The Receiver Chapter – Lesson 26

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[Speaker C] Right, but when does he violate the prohibition?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Does he violate the prohibition when he doesn’t pay, or when he takes?

[Speaker C] There’s no doubt that it’s when he doesn’t pay, but you can take the two things and glue them together: to do it and not pay—that’s something forbidden.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] To do it and not pay, yes—but not to do it with the intention of not paying. What’s the problem?

[Speaker C] But that’s probably what he meant. To do it with the intention of not paying—meaning he did it as one package.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So bottom line, bottom line, we’re not talking about the act, we’re talking about the payment. You didn’t gain anything from the Talmudic text. I don’t see it.

[Speaker C] Why? To combine both of them into one thing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But it’s not combined into one thing, because you’re telling me that all in all it’s just an obligation to pay, that’s all. Like Tosafot.

[Speaker C] It could have been formulated that way, but in order to…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Both together. No, it can’t be formulated differently. It can’t be formulated differently. Why? You’re talking about an obligation to pay; it’s just wordplay.

[Speaker C] Why? I’m allowed—why am I allowed—to say: it’s forbidden for me to borrow and not pay? You can say no, you’re allowed to borrow, you just have a problem afterward,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re forbidden not to pay if you borrowed.

[Speaker C] Right, that’s the precise formulation, but in ordinary human language it’s completely, completely acceptable to say: it’s forbidden to borrow and not pay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, look: if you tell me “and not pay,” then maybe you can say “to borrow and not pay,” let’s say. But when you say only “it’s forbidden to borrow” without the “and not pay,” and then you insert the “not pay” into the Talmudic text, and afterward you leave only the “not pay”—do you understand? It’s strange.

[Speaker C] Agreed, right. But okay—even so, you can still see it that way.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, it’s a strange business. In light of that, as I said earlier, there’s room here to hesitate over the question of what happens if a person is poor and has nothing to pay with. So what, according to the Rosh would he be forbidden to take the money? He knows he won’t be able to return it. I don’t know. From the opening of the Rosh it seems not, because this is life-threatening danger, and life-threatening danger overrides everything. But from the conclusion of the Rosh, I’m not sure. So there’s a question here—I don’t know—not a simple question. Okay.

[Speaker C] The Tur—is there anyone who actually says that this would be forbidden for a poor person? I’m willing to bet not.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s nobody who says it’s forbidden in general, so it’s hard to… no, Rashi seemingly says so. Yes, Rashi says it in a couple of words that everyone builds on, but nobody agrees with him in practical Jewish law.

[Speaker C] No, but here it’s one step further—to distinguish between rich and poor people on this issue—that sounds even more and more problematic.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Look at the wording of the Tur, for example—the son of the Rosh, right? “Even if he is in mortal danger and comes to rob his fellow in order to save his life, he is forbidden to rob unless it is with the intention of paying.” That’s an even stronger formulation than the Rosh. “For certainly nothing stands in the way of life-threatening danger; therefore he is permitted to take and save his life, but he should take it only with the intention of paying.” That is an extremely strange formulation. It should have said: “but he should not take it unless he pays afterward,” not “with the intention of paying,” but rather he is obligated to pay afterward. That formulation is very strange. The same thing is also in the Shulchan Arukh, right? “Even if he is in mortal danger and needs to rob his fellow in order to save his life, he must take it only with the intention of paying.” That’s already an even more exacting formulation than the Rosh. Here it’s really something very strange. Meaning: the Shulchan Arukh and the Tur—notice an important point—the Shulchan Arukh and the Tur are not commentators on the Talmudic text. The Rosh still writes his rulings around the Talmudic text. I can understand the Rosh trying somehow to force things in order to preserve the language of the Talmudic text, which is difficult for Tosafot. But the Tur and the Shulchan Arukh are presenting Jewish law. They are not commentators on the Talmudic text. And when you present Jewish law, to formulate it in such a crooked way—that’s really strange. If I were reading this without the Talmudic text—if I were reading only the Tur and the Shulchan Arukh and didn’t know there was some pressure from the Talmudic wording and all these things—I would read it as saying that it is forbidden to take if it is not with the intention of paying. That’s what it says there. Fine, with the Rosh you can still argue, as Binyamin said earlier: he wants to salvage some strained reading of the wording of the Talmudic text. Fine, let’s say. But in the Tur and in the Shulchan Arukh, as law books, this is really a very strange formulation.

[Speaker C] But that’s not fair, because it’s obvious to us where they took it from in the Tur.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, they took it from the Rosh—but you don’t write like that.

[Speaker C] They didn’t take considerations of that kind into account; we know this from a thousand places. They copied the wording.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I disagree. If the wording is confusing, then I don’t think that’s right.

[Speaker C] It’s not that—okay, it’s not more confusing than the source. The source is already very confusing, that’s true.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but you’re a law book—so you go and confuse us again like the source? That’s completely absurd. When the Talmudic text confuses us—fine. Even a commentator can say: I’m following the Talmudic text. But a law book—the basic thing I would expect is that it writes the clear Jewish law for me and doesn’t keep confusing me because of the Talmudic text. Once I’m reading it, I’m no longer troubled by the Talmudic text; I’ve left the Talmudic text behind. Now I want to know what I’m supposed to do.

[Speaker C] Maybe Maimonides met those legitimate requirements.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think the Tur and the Shulchan Arukh are also supposed to meet them.

[Speaker C] Do you know places where they changed the wording because it was confusing? That’s extremely rare.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I think—well, we’d have to think of places—but I have no doubt that this is ABC, the most basic thing.

[Speaker C] Okay, they were very careful about this too, probably also because of fear of issuing rulings, especially the Shulchan Arukh. He almost always copies his predecessors word for word, even in places where it really seems completely absurd.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he doesn’t mean it, that’s very strange. Anyway, so that’s regarding the Tur and the Shulchan Arukh. What I want now is to explain a bit this approach of Rashi. How can one really understand this approach that says a person is forbidden to save himself with his fellow’s money? Seemingly, “let him be killed rather than transgress” was said only about the three severe sins, not about robbery. So my claim here is the following claim. I’ll start maybe with the responsa Binyan Tziyon. In Binyan Tziyon—the one by the Arukh LaNer—he has some six or seven responsa on this topic, from 167 to 182 or 183, and there he speaks systematically about a conception that says a person must surrender his life rather than commit interpersonal sins—that there is “let him be killed rather than transgress” regarding commandments between one person and another. Among other things, he brings the Talmud in Sotah that says: “It is preferable for a person to throw himself into a fiery furnace rather than whiten his fellow’s face in public”—that is, embarrass him publicly. Tosafot there on the spot asks how this can be “let him be killed rather than transgress”; after all, this is the sin of humiliation, and that isn’t one of the three severe sins. So he explains there that yes, a person’s color drains from his face, as the Talmud says there, and it’s like some kind of accessory to murder. This is extremely strange. Not only is it extremely strange, because after all there’s no murder here—so what if the blood drains from his face? What kind of thing is that? They’re sitting there in Berakhot—what is this? But beyond that, I’d say there’s no necessity for it either. After all, that’s an aggadic statement. What does it mean, “It is preferable for a person to throw himself into a fiery furnace rather than embarrass his fellow publicly”? It means this is something very, very severe and should be avoided. Nobody writes this as some practical halakhic instruction and starts discussing whether yes or no, and why the Talmud didn’t ask there about “let him be killed rather than transgress,” and why here the Talmud ignores that and passes over it so calmly. It’s an aggadic statement, not a halakhic statement. Why are you turning it into a halakhic principle? But Tosafot did decide that this thing is essentially a halakhic statement. And the Binyan Tziyon takes this and says: truly, the words of Tosafot are strained. But he wants to argue that there really is a general principle here: that there is “let him be killed rather than transgress” for all interpersonal prohibitions. Now one has to understand—and this is how they often formulate this Binyan Tziyon—but clearly he does not really mean it literally, that there is “let him be killed rather than transgress” for every interpersonal sin. That doesn’t make sense. I don’t have to die in order to give charity to a poor person, or to do kindness for someone. Obviously not. So what does he mean? There is “let him be killed rather than transgress” for prohibitions that belong to civil law. After all, humiliation—I pay compensation for shame—that’s civil law; it’s not ritual law. Why? Because when I humiliated you, I harmed your right to honor. And that’s like causing damage. Therefore I have to pay; that’s why shame is one of the five categories of compensation. I have to pay you like a damager. Essentially, I harmed your right to honor, and therefore this belongs in civil law. All the interpersonal sins for which one must be killed rather than transgress, according to the Binyan Tziyon—and of course Rashi’s robbery is dancing at the head of them all, he’s just expanding Rashi, but understand that he takes it further—this is really Rashi’s conception. And he says this as practical Jewish law: he claims there is “let him be killed rather than transgress,” because all these sins are injuries to another person’s right. What does that mean? There is—

[Speaker D] Rabbi Shimon Shkop in Sha’ar 5 asks the following question there. He brings a question of the Maharivsan, well-known material.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He brings the question of the Maharivsan and says: why is a doubt in robbery treated leniently? In the language of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and later authorities (Acharonim), a doubt in robbery is treated leniently. What does that mean? It means that the burden of proof is on the one seeking to extract money from another—in other words, the one in possession can retain the money even though there is a dispute between him and the claimant, and this is a doubtful case of robbery, yet we go leniently and allow him to keep the money. Of course the term “leniently” is not a great term here, because leniently—not exactly; it’s stringency for the other party. It’s not really leniently, but that’s the expression. So the Maharivsan asks: why in fact are we not concerned about the doubt of the prohibition of robbery? In a doubtful prohibition we are stringent, and this is a Torah-level prohibition. So why don’t we require him to relinquish the money out of doubt and not keep it? It’s a doubt concerning a Torah-level prohibition, so he should be stringent. There are several answers here that Rabbi Shimon Shkop brings—one or two of them—and rejects them, and in a moment he brings his own answer. I just want first to sharpen the question a bit more. After all, it’s clear that in the ordinary case there’s no difficulty here at all. In the ordinary case, when I’m holding money and someone claims it from me, from my own perspective I know the truth—I know the money is mine, and I claim that that is the truth. The judges, of course, don’t know whether to believe me or the claimant. So the judges are in doubt, not I. So they can’t obligate me to give up the money in order to prevent me from a doubtful prohibition of robbery. I claim that I’m not violating any prohibition of robbery. What do you mean? I say this money is mine, and as long as you have no proof to take it from me, you can’t force me to act against the view that I myself claim to hold. You have no proof, so that’s not the question. But the Maharivsan’s question exists only in a case like certain claim versus uncertain claim, where money is to be extracted. In certain-versus-uncertain there is a dispute whether a certain claim is stronger or not. But the dispute is in a case where there is someone currently in possession. Certain-versus-uncertain where there is no one in possession—obviously the certain claim is stronger. Certain-versus-uncertain where there is someone in possession—it’s a dispute among the Amoraim. Where there is someone in possession, sorry—it’s a dispute among the Amoraim. Meaning: you are claiming money from me. Rabbi?

[Speaker E] Yes. I didn’t hear the last two sentences. I don’t know if my internet is weak or yours, but I didn’t hear them.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What I said was that the Maharivsan’s question exists only—it doesn’t exist in the ordinary situation, because in the ordinary situation they can’t force me to be stringent about a doubtful prohibition of robbery if all the while I’m shouting and saying that I’m not in doubt: this money is mine. Okay? Where does this question exist? When there is a certain claim against an uncertain one. You claim against me with certainty: I lent you one hundred shekels. I say: you know what, I don’t remember. Certain versus uncertain. Now I’m the one in possession, because you want me to pay you money. So according to the dispute of the Amoraim, and in practical Jewish law, we rule that the certain claim is not stronger, meaning that certain-versus-uncertain doesn’t help extract money from someone in possession. On that, the Maharivsan’s question is a good question. Why? Because I myself am in doubt whether I violated the prohibition of robbery. It’s not that I know the truth and the judges are in doubt. I myself am in doubt whether I violated the prohibition of robbery. So in such a situation, why am I not supposed to be stringent in a doubtful prohibition of robbery and give you the money? From your own perspective, you’re also not in doubt, because you know this money is yours—you can take it—and I, because of doubt, can’t keep it, because with a doubtful prohibition of robbery we should be stringent. There, that really is a good question: why don’t we say that in a doubtful prohibition of robbery we are stringent, and I have to give you the money even without proof? That’s the question. So Rabbi Shimon Shkop argues—famous material. I’ll just share the passage for a moment. “And an explanation of this matter, in my humble opinion, according to a general introduction: in all the laws of judgment concerning monetary law between one person and his fellow, they are not like the rest of the commandments of the Torah. For in all the commandments, and what the Torah warned us with positive commandments and prohibitions, the main thing is that our obligation to fulfill them is to fulfill the command of God.” Meaning: in all the prohibitions and commandments defined by the Torah, the prohibition or the commandment is constituted by the command. The fact that we have to do it is because the Holy One commanded it. “But in monetary law it is not so, for before the commandment of God falls upon us to pay or to return, there first has to be a prior legal obligation upon us. For even if the robber is a minor and not subject to commandments, nevertheless the religious court is obligated to rescue the oppressed from his oppressor and compel the minor to return the robbed object to its owner.” What is he saying? “Do not steal” is a prohibition different from all the other prohibitions and commandments of the Torah. In all the other prohibitions and commandments of the Torah, the prohibition and the commandment exist by force of the command. The fact that the Holy One commanded not to eat pork—that’s why it is forbidden for me to eat pork. Therefore it is forbidden for me to eat pork because the Holy One commanded. In robbery it works in reverse. Because I may not rob, therefore the Torah forbade it. Not that I may not rob because the Torah forbade it, but the Torah forbade it because I may not rob. You’ll ask: why may I not rob? It’s a legal obligation—that’s what he calls here “the doctrine of laws.” What does that mean? There is some legal system that precedes the commands of the Torah, and it defines property law, what belongs to whom, and it imposes a prohibition on taking money that doesn’t belong to me. When the Torah says “Do not steal,” it adds another religious layer on top of the legal layer. Besides the fact that when you rob someone else’s property you violate a legal prohibition, in addition you also violate the religious prohibition of “Do not steal.” But that prohibition gives religious backing to a prohibition that exists even without it. The prohibition on taking is not because of the Torah’s “Do not steal”; rather, the “Do not steal” is because of the prohibition. Then he says: “And another principal rule in this is that wherever we discuss some right or ownership of a person in some object or monetary lien, we are not discussing at all the matter of observing some commandment, but rather a matter of reality: to whom does the thing belong? And who is fit, according to the doctrine of laws, to hold the object?” We discuss to whom the object belongs. This is not a question in the laws of “Do not steal.” It is a question that precedes the Torah entirely, even before the prohibition “Do not steal” was stated. First of all I have to determine, according to the doctrine of laws, whose money this is. After I conclude that this money belongs to so-and-so, if someone takes that money from him, he has violated a legal prohibition of robbery and a religious prohibition written in the verse, “Do not steal.” But the discussion is not a discussion in the laws of “Do not steal.” And therefore, says Rabbi Shimon Shkop, this is how he resolves the Maharivsan’s question. What does he say? Since legal reasoning says that if there is doubt whether the money is yours, but the claimant did not produce proof, then legal reasoning says to leave the money with you—therefore the religious prohibition of “Do not steal” also does not apply here. Because the religious prohibition comes to give backing to the legal prohibition. And once we have decided the legal question, then legally this money is mine, and therefore the prohibition of “Do not steal” will also not apply here. And then I’m not even in doubt concerning a prohibition. No prohibition rests on me. Because once the law determined that this money is mine, it actually becomes mine, and therefore the prohibition of “Do not steal” will not apply to me and I don’t need to be stringent in a doubtful prohibition of robbery. You can argue with this a lot, but at the moment I’m using it only—I don’t want to get too deep into that discussion. What is this really saying? This is saying, for example, Rabbi Shimon Shkop says that if I take an object from a gentile, then even according to the opinion that robbery of a gentile is not forbidden by Torah law, that object does not become my object. It is the gentile’s object. The prohibition of “Do not steal” does not apply to that taking, but clearly there is a legal prohibition here, and clearly the object is still not mine; it belongs to the gentile. It’s just that there is no religious prohibition of “Do not steal” regarding taking money from a gentile according to those methods that hold that way. That is basically his claim. What is this really saying? It says that when we speak about property law, such as “Do not steal,” and so on, underneath it there sits some conception that there is a legal system that determines people’s rights and obligations regarding money. And this is not connected to the Torah; it comes before the Torah. And elsewhere there in that same chapter he writes—and this is his proof—the Torah prohibits “Do not steal.” Now how do I know what counts as stealing? As long as we haven’t established property law, there’s no way to know when a certain act is robbery and when it isn’t. Therefore, when the Torah says “Do not steal,” it clearly presupposes some system that determines property law, because otherwise it would be impossible to apply the prohibition of “Do not steal.” So there is in fact a system of legal rights and obligations, and the prohibition of “Do not steal” comes to give it religious backing, but it does not create them. They exist without it, before it. That is basically the claim. So, you know what, let’s go out for a five-minute break, and then I’ll come back to Rashi and use this. Okay.

[Speaker D] Okay, friends, let’s come back—turn on cameras. David, Shlomo.

[Speaker F] Just two minutes and I’ll turn it on. Just two minutes and I’ll turn it on.

[Speaker B] Okay. David, are you with us? Aryeh?

[Speaker G] One second, Rabbi, I’ll be there in one minute. I’ll turn it on.

[Speaker B] Aryeh? Okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so we reached Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s conclusion: that at the basis of the prohibition of robbery sits an entire legal system that determines property law—what belongs to whom. Or in broader words, it determines the monetary rights each person has. What does that really mean? It means that at the basis of these laws that we call civil law there is a structure different from the laws found in ritual law. This takes me back to my remark about the Rashba and others. Usually, in the legal world, it is accepted to say that corresponding to every duty you have toward someone, that someone has a right against you. If you borrowed from someone, you have a duty to return it to him. Why? Because he has a right to receive it from you. If you damaged someone, you have a duty to compensate him. Why? Because he has a right to receive that from you. You harmed his right, and therefore you have an obligation to pay him. Lawyers call this the Hohfeld table. The Hohfeld table is a chart that sets my right against your duty, and vice versa. Sometimes it’s a right and a duty vis-à-vis the public, but every law always has two sides: if you impose a duty on one person, you have given a right to someone else—or to the public—and vice versa. In the halakhic context the picture is more complex. There are those who think that in the halakhic context you can’t speak in terms of rights, only in terms of duties, but that is a mistake. Clearly there is a discourse of rights in the halakhic context, and that discourse is called civil law. And that is the difference between civil law and ritual law. The laws that belong to civil law are subject to the Hohfeld table. Meaning: in the laws belonging to civil law, my duty toward you is grounded in your right against me. If I damaged you, borrowed from you, and so on, you have a right to receive from me, and therefore I have an obligation to give you. In ritual law it is not like that. In ritual law—take charity, for example—I have to give money to a poor person. Why do I have to give him money? Because there is a commandment to give charity. Does the poor person have a right to receive money from me? The answer is no. That is why it’s not in civil law; he can’t sue me in religious court for it. It’s not something owed to him. I have an obligation to give him, but it is not owed to him. That is the difference between ritual law and civil law. The same thing with interest. If I took interest from someone, do I have an obligation to give that interest back to him? Meaning: does he have a right to receive the interest back from me? The answer is no. I may have an obligation to return the interest to him—at least with fixed interest that can be extracted by judges—I may have an obligation, a commandment, to return the interest to him, but he has no right; he cannot sue me and demand the interest back. That is the difference between ritual law and civil law. What this really means is an expansion of what Rabbi Shimon Shkop said in the passage we saw earlier. Civil law really rests on this: the duties imposed on me are grounded in rights that someone else has. If I harmed his right, I have to pay him. If he has a right, I have a corresponding duty. Now why is this perspective important? Let’s go back for a moment to Rashi. Rashi says that a person is forbidden to save himself with his fellow’s money—literally. What does that mean? I need to burn your stacks of grain in order to be saved, so according to Rashi I’m forbidden to do it. Not that I have to pay—according to Rashi, I’m forbidden. We asked: but “Do not steal” is not one of the three severe sins. It is overridden by life-threatening danger. My answer is the following. I am now in a situation of life-threatening danger. Life-threatening danger suspends all the prohibitions imposed on me except for three. No prohibitions apply to me now. Fine. But my life-threatening danger cannot suspend your rights. My life-threatening danger suspends the prohibitions imposed on me, but it does not suspend your rights. Therefore, even though the prohibition of “Do not steal” will not apply to me—because the prohibition of “Do not steal” is overridden by life-threatening danger—still your right remains, and the property is yours. So even if I, as it were, have no halakhic prohibition against taking it from you, I still have a legal prohibition against taking it from you. Why? Because the legal prohibition is not a prohibition imposed on me. It is a kind of reality. In reality, it is yours. I cannot take it—not because it is forbidden, but because I simply cannot penetrate there. Treat it as some kind of territory of yours that I cannot cross into; I can’t get through the wall, can’t break through the wall and enter there. If the fire is burning me, then even if I am perfectly righteous, there is no question why it burned me, because fire burns people. That is reality. You don’t ask questions on reality; you ask questions on laws. On reality there are no questions. The claim is that my inability to take your money is not an prohibition. It is also an prohibition, but it doesn’t begin as an prohibition. It begins as a reality. In reality, it is yours. Therefore, since it is yours, only you can make decisions about what is to be done with it. And if so, then it is inaccessible to me for decision-making. If I were already in a position to make decisions, the correct decision would be to take it, because no prohibition of “Do not steal” applies to me due to my life-threatening danger, so obviously I may take it. There is no prohibition on me when I take it. But we said: after all, the prohibition is only the second floor. There is also the first floor, which is the doctrine of laws—your right. My life-threatening danger overrides all the prohibitions imposed on me, but how is my life-threatening danger connected to your rights? How does the life-threatening danger that I am in remove your rights over your property? There is no connection. And therefore what happens is this: one has to look at it this way. My “Do not steal” really is overridden. It is not one of the three severe sins; Rashi agrees too. There are only three severe sins. “Do not steal” is overridden by life-threatening danger. Fine, it is overridden. But your right still stands, and therefore I cannot take the property. One can continue afterward and say that once your right remains in place, then my “Do not steal” also comes back. Possibly. I don’t know that, because in a place where in any case you can’t violate this “Do not steal” even in a life-threatening situation, then there’s no reason also to suspend “Do not steal.” Fine—whether yes or no, that doesn’t matter for my argument. What matters is that your right remains in place, and therefore there is no question on Rashi: why wasn’t robbery counted among the three severe sins? It wasn’t counted because it’s not the severity of the sin that causes me to be forbidden to take. My “Do not steal” is overridden by life-threatening danger; it is not a severe sin. It is overridden by life-threatening danger. What is not overridden is your right, and I cannot take from you—as with a gentile. Regarding a gentile, there is no prohibition of “Do not steal” according to the methods among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) that hold robbery of a gentile is not forbidden by Torah law. So there is no prohibition of “Do not steal” when I take from him, and still I cannot take from him. And if I took from him, it is not mine. I am legally forbidden to take it from him, and if I took it, it is also not mine but his. Because the property laws remain in force. The “Do not steal”—the second floor—does not apply in that case, but the first floor remains in force. Now of course, one second, just one second—still, what Rashi says is not trivial even if one adopts everything I’ve said. Because one could say: true, his right remains in place, but I am now going to infringe his right because I am in mortal danger. What prevents me from infringing his right? At the end of the day, this still remains some kind of prohibition imposed on me. So why isn’t that prohibition overridden by life-threatening danger? Why should I care about his rights? I’m asking why I can’t take the money. Why isn’t the legal prohibition overridden by life-threatening danger just like the halakhic prohibition? That’s what one could ask. But I say: Rashi claims not. It’s not necessary, but it’s possible. What Rashi is really claiming is that Torah laws are overridden by life-threatening danger. The mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted. The Holy One imposed these laws, and the Holy One also suspends them in a case of life-threatening danger. But the other person’s rights—if he wants to waive his rights, then of course he can, and blessed is he if he waives them, because I am in mortal danger. But if he does not waive his rights, nobody else can do so in his place. Only he can waive his rights. That is Rashi’s claim, and therefore there is “let him be killed rather than transgress” not on robbery as a prohibition, but on taking money that isn’t yours. There is no prohibition of robbery here, and still you have to die and it is forbidden for you to take. Yes, Binyamin.

[Speaker C] Yes, I’m hesitating now how exactly to formulate this; it gives me an uneasy feeling. The word “forbidden”—I’m saying it’s not enough to rescue the word “forbidden” here. Fine, you managed to say “forbidden,” but that’s not enough that something is forbidden for me to do. If there’s some person in the world who now decided to formulate that it’s forbidden for me to listen to the lecture, that won’t be enough. You also need my obligation. Now as I see it, there are only—there are two candidates here for grounding the obligation: either my obligation to Jewish law or my obligation to morality, and by virtue of them I obey—or else some matter of utility. By virtue of them I’m supposed, or can choose, to obey some prohibition. And here it seems that Jewish law and morality could be the same thing; maybe not—there’s a debate about that. And here it seems that all three kinds of obligation are absent. The halakhic obligation isn’t here, and morally it doesn’t seem that…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re basically asking the question I asked earlier. You’re basically saying: even if we accept everything I said up to now, still Rashi’s words do not necessarily follow from it. You’re right. One moment—they are still puzzling, because not—

[Speaker C] It’s unthinkable that morality would obligate me to something like this.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—so I’ll explain something.

[Speaker C] So what do I care that you managed to salvage the word “forbidden” by some calculation?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll explain. My claim is different. I do think this can be said. It’s not necessary to say it, but it can be said. That’s why I brought the example of the fire. I want to claim: imagine there is a wall—you can’t get through it and take the other person’s money. Then you wouldn’t have a claim, “Wait, what’s the wall doing here? I’m in life-threatening danger.” Because the reality is that there is a wall here and you can’t get through. The claim—wait, wait, one second. Fine, but that’s regarding prohibitions. Fine—but why not do it? No problem. Rashi’s claim is that a normative wall is also like a wall. The discussion is not whether I am allowed to take. That discussion never starts to arise. Why? Because I cannot make decisions about something that is outside my territory. If I could make the decision, the justified decision would be to take it—that’s true. But I can’t make decisions about what is not in my territory.

[Speaker C] I can show you that I can.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you can’t. Come and see. Physically you can. What—exactly. No, physically you can, but that’s exactly the point. I’m not talking about the physical.

[Speaker C] No, but if I can physically, then now you have to give me a good reason not to do it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, my claim is that there is physical normativity. And that is like a wall.

[Speaker C] I don’t accept this whole thesis, but first explain to me why not do it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll give you another example, I’ll give you another example. Let’s say—my friend in Bnei Brak, a joker, and this is also an example I always bring in this context. We were sitting around some table, and he saw a book he had been looking for a long time in front of someone else there who was sitting by the table reading it. He says to him, look—he says to him, look, I have two options: either take the book from you and violate “Do not steal,” or leave the book with you and violate “Do not covet.” Since either way I’m violating a prohibition, then why shouldn’t I just take the book already? In any case I’m violating a prohibition; at least let the book be with me. Now this is of course not correct in the definitions of “Do not covet,” never mind, I’m not getting into that discussion now; he also knew that, it was just a joke. But suppose even that it were true—what’s the problem with that kind of argument? My claim is the territorial claim I made earlier. Meaning, your consideration is a justified consideration. You’re right. If in any event you are violating a prohibition, then—

[Speaker C] Why not take it—what do you care? According to your own consideration, it’s a justified consideration. My claim against him is that with my property you can’t make calculations, even if they are justified calculations.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You are not the party who gets to make decisions about property that is in my possession.

[Speaker C] Because it is outside the territory with respect to which you can make decisions at all. Therefore here you are, as it were, like a wall.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can’t go in there even if it is justified to go in. It’s as if you physically can’t. That is basically the claim.

[Speaker C] No, it seems to me we’re not talking to each other. This doesn’t answer my question at all, at all. I completely agree with all that. I’m even willing to agree that legally, or in terms of what— I can say that I’ll go in anyway, by force, in action, and I’ll bear the consequences. That’s what I’m saying. But now tell me: what consequences will I bear? If you do something immoral, then he bears the consequences of the fact that he… Here he bears the consequences that he did something he was not allowed to do. What does that mean? The legal consequences. The legal system is not—this is what people sometimes mistakenly think—it doesn’t float in the air. It has to have backing. Why not do it? I now want to… what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s the claim—not true.

[Speaker C] Wait, there’s a legal system in Iran that says you’re forbidden to do all sorts of things. Why don’t you obey them?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does that have to do with anything?

[Speaker C] I don’t obey them because I don’t think they’re valid. Not connected.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t obey them because they’re not valid—not because I think they’re wrong or because I don’t feel like it, but because they are not valid in my eyes.

[Speaker C] Iranian citizens obey for one of two reasons: either because they think that’s the proper way to act—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I have it! That’s what is proper to do. That’s what is proper to do. What? That’s what is proper to do.

[Speaker C] Ah, that’s the issue—so now we’re debating the moral question. Leave law aside for a moment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, this is law. I call it law. The law says that I cannot make decisions about your money. It’s not just that it’s improper—I cannot make the decision. Not because the content of the decision is incorrect. The very decision. After all, there’s no doubt that the person who doesn’t give me the money to save me is morally not okay. There’s no doubt about that. And still the law says that I am forbidden to take the money from him. That’s all. The same thing with a poor person, by the way, in a less radical case. I—he is hungry; not life-threatening danger, hungry, okay? There is no doubt that someone who has lots of money and doesn’t give to a poor person is not okay. And still the law says that the poor person is forbidden to take that money. Morality is not always the only foundation of law. Also not in Jewish law? I’m saying also for law.

[Speaker C] Law has its… it is sometimes formally limited. It can’t give every…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but that’s right, and it should be like that too. It’s not—

[Speaker C] I don’t think it should.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so here we have a moral disagreement. What, you say, Rabbi… I think it absolutely should. There’s a difference between the question of what is the proper decision and the question whether the decision is yours. Two different things. I say the proper decision is to take the money. But the fact that I am making the decision—that is not proper. Because I am not supposed to make decisions about things outside my territory. Two different things. It’s not the morality of the decision, but the mandate to make the decision—that is what is wrong here. Because that mandate is his, even though he is not okay for not giving me the money to save me. But it is his right to be morally not okay; that money is his. Got it? There’s a whole pilpul on this.

[Speaker C] That phrase, “it is his right to be not okay,” is a bit strange, because “his right” means that it’s proper.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not true. It is legally proper even though it is morally improper. Not a moral right—a legal right. I am talking about the legal right to be morally not okay.

[Speaker C] Ah, so in short you’re saying that law lives on its own and doesn’t need moral backing. Fine. So I say that’s basically a malfunction. We would want law to correspond one hundred percent with morality, wouldn’t we?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, we would not. No. Why not? If we wanted that, we would align them.

[Speaker C] It’s all in our hands.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s exactly what it isn’t.

[Speaker C] You can’t align them because it’s very hard.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can align them easily; there’s no problem aligning them. There’s no problem at all. You can say to every poor person: take money from the homeowner as long as under the laws of charity he is obligated to give it to you. No problem. Just as you can define the laws of charity, you can define that as a legal category.

[Speaker C] That was the communists, but it didn’t work technically. I think that…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean it didn’t work? They don’t want to do it.

[Speaker C] They don’t want to because it has no chance of working.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, they don’t want to because law has an independent standing. You cannot make decisions even if they are moral ones.

[Speaker C] So why obey it? We are positing something that does not correspond to morality, and let’s assume no one will catch you.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You assume that only morality—only morality—is a set of rules one has to obey. I claim that law is too.

[Speaker C] So why? No, I have no problem that one has to obey, but convince me why. I don’t see it. Morality…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You want moral persuasion for the legal matter, but moral persuasion for the legal is self-contradictory. There is legal persuasion. Legally, the money is mine, and therefore only I make decisions about it—that’s all.

[Speaker C] Meaning a person is obligated… you expect a person to… okay, fine. And the person who violates the legal duty?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He is not okay.

[Speaker C] He is not okay only legally; morally he is a very elevated person.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] From a utilitarian standpoint. Elevated person? No. He is a person without moral blemish. But he violated his legal duty, yes. Obviously.

[Speaker C] Who cares? Why?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean—it’s like Robin Hood. Was Robin Hood okay or not? Was Robin Hood okay or not? He was morally okay and legally not okay.

[Speaker C] No, no, I think he was not morally okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? He took from the rich, who lost nothing, and gave to the poor. What’s the problem?

[Speaker C] In my view, law is people’s attempt to organize their lives according to morality. And if it really—if the law were really bad—that’s under the assumption that it isn’t…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What on earth? What is “bad law”? Law everywhere in the world is like this: the rich are not obligated to give charity to the poor. Now I ask: if a poor person takes money from a rich person, he has violated every legal system in the world. There is no legal system in the world that permits that. This isn’t the legal system that prevailed in Sherwood Forest. It’s all the legal systems in the world.

[Speaker C] No, no, there are many systems where that’s permitted. What do you mean? Among the communists that was permitted.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What—that it is permitted to take money by force from a rich person for the benefit of a poor person?

[Speaker C] That’s what every welfare state does, what do you mean?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A welfare state has nothing to do with it. A welfare state is something entirely different. The state doesn’t take it, and now the poor person doesn’t have enough money, the state didn’t provide for him, and he wants to take money from the rich person.

[Speaker C] If he is filling the role of the state, maybe he is allowed to.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, what? There is no legal system in the world that recognizes that he’s allowed to do that.

[Speaker C] No system recognizes that. But that’s not the point.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s exactly the point! What do you mean, that’s not the point? That is precisely the point!

[Speaker C] No, because as far as I’m concerned, the Robin Hood example only illustrates that in every place, anarchy is apparently worse than the attempt to establish legal rules.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But why do you decide that? Anarchy is a bad thing, but why do you set up the rules in such a way that in order to do the right thing, it would require anarchy? Set up the rules so that you won’t need anarchy in order to behave properly.

[Speaker C] Because he can’t set the rules.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course he can. Jewish law itself defines what is beyond the letter of the law and what is the law. Why doesn’t it make what is beyond the letter of the law into law?

[Speaker C] Fine, that’s a different question—what “beyond” means.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t want to get into that now.

[Speaker C] It’s exactly the same question.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are situations where I want to leave the law one way, even though it’s clear to me that it’s not appropriate to act that way. There is still value in the law being that way.

[Speaker C] Yes, because sometimes it isn’t appropriate to enforce things. It just won’t lead to…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not enforcement! It’s not appropriate to forbid it at all. It’s not a prohibition. I’m looking at something that is inappropriate… morally, yes, but halakhically, no. Returning a lost object after the owner has despaired of recovering it. So the Shulchan Arukh rules that beyond the letter of the law, you return it, and they even compel it, right? So why doesn’t the Torah say that by law you have to return the lost object after despair?

[Speaker C] That’s a good question.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And the good answer is what I said. It’s clear that law has an independent status. Nothing will help against that. It’s obvious. To me it’s obvious, I don’t know.

[Speaker C] No, I have no problem with it having independent status. I just didn’t understand why that matters to me.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And therefore someone who violates the law is doing something wrong, even if morality is on his side.

[Speaker C] No, he’s doing something wrong, but that wrong is only legal. So why should I care? Why should I care if it’s legally wrong? Morally wrong—I don’t want to be that, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Legal wrong is like moral wrong. Legal wrong and moral wrong are the same thing. It’s wrong. Why should I care that there are legal values and moral values? You’re in the wrong. Do you want to be in the wrong?

[Speaker C] Good for you. How in the world is that the same thing? So you’re saying it’s immoral.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m saying that being legally wrong is binding just like being morally wrong. It’s the same thing. A good person should be committed to both types of rules.

[Speaker C] The difference is simple: I’m not interested in legal wrong.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m willing to be in the wrong. And there are others who aren’t interested in moral wrong either. Everyone cares about what he cares about. But from the Torah’s perspective, the Torah expects both.

[Speaker C] Those people are not moral. I see myself as moral, but I don’t see myself as legal.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I’m telling you that you need to be legal too, not just moral. You’re not okay. So that other person doesn’t want to be moral either. Anyone can say, “I feel like being a criminal,” so what? What does that help me? There is a Tosafot in tractate Shabbat on page 4 about someone who stuck bread onto the inside of an oven. The Talmud discusses there whether he is allowed to remove the bread so as not to incur a prohibition punishable by stoning. Tosafot says there that you can’t forbid a person from doing such a thing, because even if it were forbidden, he would remove it. He would remove it in order to save his life because of the consequences. So first, Tosafot assumes that you don’t forbid things that a person, for other reasons, won’t observe anyway. Not everyone agrees with that assumption—it’s a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) there. That’s one thing. Second, even Tosafot says it isn’t okay. Tosafot just says, fine—but since the person in any case will end up doing it, it isn’t worthwhile to establish that as Jewish law. But in principle he is willing to accept the claim that it’s not okay. He’s only saying that practically, people won’t obey it. Two different things. I go back to this example of “you shall not covet” and “you shall not steal.” There, from my perspective, my reasoning is excellent. I’m taking it anyway, and I’m perfectly fine—after all, I’m violating a prohibition either way, so at least let the book be with me. What’s wrong with that reasoning? What’s wrong is not the reasoning itself. The reasoning itself is fine. What’s wrong is that I made the calculation. I cannot make calculations about your book. That is outside the territory of my decision-making. I do not have the mandate to make decisions there. When you asked why

[Speaker C] not be a criminal—so I never… according to what you’re saying, there’s a third answer. People usually say: don’t be a criminal because you’ll go to jail, or because it’s immoral to behave that way. According to you, there’s a third answer.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s just words, it’s not a third answer, it’s just words.

[Speaker C] No, why is it just words? In most cases it really doesn’t pay to be a criminal.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that it doesn’t pay is obvious; I’m talking about the other side. You can call the value of preserving legal rules a moral value—it doesn’t interest me, that’s word games. Bottom line: there are also legal rules that need to be kept.

[Speaker C] No, but it’s not word games, because if it’s a moral value, then in a place where morality tells me to violate the law…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, morality does not tell you to violate the law. It does—

[Speaker C] My child’s food is more important than your money.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not true. Morality tells you there is no moral problem in taking the money, but in a place where the law forbids it, morality tells you that even though morally, in itself, the act has no problem, the fact that you are making the decision about this act—that is the problem. Two different things.

[Speaker C] But the original morality was what told me to listen to the law, and now it’s telling me not to listen.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it isn’t. It says there is this aspect and that aspect, and you’re mixing them up. Morality itself—call it morality as far as I’m concerned, I don’t care—morality itself says that the legal system must be preserved, and morality also says that in a case of danger to life I can violate this or that rule. Legal rules, no. Because legal rules say that you cannot make the decisions here at all.

[Speaker C] But the legal rules—the backing, the reason I listen to them in the first place—is because morality told me to, and now it tells me not to.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, morality speaks to you about the act, not about the decision. Morality regarding the decision tells you: do not make the decision; you are not allowed to make the decision.

[Speaker C] I don’t understand the point—what does that mean?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You are not allowed to make a decision in a territory that is not yours. You told me before that this was a good question regarding “you shall not covet.” That’s the answer. There is no other answer. That’s the answer.

[Speaker C] Ah, I have an answer to the question about “you shall not covet.” There—what? Because “you shall not steal” is a prohibition linked to a positive commandment; once he took your book, he has a positive commandment to return it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what?

[Speaker C] Therefore it’s not the better option to choose. Why?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He’ll take it and return it—sure, let him do that, why not? He’ll take it and return it—sure, let him do that, on the contrary. The positive commandment he can still repair by returning it; “you shall not covet” he cannot repair.

[Speaker C] Maybe it’ll be enough just to read it—he has to return it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Oh, come on, really, nonsense. In short, forget it—it’s not a halakhic question, it’s a moral question. In the end, he can take it, read it, and return it. And when he returns it, he repairs the prohibition, but “you shall not covet” he can’t repair at all. If you want to get into pilpul, then this pilpul isn’t relevant.

[Speaker C] The moral answer really isn’t hard, because it’s obvious that this is a bigger crime here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, why? “You shall not covet” and “you shall not steal” are both crimes.

[Speaker C] In “you shall not covet,” only I am committing the transgression.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Doesn’t matter, doesn’t matter—but the Torah says both are crimes.

[Speaker C] That may be true halakhically, but morally there’s a big one and a small one.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that one I can fix, I—

[Speaker C] I’ll return it to him afterward.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not true. He will suffer until you return it. He’ll suffer for five minutes, I’ll finish reading, I’ll return it. Nothing will happen. Wicked scoundrel that he is, not lending me the book, he can suffer for a few minutes. There’s no moral problem—I can justify that for you with no problem at all.

[Speaker C] If you can justify it morally, then in my eyes that’s a problem. I think that’s a good consideration.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, in the end—

[Speaker C] Something that is morally justified is not so simple; it gets into the issue of a transgression for the sake of Heaven.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I disagree, I completely disagree. Legal rules have importance in themselves, not only in their content, but in preserving the legal rules themselves. There is, you know, in Kli Chemdah by Zimri he asks, at the end of the portion of Balak—he asks there, he brings a difficulty from later authorities (Acharonim), there are several later authorities, the Rebbe of Gur is cited there. Zimri—Pinchas came to him, and the Talmud says that if Zimri had turned around and killed Pinchas, he would not have been executed for it, in tractate Sanhedrin. Meaning, as far as Pinchas was concerned, he had the status of a pursuer. So Zimri could have killed Pinchas and would not have been executed for it. So the Rebbe of Gur asks: why, why, why was Zimri permitted to kill Pinchas? After all, he could have saved himself by one of his limbs. He could have stopped sinning, and clearly Pinchas would not have killed him, so there would have been no need to kill Pinchas. So what permission did he have to kill Pinchas as a pursuer? He could have saved himself and Pinchas if he had stopped sinning. Even if he could have shot Pinchas in the leg—if he kills Pinchas he is a murderer. Okay, whether he is liable to death or not is another discussion, but he is a murderer, okay? But here he doesn’t even need to shoot Pinchas in the leg; he just needs to stop committing a sin, which in any case he ought to do. So how is there permission here to kill Pinchas? And the answer given there is a wonderful answer. He says there: that’s true, but I don’t owe it to you to stop sinning. I don’t owe it to you to stop sinning. You come after me as a pursuer, and I will kill you under the law of a pursuer. True, I could stop sinning—I don’t have to. And since I have the right to sin—notice this: I have the right to sin! What does that mean, I have the right to sin? My legal right to do something that is halakhically forbidden. That is exactly the distinction between the categories. And because it is my legal right to do something that is halakhically forbidden, if you come and threaten me so that I won’t do it, or kill me so that I won’t do it, I can turn around and kill you and I will be exempt. Why? After all, Pinchas was right in his reasoning; the Holy One, blessed be He, even gave him His covenant of peace. Morally, Pinchas is righteous. He is morally righteous and legally criminal. Because he is not allowed to kill me. What does that mean, he is not allowed? Legally, he has no right to kill me. And therefore if I kill him, I am within my rights. It’s like someone—in a less extreme example—someone threatens me with a gun: give me a shekel or I’ll kill you. Am I allowed to kill him first in order to save myself, or am I obligated to give him a shekel and save us both? Ostensibly I can save us both: give him a shekel and that’s it. Is it permitted to kill over a shekel? And the answer is yes, of course it is. I am allowed to kill him in order to save myself. Why? But I can give him a shekel and save him and me with a shekel, as though by one of his limbs? The answer is: because I do not owe him the shekel. I have the right to keep my shekel, and if he threatens me over that, I will kill him as a pursuer. Decisions about the… my shekel—only I make them. Someone can come and say, look, if you want to be righteous, give him the shekel. Maybe. I’m not even sure about that either. But even if it’s true, still the decision whether to give a shekel or not is mine and not yours. If you try to force me to give you the shekel, that decision is not within your mandate. And because of that, I will kill you. And there is a difference between the question whether the decision I make is the right decision and the question whether it is my mandate to make that decision. Two different things.

[Speaker C] Look, Pinchas didn’t accept your reasoning. He decided to be legally wicked, though morally righteous—but legally wicked.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. The Holy One, blessed be He, says that there are certain circumstances in which He permits a person to be legally wicked, but you still remain legally wicked, and the consequence is that Zimri can turn around and kill you even if he simply doesn’t feel like stopping his sin.

[Speaker C] I understand now. So if that’s the whole practical implication—that someone will be permitted various things of this sort—then it’s really not so terrible. But what comes out of it is that there isn’t—meaning, you don’t expect someone to obey the instructions of the law.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s another question. I said it’s connected to Tosafot in tractate Shabbat on page 4. It’s connected to Tosafot there. The question is whether we expect him to obey, or whether he says, listen, I’ll commit the transgression and bear the consequences in the heavenly court. But there is still a transgression here—that’s the claim.

[Speaker C] The heavenly court—excuse me, what? Does the heavenly court judge on laws or on morality—legal law?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The heavenly court judges everything. The heavenly court judges you for everything in which you were not okay.

[Speaker F] Also—

[Speaker C] Also for not obeying the rules of the neighborhood soccer club?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—if it was something that had to be obeyed, yes.

[Speaker C] If it had to be obeyed morally, then we’re back to…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, if it had to be obeyed—not morally, legally, call it whatever you want—if it had to be obeyed.

[Speaker C] From the standpoint of the club’s rules, it had to be obeyed.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the club’s rules have no significance just because the club’s rules say so. Unless I am a member of the club, and as such I committed myself to obey the rules. Okay? And even if I committed myself, that has no—

[Speaker C] no significance unless you say that a person has a moral obligation to keep his commitments.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not true. He has a legal obligation to obey, not a moral obligation. If you want, call it a moral obligation on the meta-level—it doesn’t interest me. This terminology, “a moral obligation to obey the law”—call it a moral obligation, I don’t care. But it has an independent status beyond the moral judgment of the act itself. The moral obligation is to obey the legal system, regardless of what it says. That is different from saying whether what it says is moral or not. Two different things. All right, let’s move on, because we’re already repeating ourselves a bit. So my claim, basically, is that this is the explanation in Rashi’s view. The claim is that when a person is in a life-threatening situation, then the prohibition of “you shall not steal” really is overridden. It is overridden by danger to life. It is not one of the three severe transgressions, but there is still a legal barrier here that does not allow him to take the money even though he is in danger to life, because the other person’s right does not evaporate just because I am in a life-threatening situation. And by the way, it is entirely reasonable that the medieval authorities (Rishonim) who disagree with Rashi—I’m talking about those who disagree with him completely, not those about whom I said I was uncertain—even they may accept this model. Except that in their view, as Binyamin said here, although there is a legal prohibition, danger to life allows me to violate that as well. That doesn’t mean they don’t accept the structure itself. I’m saying that in Rashi there is no other way to understand it. There is no other way to understand Rashi. In the approach of the other medieval authorities (Rishonim), I think there is no reason not to understand it this way. You could read it differently, but there is no reason not to read it this way, because it makes sense, because it is correct. Except that in their view, they think that even the legal prohibition is overridden in the face of danger to life. That too, this framework accounts for. Okay. I think this is also the point of the Arukh LaNer, of the Binyan Tzion, who extends this to humiliating another person. Why must I be killed rather than humiliate my fellow? The answer is because even though perhaps the humiliation is not worth a life—it’s not about the severity of the transgression. The point is not the severity of the transgression; you don’t need to show that humiliation is like murder, which is what Tosafot tries to show, not very successfully. The point is not the severity of the transgression. The point is that the decision about what to do with another person’s honor is entrusted only to him. He has the right to make decisions about his honor and not me. Therefore I cannot make decisions about his honor. And because of that, even though the decision in itself is justified—I should not have to pay with my life for his honor—on the moral level, the reasoning says yes, injure him in order to live. Correct. But on the legal level, that reasoning has to be his. He has to be willing for me to humiliate him in order to save me from my life-threatening situation. If he is not willing, then decisions about his honor are given solely to him. That is basically the claim. And the same is true regarding all the interpersonal matters that the Arukh LaNer speaks about, as distinct from, for example, charity, and interest, or commandments between man and his fellow that belong to Yoreh De’ah. Such commandments are obviously not ones for which one must be killed rather than transgress, because those commandments are not founded on the right of the other person. So those are commandments that are certainly overridden by danger to life. If I am in a life-threatening situation, do I have to give charity? Obviously not. Why? Because the poor person does not have a right to receive charity; rather, I have an obligation, and that obligation is overridden by danger to life. Only in a place where my obligation reflects the other person’s right—there, even if I am in danger to life, it won’t help. My obligation may be overridden, but the other person’s right still remains in place. And therefore the Arukh LaNer is not speaking about all commandments between man and his fellow. He is speaking about the rights of the fellow, or about my transgressions whose basis lies in violating the other person’s rights. And about that he says: one must be killed rather than transgress. And that is basically the claim. This is the explanation in Rashi’s view. We spent a bit of time on this issue, so we’ll finish it next time. Okay. Let’s stop here.

[Speaker D] More power to you.