The Voice of Prophecy, Lesson 21
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- Plotinus, the Alexandrians, and the addition of the Logos
- Three levels of beauty in Don Yehuda Abravanel and the Nazir
- Integrating Plato into the Torah and creation of the world
- Abravanel quotation: father, mother, and son and the chain of emanation
- Agnon, the three priests, and the question of the Trinity
- Beauty, sight, and apprehending the good
- Matter, form, and the thing in itself
- Sight in Abravanel and what is missing in the “auditory” conception
- Homilies, the thirteen hermeneutic principles, and listening to the Torah and the world
- The onion, hierarchy, and Spinoza
- Place, soul, the created light of glory, and seeing God
- Aesthetic evaluation: visual comparison versus non-visual thought
Summary
General Overview
The text presents the Nazir’s reading of Don Yehuda Abravanel as adding a further layer to the aesthetic world, parallel to the addition of the Logos behind the world of ideas among the Alexandrians, and describes in Abravanel three levels of beauty: the beautifying beautiful, beauty, and the beautified beautiful. It presents this move as an attempt to integrate Platonism and Neoplatonism into a Torah framework of creation, but argues that in the end Abravanel remains within a visual conception that limits the connection to the “simple and hidden source.” From there develops a distinction between visual thinking, which compares forms and images, and an “auditory” perception that allows connection to the thing itself through divine speech, homily, and Torah tools, and ultimately also through the “created light of glory” or the Shekhinah.
Plotinus, the Alexandrians, and the addition of the Logos
Plotinus and Don Yehuda Abravanel add another layer to the world of aesthetic concepts, and this move exactly parallels the addition of the Logos to the ideas in section 8. The Alexandrians, who mediate between the Platonic Academy and the Stoa, introduce a Logos behind the world of ideas. Don Yehuda Abravanel performs a parallel move in the aesthetic realm and introduces into it “the beautifying beautiful” as the force that drives the process of beautification.
Three levels of beauty in Don Yehuda Abravanel and the Nazir
In Don Yehuda Abravanel there are three concepts of beauty according to the Nazir’s description: beauty, the beautified beautiful, and the beautifying beautiful, although in other descriptions seen by the author only “beautifying beautiful” and “beautified beautiful” appear. The text notes that there is no certainty what actually appears in the source and asks whether there is a Hebrew translation. The text refers to The Power of Love in two editions: an old edition called The Dialogue and a newer one, Dialogues on Love, published by Bialik Institute, and suggests checking the matter inside the text itself.
Integrating Plato into the Torah and creation of the world
In section 15 Don Yehuda Abravanel brings the Platonic or Neoplatonic concept of the idea into the Torah and turns Plato into a disciple of our elders in divine matters, in an effort to bring him into a Torah framework. In the notes, Rabbi Azariah dei Rossi is cited as saying that prime matter according to Plato is also created anew, in order to integrate him with a Torah conception of a created world. The text argues that a static Greek framework of fixed ideas leaves no room for creation and active forces, and therefore the Greeks did not believe in creation and saw the world as eternal; Plato too remains within that same Greek framework.
Abravanel quotation: father, mother, and son and the chain of emanation
The text quotes Abravanel: “There are three levels in beauty: that which brings it forth, it itself, and that which is affected by it. That is to say, the beautifying beautiful, beauty, and the beautified beautiful.” It defines the beautifying beautiful as the father of beauty, the supreme God; beauty as the supreme wisdom and the first intellectual paradigm, the mother; and the beautified beautiful as the son of beauty, the created reality. The text notes the terminology “father, mother, and son” and raises the possibility of a Christian shadow, but also brings reservations and biographical complications surrounding Don Yehuda Abravanel, including mention that the king of Portugal captured the son of Don Yitzhak Abravanel and that the son composed Complaint Against Time.
Agnon, the three priests, and the question of the Trinity
The text tells of an Agnon story in which a Jew closes his shop before the Sabbath and three Christian priests come to him, enter his home, and ask about the two candles and “the candle for the son.” The text describes how at some point they disappear or one remains, and in the end it turns out that the remaining one is a woman Jew in disguise. It notes that there was great resentment in rabbinic circles over Agnon’s very engagement with such things. The text suggests that the story carries the claim that the Christian Trinity is not entirely foreign to the Jewish spirit, and parallels it to kabbalistic ideas such as the Shekhinah as female consort, the configurations “father, mother, and Ze’ir Anpin,” and the saying “The Holy One, blessed be He, Israel, and the Torah are one,” while considering a possible closeness and shared roots through Gnosticism.
Beauty, sight, and apprehending the good
The text explains that for Abravanel the beautifying beautiful is the supreme God, beauty is the supreme wisdom, and the son is the created reality that receives emanation through a metaphysical mechanism of flow from above. It adds that aesthetics in Abravanel draws from deeper processes and seems like a garment for kabbalistic ideas. It continues with the quotation: “Beauty is something seen either by the eyes of the body or by the eyes of the intellect, and therefore it is said, ‘And God saw all that He had made, and behold it was very good,’ and good means beautiful, for visible good is always beauty,” and explains that intellectual sight apprehends beauty as divine wisdom, but “the beginning, the simple and exalted source” remains hidden and is not grasped through sight.
Matter, form, and the thing in itself
The text uses the framework of matter and form to explain that cognition acts on the form rather than the matter of a thing, and that just as one cannot apprehend the substance in itself through the senses but only its properties, so too the world of ideas has a hidden source that cannot be grasped by the tools of sight. It presents the beautifying beautiful as a force or owner that activates the world of ideas, paralleling this to the insertion of a Logos behind the ideas. It emphasizes that the ideas are “the form of beauty” and not beauty itself in the sense of the source, and that the notions of “seal and imprint” leave the process within a static visual framework.
Sight in Abravanel and what is missing in the “auditory” conception
The text states that “in The Dialogue on Love he elevates the sense of sight above all the senses,” and therefore Abravanel has still not arrived at the Nazir’s full auditory conception. It presents the problem as follows: Abravanel indeed recognizes the existence of a motivating source behind the ideas, but maintains that it cannot be apprehended and therefore there is no way to create contact with it. The text identifies what is missing as the ability to “listen” to the Logos or the divine utterance and not merely infer its existence, and formulates the distinction through the image of hearing behind a wall as opposed to sight, which stops at the external walls.
Homilies, the thirteen hermeneutic principles, and listening to the Torah and the world
The text brings an example from concepts like “Jew” and “good” in order to argue that the ability to debate characteristics and propose alternative definitions points to a connection with the concept itself even before its characteristics are fixed. It connects this to a later claim about the thirteen hermeneutic principles by which the Torah is expounded as Semitic tools, and sees homily as a form of “listening” to what lies behind the verses. It presents listening to the Torah and listening to the world as acts of the same family that enable a non-visual kind of perception.
The onion, hierarchy, and Spinoza
The text clarifies that the beautifying beautiful is not “just another level” on the same hierarchical axis of ideas and objects, but rather the owner who stands “to the side” of the entire structure, using the image of an onion with inner and outer layers. It illustrates this through a pyramid of values within a person and distinguishes between the layers of values within the form and the will or the person in itself, which is not a point in the pyramid but its owner. It mentions Spinoza and the claim that “nature and God” are one substance, and distinguishes such a view from a position in which the worlds are manifestations or forms of divine action and not the Holy One, blessed be He, Himself.
Place, soul, the created light of glory, and seeing God
The text connects the non-location of the thing in itself to the image of the soul, and cites the idea that “He is the place of the world, and the world is not His place.” It quotes from section 18: “The great figures of Jewish religious philosophy, when discussing divine unity, clarified decisively that sight does not apply to Him. For sight has no dominion over apprehending Him. And if seeing is said of God, it refers to the created light of glory, or the Shekhinah, not to the Holy One, blessed be He, Himself.” It presents the light of glory and the Shekhinah as forms of revelation that have a place, in contrast to the Holy One, blessed be He, Himself, and connects this to the sanctification formula: “Where is the place of His glory to adore Him?”
Aesthetic evaluation: visual comparison versus non-visual thought
The text presents two models for evaluating beauty: a Platonic-scientific model of comparing an ideal image with a concrete object and measuring the “distance,” as opposed to a model in which a person uses the very concept of beauty and infers from it about the case without placing an ideal image before the eyes or imagination. It argues that the scientific model is the kind of thing one would use to build a machine for evaluating beauty, but it is not necessarily faithful to the way human beings actually evaluate beauty. It identifies this non-visual process with what the Nazir calls auditory perception, and concludes that in Abravanel the framework of evaluation remains within sight, and therefore connection to the hidden source is not made possible.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Plotinus and Don Yehuda Abravanel add another layer to this whole world, the aesthetic world, let’s call it, the world of aesthetic concepts, and that parallels exactly the addition of the Logos to the ideas, what we saw in section 8: that the Alexandrians, who mediate between the Platonic Academy and the Stoa, who compose the world of ideas with the Logos, introduce a Logos behind the world of ideas. So Don Yehuda Abravanel does exactly the same thing in the aesthetic realm, and what he introduces is the beautifying beautiful. In Don Yehuda Abravanel there are three concepts in beauty. Again, that’s how the Nazir describes him. In other descriptions I’ve seen there’s the beautifying beautiful and the beautified beautiful; they don’t speak there of three things. But here it’s essential that with the Nazir there are three things. I don’t know what really goes on there. I don’t know whether there’s a Hebrew translation of this. If there is, that would actually interest me. Of what? Of Don Yehuda Abravanel.
[Speaker B] The Power of Love has two editions. Does everyone in the yeshivah have it?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s an old edition, off to the side, called The Dialogue, that’s—
[Speaker B] It’s called The Dialogue, and it’s in the yeshivah, and there’s a newer one, Dialogues on Love, published by the Bialik Institute.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Where is it in there? In the south room too?
[Speaker B] In that room.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In any case, so we really need to look at it. But the Nazir’s claim is that there are three concepts: there is beauty, the beautified beautiful, and the beautifying beautiful. So section 15 begins with the fact that Don Yehuda Abravanel brings the Platonic or Neoplatonic concept of the idea into the Torah and makes Plato a disciple of our elders in divine matters, trying somehow to bring him into the Torah framework. And down here in the notes—I don’t remember if we mentioned this last time—he brings from Rabbi Azariah dei Rossi that matter, yes, I think we did mention this, that prime matter according to Plato is also newly created, in order to integrate him with the Torah conception of a created world. We said that in practice this stands against everything the Nazir is trying to say here, that Plato too is basically a holder of a Greek conception, meaning a static conception, where the ideas are some fixed world, a static world. And we said that within a framework of such a static conception there are no forces acting in creation. Creation is some thing that just stands there existing. And once that’s the conception, there’s no room for creation, and it’s no accident that the Greeks didn’t believe in creation. They didn’t believe in creation because of that same static visual conception of the world of ideas, where nothing changes. It’s a thing that has existed from time immemorial. The world is eternal. And that is true of Plato too, because Plato too, for our purposes, falls into the Greek framework, and we’ve already discussed that several times. Here they’re trying to bring Plato into the Torah framework and say, for example, that primordial matter is newly created. So that already means there is a creator, and that means there is in fact some force behind all these static ideas. That’s basically introducing a Logos behind the ideas, which Plato does not do, at least according to the Nazir. And Don Yehuda Abravanel does do this, and says as follows: There are three levels in beauty—this is the middle of the section—“that which brings it forth, it itself, and that which is affected by it. That is to say, the beautifying beautiful, beauty, and the beautified beautiful. The beautifying beautiful, father to beauty, is the supreme God; and beauty is the supreme wisdom and the first intellectual paradigm, the mother; and the beautified beautiful, son of beauty, is created reality.” By the way, the terminology here is very interesting: father, mother, and son. Could this already be under the shadow of Christianity?
[Speaker B] Yes, it appears that Don Yehuda Abravanel converted at the end of his life.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But—
[Speaker B] Many claim that apparently that’s not true, but there’s a problem with it, because he was the son of Don Yitzhak Abravanel, and he grew up—the king of Portugal captured him and he grew up at first with him. In short, there was a whole mess there. There’s an opinion that he converted at the end? No, no, sorry, he was the son of Don Yitzhak Abravanel. He wasn’t—the son went with his father; the king of Portugal captured his son and called him—he composed Complaint Against Time, a very long poem. Really, you have to know—that is, I mentioned last time the Agnon story.
[Speaker C] There’s some Agnon story, I think I mentioned—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] this, and someone just brought me that story because he’s dealing a bit with it, there’s some university paper analyzing the story. What was it called? What’s it called? War of People? Something like that?
[Speaker C] No, no, that’s another story.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, I looked at that too, it’s something else. So someone doing work on it at the university brought it to me because he wanted to think a bit about that story. In any case, the story tells of some man who closes his shop toward the Sabbath—a Jew closes his shop toward the Sabbath and goes back to his parents’ house—and just before he closes, three Christian priests come to him. And while discussing this it suddenly struck me: three Christian priests who came to visit him. He starts talking with them, and they come to his house, and he sits them down. They want to talk to him. So he hurries to the synagogue, and they say to him, no problem, the sun hasn’t set yet, you still have time. And he’s surprised that they know something of Jewish customs and so on. He seats them there by the table, and then they ask him, tell us, why two candles? Where’s the candle for the son? Why are you lighting two candles? So of course there’s a double meaning: the son is actually him, which is also true. That is, when they light candles, he has two parents in the house; it’s a son living with his parents. So true, sometimes they also light three candles corresponding to the members of the household, and of course there’s some double meaning here, that they also mean the candle for the son. And afterward, at some point, I think they disappear, and then two more come, or two of them remain—I don’t remember exactly whether that’s it—or one disappears and one remains, and in the end that one turns out to be a woman Jew in disguise. It reminds me of Yentl. But it turns out to be a woman Jew in disguise. I think what’s in that story—even I don’t remember all the aspects—I think it was very prominent there, and Agnon didn’t include it in all his writings, and I understood from that student that there was great resentment here around that story. Various rabbinic circles were very angry with Agnon for writing that story and for dealing with things like that. At first I didn’t understand why, but I think I do understand why. That is, maybe I don’t know whether they thought of it this way, but I understand why one could resent such a thing. It seems to me there is some claim here—and I’m coming to this with trembling lips—that this notion of the Christian Trinity is not as foreign to the Jewish spirit as it appears at first glance. In the world of Kabbalah, the Shekhinah is of course the female, and she is the consort of the Holy One, blessed be He, what is often called Knesset Yisrael. Knesset Yisrael and the Shekhinah are in many contexts basically synonymous terms, and this is called something like a mother, really. In that kabbalistic world too there are configurations called father, mother, and Ze’ir Anpin—that’s the son. But even in our own concepts, the Shekhinah or Knesset Yisrael serves many times as the consort, as it were, of the Holy One, blessed be He, and the concrete Jewish people here in our world is basically some son that nurses from them. And more than that, it says that the Holy One, blessed be He, Israel, and the Torah are one. Meaning, there are ideas in the kabbalistic world that require only a very small midrashic translation to turn them into outright Christian ideas. And I’m not sure there isn’t some shared root here. We’d have to know what exactly the differences are, but Christians, after all, drew from some kind of Gnosticism, which I assume was not disconnected from kabbalistic ideas. And it seems to me that this Agnon story is basically making the claim: you also use the same thing. You too have three. Even the candles you light are two—remember and observe, by the way, that’s male and female. Remember and observe. And they only ask him, where is the candle for the son? So he says, you too are really making three things. And indeed these three priests come as three, but in the end one remains. Because in fact the three are one, exactly as with us the three are one. And the one that remains at the end also, in some sense, turns out to be a woman Jew. So this already—you understand—the story gets to a point where there is really some claim here, it seems to me, if I’m reading the story correctly. And even if I’m not reading the story correctly, I think that’s a claim one has to address independently of the story: that in fact, if you looked at it more sympathetically, you would be much softer toward such ideas. From the outset we don’t want to understand Christian ideas. What?
[Speaker B] They inject us with fear of Christianity from age zero. Exactly. Right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And perhaps, it seems to me—or, if they hadn’t emerged from us in such a rebellious way, even aside from the killing—so of course there is a basic antipathy to Christianity, and therefore every Christian idea gets painted as a ridiculous folly, or at best a novella.
[Speaker B] It could be that here they perhaps paralleled Abravanel’s method on the intellectual plane to Maimonides’ famous “He is the knower, the known, and knowledge,” I don’t remember the details exactly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what I thought at first glance when I read it, but it seems to me—at least from what I see here, I haven’t read it inside—that that’s not right. At first, when I read it here, it seemed completely parallel to me, but it seems to me that it isn’t the same parallel.
[Speaker B] It’s not parallel because it’s not on the same plane, or—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] because it’s not the same logical structure, it seems to me there. Fine. Yes. The point is that even within the Jewish world, at least in the kabbalistic world, the kabbalistic world certainly thinks this way: there are three that are one, and these three are also structured as father, mother, and son. It’s not all that foreign. And in fact his terminology here—that the beautifying beautiful is the father, that’s the Holy One, blessed be He, of course, the Most High God, he says that explicitly. And beauty is the supreme wisdom—let’s call it Knesset Yisrael for the sake of discussion, or the Shekhinah—that is the mother, the female. And the son is the thing beautified, yes, the Jewish people, who receive the emanation through the Shekhinah, who beautifies them from above, because she passes the emanation on to them. The Jewish people receive the emanation from the divine, and that is the son. And this is a general mechanism of beauty altogether, but it is also a metaphysical mechanism of drawing down emanation from above. In other words, we already said—I think—that Don Yehuda Abravanel, a lot of his ideas, if you look at them from this angle, seem to me to be some kind of garment for kabbalistic ideas. So he isn’t talking only about aesthetics. He is talking about aesthetics too, but for him aesthetics draws from deeper processes, and I think those processes have significance beyond aesthetics. Aesthetics too is built in the same way. When we talk about beauty, how beauty is bestowed upon a thing, that basically means there is a beautifying beautiful, there is that one who is father to beauty, as he calls it here, “the one that brings it forth,” father to beauty, Most High God. There is beauty itself, which is the supreme wisdom, which perhaps parallel to Plato would be the ideas. The ideas are beauty itself, the beautiful model itself. And the beautified thing is the object itself, about which I judge how much beauty there is in it. Basically what Don Yehuda Abravanel added here is the beautifying beautiful.
[Speaker B] Meaning, in the Plotinian—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] or Neoplatonic world, there are ideas, which are beauty, and there is the beautified beautiful, which is the concrete objects, this world. And in the static language there is seal and imprint; there are ideas and there are objects in this world, and I compare them in order to know how beautiful this object is. What Don Yehuda Abravanel added is that there is also a beautifying beautiful. Meaning, there is some force that moves this whole process of beautification, this power of beauty. There is also an owner of the power of beauty. Okay? “It is created reality”—that’s the son. I think that’s very clear. Now he says—I’ll keep reading—“Beauty is something seen either by the eyes of the body or by the eyes of the intellect, and therefore it is said: ‘And God saw all that He had made, and behold it was very good.’ And good means beautiful, for visible good is always beauty. But intellectual sight cannot apprehend except in the divine wisdom.” What is the divine wisdom? That is the supreme wisdom above; that is beauty, not the beautifying beautiful, but beauty. But not its first beginning, which is the beautifying beautiful. That cannot be apprehended. “The beginning, the simple and exalted source”—that is hidden. That cannot be apprehended. How can’t it be apprehended? It can’t be apprehended by the eyes—not by the sight of the intellect and not by the sight of the eyes. By sight it cannot be apprehended. Meaning, the visible good is beauty. What is that? That’s the world of ideas, that’s beauty basically in its embodiment, beauty as such—
[Speaker C] You can’t apprehend it by the eyes—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] by intellectual sight, not by the eyes. He says that here explicitly: “But intellectual sight cannot apprehend except in the divine wisdom.” He isn’t talking about physical sight. Now these are basically criteria for the good. We talked about concepts, right? Concepts have matter and form—we talked about that, right? More than once, actually. Concepts have matter and form, right? There is the concept itself, and there is how it appears. Now, it doesn’t appear to the eyes; it appears to the eyes of the intellect. The idea is how the concept appears. What Don Yehuda Abravanel added is that there is also the concept itself, whereas at the highest level, the thing in itself is God. At that point we’ve already reached another heretic, Spinoza. But that is basically the claim. The claim is that the thing itself, the beautified beautiful, is the source of beauty—what he calls, yes, “the beginning, the simple and hidden source”—that is the Most High God. That is the beautifying beautiful. Plato’s ideas are the form of beauty; they are not beauty itself, they are the form of beauty. The criteria of beauty, or the perfect horse that we’ll relate to in the beautified thing—that is the idea. Yes, certainly. That is the thing itself, the thing about which we judge whether it is beautiful or not beautiful.
[Speaker B] That’s what he says.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The reality of beauty is the created reality. “Goodness,” as he calls it here, is the idea of the good, right? That’s still a Platonic concept. Don Yehuda Abravanel’s claim is that there is something beyond that. There is a Logos within the world of ideas. There is God—or God’s utterance, not God Himself, but God’s utterance—which is the force that activates the world of ideas. There is a force that stands behind it, and that cannot be apprehended at all. “That beginning, the simple and hidden source” cannot be apprehended. Why can’t it be apprehended? Exactly in the same way that I cannot apprehend the substance in itself through the senses, through the eyes, right? All I can apprehend through the senses from an object standing before me is the form of the object, right? The substance in itself cannot be apprehended. Apprehension always operates on the form of a thing, not on the matter of a thing. In the same way, the source of all forms, all properties, the owner of all the properties, let’s call it—that cannot be apprehended by means of sensation. Right? All you can see is the color of the table, its shape, how it looks. The table itself, as such, before stripping away all its properties, is not something that can be apprehended through the senses. That is the hidden source of the table. So too the world of ideas has a hidden source; there is some thing that is their source, the thing of which they are merely descriptions or properties. Okay? According to Plotinus, according to Don Yehuda Abravanel—I’m going back for a moment to the second paragraph of this section—“In The Dialogue on Love he elevates above all the senses the sense of sight.” In that sense, Don Yehuda Abravanel still hasn’t reached the Nazir’s full conception, the full auditory conception, right? We need now to understand what still remains. Meaning, Don Yehuda Abravanel apparently has already gone beyond Platonism, beyond Plotinus, and seemingly has already arrived completely at the Semitic conception. He has already added the Logos behind the world of ideas, like the Alexandrians did, and there too we had the same dilemma. I didn’t understand—I still didn’t know exactly—whether there’s criticism of them there, or whether he claims that actually within their words there really is the true conception. Because it seems there’s some note of criticism there. Meaning, they introduce it, true, they’re somehow mediating between Plato and the Semitic world, but they did not grasp the world in a fully Semitic way. So what is still missing? That’s the question. After all, he already understood that there is a beautifying beautiful, and also a thing, a force, that stands behind the ideas, behind beauty as such. So what is missing now? What’s the problem? Meaning, why isn’t he already a perfect Jew in the perfect Semitic conception? Right? And it’s clear that he isn’t, because that’s what he says: “In The Dialogue on Love he elevates above all the senses the sense of sight.” Meaning, even Don Yehuda Abravanel still hasn’t completed the whole path to the full Semitic conception. So what is missing? It seems to me that what’s missing here is the ability to create contact with that Logos of the world of ideas. Don Yehuda Abravanel has already reached the conclusion that such a thing exists. There is something that moves the ideas, that is inside them. A divine utterance, yes, that is inside them and continues to animate them. But according to Don Yehuda Abravanel, that beginning, the simple and hidden source, cannot be apprehended. It is a hidden source from his point of view. And why? Exactly because for him everything is grasped through sight—even intellectual sight, but sight. What is sight? It is the imaginative faculty, meaning an attempt to grasp the thing through its properties. And therefore he is forced to arrive at the conclusion that we have no access whatsoever to the thing itself. True, it exists—he has already reached the conclusion that it exists—but we have no way to create contact with it. I think that is the point missing from Don Yehuda Abravanel’s teaching in order to really arrive at a Semitic conception. The Semitic conception wants to claim that I do have some way—and we’ve already talked about this more than once—it wants to claim that I have some way of creating contact with the thing itself, not just. Hearing is, as we said, hearing things behind the wall—not only guessing that they exist, but actually making contact with them, right? Someone could come and say, look, inside that room behind the wall there is something. Fine. But still, with my eyes I have no way to get to it. What I see are only the outer walls. So you’ve advanced already—you understand that there is something behind that—but you still don’t think it’s possible to make contact with it, because the tool through which you make contact is only the eyes, or only the senses, if we use the ordinary language now. Right, for him eyes symbolize the senses, sensory perception in general, or the imaginative faculty. And what is missing from that conception is the Semitic ability, my ability to listen. And that ability is what Don Yehuda Abravanel lacks. This simple and hidden source—one can still listen to it. That’s what listening is: listening to that divine utterance behind the ideas, the Logos. One can listen to it too, not only infer that it is there. That is what Don Yehuda Abravanel lacks. Meaning, there is some ability to create contact with the thing not through its properties. And it seems to me we already mentioned that it’s simply obvious that this is so. Yes, like we talked about with the concept of Jew—that was the example we discussed, I think, right? The concept of good—those were the examples we brought. The fact is that I can try to think whether these are the correct characteristics of the concept, or whether these are good definitions of the concept, or propose alternative definitions or alternative characteristics. If one can do that, it’s a sign that I can make contact with the thing itself before I know what its characteristics are, right? Otherwise, in what sense am I asking whether these are the correct characteristics? I see these, so these are what they are—what is there to discuss? Meaning, what I see is what I see, right? There’s nothing to argue about—whether this wall is white or not white. I see that it’s white, so it’s white. If I’m now discussing the question of what the proper characteristics of the concept Jew are, the meaning is that I can make contact with the concept Jew even before I know what its characteristics are. I can try to listen to what the concept Jew is saying to me, and from that understand how its characteristics ought to appear in the world. Only one born to a Jewish mother, or one who converted according to Jewish law, for example. Or the characteristics of the concept good—that it’s forbidden to murder old people in the snow. Right, all those things we discussed with the Eskimos. So that—that’s the proof I meant to bring there for the point that not only—maybe I didn’t emphasize it enough there, so I’m emphasizing it now. There I brought only a proof that there is such a thing as the concept in itself, the matter of the concept before its characteristics. But actually what we saw there is more than that. Not only that such a thing exists, but also that one can make contact with it. That one can, as it were, listen to it or contemplate it—let’s call it listening, because contemplation belongs to the world of sight—and out of that contemplation or listening try to understand what characteristics really ought to be attached to that thing. Because that is basically what we can infer from there: not only the very existence of the matter of the concept, but also that I can derive things from the concept about its characteristics, right? If I say the concept Jew must be someone born to a Jewish mother or one who converted according to Jewish law. Or I say the concept good must be, I don’t know, helping the poor.
[Speaker B] And how do you decide the characteristics?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] From the seeing—I mean, from the hearing in that case.
[Speaker B] The concept “born to a Jewish mother” and so on—I don’t derive that from the concept; I derive it because it’s written.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, okay, specifically in that concept. But whoever first formulated that criterion, for example—assuming it’s not an explicit verse, and it seems to me that even the homilies are not an explicit verse—and we’ll get to that, that’s the next article, which I don’t know when we’ll reach at our current pace, but there he speaks precisely about the thirteen hermeneutic principles by which the Torah is expounded. He claims those are Semitic tools. And that is the way of listening. The homiletic interpretations of the verses are basically the way to listen to what they are saying to us, to what is behind them.
[Speaker B] Some sort of listening to the Torah—there’s listening to the world too, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Listening to the world is like listening to the Torah. There’s no difference. It’s the same thing, yes.
[Speaker D] It seems to me the description was that there’s some beauty that doesn’t have the power to be imprinted like a seal upon the witness that would stamp beauty into beauty existing on its own, and therefore you need some beautifying beauty that gives the power.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know whether it’s because it doesn’t have the power, I don’t know. Meaning, Plato thought that there is such a process of imprinting, right? Seal and imprint. I don’t know whether it comes from some necessity that it can’t be that way, as opposed to a conception that I know there is such a thing. I believe in God—not that this is my proof for His existence. It could be—maybe Plato’s is also a consistent conception. But I don’t reject it because it’s inconsistent; I reject it because I know there is a beautifying beautiful. I’m not sure that what’s written here is that such a conception is impossible, a conception that could not be. But I know that the source of everything is God, so to me it’s obvious that there is also some beautifier.
[Speaker D] Meaning, the beautifier also created ideal beauty?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I assume so. He created the world of ideas, and through it—and the ideas themselves also come to expression in our world. In kabbalistic terms, He created the spiritual worlds, and ultimately He created the world of action, right? So there is some—someone who created this. It is not some process that just runs by itself, where each world creates the one below it. That is what happens, but in truth the owner of this world is the one who, as it were, is the matter of which this world is the form. He is the one who performs the actions. Right? Even when my hands do things, you don’t say that my hand did something. I did something, even though it was done by my hand grasping something and moving it here. So in the same way, the Holy One, blessed be He, acts in the world through all kinds of spiritual powers or spiritual worlds, but it is the Holy One, blessed be He, who acts in the world, not the powers, not the powers themselves. He is the owner of the powers, He is the actor, not the powers.
[Speaker D] He Himself is the beautifier. Right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Through beauty, right. Beauty is Plato’s world of ideas, basically in the Neoplatonic teachings. And he’s not alone in that. Maimonides and all the Jewish Neoplatonists conceive of the world this way, that Plato’s world of ideas is basically the spiritual worlds of Kabbalah, more or less. He isn’t focusing on a specific world right now; I don’t know whether there is an explicit parallel, but it is clear that it plays the same role. And these worlds too, in the kabbalistic conception, that really is what happens: world creates world, each world creates the world beneath it. But it’s clear that the one really performing the actions is the power that moves all these worlds; it’s not the worlds themselves. The worlds themselves are forms of revelation of the owner of the powers, but the owner of the powers is the one who does everything. Without Him there is nothing. Everything is basically some sort of attributes of His, or powers of His, or something like that. In Kabbalah these are positive attributes, not negative ones.
[Speaker D] So these things are positive attributes of the Holy One, blessed be He. According to that, then it ought to be some kind of chain, a column of three, one under another—or is it more like two?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, right, so I want to stress that. That’s exactly right. There are not three here one under another, because if—let’s look at this in terms of—no, no, exactly, that’s the point. Let’s think for a moment about an onion, the layers of an onion. We talked about this in the classes on repentance, right? I think—the onion structure of—
[Speaker C] the onion-like structure of the person.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But in fact everything is built like some kind of onion that has layers, more inner and more outer. Right? Each such layer of the onion defines the layer that wraps around it, the more external one, and so on. Right? Now the onion itself, the onion as such, is not the innermost layer. It is not located on that same chain in first place. It is the whole business—it stands to the side, you understand what I mean? There is the thing itself, which is the matter of the thing, and the form itself is indeed composed of some worlds, one inside another or one above another, it doesn’t matter how you look at it. More internal and more external. Those are relations between things of the same type. Meaning, even in the world of a person’s values—we talked about this there, the human will and values, how exactly a person’s will operates and how he behaves according to his values. So we said there are higher values: to be moral, to be—I don’t know—various things like that, to help the poor, and so on. And above all of them there is yet another value: to obey the voice of the Holy One, blessed be He, to serve God, from which the values are derived—the 613 values, let’s say, of the commandments of the Written Torah. Within those commandments further values are derived that are in a more external layer. So these really do stand one above another; that is indeed a hierarchical structure. Right? But the Holy One, blessed be He, Himself—or the person himself, not the Holy One, blessed be He—the person himself who decides to act according to those values, is not the point that stands at the top of the pyramid. He doesn’t belong to that pyramid at all. That whole pyramid is some form that expresses the person. It’s not that the person is the highest point in the pyramid. The person is the whole pyramid. Do you understand what I mean?
[Speaker B] He’s also not only the whole pyramid.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, of course not, of course not. He is the owner for whom the pyramid does not represent him. This pyramid, or this onion with all its layers, inner and outer, all of that is just the forms or representations of the thing itself in the world. But the thing itself is not one of the onion’s layers. The thing itself is something that exists on a completely different plane. Let’s ask: is the table itself a more inner layer than its form? It’s not more inner and not more outer; it’s something else. You can describe it metaphorically as being inside the form, the form kind of wrapping around it, but these are not two things of the same kind where one is underneath the other. Do you understand? It’s not the will itself that wants to behave according to its values.
[Speaker D] The human being is the matter of the…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but not matter in the sense of molecules—the human being as such. Is that the innermost thing? No, it’s not the innermost thing, it is exactly the matter of the thing. Within the form there are layers, one inside the other, one more inward than the next. Say, the more basic values are more inward than the more external values. The practical difference is that if there’s a clash, I’ll behave according to the inner values and not the outer ones. The inner values determine how to act in terms of the more external decisions. They determine the external decisions. There is some relation of one being inside the other. But that same will that wants all these values—now I’m talking. My power, which is called will, which wants to act according to these values, which sets these values before me as guiding my behavior—does it belong to this pyramid? Of course not. You understand, it has nothing to do with it. It is the owner of this pyramid. This pyramid is its form. It is the matter of the pyramid; it is not a point on the pyramid, it is not located at any height on it. It is the thing itself. Do you understand what… Meaning, the source of beauty, that which makes things beautiful, is not someone located within this hierarchy. That’s exactly the point I perhaps should have emphasized more, and it’s good that you pointed it out. It’s not three things standing one above the other—that’s not right. The Platonic conception is actually correct: there is no third thing on that same hierarchical axis of Plato. So it’s not that you have the objects here, and above them the world of ideas, and above the world of ideas yet something else. No. That’s right—those are all the onion’s layers. Meaning, there are ideas and there is the thing in the world, the concrete thing. Fine? But besides that there is also a master of the whole business. He is not an even higher point. He is the whole thing together—and also not only the whole thing together.
[Speaker C] Is that what we said is actually heresy according to Spinoza? Among other things?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. This is the thought of Benedict Spinoza? “Between the thorn,” I think that’s the translation of his name; that’s what he’s usually called in Hebrew books.
[Speaker D] What does he say there?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That nature and God, all of reality as a whole, is basically God. There are no creations separate from God; everything is God. The whole world is one substance; everything is God. What we
[Speaker D] want
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] to claim—is that there is some kind of systematicity here?
[Speaker D] What we want to claim is that there’s something external here, as it were? Yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is a world, exactly, a separate world, and this separate world—these spiritual worlds—are in some sense indeed expressions of the Holy One, blessed be He, but they are not the Holy One, blessed be He, Himself. Rather, these are the forms in which He appears in the world, and through which He appears in the world, or something like that. It’s not that He also belongs to the hierarchical structure and is located at the very top of it.
[Speaker D] But does that also belong to the structure itself? Like the idea is not something higher, or what exists in the world is an expression of the idea—or is that not relevant?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no. The idea and what exists in the world are two layers, one above the other, and both belong to the revelations of the Holy One, blessed be He, not to the Holy One, blessed be He, Himself. Not to His matter, if one may call it that, but to His form. All right? But these are structures, one more inward than the other, within the form.
[Speaker D] Meaning the revelation belongs—it is a form of the idea and not the matter itself? Can we say, like
[Speaker C] we say, like we say, the Holy One, blessed be He, in relation really to the idea and to matter, to the thing…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We are not the form of the idea—what are you talking about? That is not the right relation between the two things. The idea is the idea, and we are us; it’s just that we were created by some imprint of the idea upon matter. But it’s not that the idea is our soul—I don’t think that’s right, that is not the Platonic view. The idea is not some inner layer of mine in the sense that I am not the idea, and the ideal horse is not the horse as such. These are two different concepts.
[Speaker C] So then how is the Holy One, blessed be He, related to these two things? Is it similar to Plato’s relation of the ideas to matter?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s what I’m trying to say—not. The Holy One, blessed be He, stands to the side of this whole structure; He is not on this structure in the highest place. He is simply the root of the whole matter. His distance from the ideas is the same as His distance from the things themselves, from the table. There is no difference between God’s distance from the ideas and His distance from the table. All right? If one can speak of distances here at all. It’s not the distance between the substance and its form. I don’t know whether to call it distance in this context. Not distance—they are not on the same… there is no common axis for the two of them on which you can measure distances. Understood? Every measurement of distances that would serve as a criterion for beauty according to Plato is precisely because there is a common axis between the two things. The ideal horse is more ideal than the concrete horse. So we see that we have some common axis on which the ideal horse is better than the concrete horse. So I say: fine, then apparently this one is lower on the axis, and its distance from the end of the axis—which is the ideal horse—is its beauty. Fine? But the Holy One, blessed be He, is not located even higher than the ideal horse on that same axis. The ideal horse is the most ideal; there is no horse more ideal than it. The Holy One, blessed be He, is not an ideal horse. Do you understand? Meaning, He stands more to the side of this whole structure; He is not the top part of the structure. That is exactly the relation between matter and form. Matter is not inside form, it’s not… many times perhaps people use that terminology, but it isn’t correct. Matter is not inside form. Form is everything you see in this world; it’s only form. Matter itself is—I don’t know—it has no location, I don’t know where to put it. Like the soul. What do the soul and the Holy One, blessed be He, have in common? The Talmud in Berakhot, right? Just as the Holy One, blessed be He, fills the entire world, so the soul fills the whole body. What does that mean? It means that you cannot locate it. The soul is the person as such. That is the matter of the person. It’s the opposite—the soul is the most spiritual part, but in our terms that is called the matter of the person, the person as such. Right? So it has no location. It’s not that it is in some place. It doesn’t belong to that at all. The coordinate of place does not apply to it. The coordinate of place applies only to forms; it does not apply to things as such.
[Speaker C] And the person himself, and the whole world—there’s no issue of location there at all? Meaning, “fills.” It fills this whole location of the person. The soul is…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Your body is here, all right? The form in which you find expression in this world.
[Speaker C] But how does it fill my whole body?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it fills the whole body. The soul has no coordinates. I think that’s simple. My soul finds expression through the body that is located here. It is connected in some way; it acts in some way upon the body that is here. In that same sense the Holy One, blessed be He, fills the whole world, because the Holy One, blessed be He, also has no coordinate. He is not located anywhere in the world in the sense that we are located. He is simply beyond the very concept of being in a place. He is the place of the world, and the world is not His place, right? We spoke about this at the beginning of this article, when we said that the light of glory… We spoke about “Anim Zemirot,” right? And we spoke about how the Holy One, blessed be He, is revealed. That is not the Holy One, blessed be He. “Where is the place of His glory, to adore Him”—that’s what we say in the Kedushah. His glory has a place, because that really is the form through which He is revealed. The light of glory is the form through which the Holy One, blessed be He, is revealed. That thing can have a place. “And His servants ask: Where is the place of His glory, to adore Him”—not “Where is His place, to adore Him.” “Where is the place of His glory, to adore Him.” Because He Himself is in no place. All right? He is outside this entire picture. He does not belong to this picture. He is not subject to the concepts of space and time. So how can one create contact with Him if He has no coordinates at all? You can create contact only with
[Speaker C] things that are in some place? No. You can… an electromagnetic wave…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] An electromagnetic wave is not in no place.
[Speaker C] I’m not talking about place. I’m talking about… we said there are no coordinates at all, no relativity between these things, between me and the…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You really create contact through His concepts, through the utterance, the Logos, or through the light of glory, as we’ll see in the following sections. That’s the next stage.
[Speaker C] Without the utterance it would be impossible to create contact.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. But there is always some… that’s also true regarding a table. With the table itself you cannot create contact except only… you see its form, right? But you always create contact through representations.
[Speaker C] That’s the definition of creating contact.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] With the Holy One, blessed be He, you create contact through His utterance, through some mode in which He finds expression in the world. That is exactly the purpose of the light of glory or the utterance: that you will be able to listen to Him and grasp something, as it were, of the Holy One, blessed be He, Himself, and not of all the things that wrap around it. All right? That is exactly the next stage. From here we arrive precisely at the next sections; actually this is discussed in section 18. And before that we still have two more sections. So maybe just because we’re at this point, in section 18 he writes: “The great figures of Jewish religious philosophy, when discussing the divine unity, clarified decisively that sight does not apply to Him. For vision has no dominion over His apprehension. And if vision is said regarding the Name, it refers to the created light of glory, or the Shekhinah, not to the Holy One, blessed be He, Himself.” Not even intellectual vision, of course, right? That is clear. And we actually saw this in the first sections of this article. In sections 1 and 2 he speaks about it; we discussed Shir HaKavod. So this is basically the continuation, as it were, of what we finished here. Don Judah Abravanel—this is exactly the point where he stops. Since he uses only sight, only visual criteria, then all that… after all, you cannot see the horse as such, right? You can only see an ideal horse, some image of a horse. The characteristics of a thing I can see with the eyes of my intellect. But the thing itself—according to the visual conception—there is no way at all to create contact with it. How does one create contact with beauty as such? I want this to be clear; at least for me the matters are no longer vague. It took me a little time, but I hope it doesn’t come out too vague for you as well. Meaning, when I… beauty as such—not the most beautiful horse, the ideal horse. The very concept of beauty. Can one create contact with it by visual means, by sensory means? Of course not, right? Not even by means of the imaginative faculty, which operates like sight, right? I sort of imagine with my mind’s eye. What can I imagine with my mind’s eye? I can imagine the ideal horse. I cannot imagine with my mind’s eye the very concept of beauty. The concept of beauty itself is an intellectual concept; it’s criteria, it’s not a thing. Do you understand? Meaning, it belongs to operations we would call operations of the intellect, not of cognition. I cannot grasp it even with intellectual vision. Whoever grasps the… like Don Judah Abravanel, and like Platonism and the whole Greek visual conception—visual, as we already explained, is not only with the eyes. Even the intellect, the understanding, is assumed to operate visually, right? And therefore we said that when Plato spoke about beauty, even when he has ideas in hand, he compares the image of the ideal horse with the concrete horse. The distance between them is basically the measure of the beauty of the concrete horse, right? To what extent it is close to the ideal horse. But what does that process do? True, it’s not a process done with the eyes, but in fact it is a process of seeing. You see two pictures here—one of them maybe imaginary—but you see two pictures here and compare them. That is what is called visual thinking. All right? His claim is that this is precisely the point where auditory thinking goes beyond it. And this is what Plato and Don Judah Abravanel and all the Neo-Platonists did not grasp, did not accept: that one can also think about the concept of beauty as such, not only about the ideal horse, not only about the perfectly beautiful horse, but about beauty itself, not about the beautiful horse. Now, it’s clear that when one thinks about such a thing, this is not visual thinking. Right? To think visually about such a thing is in fact to think about it analytically, through rules, trying to analyze it through mathematical criteria—and that, perhaps, I would call visual thinking about the concept of beauty itself. But when you try to grasp intuitively what beauty is—not to imagine a beautiful horse before your eyes, but when you look at the horse and ask whether it is beautiful or not—you don’t do this by comparing images. Rather, from within the concept of beauty you infer whether this horse is beautiful or not beautiful. That—that is not visual work. Do you understand what I’m saying? I think these are simple things, it’s not… all right? Is that clear? If not, I’ll go back, I want you to understand. When I think about this horse and ask whether it is beautiful or not beautiful, Plato offers a model that is seemingly very simple, the simplest—and this is the way of scientists and analysts and Greeks since forever—to offer such models. Truly, that’s always how it goes. The simplest model is this: there is a picture of an ideal horse—and we said there are problems with how one creates such a picture, but let’s assume there is—there is a picture of the concrete horse that I actually see with my eyes. How beautiful this horse is I determine by the distance between the pictures, right? By how different this horse is from the ideal horse. This is a work that is entirely visual, although again, not with the eyes. The ideal horse does not exist in the world; I imagine it. But my imaginative faculty operates like sight; it operates on a horse—I see a horse, right? There is another way to grasp the process of aesthetic evaluation. Another model to describe what a person does when he evaluates the beauty of a thing, and it seems to me this is also the more correct model. And this isn’t really a matter of Jewish perception versus Greek perception. It seems to me that even the Greeks did not actually work that way; they just didn’t understand that they didn’t work that way, it seems to me. When we evaluate whether something is beautiful or not beautiful, we do not see before our eyes some picture of an ideal table, right? Let’s think. When I try to think whether this table is beautiful or not beautiful, what, do I imagine an ideal table? I imagine this table and compare them? No. That is a scientific model for determining the beauty of a thing. If science had to determine a model, that is the model it would determine. That’s obvious; it’s always like that. Science always works with such models. A computer too is a model of the way human thought works, but human thought does not work that way. And because we by now are already so addicted to the computer, it’s obvious to us that human thinking too has memory and a CPU and so on, because we are already so accustomed to the computer’s modularity, whereas today it is already becoming clear that it is not so, right? The structure of the brain is global; memory is not a function separate from thought; there are neural networks, as you know. In short, today it is already very clear that it’s not like that. But that is exactly the point: when you try to offer a scientific model, you always do it in the simplest mathematical form for describing the issue, not necessarily because it is really faithful to how it actually happens, but because you are offering a model that will yield the same results. The computer too knows how to think, in some sense, the same calculations it knows how to perform, but it doesn’t do it like a human being. Never mind—but that is my model of human thought. It receives input and produces output. Exactly how does it do this? Not like the brain. Fine. So here too, when you try to think how one evaluates the beauty of a thing, what will science propose? First of all, it’s completely obvious: if you ask someone from the scientific world how he would build a model for beauty evaluation, this is the model you’ll get, I faithfully promise you. Meaning, there is some picture of an ideal horse, here is the concrete horse, and I am basically comparing images—that’s what I’m doing. Why does a scientist think this way? Because if he had to build a machine that decides whether a certain horse is beautiful or not beautiful, that’s how he would build it. How else can one build a machine? I don’t know how to build a machine that thinks about the concept of beauty itself and decides whether this horse is beautiful or not beautiful, understood? When you try to build a mechanical model, you always build it this way. There is an ideal horse—and as if the most beautiful, 100 on the beauty scale—there is, I don’t know, maybe I’d even build the ugliest horse, and I would ask where our concrete horse stands, because to measure distance you need two sides, of course; one point is not enough. You need to know what the unit of distance is, what the scale is. So build the ugliest horse, the most beautiful horse, and ask where your concrete horse stands between them. How close is it to this as opposed to that. That’s how one would build it; that is the model a scientist would build. And that is the model Plato built for aesthetic evaluation. That is how the process of aesthetic evaluation works according to Plato. The Nazir claims—not so. He hasn’t yet made this claim, I’m getting ahead, but just so it will be continuous I want to emphasize it. The Nazir claims that the process of aesthetic evaluation does not work this way. I look at the table and want to decide whether it is beautiful or not beautiful—this is not a cognitive process, it is a process of thought. I use the concept of beauty itself, not an ideal table, and I ask: what does the very concept of beauty say about this table? And then I decide whether it is beautiful or not beautiful. Meaning—just one more second—this process is not visual. On that you agree. That is what he calls auditory. It is not visual. I do not see with my eyes. But still one uses the tools of the eyes, doesn’t one? No, obviously. But aesthetic comparison—whether it pleases my eye, whether it looks beautiful. What does “looks beautiful” mean? I, so-and-so, want to know whether a certain picture is beautiful, all right? So the process I go through—in the end I will say, of course, that this picture reaches my consciousness through the eyes. That’s obvious. But we already said that one can also hear with the eyes and also listen with the eyes, and one can also see with the ears. We already advanced beyond that. The question is: what is the nature of this process? The nature of this process is that it is a process of thinking and not of sensing. And according to Abravanel as well? What? No—Abravanel understands it like Plato. Right, so what serves as the concept of the beautiful from beauty? No, beauty as such is the idea. Fine. “The beautiful from beauty” according to Plato—meaning according to Don Judah Abravanel, at least as described here—it simply exists. That’s all. It is an upper vessel; he knows there is such a thing, but I have no way to create contact with it. Because he did not know hearing, only sight. Does he judge whether the concrete horse is beautiful by the same method as Plato? I think so. Because that’s what he says: the source is simple and hidden; I have no way to reach the source. All I can do is reach beauty. So I ask how far this is from beauty. And therefore I say that he did not complete part of the journey, in the sense that there is something inside the room. But he still claimed that there is no way to reach that something inside the room. Because he did not know hearing. He recognized that there is something to hear, but he did not recognize that we have tools to hear that thing. Because for him sight is the peak—that’s what he writes above. He elevated the sense of sight above all the other senses. All right. I think this illustrates it a bit; that’s why, I think, he chose the aesthetic channel, and all these sections deal with the process of aesthetic evaluation. The goal is exactly, I think, to emphasize what he means when he speaks of visual thinking versus auditory thinking. It seems to me that here one can perhaps put one’s finger on it more clearly. When I ask how I evaluate the beauty of a thing, there really are seemingly two ways of understanding how this process is done. The simpler way, the more scientific way, the Platonic way—it seems to me—is not the correct way. If we try to think how we form a position about whether something is beautiful or not beautiful, then it is not a visual comparison with some ideal thing that we try to bring before our imagination. It is some kind of thinking process: I decide whether this thing is beautiful or not beautiful. And is this evaluation learned? What? If the evaluation of beauty is something learned. Not only is it learned—you also want to infer from that that it is relative. That is not the same thing. It may require learning; geometry too is something learned. Geometry is not something relative. Try teaching me incorrect geometry—you won’t succeed, I hope not. Understood? Meaning, geometry is something learned but it is not something relative. Not everyone can choose for himself whatever geometry he wants. And in evaluations of beauty there is variation. In evaluations of beauty there is—fine—some framework within which one plays, although there are limits to that framework as well. There are things about which no person in the world will say that they are beautiful. Fine, true. There is some room to maneuver within the framework. The tendency in the broader world is to say no. They hold that there is no such thing as beauty as such—that is exactly the point. There is no way—or at least there is no way to create contact with it, with beauty as such. Fine, then he can produce for you any ideal horse he likes. If I teach you a different image of an ideal horse, then you will compare to that and say this horse is not beautiful. I will think this horse is beautiful; I have a different image of an ideal horse. But you can see that there is criticism here of our evaluation of beauty in one respect. Fine, but still there are shared things. There are ten pictures that people will say are beautiful; I’ll tell you that… fine. Even those who tell you they are beautiful, in my view usually don’t really mean that they are beautiful. They mean that they express an idea successfully, or in a sophisticated way, or in an original way. Understood? So you are talking about a different concept of beauty. But when you speak about the same concept of beauty, the gaps between you will narrow further. The question of why these two things are both called beauty is another question, and we discussed it a bit earlier. When we spoke about the unfolding of the concept of beauty and aesthetics, that is exactly what we said: in Plato these two expressions of the concept of beauty appear—the expression of how much it expresses, and the expression of how harmonious it is. You are speaking about beauty in the sense of harmony. And today, in what is called conceptual art, people are not speaking about beauty in that sense. They are speaking about beauty in the sense of what it expresses. It doesn’t matter whether it expresses something concrete, but there is some… content, it evokes something. Not because there is some Renaissance harmony like that, as in the Renaissance period everything was built on harmony, right? That was the beauty of works. All right? We already spoke about that. So all in all, you are using the same concept to describe different things. And if you ask them what in their view is more harmonious, then all the nonsense you have today in the Israel Museum—no one will say it is harmonious. Concepts of harmony are, in my opinion, shared by people at a certain level. Maybe not completely identical, but there is certainly a broad consensus. All right?