Lecture from Adar 26, 5767

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Shal Torah, and he’s talking about the fact that when this warning appears several times regarding the same prohibition, its role is basically to teach us that the prohibition is severe. That’s why the Torah repeats things. Nachmanides disagrees there; he argues that every such repetition has to teach something substantive, not just emphasize severity. In any case, for our purposes, the warning against labor on the Sabbath is usually learned from the verses in the Ten Commandments. Here, in our verses at the beginning of the parashah, this is the first source that appears before you. Earlier I tried with the margins that were a bit missing—I tried to fit everything onto one page, and after printing I saw that it was a little cut off at the sides. The verses at the opening of the parashah also relate to the Sabbath, but there it’s not a warning, it’s a punishment: “And Moses assembled the whole congregation of the children of Israel and said to them: These are the things that the Lord commanded to do. Six days work may be done, but on the seventh day there shall be for you holiness, a Sabbath of complete rest to the Lord; whoever does work on it shall be put to death.” So from here, basically, we learn the punishment for the prohibition of labor on the Sabbath. The warning is from Parashat Yitro, and the punishment is from here. The next verse: “You shall not kindle fire in all your dwellings on the Sabbath day.” Suddenly some command appears that already looks like a prohibition, not a punishment. Right? Here there’s a prohibition against kindling fire on the Sabbath day. It’s well known that the Sages already noticed this point, because the labors—the primary categories of labor—do not appear explicitly in the Torah. The thirty-nine primary categories of labor are learned, according to most opinions, from the labors that were done in the Tabernacle; there are other opinions, but in any event it does not appear explicitly in the Torah. This is an exposition in the Oral Torah. Two labors are exceptions: they do appear explicitly in the Torah. One is kindling and the other is carrying. And regarding kindling, there’s discussion in a number of places in the Sages as to why it was singled out. There’s the well-known tannaitic dispute: was kindling singled out to distinguish, or was it singled out as a mere prohibition? Meaning, there are those who learn that kindling was singled out as a mere prohibition. The idea is that it is written explicitly in order to teach me that this is not a stoning offense like the ordinary Sabbath labors, but only a negative prohibition, lighter like the other prohibitions in the Torah. There is another opinion that says kindling was singled out to distinguish. “To distinguish” means that if no labor had been written explicitly, we would have thought that one has to violate all thirty-nine primary categories of labor in order to be punished. So it comes to teach us that not so. Even one labor alone is enough to incur punishment. And just as kindling is punished separately, so too each of the other thirty-eight primary categories of labor. That is what is ruled in Jewish law. Kindling is a regular labor; it wasn’t singled out as a mere prohibition but rather to distinguish. Meaning, kindling is a regular labor, punishable by stoning when done deliberately and by a sin-offering when done unintentionally. So then why was it singled out? It was singled out to distinguish—that is, to show that it is enough to violate one labor in order to incur punishment. Here, for some reason, they learn from carrying—by the way, there is no discussion in the Sages, at least none that I know of, about why carrying was singled out. Apparently the medieval authorities comment on it a bit: apparently carrying was singled out because it’s a problematic kind of labor, an inferior labor. Since carrying doesn’t actually create anything new, unlike the other Sabbath labors, the primary categories of labor, but only transfers an object from one place to another, it would seem that this should not count as one of the primary categories of labor. Therefore it was written explicitly in the Torah. And that’s why the Sages don’t even ask themselves why it is written, because for them it was probably self-evident that carrying had to be written explicitly; otherwise we would not have said it on our own. So that’s why there isn’t even a parallel tannaitic dispute there like the one we find regarding kindling. With carrying, it’s apparently obvious why it had to be written explicitly. In any event, that’s just general background. Here, for our purposes, we’re going to deal with an exposition that actually learns from the last verse, “You shall not kindle fire in all your dwellings on the Sabbath day,” and learns from it the prohibition against carrying out court-imposed punishments, carrying out a burning execution—the burning of a priest’s daughter—on the Sabbath. So let’s look at the Mekhilta; this is the first midrash there after the verses. In the Mekhilta on Mishpatim they discuss whether court-imposed execution overrides the Sabbath. The context is that court-imposed execution overrides Temple service: they take a priest in the middle of his service, if he is liable to death, they take him away from the service and execute him. Meaning, court-imposed execution overrides the service. And then a discussion begins whether it also overrides the Sabbath by a kal va-homer, because Temple service overrides the Sabbath, and so on. In the course of that discussion, this exposition that I brought you here is cited. “A certain student from among the students of Rabbi Ishmael said: Scripture says, ‘You shall not kindle fire in all your dwellings’; burning was included in the general category and then singled out. And it was singled out to teach.” Meaning, burning was included among the totality as just one of the primary categories of labor—so why, in fact, was it singled out? To teach. What does it teach? Unlike the two previous opinions I mentioned earlier, this midrash holds that it was singled out to teach: just as burning is unique in that it is one of the court-imposed executions and does not override the Sabbath—that’s what is written here in the verse—so too from here we learn that all other court-imposed executions also do not override the Sabbath. Meaning, basically, this comes to teach us that court-imposed executions do not override the Sabbath.

[Speaker C] Why?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why would I even think that it would override the Sabbath? That the court would kill someone liable to death on the Sabbath itself? So that’s what I told you earlier: the background of the midrash, which I didn’t bring here because I didn’t want to get into too many details, is that there are good reasons to think that court-imposed execution would override the Sabbath—just as it overrides Temple service, and Temple service overrides the Sabbath, so court-imposed execution certainly ought to override the Sabbath. That’s how they derive it there, and therefore an explicit verse is needed to tell us no: court-imposed execution does not override the Sabbath. And just as court-imposed execution by burning, which is one of the court-imposed executions, does not override the Sabbath, so too all the other court-imposed executions. So what is written here, according to this exposition, “You shall not kindle fire in all your dwellings on the Sabbath day,” means: do not burn someone who is liable to burning on the Sabbath. That’s what “you shall not kindle fire” means here. It’s not the primary category of labor of kindling, but a prohibition of burning.

[Speaker B] Wait a second now—what about the other executions? What? Are the other executions also Sabbath desecration?

[Speaker C] Why does it say burning?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The exposition says: just as burning is unique in that it is one of the court-imposed executions and does not override the Sabbath—that’s what is written here in the verse—so too from here we learn that all the other court-imposed executions also do not override the Sabbath.

[Speaker B] No contradiction. Okay, and that too is Sabbath desecration—even strangulation, beheading?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In a moment we’ll see. For now there’s no hint about that; it’s all the same thing, there is taking of life. You’ll see in a moment—it’s probably not that simple. But right now we have no reason to deal with it; it’s obvious. Why specifically this point? How did they include court-imposed execution here? What does that have to do with it? How did they get to court-imposed execution here? “You shall not kindle fire in all your dwellings on the Sabbath day”—how did they suddenly get to burning someone who is liable to burning? Why did they connect it to court-imposed execution?

[Speaker C] There’s the plain issue here: why was kindling singled out? We have the classic derivation—

[Speaker B] There’s another derivation—

[Speaker C] An additional derivation—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the other derivations I can understand, because the other derivations are talking about the labor of kindling. But here, how did they insert court-imposed execution by burning into this? What does that have to do with anything?

[Speaker B] It really doesn’t seem connected, but they said, okay, since this is an apparently unnecessary derivation—because from their perspective burning is like any labor; after all, it is a labor, there’s no reason to spell it out—so let’s learn from it not to do it even in the case of…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But why this and not, I don’t know, not to burn sacred offerings on the Sabbath? I don’t know, I can think of a hundred thousand other things I could derive—especially if you assume that this exposition is only a supporting exposition. But maybe it’s a creative exposition? An exposition would seem to have to meet criteria such that once I understand the rules of exposition, in principle I ought to be able to do it myself. Meaning, in principle, very often we let ourselves off too easily—we say, inclusion, something; what difference does it make? There’s something extra here, so fine, inclusion. But what does inclusion mean? There were a hundred thousand possibilities to include. Why this one specifically? So if we say that we had some prior tradition, that we already knew this rule—that court-imposed execution is not done on the Sabbath—then we were just looking for a source. Here we had some extra verse, and we attached it to that. That’s what’s called a supporting exposition. A supporting exposition means that the halakhah was already known before I expounded the verse; I received it through tradition, and the exposition only anchors the known halakhah in the verses. But is it always like that? No, not always. There were those who wanted to argue—Ba’al Dorot HaRishonim—that all expositions are like that, but there are simply clear proofs from the Sages that this is not correct. Meaning, there really aren’t major disputes about this: whether all expositions are merely supportive, or whether there are also creative expositions. Creative expositions mean that a new halakhah emerges from the exposition, something we didn’t know beforehand; we learned it from the exposition. Can exposition at all teach new halakhot? There is quite a bit of evidence that yes, and that’s straightforward.

[Speaker C] We learned that specifically a kal va-homer a person can…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, deriving on one’s own is a dispute between Rashi and Tosafot. A person may derive a kal va-homer on his own; a gezerah shavah a person may not derive on his own. What happens with all the other eleven hermeneutical principles? That’s a dispute between Rashi and Tosafot in tractate Sukkah. One of them says they’re all like kal va-homer and gezerah shavah is the exception, and one says—I no longer remember who says what—and one of them says they’re all like gezerah shavah and kal va-homer is the exception. It doesn’t matter, because in the end even from gezerah shavah we generate halakhah. They generated new halakhot from it. That’s clear—it’s not… you need that. Maybe regarding gezerah shavah it’s different, but we did not receive it all complete from Sinai. That’s not how it works. There are discussions in the Talmud—if we received everything from Sinai, then how can there be disputes about gezerot shavot? Fine. I think—I don’t know if this is right—Ibn Ezra, maybe let’s skip down another two or three passages. Ibn Ezra says: “And the meaning of ‘these are the things to do them’ is this: God commanded us to do what He tells us, and He warned you that although you are obligated to perform acts of Heaven, beware not to do an act on the Sabbath. And one who transgresses in the presence of witnesses shall be put to death, and elsewhere it is explained that this is by stoning.” So what is he saying? Basically, the prohibition of the Sabbath appears here. And what is written here, “to do them”—the first verse, “which the Lord commanded to do them,” “these are the things which the Lord commanded to do them.” So Ibn Ezra says, from that juxtaposition, that apparently there are things we were commanded to do, and about those very things the Torah tells us: but not on the Sabbath. What is the action that we are commanded to do, but on the Sabbath we do not do it? It’s burning, which is prohibited on the Sabbath. Because we saw earlier that “you shall not kindle” is extra, and we are looking for something that involves burning. So that’s already closer. We already have some kind of hint as to why this is court-imposed execution. Because court-imposed execution is something we are obligated to carry out: the court is obligated to kill the condemned person by execution through burning. And it says, “You shall not kindle fire in all your dwellings,” and that you must not do on the Sabbath. That’s what Ibn Ezra says.

[Speaker B] But Ibn Ezra, I think, simply means to say: I am commanded to have you do the labor of the Tabernacle. Right? But not on the Sabbath. Meaning, the commandment is to make the laver, to make the…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that the labor of the Tabernacle itself does not override the Sabbath. But that’s what he wants to explain here.

[Speaker B] That’s what he wants to explain here—that’s what Ibn Ezra is teaching us.

[Speaker C] Ibn—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ezra links us to the first verse, “to do them,” and he claims that the expositor here was looking for something there is an obligation to do, and about that the Torah says: do not do it on the Sabbath. I asked earlier, why specifically court-imposed execution? How did they get to execution by burning? So Ibn Ezra argues—he found this difficult—and apparently he argues that this verse, “to do them,” was the hint. Because basically it is hinted here that what is prohibited to us in the last verse is something we are generally commanded to do, and we are told: on the Sabbath, don’t do it. And besides that, it’s also connected to “kindle fire,” and so from here the Sages apparently said that this means execution by burning. Fine, I don’t know—“to do them,” in its plain meaning, I also agree that it doesn’t…

[Speaker B] I don’t think that’s what he means—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —for this issue.

[Speaker B] This is the Rabbi’s interpretation… this is your interpretation, not Ibn Ezra’s. Why? Ibn Ezra says that. Why not? Because he—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —warned you although…

[Speaker B] It’s a good interpretation, but I think it really is a good interpretation of…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why does he write this? Why doesn’t he write that?

[Speaker B] I think he simply means the labor of the Tabernacle here. It doesn’t fit him at all to be answering questions of this sort. What, is Ibn Ezra here really trying to answer whether it is permissible to carry out the commandment of stoning on the Sabbath? Is that even what interests him?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m saying the mechanism he proposes can explain what the expositor said. True, the mechanism he proposes says we’re looking for something—yes, fine—

[Speaker B] That’s true.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the truth is, I think—the hint, it seems to me, is a little different. That’s what I think. The hint was something else. I opened by saying that the warning is already found in the Ten Commandments. Here, on top of the Sabbath—now I’m talking about ordinary Sabbath laws—what appears here is the punishment, right? “A Sabbath of complete rest to the Lord; whoever does work on it shall be put to death.” And about that it says, “You shall not kindle fire in all your dwellings on the Sabbath day.” Is “You shall not kindle fire in all your dwellings on the Sabbath day” a verse of punishment or a verse of command? A command, right? It’s a warning. So why is it attached here? The warnings about the Sabbath, the commands, are in the Ten Commandments; there are other places too. Here they are speaking about the punishment. After finishing speaking about the punishment, suddenly they say, “You shall not kindle fire in all your dwellings on the Sabbath day.” Even if you already want to single kindling out from the general category and write it explicitly, why are you shoving it in here? Rather, the Sages tell us: let’s read the verses this way—“whoever does work on it shall be put to death; you shall not kindle fire in all your dwellings on the Sabbath day”—meaning, this putting to death, do not do on the Sabbath day. And that is why the expositor connected these verses to one another. Maybe that’s the explanation; I don’t know. Let’s move on to the second Mekhilta. There is another similar exposition in the Mekhilta. Here, in the first Mekhilta, it deals directly with the question whether court-imposed execution overrides the Sabbath or not, and finds the answer from this exposition. The second Mekhilta also brings a similar exposition, but what it’s looking for is something else. It’s looking for why kindling was singled out.