The Voice of Prophecy, Lesson 38
This transcription was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- Analogical ability and divine knowledge
- Philosophy, Kabbalah, and the worlds of Atzilut-Beriah-Yetzirah-Asiyah
- Positive attributes and the justification for using human language
- A Kabbalistic conceptual system and its connection to the human lexicon
- Note 69: the five terms of logic—genus, species, difference, property, and accident
- Modern logic, definition by extension, and flight from analogies
- Why things stop at two levels, direct relation up to the third degree, and examples from Jewish law and Kabbalah
- Emotion, desires, the nature of the soul, and will
- The will to serve God and speaking about faith / belief
- General and particular in the hermeneutical principles, common denominator, and the rule of Hebrew logic
- Whether the rules of logic and modes of reasoning are reality or a way of looking
- The example of migo: a wall and a vessel as real concepts in reality
- The unity of opposites, knowledge and free choice, and what counts as faith
Summary
General overview
The speaker defines analogical ability as penetrating into what lies behind and within the thing that appears, and argues that on that basis one can understand something of divine knowledge rather than settling only for negative attributes, as he ascribes to Maimonides. He presents the dispute between philosophers and Kabbalists as the difference between stopping at the worlds of Beriah-Yetzirah-Asiyah and building a bridge to divine worlds such as Atzilut and Adam Kadmon, where, according to him, there is room for positive attributes. He goes on to explain a logical system of genus, species, and individual, difference, property, and accident, and connects it to the hermeneutical principles such as general and particular and general, and to the idea of a common denominator. Later he offers a critique of modern logic, which prefers definition by extension as a surrender of analogy, and suggests that Hebrew logic is an inference from the particular to the general, while discussing whether the rules point to reality or only to a human way of seeing. He brings the example of migo to argue that halakhic / of Jewish law terminology is not accidental.
Analogical ability and divine knowledge
The speaker says that the basic ability is not imagining a likeness between two objects, but understanding what lies behind the thing and within it. He says that from Beriah-Yetzirah-Asiyah and the attributes of this world one arrives at Maimonides’ claim that His knowledge is not like our knowledge and therefore we cannot understand it, and he attributes to Maimonides a stopping point at the negative attribute according to which “that He knows” means only “it is not true that He does not know.” He contrasts this with the Nazir, who, according to him, accepts that His knowledge is not like ours in the simple sense, but argues that there is still something shared, and that by reflecting on the concept of knowledge as it exists for us and generalizing it in a higher way, one can gain some contact with divine knowledge. He says that they are not speaking about the attributes of the essence, that even the world of Atzilut is “part of divinity from our perspective, its lower part,” and that the degree of apprehension varies among prophets and sages depending on how far it reaches.
Philosophy, Kabbalah, and the worlds of Atzilut-Beriah-Yetzirah-Asiyah
The speaker says that the philosophers stop at negative attributes because the human conceptual world belongs to the worlds of Beriah, Yetzirah, and Asiyah, which are “the separate worlds.” He interprets the saying that where philosophy ends Kabbalah begins as a precise statement, and defines philosophy as reaching up to Beriah, or “up to the spheres” and “the separate intellects,” as the philosophical terminology for Beriah-Yetzirah-Asiyah. He says that the Kabbalists introduced the idea that there is something beyond the world of Beriah, and that instead of an infinite gap between the spheres and the Holy One, blessed be He, they built a bridge by means of the world of Atzilut and Adam Kadmon and other spiritual worlds that are “divine worlds” and “parts within divinity itself.” He notes that this raises disputes about corporealization and idol worship, and argues that if one properly understands the idea of emanations and the enclothment of the Infinite within them, then it is not foreign worship, though one has to think carefully to understand why.
Positive attributes and the justification for using human language
The speaker argues that according to the Kabbalists there are positive attributes of divinity, and that when one says “the Holy One, blessed be He, knows,” the meaning is knowledge in the plain sense, in that it is of the same type as our knowledge, even though it is higher. He asks: according to Maimonides, if there is no connection at all between “knows” as used by us and “knows” as applied to Him, then there is no reason to use the same word, and one could just as well call it “kopokal.” He extends this also to terms such as jealous, avenging, thinking, writing, and laughing. He says that the relation between the worlds is one of emanation, like “seal and imprint,” and therefore our concept of knowledge is not accidental as a description of that same quality. He criticizes the philosophical solution of “it is not true that He does not know” as a logically problematic solution in light of the law of the excluded middle. He explains that analogy between two things, like an elephant and a donkey, rests on grasping a more abstract concept like “living being” by penetrating behind the concept, and argues that such penetration also allows ascent upward in concepts.
A Kabbalistic conceptual system and its connection to the human lexicon
The speaker says that Kabbalah has a foreign conceptual system such as Netzach, Hod, and Yesod, yet it still draws its words from our language rather than inventing a meaningless collection of sounds. He argues that the question “why is it the same word” is answered by the fact that there is something shared, and that the concept of Netzach as a sefirah is somehow connected to the concept of eternity or endurance as the word is used among us, and likewise Hod, Yesod, and the other sefirot.
Note 69: the five terms of logic—genus, species, difference, property, and accident
The speaker quotes that an introduction to the whole craft of philosophical logic begins with “knowledge of the five terms”: genus, species, difference, property, and accident, and cites from “The Terms of Logic of Maimonides, Gate 10” their definitions. He explains that the logical world is divided into genera, species, and individuals, and that binyan av is an induction in which one rises from particulars to a general concept called a species, and then rises from many species to a genus. He defines difference as a trait that distinguishes between species, property as a trait found in all individuals of the species but not one that “constitutes” the species, and accident as a trait found in most of the species or in a minority of it and which does not constitute it. He uses the image of a “constituting support” from the laws of sukkah, and the discussion of a support and a support of a support, to illustrate what it means for a trait to constitute a thing, and gives examples of property such as a heart or five fingers as something found in every human being but not necessarily part of the essential definition.
Modern logic, definition by extension, and flight from analogies
The speaker describes challenges raised in modern logic and distinguishes between “definition by extension” and “definition by content,” presenting a position according to which there is no content-based definition of a concept like human being, but only a list of individuals one points to. He says this approach stems from an unwillingness to trust the analogical ability of moving from the individual to the species, and presents it as a flight from non-mathematical inference and from reliance on tools that are not deduction. He argues that on this approach one cannot add a “new human being” to the group, which creates a principled problem, and he calls it a ridiculous approach and emphasizes how strongly it expresses distrust of analogies.
Why things stop at two levels, direct relation up to the third degree, and examples from Jewish law and Kabbalah
The speaker asks why language has only genus and species and not terms beyond genus, and suggests that this is connected to a basic structure in which a direct relation exists only up to two levels in the genus-species-individual structure. He argues that every individual belongs both to a species and to a genus directly, and not only through the species, and that such a direct relation “does not exist after two levels.” He brings an example from the Sages about a connection that stops “at the third generation,” and explains that a grandfather is directly related to a grandson but to a great-grandson only through the grandson. He connects this to a discussion among the halakhic decisors regarding the obligation of honoring a grandfather through the Maharik and Rashi on the portion of Vayigash, as a distinction between direct honor and honor by force of honoring the father. He adds an example from the sefirot, saying that there are ten sefirot and sub-sefirot up to a third level, and above that there is no “reference” because there is no direct relation, even though the differentiation can continue infinitely.
Emotion, desires, the nature of the soul, and will
The speaker argues that emotion does not stand on its own, but expresses a philosophical reality, and presents basic desires such as honor, money, and sex, adding eating as another desire. He says that the root of desires is a will “to enlarge myself” in different forms, and stresses that he is not claiming a conscious psychological cause, but a philosophical root parallel to the structure of the world. He distinguishes between desire as an impulse and will as an autonomy that decides whether to give in to the urge, and connects the description of impulse to explanations in the Guide of the Perplexed and Nefesh HaChayim regarding Adam’s sin and the serpent entering inward, so that the person experiences the temptation as “wanting.” He argues that impulses are subject to laws of nature and have explanations, whereas will is above laws and has no prior cause, and therefore there are no explanations for will itself.
The will to serve God and speaking about faith / belief
The speaker gives as an example of pure will the “will to serve God,” and argues that it has no explanation, and that the point at which the answer to “why” is “just because” is where will sits. He distinguishes between basic will and the intellectual translations of ways to attain the goals of the will, and suggests that everything for which there is an answer belongs to the intellect and not to the will.
General and particular in the hermeneutical principles, common denominator, and the rule of Hebrew logic
The speaker opens “section 23” and explains that the term “general” in the logical context means a lower or higher species within which particulars or lower species are included, and that what is called a “particular” in the examples of the hermeneutical principles may in relation to a genus be a species. He says that in general and particular and general, the conclusion applies to everything similar to that “particular” and not to one isolated item, and attributes this to the fact that the particular is a “full general species with its properties and its difference from the other species.” He explains that general and particular and general works when the last general is not similar to the first general, because only then are there two different species that allow a move up to a genus by means of the common denominator. He connects this to the understanding that “one side” of similarity is reaching the genus and “two sides” reaching the species. He concludes that “the rule of Hebrew logic” is the unity of the common element, in which particulars or species that differ in their properties are united in the common denominator, and formulates it as a logic of generalization and analogy from the particular to the general, rather than deduction from the general to the particular.
Whether the rules of logic and modes of reasoning are reality or a way of looking
The speaker presents a philosophical inquiry into whether the rules of logic are rules that exist in the world or only a structure of the human intellect, and extends this also to genus-species-general-particular as the question whether the general exists in reality or is a fictive concept created for the convenience of classification. He again connects this to the willingness to make analogies, and argues that the Torah “apparently takes the general as something that exists,” similar to the Platonic idea.
The example of migo: a wall and a vessel as real concepts in reality
The speaker brings a migo that is not a migo of claims, but for example “since it is a wall for Sabbath, it is also a wall for sukkah” and “since it is a vessel for impurity, it is also a vessel for Sabbath,” and emphasizes that the definitions of a wall on Sabbath and a wall for sukkah do not overlap. He argues that the principle makes sense only if the shared term is not an accidental linguistic resemblance but points to a real genus above the two species, and that a wall for Sabbath and a wall for sukkah are two species of one genus called wall. He says this is a necessary condition for understanding the migo, and parallels it to his main claim that the use of the same word, such as knowledge, is not foolish but expresses a real belonging to the same genus, although additional assumptions are still needed to explain why one may “descend back” from one species to another.
The unity of opposites, knowledge and free choice, and what counts as faith
The speaker rejects a logical solution that tries to solve a contradiction by claiming that there is a being for whom contradictions both hold, and argues that if, for us, two contradictory concepts cannot sit together in consciousness, then saying that for the Holy One, blessed be He, it is possible does not turn it into faith, but only into the recitation of words. He says that statements are supposed to point to ideas and not be “mere empty chatter,” and compares this to the ability to say “a round triangle” without the phrase thereby pointing to any reality. He notes that he does not decide whether knowledge and free choice are in fact a logical contradiction, and makes it depend on the nature of time, ending with a reference to the discussion of two axes of time and to earlier contexts in the lecture.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Beyond that—but I also know what “beyond” means. It finds expression in imagining a likeness between two objects, but the basic ability is not imagining a likeness between two objects. The basic ability is to understand what lies behind the thing you see and within the thing you see. That is understanding, and that is my personal capacity. Huh? So the moment you look מתוך Beriah-Yetzirah-Asiyah, from within the attributes of this world, you get, like Maimonides says, that His knowledge is not like our knowledge, and therefore we are incapable of understanding. Maimonides stops there. Maimonides says, fine, that’s a negative attribute. The statement that He knows is basically just saying that it is not true that He does not know. But the Nazir wouldn’t understand it that way. The Nazir would say: true, His knowledge is not like our knowledge in the simple sense. The knowledge that we define as knowledge is not the knowledge of the Holy One, blessed be He, but there is still something shared between them. Meaning, if I look carefully at the concept of knowledge as it functions in our world, and I try to generalize it somehow in a somewhat higher way, then I will indeed have some touch of divine knowledge. I do understand something about it.
[Speaker B] Knowledge itself, or in the world of Atzilut?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t matter. Those are different levels. The question is how far your apprehension reaches. Fine? We never speak about the attributes of the essence. Even the world of Atzilut is part of divinity from our perspective, its lower part. We don’t speak about the essence. So this is a certain apprehension of divine knowledge. Now you can go higher. Every prophet had apprehension on a different level, which reached different levels, and every sage too reaches different levels. So it depends how far you get, but you do have some touch of what divine knowledge is. It is not true that you don’t understand what it is and are merely saying that it is not true that He does not know. That’s what Maimonides does. And I say no: why call it by the name knowledge? According to Maimonides that’s very difficult. Fine, His knowledge is not like our knowledge, so in what sense do you say that the Holy One, blessed be He, knows? What does “knows” mean? If there is really no connection at all to our concept of knowing, then why call it by that word? Why not call it “kopokal”? Why knowledge?
[Speaker C] All the concepts there are used the same way. Jealous, avenging, thinking, writing, laughing. Right, let’s see. In complementary senses, they have no meaning beyond what is done.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s not true. That’s what the Nazir says is not true.
[Speaker C] No, according to Maimonides.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to Maimonides, obviously. We said Maimonides belongs to the philosophers. As we discussed in the past, the philosophers stopped at negative attributes. Meaning, from their perspective a positive attribute is impossible. There is no positive attribute of divinity, because the world of concepts we use is a human conceptual world, which really belongs to the worlds of Beriah, Yetzirah, and Asiyah—the separate worlds. Now the Kabbalists—this is the interpretation of that saying, that where philosophy ends, Kabbalah begins. It always sounds like some folk saying. It’s not a folk saying; it’s a precise statement. In terms of the Kabbalistic worlds—Atzilut, Beriah, Yetzirah, Asiyah—philosophy reaches only as far as Beriah, literally. Philosophy reaches to Beriah, Yetzirah, Asiyah—or in the language of the philosophers, up to the spheres, to the world of the spheres or the separate intellects and so on—which is basically the translation, or philosophical terminology, for the worlds of Beriah, Yetzirah, and Asiyah. The world of Beriah is the highest world. Now the Kabbalists introduced the idea that there is something beyond that. Meaning, it’s not that behind it there is a vacuum, as it were, all the way to the essence, to divinity. Between us and Him there isn’t some infinite gap. We stop somewhere around the spheres—we, meaning the separate beings, Beriah, stop somewhere around the spheres, the separate intellects, and all sorts of strange concepts of that sort. And after that there is some infinite gap, and at the end, as it were, sits the Holy One, blessed be He Himself, about whom we cannot say anything because of that gap. The Kabbalists bridged that gap. Meaning, they connected things. After the world of Beriah there is the world of Atzilut, Adam Kadmon—they added many more worlds after the spheres, after everything, worlds that are already completely spiritual, which are in fact divine worlds. Meaning, these are, as it were, parts within divinity itself. This is one of the—one of the problems Kabbalah raises. All the endless arguments around this issue—corporealization, idol worship, and all sorts of problems that arise here—they arise precisely because of this. The philosophers understood that there is no such thing as parts in divinity. Creation ends, and from there there is nothing—meaning there is only divinity, essence, and that’s it. You can’t speak about parts, about qualities, about this, and therefore everything is negative. The Kabbalists understood: no, there are parts in divinity, and one can speak about them. Again, obviously these are emanations in which divinity is clothed, the Infinite is clothed, all kinds of… if you understand it properly, then it is not idol worship, but you have to think carefully in order to understand why not. Okay? And these worlds are the worlds with which Kabbalah deals. Kabbalah does not deal with these worlds—with Beriah, Yetzirah, and Asiyah. Fine. So in those worlds there are indeed attributes, and those attributes are attributes of God—not negative, positive. Kabbalah believes in positive attributes.
[Speaker C] No, the fact that they exist doesn’t mean
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] mean that I can speak about them. No. Now what happens is that since there is a relation of emanation from one world to another, it is basically like a seal and an imprint. Yes? Meaning there is a seal, and what comes out from the seal. One is the likeness of the other, only thicker, coarser, more material. So our concept of knowledge—if we go back to the point where Maimonides says that the Holy One, blessed be He, knows—it is not used by accident to describe that same quality. That quality of the Holy One, blessed be He, that we call “the Holy One, blessed be He, knows.” Otherwise, why use that word? It’s foolish. First, why use that word? Second, you don’t need to use any word at all. Not that I have some alternative—just don’t talk about it. If it doesn’t tell you anything, why talk about it? It’s idiotic. I mean, it sounds so silly. So they say, fine, it means to say that it is not true that the Holy One, blessed be He, does not know. That’s what the philosophers say in order to get out of this problem. But I don’t know—basic rules of logic say that “it is not true that He does not know” means that He does know. Right? There is no third possibility—the law of the excluded middle. Either He knows or He does not know; there is no third possibility. So in any case, you get into some kind of—I don’t know, the philosophers don’t have a good solution here. And therefore, basically, the Kabbalists claim that there are positive attributes. And when one says that the Holy One, blessed be He, knows, one means that He knows literally. Again, what does “literally” mean? In our concepts, it is like knowledge in the literal sense. Now, true, it is a higher concept of knowledge, but it is still of the same kind. If I contemplate our concept of knowledge carefully, then we can indeed get some intuition, some touch, of what the divine concept of knowledge means. That is the claim. That is the analogical ability he is talking about—because it means looking into a thing and being aware of what is inside it, what is behind it. That’s also how we make an analogy between two things in our world. When you look at a similarity between two things, how do you identify what is similar between them? You try to see what is really behind it. After all, this is an elephant and that is a donkey—in what sense are they similar? Fine, they both have four legs, but that’s not what I mean. I mean that they are both living beings. So how do I see that? I look into the concept of elephant, or the elephant object, and I grasp that there is here some more abstract, broader concept called a living being. And I see the same in the donkey, and then I say: okay, if so, they belong to the same family, there is an analogy between them. But the analogy is based on the ability to penetrate into, or behind, the concept standing before your eyes or before your senses. And if you can penetrate that way, then you can also penetrate upward. That too is penetration upward. The concept of living being is a more abstract, more spiritual concept than the concrete elephant standing in front of me. But that already touches on things we’ll deal with today. Yes. Right, Kabbalah also has some conceptual system, but again, the conceptual system of Kabbalah is, on the one hand, completely foreign—Netzach, Hod, Yesod, all kinds of things like that, where you don’t know exactly what they mean. On the other hand, these are still words drawn from our language. Otherwise we would just be inventing some set of words with no meaning at all. Obviously it is somehow drawn from our lexicon, and it is not used in exactly the sense it has in our lexicon. So why is it really the same word? You ask, like Maimonides. Because there is indeed something shared in it. The concept of Netzach as a sefirah—its meaning is somehow connected to the concept of eternity or endurance as used among us. And likewise Hod, Yesod, and all the other sefirot, all the concepts. Fine? Good, so we’re starting with section 23. I think we’ll need to read the note, because this note is a kind of introduction to this section—note 69 below. “An introduction to the whole craft of philosophical logic”—I think he means Aristotle’s Organon—“and at its head, knowledge of the five terms.” There are five terms; this comes up among many ancient logicians: genus, species, difference, property, and accident. These are five foundational terms. “The Terms of Logic of Maimonides, Gate 10: The general notion that includes a number of individuals we call species.” Now he explains this, yes? “The general notion that includes a number of individuals we call species. And that which includes two species or more we call genus. And that by which a species is distinguished from another is called difference. And what is found in all the individuals of the species but does not constitute that species is called property. And what is found in most of the species or in a minority of it, and does not constitute it, is called accident.” These are the five terms. So I’ll explain this a bit. I’m now going to explain it. The logical world is divided into genera, species, and individuals. Fine? Genera are some sort of root terms, let’s say. We spoke about binyan av in the previous sections: we take particulars and turn them into some father principle, some general concept that contains all the particulars. That is called binyan av. Binyan av is induction, as we saw in the previous times. So we have some general term that contains many particulars. The general term that contains many particulars is called a species. But one can continue further with that process, and take many species and subsume them too, grasping them as particulars of something higher above them, which would be called a genus. A genus contains many species. Each species contains particulars. Meaning, the lowest general term is called species. Beyond that, however, we no longer have separate terms—and I’ll also talk in a moment about why.
[Speaker B] It seems to me that this is somehow anchored in the reality we know.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In any case, then, that’s genus, species, and particulars. Now he says—we’ve seen the first two terms, genus and species. Now, difference is the thing that distinguishes one species from another. In what sense are these two different species? Because there is some difference between them. Also from genus to genus. Yes, but again, here we don’t—genus doesn’t relate to genus from our standpoint. Meaning, a thing that relates to another thing we call a species. Meaning, genus is some one concept—for the sake of the discussion there is one genus in the world. True, you can replicate this picture, but we don’t—it doesn’t matter, that just replicates it. The picture we are looking at is a genus that branches into species, each of which branches into particulars. Meaning, the segment we’re looking at—obviously in principle you can extend it and make this genus into a lower species under a higher species and so on, but for us it is enough to look at this structure in order to understand the basic hierarchy, the basic building block of this puzzle. So we say: there is genus, there is species. Difference, as he says here, “that which includes two species or more is called genus. And that by which the species is distinguished from another is called difference.” Meaning, by what trait is this species distinguished from the other species—that is called difference. Now this difference is actually a trait of the species. Right? It is its trait. What special trait belongs only to it and not to the others. So what is property? Property is also a trait; in Hebrew segulah means a trait. What is property? So he says, “what is found in all the individuals of the species”—the particulars included in that species—“and does not constitute that species is called property.” If there is a non-essential trait—it reminds you of something, I imagine—traits that are not essential to this species, but they characterize all the particulars of that species, fine? That is called a property of that species. As distinct from traits that are completely accidental—meaning they do not even characterize all the particulars—which is called accident. Fine? In other words, traits that do not characterize all the particulars are just entirely accidental traits; they have no essential connection to the object they characterize, and so it is called that they are found accidentally in that object, in that particular, and so it is called accident. Properties are not something found by accident. They belong to all the particulars that make up this species, but they belong to them not in an essential way. Maybe I’ll give an example in a moment. Difference is the thing that marks, defines, constitutes—as he calls it. Yes, “that which constitutes,” things in sukkah. That which constitutes the sukkah. A sukkah has many things in it, right? But what constitutes it is the thing that made it a sukkah. Fine? Every sukkah has wood and roofing, but what constitutes it is what made it a sukkah. Fine? What? Yes, yes—no, I didn’t mean what—the constituting support is also the roofing in a sukkah. The support is the roofing in a sukkah. Therefore the support—so what do they say about a support?
[Speaker B] What is the law regarding a support?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the dispute is whether there is such a concept called support. The support itself—there is hardly any dispute. A support is a support. The dispute is—there are isolated views, true, and in practice the Mishnah Berurah also rules that a support must not be able to contract impurity. Here the Chazon Ish is the stringency of a support of a support.
[Speaker B] Yes, but the Mishnah Berurah says that even a support itself must not be able to contract impurity.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here I don’t remember, but there are isolated views. The support is more or less agreed upon. A support of a support is the dispute. But it doesn’t matter. In any case, there are some who say there is no such concept as support; I don’t care. But one who says that a support may not contract impurity—what is he really saying? That the support is the roofing. When it is written that roofing should be fit to come from the threshing floor and the winepress, that is said about the support, not about the branches lying on top—or not only about the branches lying on top. That is the roofing. What supports the roofing is the roofing. Well, anyway, that’s only a borrowed example. Property—I’ll maybe give an example. Every human being has a heart, for instance. Right? But it seems that this is not the essential definition of a human being, that he has a heart, right? Thought or intellect—I would say that is a more essential definition. Will is perhaps a more essential trait. A heart—it is true that everyone has one; there is no human without a heart. But it doesn’t sound like something essential. It is not the thing that defines his being human. True, it is found in every human being, but it is not essentially connected to the concept of human. It exists in the object “human,” let’s call it that maybe. It exists in the object “human,” yes? But it does not belong essentially to the concept human, that he has a heart. Do you understand? Every object, every particular that is a human, has a heart, that’s true, but if I had to create the concept of human, to give it a definition, I wouldn’t put into the definition a component that he also has to have a heart. Heart in the physical sense. A metaphorical heart—I think maybe yes. But that is exactly what I’m saying.
[Speaker B] What I would call essential is something that exists within that species.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, right, and with the heart that’s why I hesitated before, because a heart may not be such a good example, because in some senses a heart is perhaps what constitutes a kind of living creature, and therefore it does not constitute the species. But it doesn’t matter. I can—let’s say only humans had hearts, for the sake of the discussion, then it would indeed be an essential concept of the species. The fact that every human being has five fingers. Right. I don’t know, there may be other creatures in nature that have five fingers, but certainly not all animals, right? So it exists in every human being, but it is not an essential component of his definition as a human being. Human—that is called a property, which is not a difference. And difference is the thing that defines the species as what it is. Today, in modern logic, there are some challenges to these matters, and there are those who define species—there are two things called definition by extension and definition by content. Definition by content is to define what you mean when you say “human being.” Definition by extension is to say, “human being” means this one, this one, this one, this one, and to point at various human beings—that is called a human being. And there are those who, because they are so unwilling to use—what does this mean? If I want to clarify for you the concept of human being, then some modern logicians say that this thing has no definition by content. You can make some approximation by means of other concepts. What I can do is point to all the particulars included in this species called human. Then you have a clear criterion. Meaning, if you want to discuss regarding a particular object whether it is human or not, look at your list and see: if it appears there, then it is human; if it does not appear there, then it is not human. Do you understand where such a view comes from? Such a view comes from the fact that we are unwilling to make analogies. Do you understand the difference? The point? Because what are they basically saying? They are saying: I cannot give you—I cannot trust that your ability to look into the particular and extract from it its species is the same as mine. Analogy is a subjective thing. How can I know? Human being is a kind of abstract concept that I don’t know exactly how to put my finger on. I’ll define it this way, someone else will define it differently. So what can we do? Agree conventionally somehow: okay, one of these particular items that comes before you—you may call it a human being.
[Speaker B] And that’s
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] exactly what lies behind this.
[Speaker B] If I know how to add a new human being to the group? No, you can’t add one.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you can’t add one. That’s exactly the problem. Well, this is a ridiculous approach from the outset. I think it’s so funny that it even comes up, but the very fact that it comes up is staggering. Meaning, it shows just how much people try to escape analogies. How much people do not trust intellectual elements that do not belong to deduction, to mathematics, but to non-mathematical inference.
[Speaker B] Meaning there is no definition of a human being, or that we are not capable?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—there is no such thing as a definition. A definition is a collection of particulars that, in certain senses, seem similar to us, and it is not even certain that for all of us it is in the same senses. Meaning, it could be that from my perspective all these beings resemble each other; I assume people won’t really disagree that somehow they do seem similar to us, but fine, they treat it as something with no essential meaning. So from their perspective, the objective definition that obligates all of us is only the collection of particulars. Not the meaning behind the particulars, because that is already subjective—each one according to how he sees it. Meaning, they place no trust in those tools that are analogical tools. That is exactly what we were talking about before. This is an extreme expression of that approach that places no trust in analogical tools. Now one more note about the—well, the continuation here doesn’t matter so much; this is basically the explanation that needs to be understood. The question is why they really make do with two levels. If I really want to clarify—this is just a side note, not so connected here to the main issue, but it’s an interesting note. If I really want to point out the overall structure through just one unit of it, then it is enough to say species and genus. Why say species and particular? And then you don’t need genus either. If you are already going up to genus, then why only up to genus and not further? Meaning, why stop here? It becomes neither the minimum nor the maximum. So why are there no words in Hebrew for what is beyond genus—or at all in human language? Because it is for practical purposes.
[Speaker C] In practical terms
[Speaker B] there are
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] classifications with more than two levels. What do you mean? There are classifications with more than two levels. Almost every classification. There are objects divided into animate, plant, inanimate, let’s say for the sake of discussion, and speaking being. Fine? So you have—no, that’s not it. The genus—animate, plant, inanimate, and so on—that’s the species, right? Now each of those—I look into the plant realm, where there are trees, there are bushes, there are plants, right? Again, you still haven’t reached particulars. And I can keep dividing further. There is no problem. In everyday life we constantly encounter hierarchies that are more than two levels. So why stop here? Either way, if that’s your concern, then either species and particulars, and that’s it—or go all the way. Meaning, species one, species two, species three—you can try to create some terminology that continues infinitely.
[Speaker C] It seems to me there is a difference between genus and species. What? An essential difference between genus and species?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is an essential difference, it seems to me. There is an essential difference in the sense that genus is two removes away from the particular, while species is only one remove away from the particular.
[Speaker C] And that genus is three removes away, and this—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—but here, that’s exactly what I want to explain. The point, I think—just metaphysical speculation—but we allow ourselves to make analogies, right? So in that we place a certain trust. So if you’ve been convinced, we’ve trained ourselves in that. It seems to me that there is some basic structure that you see in a number of places, I think, according to which there really is no reference beyond two levels. Meaning, the genus branches into species, and the species into particulars. Now the genus relates to the particulars not only through the species. It also relates to them directly. Meaning, every particular has a species and has a genus, but the genus does not relate to it only through the species. It also belongs to the species and it also belongs to the genus. Fine? Besides the fact that, of course, through the species it also belongs to the genus. Now, such a direct relation does not exist after two levels. Let me give you an example. It is written in the words of the Sages that there is no connection, I think, beyond the fourth generation, right? No connection beyond the fourth generation. Meaning, is the grandfather connected to his grandson? A father’s mercy for his son. A father’s mercy for his son stops at the third generation. It does not continue further. Now what does that mean? Obviously, for example, if I have a great-grandson, yes? Then I will have mercy on that great-grandson because I’m afraid my grandson will suffer, right? So of course I don’t want my grandson to suffer, because I’m very connected to him, and through that I care about the great-grandson. But I do not care about the great-grandson directly. Do you understand? What does that mean? It means that of course there is a hierarchical relation ad infinitum. There are genera and higher genera and still higher genera down to the particulars. But that relation always passes through the hierarchy. A direct relation exists only up to the third generation. The relation between grandfather and grandson is a direct relation, not only through the father. There are practical ramifications. For example, Rashi writes in the portion of Vayigash, right? “A person is obligated in the honor of his grandfather more than in the honor of his father”—that whole famous Maharik. Whether that is so or not. What does “more than” mean? They discuss there whether the obligation to honor my grandfather is only because it is part of the honor of my father, or whether I am also obligated in his own honor directly. At least in some of the halakhic decisors, you can show this. The Maharik, after all, accepts that one is obligated in his honor. But some of the halakhic decisors—and apparently this is what it sounds like—that itself is the dispute. That itself is the dispute between those who say there is an obligation of honor toward the grandfather and those who say there is not. One who says there is not—it’s not really that there is none. He says that the obligation of honor toward the grandfather is part of the honor due to the father. But there is no one who says that I have no obligation at all to honor the grandfather. Even the Maharik would not agree to say that, I think. There are proofs about this. And one who says that I am obligated in the honor of the grandfather, who disagrees with the Maharik—that is Rashi there on the Torah, or really he brings a midrash—he is actually saying more than that. He is saying not only that I am obligated through the father; I am obligated in direct honor. Now what happens with a great-grandfather? There is room to discuss that. According to what we are saying now, it could be that regarding a great-grandfather everyone would agree with the Maharik. Meaning, that I am obligated in his honor only through the grandfather. Fine? You can see this in other places too. For example, in the sefirot in Kabbalah. It can be shown—I once saw this; I had a discussion about it with someone who opened it up for me. He understands this far better than I do, so I believe it is more established than what I can present. He really says that there is no reference of a sefirah—after all, there are ten sefirot, and each sefirah has private sefirot, right? There is Netzach within Netzach, Netzach within Hod, and so on. There are ten sefirot which are sub-sefirot of each sefirah, right? This reaches the third level. Beyond that there is no reference. Now that’s not because there isn’t any; it branches infinitely. But when you look at a picture and want to examine relations between its parts, then you will never have sefirot of a third-order level as against the private sefirot, because there is no direct relation between them. So there is no point putting that into the picture. True, there is a relation through the more general sefirah, and that already belongs to the next picture. There you will already see the next branch. But a direct relation that skips over those sefirot does not exist.
[Speaker C] Now what does “relation” mean? With the grandfather and the son you said it was a relation that was emotional, but here you’re talking about a relation?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? Does this emotional attitude express something? Okay, so that’s probably something you didn’t manage to read there—I don’t think emotion is something that stands on its own. Meaning, emotion usually expresses a philosophical reality. It doesn’t arise—I’m not saying that a person activates an emotion after some philosophical decision; that’s not what I mean. I mean that emotion has a philosophical root. And structures—for example, the emotion of honor, as an example, we talked about this, I don’t remember if we ever talked about it. There are three basic desires; they pull me toward all kinds of interesting things. There are three basic desires in a person: honor, money, and sex. Well, you could also say eating, so four desires. All these extensions, all these desires—people always say that pride is the root of all bad traits. Why? Because the pursuit of honor is really the pursuit of enlarging myself. All desires are a pursuit of enlarging myself. Sexual desire is to produce more—to enlarge myself again. That’s its philosophical root. Not that I mean that everyone who commits a sexual transgression does it in order to produce something, but the philosophical root of the feeling of that desire—it has a philosophical root connected to the philosophical structure of the world, and it’s some kind of wish to enlarge myself. Even eating, by the way—eating is something that makes you fatter, something that also prolongs my days, really. Something that prolongs my days, that keeps me around longer, and therefore there is a desire for eating. Do you understand? These are always desires of expansion and imperialism of one kind or another. That’s the root of all bad desires: to enlarge myself.
[Speaker C] Within desire, can you find some point that’s, so to speak, not volitional?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Within—
[Speaker C] Within desire, can you find a point that isn’t volitional? What do you mean? You’re mixing two concepts here, between the concept of will, which is will… Is desire a will? Of course not.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A will for something? Of course not.
[Speaker C] The opposite—the will submits to desire.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Desire is not will; desire is impulse. That’s exactly the problem that was created after the sin of the first man, when the serpent entered inside. That’s what both the Guide for the Perplexed and Nefesh HaChayim explain. The serpent entered inside, and now suddenly I feel that this desire is actually me wanting it, and this and that. Once, the serpent was outside; it told me, do such-and-such, it tempted me from the outside. Then I have a greater ability to withstand it. But here, suddenly I feel that I want this—but that’s an illusion. It’s still the serpent. It’s inside, but it’s the serpent. When I give in to desire, that’s my decision to give in to desire. I’m not talking about that; I’m talking about the desire itself.
[Speaker B] I have—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A desire for sex—now if I give in to that desire, then I also perform the act, but it’s a volitional decision that I give in to the desire. But the desire itself, the push toward it—that’s the push I’m talking about.
[Speaker C] And that’s biological? What?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s biological or psychological, it doesn’t matter.
[Speaker C] So how do you find in it an intellectual, philosophical element?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because the structure of a person’s soul is like the structure of the world. The structure of the soul, the structure of your impulses, your inclinations, your emotions—it’s like the structure of the world; there’s an analogy between them. It’s built like the world, and if in the world there is a relation up to a third level, then your emotion too will function in some way up to a third level. That’s how it works. I’m talking now about laws of nature, not laws of will. In will there are no laws—that is the whole essence of will. I’m talking about the natural laws of human psychology. What do you have an urge toward? You feel an urge toward things that come to enlarge you. You want to grow.
[Speaker B] What about desire as filling? Okay, filling.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Filling is also eating; sex too is a feeling of being filled. A feeling of emptiness? There is some part of me that is not me, and then I try to expand myself into another place that until now was empty of me.
[Speaker B] If I eat, I get fat.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—“I eat and I get fat” is the crude expression of it, although it is related. The fact that I eat also keeps me alive longer, it makes my life longer; in that sense it also extends me, enlarges me, enlarges me along the time axis.
[Speaker B] Maybe growth, but not always enlargement—people get fat in order to…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s why I said—no, I’m not making a psychological claim here. It’s not the claim that a person wants this because he wants to live longer; on the contrary, usually if he eats a lot he’ll live less long. At least that’s what doctors say today. But the philosophical root of this wanting is because eating is something that sustains a person, something that gives him life. And sex is something that carries him on into future generations.
[Speaker C] So why does a person want a certain thing? Is it because—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not a cause—again, it’s not because of a cause. These are two parallel planes. Two parallel planes; I’m only showing you that they are built in the same way. There is an analogy between the structure of the human soul and the structure of the world. Okay? The world is somehow composed in a certain uniform way; after all, there are laws that govern the world, and I think in the Torah they are supposed somehow to be present. Of course, those laws are not in the Torah in the form of Schrödinger equations, but Schrödinger equations represent the physical aspect of a structure that you can see in other contexts. Someone who knows how to make analogies between different fields will perhaps also understand Schrödinger’s equation from within the Torah. The basis of quantum theory.
[Speaker B] Is a person’s will one of those things that grounds him fundamentally in the world?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not will—it’s not the person’s will. A person’s will decides whether to submit to desire or not to submit to desire. That’s the will. But the thing of desire itself—I have some attraction, I feel an urge to do something. I still have the decision whether to submit to it or not. The decision whether to submit or not is an autonomous decision of my will; over that I am the sole master. But what creates the urge, this attraction? That is part of my psychological structure, or biological structure, it doesn’t matter—I think it’s both. So that structure does indeed operate according to natural laws. My will does not operate according to natural laws. My will is above all laws. Everyone’s will is above laws. That is the essence of will. The thing that is above laws is will. Something that has no prior cause. Okay? But urges do have a prior cause. Meaning, these are things that belong to natural laws, for which explanations can be found, and so on. Will has no explanations. No will has an explanation. A will that has an explanation is not a will; the explanation of it is that it’s not will. So what—
[Speaker C] Is it? No, I want a car, right? Why do you want a car? Because I want a prior cause, a deeper will—because if that’s the prior will, then that’s the will.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But what is that? It’s some derivative of will, a decision of the intellect, that if I want to move efficiently and get places efficiently, the intellect tells me, okay, then buy a car. That’s not will. It’s the intellect’s translation of will, of what the will wants. The intellect now determines what is worth doing in order to achieve the goals that the will has set before me. To move freely is still not the will, I believe. Meaning, now why do I want to arrive? What do I want to do in that place that I’ll be able to reach freely? Okay, but fine, there’s a hierarchy like that. There are certain wills that have no explanation at all. Everything else that we call “wills” are borrowed concepts. Either they are desires, or they are translations of the intellect for how to achieve the wills. But that is not will. Will is something that has no description—meaning it has no cause, no anything; it is simply something absolutely free. It is only in our hands, and therefore we are judged for it. Because it is only in our hands, there are no causes for will. All the explanations for why a person does something are explanations for why he had urges. Why he gave in to the urges—that will never have an explanation. You can only say that because he had very, very strong urges, it was much harder for him to withstand them. He still could have withstood them; it was in his power. It was harder for him to withstand them, and therefore there are mitigating circumstances; we will punish him less. Okay? But still, clearly that’s not an explanation for why he gave in to the urges; it’s an explanation of the urges. Urges belong to the world of nature; they have explanations, there are natural laws, everything is fine. Wills are exactly the one point that exists in the world that is not subject to natural laws: the will of man.
[Speaker B] An example of such a pure will?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The will to serve God, for example. Maybe that’s the only pure will, I don’t know, but it is certainly a good example. There’s no explanation for it—what do you mean, explanation? It’s the most basic thing there is, and from it all kinds of other things are derived. Someone who serves God because he wants to cleave—I don’t know, let’s describe it in different ways. Maybe among the Boyan Hasidim that was the will to serve? For him that was the basic will, not to cleave. I don’t know what “to cleave” means. For him it was a set of actions that he felt he had to do, and that was that. It doesn’t matter; that really is already a matter of your way of perceiving the service of God. But certainly it is a basic thing, and from it all sorts of things will derive, of course—what you do, how you behave, what you observe, what you don’t observe, how much you work, how much you invest in study, how much you invest in various other things—from that it branches out into all kinds of details. But that has no cause. Why do I want to serve God? Because I want to serve God. Because it makes me feel good? Then if it makes me feel good, the fact that I want to feel good is my will, so then it’s no longer service of God. But again—so what is the reason I want to feel good? The point where your chain of argument stops—that’s where will sits. Will is that point that begins the chain of argument. Wherever the answer will be “just because,” that’s where will sits. Anything that has an answer is not will. Anything that has an answer certainly belongs to the intellect. You ask why, and there’s an explanation why—then that’s the intellect. At the point where you ask why and answer “just because,” that’s where will sits. Axioms, let’s call it that in another language. Okay, just one note about why there is only a hierarchy of three—I think that’s a basic structure in the world. It’s not just some accident that language has no terminology beyond genus and species. There is some basic structure of the world here, that direct relation can really only be up to a third degree. Okay, let’s move up to the text itself. In general, just as a logical universal means a lower or upper species in which particulars or lower species are included. That’s a complicated phrasing of what is written below. Lower species and upper species mean genus and species. And “lower species”—this should be read alternatively, I don’t know what that’s called in literary terms, I think it has a name—lower species in which particulars are included; upper species in which lower species are included—yes, one refers to one and one to the other, in order. Okay. What is brought in the example of the first rule, universal and particular—fine, it’s brought—look there in the notes below—the example they bring for universal and particular shows that there are also lower species, not only particulars. What is called a particular is not necessarily a particular; it can also be a species in relation to a genus. That too is called universal and particular, or universal and particular and universal, okay? The universal as a species is a full universal with its properties and its distinction from the other species. Particular and universal—the conclusion, even if it pertains to the particular, pertains to everything similar to that particular, not only to the particular itself. And this is against many commentators on the hermeneutical rules who think not—that when there is universal and particular, then “you only judge according to the likeness of the particular” means only the particular. But no, the question is what “like the particular” means, and we already talked about that in previous times—what does “like” mean, how similar does it have to be—but in any case we are not speaking here of a particular that is a single object. That is his claim. Rather, it is a general species complete with its properties and its distinction from the other species.
[Speaker B] Particular and universal, and the universal adds to the particular.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—here it’s in the example of the second rule, particular—
[Speaker B] And universal—that’s not the issue of particular and universal.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So in the example of the second rule, when they bring the examples—we saw the baraita of the thirteen hermeneutical rules, right? They bring the example regarding what is called particular and universal, so in the example there, if you look, you’ll see that what they call there “particular” means species, not “particular” in our language. And the universal is a genus. Okay? That too is called universal and particular: when there is a genus in relation to a species, that too is called universal and particular, but it has nothing to do with the hermeneutical rule of universal and particular. What is brought in the rule—in the example of the second rule, particular and universal—in that example you simply see an example of this. Okay.
[Speaker B] But it’s also an example of universal and particular.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, okay. But it doesn’t matter—it’s true also regarding universal and particular and universal, and also regarding particular and universal. Everywhere there is a particular, it can also mean a species; it’s just that specifically you see it in the example brought for the second rule. Two or more universals as different species are united under a general name, an upper species—genus—by the common side they share. What is a genus? It is the common side of all the species. This is basically—what is the common side? We already saw: the common side is a prototype, it’s induction. Right? So when you make a common side out of species rather than particulars, you arrive at a genus instead of a species. When you make a common side out of particulars, you arrive at a species. When you make a common side out of species, you arrive at a genus. What is brought in the example of the third rule, universal and particular and universal: “you only judge according to the likeness of the particular.” Fine, the examples really are a different matter. “In such a case, the law of universal and particular and universal applies only where the latter universal is not similar to the former universal.” There is such a principle with universal and particular and universal—that they say it only when the first universal is not the same thing as the second universal. Why? Because if it were the same thing, then there would not be two different species here that I need to subsume into a genus; it would be the same species twice. And then there would be no point in making a generalization. A generalization you make from two different species: you find what they share, and derive from them a genus. But if your two expansions are of the same species, then the expansion is only up to the level of species, not up to the level of genus. Therefore, particular and universal and particular—what… do you remember what the conclusion of universal and particular and universal was? What he says here refers to universal and particular and universal, right? Universal and particular and universal—what was it? “You only judge according to the likeness”—only one side of similarity, right? What does that mean, really? That you get up to the genus. A species is something more similar to the particular than a genus is, but even in the genus there is some similarity to the particular, right? That’s the definition of what he proposed earlier in terms of sides. One side means getting up to the genus. Two sides means getting up to the species. What is similar in two sides is of course a narrower group, and that is only the species. What is similar in one side is something broader, and that is the genus. What is similar in three sides is simply exactly the same thing. That’s what is called one side, two sides, and three sides. Meaning here, it seems to me—he doesn’t say it—but it seems to me that here he means perhaps to explain more explicitly why he called them “sides,” what the Gemara calls “sides,” what we talked about last time. In the previous sections. And now notice: if it is universal and particular and universal, what is its rule? “You only judge according to the likeness of the particular”—not only what is in the particular, but according to the likeness of the particular. So what did he explain in the previous section? That it is only some more distant analogy; in our language, that basically means reaching the genus. Right? Now how do you get to the genus? Here you have hints. Universal and particular and universal—that is universal and particular, and particular and universal, right? It is composed of two things. It is one generalization to a species, a second generalization to a species. But now, two generalizations to two different species—then understand why this is true for two different species, because apparently there is something the two species have in common, and in other words one needs to generalize to the genus. Understand? That’s what he’s saying here.
[Speaker B] But we’re moving more toward narrowing, as though I narrow to the genus and then go back to the sides.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, genus is a generalization, not a narrowing. A genus is something that includes many more particulars than a species. Okay? It’s just that he says I proceed gradually from the particular to the genus. Because we already talked about the fact that there is also a direct path to the genus. That’s true, but when you want to derive it from the Torah, you do it gradually. You make a generalization to two species. Now he says: provided they are different, of course—otherwise what good does it do you? If the two species are the same thing, you won’t be able to advance to the genus, because in order to advance to the genus you need to understand what these two species have in common, and then generalize and say that it is true for all things connected to that genus. But if you have two generalizations that are both to the same species, then only species—you have nothing beyond that, you can’t proceed further.
[Speaker B] How did we also get from the particular to the genus? What do you mean?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] From species you get to genus, but not from a particular. In universal and particular and universal you get from the particular to the genus.
[Speaker B] Unless the particular is a species.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Certainly, certainly. If that particular is a species, then you will reach a higher genus, meaning a genus of a higher level, yes? And that is the way to advance two stages, let’s call it in more general language. Universal and particular and universal is the way to advance two stages. Universal and particular, and particular and universal, is an advance of one stage, a generalization of one stage. Okay? In two stages? What? And therefore they do that only when the first universal is not similar to the last universal. Only then can you proceed further to the genus. He brings examples below, but for instance: universal and particular and universal, “you only judge according to the likeness of the particular.” What is the particular made explicit as? Something that is offspring of offspring of the earth and things that grow from the ground, and also fruit from fruit, or something like that—there are different versions here, it doesn’t matter. The common denominator is fruit from fruit and things that grow from the ground, both of which are offspring of offspring. “Offspring of offspring” is the genus: something born from something that itself was born. So it can be born from the ground as a plant, or fruit from fruit. It doesn’t matter for our purposes; that is a topic that has to be entered into in greater detail. Indeed, the universal in Hebrew logic means a unity of sameness, in which particulars or species that differ in their properties are united by what they have in common. Yes? What are their properties? We saw—property is something that characterizes a species; property is something that characterizes a species. So species that differ in their properties, but still have something in common. Right? And that is what unites them into a genus, the two species. Okay? That common unity between the species is basically the genus, their belonging to one genus. Now one more note—what time is it now? A quarter past nine. Okay, so we’ll finish with this note. There is also a big question…
[Speaker B] What is he doing here? He’s making a genus.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The universal in Hebrew logic means a unity of sameness in which particulars or species that differ in their properties are united by what they have in common. That’s simply a summary paragraph. Meaning, Hebrew logic is a logic of generalization, or analogy and generalization. That is, movement from below upward, not from above downward like Greek deductive logic. Not from the universal to the particular, but the reverse: from the particular, trying to derive universals. Okay? One more note: there is a famous inquiry among philosophers whether the laws of logic are laws that exist in the world or whether they are a form of human perception. Can a thing and its negation not exist at the same time? Is that a statement about the world, or a statement about our way of looking at the world? It could be that this is only some mental structure of ours that prevents us from seeing things of that kind. In the unity of opposites and the unity of contradictions of the Holy One, blessed be He, people often talk about such things, but that… I don’t agree with it, and therefore I don’t…
[Speaker C] They also say that a person can reach such an order.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, which is a strange thing in itself. But it seems to me that—well, let’s leave that for a moment; afterward we’ll comment on it. This question also exists regarding the rules of simple logic, and all logical rules. Whether if X is Y, and Y is Z—this is seemingly a rule about the obligation of our reasoning, not a rule that says something about the world. Logic belongs to us, to the way we look at the world, how we can draw conclusions about the world. The world behaves the way it behaves; it’s unrelated to logic. Logic is a mode of thought of the human being who observes the world. Do you understand? Now the same question also exists regarding the concept of universal and particular, or genus and species, and so forth. Are universals something that exists in the world, or are they only some form of our inquiry and our way of looking, in which we look at some similarity between objects and abstract them into particulars that make up a universal—but not that there is really such a thing as a universal? It’s okay; from our point of view, for some reason we see things as similar, so we create for ourselves a fictitious concept called universal, or species, or genus, and say that all these particulars belong to it—but it doesn’t really exist in the world. This is of course connected to the questions we talked about earlier, definition by extension and by content. Someone who is willing to make analogies, someone who is not willing to make analogies. To make analogies, of course, is to say that they speak about the world—not merely to make analogies and say, well, this is how I look at the world. Yes? And the Torah apparently treats the universal as something existent. Something like the Platonic idea, which also exists—yes, we discussed that at length in previous lessons. The Torah understands it that way. One example that can be brought for this, and I think it is a fairly clear example, is the example of migu. Not migu in the sense of “why would I lie.” Migu, as in: since it is a wall for the Sabbath, it is a wall for the sukkah. What is that? Or: since it is a vessel for impurity, it is a vessel for the Sabbath. There are many such rules of migu. Migu means “since” or “out of.” Yes, but what is it? Not migu in the context of rules of evidence, but in several contexts in the Talmud you see, for example, a certain vessel. If this vessel is a vessel with regard to the definitions of impurity—if it can contract impurity—then it will also be a vessel with regard to the definitions of muktzeh on the Sabbath. And a vessel on the Sabbath is not muktzeh; it does not fit the definitions of muktzeh. Since it is a vessel for impurity, it is a vessel for the Sabbath. Okay? Even though basically it does not qualify. Or a wall: in sukkah and in Sabbath there are different definitions of what is called a wall for a private domain in the laws of the Sabbath, and what is called a wall in the laws of sukkah. And those definitions do not overlap. There are differences between them. Wait, wait. These things do not overlap. There are differences between them. Now on a Sabbath that falls during Sukkot, there can be a situation where this wall gives rise to two questions. First, whether it is a wall for the Sabbath, and second, whether it is a wall for the sukkah. Right? And there the Gemara says: since it is a wall for the sukkah, it is a wall for the Sabbath. And the reverse. If it is a wall for the sukkah, then as far as I’m concerned it is also a wall for the Sabbath, even though it does not meet those criteria. Now without getting into the details of that matter right now, what is the most basic thing you see here? I would say, from a simple perspective before I saw this principle, that the fact that I call this one a wall and that one a wall is just an accidental resemblance in how I look at things. This is Sabbath, this is sukkah—two completely different things. Or a vessel for impurity and a vessel regarding muktzeh on the Sabbath. The definition of a vessel. It’s just—what is it really? I’m just using an evocative word because there is some similarity between the two things. But to say that these really are two particulars of the same genus—that is, in human classification, fine, I’ll put them into the same drawer because that’s personally convenient for me. But does that point to something in reality? It doesn’t point to anything in reality. Really, I call this a wall and that a wall because both of them are some surface standing upright and reminding me of each other. But obviously the definitions are different, and in the halakhic sense of a wall there is no connection between the two things. Now the fact that—one second—the fact that they are both called a wall, the claim is that this is not accidental. Exactly like the fact that “knowledge” is used both for God’s knowing and for my knowing. That is not accidental. The terminology is not accidental. The terminology points to some similarity that really exists. And these two things are two particulars of the same species, and that species is a reality. Meaning, they really are both particulars of the species called “wall.” Now there is “wall”; the particulars are wall for a sukkah—maybe the genus is called wall, and wall for the Sabbath and wall for the sukkah are two species. They may perhaps have different laws, have differences and properties that distinguish them from one another, but there is still a common genus that stands over both of them. Now because that genus is a feature in the reality of both of them, not of my way of looking at them, I can already say—and of course that still requires additional assumptions, but it certainly requires this assumption—I can say: because it is a wall for the sukkah, it is also a wall for the Sabbath. Otherwise, what is the connection at all? The point is that clearly, in terms of the characteristics of a wall, it belongs to the genus of wall—it belongs there. Why? Because it satisfies the characteristics of the species “wall for the sukkah.” Okay? Now there is also another rule there, that what goes upward can also go downward, not only upward. To say that if it already belongs to the genus called wall, then for the purposes of the discussion, when it belongs there, it will also belong to the species “wall for the Sabbath.” Okay? I didn’t explain why, and indeed that requires analysis, but that is another issue. But clearly a necessary condition for the argument—for this kind of migu—is to understand that in reality there really is something common. There is such a thing called “wall” as a general term, as a reality that includes both wall for a sukkah and wall for the Sabbath. One must of course add more assumptions in order still to understand why I am afterward allowed to… So clearly it is connected to the genus called wall. But still—fine, it belongs to the genus called wall, and to the species called wall for the sukkah. But who says I can now also treat it as a wall for the Sabbath? So another assumption is needed for that, but that is an additional assumption. Yet certainly this assumption is also needed. Otherwise, if wall for a sukkah and wall for the Sabbath were just two things that I happened to call by the same name because of some internal associations, there would be no logic at all in saying such a law: that since it is a wall for the sukkah, it is a wall for the Sabbath. Unless, of course, one understands the laws themselves too as speaking only about me in some sense. Right? If we understand the laws as also not representing reality, but only how I look at reality, then maybe one could get out of it that way. But the simple understanding is not like that. Okay? So this is basically some statement about a different conception of what genus and species mean in the Torah as opposed to other approaches. Did you want to say something?
[Speaker B] Also on a weekday it’s a Sabbath wall? Ah, that’s a completely different assumption.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, okay. The question is—that’s a different question—whether I am allowed to come back down.
[Speaker C] To another matter. Huh? To another matter.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He said there’s an “ah” regarding the issue of contradictions.
[Speaker C] That a person, as it were—there is a claim that a person is capable of reaching some sort of awareness.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] First of all, the basic question that has to be discussed well regarding contradictions—this is a topic that deserves a discussion of its own—but the idea that I can solve logical problems by defining that there is some entity with respect to which I have no problem with the unity of contradictions has never seemed plausible to me. It has never seemed plausible to me even if in God Himself, in some sense—I don’t know if what I’m saying now is meaningless words—these contradictions really can live together. Because at the end of the day, the one who says this and believes it is me. And if in me it can’t live together—
[Speaker C] It depends on what level you’re speaking.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If in me it can’t—when I say that, say for the sake of discussion, knowledge and free choice. Knowledge and free choice—for the sake of discussion, again, not necessarily that it is so—logically cannot go together, for the sake of discussion. I’m not arguing whether that’s really so, but for the sake of discussion let’s assume it is. Then I can’t say that in God there is no contradiction between knowledge and free choice. I’m asking a question: what kind of picture of God am I supposed to believe in? So am I supposed to believe both that I have free choice and that He knows? Even if I recite it, I don’t really believe it. Because these are two elements sitting together in my head, and they contradict one another. So I can recite it, but not believe it. And that is the question.
[Speaker C] What, as it were? Say, define it as faith above intellect, beyond what is written—but that faith, what is that? Faith? You can recite it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Faith is a mental state; it is not the product of the lips. In my mental state, can I live in a state where there is both free choice and knowledge? If I can live with that, then leave God aside—I can live with it, and there is no problem. I can already live with it. If I cannot live with it, then it won’t help me to say that in God it can live together. So if yes, then there’s no problem—leave God aside—then it’s simply not a contradiction. No, the question is: you are trying to solve a problem on the assumption that it is a logical contradiction, and to say that there is some entity not subject to logical contradictions, and in that way solve the problem. But if in fact it isn’t a logical contradiction, then there was no difficulty to begin with. So don’t say that God is another kind of entity; even without God. I myself can live with the fact that there is free choice and there is knowledge—also at this end, not only for God.
[Speaker C] No, again, it’s an appropriate structure. God, as it were, contains the unity within Himself, and I have some method by which I can recognize that fact, how they can be together, and it is not an intellectual method, it is a supra-intellectual method.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t care whether it’s intellectual or not intellectual—can you live with it together? Yes. If you can live with it together, then there is no difficulty. Right. No, then there isn’t—no.
[Speaker D] It can’t live logically; it’s—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not logically—on the level of faith, mentally.
[Speaker D] It—
[Speaker B] The fact that I know this doesn’t mean I have to operate every single moment out of full awareness of both things.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You operate out of awareness only of free choice. You cannot operate out of awareness of knowledge. Yes, but I am compelled—but I can want to believe that there is knowledge, even though I operate in awareness of free choice. Now the question is in what sense that really counts as faith, or perhaps it is only recitation by mouth. If it is only recitation by mouth, the question is to what extent you can truly say that you believe it. Again, I don’t mean right now whether you arrive intellectually at the conclusion that there is knowledge and free choice; I don’t care if you get there by some non-intellectual route. The question is whether after you get there, you can live that way. Can those two concepts sit together in your consciousness? Okay, if yes, then from the outset you didn’t have a problem.
[Speaker D] Maybe it’s a question of logical opposites.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Logical opposites are perfectly fine; they are not in the same place together.
[Speaker D] Right. So that’s it—the capacity to say that evil is good too, with what we are doing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I can give completely rational explanations for that; you don’t need to get into any mysticism for that. Completely rational explanations—
[Speaker C] Rational—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What the Rabbi said, that there is no evil and no—
[Speaker C] free choice—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And free choice is something that is good in itself.
[Speaker C] The Rabbi said here—he asked a question—that it’s not true that there’s a question; it’s a matter of levels. Meaning, once you are at a certain level where you are only on the logical plane, then there is a question. Once you move to the next stage, then there is no longer a question.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does “there is a question” mean? Leave God aside.
[Speaker C] What, because He is an entity—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Upon whom contradictions can also apply? Rather, because for you it really isn’t a contradiction—you can live on a plane where it isn’t a contradiction. Fine, then the difficulty never existed in the first place. You can’t solve a problem that you yourself cannot live with by saying there is some entity for whom there is no problem. That you can’t do.
[Speaker C] Only—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That I actually can live with it.
[Speaker C] In the emphasized statement, you’re saying that the fact that I’m able to break through these two things shows—it—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Shows that they do not contradict.
[Speaker C] Yes, but why don’t they contradict?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why don’t they contradict?
[Speaker C] Because there exists some unity of contradictions where they also do not contradict—both there they do not contradict and with us they do not contradict. Fine, what?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know what “there” means. If with us they do not contradict, then we’re done, so what is the problem? Do you understand? If they don’t contradict, then they don’t contradict, so there is no difficulty. You can convince yourself that at first you thought they contradicted, and then you came to the conclusion that they do not contradict—fine, but again, that’s perfectly okay, I have no problem with it. A person needs to progress in knowledge and understanding; all is good. You can make a mistake. I’m not saying that if in your head you were mistaken then there’s no point in looking for answers. I’m only saying that the answer revealed to you that from the start you were mistaken. Not that it revealed to you that there is some entity for whom, even though for you it’s a contradiction, despite it being a contradiction, it doesn’t bother Him. There is no such thing. Because the question is what I believe about that entity, not what He is.
[Speaker B] The fact that I believe in something, or that I know in my intellect that a certain thing is so, doesn’t mean that I now have to operate out of full awareness. Meaning, I live my life out of awareness of free choice. So that’s how you think.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But again, if not, then fine, so it doesn’t contradict. No, not because it doesn’t contradict.
[Speaker B] It really does contradict. I won’t succeed in living out of full awareness both of free choice and of—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then if it contradicts, then there is no such thing. What is contradictory does not exist. For whom? For me?
[Speaker B] Or for the Holy One, blessed be He? Ah, that’s already a different claim. My claim is also—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] When you assigned it to God—when I don’t see it, then why in the world is it in God, but I can’t grasp it? That may be, but what do you want from me? I don’t believe in that. I’m not talking about that. I’m not talking about things that are just empty chatter. It doesn’t matter. Words in Hebrew or in any language are supposed to point to something. Words are not just lip-noise, right? Words or sentences point to ideas. So the fact that I can say it—that indicates nothing. The question is whether I can also say “round triangle.” I can say that too. Does that point to some entity? Do those words point to something, or is it just a collection of words? If it’s just a collection of words, then that is exactly what I’m saying. And if you hold that it points to something, then you need to tell me whether it really points to something for you. It’s not enough to show that you can say the words. Understand? It’s not enough to tell me, fine, you are commanded to say “I believe that God knows, and I also believe that I have free choice.” I can say those words, no problem, that’s free. I know how to say many other sentences too, no problem at all. The only question is whether when you say that, it is also accompanied by some actual conception. Understand? Do those words express something, or are they only words? The question is whether there is—fine, I’m not deciding it. I’m not sure that knowledge and free choice are really things that are a logical contradiction. That is, that they cannot be together. The question is simply what the nature of the concept of time is around this inquiry. Whether time is times—whether jumps back and forth on the time axis are something logically impossible, or whether it is simply a deterministic problem or a technical one.
[Speaker B] How much…
[Speaker C] Two time axes?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, two time axes—did we talk about that there? Was that in the symposium on religious freedom of choice and that?
[Speaker D] Maybe it was in the lesson on dreams…
[Speaker C] The first lesson?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, it was something—no, no, in the previous lesson we talked about it, actually.