Lecture from 15 Cheshvan 5767
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
🔗 Link to the original lecture
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Table of Contents
- The verses of authority in the portion of Shoftim
- Maimonides’ approach: “Do not turn aside” as an all-encompassing authority
- Torah-level and rabbinic law as the difference between interpretation and legislation
- Nachmanides’ objections and the implications for rabbinic-level doubt
- The focal point of the dispute: interpretation versus legislation
- The problem of the source of authority as Maimonides’ motivation
- The Minchat Chinukh and the claim about “two transgressions”
- An external anchor for a normative system
- The Rogatchover’s interpretation: “Do not turn aside” as a prohibition against rebellion against authority
- “Do not turn aside” as revealing authority and as a foundation for the Torah’s will
- Kuntres Divrei Sofrim: three parts of Torah and the will of God
- Critique and a proposal to unify Maimonides and Nachmanides
- A response to the Minchat Chinukh: “Do not turn aside” as a revealing verse
- Announcement of a schedule change and the end of the lecture
Summary
General overview
The lecture presents the authority of the Sages מתוך the portion of “If a matter of judgment is hidden from you” and the command “do not turn aside,” and sets out Maimonides’ view, according to which the command applies broadly to all the words of the Sages, both in interpreting the Torah and in legislating ordinances and decrees. Nachmanides objects that this expansion erases the halakhic distinction between Torah-level law and rabbinic law and leads to consequences such as stringency in cases of rabbinic doubt, and the discussion focuses on the tension between the need for an external anchor of authority for the words of the Sages and the halakhic fact that there are two levels of obligation. Several moves are suggested to reconcile this: the Rogatchover’s interpretation, according to which “do not turn aside” was said mainly about rebellion against the authority of the Sages and not about every practical failure, and in a parallel direction the pamphlet Divrei Sofrim of Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman is cited, presenting rabbinic law as a category of “the will of God” rather than an explicit “command.” In the end it is argued that the Minchat Chinukh is mistaken when he counts a violation of a derashah as two transgressions, because “do not turn aside” functions as a verse that reveals authority and not as a verse that adds a formal transgression in every case, and it concludes with a technical announcement about a one-time change in the lecture schedule and the note: thus far the lecture of Rabbi Michael Abraham, Monday, the 15th of Cheshvan 5767, November 6, 2006, on the eve of the 16th of Cheshvan 5767.
The verses of authority in the portion of Shoftim
The verses “And you shall come to the priests, the Levites, and to the judge who will be in those days” and “do not turn aside” obligate a person to go to the judge and obey the ruling. The obligation is described as an obligation to listen and to act “according to what they tell you,” and it is portrayed as a system that grants binding authority to the institution of legal instruction.
Maimonides’ approach: “Do not turn aside” as an all-encompassing authority
Maimonides holds that the command “do not turn aside” applies “in the broadest way possible” to everything the Sages say, including ordinances, decrees, customs, interpretation of the Torah, derashot, and tradition passed down from generation to generation. He divides the activity of the Sages into two main types: the Sages as authorized interpreters of the Torah, and the Sages as legislators creating new law not through interpretation of a verse. Maimonides determines that in both areas the Sages have full authority, and one who does not obey them violates a prohibition, while one who obeys them fulfills a positive commandment, so that Torah law governs obedience in all cases.
Torah-level and rabbinic law as the difference between interpretation and legislation
The accepted halakhic classification presents the products of interpretation as Torah-level law and the products of legislation as rabbinic law, but it is argued that behind this classification are different forms of activity by the Sages. When the Sages act as interpreters, the result is considered “something that is really already inside the Torah itself,” and when they act as legislators, the result is a new law that does not emerge from the Torah by way of interpretation.
Nachmanides’ objections and the implications for rabbinic-level doubt
Nachmanides argues that according to Maimonides “there is no such thing as rabbinic law,” because every rabbinic law that rests on “do not turn aside” effectively becomes Torah-level law with all the consequences. He presents a central result: in a case of doubt concerning a rabbinic prohibition, such as poultry with milk, one should have to be stringent, because the violator would be violating the Torah prohibition of “do not turn aside,” whereas Jewish law recognizes the principle that “in rabbinic doubt one rules leniently.” Nachmanides sees this not merely as a technical problem but as a substantive claim against erasing the difference between the two layers of Jewish law, a distinction that fills the Talmud.
The focal point of the dispute: interpretation versus legislation
Maimonides and Nachmanides agree that when the Sages function as interpreters of Torah-level law, they receive authority from the Torah and there is an obligation to obey them by force of “do not turn aside.” The dispute focuses on whether in the area of rabbinic legislation as well, the verse “do not turn aside” obligates Torah-level obedience. Maimonides answers yes, and Nachmanides denies this and argues that the verse applies to the Oral Torah in the Torah-level sense, not to “their words” as legislation.
The problem of the source of authority as Maimonides’ motivation
Maimonides’ move is explained as a response to the problem of the “source of validity”: if there is no command from the Torah to obey the enactments of the Sages, then the question arises, “Who are you?” when a Sage forbids poultry with milk. Maimonides presents “do not turn aside” as a delegation of authority from the Torah, so that obeying the Sages becomes part of the Torah’s own command structure, at the cost of blurring the practical distinction between rabbinic law and Torah law.
The Minchat Chinukh and the claim about “two transgressions”
The Minchat Chinukh is presented as drawing an “absurd” conclusion from the understanding of “do not turn aside”: that in a life-threatening situation it would be preferable to violate a prohibition explicitly written in the Torah than a prohibition derived through derashah, because violating something derived through derashah creates two transgressions: both the prohibition itself and also “do not turn aside.” The example is discussed also with regard to the labor of carrying, which is explicitly written, as opposed to other labors such as selecting, and the argument is presented as the reverse of our intuition, according to which “what is written in the Torah” is more severe, or at least not less severe.
An external anchor for a normative system
A general principle is presented according to which every normative system “draws its authority from some principle external to it,” and therefore a law cannot justify itself by means of itself. In the context of rabbinic law, it is argued that the command of the Sages by itself cannot be the reason that obligates obedience to them, and therefore Maimonides’ search for an anchor in Torah law is presented as necessary, while Nachmanides insists on preserving the fact that there are two levels of Jewish law.
The Rogatchover’s interpretation: “Do not turn aside” as a prohibition against rebellion against authority
The Rogatchover is brought in to interpret that even according to Maimonides one should not say that whoever violates a rabbinic prohibition “always violates a Torah prohibition.” He distinguishes between eating poultry with milk by mistake or out of desire and eating it “as an act of rebellion against the authority of the Sages,” and determines that only such rebellion violates “do not turn aside.” According to this approach, “do not turn aside” commands one to recognize the authority of the Sages, and its violation is realized when a person “thumbs his nose at them” and does not recognize their authority.
“Do not turn aside” as revealing authority and as a foundation for the Torah’s will
The discussion develops the claim that “do not turn aside” does not necessarily add a formal transgression to every violation of rabbinic law, but rather reveals that the Sages have the authority to create prohibitions and obligations that have validity, while the prohibition itself applies when the violation stems from rebellion. It is argued that a command about authority cannot be “without any content at all,” and therefore the very possibility of rebellion presupposes that the words of the Sages have binding content, even if the ordinary violation is not defined as a violation of “do not turn aside.” The move is formulated as a distinction between “the Torah’s command” and “the Torah’s will,” in which rabbinic laws are understood as the Torah’s will even though they are not an explicit commandment with the same force.
Kuntres Divrei Sofrim: three parts of Torah and the will of God
Source 6 from the pamphlet Divrei Sofrim by Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman presents two disputed points attributed to Nachmanides as against Maimonides: the scope of “do not turn aside” and its implication for the rebellious elder, and the claim that according to Nachmanides “there is nothing Torah-level at all in their words.” Rabbi Elchanan argues that if there is any Torah-level source at all for obeying the words of the Sages, then the question “why are their words lighter than Torah law?” returns against him as well, and therefore an answer is required that is not verse / reasoning / law given to Moses at Sinai in their direct sense. He cites the words of the Sages about “three things Moses our teacher did… on his own initiative, and the mind of the Omnipresent agreed with his mind” as pointing toward the idea that the divine mind agrees with such determinations, and concludes with an explanation of the verse in Jeremiah, “which I did not command, nor speak, nor did it arise in My heart,” together with the translation “and I did not send by the hand of My servant the prophets, nor was it My will,” in order to formulate that there are “three parts of Torah”: command, speech, and a category of “the will of God alone,” under which he places rabbinic commandments.
Critique and a proposal to unify Maimonides and Nachmanides
It is argued that deriving authority for all generations from the agreement of the Divine Presence in three cases looks “problematic” as an induction, but the concept of “the will of God” is presented as a necessary category in order to satisfy both requirements together: a source of authority on the one hand, and preserving the distinction between rabbinic law and Torah law on the other. A position is presented according to which in practice there is no real dispute here between Maimonides and Nachmanides, because the system of constraints “dictates the solution” and there is no other “degree of freedom,” and Nachmanides’ criticism of Maimonides stems from an overly simplistic reading, as though everyone who violates a rabbinic law violates “do not turn aside” in a formal sense. It is argued that the verse “do not turn aside” serves as the basis for the claim that “it is forbidden to deny the authority of the Sages,” and from that emerges the will of God to obey them even in legislation, though not every violation is judged as a violation of “do not turn aside.”
A response to the Minchat Chinukh: “Do not turn aside” as a revealing verse
It is argued that the Minchat Chinukh is mistaken because “do not turn aside has no independent content” in the sense of adding a formal transgression to every detail learned through derashah; rather, it grants validity to the fact that the words of the Sages are themselves prohibitions and obligations. According to this approach, one who selects on the Sabbath violates the prohibition of selecting, and the verse “do not turn aside” reveals that by force of the authority of the Sages there is such a prohibition, while the transgression of “do not turn aside” occurs only when there is rebellion against the authority of the Sages. In this way, the calculation of “two transgressions” is rejected in a case that is not rebellion, and the verse is said to function in two roles: as a delegation of authority and as a prohibition against rebellion.
Announcement of a schedule change and the end of the lecture
The lecturer announces that next week the lecture will be moved from Monday to Sunday as a “one-time” change, after checking that there is no objection from the participants. At the end it is noted: thus far the lecture of Rabbi Michael Abraham, Monday, the 15th of Cheshvan 5767, November 6, 2006, on the eve of the 16th of Cheshvan 5767.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’re actually still in the introduction to the topic, and we began dealing with the question of the authority of the Sages and their areas of activity—their authority and their activity. These things emerge from the section in the book of Deuteronomy: “If a matter of judgment is hidden from you, between blood and blood, between law and law.” We saw that we’re supposed to go to the judge who will be in those days, yes, to go to—“And you shall come to the priests, the Levites, and to the judge who will be in those days, and inquire, and they will tell you”—and then, “do not turn aside”: there is an obligation to listen to their voice and do according to what they say. We saw that Maimonides takes the scope of this command, “do not turn aside,” in the broadest way possible, and in practice he says that whatever the Sages say, we are obligated to obey them by force of the verse “do not turn aside.” Whatever they say means ordinances, decrees, customs, interpretation of the Torah, derashot—in short, everything, including the tradition they pass down to us. And that “everything” divides into two main categories. One category is the Sages as interpreters—derash and interpretation, let’s include that together for the moment—the Sages as authorized interpreters of the Torah. What they interpret is what binds us, even if I might think the interpretation should be different. The second branch is the authority of the Sages as legislators, not as interpreters but as legislators, and then what that means is that the Sages create a new law not through interpretation of a verse but by an ordinance or a decree or something new. We know the halakhic classification that calls the first type Torah-level law and the second type rabbinic law, but in fact behind the halakhic classification, which really refers to the status of the laws, to the force of the laws, there is actually a different form of activity by the Sages. In other words, in rabbinic laws the Sages serve as legislators, when they enact a new law because it’s something that does not emerge from the Torah; then the result is a rabbinic law. When the Sages serve as interpreters, the result is actually something that appears in the Torah, something that is really contained within the Torah itself, and the result is Torah-level law. So the distinction between Torah-level law and rabbinic law actually hides behind it the distinction between legislation and interpretation. And Maimonides, as I said, basically says that both in legislation and in interpretation the Sages have full authority, and one must obey them; and one who does not obey them violates a prohibition, and one who does obey them fulfills a positive commandment. Meaning, it is Torah law in all these cases. Against this Nachmanides raises a great many objections, because what comes out of Maimonides is that there is no such thing as rabbinic law, because every rabbinic law, once it is based on the verse “do not turn aside,” becomes Torah-level law. Yes, the most obvious consequence is when I’m in doubt regarding a rabbinic law. I have poultry with milk—that is a rabbinic law, that it is forbidden to eat poultry with milk—and I have before me something about which I am uncertain whether there is poultry with milk here or not. Since this is a rabbinic doubt, I’m supposed to go—I can go leniently. But according to Maimonides it turns out that even in a doubt of this kind one should have to be stringent. Why? Because every rabbinic prohibition—if I violate it, I violate the Torah prohibition of “do not turn aside,” and therefore if I’m in doubt I must be stringent so as not to violate a Torah prohibition. Of course, this is only an expression or a symptom of a deeper problem. It’s not just a technical question of why we rule leniently in rabbinic doubt. Rather, Nachmanides is making a fundamental claim. He says: according to Maimonides’ definition, there is no such thing as rabbinic law. Every rabbinic law basically turns into Torah-level law for all consequences. There are various consequences to this; this is one of them, and there are many more. That’s Nachmanides’ claim. And basically we pointed out that there is a kind of tension here between two problems that somehow seem impossible to manage together. Because after all, why does Maimonides really do this? That is—maybe even before asking why Maimonides does this—what is agreed upon by both Maimonides and Nachmanides? Let’s sharpen the dispute more. What is agreed upon is that the Sages as interpreters certainly have authority granted to them by the Torah. In other words, in Torah-level law, Sages who serve as interpreters or expositors—certainly one has to obey them, and that comes from the verse “do not turn aside.” No one disputes that, neither Maimonides nor Nachmanides. So where is the disagreement? The disagreement is over whether, regarding rabbinic laws as well, the verse “do not turn aside” commands us to obey them. Is there also a Torah-level obligation there to obey them, or not? Maimonides says yes, it comes from the verse “do not turn aside,” and Nachmanides says no—only regarding interpretation, not legislation. So why does Maimonides really expand the scope of “do not turn aside” in such an imperialistic way? Why does he turn rabbinic laws into Torah-level laws? Why does he do it so comprehensively? So it’s pretty clear that the basic problem he’s dealing with is the problem of the source. That is, the source of authority. Where does it come from that I have to obey the Sages? If there really is no verse commanding me to obey the Sages in their enactments, in their legislation, then why should I actually obey them? A Sage comes and says to me: you may not eat poultry with milk. So I say to him: are you the Holy One, blessed be He? His deputy? I mean, why should I obey you? Who are you? If he brings a verse and says, what do you mean, I’m not replacing the Holy One, blessed be He—I’m just His authorized agent. The verse in the Torah that the Holy One, blessed be He, gave us commands you to obey me: “do not turn aside from all that they instruct you.” There is a delegation of authority here to the Sages. Fine—he points to something higher in the hierarchy, and he is protected in terms of the source of his authority. So Maimonides was basically troubled by the question of why the Sages have authority at all to enact ordinances—how they can come to me and give me all kinds of—or issue all kinds of instructions. Maimonides says: what do you mean? The Torah itself commands me, just as I obey other Torah commandments; one of the Torah’s commandments is to obey the Sages in all their instructions. So that is a wonderfully orderly system. There is no problem. The obedience is firmly anchored in the Torah. What is the price? The price is that you have basically turned everything into Torah-level law. So then there really is no such thing as rabbinic law. That is Nachmanides’ objection to Maimonides. There is no such thing as rabbinic law, because, says Nachmanides to Maimonides, you have turned all the laws into Torah-level laws. So true, the system is very orderly, there’s no problem, the authority of the Sages is clear, no one can argue—there is an explicit verse—but we know that the whole Talmud is full of the fact that there are two kinds of laws: Torah-level law and rabbinic law. You erased the difference between them. That is what Nachmanides says to Maimonides. And that is why he remains with the position that only the interpretation of the Sages draws its authority from “do not turn aside,” but not legislation. I think I mentioned that the Minchat Chinukh wants to do something really absurd with this claim of Maimonides. He wants to argue that if there is a sick person who must eat something forbidden—if he is in danger, it is permitted for him. Which one? If there are two possibilities before him—either he will eat a prohibition that is learned, say, from some derashah, or he will eat a prohibition that is an actual explicit Torah prohibition—what would you say is preferable for him to eat? Or similarly, say both are ordinary Torah prohibitions—then say it’s the same thing; that’s the accepted view. If there is any hierarchy at all, then the prohibition derived through derashah is the lighter one, compared to a prohibition explicitly written in the Torah. There is a prohibition explicitly written in the Torah, and another prohibition that is only learned through a derashah that the Sages derived. So if I were making a hierarchy at all, I would say that the prohibition that comes from derashah is lighter. The author of Minchat Chinukh says the opposite. Meaning, if two prohibitions stand before you, you should eat the prohibition explicitly written in the Torah and not the prohibition that comes from derashah. Why? Because if I eat a prohibition that only comes from derashah, I violate two transgressions: I violate the prohibition itself, that I ate forbidden food, and also the transgression of “do not turn aside,” because the Torah commanded me to obey the Sages when they derive a derashah, so when I violate that prohibition I actually committed two transgressions—both “do not turn aside” and the Torah prohibition of the forbidden food I ate. In contrast, if I violate a prohibition by eating a food that is explicitly written in the Torah as forbidden, then I violated only the prohibition itself, the thing I ate.
[Speaker B] Is it explicit that this also includes the interpretation of the Sages, or not?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The question isn’t completely clear.
[Speaker B] I think that, for example, if we take Sabbath boundaries—the things explicitly written are kindling and carrying from one domain to another. Right. Whereas most of the others, even things that are really—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to most views, it probably doesn’t come from derashah at all, but rather from some tradition. Right. Certainly—even if it does come from derashah, if we mark it that way.
[Speaker B] Okay. Now there’s a case of saving life, and I can solve the problem through carrying from one domain to another. I have a certain intuition—maybe it’s wrong. Fine, okay, we’ll cross the Sabbath boundary by a few meters, but we won’t do one of the other thirty-nine labors that we’re really accustomed not to do.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, carrying is the opposite. Carrying is the thing explicitly written in the Torah. No, that certainly not. Well, he says yes. He says that something explicitly written in the Torah is preferable to do. Why? Let’s take carrying, yes? He says carrying is preferable to do. Why? Because carrying is written explicitly in the Torah; the Sages aren’t needed here. So what do I violate? I violate the labor of carrying on the Sabbath. But if I violate selecting in order to save this sick person—that’s not—why? Because selecting is also forbidden on the Sabbath, so I violated a prohibited labor on the Sabbath, and in addition I also violated “do not turn aside,” because the Sages told me that it is forbidden, that the Torah requires me not to select on the Sabbath, and I did not obey them—so I violated two prohibitions and not one. That’s the absurdity. The absurdity is that it is completely clear that if there is any hierarchy at all, what is written in the Torah is more severe. If at all. According to most views it’s the same, but if at all, what is written in the Torah is more severe. Maybe we’ll see that a bit later. Where is he mistaken here? He is mistaken in his conception of how this prohibition of “do not turn aside” works at all. And that’s what I began talking about last time, so I’ll come back to it in a moment. Before I finish, I just need an answer. Next week I want to move this from Monday to Sunday, just one time. Only next week. Does any participant have a problem with that? Is that okay? Okay. Fine, so I’ll move it. Just give me half a minute, because I said I’d give an answer after I spoke with you. Just one second, sorry. Hello?
[Speaker B] Ah, okay. Fine, excellent. No problem. We’ll talk. Thank you very much. Bye, bye. Yes, so I’ll come back to the Minchat Chinukh in a moment. Basically I’m now returning to the dispute between Maimonides and Nachmanides. Doesn’t the Minchat Chinukh go even further—that there’s doubt whether it’s rabbinic or Torah-level? That could also be done, yes, that could also be done, except that there it’s rabbinic plus Torah-level against Torah-level, and here it’s two Torah-levels, so it’s even stronger. But in principle that too is possible. And by the way, arguments like that come up in the context of the sugya of an oath on a prohibition. Does an oath take effect on a prohibition, or does it not? There they discuss what happens with an oath on a rabbinic prohibition, and there he even raises some such possibility regarding rabbinic prohibitions. Those are already really strange things. In a moment I’ll try to explain why I think this simply can’t be said this way.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So we asked what exactly the dispute is about. Maimonides’ basic motivation is to explain the source of the Sages’ authority. Without that, on whose authority do they come? I don’t have to obey them—why should I? And we spoke about the fact that every legal system, every normative system—
[Speaker B] draws its authority from some principle external to it. That is, the principle that justifies the legal system—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] or any system at all—cannot be one of the principles contained within it itself. Right? If the law commands me to obey the law, then I’ll ask: and as for this law itself, how do I know I need to obey it? In other words, it’s clear that the anchor obligating me to obey the law cannot itself be a law; it must be something external. So if I return to our issue with rabbinic prohibitions, this is some kind of system—a new normative system that is now claiming that I am subject to it. So I ask myself: wait, what is the source? What is the reason? What is the principle that causes this system to have authority over me? That principle cannot itself be the command of the Sages. And the fact that the Sages commanded me—does that mean I need to obey them? Never. Because that is exactly what I’m asking: why do I need to obey the command of the Sages? So you can’t come and say to me, well, because the Sages commanded. Therefore I have to obey them. That can never be a reason to obey them. Maybe it’s a good reason, but it won’t help someone who doesn’t want to obey them; that won’t persuade him, and therefore it’s worthless. So what is this principle? Maimonides says: there is no way out; I have to find this principle in the more fundamental system, in the Torah-level system. And the Torah-level system—the verse “do not turn aside”—is what gives force to the rabbinic system. Therefore, there seems to be almost no alternative. On the other hand, Nachmanides is unwilling to do that. Nachmanides is unwilling to do that because, first of all, empirically speaking—if you look at the Talmud, if you look at Jewish law—you see that there are two kinds of laws within halakhah: rabbinic laws and Torah laws. And according to Maimonides, the boundary between them disappears; the difference is erased. It doesn’t match the facts. Right, Maimonides is right that he closes a gap here, and an important one to close, as Maimonides himself writes. But it can’t work this way. It just doesn’t fit. Jewish law does recognize that there are two kinds of laws, and they have different statuses. It can’t be that every rabbinic law is really something whose violation is a Torah violation. So basically we finished, I think, last time with the explanation of Maimonides’ view. After all, each of them now has to deal with a different difficulty. Maimonides and Nachmanides come to solve two difficulties that maybe we can’t solve together—not Maimonides and not Nachmanides. Each one chooses which of the two he wants to solve. Maimonides solves the problem of the source of authority. No problem, everything is solved. But he is left with the difficulty vis-à-vis the halakhic facts: there is a difference between Torah law and rabbinic law. How can that be? On the other hand, what shall we say? That there is no source from “do not turn aside”? If there is no source from “do not turn aside,” then fine, there is rabbinic law and there is Torah law. In that respect Nachmanides is in order. But then I ask again what Maimonides asked himself: so why obey the Sages? There is no reason to obey the Sages. So it’s a kind of trying to dance at two weddings at once. You can’t. On the one hand, I need to find an anchor for the words of the Sages. And we already said that such an anchor cannot itself be a principle that is itself rabbinic; it apparently has to be something outside this sphere of rabbinic laws, something more fundamental—namely, Torah-level. And then what comes out? That whatever the case, even before we start searching in the Torah, if there is an anchor at all, it has to be some verse in the Torah. But if it is a verse in the Torah, then Nachmanides’ problem arises: so what is the difference between rabbinic law and Torah law? It always comes out Torah-level. This is a problem that on its face seems insoluble. So Nachmanides has to answer why we really need to obey the Sages. He explains the difference between Torah law and rabbinic law very well, but why obey the voice of the Sages? And Maimonides has to answer us: then how is a difference created between Torah law and rabbinic law? I understand why one needs to obey the Sages, but then it’s not obeying them—it’s obeying the Holy One, blessed be He. Meaning, there really is no difference between Torah law and rabbinic law. So each of them remains, so to speak, standing on one leg and has to explain where the second leg is. So we started with Maimonides and said that basically—this is the Rogatchover I cited, for anyone who has the page from last week, the Rogatchover is source twelve. I’ll say it orally, it doesn’t matter, but you can look there. The Rogatchover basically says—and there are other commentators who say this too—that when a person violates a rabbinic prohibition, it does not mean, even according to Maimonides, that he always violates a Torah prohibition. It is not correct that someone who eats poultry with milk violates a Torah prohibition. Only someone who eats poultry with milk because he does not recognize the authority of the Sages to establish prohibitions—that person violates a Torah prohibition. You can eat poultry with milk for many reasons. You can eat it entirely unintentionally. You can eat it because your impulse overpowered you and you didn’t withstand it. And you can eat it as an act of rebellion against the authority of the Sages. Just like in Torah law, by the way. The same three possibilities exist there too. Someone can eat pork for those same three reasons: either rebellion against the authority of the Torah, or by mistake—I didn’t know it was pork—or my impulse overpowered me; I knew, I’m not rebelling against the authority of the Holy One, blessed be He, but I fell, my impulse overpowered me. Right? So what exists in Torah law also exists in rabbinic law in terms of motivations—different motivations. The Rogatchover says that in practice, someone who simply eats a rabbinic prohibition, poultry with milk, and does so only because his impulse overpowered him, but he recognizes the authority of the Sages—just as he can violate a Torah prohibition while recognizing the authority of the Holy One, blessed be He—that can happen. Such a person does not violate “do not turn aside.” Why? Because what is the content of the verse “do not turn aside”? “Do not turn aside from all that they instruct you”—meaning, recognize the authority of the Sages to command you. I recognize their authority; I failed, just as I recognize the authority of the Holy One, blessed be He, but I failed—the evil inclination overpowered me. That is not called violating “do not turn aside.” When do I violate “do not turn aside”? When I say: I do not recognize the authority of the Sages. I eat poultry with milk and I thumb my nose at them. I listen only to the Holy One, blessed be He, not to the Sages. If you ate poultry with milk, did you violate a Torah prohibition? Where exactly is the distinction? I’m not really managing to grasp the distinction there. Why? The command “do not turn aside from all that they instruct you” commands you to obey the Sages. If you didn’t obey, then what? No—not just that you didn’t obey them; you acted contrary to their words. Not obeying the Sages contains an element of rebellion. Meaning, you don’t recognize their authority; you rebel against the authority of the Sages. In the Torah, if you rebel, that is certainly a transgression—but you’re also a sinner even if you’re not rebelling. Regarding the Sages, the entire content of “do not turn aside” is only: do not rebel. Meaning, recognize the authority of the Sages. But the very eating of poultry with milk is forbidden—but it is not rebellion against the authority of the Sages; here there would be no Torah transgression. That’s what the Rogatchover says. So if my impulse overpowered me regarding poultry with milk, according to the Rogatchover what is that? Only a rabbinic prohibition. What is the source of authority? There isn’t one—that’s the question. That’s what I asked last time near the end, and we went through it kind of quickly. Basically I asked: if so, this is a wonderful explanation of Maimonides, but the question is—we are back at the starting point, because Maimonides was looking for a source of authority. Why do I—
[Speaker B] have to obey the Sages, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] After all, that’s why—
[Speaker B] he said everything he said. If the Sages command me not to eat poultry—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] with milk, why should I obey them? Now what does the Rogatchover say? That if I eat poultry with milk, I have not violated—
[Speaker B] the prohibition of “do not turn aside.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Which means I still don’t have a source of authority. So why really obey the Sages? You have to obey the Sages. Why? Because of “do not turn aside.” But if I eat poultry with milk not as rebellion against their authority, but because my impulse overpowered me—then that’s the rabbinic prohibition. So what? Rabbinic prohibitions—we said I need a source of authority for why to keep them. You need to keep the words of the Sages because it is a command of the Torah. If you don’t keep them, you don’t violate Torah law.
[Speaker B] Now what happened here—but according to Maimonides—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the command of this—
[Speaker B] thing—now what happened here—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] is either I violate “do not turn aside” even in that case, or I don’t violate “do not turn aside,” but then we haven’t solved the problem because I’m looking for a source. So once again, you’re dancing inside Maimonides’ own view, not between Maimonides and Nachmanides. I think what you’re saying is right. It seems to me that the answer is—and this can be formulated a bit more sharply, logically, and we got a bit tangled in it last time—when the Torah commands me to obey the Sages, it says, “do not turn aside from all that they instruct you.”
[Speaker B] So if in fact eating poultry—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] with milk without—
[Speaker B] rebelling against the very thing, challenging—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] their very authority—is only a rabbinic prohibition, then I asked: fine, so why do I need to obey that prohibition at all? So no, I’m not violating “do not turn aside” here; “do not turn aside” does not provide—
[Speaker B] an anchor for transgressions of that kind. But then let’s think again: so what does it provide an anchor for? If I eat poultry with milk on the basis that I do not recognize the authority of the Sages to issue me instructions—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] but what is the content of that authority? If there is no such instruction not to eat poultry with milk, because there’s no problem—after all, if I eat poultry with milk, I haven’t violated anything, there is no such instruction—then what is the instruction? The instruction is to obey the authority of the Sages, and what? Nothing. Meaning, without any content. There’s no such thing; that can’t be. It’s like the king in “The Little Prince,” yes? He says he commands all the stars to do exactly what they want to do. That is, there can’t be a command that grants someone authority when there is no content to the authority other than the authority itself. In other words, there can’t be a command saying: gentlemen, this pillar has full authority to tell you whatever it wants, but with no content, only the fact that it has authority. Meaning, the content of the command to obey the voice of the pillar is only that I have to obey him, not the specific contents he commands. If he commands me some specific content, that has nothing to do with this? There is no such thing, right? It’s obvious that there must be something—when I look at the verse “do not turn aside”—this is a bit delicate logically, but I think—when I look at the verse “do not turn aside,” the verse basically tells me: what the Sages say, you must do. Now true, I do not violate the prohibition, and the Rogatchover is right—I’m not rejecting what the Rogatchover says, on the contrary, I’m explaining him—he’s right. If I eat poultry with milk without challenging the authority of the Sages, I have not violated a Torah prohibition. On the other hand, it’s obvious that the Sages do have authority to forbid poultry with milk to me. Because if they didn’t have the authority to forbid poultry with milk to me, then even if I ate poultry with milk in a way that challenges their authority, I wouldn’t be violating anything. Because what is the authority? The authority is to enact that one may not eat poultry with milk. That is the authority. So if there were no content to the authority, then the rebellion would not be a Torah prohibition either. There would be no content to the rebellion. Because what did I rebel against? I said: I’m eating poultry with milk, I don’t recognize this prohibition. But in fact there is no such prohibition—so what’s the problem? So what is it that I do not recognize? It has to be that these prohibitions have some independent standing, at least as the background for the fact that I violate something when I challenge the authority. Even if the formal Torah prohibition that I violate is only when I challenge the authority, it is obvious that in the background there is some conception saying that whatever the Sages say is binding. And if so, that is contained in “do not turn aside,” then I have to say—I understand what— but you have to say that “do not turn aside” includes also the source of authority to issue instructions. Right. But only that. That is, the claim is as follows. Meaning, “do not turn aside” is not only rebellion. No—here’s the point. “Do not turn aside” functions in two roles. One role says: whoever rebels against the Sages violates “do not turn aside.” He violates the will of God too, not only the will of the Sages. On the other hand, now I ask myself as an interpreter: okay, that’s what is written in “do not turn aside,” that’s all from a halakhic standpoint. Now I ask myself as an interpreter: let’s see what this verse says. What this verse says, basically, is that the Sages can establish laws, right? Because if the Sages could not establish laws—meaning—
[Speaker B] if I were to violate a law, that would not concern “do not turn aside,” the verse of “do not turn aside,” then rebellion against the Sages would also be devoid of content.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] When I rebel against the authority of the Sages by eating poultry with milk, then what is the problem?
[Speaker B] After all, there really is no such prohibition—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] after all, they have no authority to issue such a prohibition. So what follows? If the verse says there is such a thing as rebellion, that means that when I eat poultry with milk, it is problematic. Now what does “problematic” mean? Problematic and forbidden are not exactly the same thing. That is, there will not be a Torah prohibition here if I eat poultry with milk. But it is completely clear that the Torah sees eating poultry with milk as a prohibition. Because if it were not a prohibition, then rebellion against the Sages in eating poultry with milk would also not be rebellion. It can’t be that they say to me: you have to obey the Sages in everything they tell you. They tell you A, B, C, D—you have to obey everything they say. Then it is obvious that A, B, C, D must be done. But that does not mean that whoever does not do D has violated “do not turn aside.” That doesn’t have to be so. But it is clear that within “do not turn aside” there is indeed something—let’s call it the Torah’s will, not clear-cut law. I do not violate “do not turn aside” formally, but the Torah’s will is what the Torah is really telling me behind the words: that whatever the Sages say, I should fulfill. This is what in legal language would be called delegated legislation. So it seems to me that this is the only possible way to understand Maimonides correctly. And then what comes out is that everything is fine with Maimonides. I heard another interpretation that maybe solves it. If you violate the—meaning you don’t fulfill the prohibition, what the Sages commanded—then you are actually violating a Torah prohibition. But if you violate only the details—let’s give an example—if, for example, you read the Megillah backwards, then you violate a rabbinic prohibition. But if you don’t read the Megillah at all, then you violate a Torah prohibition. Why? Because if you violate the details—why? What’s the difference? I don’t see the logic behind the distinction. You can divide it however you want. I can also say: all prohibitions beginning with A through K, I violate “do not turn aside,” and prohibitions beginning with L through Z, no. The question is what the logic of the distinction is. Because the Sages commanded—they commanded to read the Megillah and they also commanded to read it not backwards.
[Speaker B] They commanded both things. So why is the first one “do not turn aside” and the second one not? Because it’s the basis. If I read it backwards, then I didn’t read the Megillah the way they commanded. I don’t see the reasoning behind the distinction. Maybe the answer is that this also has practical ramifications. I know, for example, in someone who violated a rabbinic time-limit.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So if he violated it in a way of—
[Speaker B] just failing, fine, that’s rabbinic—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] but if it was out of rebellion, then he is liable for lashes?
[Speaker B] There may not be lashes here—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] because it’s a prohibition linked to a positive commandment, or because it doesn’t involve capital punishment by the court—but in principle yes. All the considerations of a negative prohibition, how much money one must spend in order not to violate a negative prohibition when it won’t help—
[Speaker B] there are differences between Torah prohibitions and rabbinic prohibitions.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So then “do not turn aside” isn’t a practical difference, because if he’s rebellious, then he’s rebellious. Yes, it doesn’t matter. He’s rebellious only with respect to “do not turn aside,” no?
[Speaker B] He’s rebellious with respect to “do not turn aside”; he’s not rebellious against the Torah prohibitions themselves.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are more, less, all kinds of—
[Speaker B] halakhic / of Jewish law practical differences, but that’s—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] not just indications; that’s not the thing itself.
[Speaker B] So here, essentially, we arrive at some picture that manages to let us stand on both feet. Notice: on the one hand, there is a source for the authority of the Sages in every area—also in enactments, decrees, whatever you want. On the other hand, we still preserve the distinction between Torah-level / of biblical origin and rabbinic / of rabbinic origin, because that—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] was actually the goal: somehow to show that both Maimonides and Nachmanides, each one choosing—
[Speaker B] a different foot—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] but not managing to stand here on two feet. The way we’ve now explained Maimonides, it seems there’s… no problem, it’s completely two feet.
[Speaker B] The Sages have authority to enact—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] enactments. You can’t say to the Sages, “Who gave you authority at all?” because if I say “Who gave you authority?” I violate “do not turn aside.” To stumble because of temptation—fine; even in Torah-level / of biblical origin laws people sometimes stumble because of temptation, that’s not… it’s still a failure, it’s forbidden, but it won’t be called “do not turn aside.” Okay? So there is a distinction here between Torah-level / of biblical origin and rabbinic / of rabbinic origin, and yet there is still a source of authority. And this source of authority can be called… these are slightly different formulations; I don’t want to get too deep here into overly fine resolutions. Essentially, you can say that rabbinic / of rabbinic origin prohibitions are the will of the Torah; they are not the command of the Torah. That’s a slightly different formulation, but it’s also a solution that harmoniously answers Nachmanides’ difficulty according to his own approach. So now I’m moving on, I’m now moving there. So that’s Maimonides. Now, what exactly… well, afterward I’ll come back to Minchat Chinukh; let’s move to Nachmanides. With Nachmanides, our problem was the opposite. Nachmanides preserves very well the distinction between Torah-level / of biblical origin and rabbinic / of rabbinic origin, but he still owes us an explanation for why we have to listen to the Sages regarding rabbinic / of rabbinic origin enactments. In interpretation, it’s because of “do not turn aside,” but with rabbinic / of rabbinic origin enactments, why are we obligated to listen to them? Nachmanides is silent on this point; he says nothing. So here there is source 6 that I brought you, from Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman’s booklet Divrei Sofrim. He discusses Nachmanides’ words at some length; I’m not going to read all of it now—we don’t have much time—but just—
[Speaker B] selected passages: “And it appears from Nachmanides’ words that he disagrees with Maimonides on two points.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] First, that the verses “and you shall do according to all that they instruct you” and “do not turn aside”—according to Maimonides, these verses apply also to rabbinic / of rabbinic origin commandments and prohibitions, and therefore a rebellious elder becomes liable over them. Nachmanides holds that the verse of “do not turn aside” applies only to the Oral Torah, which is Torah-level / of biblical origin, and not to their enactments at all, and a rebellious elder is not liable over their enactments. Meaning, the first dispute between Maimonides and Nachmanides is: what is the scope of application of “do not turn aside”? According to Maimonides, the scope of “do not turn aside” includes rabbinic / of rabbinic origin prohibitions as well. One of the implications we didn’t discuss is whether a rebellious elder can be executed even over a rabbinic / of rabbinic origin prohibition. According to Maimonides, yes. According to Nachmanides, the scope of “do not turn aside” applies only to Torah-level / of biblical origin laws, only to interpretation and not to legislation, and therefore, of course, a rebellious elder will not be executed over rabbinic / of rabbinic origin prohibitions but only over Torah-level / of biblical origin prohibitions. That is the first dispute. Second: “And it appears from Nachmanides’ words, from what he proved—that we find that their enactments are treated more leniently than Torah law—that according to him, there is nothing Torah-level / of biblical origin at all in their enactments. For if we were to say that Nachmanides only disagreed with Maimonides regarding the verse of ‘do not turn aside,’ but he too agrees that we are commanded by the Torah to listen to the words of the Sages—whether from a verse, or from reasoning, or from a law given to Moses at Sinai—then the objections he raised against Maimonides, namely why their enactments are lighter than Torah law, we could say to him: according to your own reasoning, this very same objection applies to you as well. And what practical difference does it make whether we were commanded to listen to the Sages from the verse of ‘do not turn aside,’ or from another verse, or from a law given to Moses at Sinai?” Rabbi Elchanan says: pay close attention. Nachmanides’ argument actually prevents us from answering the question a priori, even before we begin looking. Because what is Nachmanides arguing against Maimonides? He says: Maimonides says the source is “do not turn aside.” Nachmanides says: if so, every rabbinic / of rabbinic origin law becomes Torah law—you have erased the distinction between rabbinic / of rabbinic origin and Torah-level / of biblical origin. So Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman says: let’s now think this through according to Nachmanides. What does Nachmanides think? Where really does the Sages’ authority come from in rabbinic / of rabbinic origin law, in legislation? Fine, maybe it’s not “do not turn aside,” because Nachmanides disputes Maimonides about “do not turn aside,” so maybe it comes from another verse, or from reasoning, or from a law given to Moses at Sinai? He says: none of that can be. Because if there is some source, whatever it may be, we remain with the exact same problem that he finds in Maimonides. Nachmanides is effectively telling us: from the outset, you will not find an answer to this question, even before you start looking. Since if we find a source for rabbinic / of rabbinic origin laws, where could that source come from? The rabbinic / of rabbinic origin law itself cannot serve as the basis for rabbinic / of rabbinic origin laws, so what can? Some Torah-level / of biblical origin source—either a verse or reasoning. Or a law given to Moses at Sinai, something, a derivation, I don’t know, some kind of Torah-level / of biblical origin source that grants authority to the Sages. “Do not turn aside”? No? No, not the verse “do not turn aside.” That’s where he disputes Maimonides—something else. He says it can’t be. Whatever it is, even before we start looking. Because if there were such a thing, then Nachmanides could not attack Maimonides, because he himself would face the very same difficulty. After all, if he has a source, then it’s not “do not turn aside” but another verse—so what? I would still ask him the same question. That other verse would also turn all rabbinic / of rabbinic origin prohibitions into Torah prohibitions. So how would that help? In other words, pay close attention: with Nachmanides this is not just a local dispute, not just the first dispute about the interpretation of “do not turn aside.” Nachmanides is really claiming that there cannot be any verse that does this—not because he disputes the interpretation of “do not turn aside,” but because no verse can do it. Because any verse, or reasoning, or law given to Moses at Sinai that we bring will return us to the exact same problem he finds in Maimonides. So what do we do now? If so, the problem is doubly severe. Not only do we need to look for another verse, since “do not turn aside” is off the table according to Nachmanides. Nachmanides tells us a priori: don’t look at all—you won’t find one. You won’t find one, because if you do find one, that itself is a sign that it’s wrong. There’s nothing to look for. So what do we do? Why must one listen to the Sages, according to Nachmanides? According to Nachmanides, yes. So he answers here in a direction that needs to be understood carefully. He says: “It is a great wonder to say so, for if that were true, then for what reason are we obligated to listen to them and not transgress their words, if there is no command in the Torah—not from a verse, not from a law, not from reasoning?” So then why yes? So he brings the Talmud in Yevamot, parallel also in Sabbath, where it teaches: “Three things Moses our teacher, peace be upon him, did on his own initiative, and the mind of the Omnipresent agreed with his mind: he separated from his wife, broke the tablets, and added one day.” And there the Talmud explains regarding each of these things, “What did he derive?”—from a verse, from an a fortiori argument, and so on. The Talmud asks “What did he derive?” and brings some derivation to explain each of Moses’ decisions—
[Speaker B] of Moses our teacher.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Tosafot there asks—we brought this Talmud once last year—Tosafot there asks: if there is a derivation, then why is it called Moses’ own initiative? After all, he derived it! We received the Torah at Sinai, we received the hermeneutic principles, Moses made an a fortiori argument, an analogy, whatever it was. So he reached a conclusion—why is this called “on his own initiative,” the three things Moses our teacher did on his own initiative? Not on his own initiative; he expounded the Torah according to the rules we received. Rather, clearly, these derivations are not full derivations; they are a kind of… defective derivations, let’s call them that. Supporting allusions—that’s what they’re called. That’s what Tosafot says. So Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman says that if so, it follows that these are not real derivations. So what does it mean that Moses did them on his own initiative? He decided on his own, by his own reasoning. And if he decided by his own reasoning, what does the Talmud say? That the Omnipresent agreed with him. “Three things he did, and the mind of the Omnipresent agreed with him.” Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman says: so we see that what the Sages determine, the Omnipresent agrees with. We have proof of this from the Torah—or at least from what the Talmud derives from the Torah. Now, even here you can ask why one should accept the Talmud’s words on this matter, but let’s leave that aside for the moment. So why did the Omnipresent agree with Moses’ decisions? Precisely because the Holy One, blessed be He, agrees with the view of the Sages. So what follows? From here we learn a paradigm case that says: whenever the Sages say something, apparently the Holy One, blessed be He, agrees with them—or He also thinks this is how things should be done. Fine, this is a bit problematic, because this wild induction that says that if the Holy One agreed with Moses in those three decisions, then from then on, in every generation, whenever the Sages say something the Holy One agrees with them—to derive the entire authority of the Sages from that seems a bit problematic. Beyond that, how does this stand up by his own standards? After all, earlier he said that if there is a source from the Torah, or from reasoning, or from a law given to Moses at Sinai that establishes the obligation to obey the Sages, then we’ve thrown out the baby with the bathwater; we’ve turned rabbinic / of rabbinic origin law back into Torah law. So now what is he bringing us? What is the status of this consideration Rabbi Elchanan makes? Is it reasoning? Is it a source from the Torah? What is it? It has to be one of those, right? It can’t be something else. So if it’s reasoning, the problem remains. If it’s a source from the Torah, the problem still remains. So what has he gained? He himself took the trouble to make a fairly long introduction to explain: don’t look for reasoning, not a verse, not a law given to Moses at Sinai—all that won’t help. And what does he bring? It’s supposed to be something fourth. Meaning: not reasoning, not a law given to Moses at Sinai, and not a verse. So what is it then? Some kind of intermediate status. So if you keep reading him, it seems to me you can see that what he probably means to say is—maybe I’ll jump right to the end, for those who have the page—he says, I’ll read the end and then come back and explain it: “And in this way one can explain the meaning of the verse in Jeremiah: ‘And they built the high places of Baal to burn their sons in fire as burnt offerings to Baal, which I did not command, nor did I speak, nor did it enter My heart.’ That is what the verse says. ‘And I did not command through the hand of My servant the prophets, nor was it My will before Me.’ Now in this verse it is explicit that there are three parts of Torah: one called command, two called speech, and a third to which there is neither command nor speech, but only the will of God—and these are rabbinic / of rabbinic origin commandments.” After that he brings Balaam, where Balaam says: “I cannot transgress the word of God.” Meaning, “I cannot transgress the word of God”—what God said, I cannot do against that. But you know that He doesn’t want you to go. He didn’t say that. But you know He doesn’t want you to go. That—no problem. What the Holy One wants doesn’t bother me, but the word of God I cannot transgress. Meaning, he is someone who is careful about everything the Holy One explicitly said, but not one millimeter beyond that. The will of God doesn’t concern him. So Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman says—and this is probably the completion of what he’s saying here—that he means there really is a fourth category here, and one has to pay close attention: it is a different category. There is a category called reasoning. Reasoning is Torah-level / of biblical origin—that is the plain view. The Talmud says in several places: “Why do I need a verse? It is reasoning.” Why do we need a verse if it is reasoning? What do we see from here? That if there is reasoning, the verse is superfluous; you don’t need a verse. Meaning, something that follows from reasoning has the same status as something written in a verse. There are all sorts of examples of this. So that is reasoning. A verse is obviously something else. And the Sages enacted yet something else. But there is a fourth thing, and that is the will before Me—the will of the Holy One, blessed be He. Yes, the will of God. Now notice: the will of God is something different from reasoning. Maybe it is a subset—obviously things that follow from reasoning are also God’s will that we do them. But not everything that is God’s will contains reasoning. Meaning, there are things the Holy One wants us to do; He didn’t write them in the Torah, but somehow, through one consideration or another, we can understand that the Holy One desires them—but it is not reasoning. By reasoning alone I don’t understand why this is needed. What I do know is that the Holy One wants me to do it. It seems to me—if I remember correctly, I mentioned this example sometime last year—that terumah gedolah is an example of this. The measure for terumah gedolah: one-fortieth, one-fiftieth, one-sixtieth. So what? Yes, “he is looked upon favorably.” About one-fortieth, one-fiftieth, one-sixtieth, one can bring proofs that, at least according to Maimonides, this is a Torah-level / of biblical origin law, even though people generally think it is rabbinic / of rabbinic origin. On the other hand, it is clear that in practice Jewish law treats it as though it were a rabbinic / of rabbinic origin measure. Why? Because the Torah-level / of biblical origin law here is not really that there is a verse commanding this, but one can show that the Torah expects us to separate a measure more than a single grain—
[Speaker B] one single grain in principle—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] also suffices on the Torah level / of biblical origin, but through various considerations one can show that the Torah expects us to separate more. The Sages then set this into defined measures—one-fortieth, one-fiftieth, one-sixtieth—but the basic consideration is that there is here some will of the Torah that we separate more than one grain. I’m not sure this is reasoning. I’m not sure that if you asked some person on the street, as God-fearing as he may be, and you told him, listen, one grain suffices on the Torah level / of biblical origin for separating terumah, he would have to understand on his own reasoning that he should separate more, and specifically one-fiftieth—why? What’s wrong with one grain? I’ve done my part. The Holy One doesn’t need one grain and not five either; I’ve shown what my attitude is, that’s all. True—but if you study the verses and what accompanies them, then you understand that this is God’s will. That is not reasoning. It’s not certain you would understand it on your own. Reasoning is something people are supposed to grasp by themselves, even without a verse. This is not reasoning, but on the other hand it is God’s will; the Holy One nonetheless expects me to do it. There are many other things I don’t understand that the Holy One expects me to do. So it turns out there are such things that are not written explicitly in verses, and yet they are still like that. On the one hand, they are not reasoning; on the other hand, they are not a verse. They are some will of the Holy One—He expects me to act that way. How do we know? How do we know? So here is one example Rabbi Elchanan brought earlier: the mind of the Holy One agreed with Moses. Why—why does He reveal this to us at all? Why does the Holy One, through the Sages, it doesn’t matter—why do they tell us this? To teach us some idea, so that we understand. It’s not a verse, it’s not learned directly from a verse, but we should understand the spirit of the matter: when the Sages say something, the Holy One expects us to obey them. So that’s one example. You can accept this consideration or not, it doesn’t matter; I’m trying to point to the direction—that this consideration is simply a tool for reaching the conclusion that the Holy One expects us to behave in a certain way, even if it does not follow from reasoning. But since the Holy One expects it, then He expects it. What is the status of such a thing? How do we relate to it? On the one hand, it is not a commandment; there is no verse commanding it. One who violates it has not violated a Torah prohibition. So what is its status? On the other hand, there has to be a source of authority for this, right? Who is expecting this from us? The Holy One. The Holy One does not need a source of authority above Him in order to ground His authority to expect things of us. Just as He has authority to command us, He also has authority to expect things of us. In other words, here there is no question of a source of authority. Right? So essentially Nachmanides too solves both problems. Now I return to Nachmanides, because what he is really saying is: on the one hand there is a distinction between rabbinic / of rabbinic origin and Torah-level / of biblical origin, and on the other hand there is no problem of what the source of authority for rabbinic / of rabbinic origin law is. The source of authority is the will of God, which emerges from a certain interpretation of the verses. But since the verses do not write this as some clear command, because according to Nachmanides it is not included in “do not turn aside,” then apparently it is only God’s will. The halakhic status of this is lower—it is not Torah-level / of biblical origin, it is rabbinic / of rabbinic origin—but there is no question of a source of authority. I can always ask, yes, what is the source of the Holy One’s authority to command me in commandments? That’s also a good question—we opened last year with it—but assuming I recognize the authority of the Holy One, and my question was what is the authority of the Sages, then I looked for an anchor in the Holy One that gives authority to the Sages.
[Speaker B] I found it, and that anchor is not reasoning—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] not a verse, and not a law given to Moses at Sinai.
[Speaker B] And it comes out as though it’s a kind of weaker Torah law. Exactly, a sort of half-Torah law.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. And where does this concept of the will of God appear from? What?
[Speaker B] Where does the concept appear from?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, exactly—you make interpretive considerations and you discover that this is God’s will. The question is whether all interpreters agree that there is such a thing. If there is a dispute among interpreters, then there is a dispute over what God’s will is. Fine.
[Speaker B] Just as in Jewish law itself there can also be dispute; that doesn’t negate its authority.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One has to decide who is right, by the same means through which we always decide disputes. The will of God, if there is such a thing. No—if there is this will of God in order to derive laws from it—
[Speaker B] that is—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] if you are convinced that this really is the will of God—
[Speaker B] then you—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] don’t look for any interpreters; it is the will of God. If you’re not convinced that it is the will of God, then not. There is no need to invent here… what? One second, I’ll get to Nachmanides. I don’t need to invent here the concept of the will of God. If I discover that it is His will, then I’ve discovered it.
[Speaker B] If I—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] don’t discover it—after all, this goes through concrete acts of will.
[Speaker B] If I discovered that it is His will—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that I obey the Sages, for example, then there you have proof that there is a will of God.
[Speaker B] There you are—the fact is, He wants you to obey the Sages. Maybe another interpreter will say no.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So if he says no, then there is no will of God on that matter. Fine. So one has to decide. In… I am never certain anyway. I am not certain about the laws themselves either. There are disputes about laws too. Fine, but regarding this concept of the will of God, you can’t derive Jewish law from it. Why not? I don’t understand. If I’ve convinced you that this is God’s will, then do you agree with me that you need to obey it? If I haven’t convinced you, fine—but either way it doesn’t matter. So if you recognize the authority of the will of—
[Speaker B] God, only you won’t be convinced that God’s will is such-and-such, then how has that helped?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You still won’t obey the Sages. In any case I have to convince you that the Holy One wants this. So the preliminary stage where I first have to convince you that there is even such a concept called the will of God is unnecessary. If I succeed in convincing you that the Holy One wants this, then I’ve done both. If I don’t succeed in convincing you of that, then that earlier stage won’t help me either. And from here—from the fact that I understood there is a will of God—this becomes—
[Speaker B] the source of authority for all rabbinic / of rabbinic origin laws. Right, that’s the claim. No, so I’m saying one can accept—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the argument or not; I’m only pointing to Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman’s direction. And his question is a good one, because it can’t be reasoning, it can’t be a verse, it can’t be anything. By the way, I actually think it works differently. Not because of these midrashim that “the Divine Presence agreed with them”; those are also rabbinic midrashim. Why should I believe them too? The source is entirely different. Precisely Maimonides’ source. In my view they don’t disagree on this. Meaning, basically even according to the proof that was mentioned and also according to Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman, the answer is the same thing: the will of God. Exactly, that’s my claim. I think in fact you don’t need all the… I don’t know whether Rabbi Elchanan intended this, but the conclusion has to be something like this. There is nothing else. There are two feet here that you can’t stand on unless you choose something of this sort. And therefore it seems to me, when I see the verse “do not turn aside from all that they instruct you,” how does Nachmanides read it? Exactly like Maimonides. What does he say? It is forbidden to deny the authority of the Sages. After all, Nachmanides too agrees that someone who does not recognize the authority of the Sages is certainly a transgressor. It says, “do not turn aside from all that they instruct you.” The only thing is: Nachmanides understood Maimonides to mean that every person who eats poultry with milk violates “do not turn aside.” He asks: wait—then why are we not stringent in cases of doubt? It has become Torah law. You didn’t understand Maimonides correctly. Maimonides means what you mean. What you are saying. After all, think about it—it is very strange with Nachmanides. He writes none of this. Nachmanides devotes great length to attacking Maimonides; he rejects Maimonides’ source for rabbinic / of rabbinic origin law, and he doesn’t bother in even one line to say: wait, then where do I think the obligation to obey the Sages comes from? Why not add one or two lines to enlighten us? Because there is no need. From the same verse, “do not turn aside,” that Maimonides says—I say it certainly comes from “do not turn aside.” The only thing is, he understood Maimonides as understanding that it comes from “do not turn aside” in the most simplistic sense, that everyone who eats poultry with milk has violated “do not turn aside.” He says that is incorrect. So what is correct? Obviously it comes from “do not turn aside,” not from any other source. Only, if the verse commands me not to deviate from anything they say, then within the verse itself is the same consideration I used with the anchor. So from the verse it is clear—through an interpretive consideration, and here I think it is a necessary interpretive consideration—that what emerges from the same consideration is this: clearly the Holy One expects that if the Sages tell me not to eat poultry with milk, I should not eat poultry with milk. Because otherwise I have emptied of content the command to obey the Sages, their authority itself. Exactly the same consideration I used in the Rogatchover. That very consideration is what points to the will of God. This is another angle on what we said in Maimonides. In my view, Maimonides and Nachmanides are not arguing at all. And not for a very simple reason—the reason Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman gives.
[Speaker B] Because there cannot be—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] another option. There is no other theoretical option, even before I begin looking. It cannot be. On the one hand, I need to find a source for rabbinic / of rabbinic origin laws, and that source cannot itself be a rabbinic / of rabbinic origin law. On the other hand, in light of Nachmanides’ objection, that source cannot be a verse, nor reasoning, nor a law given to Moses at Sinai, of any kind—not only not “do not turn aside,” but not anything at all.
[Speaker B] So what am I left with? Clearly there must be a fourth category, which on the one hand is—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] some kind of Torah-level / of biblical origin source, and on the other hand its status is not a verse, not reasoning, and not a law given to Moses at Sinai. There is no other option. If one understands the system of constraints within which this supposed dispute between Maimonides and Nachmanides is taking place, then one understands that there cannot be any other option here.
[Speaker B] There can’t be a dispute here. There is no other theoretical option. But Nachmanides says that this verse doesn’t apply to legislation. No—Nachmanides doesn’t say that. Nachmanides—this was my formulation earlier—that’s what I’m saying, no. Nachmanides says that legislation too draws its force from this verse. It’s true that every time I eat poultry with milk I have not violated “do not turn aside,” but Maimonides doesn’t think that either. When Nachmanides read Maimonides, he thought Maimonides meant that, and therefore he attacked him. But Nachmanides too—where does he derive the source from? From “do not turn aside.” After all, he does not bring another source. Everywhere Nachmanides disagrees with Maimonides, he says to him: what you’re saying doesn’t seem right to me. So what do you say? No—but he is precise: if you’re talking about legislation too, then here is the question Nachmanides asked against Maimonides. No, no—that’s what I’m saying. No. Just as I solved these questions in Maimonides’ approach with the Rogatchover, that very same solution exists in Nachmanides. That is exactly the point. And there is no other solution; there is no other option. This is theoretical. I could have derived this position a priori before I ever saw Maimonides and Nachmanides—it follows from the constraints. But no—he really cites the verse “do not turn aside,” speaking about interpretation in the full sense, and speaks about legislation only regarding authority. No, no—in interpretation too… now I’m getting there; this brings us back to Minchat Chinukh. Wait, but what about Nachmanides? Seemingly—in a moment I’ll show that no. It’s not only in rebellion; it’s also in all the details. One second, let me go back to Minchat Chinukh and then it will become clear. What about this reasoning of Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman? Fine. Aside from the fact that I wasn’t all that convinced by his argument about the three things where the Divine Presence agreed with him. But the theoretical direction—on the contrary—is necessary, it has to be. No—so here, that’s what there is: some kind of will of the Torah. He explains Nachmanides. What? He explains Nachmanides. No—he explains Maimonides. No, no—he explains Nachmanides. Why? He says that Nachmanides says the authority derives from some kind of… from where? And what does Maimonides say? He doesn’t write it, I don’t know. Unless he doesn’t… what, Maimonides says there is a command, like the Rogatchover, that there is a command to listen to the Sages. Fine—so it’s the same thing. It’s the same thing! There’s no need… I’m saying no. What Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman intended—maybe he really does make those considerations because he thinks it doesn’t come from the verse “do not turn aside.” But the direction is his direction. In my view the verse “do not turn aside” is enough; you don’t need these acrobatics he does with the Divine Presence and agreement and all that. But there is an important practical difference in this. What? According to the Rogatchover… according to Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman there’s an important practical difference. Which is? One who rebels against the Sages—according to Nachmanides this would not be Torah law. Why? Because it is some kind of will of God. No—the will of God is that I obey them. So that’s not Torah-level / of biblical origin? Why not? If I deny their authority, do I dispute Torah law? Eating poultry with milk, if I eat it—that isn’t Torah law. Why? Because if there is some complete authority here, it is some will of the Holy One but not a command, the spirit of the law. Yes. So if I deny that, that doesn’t count as a Torah transgression? So I’m saying, maybe regarding the Torah-level / of biblical origin status some dispute will remain between them—maybe yes, maybe no—that’s still open for now. But as for what… what you are saying, that according to this explanation, if I rebel then that too is not Torah-level / of biblical origin—the difference between if you don’t eat meat with milk because of this dispute, it’s the same thing. So I say: I don’t mind accepting that too. But still, in status… what interests us is the rabbinic / of rabbinic origin law, not the Torah-level / of biblical origin law. How do rabbinic / of rabbinic origin laws stand? In that sense they are the same. Whether some disagreement remains in Torah-level / of biblical origin law—possibly—but it’s not important, because Torah-level / of biblical origin law doesn’t need… doesn’t need a basis. Meaning, our whole problem was with rabbinic / of rabbinic origin law. Now I return to the point with which I began. Minchat Chinukh started with this conception—we opened Minchat Chinukh with the conception that says that when I violate a derivation that the Sages made, I am actually violating two prohibitions. One prohibition is “do not turn aside,” and the second is the content itself—that very prohibition itself that I violated. What is the mistake here? The mistake is that “do not turn aside” has no independent content. All “do not turn aside” does is tell me: know that the things the Sages determine are prohibitions. One who violates those things has not violated “do not turn aside”; he has violated those things. What does “do not turn aside” do? “Do not turn aside” only reveals to me that the Sages have authority to make interpretive or legislative determinations. And what the Sages determine—now, for example, if I separate on the Sabbath, which is not written in the Torah, and the Sages say it is forbidden to separate on the Sabbath—they say this; it’s not written in the Torah—so what have I violated? I have not violated “do not turn aside”; I have violated separating on the Sabbath. But how do I know there is a prohibition of separating on the Sabbath? The verse “do not turn aside” reveals to me that if the Sages determine it, then such a prohibition exists. Wait—and if so, I violated it in rebellion? Yes, no, no—if you violated it rebelliously, yes, but then Minchat Chinukh’s argument still isn’t correct. He says to me: look, if you have two options—either to rebel, or to eat non-kosher pig without rebellion—that’s not what we’re talking about. We are talking about eating something that comes out prohibited through a derivation, where it’s already written on the verse. Therefore it is clear that when Minchat Chinukh weighs this, he is not talking about rebellion. Rebellion is certainly more severe, and there is no difficulty there. There really are two things there. Our whole difficulty was: what happens when there is no rebellion? How can a rabbinic / of rabbinic origin prohibition, or a prohibition derived by exposition, be more severe than a Torah prohibition? The answer is: it is not true. That is an incorrect conception. Why? Because he makes the same mistake—that Nachmanides misread Maimonides—because he thinks “do not turn aside” is the source and also the prohibition that one violates. When I eat—when I don’t read the Megillah—have I violated “do not turn aside”? I have not violated “do not turn aside”; I have violated the commandment of reading the Megillah, which is a rabbinic / of rabbinic origin commandment—unless I rebelled. But if not, I violated the reading of the Megillah. But how do I know there is an obligation of reading the Megillah? It is not written in the Torah that one must read the Megillah. In the Torah it says that what the Sages say, I must obey. So the verse “do not turn aside” is a revealing verse; it is not a commanding verse. It reveals, it grants authority; it is an empowering verse, it gives force to the Sages, so that what they say is also a prohibition. So now, when—one second—now when I separate on the Sabbath, clearly I have not violated two things, both “do not turn aside” and separating; I have violated separating. How do I know that separating is forbidden? The verse “do not turn aside” reveals to me that separating is forbidden. But what is the prohibition I violated? The prohibition of separating. And this is also the answer to what you said. No—because “do not turn aside” is Torah-level / of biblical origin. All the interpretation of the Sages is Torah-level / of biblical origin. So now this too is Torah-level / of biblical origin, and still “do not turn aside” anchors the derivations just like the enactments, exactly the same. So that—so basically this point of Minchat Chinukh is exactly the indicator of what we are saying now. The verse “do not turn aside,” by its nature, is a revealing verse; it is not a commanding verse. It has two hats. If I directly rebel and do not recognize the authority of the Sages, then there is here—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] also a commanding element, a command—
[Speaker B] to listen to the Sages, and if I rebelled against—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that, then—
[Speaker B] I violated the prohibition of “do not turn aside.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is the only—
[Speaker B] way one violates the prohibition of “do not turn aside”; there is no other way.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If—
[Speaker B] I did not rebel, then—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I violated—
[Speaker B] the prohibition of separating on the Sabbath.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But—
[Speaker B] how do I know that there is a prohibition?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] From “do not turn aside.” “Do not turn aside” reveals to me that separating is a prohibition, not that it is a command. I did not violate rebellion against the Sages; I violated separating on the Sabbath. Fine. So it seems that in the end Maimonides and Nachmanides are both in the same place. Good—so next week, on Sunday instead of Monday, just this once. Everything—everything that isn’t written, and every prohibition—no, there is also a positive commandment.
[Speaker B] “And you shall do according to all that they instruct you.” There is a positive commandment and also a prohibition. Wait, don’t they say—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that? They do—both a positive commandment and a prohibition. So that’s the spirit of the Torah? No, no—a positive commandment and a prohibition are commandments; that’s not spirit. The spirit of the Torah is what Dr. Schwartz… it’s not what is written—
[Speaker B] there is such a thing. Okay, send—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] it to me by email, it—
[Speaker B] was very interesting, thank you very much. That concludes Rabbi Michael Abraham’s lecture, Monday, the 15th of Cheshvan 5767, November 6, 2006, the eve of the 16th of Cheshvan 5767.