Tractate Shabbat, Chapter 1 – Lesson 1
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
🔗 Link to the original lecture
🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI
Table of Contents
- Recordings, summaries, and communication channels
- Technology in Zoom: rooms, chat, and messages
- Making the learning accessible for beginners: Aramaic, abbreviations, and mutual help
- Remote learning, workload, and study guidelines
- Databases: access to the Responsa Project and Sefaria
- Opening the first chapter in tractate Shabbat: the axis of carrying and a two-stage introduction
- The prohibition of labor on the Sabbath: positive commandment and prohibition, Maimonides, and the roots
- What is the difference between a positive commandment and a prohibition: a positive state and a negative state
- The thirty-nine labors, the Tabernacle, and significance: primary categories and derivatives, and modern implications
- The criterion of significance: meaningfulness and uniqueness
- A map of the laws of the Sabbath: Torah-level, rabbinic, and scriptural tradition
- Punishments: stoning, sin-offering, and karet
- The structure of the laws of the Sabbath in Maimonides and the dominance of carrying
- The labor of carrying: domains, lifting up and setting down, and derivatives
- Carrying as an inferior labor: Or Zaru’a, Tosafot, Nachmanides, and the idea of exertion
- Conclusion and preparation for what comes next
Summary
General Overview
The lecture is being recorded, and the recordings and summaries will be uploaded to Moodle and also sent to the WhatsApp group and the mailing list by email. Participants raise technological difficulties in Zoom, such as moving between breakout rooms, receiving broadcast messages, and a chat that does not display other people’s messages, and the instructor commits to checking the settings, encouraging everyone to update Zoom, and preferring chat messages so everyone can see them. In the learning itself, problems come up involving Aramaic, abbreviations, identifying commentators, and locating things on the page, especially for beginning students and in a remote format. The instructor emphasizes that they do not have to finish the whole page, that it is fine to invest time in overcoming the obstacles, and that it is important to rely on study partners, the group, and aids like an Aramaic-Hebrew dictionary and a website for abbreviations. After that, he begins an introduction to the first chapter of tractate Shabbat, which is centered on the labor of carrying, with a systematic overview of the components of the laws of the Sabbath, the structure of the laws of the Sabbath in Maimonides, and a conceptual introduction to the labor of carrying, its domains and derivatives, including the idea of an inferior labor and differences in wording among the medieval authorities (Rishonim).
Recordings, Summaries, and Communication Channels
The lecturer says that the recordings are on Moodle, that anyone who wants can listen to them there, and that the summaries will also be sent out; he will upload them to Moodle and send them in the WhatsApp group and to the mailing list by email. He asks for feedback, both technological and study-related, and invites people to send it by email, WhatsApp, or phone.
Technology in Zoom: Rooms, Chat, and Messages
The participants describe difficulty moving from room to room and difficulty with the chat, where they can only see their own messages, and the lecturer checks where the chat is being sent and concludes that it depends on settings that he probably needs to configure. The participants say that the room-closing message did not appear for everyone, that the broadcast appears only for a few seconds at the top of the window and disappears quickly, and that sometimes only one side of the room saw it. The lecturer says he will check the issue and that he will send messages in the chat because that is more effective. He also mentions that it is worth updating Zoom, because that enables moving between rooms and other options.
Making the Learning Accessible for Beginners: Aramaic, Abbreviations, and Mutual Help
One participant says the Aramaic was hard and that it would help to have some translation here and there, and the lecturer says that is to be expected and that they can use an online dictionary, annotated editions of the Talmud / Talmudic text, and aids for Tosafot such as the book Mei Menuchot, but that with the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and later authorities (Acharonim) it is harder. He presents a policy of teaching at an advanced level on the assumption that beginners have difficulty with skill and Aramaic but not with analytical ability, and he stresses that in the first few weeks it is important that the more advanced students help the beginners, and that no one should be embarrassed to move into a more advanced room, ask about the meaning of a word or a phrase, or contact him. One participant recommends the “Aramaic-Hebrew Dictionary of the Daf Yomi Portal,” and the lecturer asks that it be recommended to everyone. Later it is mentioned that Yael sent a link to the dictionary in the chat, and another participant sends a website for abbreviations.
Remote Learning, Workload, and Study Guidelines
One participant describes how remote learning limits the ability to ask quickly, and that in practice she had to overcome many obstacles such as translating Aramaic, abbreviations, identifying “Maharsha,” and finding sources on the page, until she felt that either you finish without understanding or you do not manage even half of it. The lecturer says that at the beginning it is worth investing time in the technology even at the expense of covering less material, because it will save time later, and that they can also call or send him a WhatsApp message. He says they do not have to finish the page, and that in the lecture they will go through the sources in order, and whatever was not covered will be heard in class; he also encourages review afterward. He says that when he wrote “skim,” he only meant to get a general picture and not to chase quantity, and he stresses that beginners will need to “grit their teeth” and that it gets better over time.
Databases: Access to the Responsa Project and Sefaria
The lecturer asks about the use of databases, and one participant says she uses the databases of the responsa portal. The participants explain how to access the Responsa Project through the university library with a password, and the lecturer suggests that anyone who does not know how should ask Yael or the librarian Sisi German, and he even suggests bringing her in to explain, because later on he wants them to use databases. One participant asks whether auditors also have access, and the lecturer says that the Responsa Project will usually be enough and that Otzar HaChochma is less common; if something is not in the Responsa Project, he assumes he will photograph it from Otzar HaChochma. He also mentions Sefaria as accessible to everyone.
Opening the First Chapter in Shabbat: The Axis of Carrying and a Two-Stage Introduction
The lecturer says they are beginning the first chapter of Shabbat, and that the axis of the chapter is the labor of carrying and its derivatives, even though side questions are woven into it, such as two people performing an act together and sticking bread to the oven. He presents a two-part introduction: first a general view of the laws of the Sabbath overall, and then a focus on the labor of carrying as one of the thirty-nine primary categories of labor, and only after that entering into the chapter itself.
The Prohibition of Labor on the Sabbath: Positive Commandment and Prohibition, Maimonides, and the Roots
The lecturer states that the prohibition of labor is the most severe element in the laws of the Sabbath, carrying the punishment of stoning for intentional violation with warning, karet for intentional violation without warning, and a sin-offering for unwitting violation. He says that the prohibition of labor appears in the Torah both as a prohibition and as a positive commandment of resting, and stresses that despite the overlap in content, Maimonides counts them as two separate commandments. He cites Maimonides’ discussion in the roots of Sefer HaMitzvot, including Root 9 regarding repetition within the same kind of commandment, and Root 6 regarding a commandment that contains both a positive commandment and a prohibition, where the positive commandment is counted among the positive commandments and the prohibition among the prohibitions, and presents this as two distinct novelties.
What Is the Difference Between a Positive Commandment and a Prohibition: A Positive State and a Negative State
The lecturer rejects the simple definition that a positive commandment always means doing something and a prohibition always means refraining, and brings examples in which a positive commandment requires inaction, such as resting on the Sabbath, and a prohibition requires action, such as “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood.” He offers a conceptual explanation that distinguishes between a positive state and a negative state, not between action and inaction, and uses Robert Nozick’s analogy of temptation versus extortion to show the importance of a baseline and of rights, not just the gap between options. He explains that prohibitions point to a negative state that must be avoided, while positive commandments point to a positive state, and therefore on the Sabbath the combination of positive commandment and prohibition with the same content creates a situation in which doing labor is a negative state and refraining from labor is a positive state. He explains that a person under duress is not considered to have fulfilled a positive commandment even though he is exempt from transgression, and illustrates this with reciting the Shema.
The Thirty-Nine Labors, the Tabernacle, and Significance: Primary Categories and Derivatives, and Modern Implications
The lecturer says that the thirty-nine primary categories of labor teach that there are derivatives, and that there is no basic difference in liability between a primary category and a derivative, because both are Torah-level. He explains that the Sabbath labors are learned from the juxtaposition to the Tabernacle, from which we derive the labors that were performed in the Tabernacle and the rule of melechet machshevet, purposeful labor, but adds that the criterion of the Tabernacle is not exclusive, because things were also done in the Tabernacle that are not prohibited, such as walking. He says there is also a criterion of significance, and notes that the Mishnah in Chagigah describes the laws of the Sabbath as “mountains hanging by a hair,” because the Torah itself does not give an explicit list of the labors apart from carrying and kindling. He presents different views among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) about the relationship between significance and the Tabernacle, and emphasizes a view in Maharam according to which significance can suffice even without the Tabernacle. He connects this to contemporary discussions about electricity, closing an electrical circuit, and a Sabbath clock, including a mention of Igrot Moshe and the possibility of prohibition based on what the Sages would have done had they lived today. He notes that the number thirty-nine is linked to the “thirty-nine occurrences” of the word “labor” in the Torah, and that there is some flexibility in classifying labors such as winnowing, selecting, and sifting, which were counted separately because they were done in the Tabernacle.
The Criterion of Significance: Meaningfulness and Uniqueness
The lecturer distinguishes between two considerations: how much the act creates a meaningful change in the world, and how unique it is relative to other labors so as to justify a separate primary category. He says that uniqueness pertains to classification between a primary category and a derivative, or another primary category, whereas meaningfulness determines whether something is a Torah-level prohibition at all or only rabbinic.
A Map of the Laws of the Sabbath: Torah-Level, Rabbinic, and Scriptural Tradition
The lecturer lists several components in the laws of the Sabbath: the Torah-level labor prohibitions of the thirty-nine primary categories and their derivatives; Torah-level prohibitions that are not labor prohibitions, such as making one’s animal work and the requirement that one’s animal rest, which do not carry stoning or a sin-offering; and rabbinic prohibitions of shevut. He adds obligations and prohibitions from scriptural tradition, such as honoring the Sabbath, delighting in the Sabbath, and speaking weekday speech, which are learned from Isaiah, and clarifies that “scriptural tradition” means the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh). He divides the rabbinic prohibitions of shevut into two types: fences intended to prevent arriving at a Torah prohibition, such as the prohibition on riding an animal lest one pull off a branch and violate reaping; and expansions of the definition of labor, such as the rabbinic prohibition of selecting food from waste because of its resemblance to selecting waste from food, with two possible ways to understand it—either as a substantive expansion or as a decree because of the fear of confusion.
Punishments: Stoning, Sin-Offering, and Karet
The lecturer explains that karet applies in the case of intentional violation without warning, and notes that the attempt to renew ordination in Safed in the sixteenth century was intended to exempt people from karet by means of the rule that those liable to karet who received lashes were freed from their karet, in the context of the conversos.
The Structure of the Laws of the Sabbath in Maimonides and the Dominance of Carrying
The lecturer describes how Maimonides begins with the general rules of labor, such as doing something in an unusual manner, two people performing an act together, unintentional action, mistaken engagement, and labor not needed for its own sake; then he deals with the onset of the Sabbath and labors that begin before the Sabbath. He says that from chapter 7 Maimonides enters into the thirty-nine labors and their derivatives, and that from the middle of chapter 12 until chapter 20 the main focus is the labor of carrying, in especially great scope, after which Maimonides moves on to rabbinic prohibitions and the other issues of the Sabbath.
The Labor of Carrying: Domains, Lifting Up and Setting Down, and Derivatives
The lecturer defines carrying out as moving an object from a private domain to a public domain, and bringing in as moving it from a public domain to a private domain, and notes that for this definition four domains are needed: private domain, public domain, exempt place, and karmelit. He says that an exempt place allows one to bypass the prohibition by transferring from a private domain to an exempt place and from there to a public domain, and that a karmelit is a rabbinic domain with no Torah-level status. He says that a central issue is the definition of the act of carrying itself through lifting up, moving, and setting down, and links this to the first Mishnah they will study. He lists derivatives of carrying such as moving something four cubits in a public domain, throwing it four cubits, and extending it from one private domain to another when a public domain lies between them, and clarifies that here a derivative is Torah-level and not merely a rabbinic prohibition.
Carrying as an Inferior Labor: Or Zaru’a, Tosafot, Nachmanides, and the Idea of Exertion
The lecturer says that the medieval authorities (Rishonim) call carrying an inferior labor, and suggests that the reason the Torah wrote it explicitly is that otherwise it would not have been obvious that it is prohibited. He presents the wording of Or Zaru’a, according to which “initially it was an object and now it is still an object,” since the object itself did not change, only its location, and therefore there is no improvement in the object. He presents the difficulty raised by Tosafot and Nachmanides, who emphasize the lack of intuitive clarity in the definition: why is transferring from a private domain to a public domain prohibited, while transferring from one private domain to another private domain is permitted? Nachmanides even emphasizes that carrying a heavy load within a private domain is permitted, while carrying a light load into a public domain is prohibited. The lecturer suggests that Nachmanides incorporates a consideration of exertion, and describes the possibility that the focus is on the person and intellectual energy, as opposed to a focus on the object and production, and he indicates that he will continue next lecture and propose an additional explanatory direction.
Conclusion and Preparation for What Comes Next
The lecturer asks how far they got in the preparation sheet, and hears that some finished but did not understand everything or did not go deeply into all the sources. He announces that next time he will send a page that enters the actual passage itself, that he will continue a bit more with the introduction to carrying and then move to the Mishnah, and he concludes by wishing everyone a peaceful Sabbath.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll record this. The recordings are on Moodle, I told you, anyone who wants can listen to them there, and I also send summaries, so I’ll upload that to Moodle too and also send it in the… to the mailing list by email. Okay? Good, so first of all just give me a few minutes—this is the first time to summarize, to see what first conclusions we can draw. First of all regarding the technology, let’s leave the learning itself and the page aside for the moment. Were there any problems? Any lessons? Did anyone try to move from room to room or send a chat and couldn’t? Was there anything like that? Me!
[Speaker B] Right, I tried to move from room to room. I don’t think I succeeded. Also in my chats, when I write, I also didn’t…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I saw all of them—it’s like only me, I, I don’t…
[Speaker B] We can’t hear you, Yiska. You can’t hear me? Now you can hear. In my chats, when I write, I also didn’t see everyone, it was like only me, I don’t… my room and my chat aren’t connected, I write a chat and it only gets… I only see myself, what I wrote, I don’t see everyone.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What did you mark? Where is the chat being sent? When you choose the chat, is it to everyone, is it to someone specific, is it to the host?
[Speaker D] Look, there isn’t an option.
[Speaker C] By the way, Rabbi, there weren’t options there, I checked. You could only send to everyone, to all.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Oh really? Okay, I’ll try to check how to do that.
[Speaker C] It probably depends on the settings.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, I’ll try to check how to define that, how to do it, so apparently that’s something I need to set somehow. In terms of transitions and so on, were there any problems? Did you make transitions at all? I mean, was there any interaction between study partners?
[Speaker B] No, not really, I was afraid that I…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Did anyone try and fail, or you just didn’t need to, didn’t want to?
[Speaker E] There was no need.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. So regarding the technology, in short, as I told you at the opening meeting too, I expect comments from you. It’s not that I’m such a—well, I’m a known technophobe—but at least I can try and check how to do things if they need doing. So I’m waiting to hear from you if there are suggestions, comments, requests, or all kinds of things like that, both in the technological context and of course in the learning context too. So even if nothing comes to mind right now, you can send me an email, WhatsApp, or call, or whatever—I’d be very happy to hear feedback. And in any case, as I told you in the email a few days ago, anyone who hasn’t done it should update Zoom. It’s not complicated to do; in the email I sent I described how to do it, because that enables, for example, moving between rooms and so on, which doesn’t work in older versions but does work here. These versions keep enabling more options, so it’s worth updating from time to time. That’s regarding the technology. Regarding the messages I sent—did you get them?
[Speaker F] Messages that you sent to the rooms?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For example, the message that in another seven minutes I would close the rooms.
[Speaker G] No, we didn’t get it.
[Speaker F] No, and the closing—there was… some kind of bubble with a message at the top of the window, but I didn’t see it, so…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And that also disappears, it’s also a matter of timing,
[Speaker F] It disappears quickly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] When I open these breakout rooms… wait… when I open these breakout rooms, it lets me send a message to all the rooms. Wait… yes, here it is, broadcast message to all.
[Speaker D] And chat—did we see the Rabbi’s messages in the chat?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Also what I said, that in seven more minutes the rooms are closing?
[Speaker G] No, we didn’t see that.
[Speaker D] We saw it. I saw it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because there’s an option to send in chat to everyone, and apparently you got that, but here there’s some broadcast message to all rooms—I don’t exactly know why you didn’t see it. Fine, I’ll check it.
[Speaker H] It just goes by very fast at the top. It arrives, but it passes very quickly and it’s not like chat.
[Speaker C] Oh, so what does it mean, it goes by at the top? What do you mean? Some kind of message and not chat, right.
[Speaker H] A kind of message that appears in the title area for a few seconds and flashes, yes.
[Speaker B] It disappears very quickly, and also with the last message only one side in the room saw it. Like, it apparently reached the room, one person from each room saw it—I didn’t see it and the other person did.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In any case, then I’ll send messages in the chat; apparently that’s more effective for everyone. And of course I need to check how to make the chats work in a way that you can also send them—to whomever you want. I’ll check that too. Fine, that’s regarding technology. Regarding the learning itself, again, before we get into things—were there any problems? Did you manage more or less with the page? Not manage? Say it without embarrassment, because for those who are just starting, I assume there could have been difficulties—at least for the beginners. So.
[Speaker F] We managed more or less, but I think that—I said this with Sophie—I think the Aramaic was a bit… it wouldn’t have hurt to have some translation here and there. It was too much, it was hard for me.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, that’s pretty predictable. Did we use a dictionary? I’m not so sure how to deal with that. Yes, regarding translating Aramaic into Hebrew, you can find a dictionary online, but I don’t know how practical that is. Is there Google Translate for Aramaic? I don’t know, maybe it’ll do the whole passage for you. Honestly that’s a good question, I don’t know—maybe there is.
[Speaker I] Wait, there is something like that.
[Speaker B] There is something like that.
[Speaker I] You go to a dictionary.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In any case, here it really will be hard. Look, the point is this: today’s learning isn’t representative. First of all, you should know, it isn’t representative because we were talking about things from above, it’s not all in the same passage. When we’re dealing with one specific topic / passage and I give sources dealing with that same issue, then it’s also easier to understand them one after the other, because they relate to each other and deal with the same subject. Today was something less representative. But there still will be a certain problem like this, and therefore at least for the first few weeks it’s very important to me to have the more advanced person help the more beginner one. Okay? I hope that after a few weeks things will improve, although yes, I really do need to think a bit—certainly after you separate, if you separate—about how to make more difficult texts accessible to beginners, because I’ll tell you: my basic policy is that the class is taught at an advanced level. Meaning, even for beginners, my assumption is that beginners have a problem with Aramaic and basic concepts, but not with thinking. That is, to understand what’s going on here, my assumption is that understanding what I say should not be a problem even for a beginner. I assume your analytical ability is good regardless of your skill level in learning Talmud / Talmudic text. Therefore I hope the lecture will also be understandable—I hope it will be understandable to everyone. Skill has an advantage, but it should be understandable to everyone and it will be at a good level. The connection between the lecture and the sources is really the more problematic part for beginners, because it will be harder for beginners to decipher the sources. So in that matter, for the first few weeks, rely on the more advanced study partner. And later as well, as I said earlier, I’ll try to be accessible. If there’s a problem, don’t hesitate to turn to me—it’s a shame to get stuck. After all, it’s worth getting stuck when you’re thinking about something, but not to get stuck just because you don’t understand Aramaic—that’s a waste of time, pure wasted time. So either you look for some online dictionary, or if it’s Talmud / Talmudic text then there’s no problem because there are annotated editions, there are texts, there are annotated editions you can use. But with the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and later authorities (Acharonim) it’s harder. As Idit mentioned regarding Tosafot, there is a book called Mei Menuchot that helps explain Tosafot; it simply helps beginners read Tosafot. So for Tosafot it can help. The other medieval authorities (Rishonim) and later authorities (Acharonim) really are a bit harder, and here I’m saying we’ll have to move ahead gradually. That’s the limitation of a framework that mixes beginners with advanced students, because the division this year, as I said, is different. So we’ll somehow have to deal with it, and again I’m waiting for feedback all the time. And get help without being embarrassed also from other study pairs—move to another room of more advanced students who can help you, ask a short question, what does this mean, what exactly is the point here, even just a word meaning if you can’t figure it out, or ask me. Okay?
[Speaker I] Can I just say something? Yes, yes. I’m saying that I use the Aramaic-Hebrew dictionary of the Daf Yomi Portal, and it’s simply a wonderful site.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, then it’s worth recommending it—I don’t know it—it’s worth recommending it to everyone.
[Speaker I] Wonderful, so I’m saying it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How do you get to it?
[Speaker I] Just type it in. I wrote it online and now it’s saved in my email, and every time I open it. It’s called the Aramaic-Hebrew Dictionary of the Daf Yomi Portal.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, then very good. But of course that’s a dictionary as a dictionary—it doesn’t explain the Talmud / Talmudic text being discussed.
[Speaker I] No, no, as a dictionary.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I type the word or—
[Speaker I] I copy it, and then it gives me variants or the possible meanings; it also gives an option for text.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, so in short, there are—I assume there are other dictionaries online too. Try to use them, use me, use parallel study partners. Beginners won’t really have a choice—for the first few weeks, use your study partner, but after that too don’t be embarrassed to get help. There’s nothing to do; these are the limitations of the format. We’re a group mixed in different skill levels, and we’ll somehow have to cope with it. Okay, good, let’s begin.
[Speaker J] Can I also say something for a moment? I feel that because the learning is remote, this whole issue of technology and getting help really limits me a lot, because I can’t just go over to someone for a second and ask. And right now I can tell you that in the learning, in order to reach a place of understanding, I had to overcome a great many obstacles. It takes time both to translate the Aramaic and all the abbreviations, and everyone being cited—I don’t always know who it is. For example, I couldn’t figure out that this was the Maharsha, and where they are located on the Talmud page. I had a lot of obstacles that take a lot of time, and with the technology I didn’t even turn to another room to ask, because that too would have taken time—can I get someone, does it work, does it not work, get back to the room. It’s not like I’m sitting next to someone. And so what I wanted to say is, at least in my experience right now, I felt it was too much. Instead of getting to the point of answering the questions and really understanding, at first I understood and it was fine, and then at a certain point I felt that either I finish the page without understanding, or I just won’t manage half of it. I felt it was too much for me.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, I’ll say a few things. First, since we’re at the beginning of the road, don’t be deterred from investing time in the technology, even at the expense of how much material you cover, because in the end it will bear fruit—when you’re more skilled with the technology, it will save you a lot of time in the future. It’s worth investing a bit of time in it now, asking, checking, and mastering at least that aspect. That’s the first point.
[Speaker J] But the technology takes time even when I’ll be skilled at it, because people aren’t next to me, so this Zoom itself is made of things that take time. So that’s another obstacle. And everything—I mean, it’s more—the page was too long.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so wait, I’ll get there, I’ll get there in a moment.
[Speaker J] In terms of the amount of time.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll get there in a moment, I just want to complete this. There’s nothing to do—you move to another room in Zoom or send a chat or something like that and wait the few seconds it takes, there’s nothing to do. You need to invest the time without despairing and not be afraid that a bit of time is being lost. The technology, at least for now, is apparently going to accompany us for some time. We’ll have to work with it. That’s the first point. Second point: you can also call or send me a WhatsApp message. In that case I’ll try to be accessible—I’m not promising I always will be—but I’ll try. You can definitely try that if it’s faster and more efficient, gladly. Third thing, and those who know from previous years already know this: you do not have to finish the page. Meaning, from my perspective I won’t assume you finished the page. It helps if you did; I don’t assume it. When I begin the lecture, you’ll see that in the lecture we’ll see the sources, we’ll think, we’ll go through things in the order they’re written on the page. What you didn’t get to, you’ll hear in the lecture. And afterward, as I told you, if you invest some time in the regular order in reviewing what was in the lecture, even better. I’m very much in favor of review. And then you’ll also be able to see it on the page itself in light of what we learned in the lecture. So don’t panic if you don’t finish. That’s why, for example, now I wrote many times to “skim”—it wasn’t so that you’d finish the page, but really because I didn’t need the sources in detail; all I needed was a general picture. But going forward, if I don’t write “skim,” don’t work in a way that aims at finishing the page. Invest the time you need in each source you work on. However far you get, you get, okay? As a policy. So it’s fine—don’t panic if you don’t finish the page. On the contrary, if it takes someone more time, excellent, she should invest that time, because only that way will it improve, and later it will also go faster. Okay? Don’t be deterred. And one final remark: beginners will need to grit their teeth a little. There’s nothing to do; these are the limitations of the format. From my experience in previous years, it improves with time—don’t panic. The principle is not to despair at the beginning; the beginning is harder. Don’t despair, it will improve. Always let me know if I can shed light on something or make something easier or do something that can help—of course I’d be happy to hear any comment and any request or feedback. But in general I’m saying, beyond those things, don’t panic; things will improve with time. Okay? So you don’t have to finish the page, that’s what I said before. Fine. Here, Yael sent the link to the dictionary in the chat, so whoever wants can take it from the chat. Okay, so let’s begin.
[Speaker I] Wait, I’m also sending a site for abbreviations. You can type any abbreviation and really find different variants and figure out what fits us, what’s correct in context.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, okay, and again I’m saying: there’s a problem, send a question in the chat, move over—if it’s just abbreviations, send it in the chat. Who knows what these abbreviations are? And try to pay attention, to help. We have to rely on each other a little, otherwise some of us are in trouble—those who are beginners, at least some of them.
[Speaker K] Especially since not every abbreviation there appears in the dictionary.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, okay, fine. So let’s still try to work together, at least in the first few weeks, to notice what’s around us, whether someone needs help, and to respond or help. Okay, good, come on. All these beginnings are really just to get the process moving. Next times we’ll deal with the learning itself, we won’t be occupied with all the surrounding technology and technique, but at the beginning I still want us to enter into this more smoothly. Okay, we’re beginning the first chapter of Shabbat. In terms of the Sabbath labors, this chapter deals mainly with the labor of carrying and its derivatives. We’ll talk more about it. Interwoven into it are all kinds of side questions—two people who performed it together, sticking bread to the oven, and various other things that bring us to broader topics. But the thread that runs through most of the chapter is really the labor of carrying. Therefore, before we enter the chapter itself and the topic / passage itself, I want to give some introduction that will place us in a general context. This introduction is made of two parts. The first part will give us some overall look at the laws of the Sabbath in general. After that we’ll enter, from among the labors, into the labor of carrying, which is one of the thirty-nine primary categories of labor, and I’ll talk a bit about carrying in general—what it means—and then we’ll be able to start entering the chapter, and that won’t be today. Okay? So that’s basically what I plan to do today—to give some general introduction in order to bring us into the conceptual and principled framework. Good. The laws of the Sabbath are made up of several components. There are the prohibitions of labor; that is really, you could say, the main law of the Sabbath and also the most severe one—it is the prohibition of labor. And it appears in the Torah quite a few times. The labor prohibition is the most severe prohibition, and one who violates it intentionally is liable to stoning—intentionally with warning and when all the conditions are met. One who violates it intentionally without warning is liable to karet, and one who violates it unwittingly is liable to a sin-offering. That is the highest scale of punishment in Jewish law. Meaning, the Sabbath prohibition is one of the most severe prohibitions there are. That is the prohibition of labor. Now, the prohibition of labor on the Sabbath appears in two forms in the Torah. One form is a prohibition, a negative commandment, and the second form is a positive commandment. There is a positive commandment to rest on the Sabbath, and there is a negative commandment not to do labor on the Sabbath. Seemingly these are just two forms that phrase the same content differently. What difference does it make whether you tell me to rest—which means not to do labor—or that you forbid me to do labor? What’s the difference between telling me “eat X” and saying “I don’t want you not to eat X”? The double negation cancels out. What difference does it make? But the fact is that when we have a prohibition and a positive commandment with overlapping content, we still treat them as two different commandments. Maimonides, in the introduction to his Sefer HaMitzvot, has fourteen roots. “Roots” means principles in which he explains how he decided what is included in the 613 commandments and what is not included in the 613 commandments. In the ninth root of his roots, Maimonides writes that if the Torah writes the same commandment several times, in the count of the commandments it appears once. One of the examples he brings is that the Torah commands us to rest on the Sabbath twelve times. How many positive commandments of resting on the Sabbath appear in the count of the commandments? One. Why? Because the fact that the Torah repeats it twelve times is in order to strengthen the matter or add aspects—there is a dispute between Maimonides and Nachmanides there—but for our purposes, in terms of counting the commandments, this is one commandment that the Torah repeats several times for various reasons. But that’s in the case of repetition among positive commandments or repetition among prohibitions. In the sixth root—that was the ninth root—in the sixth root Maimonides discusses what happens when there is overlap between a positive commandment and a prohibition. I didn’t send you there so as not to… When there is overlap between a positive commandment and a prohibition, says Maimonides, both commandments are counted: the positive commandment among the positive commandments, and the prohibition among the prohibitions. Maybe I’ll show you that Maimonides. I’m sharing the Responsa Project with you here. Wait, not here—it’s in Sefer HaMitzvot, Maimonides’ Sefer HaMitzvot. Another question I didn’t ask you: what’s happening in terms of databases. So maybe you used some database? Did anyone try and fail?
[Speaker I] No, I—again—I use the databases of the responsa portal, and it’s very accessible and very convenient.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, Otzar HaChochma or the Responsa Project? Fine, you didn’t need Otzar HaChochma today, but do you know how to access those databases through the university? It allows everyone access.
[Speaker I] You go into the library, and from there ask by alphabetical order, go into “P” for the Responsa Project, and then it opens. Okay, of course you need a password.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Does everyone know how to do that? Anyone who doesn’t know how to do that, then I suggest now either ask Yael, or if someone wants a real explanation, there’s the librarian, Sisi German, available to anyone who wants. We can also bring her here, by the way, to give some explanation. I can ask her to come here and explain, because going forward I do want you to make use of databases. This time it was only Maimonides, but in principle I do want us to use databases, if only in order to practice these things and become skilled in using them.
[Speaker L] I wanted to ask whether auditors also have the possibility of access? It’s true that I have my own databases, I have a Torah CD, it’s not the Responsa Project.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For someone who has the Responsa Project, that will usually be enough. Otzar HaChochma is rare.
[Speaker L] There’s the Torah CD; sometimes there may be something in the Responsa Project that I don’t have, but that’s rare.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If there’s something that won’t be in the Responsa Project, then I assume that in any case I’ll photograph it from Otzar HaChochma. We’ll see. In principle the Responsa Project should be enough.
[Speaker M] I sent a link there—there’s also Sefaria, which is very convenient, like, it’s accessible to everyone regardless.
[Speaker L] Sefaria—there are a lot of things there.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If there are links here in the chats, take them now so you won’t forget.
[Speaker M] Fine. I also sent the university databases, from where you can enter the Responsa Project.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Great, excellent, thank you. Okay, so let’s move to Maimonides’ sixth root. Can you see? Maimonides’ Sefer HaMitzvot, sixth root. This is inside Maimonides’ Sefer HaMitzvot from the Responsa Project. The sixth root: a commandment that contains both a positive commandment and a prohibition—it is fitting to count the positive element among the positive commandments and the prohibitive element among the prohibitions. And then he says, for example, one of the examples is the Sabbath, because on the Sabbath there is a positive commandment to rest and a prohibition against doing labor. Okay? And Maimonides claims that in such a case, we do not apply the principle of the ninth root; rather, if the overlap is between a positive commandment and a prohibition, then for us these are two different commandments. First novelty. Second novelty: that the positive commandment is counted among the positive commandments and the prohibition among the prohibitions. Now, not for nothing do I say these are two different novelties. It’s not the same novelty. Why? Because one could have said that a positive commandment—let’s take the Sabbath for example—I have a positive commandment to rest on the Sabbath and I have a prohibition, yes, “do not do any labor,” a prohibition on doing labor on the Sabbath. One could have said that because the Torah phrases it both as a positive commandment and as a prohibition, in positive and negative language, so we count this as two commandments. But when I ask myself what the nature of these two commandments is, then there would definitely be room to say that in the end both of these commandments seem to be prohibitions. Because what does the commandment to rest actually tell me? Not to do labor. So it turns out that even if I count two commandments here, it is not trivial that the positive commandment should be counted among the positive commandments and the prohibition among the prohibitions. One could have said: true, there are two commandments here, but both are really prohibitions—they both tell me not to do labor; only once it was said in positive language and once in negative language. Maimonides says not so. Maimonides says: first, these are two commandments—that’s the first novelty, here, look, that’s the first line I just read. First, these are two commandments. Second, the positive commandment is counted among the positive commandments and the prohibition among the prohibitions. What is the idea behind this?
[Speaker G] Maybe the positive commandment is also broader than the prohibition?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, if there is here… no, no. If it is broader, then it is not the subject of the root principle. The subject of the root principle is when there is duplication. If there is no overlap in content between the two commandments, then there is no discussion; then it is obvious that these are two different commandments. We are talking about a case where there is overlap. And therefore, from our standpoint, that does not enter the discussion. There is overlap, and Maimonides says that despite the overlap in content, since one commandment is a positive commandment and the second commandment is a prohibition, they are counted as two commandments. The question is why. What is the idea? So first of all, a first insight. If I were to ask you, all of you, what is the difference between a positive commandment and a prohibition, then the simple answer I assume I would get is that a positive commandment expects some action from me, to do some act, to put on tefillin, I don’t know, to redeem a firstborn donkey, whatever, to do all kinds of actions, to recite Grace after Meals, to perform some kind of actions. And a prohibition expects inaction from me, non-performance, refraining from action. Okay? And then according to that definition, a positive commandment is a commandment that imposes on me an obligation to act, and a prohibition is a commandment that imposes on me an obligation to refrain or not to act. Okay? In legal language this is called an act or an omission. Yes, the question is whether the commandment concerns an act or whether it concerns an omission. But that cannot be right. Look, for example, at these two commandments regarding the Sabbath. The positive commandment to rest on the Sabbath. In terms of its content, what does it impose on me? The content is omission. Not action, right? In order to fulfill this commandment I am supposed not to do labor. Which means that this commandment is really imposing on me an obligation to refrain, not an obligation to act. So why is it a positive commandment? An obligation to refrain is the definition of a prohibition. Why is this thing a positive commandment? Or alternatively, what defines it as a positive commandment, in what sense is it a positive commandment? The same is true, by the way, with prohibitions, not in the case of the Sabbath. For example, there is the prohibition of “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood.” “Do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood” means, say I see my friend—or not my friend, but somebody—drowning in the river, then I need to save him as much as I can. Okay? Here this is a prohibition: “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood.” Someone who refrains and does not save him violates a prohibition. In what sense is this a prohibition? What is the practical content of this commandment? This commandment requires action from me, not omission. Right? It requires me to do something, to save my friend. So that means that apparently this is a positive commandment in terms of content. But the wording is “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood,” meaning it is a prohibition, a negative commandment. That is how all those who count the commandments count it—as a prohibition. So we learn from this that there are positive commandments that expect action from me and positive commandments that expect omission from me. There are prohibitions that expect omission from me—that is the usual case—but there are also prohibitions that expect action from me. And that of course sharpens the question: so what nevertheless is the difference between a positive commandment and a prohibition, if that is not the difference?
[Speaker E] But how do we know he is not—can you hear me? Yes, yes. Hello. How do we know he doesn’t mean the commandments of sanctifying the Sabbath? There are all kinds of commandments, like there are positive commandments on the Sabbath.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Is that Iris speaking?
[Speaker E] Yes, this is Iris.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe put your name there or something. Isn’t there a camera? The camera isn’t working?
[Speaker E] I’m in front of the camera, I don’t know why it suddenly isn’t picking me up.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, I’m asking, if there is no special limitation, please turn on your cameras so I can see who I’m talking to. Again, if there’s some problem, fine, but in principle we’re supposed to have cameras on.
[Speaker E] It is on, I don’t know, something with the connection suddenly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, no, but I see others here without cameras too. So whoever can, I’ll say again, please turn them on, just so we have some eye contact. Anyway, the Sages learned that this is talking about refraining from labor, resting from labor. Not about lighting candles and not about kiddush or things like that; we’ll get to that later.
[Speaker E] No, so then how and in what sense would this be called—what? All the commandments connected to the Sabbath that are commandments of action, positive commandments. They’re not connected to resting itself?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no, those are other commandments, not connected to resting. Lighting candles is not resting, making kiddush is not resting. Got it.
[Speaker G] So maybe the demand—the demand itself is positive; whether or not it requires an act, the demand itself is positive. “You shall rest” is phrased positively.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The demand is positive, but the content requires an omission from me.
[Speaker G] Right, but maybe the definition goes by how the demand is formulated.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But then how do you explain the demand?
[Speaker G] What is the explanation of the demand?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The demand requires me to refrain.
[Speaker G] It’s just phrased in positive language. To refrain from action so that there will be rest.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there is no action at all. I need not do labor, that’s all. No action is required of me. Say, now we can see Iris—how is that in resting?
[Speaker G] Huh? Say, resting of utensils. That really is just not doing labor. Right? It is connected to resting.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. So now I’m asking, why is that a positive commandment?
[Speaker G] Because she is fulfilling the rest, which is something.
[Speaker N] Maybe I’ll give you—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe I’ll give you—yes? Yes.
[Speaker N] It’s a matter of some sort of distilled content, that it’s not just not doing labor and sitting there doing nothing, but that there is a substantive positive element in resting—if we take it in other directions—like meditating. It’s not just sitting and doing nothing, but deliberately breathing, deliberately opening the mind. So here too, in resting, it is deliberately disconnecting.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does that mean practically? Say I’m supposed not to cook. What am I supposed to do? To do something practically active?
[Speaker N] No, that’s exactly it, because resting is not not cooking specifically, but disconnecting from weekday activity as a whole, as an essence, as an act.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Practically, does that have an implication?
[Speaker N] Maybe intention also matters.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Intention. Wait, wait, one at a time.
[Speaker E] Say someone were to tell you, you must rest. Is that called action?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s called omission.
[Speaker E] Who are you answering?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You. That’s called omission.
[Speaker E] Meaning, if I were to say that a person now has to lie on the bed and rest. Lying down is an action.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you tell him to lie down, that’s an action. If you tell him not to be standing, then that’s an omission.
[Speaker E] I didn’t say that; I said rest. Is resting also an action? Rest.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, resting is not an action. Resting is not performing an action.
[Speaker E] Linguistically it is an action.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What about “and you shall afflict yourselves”? Not linguistically—we’re talking about the content. The wording, obviously, is action.
[Speaker G] Maybe intention also matters.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So is intention required? On the Sabbath, in resting, is intention required in order to fulfill the commandment? I don’t know of any such opinion that one has to rest with intention. There is no such opinion in Jewish law. Except for the general rule that all commandments require intention.
[Speaker O] We talked about this in one of the previous years, that there is a difference in terms of our emphasis as people fulfilling the commandment, regarding the command of the Holy One, blessed be He, if we go head-on against it or if we simply don’t do something that He said.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning—so let me explain that. I really did talk about this in one of the previous years. I’ll explain it briefly. Look. First of all, I’m explaining on the level of content what is required of me; there cannot be a difference. Because if there were a difference, then Maimonides’ whole discussion would never even start. He asks: when there is duplication between a positive commandment and a prohibition, do we count that as one commandment or as two? If they have a difference in content, then that is not duplication. The whole assumption of the discussion is that there is real duplication here in the sense of what it imposes on me. It imposes the same thing on me. And still Maimonides says these are two different commandments. And that is the question; here you need to have it both ways. On the one hand there is no difference in content, there is duplication. On the other hand Maimonides says this is not like duplication between two positive commandments or two prohibitions; here these are two different commandments. So I’ll explain briefly what I think. I wrote a long article about this; if you want, you can read it, I’ll refer you to it on the summary sheet—the article on the sixth root principle in our book about the root principles. The claim is this. Think about it: there is a philosopher of law named Robert Nozick, and he once asked what the difference is between an inducement and extortion. An inducement is permitted by law; extortion is forbidden. Meaning, I say to a person, look, if you do something, you’ll get a hundred shekels. If you don’t do it, you won’t get it. That is an inducement. I am inducing him to do something by giving some reward. That is of course permitted, right? Every contract between two people, an employment contract or something like that, is an inducement in that sense, and it is completely permitted. Extortion is seemingly the same thing, but it is forbidden. What do I say to him in extortion? If you do it, then everything will be fine. If you don’t do it, I’ll take a hundred shekels from you.
[Speaker G] But in extortion there is no choice.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? There is a choice; he can do it or not do it.
[Speaker G] Why? He loses something; in the first case he just doesn’t gain.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There too he loses; if he doesn’t do the job, he won’t get the hundred shekels. There is a hundred-shekel gap between the two options in both situations. Now the person can decide which option he chooses; of course he will take into account the costs involved. Fine, I’ll shorten the way. Look, the point is—what? There is fear. The point is this. This psychology of fear, which distinguishes between a loss and the absence of gain—many have already discussed that.
[Speaker J] The question is what the default is. Is my default on the Sabbath not to do labor, or is my default to do and in general to do?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, wait, wait, wait, we’ll get to the Sabbath in a moment. I’m still with the analogy first.
[Speaker J] It’s the same thing here. Is my default always not to do something, and in order to get the hundred shekels I need to make an effort, or is my default always to do, and then I’ll get it anyway?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In other words, it matters what—
[Speaker J] The natural default.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I would phrase it a little differently and say this: when I am dealing with inducement, neither of the two options violates the other person’s rights. I can choose not to give him, and I’m allowed not to give him, and I can choose to give him. Okay? Both options are legitimate; they do not violate the other person’s rights. When I am dealing with extortion, then if he does the thing and I don’t do anything to him, I have not violated his rights. But on the side where he doesn’t do it and I take a hundred shekels from him—it is forbidden for me to take his hundred shekels; they are his. I have violated his rights. Or in other words, what determines what is permitted and forbidden in this legal case is not only the gap between the two options, the gradient, yes, the difference of a hundred shekels. What also determines it is their absolute level. Meaning that there is some absolute zero, which is the level of rights a person has. To add to his rights is permitted; to subtract from his rights is forbidden. Okay? So therefore in this case, if I offer him two options, one of which is illegitimate, the act is unlawful. One of them violates his rights. Even if the other one does not. Because after all, he can always do the work and then I won’t take money from him. So what is the problem? It is not necessarily that his rights will in fact be violated; he can decide to do what I demand, and then I won’t take his money. It doesn’t matter. Since I motivated him to act through an illegitimate means—because I told him that if you don’t do this I will violate your rights, and I am forbidden to do that. Or in other words, what lies behind this is some kind of absolute scale, and I can offer a person a choice between absolute zero and a positive option; I cannot offer a person a choice between absolute zero and a negative option. And similarly—and I’m using this as an analogy—similarly I want to say the same about positive commandments and prohibitions. The assumption is—and I think this is getting at what Hani suggested earlier, but in slightly different wording—there is some kind of zero state. The person is a person, let’s call him, average. A reasonable person. Not righteous and not wicked. He is supposed to conduct himself in a certain way. Okay? Do things, not do things, however a reasonable person normally conducts himself. Now, from that point on, if he does something beyond what the reasonable person does, he is righteous. He reaches a positive state, not a neutral state. If he does something that a reasonable person does not do, meaning if he is in a negative state, then he is wicked. Now, to be in a state does not necessarily mean to perform an act. I can be in a state of action or in a state of omission. For example, when the Torah says, “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood,” then this is a prohibition regarding someone who passes by the river, sees his fellow about to drown, and does not save him. Why is this a prohibition? The Torah tells me: because what I expect from you is not that if you save him you are righteous, but that if you do not save him you are wicked. Saving him is the default. Saving is an elementary demand from every reasonable person. And even though saving is an action, it is an action that every reasonable person is expected to do—save his fellow who is drowning in the river. And if you do not save him, that is indeed an omission. But that omission is not a neutral state; it is a negative state. You are in a worse state than the conduct of a reasonable person. When the Torah points me to a negative state, a state of wickedness—whoever is in that state is wicked—that is a prohibition. When the Torah points to a positive state—whoever is in that state is righteous—that is a positive commandment. That is the definition. And the state the Torah points to can be a state that involves action, and it can be a state that involves omission; that makes no difference at all. Usually, or often, the positive state is action and the neutral state is inaction. Fine? Action can be negative action or positive action, and non-action is the neutral state. But that is not necessarily so. There are situations in which action is something so elementary that you cannot say that the state in which you do it is the state of a righteous person, someone doing things worthy of praise. No, it’s basic. Obviously everyone has to save his fellow if he can. Therefore not saving is a negative state. Therefore it is called a prohibition, a negative commandment. Okay, that is the definition. Now notice: this is not a practical difference, it is a conceptual difference. Because on the practical level there is overlap between the prohibition—for example on the Sabbath—when the Torah tells me, “you shall not do any labor,” it is basically telling me that being in a state of doing labor is being in a negative state. If you don’t do labor, if you rest, you are not righteous; you are merely maintaining the level of reasonable conduct, you are an average person. That would be if there were only a prohibition here. The prohibition would forbid me from doing labor. What would I understand? I would understand that doing labor is wickedness, and doing nothing is neutral, that is the reasonable person. Okay. The Torah says yes, but there is also a positive commandment to rest. What does that mean? That one who does labor is in a neutral state; one who does not do labor is righteous. Not just that he is not wicked—he is righteous, he is in a positive state. When the Torah says there is both a prohibition and a positive commandment regarding doing labor, what it is basically saying is that there is no zero state. If you do labor, then you are wicked, and if you do not do labor, then you are righteous. There is no average state in the context of the laws of the Sabbath. The Torah’s way of saying this is to impose both a prohibition and a positive commandment on the same matter. That is the idea of a prohibition and a positive commandment with overlapping content. Okay? In places where there is only a prohibition or only a positive commandment, then the Torah is saying: I am pointing to a negative state—don’t be there. From my standpoint you are not righteous; you have only avoided wickedness, avoided being wicked. Okay? So for example, if I was coerced into doing labor on the Sabbath, okay? Then true, I am not wicked because I was coerced, but you cannot say that I am righteous, right? Because in the end I did not rest. Do you see the difference between the positive commandment and the prohibition? Meaning, I violated the prohibition under coercion, so you cannot say I am wicked, that I did something negative, because I was forced to do it, okay? So I am not wicked. So with respect to the prohibition I am neutral. But with respect to the positive commandment too I am neutral, because you cannot say that I fulfilled the positive commandment; in the end I did not rest, I performed labor on that Sabbath. There is a kind of asymmetry between positive commandments and prohibitions, and it is not because one is action and the other is inaction, but because of the asymmetry between a negative state and a positive state, or between righteous and wicked.
[Speaker G] So a person under coercion can never be righteous? What? A coerced person is never righteous?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. Righteous—again, righteous in other senses I am not talking about. I am speaking now as a metaphor for someone who fulfills commandments. Fine? He may be a supremely righteous person, but in the halakhic definition he did not fulfill a commandment. Leave aside “righteous” for now—he did not fulfill the positive commandment. Fine? Coercion, in the language of the Talmud, coercion is not like one who acted. Meaning, if someone committed a transgression under coercion, he is exempt. But if someone did not perform the commandment under coercion, then although he is exempt from the failure to fulfill the positive commandment, it is not called that he performed the commandment. In the end, in practice, he did not do it. If I was forced not to recite Shema, does that mean I recited Shema? I won’t be punished for not reciting it, but you can’t say that I fulfilled the positive commandment to recite it. Coercion is not like one who acted. If someone is coerced, it is not considered that he actually did it. What he did is not held against him, but what he did not do is not considered as though he did do it. Okay? There is an asymmetry here between the two sides. Fine, this is really in brief; whoever wants can read the article there on the sixth root principle. For our purposes: there is a positive commandment and a prohibition regarding doing labor on the Sabbath. Okay? What that basically means is that there are two aspects to the obligation to keep the Sabbath. To keep the Sabbath means not to do labor. One aspect is that doing labor is a negative state. Making the Sabbath into a weekday is something problematic. And from that aspect, resting on the Sabbath has the goal only of not making the Sabbath like a weekday, of not being wicked. From the standpoint of the positive commandment, that is the mirror image. From the standpoint of the positive commandment, the goal of resting is not to refrain from labor. Rest itself is a value in its own right; it is a positive state. On the contrary, refraining from labor is just the means in order not to violate the duty of rest from the standpoint of the positive commandment. Okay? It is simply two sides of the same coin. So for our purposes, with the Sabbath we basically have two aspects. One: to make it a day of rest, yes, to turn it into something special. Two: not to make it like the weekdays. To cease from what is usually done on weekdays. Again, practically—
[Speaker G] So it seems that the commandment of resting has superiority over the prohibition against labor.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is a big question, which is more important—the positive commandment or the prohibition. Look there in that same article of mine; I expanded on this issue there. There are two opposite aspects. In fulfillment, the positive commandment is higher. In transgression, in violating, the prohibition is lower, more negative. Violating a prohibition is more severe than failing to fulfill a positive commandment. But fulfilling a positive commandment is more important than refraining from a prohibition. You are more righteous if you fulfill a positive commandment than if you merely refrain from a prohibition. Because the later authorities struggle with this and see contradictions—there are contradictions. A positive commandment overrides a prohibition, so the positive commandment is more important, right? On the other hand, a prohibition is more severe. You get lashes for it; for a positive commandment you do not get lashes. For a prohibition a person will spend all his money in order not to violate it, whereas to fulfill a positive commandment he does not need to spend all his money. So the Sdei Chemed explains Nachmanides in Parashat Yitro that it really is these two aspects. From the side of fulfillment, the positive commandment is higher; it is more significant than not stumbling into a prohibition. But from the side of nullification, the transgression of violating a prohibition is of course more negative, more severe, than failure to fulfill a positive commandment. Fine? But that is just in parentheses.
[Speaker G] A commandment that comes through a transgression—meaning a stolen sukkah or something.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, a commandment that comes through a transgression is something else. There they tell me: don’t perform the commandment if it comes through a transgression. But a positive commandment overrides a prohibition is a different rule. What is the relationship between them? Again, a long discussion among the medieval authorities and the later authorities. Fine. So anyway, there are the thirty-nine primary categories of labor. And regarding the primary categories, as the Talmud says in Bava Kamma, if there are primary categories, that means we can understand from this that there are also derivatives of them; otherwise they would not be called primary categories. Now what is the relationship between primary categories and derivatives? In the Talmud in Bava Kamma there is an ambiguous formulation and there are various versions there; I referred you to the Talmud there. There they tie this to two parameters. One parameter is the importance of the labor, and the second parameter is its presence in the Tabernacle. Since the labor of the Sabbath was juxtaposed to the section of the Tabernacle, the Sages learn—make some kind of analogy—between the Sabbath and the Tabernacle. One of the outcomes of this analogy is that the forms of labor that were performed in the Tabernacle on a regular basis—not specifically on the Sabbath, but the forms of labor that were performed in the Tabernacle—those are the forms of labor forbidden on the Sabbath. From the fact that the Torah juxtaposed the two sections to one another, we learn from the Tabernacle to the Sabbath. Therefore there are rules of skilled, purposive labor: in the Tabernacle they performed forms of labor called skilled, purposive labor, and on the Sabbath as well, the forms of labor that were forbidden are skilled, purposive labor. Okay? That is one criterion. But in the Talmud in Bava Kamma there is another criterion as well, the criterion of importance. The labor has to be important in order to be considered a primary category of labor. In the Tabernacle they also walked. Is it forbidden to walk on the Sabbath? No. Why not? Apparently because that labor is not important. I’ll say in a moment what “important” means. Okay? So presence in the Tabernacle cannot be the exclusive criterion. Presence in the Tabernacle cannot be the sole criterion. There is also some content-based criterion for this labor. What is the relationship between these two criteria? Again, a subject for a long discussion. Here I’m just going over it telegraphically. There are several methods. A question?
[Speaker E] Yes. Is it learned only from the verse that juxtaposed the two matters? Yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning—
[Speaker E] There wasn’t any Oral Torah at all, meaning it wasn’t passed down?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, this is Oral Torah. Oral Torah learns from the juxtaposition of the Tabernacle to the Sabbath. It learns it from there.
[Speaker E] And that is the only source? There’s really no other proof for this?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What other source do you want?
[Speaker E] I would like it to be like something we learned then about partitions and so on, that those are things that are law given to Moses at Sinai.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the laws—
[Speaker E] The laws of the Sabbath are not law given to Moses at Sinai?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. The Mishnah in Chagigah says that they are mountains hanging by a hair. In the Torah itself there is one verse: “you shall not do any labor.” As my son likes to ask me, as I also heard in interviews with some of you—yes, my son likes to ask me: it says in the Torah, “you shall not do any labor”; where did all of Sabbath observance come from? And that hair—how do you learn all those mountains from it? Interpretation, exegetical tools, and part of it is Oral Tradition. But there is no advantage of Oral Tradition over exegetical derivation; it makes no difference. The derivation is Torah law according to most opinions, in every respect. Okay?
[Speaker E] But maybe—maybe it’s possible to learn other things from the Tabernacle? I didn’t understand. I said, maybe maybe one could learn something else entirely from the fact that the verses are adjacent to each other?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe. And the Sages learned this, or this too. They learned other things as well, but this too. Again, in the background, notice what this is basically saying: that there is not really a given set of Sabbath labors. More than that—not only is there not a given set, but they are not written in the Torah at all.
[Speaker G] Except for the labor of carrying.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The labor of carrying, the labor of kindling, and “in plowing and in harvest you shall rest” also appears, but the Talmud in Moed Katan redirects that to the Sabbatical year—”in plowing and in harvest you shall rest.” Even though in the plain sense of the verse it is speaking about the Sabbath. So in terms of the labors, what is written is mainly carrying and kindling. That’s it; the other labors are not written. The Sages extracted a list of thirty-nine primary categories of labor from looking at what was done in the Tabernacle. And again, using the criterion of importance. Why are kindling and carrying written in the Torah if all the other labors are not? So regarding kindling there is a dispute among the Tannaim; I won’t go into it now, why the Torah wrote the labor of kindling. One view says because kindling is lighter—kindling was singled out as a prohibition, it is only an ordinary prohibition for which one gets lashes, not stoning; it is not a full labor. That is one opinion; it was not ruled as Jewish law. The second opinion is that kindling was singled out in order to divide, to teach some general rule in the Torah’s laws of punishment. Not important now. But there is a reason why kindling, the labor of kindling, appears in the Torah. Otherwise it would not have appeared, because it is not necessary for the labors to appear in the Torah. The question of carrying.
[Speaker E] Isn’t that scary? Doesn’t that scare any of the early commentators? That so many laws depend only on one verse and also on some kind of, I don’t know, maybe even associative connection?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Whether it is scary or not is a psychological question. The Mishnah says these are mountains hanging by a hair. If it scares someone, there are pills, but the assumption is that this is how Torah works. Whether that should be frightening or not, I don’t know—each person according to their own taste—but that is how Jewish law works. Okay, it does not scare me at all if laws come out through one derivation or another and there can be lots of laws. In fact, the laws handed down to us that did not emerge through interpretive means or exegetical means are a negligible minority of all Jewish law. I’m talking about Torah-level laws, leave aside rabbinic law, which obviously does not come from verses. It is a negligible minority of all the laws. Laws that are explicitly written in the Torah are what the Talmud calls laws that even the Sadducees agree with. Those are laws that are written explicitly in the Torah, so even the Sadducees agree. How many of those are there? Very few. Even the most basic laws, the most familiar, the most agreed upon—most of them are not written in the Torah at all; rather, you have to interpret things in the Torah, you have to derive from the Torah in various ways, and we extract all sorts of laws. Okay, carrying—why is it written in the Torah? Because it is an inferior labor. What?
[Speaker G] An inferior labor.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. So the upshot that several medieval authorities suggest is that carrying had to be written explicitly, because otherwise I would not have learned it. Why would I not have learned it? Because carrying—this is the point—carrying is not important, and here the criterion of importance enters. It is not enough that carrying existed in the Tabernacle. In the Tabernacle they also walked—so what? In the Tabernacle they also wore clothes, so is it forbidden to wear clothes on the Sabbath? In the Tabernacle they did a lot of things; they also breathed. So what does that mean? Presence in the Tabernacle cannot be the only criterion. There has to be some additional content-based criterion, which generally is called importance, the criterion of importance. Therefore carrying too, because it is an inferior labor—at least according to some of the medieval authorities—that is why the Torah had to write it, because otherwise, from its mere presence in the Tabernacle, we would not have learned that carrying is forbidden. We would have thought it is like walking. Walking from one corner to another is not forbidden, so walking from the room to outside also should not be forbidden. What is the difference? Both this and that were done in the Tabernacle. It is not significant, not important. And here that brings us into the issue of carrying as an inferior labor. I’ll do this very briefly because our time is getting short, and I’ll say this: the interplay between these two parameters—the parameter of importance and the parameter of presence in the Tabernacle—if you saw there in Tosafot and in Maharsha and Maharam, there are several approaches, at least three if not more, as to how they interact. I’ll just draw your attention to one approach worth remembering, which appears in Maharam. Maharam explains this in Tosafot: importance alone can determine that something is a primary category even if it was not in the Tabernacle. In principle you do not need the Tabernacle at all. If the thing is important, then it is a primary category of labor. So what is the Tabernacle doing there? It is only a criterion for what is called important perhaps, or something like that, depending on how one understands the matter there; I’m not going into details. Why am I saying this? Because notice that these things have implications. For example, today they discuss the prohibition of turning on—say—closing an electrical circuit on the Sabbath. And the decisors look for where to put it: kindling, building, generating current, rabbinic—how to forbid it. First of all everyone assumes it is forbidden; only afterward do they look, okay, under which primary category of labor can it be placed. Notice that according to Maharam’s approach, maybe you don’t need all these forced contrivances at all. Because basically what Maharam says is: if something is sufficiently important and significant, then it is a primary category; it does not have to have been in the Tabernacle. If the Sages were alive today, then the Sages might say that closing an electrical circuit on the Sabbath is one of the thirty-nine primary categories of labor. And if you want to take something out in its place, I have a few candidates for you. For example, the Talmud in the chapter Klal Gadol says that winnowing, selecting, and sifting are really all one labor, because all of them are separating food from waste. Why were they counted as three? Because all three were in the Tabernacle. Fine, so if I have electricity, then two out of those three I will make into one labor. I have no problem, I’ll manage.
[Speaker G] Make carrying out and carrying in one.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, carrying out and carrying in were made one, and the medieval authorities also ask why. Because maybe it is an inferior labor. Okay, so I’m saying there is a lot of freedom here, and it has implications. For example, in Igrot Moshe, Rabbi Moshe Feinstein asks about a Sabbath timer. Is it forbidden to operate things by means of a Sabbath timer—the thing we are used to today, setting the timer before the Sabbath and it will operate things for me on the Sabbath, turn on a light or something like that. He had a side there in the responsum—at the end he rejects it—but he had a side in the responsum to forbid it, because if the Sages were alive today they would forbid it, even though he has no way to place it; there is no primary category of labor under which he can put it. But basically what lies behind his approach is that same approach found in Maharam. The approach that says that once a labor seems sufficiently significant to us, it ought to be forbidden on the Sabbath regardless of whether it was in the Tabernacle or not. And as for the lists, we’ll manage. Why are there specifically thirty-nine primary categories of labor? That is learned from the thirty-nine times that “labor” appears in the Torah. There are parallel discussions; I am not going into all the details here, and there too it seems not to be connected to the Tabernacle at all. In short, there is a lot of room for maneuver here and a lot of approaches among the medieval and later authorities as to exactly how this interplay works between the criterion of importance and the criterion of presence in the Tabernacle. For me that is enough for the purpose of the introduction; I won’t go into it too much. Maybe in the next lesson I’ll touch on it a bit more regarding carrying out and carrying in. Just one more note: what is the importance of a labor? What is the criterion of importance? Here, in principle, there are two kinds of considerations. One kind of consideration is how significant this act of creation is. Okay? How much you have turned something into a new thing compared to what it was before—how much significant creation there is here. The second kind of consideration is how different it is from the other labors. Why are these two parameters important?
[Speaker G] What do you mean the other labors? Those that were not in the Tabernacle?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, those that were. Say I want to know—I have a list of thirty-eight primary categories of labor, I’ve collected the thirty-eight, and now I’m discussing the thirty-ninth. Fine? Cooking. Okay? Now I ask: will cooking be the thirty-ninth category of labor or not? So I ask myself two questions. First, is this a sufficiently significant act of creation? Second, does it not fall into one of the other categories as a derivative of them? Is it unique enough to constitute a separate primary category of labor? There is a difference between the criterion of uniqueness and the criterion of importance. The criterion of importance determines the severity of the prohibition, and if it is important enough that means it is very forbidden to do on the Sabbath. It is Torah-level forbidden. If it is not a significant act of creation, then perhaps it is only rabbinically forbidden. Not significant. The criterion of uniqueness is not necessarily related. It could be that a labor is very, very significant, but it resembles the labor of writing. So there is no point in making it a separate primary category. But that is not a reason to be lenient with it. It is not any less forbidden; it is only that for purposes of classification, as a different labor, I would not make it a separate primary category because it falls under an existing primary category. Therefore the criterion of uniqueness and the criterion of significance are both important for creating the list of the thirty-nine primary categories of labor. But they play different roles. Uniqueness matters only for classification. Significance matters for the very status of the labor—whether it is significant enough to be forbidden or not—not just for classification, whether it is a separate primary category or included under one of the other primary categories. Okay?
[Speaker J] Can I ask a second question for a moment? Yes. Yes. If you take the criterion of what was not in the Tabernacle but is important, like for example those who forbid electricity today, then apparently there are many more than thirty-nine primary categories of labor, because today I can find another labor. So how can you stop this?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That brings us back to the question of how one arrives at the list of thirty-nine. I am not getting into it here because one has to study the sugya. And it is definitely possible that the list of thirty-nine—the number thirty-nine—is binding, and if I decide to include one thing I have to take something else out. Reorganize the importance of the labors: the thirty-nine most important and sufficiently unique to constitute distinct primary categories—those will be the new primary categories. And in principle, apparently in every generation one could have done this work anew when technologies are renewed or when—I don’t know—other things in reality are renewed. In principle. I’m telling you: no decisor you ask will tell you this.
[Speaker J] So apparently if they claim that electricity is an important labor, then apparently you can’t decide today that it is forbidden to use—to close an electrical circuit—because it isn’t found among the thirty-nine? Wait, wait.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In principle I can put it into the thirty-nine and decide that selecting, winnowing, selecting, and sifting are one labor, because they are basically similar.
[Speaker J] But no one does that, and as long as no one—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Does that, it is a problem—
[Speaker J] To bring in something else.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said, none of the decisors do that. That is a different practical discussion. I’m not discussing right now how Jewish law is ruled in practice. I’m saying in principle—suppose the Sanhedrin were now sitting on this issue; without getting into questions of authority, I’m talking about questions of substance. If the Sanhedrin were sitting on this issue, in principle that is what it ought to do. The question of authority is a different question; I also have a lot to say about that, but I won’t get into it here. Fine, anyway, for our purposes—
[Speaker O] But according to what Maharam says, the matter of importance is what existed specifically at the time of the Tabernacle, and not what exists in the time…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe. And I’m saying that what matters is what matters—why should I care what happened in the time of the Tabernacle? We’ve come back to the question of authority: am I allowed to say things that disagree with the Maharam? I don’t see why not, but we won’t get into that now. Okay, in any case, back to our topic. Again, this really is just an initial introduction. You have to get into the passage in tractate Bava Kamma and all the textual versions and see the implications. I’m not doing all that; this is only an introduction to give context, a general picture. So allow me not to get into all those details here. Okay, so I consider myself exempt from going further into all the Maharsha and Maharam there. In principle, besides labors, there are also—I started by listing the parts of the laws of the Sabbath in Jewish law, what categories there are. So until now I dealt with the first category. That category is the prohibitions of labor, which includes labors, primary categories of labor, the thirty-nine primary categories of labor and their derivatives. For our purposes—if you saw the Talmudic text in Bava Kamma then you saw this, but it’s not important—for our purposes there is no fundamental significance to the question of what is a primary category and what is a derivative. Both are Torah-level prohibitions, both incur stoning, and if done unintentionally, a sin-offering; there is no essential difference between a primary category and a derivative. There is some subtle difference, and even that is a dispute among the Tannaim, but we won’t get into that. As far as we’re concerned, when I say this is a labor on the Sabbath, I mean either a primary category or a derivative. It doesn’t matter to me. All right? So that is the first category. What else is there in the laws of the Sabbath besides the prohibitions of labor? There are Torah-level prohibitions on doing things on the Sabbath that are not called labor prohibitions—for example, leading an animal with a burden, and the requirement that one’s animal rest. I’m not allowed to do labor by means of the animal, and the animal may not do labors that are forbidden to me. That is leading an animal with a burden and the requirement that one’s animal rest. Again, I’m saying this very telegraphically, just to give the picture; the details aren’t important to me right now. Okay? Why do I call this not labor prohibitions? It forbids me to do things because they do not belong to the prohibition of “you shall not do any labor.” There is no liability of stoning for this, no sin-offering, so it’s not in the category of labor prohibitions. These are Torah-level prohibitions that are not part of the labor prohibitions. Plainly, this is probably just a positive commandment and not a negative one—the requirement that one’s animal rest and things like that. But for our purposes, this is not included in labor prohibitions in the accepted halakhic terminology, even though it forbids me from doing labors on the Sabbath. That is the second category. Beyond that, there are rabbinic prohibitions. Up to now I’ve spoken only about Torah-level prohibitions. Rabbinic prohibitions are also divided into several kinds. There are rabbinic labor prohibitions. What are those? Actions that are not similar enough to one of the primary categories of labor or their derivatives to count as a Torah-level prohibition. Sometimes that means it is completely permitted, because it is not really connected at all; but if it is similar, just not similar enough, then it can be a rabbinic prohibition. That is called a shevut prohibition. Shevut on the Sabbath, in halakhic terminology, means a rabbinic prohibition of doing labor that does not fall under the formal categories of labor prohibition. Why not? Because it is not significant enough or not similar enough. Okay? That is called a shevut prohibition. In parentheses I’ll say: there is a Nachmanides on the portion of Emor, and in Maimonides too there are those who understand it this way, and the Ritva in tractate Rosh Hashanah and others—several medieval authorities (Rishonim) say that there are shevut prohibitions that are also Torah-level. But again, the simple view is that shevut prohibitions are rabbinic; I’m not getting into that here within this general introduction. Besides that, there are also obligations and prohibitions from the Prophets and Writings. Honoring the Sabbath, Sabbath delight, speaking weekday speech on the Sabbath. These are learned from verses in the book of Isaiah; these too are prohibitions, called “from the words of the tradition.” In halakhic terminology, “words of the tradition” means things from the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh), not Kabbalah in the sense of esoteric teaching, but things from the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh). That is called a prohibition from the words of the tradition, which has some status between Torah-level and rabbinic—there is some debate about that—but it is not a Torah-level prohibition in the ordinary sense. Okay? These are obligations to make the Sabbath a delight, to eat three meals; regarding candle-lighting there is also room to discuss it in this context; regarding speaking secular speech on the Sabbath or preparing from Sabbath to weekday—all these things of preserving the character of the Sabbath, the honor of the Sabbath, and so on. Wait, so that is the next category. Within the shevut prohibitions, the rabbinic shevut prohibitions, the later authorities (Acharonim) divide them into two types or two categories. One category is rabbinic labor prohibitions that are forbidden because you may come to do a Torah-level labor. Fences. Fences. The second category is an extension of the Torah-level labor. I’ll give two examples. For instance, the labor of selecting—this is one of the primary categories of labor. I am forbidden to separate food from waste. Okay? Something I want is called food; something I don’t want is called waste. Separating the waste from the food is the Torah-level labor of selecting. Removing the waste and leaving the food. If I remove the food and leave the waste, that is not Torah-level in principle. Again, there are debates, we won’t get into them, maybe there are additional conditions, but right now I’m ignoring the details. So why did the Sages nevertheless forbid it? It is rabbinically prohibited. Because it is very similar to separating waste from food. Now here it could be understood in two ways. If it’s very similar, then basically this too has something problematic in it. It’s not problematic enough to be forbidden by the Torah—it doesn’t cross the threshold of a Torah-level prohibition—but the Sages lowered the threshold. They say: we want to prohibit even a lower level of problematicity, in order to preserve the character of the Sabbath more fully. That is one possible way to understand it. Another possible way to understand it is: no, it is only a fence. There is nothing problematic at all about separating food from waste. Except that if they allow me to separate food from waste, I may get confused and separate waste from food. Therefore the Sages say: you know what, don’t even separate food from waste, even though in itself that is not problematic at all. Before, I assumed it is problematic, just not enough; now I’m saying no, it’s not problematic at all. But I might come to a Torah-level prohibition, and therefore they forbade this too. Those are two possible conceptions of this shevut prohibition, for example. Now I’ll give you an example where there is only one possible conception. There is a shevut prohibition against riding an animal on the Sabbath. Someone riding a horse—it’s forbidden. Why is it forbidden? Because he may tear off a branch. A branch. Riders, when they ride and pass by a tree, tend to pull off a branch for themselves. Okay? A person absentmindedly, if he rides a horse, might tear off a branch. So riding a horse is rabbinically forbidden. If I tore off a branch, of course I would have violated a Torah-level prohibition—not of riding a horse, but of reaping. That is the labor of reaping. But I’m talking about someone who rides a horse and does not tear off a branch; he violated a rabbinic prohibition. Why? The Rabbis prohibited riding a horse lest when he tears off a branch he violate the Torah-level prohibition of reaping. Now I ask: in this prohibition too, are there also two ways to understand it?
[Speaker I] For example, isn’t there also here the issue of leading an animal with a burden?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you have to do labor by means of the horse for that to count as leading an animal with a burden. Here I’m just riding it.
[Speaker J] “A living being carries itself”—that’s what I saw in Maimonides; I happened to come across that Jewish law, that a living being carries itself.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no, no—don’t drag us into the whole issue of “a living being carries itself”; that’s a minefield in itself and has nothing to do with us. A horse—I ride the horse, all right?—and I didn’t tear off a branch. That is a rabbinic prohibition. Now I ask: this is coming to prevent the labor of reaping, right? If I tear off a branch, I’ll violate the labor of reaping. Can one say that someone who rides a horse is a weak form of reaping? That it is an extension of the labor of reaping? Obviously not.
[Speaker G] No, he violated—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —the words of—
[Speaker G] —rabbinic law; he violated a rabbinic prohibition that is a thing unto itself.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, fine, but here I’m saying: you can’t relate to riding a horse as an extension of the labor of reaping. It’s irrelevant. If I separate food from waste, that resembles separating waste from food, so one can say maybe it’s an extension of the Torah-level labor because it resembles it. But reaping—riding a horse does not resemble reaping. The whole problem is only that maybe you’ll come to reap. Here there is only the interpretation of a fence; there is no interpretation of an extension of a Torah-level labor. All right? Is what I’m saying clear? So those are two kinds of shevut prohibitions. Now, beyond that… can I ask a question? Yes, yes. Who wanted to?
[Speaker E] We came across—I think it was in Maimonides—that there is the punishment of karet. But both what you mentioned and what I know is that the prohibition is basically that if it’s unintentional then it’s a sin-offering, and if it’s intentional with witnesses and prior warning then one is liable to stoning. But is the punishment of karet still in effect for Sabbath desecration? The punishment of karet?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The punishment of karet applies to someone who transgresses intentionally without prior warning. Yes, karet is for someone who transgresses intentionally without prior warning. Then they don’t execute him, but he incurs karet.
[Speaker E] Okay, but seemingly most people today would be in the category of karet—I mean, whoever…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not most people—on what there is karet.
[Speaker E] Wait, I can’t hear.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The whole idea of renewing ordination in sixteenth-century Tzfat—
[Speaker F] —was—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —to exempt people from the punishment of karet. Because if the court gives them lashes, then those liable to karet who were lashed are exempted from their karet. Meaning, if you receive the punishment in court, the karet is canceled. That was their motivation for renewing ordination: to make it possible to punish people and exempt them from karet.
[Speaker G] Because of the forced converts, right? Because of the forced converts.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, but let’s get back to our subject, because these really are side questions. Again, I’m continuing the survey: what else do we have in the laws of the Sabbath? We have, as I said before, candle-lighting, kiddush, havdalah, the character of the day, the atmosphere of the day—these may be positive commandments, maybe rabbinic, I’m not getting into that now, but they are a separate topic. Okay? So that is more or less, it seems to me, the laws of the Sabbath. Now, in Maimonides, structurally speaking, if you’ve gone through it, skimmed Maimonides a bit, there it is divided in such a way that he begins with the general rules of the labors. The first chapter and a bit of the second chapter deal with the general rules of the labors. What do I mean by the general rules of the labors? All this is important to know, so I’m going through it. The general rules of the labors mean that there are different ways of doing a labor, and the question is whether that counts as a Torah-level prohibition or not. For example, if one does the labor in an unusual manner, then it is not a Torah-level prohibition, only a rabbinic one. If two people do the labor together—“two who did it”—that is exactly our topic, then again it is not a Torah-level prohibition. Whether that is related to doing it in an unusual manner or not—we’ll talk about that. What happens if one does the labor without intent, or is preoccupied with something else, or does a labor that is not needed for its own sake? I do the labor for a purpose other than the original purpose. All of these—again without getting into the details—are the general rules of the labors. Meaning, there are different modes, and this is a very branched and very complex conceptual discussion: exactly how a person must do the labor in order to incur the full punishment, in order to violate the Torah-level prohibition in its fullest sense. That is the first chapter in Maimonides. All right? That is basically the beginning. After that there is a bit about saving life, a bit about entering the Sabbath, how one enters the Sabbath, labors that begin on the eve of the Sabbath and continue—say I turned on a washing machine and it keeps washing into the Sabbath, did I violate a prohibition or not? That is the dispute between the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel; in practice I did not violate a prohibition—maybe rabbinically if it creates publicity, if it creates publicity, not important. But fundamentally, according to the law there is no prohibition in that, and all those are Maimonides’ discussions in the next three chapters. After that he already gets into the labors. I’m going through this quickly, because “a person should not sit by the barber near the afternoon prayer”—how one enters the Sabbath is simply according to the order of the day. That is why the laws of the Sabbath begin this way, because they really begin the order of the day with the onset of the Sabbath, how one prepares for the Sabbath, all kinds of things like that. Then in chapter 7 he begins the labors, the thirty-nine labors and their derivatives. The Torah-level labors. From the middle of chapter 12—note the scope—until chapter 20, all of that is on the labor of carrying. Notice this seemingly inferior, marginal labor takes up enormous space in Maimonides and also in the Talmud. It is, I think, the labor with the greatest scope by far.
[Speaker G] Maybe precisely because it’s an inferior labor?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe. But one has to notice: this is a labor that takes up huge space in the laws of the Sabbath—in Maimonides, in the Talmud, and generally in discussions. It’s huge, and later I’ll talk about what exactly is included in these discussions. After that, in chapters 20 and 21, he begins to speak about the shevut prohibitions, the rabbinic prohibitions. Again, he goes through the primary categories of labor and all the rabbinic prohibitions, and then he gets to all the other things—candle-lighting and all the honoring of the Sabbath and Sabbath delight and all those things. Telling a non-Jew to do something is of course part of the general rules of the Sabbath, and more. Okay? So overall that is the structure of the laws in Maimonides, and the general map of the laws of the Sabbath. Now, I’ve got a few minutes left. This took me more time than I thought. I still want to talk about the labor of carrying, to begin the introduction to the labor of carrying. The labor of carrying is basically, at its core, bound up with transferring an object from one domain to another. But not from every domain to every domain—only from a private domain to a public domain, which is what is called taking out, or from a public domain to a private domain, which is called bringing in. Think of the private domain as a house and the public domain as a street, so bringing in means bringing from the street into the house, taking out means taking from the house into the street. Okay? So that is the labor of carrying, and it is one of the primary categories of labor. As I said, it is written explicitly in the Torah—one verse or two verses; that is a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) in our context, whether you need two verses or one. But it is written explicitly in the Torah; maybe because it is an inferior labor, that is why it had to be written. But practically speaking, once it is written, it is one of the primary categories of labor, and one is liable for it to stoning, and if done unintentionally, a sin-offering, just like all the other labors. In order to define the domains between which the labor prohibition is defined, we define four types of domain: private domain, public domain, exempt place, and karmelit. Those are the four types, and again, we’ll get into all of this; I’m only giving a general map. In the next class I’ll give you something to read, a more detailed introduction to the domains. Four domains. What is needed for our purposes to define the prohibition is basically the private domain and the public domain, while the exempt place is the trick by which one can bypass the prohibition of taking out and bringing in. We’ll get to that too. It is a special kind of domain such that from the private domain to it, or from the public domain to it, there is no problem—you can do that. Therefore, if I do it from the private domain to an exempt place and from the exempt place to the public domain, I have bypassed the prohibition of taking out or bringing in. Okay? The domain called karmelit basically has no Torah-level status at all. It is a domain defined by the Sages. It is essentially a rabbinic domain. The first three domains are Torah-level. From the Torah’s standpoint, karmelit is like an exempt place or like a private domain—we’ll maybe see further. But the Rabbis define it as a domain unto itself, and for certain purposes it is considered like a public domain, but only rabbinically. Now look. As I said, part of the discussion in the labor of carrying is a discussion of defining the domains: what is defined as a private domain, what is defined as a public domain, and so on. The second part of the discussion is how the act of carrying between domains is defined. Once I know what each domain is, I have to define how the act of carrying between domains is defined. For that, there needs to be placing down, there needs to be lifting up, there needs to be transfer, and there needs to be placing down. That is basically our first Mishnah, which we will begin dealing with a bit in the next class. So that is the definition of the act of carrying. But in addition to taking out and bringing in—which are two primary categories, or a primary category and a derivative, or something akin to a primary category; disputes among the medieval authorities (Rishonim), we won’t get into that now, we’ll talk about it but not now—there are derivatives of the labor of carrying. And those derivatives are, for example, moving something four cubits in the public domain. Only the public domain is involved here; there is no transfer between different domains. But if I take an object four cubits in the public domain, I have moved the object four cubits in the public domain—that is a derivative of the labor of carrying. I violated a Torah-level prohibition, liable to stoning, a sin-offering if done unintentionally, and so on, like any other labor. That is called transferring. In addition there is throwing. To throw—if… or to throw the object four cubits in the public domain—that is basically an extension of the labor of transferring. Transferring is taking it in one’s hand and moving four cubits. Throwing is throwing it in the public domain. Okay, that is throwing. There is also passing from one private domain to another private domain with a public domain in the middle. That too is a derivative of the labor of carrying, and one is liable for it to stoning. So all these are different ways of violating the labor of carrying. Okay? So if I summarize now—Hani, did you say something? You’re muted.
[Speaker J] Yes, I didn’t understand. We defined derivatives as acts that either were not in the Tabernacle and are significant, or were significant but were not in the Tabernacle. What is a derivative of a primary labor? That’s what I didn’t understand. You defined moving four cubits in the public domain—why is that a derivative of something? Is it forbidden as a shevut prohibition or is it a Torah-level derivative? No, no, no—a Torah-level derivative.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] When I say derivative, I mean a Torah-level prohibition.
[Speaker J] But we didn’t define derivative that way.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It resembles—for our purposes—it resembles taking out from a private domain to a public domain.
[Speaker J] But we didn’t define a derivative as something similar. Something similar we defined as something that is a rabbinic prohibition that the Sages prohibited—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —and that is a prohibition as a shevut prohibition.
[Speaker J] No, what is similar—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —to a derivative. What resembles a primary category is a derivative. What resembles it a bit, but not enough, is a rabbinic shevut.
[Speaker G] But from Nachmanides I understood that in carrying, the derivatives are also learned from the Tabernacle.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, so that is because—
[Speaker G] —it is—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —an inferior labor. We’ll still talk about that. Because it is an inferior labor, it could be that here I need even the derivatives to be in the Tabernacle; on that the medieval authorities (Rishonim) disagree. All right? But at the fundamental level, in relation to derivatives and primary categories, we are indeed speaking about resemblance. That is the criterion. So basically the discussion of the labor of carrying spreads across several branches. First, defining the different domains: what is defined as this domain, what is defined as that domain. Broad and lengthy discussions. All right? By the way, the tractates devoted to this are tractate Shabbat and tractate Eruvin. Those are two tractates. Beyond that, there is discussion of the modes of carrying: which actions are forbidden. There is taking out, transferring, passing, throwing, bringing in. All these are basically kinds of labor—primary categories and derivatives—all within the category of the labor of carrying, either primary categories or derivatives of carrying. Besides that, there is the way we do it. There has to be lifting up, transfer, and placing down. Okay? That is the way we do the action. All these are discussions conducted in detail in the various Talmudic passages, by the medieval authorities (Rishonim), later authorities (Acharonim), and halakhic decisors in the context of the labor of carrying. That is why it is such a complex and highly branched labor. Our Mishnah deals with the third topic: how we do the action of carrying. There needs to be lifting up, there needs to be placing down, one person, two people, from a private domain to a public domain, from a public domain to a private domain. So it deals only with taking out and bringing in—not passing, not throwing, not transferring, not all those things. Only taking out and bringing in. And the specific discussion is the question of how the action itself must be done—from a private domain to a public domain, me and the homeowner and all those things. Okay? That is basically the subject of our passage. Now, as I already mentioned, the medieval authorities (Rishonim) say that carrying is an inferior labor. In what sense is it an inferior labor? First of all, they learn it in the Torah from the fact that the Torah found it necessary to write the labor of carrying. None of the other labors appears in the Torah at all. The Torah wrote this one, because otherwise we would not have thought—yes, it happened in the Tabernacle, so what? People also walked in the Tabernacle, as I said before. This is an inferior labor. Therefore the Torah has to write it—“Let no man go out from his place on the Sabbath day,” or something like that—and therefore it teaches us that carrying too is a primary labor, even though it is an inferior labor. What does it mean that it is an inferior labor? Here I really am not getting into the sources I gave you on the page, because I see I don’t have enough time. The general picture is more important to me. There are medieval authorities (Rishonim) who formulate it in the way of the Or Zarua. If you remember, did you see the Or Zarua? The Or Zarua says: originally it was an object, and now too it is an object. Why is it an inferior labor? Because nothing happened to the object; it did not change. Look at the object—it is exactly as it was before, only its place changed. It was in the private domain, now it is in the public domain, or vice versa. Nothing happened to the object itself. If you look at the labor of cooking, then something happened to the food as a result of the cooking. I made a change in the object itself. That is a significant labor. But a labor that merely moves an object from place to place—that is not a significant labor. Therefore it is an inferior labor according to the Or Zarua. By contrast, in Tosafot, and there is Nachmanides and Rashba and so on, there are other formulations. There it seems the formulation is more: what difference does it make whether you take it from a private domain to a public domain, when from one private domain to another private domain it is permitted? Why? There is no logic—either prohibit everything or permit everything. Why should I care whether it is from a private domain to a public domain or from one private domain to another private domain? Here there is a different statement about the inferiority of the labor. Here the inferiority of the labor is not because it is not significant enough, because according to Tosafot, if they had prohibited doing this from one private domain to another private domain as well, that would have been perfectly fine. His whole problem is that he does not understand why specifically from a private domain to a public domain and not from one private domain to another private domain. What bothers Tosafot is not that the labor is not creative enough, but that the definitions of the labor are not understandable. Seemingly there ought not to be a difference between carrying from one private domain to another private domain and carrying from a private domain to a public domain. But there is a difference, and it is not understood. Therefore there is some kind of internal contradiction or lack of intelligibility in the definition of the labor—not because it is not creative enough. Maybe that is also true according to Tosafot, but that is not the point because of which Tosafot says this is an inferior labor. That is a conceptual difference. If you noticed, Nachmanides…
[Speaker P] But maybe—I understood that labor means some sort of act, an act of work, and work has something public about it, and therefore that’s why there is a separation between the individual and the public?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But there is no separation, because from a public domain to a private domain is also prohibited, just as from a private domain to a public domain.
[Speaker P] But not from one private domain to another.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, and also not from one public domain to another, in principle. So no, it just has to change the status of the domain. I’ll get to that—I can already see I won’t get to it today. I’ll try to suggest some explanation of the idea behind it. But I just want to finish this introduction to carrying and say that there is a difference—for example, when Nachmanides brings Tosafot’s approach about an inferior labor, then Nachmanides says that even if he carries a very, very heavy load, right? That’s how he formulates it. In Tosafot it does not appear. But Nachmanides says: even if he carries a very, very heavy load from one private domain to another private domain, there is no problem; and from a private domain to a public domain, even if it is a light load. Why does it matter whether it is a heavy load or a light load? Why is that interesting? It seems that in Nachmanides’ formulation there is some element in the labors of the Sabbath that is the element of exertion, right? And therefore what did Tosafot say? Here, in the labor of carrying, you see that exertion is not determinative, because even a heavy load, if you do it from one private domain to another private domain, it doesn’t matter; and even a light load from a private domain to a public domain is indeed forbidden. So you see that exertion is not important, and therefore it is not understood; it is an inferior labor. That is, it seems that for him the basic definition of labor on the Sabbath is labor that involves exertion. And since exertion is not the important parameter in the labor of carrying, therefore it is an inferior labor. That is not the conception we are used to; usually you don’t hear it, because usually it’s the opposite—people always tell us that on the Sabbath the main thing is creation, not exertion. And more than that, when you look at the labors, what exertion is there in cooking? You put it on the fire and it cooks.
[Speaker G] No, no, no, there is exertion.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, you’re talking about—
[Speaker G] Anyone who cooks knows there’s exertion.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I know nothing; I cook and there’s no exertion. There’s no exertion because when you talk about cooking, you mean the cutting, the preparation, everything. I’m not talking about that. The labor of cooking on the Sabbath is putting the pot—
[Speaker F] Eggs, eggs! I put eggs on and they cook.
[Speaker G] Boiling—even boiling water in an urn when I do nothing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly, so there’s nothing. I put it on the fire—what exertion is there in that? I think the point of exertion—even Nachmanides, who speaks about exertion—he means exertion in the intellectual sense. Meaning purposeful labor: I think about something, and that too is called exertion—not necessarily expending energy in the sense of physical effort. By the way, intellectual exertion really does also expend energy; ask chess players—
[Speaker G] Chess players who sit—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —for hours, and they’ll tell you they come out drained and sweating after a game.
[Speaker G] דווקא on the Sabbath there is infinite intellectual exertion.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, maybe, but these labors—exertion with respect to the labors is what is forbidden. I think that even Nachmanides, when he talks about exertion, is not talking only about exertion in the sense of weight, and therefore it is not so far from the definitions we saw in the Or Zarua. In the end, somehow it seems we still arrive at the dimension of creation. So what, after all, is the difference between Nachmanides and the Or Zarua? Nachmanides puts the emphasis on the person. When the person creates, he is not resting, because he is investing intellectual energy in the matter, and that is what is forbidden. Because what is required of me is to cease, and if you are investing intellectual energy, you are not ceasing. According to the Or Zarua, the emphasis is on the object, not the person: whether something new has been created in the world, not whether the person invested intellectual exertion in the matter—that is only the indication. Ultimately what determines it is whether something new was created in the world. Therefore, according to Nachmanides, carrying is an inferior labor because I do not invest intellectual energy. And according to the Or Zarua it is an inferior labor because nothing new was created here. There was an object, and it looks just as it did before; it did not change in any way, only its place changed. Therefore it is an inferior labor. So there are differences in formulation. They are not as far apart as they seem at first glance, but there really are differences here. And later—I don’t have time to get to it—in the next class I’ll continue the introduction to carrying, and then after that we’ll get into the Mishnah, so I’ll send you another page as well.
[Speaker G] This is the only labor where they define domains. Again? This is the only labor where they define domains.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. That’s why I said that’s part of the discussion in the labor of carrying.
[Speaker O] And that really also seems to be what bothers Tosafot specifically, not like Nachmanides says. I mean, it’s the same labor but in a different place.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. That’s why in that sense Tosafot is closer to the Or Zarua. Because Tosafot says: wait, nothing new happened here. It’s just that what bothers Tosafot more is not only that nothing new happened, but that even if you say something new did happen, it happened to the same degree from one private domain to another private domain—so why shouldn’t it apply there as well?
[Speaker O] The place is what matters and not the labor itself. Again? The place is what matters and not the labor itself.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is what comes out in carrying, and therefore it is an inferior labor. Because in the basic definition of the Sabbath, place should not have mattered; what matters is whether something changed in the object. So about that I’ll try to say a bit more—it’s connected, by the way, a bit to physical concepts. I’ll give you hints—concepts of entropy. But I’ll get to that next class. Just one more question and I’ll finish: where are you holding with the preparation sheet? Who hasn’t finished it, or how far did you get, just so I can get an impression? Who did finish? I understood that Miriam and Maly—apparently Miriam and Maly I know finished. Who else?
[Speaker Q] We finished. I can’t say I understood everything, but we went through all of it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. And the rest? We went through it and more or less we were there.
[Speaker L] We finished, just we didn’t go through—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —all the sources; we can go deeper into that. In short, next time I’m already giving you a page that enters into our passage itself, but in the class I’ll still continue a little with the introduction, and only after that I’ll enter the passage. All right? Okay then, thank you very much, and we’ll enter the passage—
[Speaker G] —in a smoother way, God willing. Goodbye. Thank you very much.
[Speaker N] Sabbath שלום.