The Chapter “HaKones” – Lesson 27

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[Speaker B] Not that they’re permitted to sign, but that’s what we would have told them to do.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, that’s what we would have told them.

[Speaker B] No, but there’s a difference between the two formulations.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What, with Nachmanides about a measure of piety?

[Speaker B] Yes, that’s Nachmanides.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, that’s the direction. Okay. No, that’s not the direction, I don’t care, even so. Still, however you explain it, it’s still not clear why you assume in Rabbi Meir’s words the opposite of what he tells you.

[Speaker B] If I go in the direction I just started trying to take, then maybe it was obvious to him that even Rabbi Meir, who holds that this is a severe transgression, didn’t mean it to that extent—that a religious court would instruct people to do it. That’s already too much. If a person behaves that way, then maybe that’s what he really ought to do, but when he comes to ask the rabbi, nobody is going to tell him: die rather than steal a shekel from your fellow.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s the direction of the first Nachmanides. The first direction of Nachmanides really says that practically speaking, if he asks us, we’ll tell him it’s permitted—not desirable, but permitted. And if so, you can’t say that this is a case of “a person does not render himself wicked.”

[Speaker B] Right. And that’s the explanation in the Talmudic text, right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s true, but that explanation in the Talmudic text is forced for two reasons. Very forced. First, from “a person does not render himself wicked” to a measure of piety; but beyond that, in the actual language of the Talmudic text, what does it say? After they signed, we ask them, “Why did you sign?” We’re not asking them that. We’re only disqualifying their testimony because they render themselves wicked. And from the Talmudic text it sounds like the dispute is about the very act of signing. The Talmudic text there asks: but if they had come to ask us, we would have told them, “Sign,” so after they signed, are we asking them, “Why did you sign?” No, we’re not asking; we simply don’t believe them because they render themselves not pious.

[Speaker B] So Nachmanides will explain that this is a proof—that the Talmudic text is basically using the fact that if they had come to ask us, we would have told them it was permitted, as proof that they aren’t wicked.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because people ask us what to do. No, I don’t have a problem—again, that’s what you said before, and I agree—that’s what Nachmanides is trying to say. I’m only claiming that Nachmanides’ words are forced, because even so, in the wording of the objection it’s still difficult. Because in the wording of the objection, what it says is that after they signed, we come to them with claims: “Why did you sign?” We don’t come to them with claims: “Why did you sign?” We only disqualify their testimony because a person does not render himself not pious. That implies that the dispute is over whether it is permitted or forbidden to sign; from the language of the Talmudic text, that’s what it implies.

[Speaker B] Right, because they use—it’s clear that in the end it gets to that. The question isn’t whether it’s permitted or forbidden, but how wicked it is to sign. The Talmudic text uses the fact—right—and the Talmudic text uses the fact that if they had asked us, we would have told them to sign, so it’s not that kind of—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but that’s what I’m saying. No, according to Nachmanides there is no dispute about how wicked it is to sign. According to Nachmanides there is no dispute. According to both of them it’s a measure of piety. So Rava, who disagrees with Rav Chisda—what does he say? But that’s not a reason to disqualify their testimony under the rule that a person does not render himself not pious. He has no dispute about how un-pious he is—that’s not the dispute.

[Speaker B] The dispute—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —is over the question of “a person does not render himself wicked.”

[Speaker B] So maybe really the question was how un-pious it is to sign.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] This whole business is strange. If it’s about how un-pious it is, then I return to the original difficulty. Rabbi Meir tells you it’s very un-pious—so what’s the problem? And therefore he says that they render themselves wicked.

[Speaker B] Ah, that’s the Talmudic text. They understood by reasoning that it couldn’t be that—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbi Meir says—leave it, what do you mean they understood by reasoning? But Rav Chisda said exactly that. So decide: you can say, “I don’t like your reasoning,” but you can’t assume the opposite and then challenge me with it—that’s—

[Speaker B] This is such a strange business. No, they understood that this was an assumption accepted by everyone—that the lack of piety doesn’t go that far—and based on that they ask that if they are not—okay, fine.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That itself is what Rav Chisda said no to. In short, Rava is basically attacking Rav Chisda on the assumption that Rav Chisda also agrees, when in fact he is presenting a position that disagrees with Rav Chisda. Either way, whether according to Nachmanides or according to the second Nachmanides, the approach says that there is really a dispute here about “be killed rather than transgress.” First point. An additional difficulty I want to raise: what I explained in Rashi’s view—how did I resolve Rashi’s view? Rashba and other medieval authorities (Rishonim) challenged him that we have an accepted ruling that only three severe transgressions are not set aside before saving a life; we do not find that robbery is also on the list. What does Rashi answer to that? And I explained: because robbery as a transgression is set aside before saving a life; it’s not the severity of the transgression that causes me to be forbidden to rob—it’s simply that I have no mandate to make that decision, even though the transgression itself is overridden. Now if I’m right about that, then I go back again to the Talmudic text in Ketubot. The Talmudic text in Ketubot, after Rava challenges Rav Chisda—Rav Chisda should have said to him: what do you want? You’re right. Only three severe transgressions override saving a life. Robbery does not. But it’s simply not his mandate to decide. So why are you challenging me from the fact that only the three severe transgressions override saving a life? Of course, that’s only an added difficulty to what I explain in Rashi; it’s not a difficulty on the movement of the Talmudic text. What I want to say is this—look. In my opinion, this Talmudic text is a wonderful proof for Rashi. And the point is as follows. If you think about the situation, people come to the witnesses and threaten their lives, and tell them: sign the document. If we sign the document, what happens now? The one who forged the document will come and extract money from the supposed borrower—right?—he’ll extract money that isn’t owed to him. Who is the robber?

[Speaker D] Not them; the one taking the money out. The forger.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, the forger is the robber. What? The witnesses are not robbers. The witnesses are not—they’re fine, maybe “do not place a stumbling block,” aiding, whatever it may be. After all, they don’t have money that doesn’t belong to them. How can you say they’re robbers? They are not holding money that isn’t theirs. They may have helped someone commit an act of robbery. You can think about exactly what wording to use for the prohibition they violated; that doesn’t matter right now. But it is not the prohibition of robbery. Therefore I claim that in such a situation even Rashi would agree that they are permitted to sign. All Rashi said was that robbery is not overridden before saving a life if I myself go and rob someone else’s property. Here I have to give up my life in order not to rob. But these witnesses are not robbing; they are not violating the prohibition of robbery. Now, who says your blood is redder? You want them to kill us so that so-and-so won’t rob you? What do you want from me? I didn’t rob; I only signed for him. In such a case, it may be—and it even seems likely to me—that Rashi would say: the robber here is the lender. The lender has to die rather than rob. But the lender is robbing anyway; he isn’t asking us. The witnesses do not have to die so that someone else won’t rob you. I’ll ask you a question. For example, if someone is chasing you and threatening to shoot you with a gun, do I have to throw my body between you and the gun to protect you and die in your place? Obviously that’s an extreme example; I’m only trying to give a parable, a distant parable for the matter. That is basically what you are demanding from them. You are demanding that they die not in order not to rob, but that they serve as a protective barrier before the lying lender or this robber, so that he won’t take the borrower’s money. And for that I have to die? Fine—“be killed rather than transgress” over robbery—we swallowed that novelty of Rashi’s. But where do you invent “be killed rather than transgress” over the desire to protect you from another robber? No. On that Rashi says—and even Rashi agrees—there is no “be killed rather than transgress.” Here we tell them to sign. Now the Talmudic text moves beautifully—look how nice the flow of the Talmudic text is. The Talmudic text initially understood that Rav Chisda claims that the dispute is over “be killed rather than transgress” regarding robbery. That’s the dispute. Rava asks: but if they had come to ask us whether to sign or not, what would we have told them? Why, even you, Rav Chisda, and Rabbi Meir in your interpretation, would agree that we would tell them to sign. Why? Because by signing they are not violating the prohibition of robbery. You’re right—according to your view, the prohibition of robbery is “be killed rather than transgress.” But when Rava attacks Rav Chisda, he is not assuming the opposite; he understands what Rav Chisda is saying—that according to Rav Chisda there is “be killed rather than transgress” over robbery. It’s just that Rava asks him: but here that’s irrelevant, because here, if they had come to ask us whether to sign, certainly we would have told them to sign; this is not robbery. So then what do you want? Why shouldn’t they be believed to testify about themselves? And indeed, that is why Rav Chisda’s opinion is rejected, and later the Talmudic text says that Rav Chisda meant something else. But the flow here is wonderful, because then what comes out is that at least Rav Chisda claims there is “be killed rather than transgress” regarding robbery. I’ll say even more than that: his dispute with the Sages is over the question whether there is “be killed rather than transgress” regarding robbery—perhaps according to Rav Chisda at first, even in a situation where you are only helping a robbery, not where you are the actual robber. And that is what Rava attacks. Rava says: that I am not willing to accept. Not that he wasn’t willing to accept “be killed rather than transgress” over robbery—on the contrary, he accepts that. Rashi will say that on this point Rava also agrees, and the Sages also do not dispute Rabbi Meir; that is true according to everyone. There is “be killed rather than transgress” regarding robbery; that is the assumption of the topic / passage. The assumption of the topic / passage is that there is “be killed rather than transgress” regarding robbery. The whole discussion in this topic / passage here is over what happens in saving someone from a robber—do we say that there too there is “be killed rather than transgress”? So at first Rav Chisda may think yes, according to Rabbi Meir, and even according to the Rabbis no. But again, regarding “be killed rather than transgress” over actual robbery, even the Rabbis agree that one should be killed rather than transgress—he should not rob. The entire dispute according to Rav Chisda is only over the question what happens with protecting the victim of robbery from the robber: is there also “be killed rather than transgress” there? And Rava says to him: but that cannot be. Because here you are not violating the prohibition of robbery. Fine—even according to your view that there is “be killed rather than transgress”—not according to your view, according to my view too, we all agree. That’s how Rashi reads it, right?—that there is “be killed rather than transgress” over robbery, but here this is not robbery, so why “be killed rather than transgress”? Therefore, if they were to ask us whether to sign, then even you, Rabbi Meir, would agree that they should sign. Why? Because they are not robbers. So if they are not robbers, then what is the problem? Why classify them as wicked and not believe them? They are not robbers, and therefore not wicked either. But regarding actual robbery—“be killed rather than transgress” over robbery—on that everyone agrees: Rava, Rav Chisda, Rabbi Meir, and the Rabbis. About that no discussion arises in the topic / passage at all. On the contrary, the whole discussion in the topic / passage assumes there is “be killed rather than transgress” over robbery. The assumption is that there is “be killed rather than transgress” over robbery. Therefore the entire dispute is placed only in such a situation, where we are dealing with a prohibition that is not literally robbery, but rather protecting the victim of robbery. That’s all. And only there are we speaking. From this, one can understand that in actual robbery there is “be killed rather than transgress.” This topic / passage may even be a proof; it may even be the source of Rashi’s words. It’s not a source, because the plain sense of the topic / passage in Bava Kamma says his words. But this topic / passage is an excellent proof. Because that is actually the simplest way to read the topic / passage. Now true, let’s say more than that—even the medieval authorities (Rishonim) who disagree with Rashi could read the topic / passage this way. Only they would claim that Rava does not accept this distinction. Meaning, Rava argues according to Rav Chisda’s own view. Meaning, Rava says that there is no “be killed rather than transgress” over robbery at all, not even according to Rabbi Meir. He only understands that Rav Chisda says there is. As the Talmudic text says at first, that the dispute is over whether there is “be killed rather than transgress” over robbery. And on that Rava attacks Rav Chisda according to Rav Chisda’s own view: you, Rav Chisda, tell me that there is “be killed rather than transgress” over robbery—I understand. But here this isn’t robbery. Even you would agree that if they had come to ask us, we would have told them to sign. But you have to admit that here there is no “be killed rather than transgress”; even you have to admit that. As for me personally, even regarding actual robbery I agree that there is no “be killed rather than transgress.” My objection is to you according to your own view. Even according to your view, that over robbery there is “be killed rather than transgress,” here this is not robbery. Therefore you have to admit that in this situation they were allowed to sign. And then it’s perfectly fine that Rava attacks Rav Chisda according to Rav Chisda’s own view, and not according to his own. And I say that even medieval authorities (Rishonim) who disagree with Rashi may read this Talmudic text in its simple sense exactly as I read it earlier. Their dispute is only over the question what the Rabbis hold, and what Rava holds in Rabbi Meir’s view. Rav Chisda, in Rabbi Meir’s view, holds that even protecting the victim of robbery is “be killed rather than transgress.” That Rava does not accept. What about actual robbery? Rashi will say: actual robbery is “be killed rather than transgress,” according to Rava as well and according to the Rabbis as well. The other medieval authorities (Rishonim) will say: not at all; the dispute is over actual robbery too. Rava does not accept that robbery is “be killed rather than transgress.” But Rav Chisda, who does accept it, still has to admit that that is only in actual robbery, but not in protecting the victim of robbery. That is how they will read the topic / passage. But at least in Rav Chisda’s view in Rabbi Meir’s position, that is certainly the plain sense, and in Rava’s objection according to his view that is certainly the plain sense. So if that is the plain sense in the Talmudic text according to Rav Chisda, there is no reason at all to say that Rava disagrees. After all, in this topic / passage, we do not multiply disputes unnecessarily. The discussion here in the topic / passage is not about “be killed rather than transgress” over robbery. It is about the question whether, assuming there is “be killed rather than transgress” over robbery, do we also say that in a situation where you are only protecting the victim of robbery. That is the whole dispute. Where did we find a dispute over the very principle of “be killed rather than transgress” regarding robbery? It is not written here. And therefore Rashi says: the necessary conclusion. I say, without now getting into the difficulty of the reasoning—when I read the Talmudic text in its simple sense, without the baggage we carry with us regarding the logic—if I read the Talmudic text in its simple sense, this Talmudic text is proof for Rashi. Not only is it not a difficulty; it is proof for Rashi. Fine. And because from a logical standpoint it’s hard to say that a person has to die rather than rob, I’m willing to hear medieval authorities (Rishonim) who read the Talmudic text like Rashi, but who say that in Rava’s view, even over robbery there is no “be killed rather than transgress,” not even over actual robbery. He only attacks Rav Chisda according to Rav Chisda’s own view. But Rashi will say: we do not multiply disputes unnecessarily. The dispute between Rava and Rav Chisda is only over the question whether there is “be killed rather than transgress” when protecting the victim of robbery. Which implies that with regard to actual robbery, everyone agrees that there is “be killed rather than transgress.”

[Speaker B] Okay, there’s one thing missing for me in that plain reading.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I hear you very weakly.

[Speaker B] Okay, can you hear now? Okay, do you hear better now? I’m shouting. What’s not understood now is why the Talmudic text—just a second. Again? Two things. One: why does the Talmudic text ask that if they had asked us, we would have told them this? According to what you’re saying, the question should be different. There is no robbery here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is what they’re asking. There is no robbery here, so if they had asked us, we would have told them: sign. There is no robbery here.

[Speaker B] Fine, that’s a somewhat indirect way of asking that question. But what troubles me more is why—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s no prohibition of robbery here. If they had asked us, we would have told them to sign.

[Speaker B] Fine, the fact that they would have asked us is a consequence of the fact that there’s no robbery here. The consequence is—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s just a way of saying it. I don’t see a problem with that.

[Speaker B] Fine. But what troubles me a bit is that if there really is nothing here of robbery, then it shouldn’t be some sort of matter left to the witnesses’ discretion.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again, you’re weak.

[Speaker B] It should be that it’s forbidden to them. If there’s nothing here connected to the prohibition of robbery, then it should be forbidden for them to sign. They should be forbidden to give up their lives over this.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They are obligated to sign, not that they are forbidden to sign. They are obligated to sign.

[Speaker B] On the contrary—no, the reverse—if they sign, they don’t die; so they are obligated to sign. Exactly. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what he says. If they had asked us, we would have told you: sign.

[Speaker B] No, but okay, that’s not really what the Talmudic text sounds like; it sounds as though it’s still their choice.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If someone wants to give up his life in order not to rob, maybe there is permission to do that, I don’t know. That’s a dispute between Tosafot and Maimonides.

[Speaker B] That’s on condition that there is robbery here. But according to your approach, you can’t say that. So what then?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A dispute between Tosafot and Maimonides regarding the other transgressions—whether a person is allowed to give up his life even though he is not obligated. Maimonides says no, but Tosafot say yes.

[Speaker B] But there is no robbery here. Over what would he give up his life?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is “do not place a stumbling block” here.

[Speaker B] Ah, over “do not place a stumbling block” here? That’s not “do not place a stumbling block,” because—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Accessories of robbery, or “do not place a stumbling block,” or whatever you want.

[Speaker B] No, wait, one step at a time. “Do not place a stumbling block”—I’m not sure that’s here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not? What do you mean? You’re helping someone else rob.

[Speaker B] I’m not helping; he robs by means of—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he can’t rob—

[Speaker B] Without your signing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the question. Who said he can’t? Can’t?

[Speaker B] Without the document he won’t get the money out.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know why he’s doing it. He’d point the gun at the next person in line. Doesn’t matter. But that already takes us into questions of aiding and “do not place a stumbling block,” whether that is called “two sides of the river” if someone else could do the transgression instead of you.

[Speaker B] Fine, you’re saying an interpretive setup that maybe it’s speaking in a way where it’s “two sides of the river,” and then it’s “do not place a stumbling block,” as it were.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, I think—fine, that’s regarding this topic / passage. Let’s take five minutes and continue. Rather, Rava said: with nakedness seen through a glass partition, it is forbidden to recite Shema opposite it. What is the reason? Because the Merciful One said, “and he shall not see in you a matter of nakedness,” and here it is visible. And clothing in water—there too, what is the reason? Because of “and he shall not see in you a matter of nakedness.” Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: travelers crossing a river—when they can see the nakedness, it is forbidden to recite Shema; when they cannot see the nakedness, it is permitted to recite Shema. The Talmudic text asks: really? But didn’t Rav Huna say: if the water forms a separation, it is permitted, and if it does not form a separation, it is forbidden? After all, we learned that if the water does not separate between his heart and his nakedness, it is forbidden to recite Shema even if he does not see the nakedness. The Talmudic text answers: there, the water is clear; here, the water is murky. In murky water, since he does not see, it is permitted; but in clear water, even if he does not see, it is forbidden, because his heart sees the nakedness. Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: if a naked gentile is opposite him, it is forbidden to recite Shema. The Talmudic text asks: what is this coming to tell us? What is novel here? What difference is there between a gentile and a Jew? After all, opposite a naked Jew too it is forbidden to recite Shema. The Talmudic text answers: you might have said that since it is written, “whose flesh is the flesh of donkeys,” I might say that he is just like a donkey and it would be permitted to recite opposite him; therefore it teaches us that this is called nakedness. Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: opposite the nakedness of a gentile it is forbidden to recite Shema. The Talmudic text asks: what is this coming to tell us? He already said, “a naked gentile.” The Talmudic text answers: you might have said that only a naked gentile is forbidden, since his whole body is naked and that is degrading, but nakedness alone would not be; therefore it teaches us. Rav Huna said: opposite a small child it is permitted to recite Shema. Rav Chisda said: and that is only if one cannot discern it. Rav Chisda said: if nakedness has turned its face away, it is permitted to recite Shema opposite it. Rav Huna said: one who comes out of the latrine waits the time it takes to walk four cubits and only then recites Shema, because there is still a bad smell. Rav Chisda said: one who comes out of the latrine should not pray immediately, but rather wait long enough to walk four cubits. A baraita was taught in accordance with Rav Huna, and a baraita was taught in accordance with Rav Chisda. A baraita was taught in accordance with Rav Huna: one who comes out of the latrine waits long enough to walk four cubits and then recites Shema. And a baraita was taught in accordance with Rav Chisda: one who is standing in prayer and a bad smell attaches to him waits until the smell passes and then returns and prays. What is the difference between them? The difference between them is where he relieved himself like Gavriel or like Raphael. Rav Huna said: a garment interrupted by sweat—it is permitted to recite Shema opposite it. Rav Chisda said: we said this only regarding sweat of the body, but sweat of the latrine is forbidden. Rav Huna said: doubtful excrement is forbidden; doubtful urine is permitted. What is the difference? Excrement is more severe. Rav Hamnuna said: we said this only in a place where people are not commonly found, but in a place where people are commonly found, doubtful urine too is forbidden. Rav Yosef said: what is he coming to teach us? We already learned: provided he waits long enough to walk four cubits. Abaye said to him: there it is certain, here it is doubtful. Rav Hamnuna said: doubtful excrement is forbidden. Rav Pappa challenged this: but this is a rabbinic-level doubt, and in a rabbinic-level doubt we are lenient? Rav Hamnuna said: here we are dealing with a Torah-level doubt, for example where there is excrement there and he does not know whether the smell comes from it. Rav Yehuda said: excrement in a house—it is permitted to recite Shema opposite it. Excrement on his back—it is forbidden. Rav Huna said: and specifically in a house that has partitions, but in an open place it is forbidden. Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: anyone who stands opposite excrement and recites Shema is as though he bows to idol worship. What is the reason? As it is said, “and your camp shall be holy.” Rav Pappa said: this excrement that comes from a slope, it is forbidden to recite Shema opposite it. Rav Pappa said: this bad smell that comes from a Persian latrine, it is forbidden to recite Shema opposite it. What is the reason? Since they have no walls and the smell spreads. Rav Huna said: excrement in its place, it is forbidden to recite Shema opposite it. Rav Chisda said: we said this only in its exact place, but if he moved four cubits away from it, it is permitted. Rav Nachman said: if excrement is on his flesh or his hand is soiled with excrement, it is forbidden for him to recite Shema.

[Speaker C] Fine. I now want to move to another aspect of this matter, and that is an apparent contradiction in Maimonides in this context of saving oneself with another person’s money, and this opens the door to several more things.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maimonides, in the last halakha of the Laws of Injury and Damage, chapter 8, halakha 15: “If a ship was thought likely to break from the weight of the cargo, and one of them stood up, lightened the load, and threw it into the sea, he is exempt; for the cargo aboard is like a pursuer after them to kill them, and he performed a great commandment by throwing it overboard and saving them.” Right. This is a ship about to break, there is a heavy load, and one of the passengers comes and throws part of the cargo into the sea. He is exempt from paying for the cargo that he threw into the sea, which he damaged. Why? Because the cargo is like a pursuer after them—it threatens to drown them—and therefore he performed a great commandment and is exempt from paying. Understand that in essence what he did was save himself with another person’s property, and he is exempt from paying. Now this is interesting, because with which view does this fit? According to Rashi’s view, after all, it is forbidden; you have to die and not damage your fellow.

[Speaker C] According to the view of the other medieval authorities (Rishonim), then you—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —are permitted—

[Speaker C] —to do it, but you have to pay. So Maimonides here follows neither view. You are allowed to do it, and you are exempt.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Ra’avad here comments critically in place: “Said Abraham: we see here, there is neither salt nor spice here…” meaning: there is no law of pursuer here at all, and this is not similar to the case of the wine in chapter HaGozel. And this law, where he threw it into the sea—even though he threw the property of one individual—they calculate against all of them according to their loads, as appears in the Talmudic text. He brings a Talmudic text in Bava Kamma where you see that if you throw cargo into the sea in such a situation, the cost is divided. Meaning, you can throw one person’s cargo, but some of the other people have to compensate him according to the relative value, right, according to their loads. Each one according to the proportion of cargo he has on the ship—that is what he has to pay. So here Maimonides, first, goes against the Talmudic text; and second, “there is neither salt nor spice here,” because this is not a law of pursuer. This is saving oneself with another person’s money. And in principle, when one saves himself with another person’s money, he has to pay. True, he does not have to pay him everything, because that other person himself also had to contribute something to save them from drowning; rather, they divide it according to the cargo each person has on the ship. But for our purposes, this basically says: you are allowed to do it, but you have to pay—that’s what the Ra’avad says. So the Ra’avad fits the view of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) against Rashi. But Maimonides is a third view entirely, saying: you can do it, and you do not even have to pay. And that too is against the Talmudic text—that is the Ra’avad’s question. So the commentaries here already point out that Maimonides himself brings that very Talmudic text. He brings it in the halakhot—there it was at the end of the Laws of Injury and Damage. Here it is in the Laws of Robbery and Lost Property, chapter 12, halakha 14. And it says as follows: “If a ship was traveling at sea and a wave rose against it to sink it, and they lightened its load,” right, they threw it into the sea, “they calculate according to each one’s load, and they do not calculate according to wealth.” Right—not that the rich pays a lot and the poor pays a little, but each one pays in proportion to the amount of cargo he had on the ship. And we follow the custom of the sailors—that is, if there is another custom, then they act differently. So here appears the halakha that the Ra’avad quotes from the Talmudic text; that is, Maimonides himself brings that halakha. So if so, it is not a contradiction from the Talmudic text to Maimonides; it is a contradiction within Maimonides. Two contradictory halakhot: in one place he says he is exempt; in another place he says he pays according to his load, they divide it according to the loads. What do you say?

[Speaker B] I didn’t understand. This halakha about the ship—what does “he pays according to his load” mean? Who pays? The one who threw it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The people who were on the ship, or the people whose cargo was on the ship, must pay the owner of the cargo that was thrown into the sea in proportion to the cargo they have on the ship.

[Speaker B] So from the end of this halakha it sounds like this is some custom of certain passengers.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, on the contrary, that’s the default. If there is a sailors’ custom, then we follow the custom.

[Speaker B] No, right, but the fact that you always follow the custom implies that there is always some kind of agreement.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I don’t know. This is monetary law, so if there is another custom then you act according to the custom.

[Speaker B] No, but it’s like in Bava Batra where they build the wall in the middle. There is a default custom, but the point is that there is an implicit agreement here: everyone agrees that in a case of—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not sure. I’m not sure of that at all, certainly not in all places. In some places, in my opinion, this is a halakha that is a real, pure halakha—not one of agreements. Only, if you want to agree, fine, no problem, you’re allowed to give gifts. No, but this is basically the pure law itself.

[Speaker B] But in this specific case, why should we care to say that this is the intention? That really it’s not a matter of one person throwing it; it means the captain decided to throw it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Doesn’t matter, doesn’t matter right now. Anyone can throw it; that’s not the point.

[Speaker B] No, maybe—why? Maybe—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] This is the law. The law is that it is permitted to throw it.

[Speaker B] That’s according to what you want to say. But the other possibility is to say that there is an agreement here that they throw things overboard; whoever is authorized to do so throws the cargo, and whoever shares in paying for the cargo that was thrown is everybody according to the ratio. That’s some kind of agreement.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And what do you gain from that? I didn’t understand.

[Speaker B] That there is no topic / passage here of saving oneself with another person’s money, because this is the agreement. You want to get on the ship—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And what happens in the Laws of Injury and Damage?

[Speaker B] There there is no agreement.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So the dispute is only whether there is or is not an agreement? Then why does this appear in the Laws of Injury and Damage and also in the Laws of Robbery and Lost Property?

[Speaker B] What do you mean by this and that, just so I understand?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One halakha appears in the Laws of Injury and Damage, and the second halakha that I read appears in the Laws of Robbery and Lost Property. All you’re saying is: these are two adjacent halakhot, one of them speaks where there is an agreement and the other speaks of the law where there is no agreement.

[Speaker B] No, the halakha of damaging has nothing to do with agreements, because if it’s not an agreement then it’s a matter of damage.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, so if there is no agreement, then it’s like this, and if—

[Speaker B] —there is an agreement, then it’s like that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, if there is an agreement, that has nothing to do with the Laws of Injury and Damage; it has to do with agreements. Obviously not, because you agreed. So in the Laws of Injury and Damage you can write that if there is an agreement, then you’re not damaging.

[Speaker B] Right, but they had to tell us what the default agreement is, and so on; there is here—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not—if first of all there is no agreement, then there is no default agreement, because there is no agreement. Otherwise there is no such law of “no agreement”; there is a default agreement. Right. So what does “no agreement” mean?

[Speaker B] There is always an agreement in the absence of a stipulation.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what is a situation of no agreement?

[Speaker B] An ordinary person walking in the street.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, in the street? A ship sailing at sea with people’s cargo. In both cases that’s what we’re talking about.

[Speaker B] There too there is always an agreement. No, but I’m talking about something else—when is there no agreement? I now need a bullet—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But Maimonides is speaking about a situation of no agreement on a ship. Who said? You said—because there the default—

[Speaker B] —is that there is an agreement.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But on the ship, in the Laws of Injury and Damage, it’s talking about a ship. There it says that you can throw the cargo into the sea and you are exempt.

[Speaker B] So what’s the question? Why is it in the Laws of Injury and Damage? To teach me that this is not injury and damage?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not because of that. The question is first of all: what is the situation there? Is there an agreement, is there no agreement, is there a default?

[Speaker B] On a ship there is a default agreement. Fine.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So why is he allowed there to throw it? After all, the default agreement is that they divide it according to their loads—that’s what the Ra’avad asks.

[Speaker B] And it’s also permitted to throw it; that too is part of the agreement.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But there it says that it is permitted to throw it and you are exempt from paying.

[Speaker D] Where is “there”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the Laws of Injury and Damage it says that you are permitted to throw the cargo and you are exempt from paying. The Ra’avad asks: but the Talmudic text says they have to divide it according to their loads.

[Speaker B] Yes, maybe—right, I understand, fine, I made some mistake here. No, but you’d have to say that Maimonides there was speaking in an exceptional case where clearly there is no agreement. Say it’s not a cargo ship.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then that has no point. So just say the situation without an agreement, and wherever there is an agreement, you follow the agreement. That’s all.

[Speaker B] No, usually there is a cargo ship, there is a default that it’s a cargo ship. But just an ordinary vessel not intended to transport merchandise, and there there is—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s not it. That’s not it, and it also doesn’t need to be split between two different collections of halakhot; these are different things. Fine. Let me tell you—it’s simple. Look at Maimonides’ wording and you’ll see it yourselves. Even though many others who argued with me didn’t see it—but they were mistaken.

[Speaker D] What I wanted to say is that in the case of the ship that wants to sink, really there is no law here of robbing in order to save one’s life, because the property is already in a state of going lost. In both cases. Yes, in both cases.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what’s the difference? What’s the contradiction? What is the contradiction about? You’re right about that in principle; in a moment I’ll comment on it. First of all, look at Maimonides’ wording—what happens in halakha 14 in the Laws of Robbery and Lost Property? “If a ship was traveling at sea”—notice—“and a wave rose against it to sink it.” Why was it about to sink? There was a storm at sea. Why did he throw the cargo? Because he wanted to save the ship from the storm. I don’t know, maybe the cargo interferes with its being saved. Maybe it can sail faster without cargo and be saved, I don’t know, get out of the storm area. In any event, the cargo is not threatening to sink it. What is threatening to sink it is the storm. Throwing the cargo can help me save myself. Okay? Now look at the halakha in the Laws of Injury and Damage: “If a ship was thought likely to break from the weight of the cargo.” There is no wave in the sea. There was too much cargo on the ship, and that threatens to sink it. About that Maimonides says: here the cargo has the law of a pursuer. Why? Because what threatens to sink me is the cargo. After all, if a person threatens me with a gun, am I allowed to kill him? And I’m not liable for that, right? If cargo threatens to drown me, then the cargo is a pursuer. So if I’m allowed to kill a human pursuer, am I forbidden to throw a pursuing cargo into the sea? Of course I’m allowed. In the Laws of Robbery and Lost Property it is not talking about cargo as a pursuer. In the Laws of Robbery and Lost Property, what is pursuing me is the wave. The cargo is something I can throw overboard in order to save myself. What is the difference between the two situations? The first case is a case of the law of a pursuer. The second case is a case of saving oneself with another person’s money. And only the case in the Laws of Robbery and Lost Property is saving oneself with another person’s money. And there Maimonides indeed rules: you are permitted to throw it, but you must pay, like the view of most medieval authorities (Rishonim) against Rashi. That is saving oneself with another person’s money. Why? Because the factor—the difference is this: look for a moment at a case of a threat to life, not money. A person threatens me with a gun and says: look, either you shoot so-and-so or I kill you. Then the rule is “be killed rather than transgress,” right? Meaning, I have to die; I may not kill so-and-so. Why? Because who says your blood is redder? Meaning, my blood is no redder than so-and-so’s blood. What if Reuven is chasing Shimon to kill him? I am Levi standing on the side. Clearly I am commanded to kill Reuven in order to save Shimon. Why? Is his blood redder than Shimon’s blood? Reuven’s?

[Speaker D] Fine, that’s the Torah law. What? That in the law of a pursuer, you are allowed to kill the pursuer.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? Where did “who says your blood is redder?” disappear?

[Speaker D] He is coming to murder, he is coming to commit a transgression, he is coming to kill.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The simple reasoning is that if you are the one creating the equation—if you are the one establishing here an equation, either Shimon’s life or my life—then we’ll take your life. You created the equation. Don’t create the equation, and then you won’t force us to make decisions. But in the first case of saving oneself with another person’s life, after all that poor fellow whom they threaten me to kill—he didn’t create the equation. What do you want from him? I just want to kill him in order to save myself. What, is his blood less red than mine? It is only here that the reasoning of “who says your blood is redder?” applies—where the person is an uninvolved factor. He isn’t threatening me; rather, I can kill him in order to save myself. Right, then he is not called a pursuer. I am just killing him in order to save myself. I’m taking someone who has nothing to do with the matter—he is not a pursuer—and I may not kill him in order to save myself, because my blood is no redder than his. But if someone threatens me with a gun, of course I am allowed to kill him. Why? Because he is the one who created the equation. He is the one who created the situation in which it must be decided whether it is me or him. So what are you telling me—have you murdered and also inherited? You create the equation and then tell me: wait, wait, who said your blood is redder than mine? How dare you kill me? Let me kill you. Do you understand the absurdity of that claim? Now this is true also for someone else, not only if he threatens me personally. It’s the same thing. If you created the equation, then you are the one who has to pay in order to solve the tangle. Okay? The difference between those two situations is exactly this point: whether you are the factor creating the threat, or whether you are an uninvolved factor, except that harming you can save me. You understand that this is exactly the difference between the two halakhot in Maimonides. In the case of the Laws of Injury and Damage, Maimonides says: when that cargo threatens to drown me, that cargo has the law of a pursuer. It is the factor threatening me. And if that factor is threatening me, I would be allowed even to kill it if it were a person. So certainly I am allowed, as cargo, to throw it into the sea. After all, it is the factor threatening me. It has the law of a pursuer; I am allowed to kill it, eliminate it. In the second case, what threatens me is the wave. What do you want from the cargo? The cargo is an uninvolved factor. You want to throw it into the sea in order to save yourself? Then you are taking a factor—who says your blood is redder? Here, of course, it’s blood versus money. So therefore Maimonides’ view, unlike Rashi, is that your blood is redder than his money. Fine. But at least you have to pay, because your money is not redder than his money. And therefore this resolves the contradiction in Maimonides. It’s obvious that that is the case. And therefore there is no difficulty at all from what the Ra’avad asks against Maimonides. Maimonides himself brings the halakha of the Talmudic text that they divide it according to the load. It’s just that Maimonides claims this is only where you save yourself with another person’s property. But where the property itself is what creates the threat against you, there it is obvious that you are allowed to harm it. If someone’s bundles of barley were on fire and threatening to ignite me and burn me, would it be forbidden for me to cut them down so that they wouldn’t burn and set me on fire? Of course not. The bundles themselves are threatening me. This is not harming an uninvolved person’s property in order to save my life. This is harming the pursuer itself. And if the pursuer is inanimate, that doesn’t matter; if it is the factor creating the threat against me, then certainly it is permitted.

[Speaker D] Rabbi, but the ruling of Maimonides is difficult on its own terms. So you want to say that he saves himself by throwing the property overboard because that property has the status of a pursuer in relation to him. But it’s not that one person’s property that has the status of a pursuer—it’s everybody’s property. So why didn’t he throw his own property? I didn’t understand. After all, it’s not the property itself of so-and-so that is chasing me; it’s not Reuven’s property chasing Levi. It’s everyone’s property. It’s Reuven’s property and Levi’s property. And Levi himself is pursuing himself? By the same logic, he could also have thrown Reuven overboard. Reuven is also pursuing him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here there’s room to discuss. Because there are other things to discuss in this Jewish law as well, because first of all it could be that we’re talking about a case where there was property there belonging to only one person. Or cargo—the cargo that was about to sink us was only one person’s heavy cargo. But it could still be that all the other people had cargo just as valuable—gold coins that don’t weigh much but are worth a huge amount of money. So as far as the factor that is endangering me, it’s only so-and-so’s cargo. And maybe Maimonides is talking about that. Certainly, certainly.

[Speaker D] That’s not what Maimonides says.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not? Maimonides says that this property is pursuing him. Maimonides doesn’t mention it; only the Raavad mentions why we don’t divide according to weight. In Maimonides it doesn’t sound as though there’s an option here to divide by weight. Maybe in fact if there were an option to divide by weight, maybe he too would agree.

[Speaker D] Then throw according to weight—let him throw Reuven overboard.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How would he throw Reuven overboard? That’s a life, what do you mean?

[Speaker D] He’s a pursuer.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The property is threatening him, so throw Reuven overboard—Reuven is threatening him too. No. If the property is threatening to kill us, then we throw the property overboard. Obviously there’s a difference between property and life if you have to decide whether this is the law of a pursuer—not in the sense of saving oneself through another person’s property; there Rashi says no. But in a place where the property is pursuing me, that’s like what I said before, then obviously the pursuer has to pay the price in order to save me.

[Speaker D] So you want to reconcile Maimonides’ ruling only in a case where there was one piece of property that was the one pursuing us?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let’s say. No, I’m only saying it for the sake of the discussion, just to say that your difficulty isn’t a proof. Beyond that, this does require discussion. It could be that even where everyone’s property is pursuing us, still, after all, all that property has the status of a pursuer, right? So I throw one of them overboard—I threw property that has the status of a pursuer, so why should I have to pay? It’s not considerations of fairness. On the level of fairness, you’re right, but from the standpoint of the formal justification, after all this property has the status of a pursuer just like all the other property. I made a lottery and threw that one overboard—so what? Why do I have to pay? It has the status of a pursuer.

[Speaker D] Then why does Maimonides also praise him? He could be wicked.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, praise him? He’s not wicked, and Maimonides doesn’t praise him. Maimonides only says that this sailor acted properly in doing something permitted, because that property has the status of a pursuer. He did well…

[Speaker D] That sounds like praise to me.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, it’s not praise for righteousness. It means that he did something permitted. Look, I’ll give you an example—you’re reminding me—there’s Rabbi Akiva Eiger in his novellae to Ketubot. A passage appears there in the name of his son, Rabbi Shlomo Eiger. Rabbi Shlomo Eiger discusses a question there and tries to prove from a certain passage there—in my opinion it’s no proof at all—he tries to prove from the passage what happens when there is mutual pursuit. Two people go out to a duel and stand facing each other, draw pistols, okay? Each one is pursuing the other. Now I’m standing on the side: am I allowed to kill? Whom do I kill? Both of them? One of them? How do I choose which one? So Rabbi Akiva Eiger wants to claim—Rabbi Shlomo Eiger wants to claim—that in a situation of mutual pursuit there is no law of a pursuer. If each one is pursuing the other, there is no law of a pursuer. He tries to prove that from the Talmudic passage in Ketubot. In an article of mine on Siamese twins, I think I referred you to it, I bring this there. I don’t agree with his proof from the Talmud at all, but I also don’t agree with the logic itself. I argue that if there is mutual pursuit, then both of them have the status of a pursuer, and therefore I am allowed to kill one of them. You can of course ask, okay, how do you choose whom to kill? Simple: I make a lottery. But the question of how to choose whom to kill is a different question from whether it is justified to kill one of them. It is justified to kill one of them because he has the status of a pursuer, right? Both of them have the status of a pursuer, so you can ask why I chose this one and not the other, but the very act of killing him is justified because he has the status of a pursuer. So what I’ll do is make a lottery. Why did I say this? Because the article I wrote was an article about separating Siamese twins—twins who are attached. Let’s say they have a shared heart, and the doctors know that within nine months or something like that—the common case there in such a situation—both of them die. Now it’s possible to do a separation surgery and leave the heart with one of them; the second one of course remains without a heart and dies. Is it permitted to do such a separation surgery? All the halakhic decisors say no, it is forbidden; there is no permission to murder someone in order to save someone else. Now when I saw this, I was really outraged. There was, by the way, something in the news—I heard on the radio about a case at Tel HaShomer, a Haredi couple who had Siamese twins, and the halakhic decisors instructed them not to perform the separation surgery and to leave both of them to die. I heard it on the radio and exploded. I got into the topic a bit, studied the topic, and then I wrote the article in Tehumin, my first article in Tehumin, in volume 20. And there I argued that not only is it permitted, but they are obligated to perform the separation surgery. I had long arguments about this with Mordechai Halperin, the expert in ethics, the physician-rabbi who is an expert in ethics. He examined it with all the halakhic decisors; he would not agree to my arguments under any circumstances. And among other things I said to him: first of all, leaving both of them to die is not killing one in order to save the other; it is killing one who will die anyway in order to save the other, so that at least that one won’t die. So he asked me, and how will you choose? I said to him, I’ll make a lottery. But there’s a… what do you mean? The point is this: there’s a lottery here; people don’t make a lottery over lives. It appears in Sefer Hasidim that one does not make a lottery over lives. Fine, so I went to check. First of all, I’m not alarmed even if it appears in Sefer Hasidim, but let’s say it does. So I went to Sefer Hasidim and saw nothing of the sort. By the way, later I saw that Rabbi Ovadia had already noticed this. There are two contradictory passages in Sefer Hasidim, in completely different places. In one place—what? I can’t hear.

[Speaker F] I think that same case was already ruled on by Rabbi Moshe Feinstein.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In Philadelphia in ’76 there was a case—the Philadelphia Inquirer describes it—where Rabbi Moshe Feinstein really did discuss this matter, but it’s a somewhat different story. The question is whether there was symmetry between them there; that’s a different story. In any event, for our purposes, yes, Rabbi Moshe Feinstein argues that it is forbidden in principle. He too argues that it is forbidden. What I wanted to say is that when you look in Sefer Hasidim, you see the following claim. He brings these two cases of Maimonides about the ship of Jonah the prophet. He says it is forbidden to make a lottery in Jonah the prophet’s case. That’s what he says, and from there many halakhic decisors learn that one does not make a lottery over lives. And you look at that and say, what do you mean, why, what’s the idea, where does that come from? In any case, the fact that the people there made a lottery is of course no proof of anything—they were gentiles, and who knows whether they acted properly or not. There is another passage in Sefer Hasidim where it says the opposite, where it says that it is permitted to make a lottery over lives in such a situation. There is a contradiction. Now when you look at this, you’ll see that those two passages in Sefer Hasidim are talking about the two scenarios Maimonides discusses. In one place there is a wave threatening to sink the ship, and then you want to make a lottery, to throw someone into the sea in order to calm the wave. Sefer Hasidim says that is forbidden. In another place the claim is that there is a wave only around this ship, but all the ships around it are sailing peacefully and calmly. And now you want to make a lottery. There Sefer Hasidim says it is permitted. What is the difference? The difference is that in the first case there is no reason at all to assume that the lottery will solve the problem. Why resort to this mysticism, that if you throw someone into the sea then the storm will stop? A storm is part of the natural world; it can sink the ship, and throwing him into the sea will save you? So obviously it is forbidden to make a lottery and forbidden to throw him into the sea. But in a case where you see that the decree has gone out specifically against your ship, because in fact the storm is attacking only your ship and there are no storms anywhere around, then you can make the calculation: “Well, apparently there is someone here because of whom this decree was issued. Let’s make a lottery, and that lottery will reveal to us who he is; we’ll throw him into the sea and the fury will subside.” That, he says, is permitted. So what do we see in Sefer Hasidim? First of all, we see the distinction that we saw in Maimonides. But beyond that, what do we see in Sefer Hasidim? That the prohibition on making a lottery is not really that there is a prohibition on making a lottery; rather, there is a prohibition on making a lottery where it is not relevant, where there is no reason at all to assume that throwing someone into the sea will really save you. So why would you do it? It’s just murder. But in a place where it can save you, he says explicitly that it is permitted and one should make a lottery. Now I say: in the case of Siamese twins, yes, with Siamese twins I make the lottery, and it is obvious that one of them will be saved, so it is obvious that this lottery is effective for saving life. There is no doubt that it is permitted to make such a lottery. The same, by the way—I return to Rabbi Shlomo Eiger—in the case of mutual pursuit, there too it is the same thing. I make a lottery—why? Because if I leave both of them, it could be that both of them will shoot at once and both will die, simultaneously, within the flight-time of the bullet, okay? There is a possibility that both will die. If I shoot one of them, then one will be saved and one will die. How do I choose whom to shoot? I’ll make a lottery. It is permitted to make a lottery in such a situation, because a lottery in such a situation can save a life.

[Speaker D] There’s also a case where no one will die.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I can’t hear.

[Speaker D] There’s also a case where no one will die.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s true of every pursuer. In every case of a pursuer pursuing another in order to kill him, maybe he won’t succeed. Fine, we are assuming a situation where it is fairly clear that they will be harmed—that’s not the point. The only question is who shoots first. Fine, let’s picture it that way for the sake of our discussion. So the point is that first of all we see here this distinction that I mentioned in Maimonides; we really do see it also regarding lotteries over lives. And second, we really do see here this idea that there can be a situation where there is—I’m returning to David’s question, yes? David said: what happens if there are other passengers on the ship, and it’s not specifically one of them pursuing us—everyone is pursuing. Also regarding lotteries over lives. And second, we really do see here this idea that there can be a situation where there is—I’m returning to David’s question, yes? David said: what happens if there are other passengers on the ship, and it’s not specifically one of them pursuing us—everyone is pursuing us. You understand now that in light of what I said here, it definitely could be that I would make a lottery, choose one of them, and throw that one overboard. Of course one can say that fairness says let’s take a kilo from each one and throw it into the sea, because that is more equal, or ten percent from each one and throw it into the sea—it doesn’t matter right now. But in principle, a lottery is also a fair distribution, because each one gets an equal chance that his cargo will be thrown overboard. It’s not a distribution of the cargo thrown overboard; it’s a distribution of the chances. By the way, that is always the idea in a lottery. The idea in a lottery is to distribute risks. You create equality in the risks and not equality in the outcomes, but it’s the same thing, the same idea. Okay. Yes, fine, I agree with your suggestion, David; that’s also correct. Anyway, I’ll stop here. We could still go on for a long time. I’ll stop here—I just want to use the few minutes that remain to hear from you whether you have any comments, summaries, suggestions, criticism, I don’t know what. Anything you have to say about our learning this year, this semester, each one according to however long he was here.

[Speaker D] Well, I studied only this semester. Right now it’s very, very hard by Zoom. It was very, very interesting in the week when I came to the study hall. Granted, that was more in paired study than in the group, but yes, fine, God willing we’ll be done with Zoom soon. Overall the learning was very, very enjoyable.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What is hard about Zoom, really? Is it hard to stay focused over time?

[Speaker D] There isn’t the framework that keeps you going. In university courses there’s the exam at the end. Here on Zoom, considering that it’s a study hall setting, it’s very easy to say, well, let’s check what someone sent here; it takes much more self-discipline. And that’s what’s hard.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And in the classroom there is—

[Speaker D] For you, there’s just no option—you’re compelled by reality.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. Any other comments? Any other suggestions? I don’t know, whatever you have.

[Speaker F] I actually think the opposite—that remote learning was much more convenient, and in my opinion it didn’t hurt the learning,

[Speaker C] at least not in my learning.

[Speaker F] In this specific course I would have wanted a little more—I would have wanted it to be a bit more, but only a bit, according to the order of the tractate.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. At the beginning we worked in order; only at the end I did a sort of series on saving life or on saving one’s own life through another person’s property. But during the semester we worked in order, in both semesters.

[Speaker F] Yes, but the series at the end—I liked that series, I just wish it could have fit into the order of the…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it appears later in the chapter. If we had gone in order, we wouldn’t have gotten there. But fine, okay, I hear. Anyone else?

[Speaker E] Yes, I was also in the same course the previous semester. Yes, it was very interesting both last semester and this semester. I don’t have much to add overall; as far as I’m concerned the classes were given in an interesting and good way. And for me it also doesn’t really matter if we didn’t work in order all the time.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And Zoom—how was Zoom?

[Speaker E] Yes, it’s a little hard to learn through Zoom, but okay, I think we’re managing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay.

[Speaker F] So that it shouldn’t come out sounding bad—I liked the course.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, everything’s fine, no problem at all, no bad taste or anything… By the way, it’s also allowed not to like it—that’s fine too. There’s no bad taste. I really do want to hear comments; it’s not…

[Speaker B] I want to take the opportunity to say thank you. I learned a lot in this course, and I have a background in Talmud from many years in yeshivot and afterwards as well, and still I learned a great deal. That’s one thing. Regarding what was raised here about whether it should follow the order of the tractate or be thematic, I think that learning by topics is more suitable to the way one teaches, for example, in a specific course. But what I do think is that maybe it would have been worthwhile to emphasize in the syllabus that this is the mode of learning, and also… I think—I’m not completely sure because I’m somewhat advanced and I have a background—but I think it would be worthwhile to emphasize that this course is intended for advanced students with prior background. I don’t know whether that appears or doesn’t appear. I’m guessing—I don’t know—but I’m guessing that someone who comes with very little background will have a hard time keeping up with the amount of material.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It seems to me that we defined the course as thematic within the chapter HaKones, I think—I don’t remember anymore.

[Speaker B] No, if so, that’s excellent. But only regarding this point—that it should be very clearly emphasized in the syllabus that this is intended, in my opinion, for people who have a background in learning, in yeshiva-style learning, even—even a broad background, I would say. It’s hard for me to see how a person without experience could… maybe people like David, who have a wonderful ability to get to the depth of topics in a short time,

[Speaker D] But okay, I wanted to point out that I don’t have any prior background.

[Speaker B] Right, so that’s exactly what I’m saying—you’re probably not proof. But there are people who, I think, may well come to the course and be disappointed, because my guess is—I don’t know, one would really have to ask people who truly have no experience—I don’t see how I would have been able to digest this material if I hadn’t already known quite a lot of it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. Aryeh, are you still with us? What do you say? Do you have anything to comment? Okay. Well, in any event, my email still exists—or phone, whatever you want—any comment, suggestion, or anything you have to say, gladly. So although next year I’ll be on sabbatical, in Elul I’m still supposed to be around, but in any case, whether now in the summer or whenever you want, of course you’re welcome to get in touch. Okay, all the best, goodbye. Success on the exams, for whoever has them.

[Speaker C] Thank you very much, bye,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Goodbye.