Lecture dated 11 Cheshvan 5767
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
🔗 Link to the original lecture
🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI
Table of Contents
- Opening and defining the question about a guilt-offering
- The guilt-offering as payment for damage to reality, not for a transgression
- The guilt-offering of a designated maidservant: harm to a marital bond without a prohibition
- Pnei Yehoshua and Avnei Miluim: why there is no betrothal after betrothal in the case of a designated maidservant
- Maimonides in the Laws of Kings and Shechem: harming betrothal as a form of theft
- The Maharik on “and she commits trespass against him”: inadvertent violation of a prohibition in adultery and the real breakdown of the marital bond
- The guilt-offering for misuse of consecrated property: liability only for inadvertence proves that the guilt-offering depends on real damage
- Misuse in the case of konamot: a guilt-offering for misuse without a prohibition and without a verse
- Blessings over enjoyment as misuse, and the students of Rabbenu Yonah: liability for a guilt-offering over enjoyment without a blessing
- The guilt-offering for thefts and Rabbi Shimon Shkop: theft as a concept that precedes Jewish law
- The suspended guilt-offering and Maimonides: repair for possible damage even when there was no transgression
- Returning to the verses and distinguishing between a sin-offering and a guilt-offering
Summary
General Overview
Rabbi Michael Abraham argues that the deep defining feature of the guilt-offering is not that one is liable for it “whether deliberate or inadvertent,” but rather that the guilt-offering comes for a damage in reality created by an act, even when there is no halakhic transgression, or when personal blame is not the central issue. He presents the guilt-offering of the designated maidservant as a clear example that one brings a guilt-offering even without any prohibition, because an actual marital bond was harmed, and explains that specifically in the guilt-offering for misuse of consecrated property, liability is limited to inadvertence because only then does the real damage occur, namely that the object leaves the domain of the Temple treasury. He then strengthens the thesis through the law of misuse regarding konamot and through the words of the students of Rabbenu Yonah about someone who enjoys this world without a blessing as being liable for a guilt-offering for misuse, and he proposes a reading according to which blessings over enjoyment have a Torah-level foundation of “not to enjoy without a blessing,” while the formulated text of the blessings is a rabbinic enactment. Finally, he connects this to the suspended guilt-offering and to Maimonides’ view that stringency in Torah-level doubt is rabbinic, and argues that the suspended guilt-offering repairs a “possible damage” in reality and does not stem from a transgression of the person.
Opening and defining the question about a guilt-offering
The Rabbi opens by saying that the rule “one is liable for it whether deliberate or inadvertent” cannot be an essential definition of a guilt-offering, because it does not hold true for all kinds of guilt-offerings. He suggests looking for a more basic characteristic, where “it makes no difference whether deliberate or inadvertent” is only a practical implication of some deeper idea, and he isolates the guilt-offering for misuse of consecrated property as an exception in which liability is only for inadvertence. He asks what might characterize a sin or a liability in which the person’s motives are unimportant, and suggests that the natural direction is that we are dealing with a problem of result or of a reality that was created.
The guilt-offering as payment for damage to reality, not for a transgression
The Rabbi defines the guilt-offering as “result-oriented,” and goes so far as to argue that a guilt-offering does not necessarily come for a transgression at all, but for a damaged state that was created, even if there was no transgression whatsoever. He distinguishes between the sin-offering, which focuses on the person’s transgression, negligence, and lack of awareness, and the guilt-offering, which focuses on the defect created in reality. He uses the example of murder to illustrate that the result can be the problem even if the discussion of punishment is different.
The guilt-offering of a designated maidservant: harm to a marital bond without a prohibition
The Rabbi presents the guilt-offering of the designated maidservant as a case in which one who has relations with her brings a guilt-offering whether deliberately or inadvertently, and according to most opinions there is no prohibition on him at all, even though the maidservant herself receives lashes. He emphasizes that the liability for a guilt-offering remains even when there is no “transgression” to hang it on, and therefore the focus is damage to the reality of an existing marital bond. He formulates it by saying that the guilt-offering comes because “the marital bond was damaged,” even if there is no halakhic prohibition.
Pnei Yehoshua and Avnei Miluim: why there is no betrothal after betrothal in the case of a designated maidservant
The Rabbi cites Pnei Yehoshua’s question on the Talmud’s determination that there is no such thing as “the wife of two dead men,” and contrasts it with the apparent possibility of a designated maidservant who is married to a Hebrew slave and could then be betrothed by a second man, since “betrothal takes effect where there are merely prohibitions carrying lashes,” and here “there is not even a prohibition, only a bare guilt-offering.” He quotes Pnei Yehoshua’s answer that betrothal does not fail because of the severity of the prohibition, but because she is “in his domain” and “does not have the legal capacity to accept betrothal from another,” meaning that the issue is the marital bond as a reality of belonging, not just a prohibition of forbidden relations. He notes that Avnei Miluim disagrees in siman 44 but does not enter into that topic, and concludes that the defect in the designated maidservant is damage to the marriage bond itself, on a “meta-halakhic” level that precedes prohibitions.
Maimonides in the Laws of Kings and Shechem: harming betrothal as a form of theft
The Rabbi cites Maimonides on the liability of the people of Shechem because they did not judge Shechem, who “stole,” and notes that later authorities infer from this that harming betrothal contains an element of theft, in the sense of taking a woman who is not his, even though she is not property. He uses this to stress that there are acts in the sphere of marital relations that carry a pre-halakhic meaning of violating domain or ownership, even when there is no formally defined halakhic prohibition of theft in the act itself.
The Maharik on “and she commits trespass against him”: inadvertent violation of a prohibition in adultery and the real breakdown of the marital bond
The Rabbi cites the Maharik on a woman who committed adultery “willingly” but did not know that the act was prohibited, and explains the division between mistakes about reality and mistakes about prohibition. He quotes the Maharik’s wording that since she “intends to commit trespass against her husband and to fornicate under him,” she does not have the status of an inadvertent sinner so as to be permitted to her husband, and emphasizes that the explanation rests on “and she commits trespass against him,” not on an intention to violate a prohibition. He concludes that the consequence of the real defect in the marital bond is that she becomes forbidden to her husband even when the mistake is only about the prohibition, and that the term “misuse” here points to the corruption of a relationship in reality, not to a category essentially tied דווקא to inadvertence.
The guilt-offering for misuse of consecrated property: liability only for inadvertence proves that the guilt-offering depends on real damage
The Rabbi returns to the difficulty that the guilt-offering for misuse applies only to inadvertence, and explains that this fits the new criterion: the guilt-offering does not come for the prohibition of misuse itself, but for the reality that the object has left the domain of the Temple treasury and become unconsecrated. He states that in a deliberate case there is a prohibition of misuse, but the object does not become unconsecrated, and therefore there is no real damage of the kind that requires a guilt-offering, and explains that this itself is the proof that the distinction between deliberate and inadvertent is a sign, not a cause. He adds that if there were a result that occurred only in a deliberate case, then in principle the guilt-offering would be connected to that as well, even though we have no such case before us.
Misuse in the case of konamot: a guilt-offering for misuse without a prohibition and without a verse
The Rabbi cites the law of misuse regarding konamot, that if someone forbade a loaf to himself by a konam and ate from it, “he has violated misuse” and brings a guilt-offering, and he asks how “consecration” can apply in vows and what the prohibition is. He explains the distinction between a vow as an object-based prohibition and an oath as a person-based prohibition, and formulates that in a vow the object becomes “outside his domain,” and therefore eating it is an intrusion into a forbidden domain in reality, similar to damaging a marital bond. He states that the guilt-offering does not come for “he shall not violate his word,” and that there is no need for a verse or a prohibition in order to obligate a guilt-offering when there is damage in reality, and notes that the Mishneh LaMelekh is puzzled about the source of this law.
Blessings over enjoyment as misuse, and the students of Rabbenu Yonah: liability for a guilt-offering over enjoyment without a blessing
The Rabbi cites the Talmud in Berakhot that “whoever enjoys this world without a blessing commits misuse,” and the words of the students of Rabbenu Yonah that “if he eats, he will be liable for a guilt-offering for misuse each and every time,” and that even the blessing of she-hakol exempts “from misuse.” He points to the tension in the fact that the students of Rabbenu Yonah also write that “holy praises to the Lord” is only a rabbinic support-text, and that the blessing before eating is rabbinic, and yet they still speak of an actual guilt-offering for misuse. He cites Pnei Yehoshua, who is puzzled how the Talmud’s conclusion, “rather, it is based on reason,” fits with the rule that “something derived from reason is Torah-level,” and he proposes a solution according to which the prohibition itself of enjoying without a blessing is Torah-level, whereas the defined formula with God’s name and kingship is rabbinic. He connects this to the rule that in cases of doubt about blessings one is lenient, as referring to doubt about the rabbinic formula, and formulates that someone who is unsure whether he recited a blessing at all should at least say words of thanks without God’s name and kingship, in order to fulfill the Torah-level requirement of “not to enjoy without a blessing” and be saved from misuse. He mentions that the Tzelach disagrees and argues that this is rabbinic and that not every logical conclusion is Torah-level, and he suggests a possible distinction between interpretive reasoning and reasoning that creates a new law.
The guilt-offering for thefts and Rabbi Shimon Shkop: theft as a concept that precedes Jewish law
The Rabbi notes that he did not have time to get into the guilt-offering for thefts, but he cites Rabbi Shimon Shkop in Sha’ar 5, that theft is founded on “the law of justice” that precedes Jewish law, and the prohibition “you shall not steal” is a second level built on an actual state of ownership. He presents the question of the Mahari Asad about “the burden of proof rests on the one seeking to extract from another” as against “Torah-level doubt requires stringency,” and Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s answer that the prohibition depends on the legal determination of ownership, and if according to property law the item is his, then there is no theft here. He formulates that the common principle is that the primary problem is taking something that is not his in reality, and from this there follows a direction for understanding the guilt-offering for thefts as repairing damage in reality.
The suspended guilt-offering and Maimonides: repair for possible damage even when there was no transgression
The Rabbi presents Maimonides’ position that all laws of doubtful impurity and doubtful prohibitions are “of rabbinic origin,” and that nothing is impure by Torah law except with certainty, and cites the addition in parentheses, “and nevertheless, something for whose deliberate violation one is liable to karet, its doubtful case is prohibited by Torah law,” and says that this is “an invention from the land of inventions” and contradicts Maimonides’ own language, where he counts “forbidden sexual relations and Sabbaths” among the cases of doubt that are rabbinic. He explains the difficulty raised by the later authorities: how can one become liable for a suspended guilt-offering if the obligation to be stringent in cases of doubt is only rabbinic? He answers that the suspended guilt-offering is not for a transgression or for the person’s failure to be stringent, but for the possibility that in reality he actually violated a prohibition, such as if he ate pork, and therefore one brings an offering for a “possible defect.” He formulates that the suspended guilt-offering is founded “in order to repair possible defects,” and that this is another example of the guilt-offering operating on the plane of reality rather than on the plane of personal wrongdoing.
Returning to the verses and distinguishing between a sin-offering and a guilt-offering
The Rabbi concludes that in the section dealing with the sin-offering, the keyword is “sin-offering,” “he sinned,” and “from his sin,” because the sin-offering comes for the person’s transgression and negligence, and the number of sin-offerings is determined by the number of lapses of awareness. He contrasts this with the guilt-offering as focusing on the result and on the damaged state, and presents the example of a guilt-offering in a case of “complete coercion,” where there is no personal wrongdoing at all, yet a reality of damage or of taking what is not his was still created, and therefore there is a guilt-offering. He notes at the end that a suspended guilt-offering is required “specifically when his heart troubles him,” and leaves the continuation as a point still requiring explanation.
Full Transcript
[Speaker A] Rabbi Michael Abraham, Thursday, the eleventh of Cheshvan, leading into the twelfth of Cheshvan, the time is 7:45, which means I’m about half an hour late from the beginning of the lecture.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what may be going on is that there’s some even deeper characteristic of the guilt-offering here, and the fact that one is liable for it whether deliberate or inadvertent is only a consequence, only a practical implication, and that’s not always true. And we’re going to look for something that perhaps, with a guilt-offering, one is liable for—not… meaning, if the defining feature were that one is liable whether deliberate or inadvertent, that’s not true, because it doesn’t hold in all guilt-offerings. But on the other hand, what, it’s just accidental? It’s not reasonable that it’s accidental. So we’re trying perhaps to find something more fundamental, because of which it usually comes out that deliberate is like inadvertent, but not always, not necessarily.
[Speaker C] What were you saying—like you emphasized, basically, that there’s a possibility that it’s exactly the opposite?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean?
[Speaker C] In misuse of consecrated property, where it’s inadvertent and not deliberate.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, of course. All the others are both and both, it’s not only deliberate. It’s both deliberate and inadvertent. And in misuse, it’s only inadvertent.
[Speaker C] I’m only saying that we haven’t found, say, deliberate and not inadvertent. Ah, yes, yes. We only found only inadvertent, right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] More than that—so actually that’s true, maybe I’ll add that as a note too. What we’re looking for is not something that characterizes the deliberate case, but something that characterizes the fact that I don’t care whether it’s deliberate or inadvertent, right? I don’t care whether it’s deliberate or inadvertent. In a moment we’ll set aside the guilt-offering for misuse for a second. Let’s try to see what kind of thing in general it could be, where it makes no difference whether it’s deliberate or inadvertent. What do you say? What do you say? If there is some sin where I don’t care whether it was done deliberately or inadvertently, what would characterize such a sin? Coercion? There are certain sins where, whether you did it deliberately or inadvertently, I don’t care. In any case you bring a guilt-offering—here it’s a guilt-offering, but let’s leave the guilt-offering aside for a moment. What could characterize sins where I don’t care whether it was deliberate or inadvertent?
[Speaker A] That the sin itself stems from lack of attention, from not caring.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s true in any case for inadvertence. In inadvertence there’s always some element of negligence.
[Speaker A] There are deliberate sins where you aren’t punished at all, it doesn’t cost you anything, because a lot of conditions weren’t met; whereas the inadvertent case does cost you a sin-offering, and there’s some comment of Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch who says that the very lack of attention, that indifference that created the situation, is itself a transgression—that’s why I pay.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, it’s written in the medieval authorities (Rishonim), but that’s true regarding the sin-offering. When you bring a sin-offering for inadvertence, people ask why you… how is that different from coercion? In many places in the Talmud, by the way, you see that inadvertence and coercion are the same thing. “A person” in the context of an oath excludes one under coercion. What examples do they bring there in tractate Shevuot? Examples of inadvertence, not of coercion. And clarification of the matter… there are places where yes, places where no. These are different types of coercion. What’s the difference?
[Speaker C] I’m saying, the result.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. I think the first thing that comes to mind when I’m looking for something shared by deliberate and inadvertent together, where I don’t care whether it’s deliberate or inadvertent, I would say: apparently the reality. Meaning, the mere fact that something happened here, completely apart from the motives of the person who did it. The very result that occurred here is the problem, right? That’s what I’d think. If I see something where I don’t care whether it was done deliberately or inadvertently, then apparently what bothers me here is the result itself. Someone murdered. He murdered inadvertently—that’s very nice, but the victim is dead. That won’t comfort the family, that it happened inadvertently. I’m not talking right now… punishment is certainly different; I’m not talking now about punishment, it’s just an example. Meaning, if there is a transgression that is result-oriented, let’s call it that, where the problem is the result that occurred, then there I would expect there to be no difference between deliberate and inadvertent, right? So my claim is that the guilt-offering is result-oriented. More than that, I’ll claim: not only is the guilt-offering result-oriented, the guilt-offering in fact does not come for transgressions at all. The guilt-offering comes for a problematic state that was created, with no connection at all to the question of whether there was a transgression or not. Even if there was no transgression, the mere fact that a situation was created here that is defective—that’s what creates liability for a guilt-offering. Now we’ll prove this in all the guilt-offerings, to the last one.
[Speaker C] Is a defective state a transgression?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, just watch. Let’s start. The first guilt-offering: the guilt-offering of the designated maidservant. That may be the clearest example. Why? What is the guilt-offering of the designated maidservant, first of all? A designated maidservant is half slave and half free woman in Jewish law, and she is married to a Hebrew slave—or perhaps even to a Jew—and someone has relations with her. So there is a married woman and someone had relations with her, right? The one who had relations with her, whether deliberate or inadvertent, as we said earlier, brings a guilt-offering—the guilt-offering of the designated maidservant. According to most opinions, the person who had relations with the designated maidservant did nothing wrong. There is no such transgression, there is no prohibition. The maidservant is lashed, she transgressed. But the one who had relations with her did not violate a prohibition, and nevertheless he brings a guilt-offering, according to most opinions. In the Talmud itself, in fact, it may be that there is a dispute about this.
[Speaker C] That’s if he had relations with a maidservant, like he had relations with a maidservant—no, a maidservant…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Designated maidservant—we’re talking about a woman who is married to a man.
[Speaker C] Yes, but—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Do you bring a guilt-offering when you have relations with a maidservant?
[Speaker C] No, a married maidservant.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does that mean, a married maidservant? Married to whom?
[Speaker C] To a slave, to a Hebrew slave—there’s no guilt-offering for that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, to a Hebrew slave, that is a designated maidservant.
[Speaker C] Every designated maidservant doesn’t mean half slave and half free woman?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, half slave and half free woman who is married to a Hebrew slave. An actual full maidservant who is married to a Hebrew slave? I don’t think there’s a guilt-offering for that.
[Speaker C] So? So what? Why is the slave portion inside this mixed maidservant more severe than if she were entirely a maidservant?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s a different question altogether; we should always ask ourselves that. I don’t think—I don’t know—but it’s not connected. First of all, the facts: the facts are that there is no prohibition, there is no ban, and yet there is liability for a guilt-offering.
[Speaker C] Yes, I understand, I just thought that it came to emphasize that there is no prohibition.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying even more strongly. First of all, there is no prohibition, and yet he is liable for a guilt-offering. My previous claim, after all, was that the guilt-offering comes for results. I don’t care whether there’s a prohibition—but it doesn’t come for the prohibition, it comes for the results. Now we see that there isn’t even a prohibition. Meaning, it’s not only that it comes for results—it’s only the result that remains, because there is no prohibition at all.
[Speaker C] Yes, what you mean is basically to say that there can be a case where we reach the same result in principle and there won’t be a guilt-offering. But a guilt-offering is for a result—apparently it’s not the same result.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly, apparently it’s not the same result, and we need to think why—but that’s not connected to what I’m saying right now.
[Speaker C] Let’s try to understand the result.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what is really happening here? Why does he bring a guilt-offering? There’s no sin! So why does he bring a guilt-offering? To understand that, look at Pnei Yehoshua. Pnei Yehoshua asks an interesting question—a famous Pnei Yehoshua—there’s a dispute with Avnei Miluim in siman 44 on this matter. Pnei Yehoshua asks an interesting question. The Talmud says there is no such thing as the wife of two dead men. Right? “The wife of two dead men” means a woman who requires levirate marriage from two brothers-in-law together. How could that happen? If she had two husbands and both died, then she would require levirate marriage from two brothers-in-law, right? But there is no such thing as a woman of two husbands, a lady of two masters, there’s no such thing. So basically, in our language, the Talmud says there is no such thing as a woman who belongs to two men—leave levirate marriage aside, that’s just the language, there is no such thing as a woman of two men, it cannot be. Why? If she is a married woman, then obviously no one else’s betrothal can take effect in her, and therefore there cannot be a situation where a woman is married to two men, right? Pnei Yehoshua says: why not? Here we have such a situation. There is a designated maidservant; she is married to her husband, the Hebrew slave, right? Now someone comes and betroths her, a Jew betroths her. Does the betrothal take effect? Certainly it takes effect. Why? Because betrothal takes effect even in cases of prohibitions carrying lashes. In cases of karet, if there is a prohibition of incest, betrothal does not take effect, right? According to Jewish law. But in prohibitions carrying lashes, according to Jewish law, betrothal does take effect. And with a designated maidservant there isn’t even a prohibition. So what is the problem? Certainly the betrothal takes effect, right? So Pnei Yehoshua says: we have found the wife of two dead men. Here—there is a designated maidservant, someone betroths her, there is no prohibition on the one doing the betrothal, and therefore the betrothal takes effect, so he becomes her second husband. She can now rule over two. So what… then how can the Talmud say that there is no wife of two dead men? Now, in truth, already in the Talmud itself it is not clear that he is correct in interpreting the Talmud as meaning there is absolutely no such thing; maybe there are disputes about that. It doesn’t matter right now, but that is his argument. What answer does he suggest?
[Speaker C] Wait, and also the third one who marries her, that’s…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the third one already… with the second she may already be fully married, depending on what her status is relative to the second, I don’t know. We’d have to check whether she’s still a designated maidservant or not. Maybe the wife of a hundred dead men—two is like a hundred. In any case, Pnei Yehoshua says: “If so, it would seem that the betrothal of the second man also takes effect in her, for we hold that betrothal takes effect in prohibitions carrying lashes, and here there is not even a prohibition, only a bare guilt-offering.” Do you hear that? There is no prohibition, only a bare guilt-offering. Pnei Yehoshua answers: “And it seems to me possible to resolve this, that what we hold elsewhere—that betrothal takes effect in prohibitions carrying lashes—that is in ordinary prohibitions carrying lashes. But not where the issue comes through betrothal itself, for otherwise you would never find betrothal after betrothal. Since Reuven’s betrothal has taken effect, she is in his domain, and she has no legal capacity to accept betrothal from another—so it seems to me.” Pnei Yehoshua says the following: usually, when I want to betroth a woman who is forbidden to me as an incestuous relation, why doesn’t the betrothal take effect? Because she is forbidden to me by a very severe prohibition; that prohibition prevents the legal effect of the betrothal. As opposed to a prohibition carrying lashes, which is less severe. In the case of a married woman, true, the prohibition relative to me—someone else’s married woman—the prohibition relative to me is a prohibition of incestuous forbidden relations. And certainly my betrothal does not take effect in her because of the prohibition, like with all the other forbidden relations. But with a married woman there is something more: the betrothal does not take effect simply because she is the wife of someone else. She is already taken, belongs to someone else. This is called: she has no legal capacity to accept betrothal. Not that he means to say there is no practical way to perform the act of acquisition, but simply: she is already taken. She has a husband. You can’t betroth twice; she is no longer a woman available for betrothal. So the problem here is not only the transgression—apparently also the transgression, there is probably that aspect too, the prohibition of forbidden relations probably also prevents the betrothal from taking effect—but also the very fact that she is taken, someone else is already her husband. So Pnei Yehoshua says: where will this duality, these two legal dimensions, find expression—that the reason betrothal does not take effect is both because of the prohibition and because she is someone else’s wife? In a place where there is no prohibition: the designated maidservant. If she is a designated maidservant, then having relations with her is not a prohibition. So from the side of the prohibition, there is no problem at all; betrothal should have taken effect. But it still does not take effect, even here, despite there being no prohibition. Why? Because she is someone else’s wife. Someone else’s wife—you can’t betroth her, she is not free for betrothal. Avnei Miluim disagrees with him in siman 44; that’s not important right now, we won’t get into the topic. What is really written here? That a married woman—or a designated maidservant in this context—where betrothal does not take effect in her, or someone who has relations with her—what is the problem if he has relations with her? Now I’m leaving betrothal aside for the moment; someone has relations with her even not for the sake of betrothal. So what is the problem here? There is no prohibition. So what is the problem? The problem is that he had relations with another man’s wife—not because of the prohibition. In the first or second lecture we had—I don’t even remember which one—we talked about maritality, about the concept of marital bond, that there is some reality which precedes the halakhic layer. Here there is only the reality; there is no halakhic layer, there are no prohibitions. But the marital bond exists; the designated maidservant is married to her husband. So if I now have relations with her, then I have relations with a married woman. I did not violate a prohibition. I did not violate a halakhic prohibition. But I still damaged a marital bond here, a bond of maritality. For that one brings a guilt-offering. A guilt-offering is brought for a reality that was damaged. I damage some bond of maritality, with no connection to transgressions, even if there is no transgression. In the case of the designated maidservant there is no transgression. But in the end the marital bond has been damaged, that reality has been spoiled. For that damage one brings a guilt-offering. Meaning, a guilt-offering comes for damage in reality, even if there is no sin at all. And here there is no sin at all, and yet a guilt-offering comes.
[Speaker C] Why is there no sin here at all?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is no sin; the one who has relations with a designated maidservant has no sin upon him—that’s what we said. There is only a guilt-offering; Pnei Yehoshua also writes that there. There is not even a prohibition on him, only a guilt-offering. Basically, look—I brought Maimonides, Chizkiya—
[Speaker C] Bar Pumbedita—did Chizkiya do it because of that? Chizkiya a maidservant? Yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Only because of that. One like this, who is married to a Hebrew slave—the marital bond between them is of such a kind that they leave it on the meta-halakhic level. They do not impose halakhic prohibitions on it. There is a marital bond, but one who harms it does not violate halakhic prohibitions. That is what the Torah determined. Look at the Maimonides I brought afterward from the Laws of Kings: “And how are they commanded concerning laws? They are obligated to appoint judges and magistrates in every province and district to judge concerning these six commandments,” and so on. “And because of this all the people of Shechem became liable to death, for Shechem stole, and they saw and knew and did not judge him.” What does it mean that he stole? Is that called stealing? He took Dinah. Is that called stealing? What, was she Jacob’s property? From here quite a few later authorities learn that in harming betrothal there is an element of theft. That when you take a woman who is not yours, there is a certain aspect of theft here, even though it is not theft in the simple sense—she is not anyone’s property, even if she is married. But with any betrothal, anyone who harms a betrothal, there is some element of theft here. This has various implications regarding—
[Speaker C] For Noahides, for example.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Was she married?
[Speaker C] Even if not.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well then. He took someone who wasn’t his, damaged a bond, took someone who wasn’t his. If she didn’t consent, not his—depends how you interpret the passage there. Yes, didn’t he damage a marital bond? No, no, he took something that wasn’t his; he didn’t damage a marital bond. I’m only saying that when you take a woman, there is some aspect of taking something that isn’t yours. If there is a marital bond there and you take her, then you also damage a marital bond. I don’t know whether she was married there or not, I’m not expert in it.
[Speaker A] It’s sort of the opposite of returning a lost object—for example, if a person has lost his way or can’t find the way, then helping him find the way has an aspect of returning a lost object, like, say, an elderly person who isn’t able to get back home—if I remember correctly, that’s the example I remember. Yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And that’s—
[Speaker A] From the standpoint of returning a lost object, the person himself, his body, being lost. His body being lost.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So—
[Speaker A] If so, what he did to Dinah was the opposite: he takes her from a place—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] To a place that she—
[Speaker A] Does not want and that is not fitting for her to be in.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. Okay. I understand.
[Speaker C] How does that connect to all this?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The claim is—I don’t know whether she was married or not—but even if not, the claim is that there is something about taking a woman who is not yours that is like theft.
[Speaker C] But how does that prove the issue of the result?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, it doesn’t prove it. I’m giving an example: when you take a woman, you’re acting here on planes that are pre-halakhic, because there is no prohibition of theft on this. Taking a woman is not the halakhic prohibition of theft. But there is something here, like in monetary law, that if you take something from someone else it’s also theft, and then you also damage the bond. But all this is on a level prior to Jewish law. There is no halakhic prohibition of theft here; someone who has relations with a woman does not violate the prohibition of theft in the halakhic sense. There is an aspect of theft in this prohibition involving a married woman. Good, so this is… it seems like a similar idea that will lead us afterward to the next guilt-offerings. A married woman who committed adultery becomes forbidden to her husband and to the adulterer. Right? “She committed trespass against her husband”—if she committed adultery, she becomes forbidden both to the husband and to the adulterer. If she did it inadvertently, then no, right? The Maharik says—the well-known Maharik, also brought in the Rema as Jewish law—“And regarding what Mahari’l asked about a woman who committed adultery under her husband willingly, but she did not know whether there was any prohibition in the matter, whether she should be considered inadvertent or not.” Meaning: she committed adultery under her husband willingly, she wanted to commit adultery. But she did not know that there is a prohibition on adultery. On the face of it, that’s inadvertent, right? Inadvertent—she did not know that this thing is forbidden. What is written in the chapter Kelal Gadol, right? There are two types of inadvertence. There is the case where I don’t know that today is the Sabbath, and there is the case where I don’t know that trapping on the Sabbath is forbidden. Two types of inadvertence. So too with a married woman there can be two kinds of inadvertence. It could be that she does not know that this is not her husband—at night, I don’t know, she doesn’t see—she doesn’t know she is committing adultery at all. That is one kind of inadvertence. Another kind of inadvertence: she knows this is not her husband, and she does it willingly, but she does not know that it is forbidden. There is inadvertence about the prohibition and inadvertence about the reality. So on the face of it, that should be inadvertence—what’s the problem? So she should not become forbidden to the husband or the adulterer. Meaning… So the Maharik says: “In my humble opinion it appears that this woman does not have the status of inadvertence so as to be permitted to her husband, since she intends to commit trespass against her husband and to prostitute herself under him. For the verse does not say, ‘if a man’s wife goes astray and commits trespass against the Lord,’ which would imply specifically intending the prohibition, but rather ‘and she commits trespass against him.’” The Maharik says this: why does the woman become forbidden to her husband? Because she commits trespass against him. What does that mean? Not because of the prohibition she committed. Rather, because if she breaks up the marital bond, if she does not want this marital bond, then the marital bond has broken down, and she is forbidden. So what? So now, if a woman commits adultery willingly under her husband and also knows it is forbidden, then that is simple. But then we might think maybe it’s because of the prohibition, because in the end it’s deliberate, yes? She knows it is forbidden. The Maharik says no—even in inadvertence, if it is this kind of inadvertence—
[Speaker C] He says it’s not inadvertence—not that it’s…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean it’s not inadvertence? She doesn’t know it’s forbidden.
[Speaker C] No, but she intended to commit trespass, intended to betray her husband.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what? But it’s inadvertent. Throughout the Torah, inadvertence about the prohibition is inadvertence. If you don’t know that this thing is forbidden, you don’t know that sorting on the Sabbath is forbidden…
[Speaker C] Yes, I understand, there’s always mistake about the punishment, mistake about the act…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] נכון, and mistake about the prohibition—this is mistake about the prohibition.
[Speaker C] I understand, but what the Maharik is basically coming to say—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That such a situation is not called inadvertence. It’s not that she doesn’t become forbidden… what do you mean, it’s not called inadvertence? He can’t say it’s not called inadvertence. She becomes forbidden to her husband—that’s what “to commit trespass” means, right? He says this is called to commit trespass, not that it isn’t inadvertence.
[Speaker C] Even though—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Even though it is inadvertence, it is called committing trespass. Why? Because on the contrary, it is certainly inadvertence. Reality—that’s the word you’re saying—reality. Correct. But what can you do? In the end, in reality the bond has been broken.
[Speaker C] According to the Maharik, I think—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think she does violate the prohibition. What? According to the Maharik she wouldn’t violate the prohibition in halakhic terms? I think she would. What do you mean? She certainly violates the prohibition. A prohibition inadvertently. That won’t be considered… what are you talking about? A prohibition inadvertently. A prohibition inadvertently, without a doubt. Meaning, the issue of coercion is clear. As for becoming forbidden to her husband, this is considered like deliberate action—she becomes forbidden to her husband. Why? Because even though it is inadvertence, this is called committing trespass against him. Why? Because she is trespassing against the marital bond. That is a reality. She really does not want him. She really is going with someone else willingly. Not that she got confused here and doesn’t know. So that means she is committing trespass. She has dismantled this bond. If in reality that bond has been dismantled, she becomes forbidden. Once again we see that if—
[Speaker C] If she thinks it’s her husband?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then certainly not. That’s the inadvertent case; that’s the regular law. In inadvertence a woman doesn’t become forbidden. For a regular Israelite husband, in inadvertence she does not become forbidden. So the Maharik says: that is only in inadvertence regarding the act. But in inadvertence regarding the prohibition, she does become forbidden.
[Speaker C] That’s what—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Maharik says—that’s brought in the Rema as Jewish law.
[Speaker C] In the Rema.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do we see here? What do we see here?
[Speaker C] For a priest, that’s a special novelty. I didn’t understand. For a priest. Yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And for a priest that is a special novelty.
[Speaker C] So where is the guilt-offering? What?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no, wait, he’s not guilty yet. So what do we see here? We see two things. The first thing we see here is that the marital bond between a woman and her husband is not a function of prohibitions. You can damage the marital bond even if you didn’t violate any prohibition. The implication of that in the case of the designated maidservant is that one brings a guilt-offering. The implication of that here is that she becomes forbidden to her husband even though she acted unintentionally, because in the end the marital bond was damaged. Of course, in that case there is no guilt-offering, because it’s an actual married woman, but it’s really exactly the same situation as with the designated maidservant. You damaged the reality that there is a bond between you and your husband. You really do not want this bond. Ah, there was no bill of divorce, there wasn’t—irrelevant. You do not want this bond, so that’s it. From the standpoint of Jewish law there is no bond. Not that there’s no bond—you still need a bill of divorce. But she is forbidden, forbidden to her husband. All right?
The second thing we learn—it’s interesting, the terminology, notice—the terminology is: “and she commits a trespass against her husband.” Trespass—here we come to our previous puzzle. What is trespass? Usually trespass means unintentional misuse, right? Trespass applies only to an unintentional act. That’s what we saw earlier. So why, regarding a married woman, does the Torah specifically use the language of trespass, even though what the Torah actually requires is that it be intentional, not unintentional? The Maharik introduces the novel idea that a certain type of unintentional act is considered like an intentional one. Fine. But basically, when does a woman become forbidden to her husband? When she sinned intentionally. So why does the Torah call it “and she commits a trespass against her husband”? What, doesn’t trespass apply only to an unintentional act? So that’s a second point we need to remember.
So what have we really learned so far? Up to this point we have really dealt only with the guilt-offering of the designated maidservant. The other examples only came to sharpen that. The guilt-offering of the designated maidservant in fact comes even though the man who had relations with her did not violate a prohibition at all. There is no prohibition. He violated no prohibition whatsoever. He brings a sacrifice without having violated a prohibition. Why? Because he harmed the bond between the woman and her husband. We see the same thing in the case of a regular married woman, where she can damage the bond between herself and her husband, and then she becomes forbidden to her husband, even if it was unintentional. As long as the bond was damaged in reality, then it was damaged.
Now we move to the guilt-offering for trespass. The guilt-offering for trespass was our problem. Why? Because the guilt-offering for trespass comes only for an unintentional act. And if the problem is the result, then what difference does it make whether it was intentional or unintentional? Right? After all, where did we start from? Since for guilt-offerings it doesn’t matter whether it was intentional or unintentional, apparently guilt-offerings come only for the reality. And in reality it happened—so what difference does intentional or unintentional make? Now we asked: but the guilt-offering for trespass comes only for an unintentional act. What’s going on? Why doesn’t that work there? A very simple answer. For what is the guilt-offering in trespass brought? Because I removed an object from the possession of the Temple treasury, right? For that reality—that I removed the object, I severed the bond. If you want to use the language of the woman, it doesn’t matter. I harmed the ownership of the Temple treasury over that object. When does that happen? Only unintentionally, right? If done intentionally, the object does not go out into ordinary non-sacred status. There is a prohibition of trespass, but the object does not become ordinary property.
So there is your proof—on the contrary, that itself is the proof. What was the difficulty? That we bring a guilt-offering for trespass, and trespass is an unintentional act, so how can that be? After all, the defining feature of guilt-offerings is that intentional and unintentional are the same. So I said no. In fact, “intentional like unintentional” is not the criterion. There is a deeper criterion, which is the criterion that defines a guilt-offering. Usually it comes out that the intentional act is like the unintentional one, but not always. Here we see it very well. What was the criterion? The criterion was that the guilt-offering does not come for the transgression; it comes for the damage in reality, right? Now what happens in the case of guilt-offerings? In the intentional case there is a transgression just as in the unintentional case. If it were coming for the transgression, then it should have come for both the intentional and the unintentional act, because there is a transgression of trespass in both the unintentional and the intentional case, right? So why does it come only for the unintentional case? Because only in the unintentional case is there a problem in reality, since only in the unintentional case does the object leave the possession of the Temple treasury. In the intentional case it remains there. And for what do I bring the guilt-offering? Not for the prohibition of trespass. I bring the guilt-offering for the fact that I actually removed the object from sacred ownership, and therefore it comes specifically only for the unintentional case.
Now look at exactly what we gained. Meaning: we do not take the criterion to be that intentional and unintentional are the same thing; that is not what defines a guilt-offering. What defines a guilt-offering is only signaled by that, it’s not the reason. The fact that intentional and unintentional are the same is a sign that there is some consequential problem here, and the guilt-offering comes for the consequence and not for the transgression involved. And now we see that sometimes this really will not happen, if the result, for some other reasons that have nothing at all to do with the obligation of a guilt-offering, occurs only in the unintentional case and not in the intentional case—then the guilt-offering will come only for the unintentional case. If the result were to occur only in the intentional case and not in the unintentional case, the guilt-offering would come only for the intentional case. There’s no such case, but no matter; intentional and unintentional here are only signs, that’s not what matters. The question is whether the result occurred or not.
Now, the fact that trespass removes an object from the possession of the Temple treasury, turning it into ordinary property, only in the unintentional case and not in the intentional case—that belongs to the laws of trespass; it is not connected to the guilt-offering. Now one has to try to explain that, but it’s not important for our purposes. If that is the given, then it is completely clear that the guilt-offering should come only for the unintentional act and not for the intentional act. So this actually fits very well with what we are saying. And remember: in the intentional case there is also a prohibition. If the guilt-offering came for the prohibition, then it ought to come also for the intentional case. After all, trespass exists in the intentional case too—there is a prohibition. What is the difference between intentional and unintentional in trespass? That in the unintentional case the object with which the trespass was committed leaves sacred ownership, it becomes ordinary property, and for that one brings the guilt-offering, not for the transgression. So if so, the guilt-offering for trespass is actually even proof for our position; not only is it not a difficulty.
Now we can understand “and she commits a trespass against her husband.” Why is the concept phrased as trespass? Because in truth, regarding the concept of trespass, the unintentional act is not essential. Trespass means spoiling something in reality; that is called committing a trespass in a certain matter. Spoiling something, dissolving some kind of bond. When I dissolve the bond between sacred property and the objects that belong to it, I commit trespass against the sacred. That happens only unintentionally. If I dissolve a marital bond or harm a marital bond, then that trespass will be in the intentional case—each case according to its own terms. But the concept of trespass, like the concept of guilt-offering, does not belong specifically to either intentional or unintentional action. There too, that’s only a result, not the reason; it’s the sign.
Now we’ll bring two examples of trespass-offerings that prove this more strongly. They bring two puzzling examples found in the guilt-offering for trespass. One example is trespass in konamot. We know that when someone makes a vow, he prohibits a loaf of bread to himself: “This loaf is forbidden to me like a konam,” so that loaf is forbidden for him to eat. If he ate it, then the Talmud says that he committed trespass and must bring a guilt-offering. Why? What is this, sacred property? I just made a konam—it’s a vow, it has nothing to do with consecrated property. There is no connection to consecrated property at all. What trespass is there here? What does this have to do with the matter? For what prohibition is he bringing this guilt-offering? For “he shall not violate his word”? For “he shall not violate his word” there are other punishments. It is not because of “he shall not violate his word” at all.
What is the difference between a vow and an oath? The Talmud says, right, that a vow is an object-based prohibition and an oath is a person-based prohibition. Right? What does object-based prohibition and person-based prohibition mean? The Talmud at the beginning of tractate Nedarim. When I make a vow prohibiting a loaf of bread to myself, then according to the common understanding a status of prohibition rests upon the loaf; the loaf itself becomes a prohibited object, and therefore I am forbidden to eat it. When I swear not to eat a loaf of bread—not make a vow, but swear—that is an oath, not a vow. What does that mean? The loaf is not prohibited food. I am forbidden to eat it, because I swore not to eat it. That is called a person-based prohibition, not an object-based prohibition.
So why is there really a guilt-offering for trespass in konamot? Because if in reality there is here a prohibited object, an object that is outside my domain—it’s not, it’s outside my permitted sphere; I placed the fence around it, but now there is a fence—then when I violate this and take the thing from outside my domain, I have committed a trespass, right? I performed some act here that damaged some relation in reality. I invaded a domain, just as if I took another man’s wife who is not mine, I invaded a domain that is beyond my limits. So I bring a guilt-offering.
You may ask: for what prohibition am I bringing this guilt-offering? No prohibition at all. The punishment for “he shall not violate his word” is a different punishment—“he shall not violate his word,” lashes, whatever it may be. That has nothing to do with this at all. Trespass in konamot is a side issue. Besides that, there is also the guilt-offering, and there is no source for it, no verse, nothing. The Mishneh LaMelekh is astonished—yes, well-known matters, everyone is astonished about it. Where does this whole matter of trespass in konamot come from? No verse is cited, nothing. No verse is needed. No prohibition is needed, and nothing is needed. If you damaged reality, for that one brings a guilt-offering, not for the transgression. The Torah deals separately with the transgression of “he shall not violate his word.” That is trespass in konamot.
What other kind of trespass do we know that is puzzling? A guilt-offering for trespass. I skipped there—I reversed the order regarding trespass in konamot. No, I’m sure I even photographed trespass in konamot for you. I’m talking now about blessings over benefit. The Talmud says as follows in tractate Berakhot: “From where do we know that one must recite blessings over benefit before eating? As the rabbis taught: ‘A holy praise to the Lord’—this teaches that they require a blessing before them and after them. From here Rabbi Akiva said: It is forbidden for a person to taste anything before he blesses,” and so on. The Talmud discusses where the source is—yes, no. The conclusion: “Rather, it is logical reasoning: it is forbidden for a person to benefit from this world without a blessing.” “The rabbis taught: It is forbidden for a person to benefit from this world without a blessing, and anyone who benefits from this world without a blessing has committed trespass. What is his remedy? He should go to a sage,” and so on—“let him teach him blessings in advance so that he not come to trespass.” Someone who eats without a blessing has committed trespass—that’s what the Talmud says.
Fine, nice aggadah. In the end, eating without a blessing is a rabbinic prohibition, right? What does “committed trespass” mean? It means as if he committed trespass, right? It’s a rabbinic prohibition; there is no Torah-level prohibition against eating without a blessing. The students of Rabbeinu Yonah write there: “‘A holy praise to the Lord’ teaches that it requires a blessing before and after, and this is only a mnemonic support. For certainly by Torah law, even the seven species, which require a blessing after them by Torah law, as it is written, ‘And you shall eat and be satisfied and bless,’ do not require a blessing before them by Torah law, only by rabbinic law.” So what are the students of Rabbeinu Yonah saying? It is a rabbinic prohibition; this is only a mere mnemonic support.
Later the students of Rabbeinu Yonah say: “Meaning, one who does not know blessings—how could he possibly eat? For if he eats, he incurs a trespass-offering every single time. And we answer that he should go to one who is expert and let him teach him the blessings for each and every thing. And likewise, even if he knew only the blessing ‘by whose word all things came to be,’ he would thereby be exempt from trespass, as we learned: regarding all foods, if one said ‘by whose word all things came to be,’ he has fulfilled his obligation.”
What are the students of Rabbeinu Yonah saying? Someone who eats without a blessing is liable for a guilt-offering. Do you hear that? A trespass-offering—for each and every time he is liable to bring a guilt-offering. If he said “by whose word all things came to be,” then he is exempt from the guilt-offering. And they say this a little after they wrote in one of the previous paragraphs—it’s not these two paragraphs right next to each other—a little after they wrote in one of the previous paragraphs that really this is all just mnemonic support. The prohibition against eating without a blessing is a rabbinic prohibition. Well then, for what guilt-offering? Maybe unconsecrated food in the Temple courtyard. What is this guilt-offering? I did not violate any transgression. What guilt-offering is this?
[Speaker C] That’s not Jewish law.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What isn’t Jewish law?
[Speaker C] Someone who didn’t bless brings a guilt-offering?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is what the students of Rabbeinu Yonah hold. What does “Jewish law” mean? The students of Rabbeinu Yonah hold yes.
[Speaker C] Fine, but who—if the Temple existed now—someone who didn’t bless then, if—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you had asked them, they would have told you yes. I know, fine. If you think not, then argue with them, and we’ll need a count and see who wins, and then Jewish law will be established accordingly or not. There are no practical rulings in this matter, because we don’t—there’s nothing here that is actually practiced. The students of Rabbeinu Yonah say yes. After they say that, I no longer know whether anyone disagrees with them. Because anyone who disagrees with them—how would you know that he disagrees? You’ll see him saying that it is only a rabbinic prohibition. But they also say it is only a rabbinic prohibition. I don’t know whether anyone explicitly says that one does not bring a guilt-offering. Maybe because the possibility never even occurred to him, but I don’t think I remember anyone saying it explicitly. But heaven forbid—that is what they say.
[Speaker C] Maybe the meaning is that he incurred a sacrifice, not that operationally he actually brings a sacrifice, but what? Like, as if it were trespass.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean? “Liable for a sacrifice every single time”—they stress that too. What do you mean?
[Speaker C] Even though you don’t bring a sacrifice if it’s still an unintentional act. Right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, fine. “Every single time” means for each separate lapse of awareness. First of all, it’s an unintentional act. But who said it’s an unintentional act? It could be even for an intentional act.
[Speaker C] No, he doesn’t—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Know; “he should go to a sage and learn.” Ah, fine, in that case we’re talking about someone who acted unintentionally, but the unintentional aspect here is not necessarily essential. It could be even for an intentional act. So then how does one bring a guilt-offering?
[Speaker C] There’s no source, no prohibition.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s no other guilt-offering—it’s a trespass-offering. Also with trespass in konamot it’s a trespass-offering, even though there too there is no source and nothing. A trespass-offering. What—
[Speaker C] What does the Shulchan Arukh say about this?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Shulchan Arukh doesn’t discuss sacrifices, so you can’t know. Look, the Penei Yehoshua there says as follows on the Talmud: “Rather, it is logical reasoning: it is forbidden for a person,” and so on. “It appears from the language of all the halakhic authorities that according to this conclusion here, all blessings over benefit are rabbinic except only Grace after Meals. But in my humble opinion one might seemingly wonder, for throughout the Talmud it appears that whatever comes from logical reasoning is of Torah law. Indeed, the Talmud asks: Why do I need a verse? It is logical reasoning!” If it is logical reasoning that one must bless before food, then it should be a Torah law, a blessing before food. Why? Because everywhere in the Talmud we assume that logical reasoning is Torah law. The Talmud itself always asks: Why do I need a verse? It is logical reasoning! Meaning, where there is logical reasoning, you don’t need a verse, because the reasoning itself leads us there—that is Torah law. “If so, one may not benefit from this world,” and so on. “Why do I need a verse? It is logical reasoning.” And further: “Over food one blesses afterward, if so one may not benefit from this world without a blessing”—he has another difficulty there, but it doesn’t matter at the moment.
So what really comes out from here? The Penei Yehoshua remains with the issue unresolved. He says: the Talmud tells us that this is logical reasoning. And reasoning, we know, in the Talmud generally receives the status of Torah law—whatever emerges from reasoning. So why, with blessings over benefit, whose basis is reasoning, is it only a rabbinic law? The answer is very simple: it is not a rabbinic law; it is a Torah law that one must bless before food. And one who did not bless before food must bring a trespass-offering, as the students of Rabbeinu Yonah say. This is Torah law.
Ah, so then why “in cases of doubt about blessings we are lenient,” and all those rules? That is regarding the formula of the blessing. The rabbis came and said as follows: what is forbidden to you is to benefit from this world without a blessing. You need to bless the Holy One, blessed be He, to thank Him, to praise Him before you eat. That is Torah law. You can stand there and say, “Thank You very much, Holy One, blessed be He, for giving me this apple,” and eat it in peace, and you will be exempt from trespass. As the students of Rabbeinu Yonah say: with “by whose word all things came to be” you are exempt also from the trespass-offering. Why? Because you did not eat without a blessing; you thanked the Holy One, blessed be He. True, it wasn’t the correct formula, fine, but you have escaped trespass.
Now, by rabbinic law, you have to do it in a very specific form: to say it with God’s name and kingship and so on, according to the formula of the blessing. The sages established a very defined pattern for how to make the blessing. But the basic obligation is Torah law. So now, if I am in doubt whether I said the correct formula, that is not important, because with any formula I have escaped trespass; I fulfilled the Torah-level requirement. So what remains? I am only in doubt whether I fulfilled the rabbinic requirement, and in a case of rabbinic doubt we are lenient.
A practical difference: someone who is in doubt whether he blessed at all—not about the wording of the blessing. What is generally accepted among us? In cases of doubt about blessings we are lenient, right? A dispute between Tosafot, but the ruling is that in cases of doubt about blessings we are lenient. One does not bless. According to what came out here, one should have to say some formula in any case—without God’s name and kingship or something—one should say to the Holy One, blessed be He, thank You for this. That is Torah law; otherwise one is liable for a trespass-offering. Fine, in doubt of course.
[Speaker C] Grace after Meals—the formula—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Is the formula Torah law? What? It’s like the question: Moses, Joshua, who instituted there the first three blessings—but apparently that is specific. Yes, yes, I’m speaking about the blessing before. That’s what comes out for me here. How does this guilt-offering arise? There is no source, no prohibition. What is this reasoning? There is no verse, no prohibition, you didn’t violate a prohibition. The reasoning says—what is the reasoning? Because there is some reality here: you took something you weren’t supposed to take. For that one brings a guilt-offering; no source is needed. No source is needed and nothing is needed. You harmed something; for that one brings a guilt-offering. For the reality, not for the prohibition; there is no prohibition.
The Tzelach, famously, argues there with the Penei Yehoshua and claims that this is rabbinic, and that it is not true that every piece of reasoning is Torah law. The Tzelach brings proofs. I think the Tzelach’s statements are strange. It could be that the Tzelach means interpretive reasoning; interpretive reasoning is Torah law, not reasoning that invents a new law. Reasoning that invents a new law is not Torah law. But that is a different topic.
[Speaker C] And if I stole something from someone or robbed something from him, that’s a guilt-offering for thefts? What?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A guilt-offering for thefts—that is the third guilt-offering. Until now we’ve spoken about the guilt-offering of the designated maidservant and the guilt-offering for trespass. What happens with the guilt-offering for thefts? The guilt-offering for thefts—we didn’t get to… Rabbi Shimon Shkop, I no longer remember, it seems to me that last time we also didn’t get to it, so this time too I won’t get to it. Rabbi Shimon Shkop, as is well known, in Gate 5 says that theft—the foundation of theft is not a halakhic foundation. The prohibition of “you shall not steal” is based on what he calls the theory of civil law, on a condition that precedes Jewish law. When you infringe someone’s ownership, you violate the prohibition of “you shall not steal.” That’s how he answers the difficulty of the Maharai Basan. The Maharai Basan asks: why in monetary doubt are we lenient for the defendant? Why is the burden of proof on the claimant? Seemingly he is committing theft; in a Torah-level doubt one should be stringent, so he should act stringently and give the plaintiff the money so as not to violate theft, a Torah-level doubt.
So Rabbi Shimon Shkop says no, what are you talking about? If the legal ruling is that the money is his, then there is no prohibition of “you shall not steal” here either. Why? Because the prohibition of “you shall not steal” is a result of a legal prohibition, not a halakhic prohibition. The Jewish law is a result of the law. And if according to accepted legal norms, according to the laws of ownership, you are permitted to take that money, then you also did not violate “you shall not steal.” Meaning that in theft, exactly as with a married woman as we saw earlier in Maimonides, it is the same principle. Basically, what exists in theft is not the prohibition of “you shall not steal”; “you shall not steal” is the second level. What exists in theft is first of all that you took something that is not yours in reality, and for that you bring a guilt-offering—the guilt-offering for thefts. Now the guilt-offering for thefts is brought only in certain cases, and that too proves our point, but I won’t go into that here because I still want to get to one more thing, and that is the provisional guilt-offering.
Here too there is a whole Torah, I won’t have time to say it, but briefly. Maimonides says a well-known thing: “All these impurities and the like that are due to doubt are by rabbinic law; and one is impure by Torah law only if he became definitely impure. But all doubts, whether regarding impurities, prohibited foods, forbidden sexual relations, or Sabbaths, are only by the words of the scribes.” Maimonides’ well-known view is that a Torah-level doubt requiring stringency is a rabbinic law. By Torah law one does not need to be stringent in cases of doubt, even Torah-level doubt. The requirement to be stringent in a doubtful Torah prohibition is itself a rabbinic law. That is Maimonides’ view.
“And nevertheless, something whose intentional violation incurs karet, its doubtful case is forbidden by Torah law, for one who does it is liable to a provisional guilt-offering.” Do you see those parentheses? Those parentheses are later additions; they are not in any printing, and it’s an invention from the land of inventions—there is no such thing. Why did they add those parentheses? They added those parentheses because many later authorities, and perhaps already earlier authorities too, began asking Maimonides: how does one bring a provisional guilt-offering if the obligation to be stringent is only rabbinic? The obligation to be stringent is only rabbinic, right? The obligation to be stringent in cases of doubt according to Maimonides—so then how does one bring a provisional guilt-offering? Somebody did not act stringently, he was negligent, he did not act stringently—what did he violate? A rabbinic prohibition. So why is he liable for a provisional guilt-offering? There is no prohibition. So they say: ah, we must say that in a matter involving a root prohibition, or in matters of karet, the obligation is Torah law. This is an invention from the land of inventions. It makes no sense. There is no such thing. Even though some great later authorities say it—with all due respect—it is simply not correct. There is no such thing. One brings a guilt-offering not because of that. One brings a guilt-offering because a guilt-offering is brought for the fact that you impacted the prohibition, not for the delinquency involved. In truth, as far as your personal obligation is concerned, you did not have to be stringent.
[Speaker C] Who says he violated anything? Huh? Who says he caused damage?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] With a provisional guilt-offering, one brings it because of the doubt that he caused damage. After all, I have doubtful pork in front of me; I don’t know whether it is pork or not. As far as my obligation is concerned, I am not obligated by Torah law to be stringent, right? So all the later authorities ask: then why do I bring a provisional guilt-offering? After all, I was not obligated to be stringent. The answer is: because I may actually have eaten pork. If I actually ate pork, then I impacted a prohibition. The fact that maybe—right, so that is why it is a provisional guilt-offering. We do not bring here a definite sacrifice; I bring it for the doubt.
[Speaker C] Why am I required to relate to the possibility at all?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because I am forbidden—not forbidden to me—the idea is that I must not enter a state in which I impact a prohibition, maybe impact a prohibition, enter the house of doubt, as Rabbi Shimon Shkop calls it. And for that I bring a provisional guilt-offering.
[Speaker C] There’s no prohibition, none at all. After all, a Torah-level doubt is only rabbinically treated stringently. What?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes. There is no prohibition.
[Speaker C] Not only is there no prohibition, it’s also possible that I caused no damage, created no defect at all. Why am I obligated to relate to doubtful damage?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s exactly the point. In a Torah-level doubt there is no obligation upon you to be stringent, but if you ate pork, then you ate pork—that’s reality. Maybe. So there is a side here that I ate pork.
[Speaker C] But why do I need to relate to the doubt?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is a side that yes; there is a doubt here.
[Speaker C] In a place where there is no reason that arouses—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The doubt—where there is no rule of doubts, that is well known. We say: in a place where there is a possible side of doubt, where there is a possible side of doubt—let’s say fifty percent I ate pork, fifty percent I did not. For that one brings a provisional guilt-offering. By Torah law this is nothing. By Torah law I do not need to be stringent, no obligation is imposed upon me to be stringent, but on the side that I ate pork, I ate pork. So for that doubt I bring a provisional guilt-offering. Not a definite guilt-offering—a provisional guilt-offering. That is exactly founded in order to repair doubtful defects; that is why it is a different guilt-offering—it is a provisional guilt-offering.
After all, what they add here to Maimonides is absurd. What do they add here to Maimonides? “And nevertheless, something whose intentional violation incurs karet, its doubtful case is forbidden by Torah law.” That’s the addition in the parentheses, right? Go down two lines lower—one line lower. “Whether regarding terumot, prohibited foods, forbidden sexual relations, or Sabbaths, they are only by rabbinic law.” Master of the universe—forbidden sexual relations and Sabbaths? So how can you tell me that something whose intentional violation incurs karet, its doubtful case is forbidden by Torah law? Something whose intentional violation incurs karet is Sabbaths and forbidden sexual relations. And about that Maimonides says it is only a rabbinic law. Rather what? The pressure disturbed people—how can it be that he is liable for a provisional guilt-offering on Sabbath and so on, how can it be that someone is obligated to bring a guilt-offering when he committed no transgression? The answer is that a guilt-offering is always without a transgression. Always it is without a transgression. And here too it is without a transgression.
Well, if there had been time one could have expanded on this more, but one could have expanded more. I just want to return for one second to the verses from which we began. The verses from which we began—so what is written? Basically, in the first section it was an intentional transgression and there are punishments for it and everything is fine. The second transgression was unintentional. What happens in the unintentional case? The key word in the section is sin-offering, sinned, his sin. Three times the word sin appears, because a sin-offering comes for the transgression of the person. That is the definition of a sin-offering as opposed to a guilt-offering. How do we know that? The number of sin-offerings corresponds not to the number of transgressions but to the number of lapses of awareness, right? What determines the number of sin-offerings for which one is liable is the number of lapses of awareness. Why? Because the problem is the person’s negligence, the delinquency—the fact that you were not careful, not the fact that you caused damage. That is a sin-offering.
But in a guilt-offering the problem is the result, and that is the line, and that is the third section. The third section, as we saw, like Maimonides explains, as it says explicitly in the verses, he is under complete compulsion. He is under complete compulsion—a guilt-offering? Wait a second. Even though the first is intentional—after all, a guilt-offering comes for intentional or unintentional action—so why did you specifically bring us a guilt-offering here? The answer is very simple. Someone who is compelled—then there is no personal delinquency at all. But in the end he took the dish—
[Speaker C] So here the guilt-offering is in its full glory—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Even though also—
[Speaker C] Before there was a guilt-offering.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There was a guilt-offering, but it was swallowed up within the sin-offering. It was swallowed up, like a married woman as opposed to a designated maidservant, and it was absorbed inside. Here it is only a guilt-offering, because someone who transgressed under compulsion—the reality still exists: you took a woman who is not yours, so that is called guilt. Wonderful, wonderful. Really beautiful. A provisional guilt-offering is required specifically when his heart troubles him. If—
[Speaker C] The problem—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Is in the result…