreement with it, then the majority has no authority at all to impose on me how to behave. And all of its authority derives from the fact that I agreed to be with it in the mixture and to make decisions together. Now what does that actually mean? The claim is that up to this point is the explanation—what is the justification for following the majority. And now I come to what I want to say: tyranny of the majority. Tyranny of the majority means there are situations in which one does not follow the majority. Why not? So if you hold that following the majority is a moral principle, or that the majority has some right to be followed, then you need to explain to me: fine, then why in cases of tyranny of the majority should we not follow the majority? Why should one care about the minority? There is no choice but to say: have mercy on them. It is a moral principle, you need to behave like a human being, don’t abuse the minority even though it’s your right, correct? Because that is the implication of the matter. But if one understands that following the majority is not the result of a moral principle, but only because the majority represents the opinion of the whole public—that is our model for representing what the public wants—then here one has to check. Because there are situations in which it is not true that the opinion of the majority represents what the public wants. For two reasons, which are really not two reasons but two implications of the same principle. One example is David Levy’s principle, or if we go back to the three children fighting over the game or the separate swimming and so on. If all the decisions will always be in favor of the majority, and all the decisions are always the same majority against the same minority, just for simplicity, yes? Then clearly the minority will not agree to such an arrangement, right? What person enters in advance into a deal in which no one will ever listen to what he thinks, to what he wants? In a built-in way he always gave the right to the other group. Who is crazy enough to make such an agreement? Now without my having made that agreement, the majority cannot come to me with complaints. This demand of the majority, as if it can come to me with complaints and as if it thinks it has rights—it has no rights at all. Only because it represents the opinion of the whole public, and even that is based only on our really seeing ourselves as one collective and all of us having agreed. And this has to be accepted unanimously. This decision, according to everyone, has to be accepted unanimously, like Rabbeinu Tam. The decision that we are one collective, and from then on decisions are made according to the majority—that decision has to be accepted unanimously. Therefore the claim is that if in one hundred percent of cases they go in favor of the majority, clearly there is no justification for that. It is not a moral principle—that is what I want to claim. Not that it isn’t fair to the minority—true, it also isn’t fair to the minority—but that is not the point, that is not the basic claim. The basic claim is that you have no right at all to do this. Not that I am asking you to have mercy on me or take me into account—you have no right to do it. Your entire right to do it exists only because I agreed. I did not agree to one hundred percent of decisions in your favor. That is one exception. Another exception is tyranny of the majority. What does that mean? Not one hundred percent of decisions—one decision, but one dramatic decision. A decision that strikes at the minority’s deepest soul. Such that if that decision is adopted, it is no longer willing to remain in partnership with the whole group. It touches the core of its values to that extent. There too it is exactly the same thing, even though it is one decision. Because if the minority says, friends, the collective is over, we are no longer willing to continue this package deal—if that’s the case, we’ve broken apart. The majority has no right to impose its opinion on the minority. Therefore—and one could perhaps think of more scenarios now—but it seems to me this is the correct explanation of why tyranny of the majority is impossible in a democracy. Not because one has to care about minority rights, not because one must—not only, not only because of one moral principle or another. From a moral principle one cannot coerce; one can ask me to yield. I claim that here one can coerce, I have a right to demand it. And if you do not answer my demand, I dissolve the package, everyone will do what he wants, and from that point on the majority has no significance whatsoever in such a situation, even if you are the majority. It’s like two neighboring states, one with many inhabitants and one with few inhabitants—no one imagines that the large state can impose on the small state what to do. We have become two states, or two collectives; this is no longer a mixture, there is no nullification. This is also the explanation for following the majority, and consequently also for the limitation that one does not engage in tyranny of the majority. And this explanation is at the foundation of the democratic conception; it is not a moral question, one is not doing kindness to the minority. Now, as for our own issue, if I return to our own times, this is basically the claim of the protesting minority. Again, one can argue right now whether yes, it’s correct, yes they agree, no they don’t agree—but one must understand what the argument is about. The argument is about this. People say: if you change the rules of the game—you have sixty-four, you’re right, you have a coalition, you can make the decisions. If you change the rules of the game, these are not the rules of the game that I signed onto. When we signed on to be one collective functioning together, making decisions together, we also agreed on certain rules of the game. Broadly, of course—it wasn’t fully closed and settled, obviously—but the framework was agreed upon. If you violate the framework, we return to a new negotiation. It is not certain that we will agree to continue being one collective together with you. You changed the rules of the game; you can’t change the rules of the game in the middle. This is a very important point. Now this claim on the logical level is an excellent claim, a claim that holds water. One can of course argue whether the injury really is so severe that it justifies dissolving the package because of it. After all, in an indirect way every minority that loses on something can present it as the apple of its eye and say okay, if that’s the case then I no longer agree to continue the joint journey. The package has fallen apart. So again we return to the situation where no decisions can be made at all. The question is, first, is it authentic? Meaning, is that person not doing this as manipulation, saying no no no, you struck at the apple of my eye, our social agreement is over—as manipulation, not because it truly struck at the apple of his eye, but simply because this is the minority’s way of overcoming things anyway. If that is what is happening, then he has no right. Okay? But if in his own inner feelings they are authentic, he truly and sincerely thinks that the apple of his eye has been struck, then one cannot come to him with complaints. The package has fallen apart; I am not willing to keep playing by the new rules of the game, let’s have a new negotiation. What happens? A more delicate question: what happens if the concerns that the minority itself raises are simply not correct? Factually not correct. By the way, in my opinion that is more or less the situation here; I see that I am ending up expressing some opinion. Because I, personally, for example, think there is no danger to democracy in Israel. I strongly oppose the reform, strongly oppose it, and oppose even more strongly the dreadful coalition we have here; I do not think there is a danger to democracy in Israel. Now again, without entering at all into the discussions of whether yes or no, this is also a point that can be a criticism of the minority. You are authentic, and true, the apple of your eye has been struck because you are not prepared to be a pilot under a dictator. You volunteered to fly because you knew there was a democratic state here; if the rules of the game have changed, I am not willing to do that—that is basically the claim. Now, however, if I am correct that there is no fear of dictatorship here, then don’t tell me that the rules of the game have changed; you are simply assessing reality incorrectly—or this is even manipulation, but if we assume it is not manipulation, then you are simply assessing reality incorrectly. I thought about today what happened with Yigal Amir. I always objected to the criticisms of Yigal Amir. Why? Because if Yigal Amir really thought that Rabin was a pursuer. I believe him that he thought that; many people thought that. That if Rabin implemented his decisions, all of us were in mortal danger. Fine, that’s what he thought. Again, you can agree or disagree, but that’s what he thought. So according to his own view, should he not have killed Rabin? It’s the law of a pursuer, what do you mean? He is certain that Rabin is now going to murder all of us. We think otherwise, fine, but according to his own position, when he makes the decision, he is right—it’s the law of a pursuer, he is the only brave one or the only wise one, yes, who will save all of us from ourselves. We are heading for mass suicide and he is the one who will save us. Likewise Grynszpan before World War II, before the Holocaust. Grynszpan and the other one, yes, there are two in France and Switzerland. There are two there. I knew Grynszpan’s sister; she lived in Tel Aviv. In any case, so the claim—the claim is that he acted according to his own view, what do you want from him? The only thing I can come to him with complaints about is this: listen, this is a cardinal decision. You think he is a pursuer, but listen, almost the entire rest of the public does not think he is a pursuer, at least not on a level that justifies killing him. You are completely ignoring the fact that you are a lone opinion or almost a lone opinion—that is not responsible. Meaning, in order to make such a dramatic decision, you need to be very careful in your considerations and very convinced. And to be very convinced that we are all going to die because of Rabin’s steps—here there is room for claims against you. According to your own view you are right that he was a pursuer, but the fact that this is your own view—there is a degree of negligence here. Notice: the others are not all stupid. Now something like that claim is what I want to argue here. You say there is going to be a dictatorship here, and therefore you refuse here and you take your money out of the country, and each person with his protest steps, okay? Therefore according to his own view he is right; he is not willing to serve a dictator. Except that I think there is no real concern that there will be a dictatorship here. Meaning, in his assessment of reality, in my opinion, he reached it rashly. Rashly and with a bit of brainwashing, with the help of the groups around him. There is a lot of brainwashing on both sides. That is a basis for some kind of claim. When you make a decision like this—the refusal of pilots, of almost an entire squadron—that is not a simple decision. It threatens the functioning of the army. And I accept it on the principled level if we really are on the way to becoming a dictatorship. But you need to be very convinced that we are becoming a dictatorship in order to make such a decision. And I don’t think there is enough basis here to be fully convinced of that. Then the question is whether you are allowed to take a step that is justified according to your own view when your own view itself is not so well grounded. Meaning, that is more or less the outline of the discussion. And again, in this sense, each person of course will form his own position, but look—the discussion is more delicate than both sides think. Several stages have to be weighed here, and each one has two sides. This is not a clear case in either direction. Meaning, these are not simple matters, this discussion, and it is fateful. This state currently has a not negligible chance, in my opinion, of falling apart. A not negligible chance of literally falling apart. Of returning to exile, of being like our ancestors were. Our ancestors too, ten years before they went into exile, did not believe they would go into exile. There was once a panel in Elkana, and my father, as one of the oldest residents—he was also a Holocaust survivor—spoke there about whether there could be another Holocaust. Everyone said no, and he said why not? Who says not? Why do you assume it can’t happen? There is some such conception, as if—even those of the Holocaust, ten years earlier—what ten years earlier? Even during it, there were many who did not believe it was happening. It can happen. Things can happen to us too that we read about in history books. It can happen. Therefore I say, when people make decisions in such an explosive situation, there is a doubly redoubled demand at least to examine your factual assumptions carefully. Meaning, it is not enough that according to your own view this is the conclusion, the factual forecast, and therefore according to your own view your step is justified. I accept such an argument, but once the step is truly fateful and threatens our very existence, check your factual assumptions very, very carefully. And there is a demand—I at least have a demand—that people did not examine their factual assumptions nearly carefully enough.

[Speaker B] So Rabbi, one second, I didn’t understand then what the responsibility of the majority is, because basically from the outset the minority agreed that the elected government would act according to the majority all the time, in one hundred percent of the cases.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] True, but with limitations. Certain limitations. One of them, for example, is that the majority cannot change the rules of the game. Because after all we agreed on certain rules of the game. What, can the majority also determine that from now on there will be no more elections? No more elections, Bibi remains our king forever. Can it do that?

[Speaker B] So where do you draw the line?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Where do I draw the line? Each person, before he refuses, has to decide whether for him this is some kind of red line beyond which he is no longer willing to remain a partner in this covenant. This is not something universal. Different people have different values. Therefore a social agreement is a delicate business, because everyone has his own red line. And on the one hand, you need to be careful with your own red line, and on the other hand human beings need to be careful not to harm other people’s red lines, even if you don’t think it is such a critical red line.

[Speaker B] And the government needs to be careful with the red line of all the citizens.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, absolutely. I had an argument with—I spoke with Madro a few days ago, I wanted to recruit him to—I’m involved a lot now in activity around the reform, so I wanted to recruit him too. So we had a long discussion. He says: look, they want the government to suspend the reform. This was before Bibi announced that he was suspending it. Why don’t they demand that the demonstrators stop demonstrating too? They also need to give up something. It’s not one-sided. Why did I remember this?

[Speaker B] That the government needs to be careful with the red line of all the…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, so I told him: Look, you’re right in principle, but there’s a technical problem. There’s no one to talk to. Because the opposition leadership doesn’t control the protests. They’re not the bosses there. Lapid and Gantz aren’t managing what’s happening in the street. On the contrary, the street is managing them. And in the street itself there are several organizations and several leaders; there really isn’t anyone to talk to and reach agreements with. It’s like with the Palestinians. You reach agreements with Hamas, then Fatah starts up with you; you reach agreements with Fatah, then Hamas starts up with you. When there isn’t one clear head, you can’t reach agreements. And therefore there’s no one to talk to. Now I told him: Look, you were a commander in the army. You have a unit, a company, let’s say you’re a company commander. Okay? You have a company, and you know that if you give a certain order, I don’t know, a third of the company, twenty-five percent of the company, will refuse. Whether they’re justified or not justified, but that’s the fact. Would you give that order? What’s a company commander? Commander of a company. Would you give that order? Obviously not. He agreed with me, obviously not. Meaning, even if you belong to the majority, even if you’re the commander and you have the right—you are the commander—you still need to be smart. If you give an order that, from the perspective of twenty-five percent of your unit, crosses a red line, don’t give it. Even though most of the unit or most of the public thinks it’s right, that that’s the proper way to act. You think it’s right, but they don’t just think it’s wrong—it is a red line for them. That’s not the same thing. Meaning, if for you too it’s a red line, then there’s nothing to be done; it’s a red line against a red line. But if you think this is the right thing, while on the other side there are people saying, listen, this is the apple of our eye, then don’t give the order, don’t be an idiot. Meaning, you think the reform is necessary, and also not terrible. I think it’s necessary and not terrible too, just that it’s extreme. Fine, he also thinks it’s extreme, by the way. Doesn’t matter. But still, when you see that’s what’s standing opposite you—and it’s a minority, true, you’re the majority—be smart, don’t be right. You don’t give an order in such a situation. It’s basic ABC, unless you want to dismantle things. Why didn’t they put all those pilots in jail? Because you can’t put an entire squadron in jail. Nor an entire Golani company, by the way; this isn’t favoritism toward pilots. A whole Golani company wouldn’t be put in jail either. If it’s a whole company—there was once some story like that, I think they were released immediately, some refusal by an entire company or something like that, I remember a story like that. You can’t handle things that way. After all, this is still a democratic state here; people can express an opinion. They’re violating the law, yes; in principle they should have been put in jail. Fine, but it doesn’t work. So if you know that’s what the situation will be, don’t give the order. By the way, once I spoke with some guys from the second class in Yeruham who were about to go out to officers’ course. They came to me for a talk before they went to officers’ course. I told them: Look, I would not go to war with a soldier that I know would never refuse me. I wouldn’t go to war with him. I can ride a horse, but a soldier is not a horse. A horse I want to obey my voice, not to be like Balaam’s donkey, yes, which stops even though he wants to move forward. But a soldier is not a horse. If the soldier has such a tiny head, some automatic machine that carries out all orders—like with the Nazis, yes, who carried out orders, that was their defense claim—then he’s a bad soldier. I wouldn’t go to war with him. Now, that doesn’t mean the soldier should refuse every time, but if you know this is a soldier with a backbone, and if you cross a red line you’ll get refusal, then you know there are orders you won’t give. There are orders you won’t give. Again, if they’re essential, then there’s nothing to be done—you’ll give them and he’ll go to jail. But you’ll think very, very carefully about the orders you give, because you know that the person standing opposite you is not a marionette. And then your orders will also come out better. The possibility that a soldier may refuse creates a better army, not a worse one. Of course, as long as this isn’t just exercised casually, but the very possibility—that you’re not some Nazi army where whatever you’re told, you do, no matter what, even if you’re told to kill the whole world—you know there are boundaries. A commander who will always be obeyed won’t think twice about the order he gives. No problem, he gives orders and that’s it. Why should he care? Everything he says gets carried out. If you know not everything you say is carried out automatically, you’ll think twice about an order you give. The order will be more correct, more thoughtful. It’s very delicate, meaning: you’re the commander, in principle people need to obey you, that’s true, and whoever doesn’t obey you will go to jail, and that’s also true. But be smart. This whole business is very delicate, and it’s terribly important to make the basic definitions: what your rights are, where morality comes in, where your rights end, and what your factual assessment of reality is. There are so many, many parameters here that get so mixed up in the discourse and are so unclear on both sides that it almost makes conversation impossible. Everyone is captive inside some conceptual framework, and you have to break it down on the conceptual level, and I think that would dissolve a great many of the disputes we have today. If people were willing to sit for a moment and listen to some orderly conceptual analysis. That still doesn’t mean it would close all the arguments, but at least we’d know where the front lines are. What we’re arguing about and what we’re not. Today everyone is rushing around in a hundred percent frenzy after whatever their gut tells them. It’s crazy; you can’t talk. And everything, everything is a matter of conceptual analysis, and on that conceptual analysis I think everyone can agree, from the right and the left and the center. The dispute isn’t over the conceptual analysis; the conceptual analysis, in my view, can be agreed on. The question now is where your red line is, what your assessment of reality is—there there will be arguments, each person according to his values, his assessment of reality, perfectly fine, people are different. But today you can’t even conduct the argument because of the conceptual mess, the conceptual fog that’s here. Now the claim—what I want to end with, because I see we’re already reaching the end—my claim is that there is here a kind of migo. What do I mean? There’s a minority that says: Look, there is some red line here, or there is expected to be a red line. Now I say, look, I don’t want to withdraw from the game, meaning to dismantle the social covenant. In principle, if the minority announces, friends, we’re done, I’m withdrawing from this social covenant, finished—the majority has no validity. Of course, the minority doesn’t do this over every little thing; sometimes it may say it tactically without really meaning it, which isn’t honest. But there’s a kind of migo here, a migo of force of argument, that says: after all, I can dismantle our collective covenant. Right? In principle I can. My power to dismantle the collective covenant gives me some power or right to make demands even if this isn’t quite at the red line but may reach, might reach, the red line or come close to the red line. And then I say: Look, if for you, the majority, this isn’t something that’s the apple of your eye—you think it’s right, but it’s not something without which life isn’t worth living—then I demand that you take into account that for me this is very important. True, I’m the minority, but the price for me is very high, therefore your expected gain versus my expected loss is equivalent. True, you’re the majority, but how much is it worth to you? It’s worth little to you. If you multiply those two things by each other, the expected value comes out equal. And since I have the power to dismantle this collective covenant, then give me that power also as an argument—when I say, look, I can dismantle it, then regard it as if it were dismantled. You need to take account of what I’m saying because of the migo that I could have dismantled it. That’s only a metaphorical expression. The fact that I have a right to dismantle it—because it’s not true that I’m asking for favors, I have a right to dismantle it—gives me some real power in the negotiation. And that has to be taken into account. These are considerations of justice; it’s not just arm-twisting. Power here plays a role, exactly like on the other side, by the way. When people complain, what, do the pilots have preferential treatment over the mechanics? Like Erez Tadmor’s famous formula. Or what do you mean, they stole everything from us, all kinds of rich high-tech people, startup people, pilots, all kinds of elites—even though they lost the election they’re demanding to change the political decision. Okay, so that’s unfair. It’s not entirely accurate. First of all, most of the people were in favor of stopping the rush of the reform. Not canceling the reform, but stopping the rush and moderating the reform, including Likud voters. Therefore it’s not true that since they got the majority in the election, that means they are acting in the name of the majority. That’s the slogan they keep repeating. It’s not true. Today they are not acting in the name of the majority, unequivocally. All the polls show it. The majority says it needs to be moderated, agreements need to be reached even at the price of concessions. Even those who in principle think the reform is worthy still say, okay, but there’s no choice, we need to reach agreements, we need to moderate it. And don’t tell me you’re acting in the name of the majority. That’s simply not true. You are acting in the name of a minority, unequivocally. That is your legal right because you were elected by majority vote, but don’t tell me that morally you’re acting in the name of the majority—that’s not true. Second, I say that the economic, intellectual, cultural power—whatever you want—that this minority has, that too has some kind of justice in it. Look, this is the example I also gave in one of the columns. The United States has veto power in the Security Council; Belgium doesn’t. Not fair, right? What do you mean? Democracy, there are votes, you decide by majority. No, it’s very just. In every crisis that happens in the world, who sends the soldiers? Who invests the money to deal with it in the name of the UN? The United States. So if that’s the case, then they also have a greater right than others to influence the decisions the Security Council makes. Yitzhak Tshuva pays taxes like an entire city, if not more than that. So I think—he doesn’t have more of a right at the ballot box, he has one vote at the ballot box. But if he—I’m not speaking about him personally, I don’t know what his position is, I’m just talking about some millionaire, okay? Or billionaire, doesn’t matter—if he takes his money abroad, people say that’s unfair, you’re exploiting your economic power to influence things. True. Just as he uses his economic power to contribute to the state treasury and all of us live because of that. Meaning, there is something to it: power also gives you more weight in considerations of justice. There is something to that. It’s not absurd that people use the power they have even though they are a minority; true, that’s part of the story. Fine, that’s the communist argument, I don’t accept it. Otherwise, according to that communist argument, basically everyone should earn the same amount. Why does Tshuva earn more? Presumably because he contributes more—game theory, that’s not—exactly, it’s the same thing, because he’s willing to take risks and all that, right. In short, what I want to say is that the situation is far more complex than the simple question of majority rule, tyranny of the majority, and all kinds of slogans that are thrown around here in the air, all of which are true. But when you look back at the conceptual definitions, where all this comes from and what it means, it turns out the picture is more complex in both directions. It’s more complex. There are no simple positions here. There isn’t someone who’s certainly right and someone who’s certainly wrong; it’s genuinely complex. And the moment it’s genuinely complex, that’s all the more reason not to bang your head against the wall, but to reach some kind of agreement, and I don’t know—there’s no choice—even if you think otherwise, none of us wants to break this whole package apart. All right, I’ve made my comments; after all I got a little too far into current events, but I hope I wasn’t too one-sided in favor of the center.

[Speaker D] Rabbi, may I ask a question? Two, short ones. One: the rabbi is again separating morality from the rules of democracy, which are rights. This whole fiction of rights in general—does it have anything to stand on? Where does it come from? Who told us there is such a thing at all?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Since we’ve already argued about that once, I think yes, you think no, fine.

[Speaker D] Second question, regarding—I’m asking more than asserting—regarding what the rabbi said about Yigal Amir. Meaning, he was mistaken and he thought Rabin was a pursuer, so what did you want him to do? He thought he was saving the state from a pursuer. So by that same judgment you could also say—separated by a thousand thousand distinctions—that Hitler too really thought the Jews were destroying the world, so basically he isn’t a murderer, he was perhaps mistaken?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course. I wrote that in a column. Of course, unequivocally. I’m only saying: exactly the same claim I have with regard to Yigal Amir could also apply to Hitler. Did you really check all the way through that the Jews were in fact going to destroy the world? Factually—did you seriously examine the facts you relied on? Because you took a very dramatic step. I think he didn’t examine it seriously, it seems to me—but I don’t know. If he feels that he did, then so be it; I have no complaints against him except that I’d shoot him in the head because I don’t want him to kill me. Someone mentioned that here earlier.

[Speaker D] Yes,

[Speaker B] Yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That deals with judging a person on his own terms. Try searching on the site: “Judging a Person on His Own Terms,” that’s 372. There I went into this in detail. What? 372, yes. Yes. Rabbi, one second? You say that the democratic majority—when you say that the democratic majority is a tool to express the will of the people and not a tool for arriving at truth. Is that a factual claim or a normative claim? In other words, shouldn’t the democratic majority be a tool for arriving at truth?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. That’s why I say: it may be that factually the majority, even in a democracy, is also a tool for arriving at truth. I’m not arguing about that; I think not. But that’s not my dispute. Even if that’s true, that is not the reason we follow the majority. My claim is a normative claim, not a factual one.

[Speaker B] I would have thought exactly the opposite—that in essence the democratic majority should be a majority as a tool for arriving at truth. For example, I would want to live in a state whose decisions are made according to the criterion of justice.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Notice how you yourself justified it. Suppose you agree that some genius will run the state for you, because you know he’ll make better decisions than you. Do you understand why he would run the state? Because you agreed. That’s perfectly fine; I have no problem with that. If the majority of the public decides that it wants a small forum that will make the most correct decisions, that’s completely legitimate. But if the public doesn’t want that, you can’t come with complaints against them on the grounds that those people would make more correct decisions. So you understand that the foundation is not the correctness of the decisions but human rights. And if I, by virtue of my rights, want to establish a forum that will make the most correct decisions, that’s perfectly fine. That’s called implementing what I want. Understand? From the side… no, that’s called listening to the opinion of the public, when the public says: I want three philosophers to run the state. That’s called running the state according to what the public wants, because the public wanted them to run it. So the foundation is not that the philosophers hit the truth; that’s not what gives them validity and authority. What gives them authority is that we decided that we want them to govern because they hit the truth.

[Speaker B] Fine, so I’m saying that in principle we should not have listened to the voice of the public. We were neither obligated nor supposed to, and it’s bad to listen to the voice of the public. We should really have listened to the philosophers and not to the voice of the public.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying, if you persuade the whole public of that, there’s no problem at all.

[Speaker B] No, I don’t want to persuade them.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you don’t persuade them, you can’t do it. You can’t do it by force.

[Speaker B] No, but I’m saying democracy should have been like that. Huh? I’m saying democracy should have been like that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Plato said that too, and both of you are wrong. Only if you persuade the public that it will be better for them if those philosophers run the state, and the public agrees, then there’s no problem, because that’s what the public decided. But in the end, in the end, the public has to decide.

[Speaker D] If, let’s say, in a certain situation the whole public is incited toward something completely suicidal—let’s say Germany near the end, its warfare was completely suicidal, but it was incited.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In such a situation, in such a situation I think the covenant has already expired. We are no longer functioning as a public—every man for himself, O Israel—so save yourself.

[Speaker D] Rabbi, by the way, it’s not clear that Rabbenu Tam actually agrees with what the rabbi said, and that when he says unanimously he means that the minority too has to accept upon itself to accept the general agreement.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course Rabbenu Tam agrees with that. If the minority too agrees that we should follow the view of the majority, that’s called unanimously. That’s fine. If the whole public authorizes someone else to make the decisions, I don’t care that his decisions aren’t accepted by some of the people, so long as that segment says: even if it’s not acceptable to me, he’ll run the matter. That’s called proceeding unanimously.

[Speaker D] So apparently Rabbenu Tam meant that, after all he couldn’t have meant otherwise; you really can’t live any other way.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well, of course he meant that. No, but there’s a big difference—he doesn’t say the same thing as the other medieval authorities. Because what happens if the minority does not agree? If the minority doesn’t agree, then you can’t do it. The minority has to agree—that’s exactly the point. You’re right that the distance between Rabbenu Tam and the other medieval authorities isn’t as great as… fine. Okay, Sabbath peace. And goodbye.

[Speaker C] Sabbath peace.

[Speaker B] Sabbath peace.