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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But then Rabbi Akiva Eiger asks this as well, in the context of the Sabbath, regarding indirect causation of erasing God’s name. The Talmud says that if there is a mezuzah in an idolatrous city condemned to destruction, then you don’t burn the city. So Rabbi Akiva Eiger says: what’s the problem? Do it indirectly. Indirectly causing the erasure of God’s name is permitted. So burn the mezuzah indirectly, and then you can burn the condemned city and go home happy and content. So I don’t… I think he leaves it as requiring further analysis, but it’s not difficult at all. Because the moment you do it indirectly, then you also haven’t fulfilled the positive commandment. After all, in the same way that indirect causation is not a violation of the prohibition, it’s also not fulfillment of the positive commandment. If an act is required, then an act is required for both sides. Okay, anyway, let’s get back to our topic. So this, for example, is a rule, right? This rule that the specific overrides the broader one, again, is not a rule of hierarchy. On the contrary. As it happens, and I even think usually that’s how it is. Meaning, for example, in legal contexts, there is a basic legal principle, right? Which is generally more important than a particular law in terms of its legal standing, its normative standing. But then there is some specific, narrower law where the legislator has said his piece. That, yes, has to be done. And there are certain conditions, I don’t know, that maybe have to be written explicitly in the law—in the legal context, I think—because otherwise you could cancel it, otherwise the court could never cancel a law. Because if the legislator said so, then he said that here the general norm does not apply. There probably has to be some kind of limiting clause or I don’t know, something inside the specific law that says, yes, yes, we know the general law contradicts it, but we are limiting it—something like that—but never mind. On what level? Even so. Yes. So on the principled level, usually precisely the broader norm is also the more important one, more foundational; it’s a fundamental principle. And even so, the specific thing prevails. Why does it prevail? Not because it’s more important, as I said earlier, but because it’s an interpretive consideration. It’s obvious that the legislator intended—when the legislator says, “you shall blot out the memory of Amalek,” he said two things. He said, first, here there is no prohibition of “do not murder.” This is a limitation on the prohibition of “do not murder.” Of course that’s not enough, because the fact that there is no prohibition of “do not murder” would not mean that you have to kill the Amalekites. That would only mean it is permitted to kill the Amalekites, if this were merely a limitation on “do not murder.” But there is an obligation to kill the Amalekites. So first, there is here a limitation of the general norm, and second, of course, there is also an obligation to kill the Amalekites. But embedded within the specific norm there is also some limitation of the general norm. So this situation basically means that we are dealing here with permission in the full sense, not mere override. The general norm in this case does not apply; it’s not that it is pushed aside. Because if it were still in force, it would not be pushed aside—it is more important than the specific norm.

[Speaker B] Let’s take the example of the condemned city, where the Torah says, “and He will give you compassion and have compassion on you.” Meaning, if we said this was full permission—that the killing in the condemned city was permitted, and then you didn’t commit any murder at all—why would you need compassion?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that doesn’t follow. The moral or psychological effects of an act of killing do not depend on whether it is prohibited or permitted.

[Speaker B] Learn it well and you’ll feel that you did a moral act.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, so that too is “and He will give you compassion and have compassion on you.” Learn it well and that’s it—no need to get mystical. Learn it well, and that way you’ll be protected against that deadening of sensitivity to human life, because you’ll understand that here there is something very specific that the Torah commanded because it is very important, and so on, and that will immunize you in other cases so that you won’t become numb toward killing. Now I want to enter a family of principles—or one principle that really belongs to this family of classification, classification of one norm because of another norm—but what is special about this family is that the classification is done on the basis of meta-halakhic considerations. Meaning, with Amalek versus murder, the Torah said not to murder and the Torah said to kill Amalek, so it’s only an interpretive question. Meaning, the Torah said that because it said to kill Amalek, it said that in this case the prohibition of “do not murder” does not apply. I didn’t do anything here; I only discovered through interpretive means what the Torah intended. Now there are situations in which I decide that there is a limitation on a certain Torah commandment even though I have no source for it in the Torah. It is an internal limitation, not an external one. Meaning, the halakhic norm actually extends only up to a certain boundary and no further. Not because outside there is some contrary norm, but because it is a limitation from within. I call this halakhic territory, considerations of halakhic territory. So let’s look at examples. What is the case? Is a court-imposed death sentence… oh, that’s something else.

[Speaker C] The execution of what ruling?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Torah says that one who desecrates the Sabbath is liable to death.

[Speaker C] But after all, a religious court sits and rules—that’s not Torah-level?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously. The religious court implements what the Torah says, that one must execute a Sabbath desecrator.

[Speaker C] But what do you call that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you call it conceptually? Full permission: here there is no prohibition of “do not murder,” yes. Because it’s a specific law—again, a specific law. Meaning, the Torah specifically said that someone who desecrates the Sabbath in the presence of witnesses and prior warning is liable to death, so it is obvious to me that the prohibition of “do not murder” was not said here. True, it depends on the religious court deciding the case, fine.

[Speaker B] What about “zealots may strike him”—is that also full permission?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the Brisker Rabbi, among other things, that I’m talking about. He says that indeed in “zealots may strike him” there is… the first principle, meaning that there is here a limitation on “do not murder,” but there is no commandment.

[Speaker E] Or “if Zimri had killed Pinchas first”—what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, I’ll get to “if Zimri had killed Pinchas first” in a moment. But in principle, in “zealots may strike him” it’s only a limitation on the prohibition of “do not murder.” Exactly—without the commandment, without that second element that there is a commandment; rather there is some value in it, or I don’t know, but not a commandment.

[Speaker B] And this is “it is the law, but we do not instruct people to act this way”? Fine, we don’t instruct it, but it’s still the law.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “It is the law, but we do not instruct people to act this way”? As written in… Maimonides writes it without instructing it that way; I don’t know exactly what he meant. Okay, let’s start with one example or two examples. There are two articles in Techumin, one by Rabbi Ovadia and one by Rabbi Ariel, Rabbi Yaakov Ariel, dealing with similar questions. Rabbi Ovadia’s responsum deals with a boy who wants to go study in a yeshiva where only sacred studies are taught, and his parents want him to go to a high-school yeshiva or a place where secular studies are also taught. Okay? Livelihood, whatever—everyone and his considerations; he presents it, I think, as livelihood. I think one can speak here about something broader, but that’s how he presents it. And the question is whether he must obey them, because after all, “every man shall fear his mother and his father, and you shall keep My Sabbaths”—so if a father or parents tell you to violate a commandment or not to perform a commandment, you are not obligated to obey them. So now the question is whether the son has to obey his parents and go to a high-school yeshiva, or whether he may—or perhaps even must—go to a small yeshiva. So he discusses there, first, what is the nature of the commandment to obey one’s parents, and second, what is the nature of the commandment to study Torah or not to study other subjects—the commandment not to study other subjects, right? Meaning, is this an obligation, an enhancement of a commandment, on the contrary is it prohibited, because teaching him a trade is one of a father’s commandments toward his son. So he discusses all that there, and in the end he reaches the conclusion that the son is permitted not to obey his parents—that is, to go to a small yeshiva. Yes. Now, isn’t the son obligated to learn a trade? What?

[Speaker B] Isn’t the son obligated to learn a trade?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, he says that the tribe of Levi—at the end of the laws of the Sabbatical year and Jubilee in Maimonides—whoever is moved in his heart to be like the tribe of Levi is exempt from all worldly burdens and can engage only in Torah. Maimonides himself writes—he is the father of the approach that says that one who makes the Torah a spade with which to dig profanes God’s name, and so on. In any case, the whole discussion there revolves around the question of whether this falls under the rule of “every man shall fear his mother and his father, and you shall keep My Sabbaths.” So he speaks about whether this is a Torah-level commandment, whether it is a rabbinic commandment, whether it is an enhancement of a commandment—how exactly to relate to this desire to study only Torah and not study other things—and then one must discuss whether the rule of “every man shall fear his mother and his father, and you shall keep My Sabbaths” was also said regarding an enhancement of a commandment, or regarding a rabbinic commandment, or something like that. The conclusion is interesting in itself, because he says it is permitted. Not obligatory. Now that’s strange, because if it is only permitted, then why on earth does it override the commandment to honor one’s parents? Meaning, if there is something you are obligated to do, it is like saying: you are allowed to kill so-and-so, but you are not required to. There cannot be such a situation. Meaning, there could be a situation where you are obligated to kill him, and then there is no choice. But what does it mean that it’s permitted? If it’s permitted, then obviously “do not murder” says don’t do it, if it is also permitted not to—that’s what “permitted” means, right? So how can the clash with honoring one’s parents produce a situation in which you are allowed to do it and not obey your parents, but you are not obligated? If you are not obligated, then why doesn’t the commandment to honor parents apply here?

[Speaker B] Could it be that the two values were equal? There was a struggle between two values and it came out a tie, so whatever you do, you won’t… there was a state of equality; the two values were equal, and then you have the freedom to choose one of the two.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, could be, although that’s true here, but there is a broader principle here. I think what he means to say is more than that. I don’t remember the language right now; one would have to look more carefully at his responsum. But I think he means to say more than that. Suppose I start from the assumption that the commandment to study in a small yeshiva is only an existential commandment. If you do it, you have a commandment; if you don’t do it, nothing happened. The question is whether an existential commandment also overrides honoring one’s parents or not. Not because of the clash between two values; on the contrary, even without my parents commanding me, I can go to a high-school yeshiva—there is no prohibition in that, okay? If I go to a yeshiva that teaches only sacred studies, maybe that is a commandment, but if not, fine—it’s permitted. A person can decide. I didn’t commit a sin. I didn’t commit a sin. An existential commandment is a commandment that one may fulfill. But one cannot violate it, right? Unlike a prohibition inferred from a positive commandment. A prohibition inferred from a positive commandment can only be violated; it cannot be fulfilled. And that is exactly the other side of the same coin. So what happens if this thing is an existential commandment? There is still room to say that if I want to perform an existential commandment—I have decided that I want to. If I don’t do it, there is no prohibition, but if I do it, then I have a commandment. Now my parents tell me not to do it. So you can’t say that I am forbidden to obey my parents, because after all I am generally permitted not to do this commandment. But on the other hand, once I have decided to do this commandment, then it may very well be that my parents can no longer say anything. Okay? Something like this appears in the Raavad at the beginning of the Sifra; he speaks there about a positive commandment overriding a prohibition. What about a time-bound positive commandment? He brings there the dispute about women: can women do it, are they obligated in some sense to do it—at least they can do it if they recite the blessing; there are various levels there among the halakhic decisors as well. He says that even though a time-bound positive commandment is, from the standpoint of women, an existential commandment—that’s how some define it; I’m not sure that’s what he means there, in my opinion he means something else—but it is an existential positive commandment for women, and nevertheless it overrides a prohibition. And if women want to fulfill a time-bound positive commandment, but it would involve a prohibition, okay? Then an existential positive commandment will override a prohibition for a woman who is not obligated in it at all. Why? Because once she decides to enter into it, she is engaged in a positive commandment, and once she is engaged in a positive commandment, she is exempt from the prohibition. I tend to think that if we understand that an existential positive commandment overrides a prohibition, maybe this is the practical difference I said did not exist—that with a positive commandment overriding a prohibition, it is ultra-override. Meaning, if the prohibition does not exist at all where you are engaged in a positive commandment, then even if the positive commandment is existential, it may be that there too the prohibition was not said in a place where the violator’s motivation is the desire to serve God. There is Rav Nissim Gaon; there are several medieval authorities (Rishonim) who say this.

[Speaker C] But mixed fibers in tzitzit is like that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Mixed fibers in tzitzit is another question; no, not clear.

[Speaker C] Not clear? No?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Oh, that it’s also existential? Yes, but not from the aspect you’re talking about—from the perspective that this is full permission. Because among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) there are some disputes about this: is it really the case that where there is a prohibition, where there is a positive commandment, there is no prohibition opposite it at all, or is the prohibition merely pushed aside? This is what Rav Nissim Gaon wants to say about the Sabbath. He says that where you violate the prohibition and your motivation is not criminal, not to violate the prohibition—your motivation is to fulfill the positive commandment—there the prohibition was never said at all. You did not violate the prohibition. Okay? So perhaps here too one can say that since this commandment is an existential commandment, then you are not obligated—meaning, without the parents saying anything, you can go study in a place where other subjects are also studied—but if you decided to be like the tribe of Levi and do this commandment, then even the command of your parents cannot prevent you from doing so. That’s Rabbi Ovadia’s responsum. I felt very uncomfortable with that responsum, beyond the scale of values it reflects—I mean even in terms of the method of the discussion. I’ll come back to that in a moment. There is a responsum of Rabbi Ariel on…

[Speaker E] What? Again a different scale of values?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but here the Torah said, “every man shall fear his mother and his father, and you shall keep My Sabbaths; I am the Lord.” I spoke about this in one of the previous sessions, about this override, how exactly one does this override. There is a responsum of Rabbi Ariel about a young man who wants to go into officer training in the army. So that involves another year of service, okay? He serves three years, and now he wants to go to officer training, that’s another year. His parents don’t want that. They want him at home, to come out after three years. Is he obligated to obey them or not? And again Rabbi Ariel goes through more or less the same route as Rabbi Ovadia. “Every man shall fear his mother and his father, and you shall keep My Sabbaths,” so now one has to discuss the nature of the commandment of honoring parents. That depends on a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) in tractate Yevamot 6a: when parents command something but derive no benefit from it, they just don’t want it, is there a commandment of honoring parents in such a case at all? So that’s a dispute among medieval authorities (Rishonim), that’s one discussion. And on the other side of the coin: what is the nature of volunteering for officer training? What is that? Is it a positive commandment? Is it an enhancement of a commandment? How exactly should one relate to this matter? His conclusion is that it is an enhancement of a commandment. The commandment is the three years; if you want to enhance the commandment, then do a fourth year too—that’s enhancement of a commandment. And then he goes into the question whether an enhancement of a commandment also overrides honoring parents. Was “every man shall fear his mother and his father, and you shall keep My Sabbaths” also said regarding enhancement of a commandment, and not only regarding an actual commandment?

[Speaker D] It’s hard to say that’s enhancement of a commandment. What? It’s hard to say it’s enhancement of a commandment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I also think it’s hard to say that.

[Speaker D] Because the definition is very simple—what does it mean, enhancement of a commandment? Meaning, if everyone does the commandment and doesn’t enhance it, that’s perfectly fine. But the army can’t survive if everyone does only the commandment without enhancing it, because then it won’t have officers. So from its perspective that can’t be enhancement of a commandment. No, then I don’t agree, no. If there are volunteers, then fine. It could be that when there are no volunteers, then the army—or the law—will dictate that you have to go

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] into officer training, and then fine, then that will be the case. But as long as there are, maybe that’s okay. So I’m not sure that’s right. Why do I think it’s not enhancement of a commandment? Because enhancement of a commandment is obligatory. That’s why I don’t really understand this definition. Enhancement of a commandment is a full obligation. Therefore I don’t really understand this definition. Enhancement of a commandment is a full obligation. “This is my God and I will beautify Him”—you are obligated to enhance the commandment. When people say that enhancement of a commandment is not indispensable to the commandment, that means it does not prevent fulfillment of the commandment. Meaning, if you take a non-beautified etrog, you fulfilled the etrog commandment, but you did not fulfill the commandment of enhancement. After all, there is also a commandment of enhancement: “This is my God and I will beautify Him”—beautify yourself before Him through commandments. That commandment is a full obligation on every individual; it is not voluntary. You are obligated to enhance. Is it counted among the 613? Yes—no, it’s not counted among the 613, so what? It doesn’t matter. It isn’t counted because it is a detail within existing commandments, just as a partial measure isn’t counted among the 613, as you’ve seen in Jewish law. There are many things not counted among the 613 that are Torah-level. The assumption is that this is probably some kind of meta-halakhic principle, or a broad principle like that, so they don’t put it into the 613 but understand it as a detail within what is already counted in the 613. Do everything in an enhanced way. So then there is no point in counting it separately; it’s a detail within the counted commandments. But it is a full commandment, you know. Enhancing a commandment is “This is my God and I will beautify Him”—beautify yourself before Him through commandments; you are obligated to enhance. It’s always the same confusion with blue thread in tzitzit, right? People think blue thread in tzitzit is voluntary. Because it says the blue does not prevent the white and the white does not prevent the blue. Blue thread in tzitzit is a full obligation. Again, assuming—according to each person’s view whatever he thinks—but assuming that we know what the blue thread is, the blue thread is a full obligation. What it says is that fulfillment of the obligation of the blue—if I… non-fulfillment of the obligation of the blue does not prevent the white. The white you did do, but the blue you did not do. If you did not place blue thread, you violated, you neglected a positive commandment if you did not put in blue thread. “It does not prevent the white” means you neglected the positive commandment of the blue and not the positive commandment of the white, that’s all. Yes, so also with enhancement of a commandment, enhancement of a commandment is plainly obligatory. What?

[Speaker C] Are blue and white two separate positive commandments?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, again, they are two details within one positive commandment; that’s not important. Both are Torah-level. They are not counted separately because, by the way, regarding tzitzit, Maimonides counts two—does he count one for tzitzit and two for tefillin? Maybe, I no longer remember. Two for tefillin? So even that is not so simple; there are discussions there in the eleventh principle. What? Yes, no—not a principle, principle eleven. So in this context it’s a bit hard for me to understand why volunteering for officer training is enhancement of a commandment. If it were enhancement of a commandment, it would be obligatory. Now you can say, yes, it’s obligatory. True, not everyone does it, but it’s obligatory. There are many sinners who don’t do it. It doesn’t prevent the three years; the three years you do and you fulfill the commandment, but the commandment of enhancement you did not fulfill. I don’t think—it doesn’t sound plausible to me that I should relate to everyone who doesn’t go to officer training as a sinner. Fine, I don’t know. But that’s what he argues, in any case. So for our purposes, let’s adopt that assumption, and he says that since this is enhancement of a commandment, and from his conclusion and proofs enhancement of a commandment is also included in “every man shall fear his mother and his father, and you shall keep My Sabbaths,” meaning if your parents tell you not to enhance a commandment, you are not obligated to obey them. Therefore you may do it. And again, it seems to me—I don’t even remember whether he writes this, but it’s fairly clear—that the conclusion is that you may do it, not that you must, exactly like in Rabbi Ovadia’s case. Because I assume he does not say that everyone is obligated to go into officer training; rather, if you decided to go into officer training, then even if your parents don’t want it, you are not obligated to obey them.

[Speaker B] The alternative was that he would return to yeshiva in the fourth year.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, and then there would be a clash of commandments. Okay. In any case, those two responsa gave me the feeling that there is something missed here in the method of the discussion. Because it seems to me that in both of these cases I would not connect it at all to “every man shall fear his mother and his father, and you shall keep My Sabbaths.” Meaning, even assuming, say for the sake of discussion, that we take the view of those medieval authorities (Rishonim) that there is no commandment to honor parents where they don’t need it—yes? where they don’t benefit from it directly. I mentioned this dispute in tractate Yevamot 5. In such a case, in both of these cases there is really no commandment of honoring parents. What do they gain from whether I go here or there? It’s my calculation. Meaning, they are not… they do it for me, not for themselves. What’s for me—leave to me.

[Speaker C] Isn’t that reverence and honoring parents? Or is it something else? To carry out what they say?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, fine, but to carry out what they say when they need it—not to carry out what they say just because they said it, so now you have to obey. That’s a dispute among medieval authorities (Rishonim). Does it apply to everything my father says, that I have to do it, or when my father says something that he needs, that benefits him, that he lacks if I don’t do it—only then do I have to obey him? What, if he tells me, stand on one leg for two minutes now, do I have to stand on one leg? There are medieval authorities (Rishonim) who say yes.

[Speaker C] Because if you don’t stand, he’ll feel bad.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does it mean, he’ll feel bad? Fine, he feels like having me stand on one leg, but he doesn’t really gain anything from that, so let him take a pill. Okay, so in short, it’s a dispute among medieval authorities (Rishonim). So that’s that.

[Speaker C] Fine, say they forbid him to go to kibbutzim—is that so that, God forbid, nothing will happen to him? Yes, or that something will happen to him?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Or maybe they want something for themselves. What? For themselves, yes, because of the kibbutzim. For themselves, yes, but not in any tangible sense. If it’s in order to help them at home, then there is room to discuss it; maybe it doesn’t depend on that dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim). But assuming, say, that they want it for his sake—that he should go already to university, get settled, get organized quickly. So in such a case I think—let’s assume even for the sake of discussion that there is a commandment of honoring parents even where they have no direct benefit, or that here they do have direct benefit, never mind, no problem, there is a commandment of honoring parents in such a case. It still seems to me that the basic consideration—I don’t think there is any sense, before even analyzing the problem, that the answer would be yes. You are not obligated to obey him. Then afterwards I need to think how exactly it fits in, but the answer should be no. And I want to put my finger on that intuition, because I usually trust such intuitions. Usually when there is such an intuition, look carefully—it is a good intuition. Meaning, halakhic decisors already write that many times you need some initial inclination of what is right in the case, and only after that start looking. Logic tells me. Almost the opposite of what we would usually say, really—on the contrary, clear yourself out, go by the pure halakhic discussion. In any case, it seems to me that the root of this intuition lies in the principle I earlier called halakhic territory. What does that mean? There is a certain sense that in a place where I am deliberating about—or want to do—something that for me is very important, this is how I want to live my life. It is extremely essential for me. I want to be an officer in the IDF; that will build my personality, contribute to the state, everyone and his reasons. It’s very important to me. This is the way of life I want to live.

[Speaker E] Not at all in the terminology of a commandment. What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Not at all in the context of a commandment. It is simply outside the parents’ territory to prevent me from doing it. Not because there is a commandment involved—not enhancement of a commandment and not anything. The argument is: I want to be an officer in the IDF. It’s terribly important to me, terribly important to the state, terribly important—I don’t know why. That’s how I want to live. So if you want me to bring you a glass of water, obviously I have to bring you a glass of water. If you want me to help you here, that I should obey you, all good. But you cannot demand that I give up something that is deeply significant to me in life. He still wants him to obey him. What does that mean?

[Speaker D] It means he is not obligated, he is not obligated.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t matter—at age thirty he is still obligated in honoring parents. That’s not the law.

[Speaker D] Yes, but that isn’t called not honoring.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The fact that you don’t obey him—obeying them is part of the honoring in halakhic terms. Obeying them. What? I’m not talking about practical solutions. There is no practical solution. What do we do now?

[Speaker C] If someone wants to study in the United

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] States and they have a vacuum at home…

[Speaker C] If a child wants to go study in the United States and his father needs him at home…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, so wait. That’s already a somewhat more complicated dilemma. We’ll get to the end of it in a moment.

[Speaker E] We need to take this now into questions of worldview as part of our discussion.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, right, right. No, and that’s a very important point. Because in the end there is a halakhic result here. And my claim is that there is a limitation from within, not from without. Meaning, here—usually when we understand this limitation on honoring parents, we say there must be some value outside that stops honoring parents: up to here. Right? “You shall keep My Sabbaths.” You can’t tell me not to enhance a commandment, or not to fulfill a commandment, or to violate a prohibition, or whatever it may be. There is something external that stops the value of honoring parents. My claim is that here there is something inside the commandment of honoring parents, not something external. The commandment of honoring parents has a territory up to which it extends. Outside its range, it does not exist. Not that something overrides it, that there is some other halakhic value. As though here my rights override it—but this is not override. I’ll define it more precisely later.

[Speaker D] We’ve canceled the obligation to obey parents altogether. What? We’ve canceled the obligation to obey parents… No, no. Anything they tell you—thank you very much, with all due respect, but I want to, it’s very important to me.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it is really very important to you, then yes. But what do you mean, always say that?

[Speaker D] If you say that, then you’re a fraud.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it really is important to you, then yes indeed. Right, that’s something. Obviously when it’s merely inconvenient for me, of course I have to obey them. I’m not talking about convenience. I’m talking about something that matters to me in life.

[Speaker D] I want

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] to live this way. It’s not a question of convenience. I’m not talking about giving up something convenient for me for the sake of my parents. I chose to live a certain way of life; parents cannot dictate a way of life to me. A very clear example of this is—again, a great deal of the discussion also revolves around this—the Maharik, whose ruling was accepted in practice also by the Rema in the Shulchan Arukh, section 240. What happens if a young man wants to marry a certain woman, and his parents say to him: we don’t want her as a daughter-in-law? We don’t want her as a daughter-in-law. What happens in such a case? It says in the Shulchan Arukh that he is not obligated to obey them. Now here too the question is in what terms we explain this law. In the Maharik himself, who is the source of the law, one can see two kinds of explanations. One explanation is in terms of commandment: there is a commandment to marry a woman, and “every man shall fear his mother and his father, and you shall keep My Sabbaths,” and therefore it is excluded. But this commandment is strange. First, a commandment to marry a woman is not so simple. He has the choice—if he marries another woman? Exactly, let him marry another woman. What’s the problem? Let him marry a woman acceptable to his parents. Why does he have to marry specifically her? Is there a commandment to marry specifically her? Therefore it seems to me that these explanations always come afterward and miss the point. And the Maharik really begins—and this is the second explanation—with saying that it is a fortiori from money. According to practical Jewish law, we rule that you are not obligated to honor your parents from your own funds, only from theirs. I mentioned Rav Chaim, right? That some young man came to him and asked him… let it go.

[Speaker D] Yes, exactly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So similarly, the argument is that it is a fortiori from money. If with money—if your money—you are not obligated to invest in your parents, then certainly you are not obligated to invest a whole lifetime with a woman you do not want to live with. Okay? So what is this? It is certainly not a question of some commandment to remain with my money, or some commandment to live with this woman and not another. It is not a commandment. I decide who the life-partner is that I want to live with. My parents cannot interfere here. This is not a question of one commandment overriding another, but of there being a certain area beyond which the parents have no authority at all. It is not pushed aside because of something else. In that area, you can’t say anything. It’s outside your domain. So these are limitations from within, meaning from inside—from within the commandment of honoring parents it is clear that it goes only this far and no further. It is not because there is something outside that stops the obligation to honor parents. And therefore it seems to me that the same applies to someone who wants to go to a yeshiva—though here we are talking about a young child, so I’m not entirely sure I agree with the claim, because he isn’t yet really mature enough to determine his life—whether yeshiva or officer training or something like that, all these are connected, at least partially let’s say, if it really seems to you very significant, very important to you, then there is no need to reach all those considerations of “every man shall fear his mother and his father, and you shall keep My Sabbaths.” This is what I call—even the reverse—not only if he wants to go to yeshiva; if he wants not to go to yeshiva. Yes, the same thing. Exactly the same thing. That is exactly the claim. Exactly the same thing. It’s not because yeshiva is a commandment or yeshiva is not a commandment, but because this is how I have decided to live my life. They cannot dictate to me how to live my life. They can make requests of me. And this is true—it is very problematic, because where is the line?

[Speaker C] Rabbi Ovadia also ruled the opposite in the same way.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Hm? No, I don’t think so. That’s exactly what I’m saying—because in both of those responsa they do not ignore this consideration. They rely only on the question of what is a commandment, enhancement of a commandment, whether it is overridden or not overridden. And I say that they assume there is some kind of normative override here. And I say no—there is a mechanism here of non-normative override. Meaning, there is a mechanism of a limit, like lex specialis, some kind of qualification: here the commandment does not exist. Not because it is overridden by something. Here it does not exist. But unlike Amalek, where the limitation of the prohibition of “do not murder” is the result of a commandment written in the Torah—”you shall blot out the memory of Amalek” is written—here it is not written in the Torah that I may live my life as I understand it. That is not written anywhere. It is reasoning. But that reasoning tells us that in interpreting “honor your father and your mother” or “every man shall fear his mother and his father,” I place a boundary and a certain area beyond which they cannot go. So this comes from the interpretation of “honor your father and your mother”; it is not because of some other principle that limits it. There are several examples of this both in the context of honoring parents and beyond. So in the context of honoring parents, for example, I mentioned earlier that the son is not obligated to honor his parents from his own money. In practical Jewish law this is a dispute in the Talmud, but in practice it is only from their money and not from his. Okay? He does not have to spend money on honoring parents. Now for every positive commandment one is obligated to spend up to a fifth of one’s assets. Every positive commandment. Honoring parents is as weighty as all of them, right? It’s a very important commandment. So why not here? It is obvious that this is not because of the general consideration that yes, one must spend up to a fifth on a positive commandment. Rather, with respect to the money, my money is outside their territory. Their demand—sorry, their demand of me—to spend money in order to honor them is illegitimate from the outset.

[Speaker C] Why doesn’t the Torah demand it of me?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why the Torah doesn’t demand it, I don’t know, but we see here some principle that this is outside the domain. Not because you are not obligated to spend, not because it is override. Meaning, it’s not that it isn’t worth money, because positive commandments are worth up to a fifth. Rather, because my money is outside their domain. That is exactly what the Maharik says. The Maharik—one second—the Maharik makes this a fortiori argument and says: if my money is outside their domain, then certainly my way of life or my life partner is outside their domain. That is exactly the a fortiori argument he makes.

[Speaker D] A time-bound positive commandment? What? Up to a fifth? Otherwise you’ll be impoverished immediately. What did you say?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand that.

[Speaker D] Now if you are obligated—there is a commandment to give charity. I gave a fifth now. I have to give charity, a positive commandment. Fine, I gave it. Do I immediately again have to give—the commandment of charity exists all the time. Again I give a fifth? No, that isn’t…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A fifth of the remainder? No. Also not a fifth of the remainder. Also not a fifth of the remainder. Obviously not.

[Speaker D] Why not? I’m commanded. When do I have to give? I just gave twenty percent to charity. When am I obligated again to give the—when am I again obligated to give the twenty percent? After how long? After a year? After how long?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, I don’t think it works like that. Of course not.

[Speaker D] At least not from that angle. You are obligated to spend up to a certain fifth.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Absolutely not true. The obligation is not that every time I approach you, you have to give another fifth of your assets.

[Speaker D] What you

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] need to do is spend up to a fifth of your assets on the commandment of charity, say, for the year.

[Speaker F] From the assets and from the income.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] From the assets and from the income. A third of a shekel.

[Speaker D] A third of a shekel per year. What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] When? All obligations of charity are annual. All obligations of charity are annual. A person should give no less than a third of a shekel per year. A third of a shekel is the minimum and a fifth is the maximum. The unit in charity is a year. How did they determine that? But of course that’s not written in the Torah. The Sages established it, probably because of this very question. And it’s obvious this applies to every commandment; it’s not only about time-bound positive commandments. Okay, anyway, let’s take another—let’s take another example.

[Speaker C] Basically this

[Speaker E] gives some kind of norm in honoring father and mother, that it gives some definition of what honoring father and mother is.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Yes, correct.

[Speaker E] Through money they basically defined for us our style.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Regarding money, they cannot command you—it is outside the domain.

[Speaker E] They set for us generally the style.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Now another example: it says there in the Shulchan Arukh, “A father who commanded his son not to speak with so-and-so and not to forgive him until a fixed time, and the son would have wanted to reconcile immediately were it not for his father’s command—the son need not heed his command.” That’s what it says in the Shulchan Arukh. The father says: with him, you stay angry all your life, don’t speak to that fellow. Right? He is not obligated to obey him. So again, here too they begin discussing maybe it’s the prohibition of “you shall not hate your brother in your heart,” but it’s obvious that it’s not only the prohibition. What?

[Speaker C] If the father says make peace and he doesn’t want to?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to what I’m saying, it comes out the same either way. The same thing—it’s not because of the prohibition. It’s not because of the prohibition; even “do not hate your brother in your heart” — it’s not clear there’s a prohibition there if I tell him that I hate him; I’m not keeping it in my heart. So that would be fine; according to Maimonides, there’s no prohibition. Fine. But I just want to sharpen the meaning of the point. Look, the example from before that… I’ve probably already mentioned it at some point. The example of my joker friend from Bnei Brak: once we were sitting in yeshiva around some table, and we saw a book. He saw a book by someone else who was also sitting by the table, and he wanted it. So he says to him, listen, I have two options: either violate “do not covet” and leave the book with you, or violate “do not steal” and the book will be with me. Since in any case I’m violating a prohibition, then at least let the book be with me. Now yes, of course this is a mistake in understanding the parameters of “do not covet,” and he knew that too—he’s a knowledgeable Jew—but let’s say for the sake of discussion that it really were true. Even so, the feeling is that there’s something flawed in this reasoning. What’s flawed in this reasoning? What’s flawed in it, it seems to me, is that even if your calculation is correct, make your calculations about your own money, not mine. Meaning, when you decide, I’m now making a calculation that is entirely me, within myself, facing the Holy One, blessed be He—the other person doesn’t exist in the picture at all. I have either “do not covet” or “do not steal.” In both cases I violate a prohibition, so at least let the book be with me. He’s not at the center at all; he’s erased, and it’s just me and the Holy One, blessed be He. But no: you and the Holy One, blessed be He, are dealing with matters that concern you, your property. You can’t do this. Your halakhic calculation, even if it is correct—not because it isn’t correct, that’s exactly what I’m saying—even if it were correct, you still would be forbidden to take it. Why? Because correct halakhic calculations you make about your own money, not about my money. Even if they’re correct—not because they’re incorrect, but because this is a territorial boundary. Meaning, your halakhic calculations cannot dictate what you will do with my money. Let me give you another example. Once I had some argument with someone. After all, every commandment is overridden by saving a life except for the three cardinal sins, right? Now suppose I need an organ transplant. So I attack my friend, remove a kidney from him in a completely proper way, with an expert surgeon; he’ll remain alive—you can live with one kidney.

[Speaker C] They’ve done that enough times.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, I don’t know.

[Speaker C] In particular, every so often they catch some Arab in a hospital; he wakes up without a kidney.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Really? Okay. So there you go—Jewish law basically says that this is permitted, maybe even a commandment. What is that? At most it’s the prohibition of injuring someone, right? The prohibition of injuring is overridden by saving a life. After all, there are only three prohibitions that are not overridden by saving a life—not to mention robbing a bank if I need the money for the kidney transplant. I don’t have money, so I’ll rob a bank. What’s the problem? What is it, “do not steal”? Fine, “do not steal” isn’t one of the three cardinal sins. So why not do it? Right—saving a life.

[Speaker D] There’s a Rashi here in Bava Kamma and some others.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes, that’s Rashi. I hope I’ll still get to him. In just a moment. But why really can’t you do it? Or maybe—someone here wanted to argue that you can. An important halakhic decisor—i.e., someone whose halakhic rulings matter—once argued with me about this. He wanted to claim that yes, it is permitted.

[Speaker E] Why? But there’s a Talmudic text saying that someone who saves is exempt if he damaged someone else.

[Speaker B] What? No, obviously.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he caused damage, that’s something else. He’s exempt—that doesn’t mean it’s permitted to do it.

[Speaker B] A person is on the verge of starvation and wants to steal food in order to survive.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There too, in truth, it’s probably not possible.

[Speaker D] Probably not possible. Is he allowed to steal? Why not? We talked about this in the lesson that dealt with the concept of ownership.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s something else. No. If I’m hungry, that doesn’t mean the concepts of ownership disappear. The whole society would have to be in some problematic situation.

[Speaker E] So look, a person being pursued can defend himself with property that belongs to him, but he can’t take it from someone else.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s Rashi there in Bava Kamma. In a moment. Rashi in just a moment—I’ll get to that in a second. So the point is, the point is that even if this halakhic reasoning is correct, still: make correct calculations about your own kidneys, not about mine. You understand? This isn’t a matter of balancing transgression against commandment, or which overrides which. It’s a limitation from within, not from outside. Meaning, my ability to take care of myself stops at the territory of the other person. Not because there’s some halakhic consideration, not because there’s something wrong with my halakhic reasoning. Everything is correct—but correct halakhic reasoning I apply to my own property, not to someone else’s. And here I really arrive at this Rashi. Rashi in Bava Kamma 60 says there—or the Gemara says there—that a person may not save himself at the expense of another person’s property. King David asks the Sanhedrin, and so on: a person may not save himself with another person’s property. So most of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) there explain: what does that mean? Plainly, what’s the situation? The situation is that a person is being pursued, he’s about to die, and he can save himself if he burns some stack of grain or produce belonging to someone else. The question is whether he can do that. The Gemara says no. No—he must die rather than damage or steal another person’s property. But most of the medieval authorities (Rishonim), who really have difficulty with this—after all, “do not steal” is not one of the three cardinal sins—say: it is permitted, but he must pay. That’s what it means that a person may not save himself with another person’s property—it means he must pay. The side that says he may save himself with another person’s property is the side that says he wouldn’t even need to pay afterward. Okay? Which is, of course, the price of that position. The price of that position is that it comes out absurd on the other side. So what is the position that says a person may save himself with another person’s property, to the point that he wouldn’t even need to compensate that person? It’s completely illogical.

[Speaker B] And Rashi really takes the approach of complete suspension.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Complete suspension isn’t the issue—you still pay even with complete suspension. Complete suspension means you did not violate “do not steal,” but pay you certainly must.

[Speaker B] Even if it benefits the other side. And therefore it’s his desire that I burn the stack now.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s not a problem that it’s his desire; it’s also his desire that you pay him. What’s the prohibition of causing damage? Why do you pay when you cause damage? There’s even an opinion that there is no prohibition at all, even though you still have to pay. A person who gives someone permission to perform a commandment with his property—

[Speaker B] And he’s really very happy that thanks to his field—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but he was very happy; he just wants you to pay him for the stack. He’s extremely happy that you burned it and paid. He’s extremely happy—but pay. Besides, you can also save a life with your own property, so fine—invest your own money and save the life. Why my money? Where it’s impossible—no, then pay me, and by that you have basically saved your life with your own money. In any case, what I’m saying—Rashi really says this literally. Once I heard that Rabbi Lichtenstein said about this that it must be a scribal error; this Rashi cannot be. A mistaken student, yes—like people always say when something doesn’t work out. Because really only three sins are cardinal sins that are not overridden by saving a life, and we never found that “do not steal” is one of the three cardinal sins. I’ll tell you more than that: in Binyan Tzion by the Arukh LaNer, he extends this to all interpersonal prohibitions. I mentioned this when we talked about Choshen Mishpat. He extends it: all interpersonal prohibitions have the rule of “be killed rather than transgress.” He brings this Tosafot regarding public humiliation—better for a person to throw himself into a fiery furnace than to humiliate his fellow in public. So Tosafot asks why. Because this is an accessory of sexual immorality? An accessory of murder, sorry. The blood drains from the face—I don’t know, a somewhat strange explanation—that this is an accessory of murder, and therefore one must be killed rather than transgress. And the Arukh LaNer says no: it’s not because it’s an accessory of murder, but because an interpersonal commandment is not overridden by saving a life—that is, saving a life does not override it. That’s all. And therefore he says this is true for everything: humiliation, theft, damage—all interpersonal prohibitions are subject to “be killed rather than transgress.” He also brings this Rashi as a source, and I think I mentioned this then when we discussed it. Rashba, not from page five?

[Speaker C] What? Rashba, I think.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is a responsum of Rashba—there is a responsum of Rashba where he disagrees with this Rashi. I don’t know whether it’s that Rashba. He understands with him that exactly, exactly. Meaning, the Rashba who disagrees with Rashi—not all the medieval authorities (Rishonim) understand the reasoning this way, but some do—he writes there in a responsum that really you are forbidden to save yourself. Meaning, as for what’s written—that really it’s permitted, only you must pay, and not that there is a prohibition—he says that’s because the other person too is obligated to save you, because he has the commandment “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood.” So since he is in any case obligated to save you, now you’re just taking it yourself—which, by the way, is also a novelty, because he is obligated to save you not financially; he is obligated in Yoreh De’ah, in the sphere of prohibitions. But the money is still his money. If he decides to be a sinner, that’s his calculation; you can’t take the money. The money isn’t yours in the legal sense. This isn’t Choshen Mishpat; this is Yoreh De’ah. And that’s how he argues. So from this you can really see that at the substantive level he too agrees with Rashi: were it not for the fact that the property was already obligated to be used for your rescue, it would be forbidden for me to take the money even if I would die. Why? After all, “do not steal” is overridden by saving a life. Why is it obligated? Huh? Why is it obligated? Because he has “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood”; he has to save you. Ah. So you see that in conception, at least, the Rashba also agrees with Rashi. And what is the idea behind this? The idea behind it, it seems to me, is that all commandments are overridden by saving a life, all prohibitions are overridden by saving a life. “Do not steal” too is overridden. So what if it’s overridden? It’s still my money. In the lesson where we discussed Choshen Mishpat, I spoke about this. Meaning, when you deliberate whether to take my money in order to save your life, the basis of the deliberation is not the prohibition of murder, but that it is my money. Because the money is mine, there is also the prohibition of “do not steal,” sorry. The prohibition of “do not steal” is overridden by saving a life like all the other prohibitions—but what about the fact that it’s mine? You have halakhic justification; there’s nothing wrong with your halakhic reasoning that says to take my money. But make your halakhic calculations about your own money, not mine. You can’t take it—it’s as if there’s a physical wall that doesn’t let you take it—not because of some halakhic obstacle. This is not a normative override; it’s territory. Meaning, on my territory you cannot make halakhic calculations, even if they are correct. Because the range of your control when you make halakhic calculations extends over your own territory and no farther than that. So this is another example of this decision rule, which speaks of a delimited territory of halakhic obligation—not because there is some external norm that overrides it, because the prohibition of “do not steal” is overridden. There is no other norm because of which this right of mine to save my life has been overridden. It’s not because of an external norm, but rather this right is limited from within; that is, it cannot reach places that belong to another person. Fine, maybe we’ll continue next time. Wait, you have here the Shoresh file of Rabbi Michael Abraham—

[Speaker C] Fifty.

[Speaker F] Twenty-first of Tevet, 5772, sequence 2012. Is this protocol a file? Or is it only… or is it only a recording? Wait, wait, afterward I copy it to the computer and also convert it to… is it a file or—

[Speaker B] —that it’s only?

[Speaker F] Later I copy it to the computer—

[Speaker B] And I—

[Speaker F] —also convert it to MP3. MP3, the best.

[Speaker B] Fine, good evening everyone. We are in the lesson for the Sabbath before the portion of Vayechi. This Sabbath we finish the book of Genesis, Shabbat Chazak. The portion opens with the verse: “Jacob lived in the land of Egypt seventeen years, and the days of Jacob, the years of his life, were one hundred forty-seven years.” We see here the end of the days of our forefather Jacob. He calls his son Joseph, and asks him not to bury him in Egypt, but rather to bury him in the Cave of Machpelah with his fathers. After that Jacob calls all his sons: “Gather together, and I will tell you what will happen to you at the end of days.” The Sages say that Jacob wanted to reveal the end, but the Divine Presence departed from him. Why did he want to reveal the end? And what is the significance of his dwelling in Egypt for seventeen years? Rashi on the first verse of the portion says: why is this portion closed? Of all the portions of the Torah, this one has no spacing; it is closed. Rashi brings two explanations. One explanation: because when our forefather Jacob died, the eyes and hearts of Israel were closed because of the suffering of the enslavement, for they began to enslave them. A second explanation: because he wanted to reveal the end to his sons, and it was concealed from him. The question is: after all, the enslavement only began after all the tribes had died, and that took more time, so why does Rashi say that their eyes and hearts were closed immediately when Jacob died? Rather, the feeling of exile began already then. When the backbone of the family, when our forefather Jacob died, that was when the feeling of exile began to form, of foreignness in the land of Egypt. Jacob blesses his sons, each according to his blessing, and prepares them for the long journey of the Jewish people. We conclude the book with the reading: “Be strong, be strong, and let us be strengthened.”