Halakhic Positivism, Lecture 4

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Hello everyone. Today I want to do something connected to the current season, to talk about Hanukkah, but also in the context we’ve been discussing, the context of positivism. I want to show a certain facet, a facet of Jewish law through the laws of Hanukkah and the lighting of the menorah in the Temple. We don’t have all that much time, so I’ll do it in a relatively telegraphic way. There are two topics in tractate Shabbat that also deal with the Hanukkah lamp. The first topic is whether, if it went out, one must relight it or one need not relight it, and the second is whether lighting constitutes the commandment or placement constitutes the commandment. On the face of it, when you look at the Talmud itself, it seems there is no connection between the two topics. The first topic, regarding if it went out one need not relight it—I’ll just read a passage here. Right, the basic assumption is that for Sabbath candles there are only—yes, like we say in “With what may one light.” With what may one light and with what may one not light. Meaning, Sabbath candles are lit only with oils and wicks such that the fire catches hold of them well, so that we won’t come to fix it on the Sabbath and violate the prohibition of kindling. That’s how the Talmud here explains these laws of the wicks and oils. And then from there it moves to the Temple, and says that in the Temple too one must light with those same wicks and oils that are fit for the Sabbath. The Talmud says: Rami bar Hama taught: the wicks and oils that the Sages said one may not light with on the Sabbath, one may not light with in the Temple, because it says, “to cause a lamp to burn continually.” And he taught it and stated it: so that the flame should rise on its own and not that it should rise by means of something else. Meaning, in the Temple it’s for a different reason, because if the fire doesn’t catch well then it will need adjustment, and “to cause a lamp to burn continually” means that the kindling of the lamp has to be lasting. That is, without additional help—the lighting itself has to be what creates the flame. Therefore here too, in the Temple, one needs wicks and oils like on the Sabbath, ones that the flame catches well in.

Later in that discussion, after the Sabbath and the Temple, they discuss the Hanukkah lamp as well. Exactly the same discussion. Rav Huna said: the wicks and oils that the Sages said one may not light with on the Sabbath, one may not light with for Hanukkah, whether on the Sabbath or on a weekday. So for Hanukkah too, whether it’s Sabbath of Hanukkah or a weekday of Hanukkah, one also doesn’t light with those wicks and oils. On the Sabbath, apparently, that’s simple enough for the same reason as Sabbath candles. But even on a weekday one doesn’t light. Rava said: what is Rav Huna’s reason? He holds that if it went out one must relight it, and it is permitted to use its light. It turns out that even on the Sabbath there is a novelty here, because for Sabbath candles it’s permitted to use the light, so there it’s obvious that it’s forbidden to light with such wicks and oils that would lead me to fix the flame on the Sabbath. But if for the Hanukkah lamp the rule were that it is forbidden to use its light, then even on the Sabbath of Hanukkah one could light with problematic wicks and oils, because if I’m forbidden to use its light then I won’t come to fix it. From the fact that he says that on Hanukkah it’s forbidden to use those oils and wicks, it’s clear that he understands that with the Hanukkah lamp it is permitted to use its light, and beyond that, if it went out one must relight it. That’s what explains why even on a weekday one doesn’t light with those wicks and oils. On a weekday one doesn’t light with them because there is concern that it will go out, if they are poor-quality wicks and oils, and the person will forget to relight it. So the assumption is that of course if it went out, one has to relight it, because if not, what’s the problem if he forgets? If there’s a problem that he may forget, apparently by law he needs to relight it.

After that two more opinions are brought. And Rav Chisda said: one may light with them on weekdays but not on the Sabbath. He holds that if it went out one need not relight it, and it is permitted to use its light. That’s the second opinion. And Rav Zeira said in the name of Rav Matna, and some say Rav Zeira said in the name of Rav: the wicks and oils that the Sages said one may not light with on the Sabbath, one may light with them for Hanukkah both on weekdays and on the Sabbath. That’s a third position, that one can light both on weekdays and on the Sabbath. The first says you can’t, neither on weekdays nor on the Sabbath; the second says one may light on weekdays but not on the Sabbath; the third says one may light both on weekdays and on the Sabbath. Meaning, there is no limitation for Hanukkah lamps. And the reason for that—what is Rav’s reason? He holds that if it went out one need not relight it, and it is forbidden to use its light. In the conclusion of the discussion, if it went out one need not relight it. That is, the law is that if the lamp went out, we don’t require it—one doesn’t need to relight it. That’s one topic.

A page later, on page 22, the Talmud discusses lighting one lamp from another. Is it possible to light one Hanukkah lamp from a previous Hanukkah lamp? There are two opinions there whether there is degradation of the commandment because—yes, the question is whether I transfer it by means of a shamash, so I’m lighting the shamash, which is not an act of commandment, and to light the shamash from a commandment-lamp is a degradation of the commandment; that’s one reason. The second reason is diminution, that I diminish the lamp of the commandment by lighting something else from it. In the end the Talmud says: what was the conclusion? The Talmud brings practical differences and things like that—what was the conclusion? Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua said: we see that if lighting constitutes the commandment, one may light from one lamp to another, and if placement constitutes the commandment, one may not light from one lamp to another. Meaning, the discussion whether one may light from one lamp to another depends on whether lighting constitutes the commandment or placement constitutes the commandment. If lighting constitutes the commandment, then you can light from one lamp to another because the lighting itself is the commandment. But if placement constitutes the commandment, then when I light from one lamp to another I’m doing an act that is itself not a commandment, because lighting is not the commandment. And therefore one may not light from one lamp to another.

Then the Talmud goes on to discuss the question whether lighting constitutes the commandment or placement constitutes the commandment, and it brings various practical implications and proofs. In the end the Talmud says: and furthermore, from the fact that we recite the blessing, “Who sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us to light the Hanukkah lamp,” infer from this that lighting constitutes the commandment. Infer from this. Meaning, the conclusion is that lighting constitutes the commandment. And now that we have said that lighting constitutes the commandment, if a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor lit it, he has done nothing. So a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor also can light—because the lighting—sorry, cannot light, because if lighting does it, then a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor is not someone obligated in the commandment. If placement constituted the commandment, then a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor could light it, because in the end I take the burning lamp and place it in its spot, so that would also be fine. Although in the Talmud even that isn’t written. The Talmud says that if placement constitutes the commandment, then a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor can light it, and it doesn’t say there that they can light it because afterward I’ll take it and place it in its spot. It seems that even if they light it in place, a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor can light it, even though I’m not doing anything with it—the placement too was done by them. So why can a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor light according to the one who says that placement constitutes the commandment? Okay, I’ll come back to that in a moment.

But on the face of it, as I said before, these two discussions seem unrelated to each other, for two main reasons. One reason is the different terminology. “Lighting constitutes the commandment” is one formulation, and “if it went out one need not relight it” is another formulation. It doesn’t sound like the same question. Beyond that, even in the course of the discussion—part of which I skipped—when they bring the proofs whether lighting constitutes the commandment or not, and whether if it went out one must relight it or one need not relight it, they don’t bring one from the other. Meaning, the proofs regarding whether if it went out one need not relight it are not used regarding whether lighting constitutes the commandment, and vice versa. It looks like two topics that aren’t talking to each other. Why do I think it’s worth noting this? Because on the level of reasoning, it seems to be the same thing, the same question. If lighting constitutes the commandment, then once I lit it, I lit it—I already performed the commandment. So if it goes out afterward, I don’t need to relight it because I already fulfilled the commandment. But if placement constitutes the commandment, then maybe one does need to relight it. Seemingly it’s really the same question in two different formulations. From the Talmud, you see that it isn’t.

[Speaker B] And what could one have said if placement completes the commandment and not the lighting? So too.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re saying that if after I placed it, it went out—right, I’ll comment on that in a moment, correct. In the Shulchan Arukh, in section 673, he brings the following in paragraph 2. He writes: lighting constitutes the commandment; therefore, if it went out before its time had passed, one need not relight it. So he connects the two questions, right? He says lighting constitutes the commandment, and therefore if it went out one need not relight it. So he explicitly ties the two questions together, against what I said emerges from the Talmud, and the Taz and Maginei Giborim already discuss how this fits with the Talmud. I don’t want to reconcile the Talmudic passages; I want to understand how he learned. So what is the Shulchan Arukh saying? Before trying to reconcile him with the discussions exactly—why in the discussions we don’t see a connection between these things—but practically speaking, how did he understand these questions, the connection between these questions, and the questions themselves? It seems from the Shulchan Arukh that precisely because lighting constitutes the commandment, therefore if it went out one need not relight it. And that implies that if placement had constituted the commandment, then if it went out one would need to relight it.

Now the question arises, the one you raised, and rightly so—why? After all, if placement constitutes the commandment, and I placed it, and now the lamp went out, what’s the problem? I performed the commandment. Why should I need to relight it? So what if placement constitutes the commandment? After the placement, I performed the commandment. Right? So why does it matter if it goes out afterward? Why should I have to relight it?

[Speaker C] He brings in the concept of time.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean?

[Speaker C] The Shulchan Arukh said whether it went out during the time or not; he’s talking about its proper time.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it went out before its time passed—of course. Because after its time passed, obviously one doesn’t need to relight it. He says that even if it went out within its proper time, still one doesn’t need to relight it. Now why is that connected to lighting constitutes the commandment? If placement constitutes the commandment, then I lit it here and afterward I took it and placed it in its location. So the placement is the commandment-act, and now the lamp has gone out. So still one need not relight it—what’s the problem? I already did the placement. It’s clear that the Shulchan Arukh understood it differently. “Lighting constitutes the commandment” or “placement constitutes the commandment”—the question is not what the commandment-act is, whether the act is the act of lighting or the act of placing. The question is what kind of commandment this is: is it a commandment of action or a commandment of result? “Lighting constitutes the commandment” means the commandment is an act, whereas “placement constitutes the commandment” does not mean that the commandment is the act of placement—

[Speaker D] That there should be a burning lamp.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Rather, that there should be a burning lamp. Meaning, the act of lighting is not the commandment. Lighting is only a preparatory instrument for the commandment, in some sense. That is, you have to light in order for there to be a lamp here. The commandment is that it be burning in its place, of course—that you place it in its proper place, at the entrance to the homes, wherever Jewish law says. The law is that it needs to be burning. That is how the Shulchan Arukh understood it, clearly. Okay, that really is a difference. That’s not what emerges from the Talmudic discussions. In the discussions, where I said there is no connection, there really is no connection on the face of it, because as you rightly said, even if placement constitutes the commandment, afterward you can still say that if it went out one need not relight it—what’s the problem? I already fulfilled the commandment. The questions are not dependent on one another. The Shulchan Arukh understands that “placement constitutes the commandment”—and this is where it all starts. “Placement constitutes the commandment”—we do not rule that way, but the idea is that “placement constitutes the commandment” means that the lamp needs to be burning. You do not need to light; meaning, it is not a commandment of action but a commandment of result. Maybe I’ll give an example to sharpen the point.

[Speaker E] He says it has to be burning for a certain amount of time.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes, of course. We’re talking about until foot traffic ceases from the marketplace.

[Speaker E] Lighting is something momentary, while placement is something ongoing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Placement means: make sure there’s a lamp here. In other words, it doesn’t matter, at least for the moment, who lights it. As far as I’m concerned, a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor can light it.

[Speaker E] Also according to that, if placement is like that—but even according to that, if you placed it for ten minutes, and after ten minutes it went out, you still need to relight it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—even within the time, that’s what the Shulchan Arukh says.

[Speaker E] No, according to the opinion that says placement constitutes the commandment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, according to the one who says placement constitutes the commandment—yes, certainly, because you need to make sure that it burns for the entire duration that it is supposed to. I think the source for these things—and I’ll come back to this Talmud passage—the Talmud in Shabbat that I read earlier. Fine, let me return for a moment to that Talmud passage.

[Speaker F] There’s an example to sharpen the point.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is a similar commandment where this question also arises, and that is the commandment of circumcision. In the commandment of circumcision—and the Brisker Rav brings this in the context of Hanukkah. Today I looked for it here and didn’t find it, but I remember that he writes it there in the context of the laws of Hanukkah. But the discussion begins from shreds of flesh, from the Talmud in Shabbat 133, regarding shreds that do not invalidate the circumcision. Someone performing a circumcision removes the foreskin. Now there are pieces of skin, shreds, that it is proper to remove them, desirable to remove them, but they do not invalidate the circumcision. Meaning, if you did not remove them, then you performed the commandment of circumcision—maybe not in an ideal way, but you performed the commandment of circumcision. In the Talmud in Shabbat, the Talmud says there that on the Sabbath one does not return for shreds that do not invalidate the circumcision. Simply understood, this refers to the Sabbath prohibition—that is, because the commandment itself you already performed. Circumcision overrides the Sabbath, but beautifying the commandment does not, because you fulfill your obligation even without it.

Maybe just as an aside, to clear up what I think is a common misconception. People think beautifying a commandment is something voluntary. That beautifying a commandment is voluntary: if you did it, great; if you didn’t, nothing happened. A kind of optional commandment. I think that’s wrong. Beautifying is a full obligation. It says, “This is my God and I will beautify Him,” and from there they derive: beautify yourself before Him in commandments—you have to beautify commandments. What is true about beautification is that it does not invalidate the commandment. Meaning, if you didn’t do the beautification, you still fulfilled the commandment, but you neglected the commandment of beautification. As they say, for example, regarding tekhelet in tzitzit. It says in the Mishnah in Menachot: the tekhelet does not invalidate the white strands, and the white strands do not invalidate the tekhelet. Tefillin of the arm do not invalidate tefillin of the head, and those of the head do not invalidate those of the arm. So people think tekhelet is optional, voluntary. Tekhelet is a fully obligatory positive commandment.

[Speaker D] Are there two commandments?

[Speaker G] Obviously, two details within the commandment of tzitzit.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maimonides counts it as one commandment, and that’s an interesting question why. He discusses it in root eleven. But these are two different details within the commandment.

[Speaker G] And tefillin are two separate commandments.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. He discusses there the point that even though the two things do not invalidate one another, one of them is counted as one commandment and the other as two commandments. But the fact that they do not invalidate one another does not mean they are two commandments. It can be one commandment—that’s exactly the point in root eleven. In any case, wearing tekhelet is not voluntary. Rather, it is a fully obligatory positive commandment, only it does not invalidate the white strands. Meaning, if I did not put on tekhelet, then I did not lose the commandment of the white strands, which I did fulfill—that is what “does not invalidate” means. But it does not mean that the commandment of tekhelet is optional—if you want, do it; if you don’t want, don’t do it. That is simply incorrect.

I think beautification works in the same way. Beautification is a complete obligation. So there is an obligation to beautify, except that beautification does not invalidate the commandment. If I took an etrog that is not beautiful, I fulfilled my obligation of the etrog, but I did not fulfill the obligation of beautification. And beautification does not override the Sabbath. The commandment of circumcision overrides the Sabbath, and therefore the Talmud says there that one does not return for shreds that do not invalidate, because shreds that do not invalidate are beautification. And that is indeed how the Tur writes it. The Tur brings it as practical law that on the Sabbath one does not return for shreds that do not invalidate. Maimonides, of course, writes the opposite. If the Talmud says one thing, then obviously in Maimonides it will be the opposite. Maimonides writes that one does not return for shreds that do not invalidate even on a weekday.

So yes, in the Brisk school they really like this dispute between the Tur and Maimonides. The Beit HaLevi dealt with it, and his grandson, the Brisker Rav, too, and they go in the same direction even though they phrase it a bit differently. Their claim is that according to Maimonides, the reason we do not return for shreds that do not invalidate is because there is no commandment of beautification after the commandment itself has been completed. Beautification is a more beautiful way of doing the commandment, and if I have already done the commandment and fulfilled my obligation, then what does it help afterward to do additional beautification? And one could say that about any beautification.

[Speaker G] Any beautification, any beautification.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You need the act of the commandment. After the act of the commandment, there is nothing to beautify.

[Speaker G] Every beautification is not a commandment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why is it not a commandment? It is not a commandment in its own right? No—it is a commandment, a commandment in its own right to beautify an act of commandment. But it’s a commandment in its own right; it’s just that you have to do—what is the commandment? To beautify a commandment-act. Let me give an example. Why is the commandment of “This is my God and I will beautify Him” not counted in the Book of Commandments? Because in fact it is true that this is an obligatory commandment, but that commandment introduces details within existing commandments. It is not a separate commandment. Just as on the side of prohibitions, there is such a thing as a partial measure. According to Rabbi Yochanan, and we rule this way in practice, a partial measure is forbidden by Torah law. So if someone eats a third of an olive’s bulk of pork or forbidden fat or something like that, he has violated a Torah prohibition. He just does not receive lashes, he is not punished, but he has violated a Torah prohibition. So why don’t we count the prohibition of a partial measure? The answer given is that the prohibition of a partial measure is indeed a Torah prohibition, but it introduces details within each of the prohibitions themselves, and therefore there is no point in counting it as a separate commandment. The same is true of beautification.

In any case, what is the dispute between the Tur and Maimonides? Here the paths of the Beit HaLevi and the Brisker Rav part company. One of them says—and I don’t even remember which says what—that the dispute is over whether one can in fact beautify after fulfilling the commandment or not. And then the assumption is of course that the commandment of circumcision is the act of circumcision, and if you have finished the act of circumcision, then you are already after the act of circumcision, and therefore beautification no longer applies. The other says no—even though you finished the act of circumcision, you can still beautify even afterward. And the second says that the dispute is precisely about that point itself: what is the commandment of circumcision? Is the commandment of circumcision the act of circumcision, or is the commandment of circumcision to be circumcised? If the commandment of circumcision is to be circumcised, then when you cut the shreds that do not invalidate afterward, that is not after fulfillment of the commandment; you are beautifying the commandment itself, because the commandment is to be circumcised, not the cutting, not the act of circumcision. So therefore beautification does apply.

And everyone agrees that beautification does not apply after the commandment; the argument is whether this case is really after the commandment. Why? Because the question is whether in circumcision the commandment is the action or the result, namely being circumcised. And there is some midrash, I think, about King David—right—that there are these commandments that constantly surround us: circumcision and the Land of Israel and sukkah. I think that’s it, something like that. So from there too it sounds like the commandment is to be circumcised and not to circumcise. To be circumcised is really the commandment here; therefore it constantly surrounds us.

[Speaker I] In any case, and indeed we perform drawing a drop of blood for a child who was born circumcised.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Because there is a condition that circumcision has to be done through an act, a human act. Like, for example, with a sukkah. Building the sukkah is not the commandment, right? Sitting in the sukkah is the commandment. So what is building the sukkah? A preparatory act for the commandment. Now in principle, if it is merely preparatory, if it came down from Heaven, if it was done automatically, why should I care? But it says, “You shall make, and not from something already made,” meaning if it comes about in a non-active way, just on its own, then the sukkah is invalid. Why? After all, there is no commandment to build a sukkah; I only need a sukkah in order to have something to sit in. You see that even when there is a commandment of result, there can still be conditions on the action that creates the result. That doesn’t mean there can’t be. The result has to be the result of a certain kind of action, but the commandment is a commandment of result.

[Speaker J] That’s true, but with blessings not so much. In blessings it’s on the act, not on the… the blessings are on the…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because that’s what I do. I know.

[Speaker J] Yes, and ostensibly we should have said “to be circumcised” and not “to circumcise.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But there really is a proof from the Talmud here for what you’re saying. The Talmud here brings “to light,” and that is a proof that lighting constitutes the commandment. According to the—you’re right, because otherwise the Talmud should not have asked that, since you could say that placement constitutes the commandment and still the blessing would be “to light.” But still it’s different. Because lighting versus placement, at least according to this, not really according to the Shulchan Arukh—because lighting and placement are both actions. So you could have said, “Who sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us to place the Hanukkah lamp.” And that too is my action. In circumcision, the result is not an action; the result is a result. But according to the Shulchan Arukh, you’re right, because according to the Shulchan Arukh, in circumcision too we’re talking about the result, and with the Hanukkah lamp too we’re talking about the result.

In any case, one of the implications of this, for example—there are several medieval authorities, Tosafot Rid and Maharach Or Zarua, who write—you know that when we send a mohel to circumcise our son, usually we appoint him as an agent, right? But Maharach Or Zarua and Tosafot Rid say that there is no need. There is no need to appoint him as an agent. There is even someone who says that appointing him as an agent is ineffective, because this is a commandment involving one’s own body; I don’t know, there is such a view. But there is a third view that I want to discuss, which says there is no need to appoint him as an agent. Why not? Because the commandment—I’m talking about the father’s commandment regarding his son, not the commandment on the son himself; that’s a separate topic. But the father’s commandment to circumcise his son is not a commandment to circumcise; it is a commandment to ensure that he is circumcised. So if I took a mohel, and I made sure he would circumcise my son, then I did my commandment. The cutting itself is not a commandment imposed on me, so he does not have to be my agent. If it were a commandment imposed on me and he were doing it, then he would need to be my agent in order for it to count for me, as though I myself had done it. But since the cutting itself is not imposed on me at all, and I only have to ensure that he is circumcised, then there is no need at all to appoint the mohel as an agent. Which fits very well with what we saw here, that the commandment of circumcision in general is perhaps—according to that view—a commandment to be circumcised and not a commandment to circumcise. If the commandment is to circumcise, then apparently one does need to appoint an agent.

[Speaker K] If someone came and circumcised him and the father wasn’t involved at all, did he fulfill the commandment or not?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he was exempted from the commandment; he did not fulfill the commandment. Meaning, it’s like someone who has a house with a guardrail. The house—I don’t know—the contractor built it for him; he didn’t even ask, the contractor built it, or a guardrail fell from Heaven, I don’t know exactly what happened. There is a guardrail. Did I fulfill the commandment of a guardrail? No. But I was exempted from it because I have a guardrail, so what can I do? Yes, so that’s called being exempted. Okay? I don’t have a positive commandment credited to my account; I didn’t do the commandment, but fine, I am exempt from it.

[Speaker L] But what did the father really have here? The father didn’t fulfill the commandment—where does it say that the son has to perform it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s another topic. There is another law that the son has to do it when he grows up if his father didn’t do it. I’m talking now about the commandment imposed on the father.

[Speaker F] Doesn’t Maimonides define it that way? A commandment on the father to circumcise his son? Who is “he”? Maimonides.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He defines it that way.

[Speaker F] And the Talmud too, the obligations of a son upon the father.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously. No, a commandment to circumcise. The question is what that means: does the commandment mean to perform an act of circumcision, or does it mean to make sure that he is circumcised? And that is the claim. So this is basically the same principle. What I want to say is that I’m bringing this as an example from another halakhic context in which the same question arises: is the commandment the action, or is the commandment the result created by the action? In circumcision. The Shulchan Arukh takes the same approach regarding Hanukkah lamps. Is the commandment to light, or is the commandment that it be burning in its place? Sabbath candles too. What? Sabbath candles too. What about Sabbath candles?

[Speaker M] Lighting or that—there’s Maimonides and Tosafot, I think,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Regarding lighting and placement for Sabbath candles? Could be, I don’t remember. In any case, here too we have to understand what the two sides are. According to the Shulchan Arukh, placement means that it should be burning. In the plain sense of the Talmud, no—placement means placement, and lighting is something different. In any case, I’m saying that according to the Shulchan Arukh, the question whether lighting constitutes the commandment or placement constitutes the commandment is really the same question we asked regarding circumcision: is the commandment the action, or the result?

On the face of it, that’s a very strange thing, because seemingly it’s quite clear that the purpose of lighting is that it should be burning—publicizing the miracle and all those things. What kind of strange definition is this, that I’m obligated, or that the commandment is, to perform the act of lighting? To that extent, you could even say: do the act of lighting, but there’s a condition that it remain burning. There are such things. Sometimes we make a halakhic definition that the commandment is the commandment of the action, but you have not fulfilled your obligation unless some condition is met.

So here too one could have defined it that there is a commandment in the lighting, in the act of lighting, and there’s logic to define it that way, because after all that’s what depends on the person. That it should be burning—fine, it will be burning; what exactly am I supposed to do about that? I’m supposed to perform an act of lighting. Therefore I define the commandment as the act of lighting. Fine. But make it conditional on its remaining lit.

But in the Talmud we see that it’s not so—or the Shulchan Arukh according to the Talmud, the Talmud according to the Shulchan Arukh—we see it’s not so, because according to the one who says that lighting constitutes the commandment, lighting constitutes the commandment to such an extent that you don’t even need the condition. If it went out, it went out. Meaning, it doesn’t have to remain burning as a result of this lighting, so it really seems that it doesn’t have to be burning at all. Not only is that not the definition of what the commandment is here; it doesn’t even have to be burning at all.

If there isn’t enough oil in the lamp—that’s an explicit Talmudic statement—enough for its required measure. The Talmud says that if there isn’t enough oil in the lamp for it to burn until the marketplace empties out, then you have not fulfilled your obligation even according to the one who says that lighting constitutes the commandment. And that is what is called lighting. Lighting means performing an act that is supposed to leave the lamp burning, but that is part of the definition of the act of lighting. And the proof is that if an unusual wind came and extinguished the lamp, then why should you care? Light it again. What’s the problem? The main thing is that it be burning. No. What does the Talmud say? You don’t need to. If it went out, one is not required to relight it. You see that there is no condition that it actually materialize in practice. What is required is that at the time of the lighting, it be a sufficient lighting for it to burn until the marketplace empties out.

So this claim is very surprising. This idea that with a Hanukkah lamp, what we need to do is simply perform the act of lighting—and that’s it—goes against what we would have expected. I think this idea is basically taken from the question of how we understand the lighting of the lamps in the Temple. There too, in the lighting of the lamps in the Temple, you can see a very similar phenomenon. And as is well known, the Hanukkah lamp is of course in commemoration of the lighting of the menorah.

Rashi, for example, writes there in the passage about whether lighting or placement constitutes the commandment: if lighting constitutes the commandment, says Rashi, the commandment of Hanukkah depends on the lighting—we light, as we find with the menorah. Meaning, Rashi himself makes a connection between the parameters of lighting the Hanukkah lamp and the parameters of lighting the menorah in the Temple. And why? Because we light candles, we light them in commemoration of the lighting of the menorah in the Temple, so the laws connected to the lighting of the menorah in the Temple are also relevant to the Hanukkah lamp. Especially in the context of whether lighting or placement constitutes the commandment.

And in fact the later authorities struggle with this somewhat. In the plain sense, Rashi here says that with the menorah too, lighting constitutes the commandment and not placement. There are several later authorities—the Minchat Chinukh, for example—who argue that in Maimonides we see that this is not so. Because Maimonides says—it is written that lighting is valid if done by a non-priest. Lighting the menorah in the Temple is valid if done by a non-priest. Non-priest means someone who is not a priest. How can a non-priest light it? The menorah is there in the sanctuary; how can he enter there? So Maimonides says: they bring the menorah out to him, he lights it outside, and then they return it and place it in its place.

Now if lighting constitutes the commandment, that’s a problem—you lit it not in its proper place. Right? So it’s pretty clear that with the menorah, placement constitutes the commandment. And Rashi here writes that lighting constitutes the commandment. Fine, the later authorities discuss this; I’m not going into it right now.

In any case, let’s try to enter a bit into the question of the lighting of the menorah and see the same phenomenon there, and then I’ll try to suggest an explanation for why we really focus on the act of lighting and not on the result, and that will bring us back to our topic, in fact, to positivism.

So, regarding the lighting of the menorah: in the verses of the Torah there appear several verbs that relate to the menorah. “And you shall command the children of Israel”—the beginning of the portion of Tetzaveh—“that they bring you pure olive oil, crushed for illumination, to raise up a continual lamp. In the Tent of Meeting, outside the curtain that is over the testimony, Aaron and his sons shall arrange it from evening until morning before the Lord, an eternal statute for their generations, from the children of Israel.” So here we see: “to raise up a continual lamp,” “shall arrange it”—that’s arranging—raising up. Then later there is “when he prepares the lamps,” so here there is preparing. There are, I think, two more. Incense—“when he prepares the lamps, he shall burn it.” And then, wait, preparing, raising up, and there’s also “when you raise up the lamps, the seven lamps shall shine toward the face of the menorah.”

Okay, so the commentators are somewhat uncertain what exactly the meaning of all these terms is. For our purposes, most of them identify some of them with the others, but there are two distinct ones. One is preparing, and one is lighting. Arranging, most say, is like preparing. Raising up, most say, is like lighting. What are these two things? Preparing means essentially cleaning out the ash from the lamp that burned until it went out, and preparing the oil and the wicks for the next lighting. That is done in the morning; the lighting is done in the evening. That is preparing, and lighting is lighting.

Now the question is: what is the relation between preparing and lighting? So Maimonides, in Positive Commandment 25, writes as follows: “The twenty-fifth commandment with which the priests were commanded is to light the lamps continually before the Lord.” The commandment is the lighting of the menorah—he is talking about the menorah in the Temple, of course. “And this is what He, exalted be He, said: ‘In the Tent of Meeting, outside the curtain that is over the testimony, Aaron and his sons shall arrange it’—and this is the commandment of preparing the lamps.”

Why is the commandment to light, and “this is the commandment of preparing the lamps”? Why? Preparing is cleaning out the ash, and lighting is lighting—what does “this is the commandment of preparing the lamps” mean? And also in the Laws of Daily Offerings and Additional Offerings, chapter 3, law 12: “What is the clearing of the menorah? Every lamp that has gone out…” Clearing is another term, though not one that appears in the Torah itself in connection with the menorah. “What is the clearing of the menorah? Every lamp that has gone out, one removes the wick and all the oil in the lamp,” etc., “and lights a lamp that has gone out, and the lighting of the lamps is their preparation.” Again, there is some kind of identification here between lighting and preparing.

By contrast, Sefer HaChinukh, in commandment 98, writes as follows: “The commandment of arranging the lamps of the Temple: to prepare the lamps continually before the blessed Lord, as it is said, ‘Aaron and his sons shall arrange it,’ that is, he shall arrange the lamp before the blessed Lord, and this is the commandment of preparing the lamps mentioned in the Talmud.” On the face of it, he is speaking about arranging and preparing, not lighting. He continues and says: I’m skipping a bit—“And part of the commandment of preparing is clearing them, and in clearing the menorah and preparing them there is a positive commandment in the morning and at twilight. And clearing means that every lamp that has gone out, one removes the wick and all the oil in the lamp and wipes it clean and puts in another wick and other oil. And a lamp that has not gone out, one adjusts it. And if the middle lamp has gone out, one lights it from the fire of the outer altar, and the others one lights from it,” etc. “This is the view of Maimonides, of blessed memory, in this commandment: that the preparation of the lamps is their lighting, as we explained.”

Meaning, he says: also the clearing and everything—he probably means that this is one unit. The lighting and the preparing are all together. Preparing is the preparation toward the lighting, and the commandment of preparing the lamps means to prepare and to light; that is, all together as one commandment. “But the view of many commentators,” says the Chinukh, “is that preparing is the clearing and cleaning and arranging the wicks, and that is a commandment in itself.”

[Speaker G] Does the Chinukh add another commandment here? What? Is the Chinukh adding one here?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he says it within this commandment. Now the question is whether the lighting is a commandment in its own right.

[Speaker G] What? Preparing?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, that is this commandment. That’s it. There’s no lighting?

[Speaker G] No lighting. There’s no—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —lighting. Now the lighting—there is no lighting. But no, look and you’ll see in the commentators, and even the Chinukh himself doesn’t add another commandment. No, there is only one commandment: preparing. The commandment is only the preparing, not the lighting.

[Speaker F] Lighting is valid if done by a non-priest? What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In a moment, I’m getting to that, definitely. “And it applies in Temple times to priests, and a priest who violates it and did not arrange the lamps as commanded has neglected a positive commandment.” He is careful to say “arranged.” Meaning, basically the commandment is only the preparing, and that is the view of most of the medieval authorities (Rishonim). The view of most of the medieval authorities is not like Maimonides; the commandment is only preparing. If this reminds you of the Hanukkah lamp, I think that’s not accidental. Here too, the commandment is only the preparation toward it. The lighting afterward—that comes afterward. Meaning, you only have to do the preparations, the stages along the way. That is the commandment imposed on you.

Now regarding the non-priest—we now come to the point that lighting is valid if done by a non-priest. So Maimonides writes in the Laws of Entering the Temple, chapter 9, as follows: “A non-priest who performed service in the Temple—his service is invalid, and he is liable to death at the hands of Heaven, as it is said: ‘And the outsider who comes near shall die.’ By oral tradition they learned that this liability applies only to coming near for service—not coming near the Temple, but if he performed service then he is liable to death at the hands of Heaven. And where was he warned about this? ‘And no outsider shall come near you.’ Who is an outsider? Anyone not from the male descendants of Aaron, as it is said, ‘And the sons of Aaron shall arrange’”—that is actually said about the menorah, right?—“‘and the sons of Aaron shall burn incense’—the sons of Aaron, not the daughters of Aaron.”

Law 2: “Although outsiders are warned not to engage in service among the sacrificial rites, they are liable to death only for a complete service, and not for a service after which another service follows.” Non-priests are indeed warned not to perform service, but not every time a non-priest performs service is he liable to death. When is he liable? When that is the final service. But if it is a service after which another service follows, then no—he is not liable to death if he did the first service. “And the outsider is liable to death only for four services: sprinkling, burning incense, pouring the water on the festival, and pouring the wine regularly. One who arranges the two logs of wood on the pyre…” He brings many others, “and one who prepares the lamps,” and so on—even though these are invalid if done by a non-priest, and he is warned regarding all these and receives lashes, he is not liable to death because each of them is a service after which another service follows, and it is not a concluding service.”

All right? So he says that basically a non-priest who prepared the lamps is not liable to death because it is a service after which another service follows. What service follows it? The lighting. Right? But the lighting is not a service. Lighting is valid if done by a non-priest. An explicit Talmudic passage, and Maimonides rules it that way in Jewish law: lighting is valid if done by a non-priest. More than that, Maimonides writes that lighting is valid if done by a non-priest from the outset—not just after the fact, that if a non-priest lit it then it is valid. In that same chapter, laws 6–7: “Likewise the lighting of the lamps is valid if done by outsiders; therefore it is valid if done by outsiders.” He didn’t write that if outsiders lit them, then after the fact it is valid. “It is valid if done by outsiders. Therefore, if the priest prepared the lamps and brought them outside”—what I said before, why from the outset bring them to him—“it is permitted for a non-priest to light them.” Permitted from the outset, not merely that if he lit them they are not invalid.

And the Raavad indeed says: “Abraham said: he went too far when he said, ‘it is permitted for a non-priest to light them’; rather, if he lit them, they are valid.” The Raavad understands the statement that lighting by a non-priest is valid to mean valid only after the fact. Maimonides says permitted from the outset. And that is indeed puzzling, because from here it is clear—to anyone a little familiar with the language of sacred offerings—that if so, lighting is not a sacrificial service. Service is done only by a priest. Sorry, Rabbi, slaughter too—

[Speaker D] Right, slaughter too is not a service.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] An explicit Talmudic statement. Slaughter is not a service, and therefore it is valid if done by a non-priest, and the same should be true here too: lighting is not a service, and it is valid if done by a non-priest.

So if that’s so, then there are all kinds of difficulties here that are really not clear. First: what sense does it make that there is a commandment only to prepare and not to light? The means is the commandment, but the final goal is not a commandment?

[Speaker L] Maybe because it’s a continual lamp, and there’s no issue of lighting. They lit it once and that’s it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no. They lit it every day. It went out and they cleaned it out—what do you think clearing is?

[Speaker L] So that’s part of the preparing, because the lighting was once, a continual lamp and that’s it. Then afterward it’s part of the preparing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For half a day it wasn’t burning, according to most views at least. For half a day it wasn’t burning—it went out in the morning, they waited, and in the evening they lit it again. Meaning it wasn’t burning continuously. There is no requirement that it burn all the time, except perhaps the western lamp.

[Speaker G] So when did they prepare them? What? When did they prepare them? In the morning.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the morning they prepared them; in the evening they lit them.

[Speaker G] In the morning, in the morning; in the evening, at twilight, that’s the time of lighting, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. So on the one hand there is a commandment to prepare and not to light. More than that: preparing is a service, and lighting is not a service. Preparing requires a priest; lighting is valid if done by a non-priest. So that itself is unclear, like I said about the Hanukkah lamp. Right? There’s something strange here: the preparatory means is itself the commandment, and the final goal—that it be burning—doesn’t matter.

Second: why does Maimonides call it a service after which another service follows? In preparing, no service follows it—what follows it is lighting, and lighting is not a service. Right? Third: how does Maimonides identify lighting with preparing? Maimonides says lighting is preparing, right? In the two places we read. But here you’re telling me there are differences. One is valid if done by a non-priest, one is a service—they’re two completely different things. So how can you tell me that preparing is lighting?

Afterward he says—well, there’s another Maimonides, never mind, let’s leave that now, we won’t get into it. In short, there’s a whole collection of difficulties here. Beyond that—fine, the Raavad, when he writes that lighting by a non-priest is valid only after the fact, that one can understand. Because with sacred offerings the rule is: “Scripture must repeat it to make it indispensable.” Meaning that for any law written in the Torah regarding sacred offerings, it is not indispensable unless Scripture repeats it again or writes “an eternal statute” about it. Meaning, Scripture has to give some additional hint in order for the law to be indispensable; without that, the law is not indispensable.

And since in the lighting of the menorah perhaps the Raavad understands that Scripture did not repeat it again, then it is a law from the outset but not indispensable—that the sons of Aaron are the ones who should light, not outsiders. But according to Maimonides, it is permitted from the outset. Everyone asks him: but it says, “Speak to Aaron: when you raise up the lamps, the seven lamps shall shine toward the face of the menorah.” So it is talking about Aaron lighting the menorah. It says so explicitly in the Torah. How can Maimonides say that lighting is valid from the outset if done by a non-priest?

In short, this whole business looks very problematic. There are more questions here. I think what I’m about to say will answer dozens of questions, but I’ll present only these—that’s enough for our purposes. It seems to me that what Maimonides is saying here is that preparing is indeed a preparation for lighting. But the commandment upon us is the commandment to make the preparation—to prepare. Whoever made the preparation—if the priest made the preparation—the lighting is attributed to him. It’s as if he did the lighting. When Maimonides says that lighting is preparing, he does not mean a semantic identification—that when you say “lighting” and when you say “preparing” you mean the same thing. He means a substantive identification. He means to say that the lighting, in the end, the one who prepared is ultimately called the one who lit. Meaning, the one who made the preparation is called that, even though in practice he didn’t actually do it.

And if I remind you of what the Talmud I read at the beginning says, the Talmud in tractate Shabbat says: “The wicks and oils that the Sages said one may not light with on the Sabbath may not be used in the Temple, because it says, ‘to raise up a continual lamp.’” And his father taught him: “so that the flame rises by itself, and not that it should rise by means of something else.” What does “the flame rises by itself” mean? I suggest that Maimonides—really not only Maimonides, but especially Maimonides—interprets this literally. The flame can rise by itself; as far as I’m concerned, let it come on its own. In the end, your job is the preparation. You have to make the preparation. After that, what happens with the flame—whatever you want—it doesn’t matter.

[Speaker N] And if, according to Maimonides, some outsider strangely went in to light, is that also valid?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, he is forbidden to go in—

[Speaker N] You can kill him, but he performed a commandment?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe it’s a commandment that comes through a transgression, I don’t know. There’s room to discuss it.

[Speaker N] But maybe he didn’t perform a commandment? No, he didn’t perform a commandment. Not certain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That too is a dispute among the later authorities: whether there is a commandment in the lighting even though it is not a sacrificial service. The practical difference would be, for example, a deaf-mute, an incompetent person, or a minor who lit it. Since it is not a service, it can be done by a non-priest—but if it is a commandment, then a deaf-mute, an incompetent person, or a minor cannot do it. The Minchat Chinukh also discusses this issue.

[Speaker O] Have you ever heard about whether when he lights—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What, the lighting of the Temple menorah?

[Speaker O] Yes. Don’t remember. I don’t know whether a non-priest would need to recite a blessing, whether one must—I don’t know, no—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t remember whether there is a blessing on that matter. In any case, the claim is essentially this. Maimonides says that preparing is preparation for lighting. Not only is it preparation for lighting; whoever prepared is considered the one who lit. True, afterward a monkey could come and light it—I don’t know, whoever you want, in principle—unless there is a commandment, and then that’s another problem. But from the standpoint of the service aspect of the matter, it could be done on its own. Okay? It doesn’t change anything.

Maybe that was the sin of Nadav and Avihu, who brought strange fire and did not let the fire descend from above—that they thought it was incumbent on them to light, whereas they were only supposed to prepare and the fire was supposed to come afterward. I don’t know.

In any case, now everything makes sense. Because it’s clear why preparing is a service and lighting is not. But that doesn’t mean lighting is valueless; it means that the one who prepared is the one considered to have lit. Like “Men of the High Priest, we have done your mission” regarding the scapegoat. The meaning is that the High Priest made all the preparations, and in the end he too is considered the one who sent it away, even though that is valid if done by a non-priest. Yes, it is written in the Talmud in Yoma that the scapegoat can be sent by an “appointed man,” meaning even a non-priest.

Now Maimonides says that this is a service after which another service follows, and therefore a non-priest who did it—the preparing—is not liable to death. I asked: how can that be? Lighting is not a service. But it’s an a fortiori argument. Why is one exempt from death if a non-priest did a service after which another service follows? Because that service is not so important; it is only preparation toward something. So if a service that is preparation toward another service is not so important, then a service that is preparation toward something that is not even a service certainly is not important. Therefore, Maimonides says here too: true, the focus is the preparing, but that does not change the fact that preparing really is only preparation for lighting. It remains that way. It’s not that there is some novelty here that I need only prepare, not as preparation for lighting. No, no—preparing is preparation for lighting. Except what? The commandment is to make the preparation. But because it is only preparation, it is not important enough a thing, so a non-priest who did it is not liable to death—just like a service after which another service follows.

A service after which another service follows—why is he not liable to death? It’s not some special scriptural decree. The point is that if it is a service that prepares toward another service, then it’s not all that important. So too here: it doesn’t matter that the lighting after it is not a service; the fact that the preparing is preparation toward something else means that the preparing is not important enough to incur death if a non-priest did it.

And therefore I also asked about Maimonides: but it says, “Aaron, when you raise up the lamps, the seven lamps shall shine toward the face of the menorah.” So it says the priest has to raise up the lamps. Rashi certainly says: only from the outset; after the fact it is not indispensable. Maimonides says: from the outset, even a non-priest can do it. Why? Because the one who prepared is considered the one who raised up the lamps. “When you raise up the lamps”—Aaron raised up the lamps. It doesn’t matter who ultimately lit them in practice. Because the one who prepared is considered that one who raised them up; therefore it makes no difference who physically raised them in the end.

All right, I could answer with this many more difficulties that arise here—really a great many questions of the later authorities—such that once you understand this, the whole thing falls into place completely. But I want only to close our circle: what is the underlying principle behind this?

It says that one who wants to become wise should turn south, right? Oil is a symbol of what? Of Torah, of wisdom. So this basically means that the menorah expresses Torah, wisdom. And what perhaps lies behind this, both in the Hanukkah lamp and in the Temple menorah—where in both, as we saw, only the preparation is really incumbent on us, or is the service, or is the main thing, or is the commandment—and the lighting then comes on its own.

Also in the context of study, there are many rabbinic midrashim about this: “the fear of the Lord is his treasure,” that verse in Isaiah which says that with fear of God you build some kind of storehouse, a warehouse, and then Torah can enter into it. Meaning, many times what we are really occupied with is only some kind of preparation, and in the end Torah enters seemingly by itself after we have made the necessary preparation. There are various expressions of this—Torah is called something found, that it comes to a person when his mind is off it—so it somehow comes to us. But it doesn’t come to us just because we slept and it arrived; rather, whoever works as he should, in the end it comes to him.

Now aside from all the mysticism people talk about on this matter, in practice this is how it works. When we have a difficulty, there is no algorithm that takes us from the difficulty to the solution. Here I’m getting to positivism. Right? I have some difficulty, a contradiction between two Talmudic passages or some other question—how do I find the answer? There is no straightforward method by which I proceed from the question, in an orderly analysis, to the answer. There is no such way.

I have a good friend who has some kind of international consulting company called SIT—Systematic Inventive Thinking. It’s almost a contradiction in terms: systematic inventive. The claim is that this is a method developed in Russia by some Jew named Altshuller, which some young Israelis brought to the country, and they do consulting for governments, IBM, Philips, all kinds of companies, solving problems for them in a systematic way. Meaning, they say: tell us what problem you have, and they teach them an algorithmic way to solve the problem, to go from the problem to the solution in an algorithmic manner. Although even there it’s not truly an algorithm in the full sense; it mechanizes at least part of the way.

But that expresses this point: in practice, when you stand before a difficulty, you have no orderly way to arrive at the solution, the answer. What you can do is analyze the concepts well, define the matters, sharpen what exactly is difficult and where exactly the weak point is—and then wait. And if some inspiration lands on you, then you have an answer; and if no inspiration lands on you, you won’t have an answer. Meaning, in the end, the way of learning requires much toil, much depends on us, but that is only the preparation. In the end, we make the preparation; the result comes to us by some sort of inspiration from above, and that is what is called “the flame rises by itself.”

I think that may be what Hanukkah lamps and the Temple menorah have in common. I said that oil is compared to Torah, and the menorah is compared to Torah, and the claim is that what they want to teach us is that in learning, or in acquiring wisdom, what is incumbent on us is basically the preparation. And that is so important that they tell us, “If it went out, one is not required to relight it.” Now obviously the purpose of lighting is that it be burning—publicizing the miracle and all that—but it was more important to the Sages to say: leave it as it is; as far as I’m concerned, it is enough that you lit it, in order to teach you this message, that what you need to do is make the preparation, and they even give up publicizing the miracle for that purpose.

By the way, as an aside, I’ll just say: people think that lighting Hanukkah candles is publicizing the miracle. I don’t think that’s right. Lighting Hanukkah candles is in commemoration of the Temple menorah. There is another law that there should be publicizing the miracle in it; those are two different things. But the essence of the commandment of lighting Hanukkah candles is not publicizing the miracle. The essence of the commandment of lighting Hanukkah candles is the commandment to light Hanukkah candles in commemoration of what happened there in the Temple. There is an added requirement to make it involve publicizing the miracle. That is a very significant practical difference.

For example, if a person lights for himself when there are no other people around. Or for example, a poor person who is supported from the public soup kitchen—can he take from there for lighting Hanukkah candles? It seems that he can, because of publicizing the miracle. For commandments connected to publicizing the miracle, one may also take from the soup kitchen in order to fulfill them. For ordinary commandments, no—you cannot take charity in order to spend it on fulfilling commandments. This has various implications.

In any case, it seems to me that the fundamental law of the Hanukkah lamp is really learned from the Temple menorah; besides that, there is also the matter of publicizing the miracle, meaning that is another topic. And this was so important to the Sages—that this fundamental law is connected to the lighting of the Temple menorah and to the lighting of Hanukkah candles—that they say, “If it went out, one is not required to relight it.” Meaning, if you lit it, everything is fine.

And the peak of the matter—and this is really our issue for today—there is a very interesting responsum of the author of Terumat HaDeshen, and this is the source of the Shulchan Arukh I read earlier. The source is the Terumat HaDeshen. Terumat HaDeshen asks: what happens if I lit the Hanukkah lamp before the Sabbath, since on Friday we light it before the proper time, right? And it remains burning. Now, lighting constitutes the commandment. That itself is problematic. So how do you fulfill the obligation? Fine, it is a rabbinic law, there’s nothing to be done. Here the Sages said: there’s no choice; here you light before the proper time. It doesn’t exactly fit the categories. Maybe it’s because of the reasoning of the Nimukei Yosef, for those who know it, that a burning lamp is considered as though it is continuously burning by my power. But that is what the Sages say.

Now, what happens if the lamp goes out before the Sabbath? Before the Sabbath I can still relight it. Terumat HaDeshen says: no need to relight it. This is astonishing. Truly astonishing. Because if lighting constitutes the commandment, then once you lit it, if it went out, one is not required to relight it. What do you mean? But on Friday evening, clearly lighting does not constitute the commandment—you are not lighting at the proper time. There, clearly, the goal is that the lamp be burning. The lighting is only a practical means so that the lamp will be burning at the proper time, and the proper time is the Sabbath itself. So how can it be that if it went out before the proper time, you don’t relight it? And this is ruled in the Shulchan Arukh—I read it earlier—it brings this Terumat HaDeshen as Jewish law. It’s a wonder.

Again, I’m saying: it follows this definition to such an extent—they want to sharpen the point that lighting constitutes the commandment—so strongly that even in a place where you did not perform the commandment when you lit it, even there, don’t light it again. To such an extent do they want to sharpen this point: that what is imposed on you is only to make the preparations.

From here on, I’ll finish with a nice midrash. The source is Kli Chemdah; that’s where I saw it. Midrash Tanchuma at the beginning of the portion of Tetzaveh. Midrash Tanchuma says this: “Our master, teach us: at what age is a child circumcised? Thus our Rabbis taught: a child is circumcised at eight days. What is the reason? Just as our forefather Isaac was circumcised. Come and see that nothing is dearer to a person than his son, yet he circumcises him. And why all this? Rabbi Nachman bar Yitzchak said: in order to do the will of his Creator.”

So Kli Chemdah asks: what is this doing at the beginning of the portion of Tetzaveh? Why all of a sudden do they start discussing at what age a child is circumcised? What does that have to do with the matter here? So he says it’s because the portion of Tetzaveh deals with the menorah, in which preparing is the preparation toward lighting, and what is imposed on you is only to see to it that it be ready to burn; you don’t need, in the end, the lighting itself or even that it actually be burning by itself. And because of that, Tanchuma brings here this discussion of circumcision, because in circumcision too it’s the same thing as in the menorah. In circumcision too, the commandment is basically to see to it that there be a result, or to see to it that there be a circumcised person, and not the bare fact of your being circumcised. All right, Shabbat shalom.