Yoma, Chapter 8 – Lesson 3

This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] This isn’t some transgression that you simply fail to fulfill, and if you’re coerced then you’re coerced. At most, you’d be called someone who puts himself into a situation of coercion, and putting yourself into coercion is a separate issue in itself. By the way, usually you’re not violating something for yourself; you’re violating it for your wife. So if she can’t fulfill it and you don’t annul it, then who violated the prohibition? You did. Did you cause the prohibition to be violated? At most maybe you violated “do not place a stumbling block,” maybe. Certainly not a prohibition of annulling vows—there is no such prohibition. So those are the four types of positive commandments. I’m closing the parenthesis—this whole thing was the parenthesis, you just asked. Divorce, as I said earlier, people think it belongs to this category; I don’t think it belongs to this category. Divorce is an obligatory positive commandment, an obligated-but-conditional one. Slaughtering as well—you could discuss it, there may be room to discuss it—but slaughtering too, simply speaking, is really a commandment.

Okay, in any case, back to our topic, let me return for a moment to our discussion. So the definition of positive commandments and prohibitions is, if so, being seriously challenged in light of the facts. We’re usually used to thinking that a positive commandment is something fulfilled through positive action and neglected through passive omission, and a prohibition is the reverse. And we see that that’s not true. There are positive commandments fulfilled through passive omission, and there are prohibitions fulfilled through positive action. So now I come back and ask: what defines a commandment as a positive commandment or a prohibition? If it’s not the mode of performance—passive omission or positive action—then what is it?

[Speaker E] Its wording? The wording, the language of the verse, the way the verse formulates the commandment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You did a doctorate in Talmud, right, Doron? Yes? Why? I’ll tell you why. No, it’s not a put-down, it’s an observation. What do you mean? There’s an article by the late Aharon Shemesh, he was a professor of Talmud at Bar-Ilan.

[Speaker E] Yes, I studied with him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And he once wrote in Tarbiz about the difference between a positive commandment and a prohibition. And there he basically raises this very claim, and he shows, in the way scholars do, that there was some development in this distinction between positive commandments and prohibitions. In the earlier generations, in the earlier strata of the Talmud, you can see that the distinction is operational. Meaning: what is fulfilled through positive action is a positive commandment, and what is fulfilled through passive omission is a prohibition. But at some stage there’s a shift, some kind of transformation in this distinction, and it becomes what he calls linguistic—a linguistic definition. That’s basically what Doron suggested here. And his claim is that everything is determined by the Torah’s wording. If the Torah formulates it with ‘beware,’ ‘lest,’ and ‘do not,’ then it’s a prohibition; if the Torah formulates it positively, then it’s a positive commandment.

[Speaker C] Yes, but it’s not only a difference in wording. The difference in wording expresses some difference in content too…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Apparently you didn’t do a doctorate in Talmud, because you’re a yeshiva guy like me. And when a yeshiva guy reads this, he immediately jumps, just like Shlomo jumped here. And that’s why I commented earlier: I said, okay, I accept this distinction as a diagnosis, but it can’t be the root of the matter. Meaning, the Torah’s wording may be an indication that this is a prohibition and this is a positive commandment. Fine. But an indication of what? Or in other words: according to what did the Torah decide to formulate this one way and that one another way? After all, if you’re telling me that positive commandments and prohibitions are basically the same thing, then why did the Torah decide to formulate these commandments this way and those commandments that way? It must have had some idea behind the difference in formulations, right? What is that idea? So what really is the difference between positive commandments and prohibitions? Maybe it’s an indication of purpose?

[Speaker G] Meaning, resting is the indication; the prohibition is meant to bring you to that purpose of rest.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then they’re both positive commandments, both are positive commandments. If purpose is what determines it, then ‘do not do labor’ should also have been a positive commandment, because the purpose is that I should rest. Fine. The point is that some wanted to say: okay, this is for the practical legal differences. Meaning, the Torah wrote this in the language of a positive commandment and that in the language of a prohibition so that for this one you spend all your money and for that one only up to a fifth; so that this overrides that—positive commandments override prohibitions; human dignity overrides only in passive omission and not in positive action. There are distinctions between positive commandments and prohibitions.

[Speaker I] But no one disputes that most positive commandments happen, in practice, to involve positive action. There is a correlation between them.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correlation is nice, but correlation isn’t essence. The question still is: what is the essence?

[Speaker I] No, so I’m saying you can’t hang everything on wording, because otherwise we wouldn’t expect there to be a connection between this and the wording.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, fine. That’s maybe more support for my question, but it still doesn’t give me an explanation of what… so what is it? And on that I say: the practical differences too—once I had an argument with my study partner about lesser sancta being the owner’s property—Rabbi Yosei, yes, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. Lesser sancta are the owner’s property. I asked: what does it mean, the owner’s property? After all, you have to eat it the way sacrificial meat is eaten. In what sense is it called the owner’s property? Because you can betroth a woman with it. The fact that you can betroth a woman with it is a result of the fact that it’s the owner’s property. I’m asking: in what sense is it the owner’s property? Why can you betroth a woman with it? Give me an independent meaning from which the practical legal differences emerge. The practical difference doesn’t answer me. Same thing here: these practical differences—that here it’s only up to a fifth of one’s assets and there it’s all of one’s assets; that this overrides that, and so on—I understand. But that means there is something shared by all positive commandments, and something shared by all prohibitions, because of which these are only up to a fifth of one’s assets and those are all of one’s assets; because of which these override those; because of which human dignity overrides here and not there. What is that something? Those are results, not causes.

[Speaker C] Apparently everything you’re saying is about results, right—it’s not causes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s exactly what I’m saying. Since those are results, I’m looking for the cause that generates those results. So what really is the difference between a positive commandment and a prohibition? A hard question. More than that—I can ask it in a logical way. Look, if I say ‘put on phylacteries,’ or if I say ‘I don’t want you not to put on phylacteries,’ isn’t that logically equivalent? A double negative cancels out, right? A double negative brings us back to the positive statement. So what difference does it make whether you formulate the same thing positively or negatively? After all, it’s logically equivalent. It says the same thing. How can it be that two statements that are logically equivalent, one is a positive commandment and the other is a prohibition? They say the same thing. It’s only a question of whether you chose to say it this way or chose to say it that way.

[Speaker K] The negative—if I say it in a negative formulation, I’m assuming there’s some natural and normal thing to do, namely to put on phylacteries, and I’m telling you: don’t deviate from that thing. If I tell you ‘put on phylacteries,’ that means this isn’t the ordinary thing, or what human beings are normally supposed to do, but rather some extra level above that. So if I tell you ‘you may not ignore,’ I’m telling you that even though it’s a positive action, it’s something that ought to be natural in a person; I’m just placing something there to keep you from reaching some negative state. But generally, that’s what ought to exist in a person. And if I tell you the opposite formulation, then the opposite.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I completely agree. I think that is the definition, but I’ll explain it a bit more.

[Speaker C] Apparently this is connected to the fact that positive commandments belong more to love of God, and prohibitions to fear of God.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Completely connected. Nachmanides on the portion of Yitro. I’ll explain. Actually, once we wrote a book in the Talmudic Logic series, and there I dealt with the question: what exactly is the difference between a prohibition and a positive commandment?—precisely this question. And I went to some professor of law, who also deals a bit with philosophy, to talk with him about how legal theorists see this. And I asked him whether Israeli law also has positive commandments, or whether it has only prohibitions. He said to me: of course it has positive commandments. For example: paying taxes, serving in the army, I don’t know, things like that. I told him that in my eyes those are prohibitions. If you don’t pay taxes, you’ll be punished. If you don’t serve in the army, you’ll be punished. Those are prohibitions, not positive commandments.

[Speaker J] I once heard that it’s deliberately formulated that way.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He defined them as positive commandments because his criterion was the operational one. What’s required of you is to do something rather than not do something, so it’s a positive commandment. Then I tried to explain to him how I see it in Jewish law, and then he actually told me an interesting distinction. He told me that, by the way, around ‘do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood,’ for example, there were major debates that touched exactly on this point. Those who opposed legislating Hanan Porat’s ‘do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood’ law—one of their arguments was that you can’t insert an active obligation into the law books. So what about paying taxes and military service? They view those as passive obligations. In a moment I may comment on that.

In any case, look, he gave me a nice example, and I think I can use it. There’s a legal philosopher named Robert Nozick who once asked: what’s the difference between extortion and temptation? If I say to a person: look, if you do X, you’ll get a hundred shekels from me. If you don’t do X, you won’t get a hundred shekels. Is that allowed? Yes, of course. You’re allowed to say such a thing, right? That’s temptation. I’m trying to tempt him to do X by giving him a hundred shekels. Okay? Completely allowed. Now someone comes and says this: look, if you do X, everything will be fine. If you don’t do X, I’ll take a hundred shekels from you. Is that allowed? Extortion, right? Forbidden. Now he says: what’s the difference? In the end, you’re basically offering the person a deal where the difference between doing and not doing is a hundred shekels. So what difference does it make, and what gets defined as extortion and what gets defined as temptation?

[Speaker I] And the answer is that it’s forbidden to take a hundred shekels.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, and the answer is this: there is some state, some zero state—that’s exactly Ariel’s formulation earlier—there is some zero state which is the reasonable state. Meaning, it’s the state in which everyone has his rights and no one harms the rights of another. I’m allowed to waive my rights or add rights to someone else; I’m not allowed to violate his rights without his permission. Right? Basic, basic assumptions. Now if I offer him a tempting deal, I say: look, if you do X, you’ll get a hundred shekels. I’m allowed to give him a hundred shekels, right? If you don’t do X, you won’t get the hundred shekels—I’m also allowed not to give him the hundred shekels. Both steps I’m taking upon myself are permissible steps. I’m allowed not to give, and I’m allowed to give. Therefore that’s legitimate. What happens in extortion? In extortion I say to him: look, if you do X, everything will be fine; if you don’t, I’ll take a hundred shekels from you. But I’m not allowed to take a hundred shekels from him. Now you can play around and say, okay, so let him do X and then I won’t take it—what’s the problem? After all, not taking from him is a permitted action, right? So let him do X and then he won’t force me to take the hundred shekels. But that’s obviously sophistry. Why? Because he has the right not to do X, just like I have the right not to give him the hundred shekels. I’m not allowed to dictate a violation of his right, and therefore extortion is defined as a forbidden act, because one of the two options I’m presenting to him is a forbidden option.

What does that actually mean? The distinction between temptation and extortion basically says that there is some definition of an absolute zero, above which is giving something—that’s positive, that’s something one may do—and below which one may not go, because that is a violation of rights. If I give an option between zero and one, legitimate. If I give an option between minus one and zero, not legitimate. Okay? Let’s return to positive commandments and prohibitions. My claim, exactly like Ariel said earlier, is that the distinction between positive commandments and prohibitions lies in the question whether the Torah instructs me toward a positive state or forbids me from being in a negative state. What does that mean? Suppose the Torah tells me to put on phylacteries. Then it is telling me: look, the state of being with phylacteries is a positive state. That is a positive commandment. What happens if I don’t put on phylacteries? Then I’m not in the positive state. Being without phylacteries is not a negative state; it is simply not being in the positive state. Okay? Let’s leave aside for a moment the difference between an obligatory positive commandment and merely fulfilling one, because that requires a discussion of its own. Let’s leave that for now. So not neglecting a positive commandment means not rising to the positive level, remaining in the zero state. If the Torah had told me, ‘I don’t want you to be without phylacteries,’ which is basically the same thing—it’s telling me to put on phylacteries but in negative language—that’s not true; it’s not the same thing. Because then the Torah would be telling me that being without phylacteries is a negative state. If you’re with phylacteries, I don’t care—that’s not a positive state; it’s only that if you’re with the phylacteries you’ve avoided being in the negative state. That’s all. It’s not a state that has value in itself to be with phylacteries; it’s only a state in which you’re not in the negative state.

[Speaker F] Rabbi, may I ask?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One second, Shlomo. Yes?

[Speaker C] According to this, it wouldn’t make sense for one thing to have both a positive commandment and a prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It does make sense, it does. I’ll explain in a moment.

[Speaker C] Yes, but apparently at first glance, no.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’ll explain in a moment. Yes, Eliyahu. Right, yes.

[Speaker F] According to this, what comes out from what the rabbi is now saying is that a positive commandment is some kind of bonus—be on some level of…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Some added level, yes. And then the prohibition—

[Speaker F] The prohibition preserves the basic state. So according to that—and if I’m not mistaken there’s also the Maharal who says that violating a prohibition is more severe than performing a positive commandment, or something like that, I don’t remember exactly—then how, on the other hand, is there the Talmudic rule we’ve discussed a lot in this class, that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition? Seemingly the prohibition ought to be much more significant.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll answer in a moment. I’ll answer in a moment, okay? I see that I’m already— I see I’ve gone the whole class on this topic, so let’s talk about it a bit. I didn’t plan to, but let’s talk about it a bit. Look, the claim basically—I’ll say it in a moment—the claim is that a positive commandment is a commandment that points you to a positive state. Neglecting a positive commandment is not being in a negative state; it’s not being in the positive state. Okay. A prohibition is a commandment that points you to a negative state. If you avoid it, you haven’t violated the prohibition—you haven’t done something positive, you just weren’t in the negative state. Fine? And if the Torah tells you to put on phylacteries, then it’s saying that being with phylacteries is a positive state. If the Torah had formulated the same thing in passive, negative wording, then it would be saying something else; it would not be saying the same thing. It would be saying that being without phylacteries is a negative state. That is not the zero state. Being with phylacteries would then be the zero state. Therefore it’s very important whether the Torah formulates it positively or negatively. By the way, the claim of logical equivalence is also a mistake—a mistake in formalization, for those who know. It is not true that those two formulations are logically equivalent. Why? To say ‘I want you to be with phylacteries’ is not the same as, and not logically equivalent to, the claim ‘I do not want you to be without phylacteries.’ The ‘not’ and the ‘want’ are not commutative. The question is whether you do not want, or you want-not. People assume that’s commutative, but it isn’t. If you do the calculation on paper, you’ll see those are not two logically equivalent statements. It’s simply a mistake.

In any case, for our purposes, what I’m basically trying to claim is that the positive formulation and the negative formulation are not logically equivalent; they do not say the same thing. And then my claim is the following. You know what, first I’ll answer Shlomo. What happens when the prohibition and the positive commandment are doubled? For example, with Sabbath observance. I have the positive commandment of resting and the prohibition against doing labor. In that case the Torah is basically telling me—

[Speaker G] commanding me to be in a—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] positive state. ‘Rest’ is a positive state. One second. ‘Rest’ is a positive state, and doing labor is not a zero state; it is a negative state. There are situations in which there is no zero state. If you do it, you’re in a positive state; if you don’t do it, you’re in a negative state. The Torah describes such situations by means of a doubled prohibition and positive commandment.

[Speaker C] Is there an example like that outside the Torah? I mean, in the world of concepts, is there such a thing?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. That’s a matter of interpretation. If you interpret paying taxes as something positive, then you could say the same there. It’s an interpretive issue. I don’t know—decide.

[Speaker C] Yes, but are the two systems there simultaneously? Yes?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What’s the problem? Why can’t you say that doing labor is something negative—it’s not merely not being in the positive state—and that resting is not merely not being in the negative state, but being in a positive state? There can be such a situation. What’s the problem? Why not? There is no zero state here. All right?

It’s like—you know—at the end of the first chapter of tractate Ketubot, these are yeshiva jokes. You know what the yeshiva jokes are? There’s a topic there about a baby found abandoned, at the end of the first chapter of Ketubot. So the Talmud says: if it’s a place where half are Jews and half are gentiles, then he’s in doubt, maybe Jewish maybe gentile; you follow the majority. If it’s half Jews and half gentiles, then it’s a doubt. Okay? What do you do? You go stringently. In a Torah-level doubt, one goes stringently, right? So usually there’s no problem. Say, with forbidden foods—it will be forbidden for him to eat because he may be Jewish. Okay? There are certain things forbidden for him as a gentile. Okay? But what happens, say, regarding Sabbath observance? As a Jew he is obligated; as a gentile he is forbidden—not merely not obligated.

[Speaker H] A gentile who observes the Sabbath is liable to death.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Liable to death. Now here there is no way out. This is, for example, a situation in which there is no zero state. In all the ordinary situations there is a zero state versus one, or zero versus minus one. So there I can always tell you what the stringency is, what it means to act stringently. But in situations like this, where there is no zero state—there is either one or minus one—there, there is no stringency, there is no zero state. The yeshiva joke asks: what should he do with Torah study? Torah study is forbidden to a gentile—‘an inheritance’ becoming ‘a betrothed woman,’ yes—and a Jew is obligated. What should he do? He should talk in learning. That’s the yeshiva students’ wasting-time joke, all right? So he’ll talk in learning.

Anyway, for our purposes, the point is that a prohibition and a positive commandment together—those doubled states of prohibition and positive commandment—are situations in which there is no zero state. You can be in a positive state or in a negative state; there’s no way to satisfy all opinions and all approaches by going stringently. There’s no such thing. You have to make a decision. Either you’re in a positive state, or you’re in a negative state. That is the situation of doubled prohibitions and positive commandments.

Now look at a practical implication. Say there were only a positive commandment to build a parapet. Again, I’m ignoring for the moment the difference between an obligatory positive commandment and one whose fulfillment is merely commendable, because that complicates the picture even more. Suppose there were a positive commandment to build a parapet, and there were no prohibition of ‘do not place blood in your house.’ Okay? Then what are they really telling me here? That building the parapet is a positive state. A house without a parapet is not a negative state, but simply not a positive state. Right? If only the positive commandment were written. If only the prohibition were written, then it would say the opposite: a house without a parapet is a negative state. A house with a parapet is merely not a negative state. Right, positive. Yes.

Now look: this distinction neutralizes the distinction between positive action and passive omission. Right. For example, when I say, ‘do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood.’ That’s a prohibition fulfilled through positive action, right? By saving my friend. Meaning, an action is required of me even though this is a prohibition. Why is it a prohibition? Because they are telling me that failure to save is a negative state. Saving is basic. Saving is not something for which you deserve a medal. If you didn’t save, then you’re wicked. If you did save, you’re not righteous—you did your duty. Therefore it is a prohibition. And it doesn’t bother me at all that this prohibition is fulfilled through positive action, because the definition distinguishing a prohibition from a positive commandment doesn’t depend on the manner of performance—whether it is physically positive action or omission—but on the question: what is the normative evaluative character of the state? Is it a positive state or a negative state? The positive or negative state can be a state of action or a state of omission. Both can be positive and both can be negative according to the Torah’s definition. And the Torah chooses positive or negative wording for positive commandments and prohibitions according to how it wants to tell us the value of that state—whether it is a state with positive value or merely not negative—regardless of whether it involves action or inaction.

[Speaker F] If it’s both?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then there’s both a prohibition and a positive commandment.

[Speaker F] Yes, there’s a doubled prohibition and positive commandment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s exactly the case of a doubled prohibition and positive commandment, like on the Sabbath.

[Speaker F] Then you can say that it’s either minus one or one, but not zero.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. In the laws of Sabbath there is no zero state. If you do an action—prohibited labor—then you are in a minus-one state, and if you rest then you’re in a plus-one state. You can’t be in a zero state because there is both a prohibition and a positive commandment. If there were only a prohibition, then resting would be the zero state. It wouldn’t be fulfillment of a positive commandment; it would only be avoidance of a negative state.

[Speaker F] And how would the rabbi define a gentile who doesn’t do labor on the Sabbath? Is he in a zero state?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. From his perspective there’s no issue—do it, don’t do it—it’s all a zero state.

[Speaker F] So for the gentile it really is either zero or minus one, whereas for a Jew it’s either minus one or one?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there’s no minus one. For the gentile it’s simply zero. He can do labor and he can refrain from labor—it makes no difference.

[Speaker F] But if he refrains from labor and observes the Sabbath, then that’s a problem.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s in terms of a prohibition of theft, not the prohibitions of labor. Fine, so as far as the prohibition of theft goes, you’re right. But on the principled level, I’m saying that as far as the laws of Sabbath are concerned, the Sabbath for a gentile is something neutral, transparent—nothing. Zero state. Do whatever you want. All right?

[Speaker C] What about, for example—it’s a particularly elevated commandment—but what about knowledge of God? Why doesn’t the commandment of knowledge of God have a prohibition, basically? Because its prohibition is ‘you shall have no other gods.’

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? What does that have to do with it? Knowledge of God means a kind of study, understanding. ‘You shall have no other gods’ is worship. Fine? Yes.

[Speaker C] So in general, then, it doesn’t have a prohibition? No. So what, then it’s not negative?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s only not positive. You’re bringing us back in through the back door to the distinction between a prohibition and a positive commandment, between a merely fulfillable positive commandment and an obligatory positive commandment. Because what I described here is basically a merely fulfillable positive commandment. Because it means: if you did it, you’re in a positive state; if you didn’t do it, nothing happened—it’s not a negative state. But with an obligatory positive commandment there is also neglect of a positive commandment. Meaning, if you don’t do it, that is a negative state. Then the question arises: what is the difference between neglecting an obligatory positive commandment and a prohibition?

[Speaker C] So it’s negative in a different degree?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Is it a question of degree?

[Speaker C] A different degree. Not doing something good and doing something bad—even if the good thing was obligatory, it’s not the same kind of offense.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And that is the answer to that question. I think the answer is that there’s a difference between the censure involved when you’re not in a positive state that you’re expected to be in. Then sometimes it’s okay—you’re not some great saint, nothing terrible happened. But there are certain kinds of righteousness required of us, such that if someone isn’t there, there is a claim against him. That doesn’t mean he is in a negative state, because every gentile is there and that’s fine. But it is still a demand, and the Torah views it negatively if you’re not there. That is called neglect of an obligatory positive commandment. And it still isn’t a prohibition.

[Speaker C] All these definitions of positive commandments, and the way the Torah expressed itself as positive commandment and prohibition—besides the practical differences—is it also meant to create in us a certain consciousness and way of relating to things?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand the question. Obviously—it’s the way of relating to things. What else, aside from the commandments themselves, would it mean?

[Speaker C] She wants us, by force of the commandments and the knowledge that this is a positive commandment—I don’t know.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can say yes and you can say no. It doesn’t follow from what I said. It may be that this is only the Torah’s own conception; it’s the basis for why it requires these things of us. The question whether we ourselves need to enter the conceptual level and understand why resting on the Sabbath is a positive state—that’s a worldview question. I don’t know. Maybe yes, maybe no. It doesn’t follow from what I’m saying.

[Speaker C] And isn’t that part of the commandment of Torah study—to study the commandments and learn the commandments?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe yes, I don’t know, but it’s not a necessary consequence of what I’m saying. Maybe yes, maybe no. In any case, the reason for the verse—fine, never mind, you can discuss it, but it’s not connected to what I’m saying here.

[Speaker F] Rabbi, you still haven’t addressed my question. I said that a positive commandment is an extra thing. Again.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m getting there, I’m getting there. I just want to say that all the implications we know regarding a prohibition and a positive commandment—look, they actually still stand even according to my distinction. Here I’m getting to your correlation, Binyamin. What you said earlier, that there is a correlation with positive action and passive omission. Because basically, if you think about it, what is the difference between positive action and passive omission? Why indeed are positive commandments usually by positive action—what are the essential differences? So what if the Torah demands action from me or non-action? The point is this. If I did something that the Torah forbids me to do, then I clashed head-on with the Torah’s will. I did something that it explicitly told me not to do. By contrast, if I neglected a positive commandment, then I didn’t clash head-on with the Torah’s will; I simply didn’t do something that it did want me to do. Right? That’s how we would explain the difference between violating through passive omission and violating through positive action.

My claim is that this is exactly the same explanation with respect to my distinction—just not on the physical plane but on the conceptual plane. If the Torah tells me there is a positive commandment to rest, and I did labor—fine—I did not clash head-on with the Torah’s will. The Torah did not say not to do labor; it said to rest. When I did labor, I wasn’t in a state of rest, but the very act of doing labor, in itself, was not a head-on clash with the Torah’s will. When the Torah prohibited labor—where there is also a prohibition—then the Torah is telling me that your doing labor is a head-on clash with my will. That’s much more severe. But notice that now this no longer depends on whether it’s active doing or refraining, yes, or not doing. Rather, it depends on whether you do something—or fail to do something—or find yourself in a state that the Torah defines as negative. That is a head-on clash with the Torah’s will. But if you are merely not in a state that the Torah defines as positive, then you did not do the Torah’s will, but it isn’t a head-on clash. It’s like carrot and stick. There’s a difference between giving a person a carrot to tempt him—temptation and extortion—to do something, and hitting him if he doesn’t do it. Why? Because if I hit him when he doesn’t do it, it hurts. If he doesn’t eat the carrot, then if he doesn’t do it, it won’t hurt; it just won’t taste good. Assuming he’s a rabbit and likes carrots. Okay.

So the point is that the same distinction people have intuitively between positive action and passive omission remains in place even under my definition. I just want to claim that positive action and passive omission are not defined physically—whether I do something or don’t do something—but normatively. If I perform a positive act, that’s called positive action; and if I refrain from a negative act, that’s called passive omission—even if that refraining is done by means of a physical act, or even if that doing is accomplished by refraining on the physical level. Do you understand? That is why I claim that people’s intuition to distinguish between positive commandments and prohibitions is a correct intuition. It remains even in my definition. It just gets abstracted.

And here I return to Aharon Shemesh, because I think that very often you can indeed see that the earlier strata in the Talmud—the Mishnah as compared with the Talmud, say—are more concrete, and the later strata abstract out principles that appear in the earlier layers. And I think that’s what happens here. The distinction of positive action underwent abstraction, but that abstraction didn’t throw the baby out with the bathwater. Meaning, the same distinction that existed when people thought this was an operational distinction still exists when one grasps the matter in its abstract form.

And now look: all the practical implications remain well explained. Why do I have to spend all my assets for a prohibition, but only a fifth of my assets for a positive commandment? Because if I violate a prohibition, I am in a negative state. In order not to be in a negative state, I have to spend all my assets. That’s basic. But in order to be righteous—in order to be righteous—I need only spend a fifth of my assets. Otherwise, not being righteous isn’t so terrible; it doesn’t make me wicked. Notice: this has nothing to do with whether it is done through action or omission. I am translating all the intuitions you would have told me about action versus omission into intuitions formulated in the language of being in a positive state or not being in a negative state.

And all the practical differences—positive commandments overriding prohibitions, spending money, and whatever else—human dignity overriding only in passive omission and not in positive action—my claim is that when we say it overrides in passive omission, we mean it overrides a positive state; it does not override and permit me to be in a negative state. Not positive commandment and prohibition in the physical sense. Okay? Now many later authorities discussed this. There’s Noda B’Yehuda on human dignity, and Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman—many later authorities discussed this. According to the formulation I’m giving here, things come out clear as daylight. The question whether it’s positive action or passive omission means positive commandments or prohibitions—that’s an investigation among the later authorities. In many places where a distinction is made between passive omission and positive action, they discuss whether this is a distinction between positive commandments and prohibitions, or between commandments fulfilled by positive action—which can be either a prohibition or a positive commandment—and commandments fulfilled by passive omission—which can also be either a prohibition or a positive commandment. And my claim is that there is room to say that this is a distinction between prohibition and positive commandment, even though the Talmud says it’s a distinction between positive action and passive omission. Because in my account, in essence, every fulfillment of a positive commandment is positive action. Sometimes the positive action is done through omission, but it is still positive action in the conceptual sense. The meaning of positive action is: put yourself in a positive state. That’s called positive action. Or, being in a negative state is a violation through positive action, while not being in that state is a violation or a commandment through passive omission. That’s why all this explains very well why, when the Talmud speaks about positive action versus passive omission, there are later authorities who say that this means positive commandment versus prohibition. And that seems wrong, because there are positive commandments fulfilled through passive omission. My claim is: no, that’s not true. There are no positive commandments fulfilled through passive omission. There are positive commandments fulfilled through physical omission, but conceptually that is always positive action. That is the point I want to make.

Now I’ll come back to the point you raised, Eliyahu, which really is a tricky situation. These things, it seems to me, are basically written in Nachmanides on the portion of Yitro. Nachmanides there, on the commandment of Sabbath, discusses ‘remember’ versus ‘observe’ in the first and last versions of the Ten Commandments, and Nachmanides says there that ‘remember’ is a positive commandment and ‘observe’ is a prohibition. And Nachmanides says there that positive commandments come from love, while prohibitions come from fear. In our terms, what does that mean? Love means that even if they point me to a positive state, and not being there isn’t a negative state, still if I love the Holy One, blessed be He, then I will go to the state He wants me to be in. That’s what I do for someone I love. Not because of physical positive action versus passive omission, but because then I am careful to be in the positive state that the Holy One, blessed be He, defines as positive, and not to remain in a neutral state—even though in the neutral state I’m not wicked, I’m neutral—but if I love Him, that’s what I will do. But if I only fear Him and don’t love Him, then in a state He defines as negative I will make sure not to be there. But to be righteous—maybe not. I may allow myself to remain in the zero state. Therefore prohibitions, in essence, regardless of positive action or passive omission, belong to the trait of fear, and positive commandments belong to the trait of love.

Now he says this: positive commandments are greater than prohibitions because love is greater than fear, and therefore a positive commandment overrides a prohibition. On this, several later authorities ask him—for example the Sdei Chemed asks him—how can that be? After all, for a prohibition we spend all our assets, and for a positive commandment only up to a fifth. Human dignity overrides a positive commandment but does not override a prohibition. So the Sdei Chemed says this—and I’m doing this a bit quickly because I want to finish with it today at least; all this I had only planned as an introduction to the beginning of the class—the Sdei Chemed basically wants to say this, and these are two sides of the same coin. It’s not a resolution; it’s simply the way it is.

[Speaker I] When I—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] speak about a positive commandment, the positive commandment points me to a positive state; it requires me to be in a positive state, whether through action or through omission. A prohibition requires me not to be in a negative state, okay? But if I compare the fulfillment of a positive commandment to refraining from a prohibition, which is greater? Obviously one is greater than zero, right? Refraining from a prohibition means being in the zero state; fulfilling a positive commandment means being in the one state. Which is greater? The one state. But on the negative side, on the side of transgression rather than fulfillment—if I violate a prohibition, and if I neglect a positive commandment, which is more severe? Obviously minus one is more severe than zero. So there is no contradiction at all. It’s obvious. These are two sides of the same coin. On the side of fulfillment, the positive commandment prevails over the prohibition. On the side of neglect, the prohibition prevails over the positive commandment. Because on the side of neglect, neglect of a positive commandment is less severe than violating a prohibition. On the side of fulfillment, the person who fulfills a positive commandment is more righteous than the person who refrains from violating a prohibition.

Now, in order not to violate a positive commandment, I spend only up to a fifth of my assets. Why? Because the money is not spent in order to fulfill the positive commandment, but in order not to be in a state where I fail to fulfill it. And that is of course less bad than being in a state where I violate a prohibition. There, certainly I must spend all my assets in order not to be in a state of violating a prohibition. I am not doing this in order to avoid; I am doing it in order not to transgress. All right? So obviously, to avoid violating a prohibition I spend more money than to avoid failing to fulfill a positive commandment.

But—and this was Eliyahu’s question earlier, and it’s a major puzzle in Nachmanides’ words—Nachmanides says that therefore it is also obvious that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition. Now, that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition is not at all simple. Because notice, take an example. Suppose I have to eat matzah. Fine? On the night of Passover there is an obligatory positive commandment to eat matzah. But I have only grain from the new crop; there is no grain from the old crop. I have only grain from the new crop. New grain is forbidden until the day of the waving of the omer, right? Until the day after Passover. So I’m not allowed to eat it. Yet a positive commandment overrides a prohibition. I can take grain from the new crop, bake matzot from it, and fulfill the commandment of eating matzah with them. A positive commandment overrides a prohibition. Okay? Now let’s try to understand how we arrive at that ruling, that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition.

On the one hand, I have the option of fulfilling the positive commandment and violating the prohibition. Fulfilling the positive commandment is one.

[Speaker H] Violating the prohibition is minus one.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what is the overall value of the decision to violate the prohibition and fulfill the positive commandment? Zero. The second alternative is not to violate the prohibition of the new crop and not to eat matzah. What’s the result there? Minus one? Zero. Zero also. I didn’t fulfill the positive commandment and I didn’t violate the prohibition. In both cases it’s zero. So why does a positive commandment override a prohibition? Seemingly the two options are equivalent. Because fulfillment of the positive commandment always comes together with violating a prohibition, and neglect of the positive commandment always comes together with avoiding the prohibition. So it’s a big plus and a big minus against a small plus and a small minus, and they cancel out. Why does Nachmanides say that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition? And more than that, why does Nachmanides think this follows from what he said above, that the positive commandment is greater than the prohibition? Even if you had some rationale here—but Nachmanides sees this as a consequence of the distinction he made above, of the why. Why is it a consequence of that?

The answer—and I’ll say it briefly now—is: what did the Torah command?

[Speaker C] Not yet—it’s not that I have the two commands before me and now I have to decide. The question is: what did the Torah command here?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Torah commanded nothing—it commanded both, and now I have to decide which overrides which.

[Speaker C] The Torah didn’t tell me, ‘you decide.’ The Torah wants me to understand.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Where does it want that, and where did it say that?

[Speaker F] It told me that there is—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the commandment to eat matzah, and it told me there is the prohibition of the new crop.

[Speaker F] Now I’m in conflict—what should I do? A decision has to be made.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You don’t have to violate the new crop to eat matzah. Eat from the old crop.

[Speaker F] Why do you need that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But you don’t have any, you don’t have any old crop now. How can you?

[Speaker F] You have no grain from the old crop. It didn’t grow; there was a drought; nothing grew. Fine, so that’s something else, but that’s the question. But wait, didn’t the rabbi explain this earlier when he said that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition because a prohibition only means I’m not righteous, whereas a positive commandment means I’m righteous? The rabbi distinguished between neglect and transgression.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what I’m saying: it’s not correct, it’s not an explanation. Why not? Because if you—this is why I brought the example. One possibility is to bake matzah from the new grain and eat it. That’s the solution of a positive commandment overriding a prohibition, right? And what happens then? I fulfill the positive commandment and violate the prohibition. That’s a big positive and a big negative. Overall I gained a value of zero. If I decide not to use the new grain.

[Speaker E] But if we say that fulfilling a positive commandment is a greater positive than neglecting a prohibition is a negative, because this is love and that is awe, then what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. Love versus awe is the comparison between fulfilling the positive commandment and refraining from the prohibition. But where do you know the absolute value of fulfilling a positive commandment as against violating a prohibition? You have no source for that.

[Speaker F] Maybe a transgression for the sake of Heaven, because of the transgression.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, this is not a transgression for the sake of Heaven. If it’s permitted, then it’s permitted, and if it’s forbidden, then it’s forbidden. It’s not a transgression for the sake of Heaven. A transgression for the sake of Heaven is a completely different topic. Here the question is whether a positive commandment overrides a prohibition.

[Speaker F] There’s also a transgression here—you’re eating from the new grain before the omer permits it—so that’s a transgression. True, but it’s for the sake of Heaven because you want to eat matzah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] As a verbal formulation, that’s true, but it has nothing to do with the topic of a transgression for the sake of Heaven. It has to do with the topic of a positive commandment overriding a prohibition. The question is: which takes precedence? After you decide that this takes precedence, then you can eat it. But explain to me why you decide that it takes precedence.

[Speaker C] Apparently the assumption is that love is more important than, let’s say, awe—the relation between them.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The question is: where does it come from that the absolute value of the positive value is greater than the absolute value of the negative value? That’s not written in Maimonides. And Maimonides says that from what he wrote above it follows that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition. How does that follow from there? Only if you add the assumption that this is plus two and that is minus one. But that’s not written in Maimonides. In Maimonides it says that love is greater than awe. “Love is greater than awe” means one is greater than zero. That is fulfilling the positive commandment versus refraining from the prohibition, not

[Speaker F] fulfilling the positive commandment versus violating the prohibition. Where do we learn in general that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Talmud in the beginning of tractate Yevamot discusses it, learns it from tzitzit—it’s a complicated story. But I want to explain—look, there’s a simple mistake here. Here I actually am bringing in the positive commandment and the existential positive commandment. What do I mean? If I fulfill the commandment and eat matzah from the new grain, I have plus one and minus one; they cancel each other out, right? If I don’t eat the matzah, I have minus one-half. Failing to fulfill a positive commandment is a small negative. But I’m not violating the prohibition of the new grain; that’s not plus one-half, that’s zero. Refraining from a prohibition is not a low-level positive state; it’s simply a state of zero, net. Okay? So really the comparison here is between zero and minus one-half, not between zero and zero.

[Speaker E] Meaning, canceling a positive commandment is not zero? Canceling a positive commandment is less than zero?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course, because after all this is a positive commandment in the strong sense. If it were an existential positive commandment, then yes. That’s a question—the Raavad at the beginning of Sifra argues that even an existential positive commandment overrides a prohibition. That cannot be explained in this model. But with a positive commandment in the strong sense, if you fail to fulfill it, then you have some kind of transgression—a small transgression, let’s call it minus one-half, minus one-quarter, whatever. And you have one plus minus one on the side where a positive commandment overrides a prohibition, which gives you zero. On the side where a positive commandment does not override a prohibition, you have minus one-quarter. Zero is preferable to minus one-quarter. That’s what Maimonides means.

[Speaker F] So what you said before, that a positive commandment is just net extra—that’s only with an existential commandment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. I noted that earlier too. I said there’s a difference between a positive commandment in the strong sense and an existential positive commandment, and the only way I can explain the difference in this model is that with a positive commandment in the strong sense, there’s something negative in the fact that you weren’t righteous enough. With an existential positive commandment, you’re not required to be righteous. If you want, then be righteous, but there’s no expectation that you be righteous. With a positive commandment in the strong sense, there is an expectation that you be righteous, so if you weren’t righteous, then it’s not a fully negative state, but there is some kind of problem there. Quantitatively, I call it minus one-quarter instead of minus one—it doesn’t matter. Okay? So on these considerations it really does come out that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition. Fine, so in fact today we dealt with a topic I hadn’t planned on at all, but we’ll stop here. For the next class, take a look a bit at the prohibition and the positive commandment of affliction and of eating, look at Maimonides, look a bit at his commentaries, and look at Sabbath 114—there’s a passage there that apparently says, with Rashi and Tosafot, there’s a passage there from which one can apparently understand the source of the positive commandment of labor. Is there a positive commandment of labor on Yom Kippur? Look in tractate Shabbat 114 about gathering vegetables.

[Speaker E] Maybe the Rabbi can put it in the folder?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll put it in at the end. I’ll upload a summary of this class. You know, basically the summary of this class is an article. I’ll put an article there, and I’ll also put in another page with the sources. And then I’ll put in another page there with these instructions, okay.

[Speaker E] Okay, thank you very much.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Thanks. So, see you.