Between Torah Study and the Mitzvah of Torah Study – Rabbi Dr. Michael Avraham – Beit Midrash Kalna
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- [0:03] Defining the halakhic status of Torah study
- [1:35] Vows of encouragement — why use an oath?
- [2:54] Does reciting the Shema discharge the commandment of Torah study?
- [4:36] Discussion of the Ran — does the oath take effect?
- [12:50] A non-obligatory but fulfillable commandment — definition and examples
- [16:22] The connection between positive commandments and oaths
- [26:47] Implications for women’s Torah study
Summary
General Overview
The text develops an analysis of the halakhic status of Torah study from the passage in tractate Nedarim and the passage in tractate Menachot, and draws a distinction between the commandment of Torah study in its minimal sense and Torah study as a broader demand that is not always formulated as a halakhic command. It presents the Talmudic exposition that since one can discharge one’s obligation through reciting the Shema morning and evening, an oath regarding additional study can take effect; it brings the explanations of Rashi / Ran / Rosh, and develops a fundamental dispute as to whether anything beyond Shema is optional, a non-obligatory but fulfillable commandment, or an obligation rooted in reasoning rather than explicit command. From this it suggests that study beyond the minimum is not “the commandment of Torah study” but “Torah study” itself, and therefore the implications apply to women as well, who in his view are exempt from the commandment-layer but obligated in the layer grounded in reasoning.
An oath to fulfill a commandment and vows of encouragement in Nedarim
And Rav Gidel said in the name of Rav: From where do we know that one may swear to fulfill a commandment? As it says: “I have sworn, and I will fulfill it, to keep Your righteous judgments.” The Talmud asks: “But is he not already sworn from Mount Sinai?” since an oath does not take effect upon an oath, and answers: “A person is permitted to spur himself on” — this is a case of vows of encouragement. And Rav Gidel said in the name of Rav: One who says, “I will rise early and study this chapter, I will study this tractate” — “he has made a great vow to the God of Israel,” and again the question is raised: “But is he not already sworn and standing, and an oath does not take effect upon an oath?”
The Shema as the minimum measure, and the application of an oath to Torah study
The Talmud rejects the explanation that this is merely a novelty about encouragement, because that would just be “the same as Rav Gidel’s first statement,” and establishes the novelty as follows: “Since if he wished, he could exempt himself by reciting the Shema morning and evening, therefore the oath takes effect upon him.” According to the straightforward reading, reciting the Shema morning and evening discharges the obligation of the commandment of Torah study, and the oath regarding additional study takes effect because there is no prior state of being “already sworn and standing” with respect to anything beyond the minimum. Rashi explains: “Since he recited the Shema, he fulfilled ‘it shall not depart,’” and brings Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai’s statement in Menachot that “whoever recites the Shema morning and evening has fulfilled the commandment of ‘it shall not depart,’” and explains that the oath takes effect because “he has already exempted himself” from the oath of Mount Sinai. The Ran and the Rosh are cited as saying “the same thing,” meaning that morning-and-evening Shema is treated as the minimum line relative to which an oath concerning additional study can take effect.
The Ran’s approach: what is derived by exposition is not included in “already sworn and standing”
The Ran refuses to read the passage in its simple sense and says: “It seems to me that not specifically that he is exempted in this way,” because “every person is obligated to study constantly, day and night, according to his ability,” and Shema morning and evening “is not sufficient for that”; he cites Kiddushin: “And you shall teach them diligently” — that the words of Torah should be sharp in your mouth. The Ran proposes a rule that “anything that comes by way of exposition, even though it is from the Torah, since it is not explicitly written in the verse, an oath does take effect upon it,” and thus reads the Talmud to mean that from what is explicit in the verse (“when you lie down and when you rise”) one can discharge the obligation through Shema, while regarding what goes beyond the simple meaning of the text, the oath takes effect “completely, even with respect to a sacrifice.” He defines the “great vow” as one that takes effect “in all its laws like a voluntary matter,” and from here a distinction is presented between Torah-level laws explicitly written in the verse, regarding which one is “already sworn and standing,” and Torah-level laws learned through exposition, regarding which an oath may take effect.
“An oath does not take effect upon an oath” versus “one prohibition does not take effect upon another”
The text notes that most medieval authorities understand that the passage is not based on “an oath does not take effect upon an oath” but rather on the principle that “one prohibition does not take effect upon another,” and remarks that if so, it is hard to understand the Ran’s novelty, which makes the distinction depend on whether something is explicit in the verse or learned through exposition. It explains that the Ran assumes this is specifically a case of the rule that “an oath does not take effect upon an oath,” and therefore he can innovate that we are not “sworn” regarding details derived from exposition in the same way that we are sworn regarding what is written explicitly. From here the text raises the tension with familiar concepts such as “neglect of Torah study” and “Torah study outweighs them all,” if indeed the binding minimum is only reciting Shema.
Classifying positive commandments: obligatory, non-obligatory but fulfillable, and other types
The text suggests interpreting “voluntary” as a non-obligatory but fulfillable commandment, and defines an obligatory commandment as one such that if a person does not do it, he “has nullified a positive commandment,” while a fulfillable-but-non-obligatory commandment is one where, if he did it, “he fulfilled a commandment,” and if he did not, “nothing happened.” It adds, by combinatorial logic, additional categories, including “a commandment that can be nullified but cannot be fulfilled,” identifying it with “a prohibition inferred from a positive commandment,” such as “for eating and not for commerce” regarding Sabbatical-year produce; alongside this it places Maimonides’ procedural commandments, in which “it is impossible either to nullify or to fulfill,” such as Positive Commandment 95 regarding annulment of vows and Positive Commandment 96 regarding impurity. It uses this framework to examine whether anything beyond reciting the Shema counts as fulfilling a non-obligatory commandment, or whether it is something that does not enter the category of commandment at all, and therefore an oath can take effect upon it.
“Torah study” is not “the commandment of Torah study”: areas the Torah does not command because of their very importance
The text argues that “Torah study is not the commandment of Torah study” and presents a model according to which the Torah does not command certain areas precisely because of their importance, so that they will not become a matter of “checking a box.” It cites Rabbi Chaim Vital in Sha’arei Kedushah on character refinement, and brings a formulation of Rabbi Kook according to which there are things in which “greater still is one who is not commanded and does,” and therefore the Torah did not command them in order to leave them within the realm of inner initiative. It brings another example from the commandment of repentance according to Maimonides, according to whom “the Torah has already promised that Israel will ultimately repent” is a verse of promise, not command, and therefore in Sefer HaMitzvot there is no commandment to repent, only a commandment to confess — even though in the Mishneh Torah “one must repent.” It places Torah study into this same group and determines that the commandment of Torah study is a minimal threshold of reciting the Shema morning and evening, whereas Torah study itself is an expectation to study “according to one’s full ability” out of an understanding of the meaning of Torah, and not by force of command.
The Menachot 99 passage: the minimum, “it is forbidden to say this before the unlearned,” and the boundaries of obligation
In Menachot it says: “Rabbi Ami said… even if a person learned only one chapter in the morning and one chapter in the evening, he has fulfilled the commandment of ‘it shall not depart,’” and Rabbi Yochanan in the name of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai narrows it still further to: “Even if a person recited only the Shema morning and evening, he has fulfilled ‘it shall not depart.’” It then says: “And this matter is forbidden to be said before the unlearned,” while Rava says: “It is a commandment to say it before the unlearned,” and the text explains that both the concern and the permission are understandable only if even one who agrees that, from the standpoint of commandment, Shema is enough still holds that it is proper to study beyond that. Later Ben Dama asks Rabbi Yishmael: “Such as I, who have learned the entire Torah — what is the law regarding studying Greek wisdom?” and Rabbi Yishmael replies from the verse “and you shall meditate on it day and night”: “Go and find an hour that is neither of the day nor of the night.” The text suggests that the question concerns what lies beyond the narrow halakhic definition. The Talmud then says: “And this disagrees with Rav Shmuel bar Nachmani,” who says: “This verse is neither an obligation nor a commandment, but a blessing,” and the text explains the distinction between “obligation” as a mandatory commandment and “commandment” as a value that is not strictly obligatory, presenting the dispute between Rabbi Yishmael and Rav Shmuel bar Nachmani as revolving around whether beyond the minimum there is a binding demand or only a blessing. The closing line — “A teaching from the school of Rabbi Yishmael: words of Torah should not be upon you as an obligation, but you are not permitted to exempt yourself from them” — is read as a ruling that beyond the minimum there is no formal “obligation,” but one still has no permission to remove oneself from engagement with Torah.
Resolving the contradiction with Berakhot: “and you shall gather your grain” and the obligation beyond the minimum
The text presents the apparent contradiction between Menachot, where Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai reduces the minimum to reciting the Shema, and Berakhot, where Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai describes an ideal of Torah without involvement in worldly occupation, while Rabbi Yishmael says: “conduct yourself in accordance with the way of the world.” It argues that there is no “switching of positions,” because in both places everyone agrees that the commandment-level obligation is Shema morning and evening, and the whole debate concerns the demand beyond that and the degree to which it limits involvement in livelihood and external wisdom. It formulates the dispute as dealing with “the commandment beyond the obligation,” or with an expectation that is not a commandment in the formal sense.
An obligation rooted in reasoning, its application to minors, and oaths
The text proposes a principle according to which obligations rooted in command apply to those of commandment age, while obligations rooted in reasoning apply “to anyone who understands the reasoning,” and therefore are not subject to formal age limits. It brings an example from Sanhedrin 58 about intercourse with an animal as a passage implying obligation even for minors, because this precedes halakhic prohibition in the sense of “human or moral decency.” It cites Maimonides in the laws of hiring workers: “one does not administer an oath to a minor, because he does not understand the punishment for an oath,” and understands from this that if he does understand, the obligation has binding significance. It also cites Ri Migash regarding a written oath, which is binding because there is an obligation “from reasoning” to fulfill an oath even without verbal articulation, while distinguishing that lashes would not apply because there is no Torah prohibition involved. It brings the Mishneh LaMelekh on the reason for “already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai,” and a responsum of the Avnei Nezer, Yoreh De’ah 306, which grounds the force of an oath on reasoning, and adduces proof from the patriarchs, who swore before the giving of the Torah.
Implication for women: exemption from the commandment, but obligation in Torah study as a rational demand
The text states that the commandment of Torah study, in its minimal form of reciting the Shema morning and evening, is the layer from which women are exempt; but study beyond that is an obligation rooted in reasoning, flowing from an understanding of the essence of Torah, and therefore applies to “minors, women, whoever you like.” It concludes that women are “fully obligated” to study the entire Talmud, medieval authorities, later authorities, Maimonides, and the Shulchan Arukh, in the same sense of obligation as men, because this is “Torah study” and not “the commandment of Torah study.”
The blessing over Torah for women: a blessing of praise, not a blessing over commandments
The text raises the question of the Shulchan Arukh’s ruling that women are obligated in the blessing over Torah even though they are exempt from the commandment of Torah study, and quotes the Magen Avraham’s answer that they are obligated to study the commandments that pertain to them. It rejects this as an explanation of the blessing, because study for the sake of practice is not “the commandment of Torah study,” and argues that the blessing over Torah is “a blessing of praise” for the gift of Torah, not “a blessing over commandments.” It adds that if it were a commandment-blessing, it would fit better with “Ahavah Rabbah” as a blessing adjacent to the Shema, whereas the morning blessings over Torah reflect praise for Torah itself and therefore apply equally to women and men.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Good week. I want to spend a little time on Torah study, to try to define its halakhic status and draw a few conclusions from that. The starting point is a passage in tractate Nedarim. I hope everyone has the sheets. The Talmud there brings a statement of Rav Gidel in the name of Rav. And Rav Gidel said in the name of Rav: From where do we know that one may swear to fulfill a commandment? As it says, “I have sworn, and I will fulfill it, to keep Your righteous judgments.” So a person can swear that he is going to fulfill a commandment. The Talmud does not see this as something trivial, because in effect this is a meaningless oath: he is obligated to do that commandment even without swearing. And indeed, after the Talmud derives it from the verse “I have sworn, and I will fulfill it,” it asks, “But is he not already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai?” What meaning does this oath have? He is already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai. The rule regarding oaths is that one oath does not take effect upon another oath. And if a person is already sworn from Mount Sinai to fulfill the commandments, then he cannot swear again about the same thing he is already sworn about; an oath does not take effect upon an oath. Rather, this teaches us that a person is permitted to spur himself on, that it is permitted for a person to encourage himself. When someone swears, this is called vows of encouragement: the person swears in order to motivate himself further to fulfill. Fine, we won’t get into the parameters of vows of encouragement here; that too is not a simple topic.
And Rav Gidel said in the name of Rav: One who says, “I will rise early and study this chapter, I will study this tractate,” has made a great vow to the God of Israel. Another statement from that same man, Rav’s student: if a person says, “I will rise early and study this chapter, I will study this tractate,” he has made a great vow to the God of Israel. And again, apparently this too is really an oath to fulfill a commandment, this time the commandment of Torah study. The Talmud asks: “But is he not already sworn and standing, and an oath does not take effect upon an oath?” Here too, exactly the same question as before: the commandment of Torah study is a commandment, and the person is already sworn to study Torah, so what meaning does this oath have? “What is this teaching us — that it is effective even merely as encouragement?” So what will you say — that here too the novelty is that one may swear in order to spur himself on, vows of encouragement? But the Talmud says that is not reasonable, because we already learned that from the earlier statement. There is no reason for there to be another statement teaching the same thing. “That is the same as Rav Gidel’s first statement.” Rather, the Talmud says: “This is what it teaches us: since if he wished, he could exempt himself by reciting the Shema morning and evening, therefore the oath takes effect upon him.” Since a person can discharge his obligation of the commandment of Torah study by reciting the Shema morning and evening — he thereby fulfills his obligation and is exempt from the commandment of Torah study — then if he says, “I will study another chapter,” that is beyond what he is obligated to do, so on that he is not already sworn and standing. That oath can take effect because with respect to that, he is not already sworn.
In other words, as far as the commandment of Torah study is concerned, you fulfill your obligation through Shema morning and evening. Everything beyond that, according to the straightforward reading of the Talmud here, is voluntary. Whoever wants can do it; whoever doesn’t want, doesn’t have to. And in fact that does seem to emerge from several of the medieval authorities on this Talmudic passage. Rashi, for example — this isn’t actually Rashi, but the commentary says: “Since if he wished, he could exempt himself by reciting the Shema morning and evening” — since he recited the Shema, he has fulfilled “it shall not depart”; he has fulfilled the commandment of Torah study. As Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai said in tractate Menachot: “Whoever recites the Shema morning and evening has fulfilled the commandment of ‘it shall not depart.’” And since, if he wished, he could exempt himself from “and you shall teach them diligently” through the Shema, for he thereby fulfills his obligation from that oath of Mount Sinai, therefore when he says, “I will study this chapter,” even though he was not already sworn about this, for he has already exempted himself, therefore the oath takes effect upon him. That is, he explains the Talmud in its simple sense: Shema morning and evening fulfills the obligation of Torah study; everything beyond that is voluntary — not an obligatory commandment, perhaps a fulfillable one — and therefore one can swear about it, and the oath takes effect. The Ran here and the Rosh in his commentary on the page write the same thing, as do several other medieval authorities.
The Ran here on the Talmud does not leave it at that, and he says as follows: “But is he not already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai?” Meaning, certainly even though when he says “a great vow,” he really means an oath, for he says explicitly in the form of an oath, “I will study this chapter”; for as a vow, since he creates an obligation on the object with respect to himself, that would not apply here. Let’s move to the second paragraph. “This is what it teaches us: since if he wished, he could exempt himself,” and so on. “It seems to me that not specifically that he is exempt in this way.” The Ran says: it does not seem right to me to read the Talmud in its simple sense. How can it be that a person is exempt from Torah study by reciting the Shema morning and evening? That’s all? Is that enough as far as the commandment of Torah study is concerned? Not reasonable. Why? “For every person is obligated to study constantly, day and night, according to his ability.” A person has to study all the time. How could Shema morning and evening suddenly be enough? And we say in the first chapter of Kiddushin: The rabbis taught, “‘And you shall teach them diligently’ — that the words of Torah should be sharp in your mouth, so that if a person asks you something, you should not stammer and say…” and Shema morning and evening is not sufficient for that. Right — “that the words of Torah should be sharp in your mouth” means that one has to study Torah until all the words of Torah are sharp on his lips, that he knows them. And obviously someone who recites the Shema in the morning and evening cannot reach that state where all the words of Torah are sharp in his mouth, so that if someone asks him, he will not stammer and say… yes? Someone who recites Shema every morning and every evening will hardly be able to answer almost any question. Therefore, says the Ran, it is not reasonable that by reciting Shema morning and evening one fulfills the obligation of the commandment of Torah study.
So then how do we explain the Talmud here? “Rather, from here there appears to me to be proof for what I wrote in the chapter ‘Shevuot Shtayim Batra,’ that anything that comes by way of exposition, even though it is from the Torah, since it is not explicitly written in the verse, an oath takes effect upon it.” The Ran says: I wrote in tractate Shevuot a rule saying that if a certain law does not appear explicitly in the Torah — even though it is a binding law, and the simple reading seems to be that he means it is a Torah-level law even though it is not explicitly written — still, if someone swears regarding it, the oath takes effect. The rule that an oath does not take effect regarding a commandment is only in commandments that are written explicitly in the Torah. But a commandment that is not written explicitly in the Torah, and is instead learned from exposition or some more indirect interpretation — there the oath does take effect. If someone swears about it, then indeed the oath takes effect.
“And here this is what we mean.” Now he returns to the Talmud and says: this is what is being said here. “Since, if he wished, he could exempt himself from that which is written explicitly in the verse, namely ‘when you lie down and when you rise,’ by reciting the Shema morning and evening, therefore the oath takes effect upon him completely, even with respect to a sacrifice. And this is what is meant by ‘a great vow,’ meaning in all its laws like a voluntary matter. And I have already written this there with conclusive proofs.” What is he saying? Here, what is written in the Torah with respect to the commandment of Torah study is “when you lie down and when you rise.” So as far as what is explicitly written in the Torah, Shema morning and evening is enough; one fulfills the obligation. Everything beyond that, though apparently binding, perhaps even at the Torah level, is not explicitly written in the Torah. It is learned by exposition, like what he cited earlier — “‘And you shall teach them diligently’ — that the words of Torah should be sharp in your mouth.” That is some kind of exposition; it is not explicitly written. And because of that, even though it is binding, one can swear about it, or if one swears about it, the oath takes effect even with respect to a sacrifice — meaning, it is an oath in every sense, and whoever violates it is liable for a sacrifice. That is the Ran’s innovation.
There is quite a lot to comment on regarding the principle itself that appears in the Ran. What exactly is the difference between something explicitly written in the Torah and something learned through exposition or interpretation? Most of the medieval authorities, when they learn the Talmud here, rather strangely understand the Talmud as not referring to the rule that one oath does not take effect upon another oath, but rather to the issue that one prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition, which is a more general principle. There is a general rule that if something is already prohibited by one prohibition, another prohibition cannot additionally take effect upon it. Never mind — that principle too could be discussed at length. There is another principle, apparently distinct, which is that one oath does not take effect upon another oath. If I already swore about something, and then I swear again, the second oath does not take effect, because the matter is already under oath; therefore the second oath does not take effect. And simply speaking, these are not the same principle; they are two different principles. Most of the medieval authorities understand that what is at issue here is the rule that one prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition. If that is indeed what is going on, then it is hard to understand what difference it makes whether something is explicitly written in the Torah or learned by exposition or interpretation. What difference would that make? As long as there is already a prohibition, the second prohibition cannot take effect upon it.
The Ran apparently assumes here — and that does seem to fit the simple wording of the Talmud — that the issue is specifically the rule that one oath does not take effect upon another oath. And on that basis he introduces a very interesting novelty: if something is not explicitly written in the Torah, but comes from exposition or interpretation, then we are not sworn about it. We are sworn to fulfill what is explicitly written in the Torah; we are not sworn to fulfill what emerges from exposition. And because of that, if I now swear to study a certain chapter, beyond Shema morning and evening, then I am not already sworn about that from Mount Sinai. Therefore that oath takes effect, because with respect to that matter I was not already sworn in advance, so there is no problem here of one oath not taking effect upon another oath. And that is a very interesting innovation, because what comes out is that there are laws in the Torah — and again, I’m saying that simply speaking it sounds from his words as though these are all Torah-level laws — but there is a difference between Torah-level laws explicitly written in the Torah and Torah-level laws learned from exposition or by more indirect means. The first category — we are sworn on it from Mount Sinai. The second category — we are not sworn on it from Mount Sinai. Of course the question arises: then why do we have to fulfill it? Fine, that is a separate issue. But that is why, says the Ran, the oath I take to study a certain chapter does indeed take effect, because I am not already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai regarding the study of that chapter.
In any case, for our purposes, what is written in the Torah — “when you lie down and when you rise” — means Shema morning and evening. That is enough. Everything beyond that, whether it comes from exposition, over the generations, is entirely voluntary. And the question is: what exactly does that mean? We are used to speaking in terms beyond what the Ran says here — yes, “that you should not stammer; if someone asks you, do not stammer and answer him.” Apparently one needs to know the whole Torah. Clearly, Shema morning and evening is not enough. With that we will not reach the required level of knowledge. But beyond that, we are familiar in many places with a demand regarding neglect of Torah study. So what is this concept of neglect of Torah study? If one does not need to study Torah except for Shema morning and evening, then what is neglect of Torah study? Neglect of Torah study would mean when you are not studying even though you were obligated — but you are not obligated. The person who did not recite the Shema — that is neglect of Torah study? Not reasonable. So what is the meaning of all this? What are people constantly talking about when they say that we must always study, that a person is held accountable for neglect of Torah study, which stands at the center, at the top of the list of accusations — when one arrives at the heavenly court — while what emerges here from the Talmud is that one is not really obligated to do it at all; it is voluntary?
There is also room to discuss this claim that it is voluntary. According to the Ran it is not voluntary; it is an obligation, except that it is not explicitly written in the Torah. But according to the other medieval authorities, it really does seem to be voluntary. What does that mean? Earlier I casually said that perhaps this is a fulfillable-but-non-obligatory commandment. There is such a category of commandments that we are not obligated to do, but if we do them, then we have fulfilled a commandment. That is called a fulfillable-but-non-obligatory commandment. Most commandments in the Torah — positive commandments — are obligatory commandments. An obligatory commandment is one that you must do, and if you did not do it, then you have nullified a positive commandment; that is a kind of transgression. A fulfillable-but-non-obligatory commandment is one where, if you did it, you fulfilled a commandment; and if you did not do it, nothing happened. You cannot nullify it; you can only fulfill it.
I’ll maybe add parenthetically: in principle there are four, perhaps even five, types of positive commandments. An obligatory commandment is, say, like putting on tefillin. Someone who put on tefillin fulfilled a commandment, and someone who did not put on tefillin nullified a positive commandment, committed a transgression. So that is an obligatory commandment. A fulfillable-but-non-obligatory commandment, as I mentioned before, is a commandment that if I did it, I fulfilled a commandment, and if I did not do it, I did not nullify anything. That is a commandment that can be fulfilled but cannot be nullified. Fine — so the combinatorics immediately yield the next two categories. The third type is a commandment that can be nullified but cannot be fulfilled. And the fourth type is a commandment that can neither be nullified nor fulfilled. There is such a thing too.
A commandment that can be nullified but cannot be fulfilled is what the Talmudic language calls “a prohibition inferred from a positive commandment.” For example, regarding Sabbatical-year produce: “and the produce of the land shall be for you to eat.” The Sages expound: for eating, and not for commerce. When someone does business with Sabbatical-year produce, he nullifies the positive commandment “and the produce of the land shall be for you to eat.” But if someone eats Sabbatical-year produce, he is not thereby fulfilling a commandment. This is a positive commandment whose whole meaning is that if one does not act in accordance with it, one nullifies it, but if one does, one is not thereby fulfilling a positive commandment. Nachmanides may perhaps have a different view; some want to argue otherwise. I’m not sure I agree. But the view of most medieval authorities is that this is a prohibition inferred from a positive commandment, and there are many such cases. In essence, these are positive commandments that can only be nullified and cannot be fulfilled. The opposite of a fulfillable-but-non-obligatory commandment. A fulfillable-but-non-obligatory commandment can be fulfilled and not nullified. A prohibition inferred from a positive commandment can be nullified and not fulfilled.
The fourth type is commandments that cannot be either fulfilled or nullified. They are really fascinating commandments. Maimonides in Sefer HaMitzvot, Positive Commandments 95 and 96. Commandment 95 is annulment of vows: if a woman makes a vow, the husband can annul it on the day he hears the vow. Maimonides says: and know that you will hear from me this principle — that there is no obligation to annul the vow, and of course one who did not annul the vow has not violated any prohibition. Nothing. It is a halakhic procedure. If you want to annul the vow, this is how it is done. If you don’t want to, then don’t annul it. There is no commandment to annul, and no prohibition against not annulling. This is counted by Maimonides among the positive commandments, but it can neither be nullified nor fulfilled. It is only a procedural definition. This is how vows are annulled. In Commandment 96 Maimonides talks about impurity. Yes? If someone becomes impure, touches a corpse, then he becomes impure. Is there a commandment to become impure? No. Is there a prohibition to become impure? For an ordinary Israelite, also no; for a priest there is, for an Israelite there isn’t. So what is the meaning of it? It is a definition: if you touch a corpse, you become impure. But there is neither obligation nor prohibition here. You can neither fulfill this commandment nor nullify it. So that is the fourth type of commandment.
But for our purposes, let’s return for a moment to the commandment of Torah study. Shema morning and evening is an obligation; it is an obligatory commandment. If I recited the Shema morning and evening, then I fulfilled the commandment, and if not, I nullified it. But everything beyond that is voluntary. The first suggestion I made was: perhaps “voluntary” here means a fulfillable-but-non-obligatory commandment.
[Speaker B] What kind of fulfillable-but-non-obligatory commandment?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For example, the commandment of charity. With charity, a person should not give less than a third of a shekel per year. So if someone gave less than a third of a shekel per year, he nullified the positive commandment of charity. But if someone gave a third of a shekel per year and after that gave no more, there is no problem; he did not nullify a positive commandment. But if he gave more, then he fulfilled additional positive commandments of charity. So that is another example of a fulfillable positive commandment. By the way, most positive commandments of this kind — perhaps all of them — are really fulfillable only above a certain threshold, like what I said before about charity. There is a threshold up to which one is obligated to act — that is mandatory — and above that it is voluntary, it is fulfillable. If you do it, you have a commandment; if not, you are not obligated.
There is a debate whether there are commandments that are entirely fulfillable and never obligatory. Rabbi Moshe Feinstein wanted to argue that the commandment to settle the Land of Israel is entirely a fulfillable commandment. Meaning: if you want to, then there is a commandment for you; if you did it, you have fulfilled a commandment, and if not, nothing happened. Rabbi Avraham Shapira disagrees with him, not only in that context but in general. He argues that there is no such thing as a completely fulfillable-but-non-obligatory commandment. There are commandments that become fulfillable above a certain threshold, but a commandment that is entirely voluntary — there is no such thing. Okay. But for our purposes, we really are talking about that kind of minimum-threshold structure. Then Shema morning and evening is the binding threshold, and above that it is fulfillable. That is a first proposal.
I’m not sure I agree with that definition. It seems to me more that we are dealing with something entirely voluntary. Not even a positive commandment of the fulfillable sort. From a halakhic standpoint, one does not need to do it at all. Shema morning and evening, and that’s it. Everything beyond that is nothing — not even fulfillable. To show that, one would need to bring in all sorts of sources that I’m not going to get into here. But in principle, it is hard to accept that an oath takes effect on a fulfillable commandment. That would depend on various discussions in this area. Simply put, a fulfillable commandment is still a full-fledged commandment; the Torah commands it. It’s just that the form or structure of the obligation is one of fulfillability rather than direct obligation. So if I swear to do it, then in effect I am still swearing about something the Torah itself has commanded me, a commandment the Torah imposes on me. And simply speaking, an oath should not take effect on that either. So if we want to say that the oath does take effect here, then perhaps this is not even a fulfillable commandment. Later I’ll try maybe to support that a bit more.
So then what is it? As I said earlier, after all we are familiar with concepts like neglect of Torah study, the severity of “Torah study outweighs them all.” When people say “Torah study outweighs them all,” I assume they do not mean reciting the Shema morning and evening. So how does that fit with this picture, in which Shema morning and evening is basically the whole content of the positive commandment of Torah study? What I actually want to argue is that Torah study is not the commandment of Torah study. That’s the title I gave this lecture. There is a difference: there is the commandment of Torah study, and there is Torah study. The commandment of Torah study — you fulfill it with Shema morning and evening. Why? Because there are quite a few things about which the Torah does not command us, and it does not command us because it does not want to diminish their importance. Not because they are unimportant. There are things that do not enter halakhah because they are not binding enough, not important enough. So they are not obligatory. But there are things that do not enter halakhah because they are too important, and turning them into halakhah would diminish them.
One example of this — there are several examples — is character refinement. Rabbi Chaim Vital asks in Sha’arei Kedushah: why does the Torah not command work on one’s character traits? So Rabbi Chaim Vital says: because the Torah speaks to human beings; someone who is not a human being — there is no point commanding him. That is one formulation. Rabbi Kook formulates it somewhat differently, a bit more far-reaching perhaps — I don’t know if more far-reaching, but a different formulation. Usually we know that “greater is one who is commanded and does than one who is not commanded and does.” That is what the Sages teach us. But simple intuition, it seems to me — if you asked an ordinary person — he would tell you that greater is one who is not commanded and does. Rabbi Kook says: there are certain things in which greater remains one who is not commanded and does — such as character refinement — and therefore the Torah did not want to command them, in order to allow us to do them as those who are not commanded and do. If it had commanded them, then it would have forced us to do them as those who are commanded and do.
The example that always comes to my mind in this context is the famous yeshiva joke. A young man reaches the stage of matchmaking, starts meeting prospective brides. He rejects all of them. Yeshiva student, rejects all of them. Fine. He goes to the mashgiach to talk. The mashgiach tells him: you are probably arrogant; you need to sit and work on your character. Fine. He sits, studies ethics with passion for a whole year, works on his character, afflicts himself for years. After a year, he comes back and keeps meeting the same women — or not the same ones, doesn’t matter — more candidates. Again he rejects all of them. So the mashgiach says to him: tell me, what did you do all year? You worked on your character and you stayed exactly the same as before. So he says: what do you mean? A year ago, when I was arrogant, none of them was good enough for me. Now that I’m humble too, then certainly none of them is good enough for me — all the more so. That, roughly, is what someone looks like when he works on his character because there is a halakhic requirement to work on his character. He does it, checks the box. And therefore the Torah did not want there to be such people, and so it did not command us to work on our character. It left it to us to do out of our own understanding that this is what ought to be done.
Maybe I’ll bring one more example: the commandment of repentance, according to Maimonides. Nowadays people say — I’m not exactly sure where the source for this is — the sealing on Hoshana Rabbah. The commandment of repentance: according to Nachmanides there is a commandment to repent. “And you shall return to the Lord your God” — that is a commandment. But Maimonides, in chapter 7 of the laws of repentance, writes: “The Torah has already promised that Israel will ultimately repent.” Meaning, Maimonides sees that verse as a verse of promise, not a verse of command. Therefore, in his view, there is no positive commandment to repent. And indeed, if you look at Maimonides’ enumeration of the commandments, he counts there the commandment to confess, Positive Commandment 73, but there is no commandment to repent. It does not appear in Sefer HaMitzvot of Maimonides. On the other hand — and this is already raised by Minchat Chinukh — one asks about a contradiction in Maimonides. In Sefer HaMitzvot there is no commandment to repent, but at the beginning of the laws of repentance, Maimonides counts one positive commandment, namely that the sinner should repent from his sin and confess. Meaning that both confession and repentance are details within the commandment of repentance, or one commandment with two binding details — repentance and confession. So we see there is a commandment to repent. Then why does Maimonides not count it in Sefer HaMitzvot?
It seems to me that the explanation is this: since Maimonides reads the verse “and you shall return to the Lord your God” as a promise and not a command, then from Maimonides’ perspective there is no verse commanding repentance. And since there is no verse, it will not appear in the enumeration of the commandments. There is no commandment. Maimonides’ method is that something for which there is no verse is not counted in the enumeration of the commandments. There is no such commandment. Must one repent? Of course one must. There is no commandment, but one must. In the Mishneh Torah, everything that one must do appears there, not only commandments. The Mishneh Torah also includes rabbinic laws, laws based on exposition, customs, and so on and so on, all sorts of things. Everything one must do appears in the Mishneh Torah because it is a halakhic work. A halakhic work contains all the laws of all kinds. Therefore, in Sefer HaMitzvot there will be no commandment to repent, because there is no such commandment. But in the Mishneh Torah it appears that one must both repent and confess. Why? Because one must repent. There is no commandment, but one must. So that is another example of something the Torah expects of us but does not command us to do. There are things the Torah leaves to us to do out of our own understanding that this is what ought to be done, and intentionally does not command. It does not command because it wants us to do it on our own initiative.
What I want to argue is that Torah study also joins this distinguished group, and that Shema morning and evening is basically a minimal threshold that is binding from a halakhic perspective. The positive commandment of Torah study is Shema morning and evening. Everything beyond that we are supposed to do only because we understand what Torah study is. Someone who understands what Torah study is — then of course he must study according to all his ability, not because of the command. The point here is Torah study, not the commandment of Torah study. The commandment of Torah study is much thinner than Torah study. Torah study is comprehensive; one must do as much as one can, to the extent one can. The commandment of Torah study — Shema morning and evening is enough.
[Speaker B] Rabbi Michael, I have to ask in this context: what is the implication of this approach for the understanding of women’s Torah study?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll get to that. I haven’t forgotten the hosting venue; I’ll get to that at the end. In my opinion it has important implications, but I’ll get to it. But before I get to that issue, let’s look at the passage in Menachot, on page 99. I remind you that the commentator in the passage in Nedarim mentioned this passage as the source for the idea that reciting Shema morning and evening is the defining obligation in the commandment of Torah study. I want to read the Talmudic text in Menachot. I divided it into paragraphs because each time I’m going to focus on one of them, but I also want you to see the overall movement. It seems to me that the overall flow of this passage basically comes to say what I told you before. Rabbi Ami said: From the words of Rabbi Yosei we learn that even if a person studied only one chapter in the morning and one chapter in the evening, he has fulfilled the commandment, “This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth.” Yes? One chapter in the morning, one chapter in the evening, a passage, yes, it doesn’t matter, in the morning, a passage in the evening, and that’s all. You fulfilled the commandment, “This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth.” Rabbi Yohanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai: Even if a person recited only Shema in the morning and in the evening, he has fulfilled “it shall not depart.” What is he saying? He narrows it even further, right? If the first one told us one chapter in the morning and one chapter in the evening, that means aside from Shema, do something more as well for the commandment of Torah study. Study a passage in the morning, a passage in the evening. Rabbi Yohanan in the name of Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai says: what are you talking about? Even that isn’t needed. Shema morning and evening—you recite it—that’s good enough. We fulfill the commandment of Torah study even with Shema itself; there’s no need to add even one extra chapter in the morning and evening. Meaning, Rabbi Yohanan—or really Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai; Rabbi Yohanan in the name of Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai—basically comes to empty the commandment of Torah study of even the remnants of content that Rabbi Ami still left in it. Rabbi Ami left some minimal content: a chapter in the morning, a chapter in the evening. Rabbi Yohanan comes and says: not even that. Nothing is needed. You recite Shema anyway. That’s it. You’ve also fulfilled the commandment of Torah study.
The Talmud continues: “And this matter may not be said in the presence of the unlearned.” I hope I’m not violating that prohibition here. “And Rava said: It is a commandment to say it in the presence of the unlearned.” There’s some dispute here whether it is forbidden to say this in front of the unlearned or whether it is a commandment to say it in front of the unlearned. What is the dispute? On a simple reading it looks like a tactical matter. That is, it is forbidden to say it before the unlearned because then they won’t study anything; they’ll think that Shema morning and evening is enough. But if so, they’d be right, no? What’s the problem? Why not say it to the unlearned person? Because maybe he won’t study anything beyond Shema morning and evening? But that’s perfectly fine, because in truth nothing more is required. So what’s the problem people see here? In truth no more is required to be studied. Therefore it’s clear that even the one who says that Shema morning and evening is enough does not mean that that is what one should do. What one should do is study as much as possible. Shema morning and evening—that is the obligation of the commandment of Torah study. And that, don’t say to the unlearned, because they’ll think that what’s binding is only the commandment, and they won’t understand that one also needs to study beyond that as much as one can.
The second view—Rava says it is a commandment to say it before the unlearned. Why is it a commandment to say it before the unlearned? So again, here too one could have said that it is to reassure them, that even if they recited Shema morning and evening, that’s also good; they fulfilled the commandment of Torah study. But as I said before, that explanation is very unlikely. On the contrary, tell the unlearned person that the commandment is not enough—that is, you need to do also what goes beyond what the commandment obligates. It seems to me that what Rava really wants to say is that when you tell this to the unlearned person, explain to him precisely this point: that Shema morning and evening is enough from the perspective of the commandment of Torah study, but Torah study should be done as much as you can. That’s the point, and therefore you need to say it to the unlearned person in order to explain to him how important it is. You need to explain to him that since the Torah commands us regarding Torah study only up to Shema morning and evening—that is the only obligation—he should ask himself: why? Because it is so important that the Torah did not want to diminish it by turning it into a regular command within the 613 commandments. Once you explain that to him, there is a chance that maybe he will study beyond what the commandment obligates.
Moving on. I’m in section three. Ben Dama, the son of Rabbi Yishmael’s sister, asked Rabbi Yishmael: “As for one such as I, who has studied the entire Torah, what is the law regarding studying Greek wisdom?” He read to him this verse: “This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth, and you shall meditate upon it day and night.” “Go and find an hour that is neither of the day nor of the night, and study Greek wisdom then.” There are a few interesting comments here. One comment is maybe half a pilpul, but with pilpul the question is just setting things up for the answer. So in pilpul one should relate to the answers and not to the questions. Once I was in Yeruham, at the hesder yeshiva. I came there; it was the Shavuot night study session. One of the students came up to me and asked: Ben Dama studied the entire Torah. Now he comes and asks his uncle, Rabbi Yishmael, “Can I study wisdom—such as I, who have studied the entire Torah, can I study Greek wisdom?” If he studied the entire Torah, how does he not know this? If he knows everything, then what does his uncle know more than he does? Apparently he doesn’t know everything if he still has questions he’s asking. Maybe this is what finishes it off; maybe this is the last thing left for him. So I told him that it seems to me that what he asked was precisely about the definition of the commandment of Torah study. With Shema morning and evening one fulfills one’s obligation, and I also know the Torah—I studied everything else. The question is whether there is something beyond the halakhic definition of the commandment of Torah study that also obligates me to study.
He studied the entire Torah, meaning he studied everything written in the Torah, all the Jewish law, everything one is obligated to do. But there are things beyond the halakhic obligation; he did not say that he knows everything about that. He knows everything said to Moses at Sinai; all the Jewish law he knows. There are things beyond that, and that is what he asks Rabbi Yishmael, his uncle. Is there something more? I know, I studied the entire Torah; with Shema morning and evening one fulfills one’s obligation, and if I know everything else then from the standpoint of the categories of Jewish law there is no need to study beyond that. But the question is whether there is something beyond Torah or beyond Jewish law in the narrow sense—Jewish law. Is there some obligation to study beyond the definition of the commandment of Torah study? That is something beyond what he studied. He knows the entire Shulchan Arukh; this does not appear in the Shulchan Arukh; it is beyond Jewish law. Therefore he asks.
What does Rabbi Yishmael answer him? It appears that he answers him that one must study all the time. One could have understood that one must study all the time because, in his view, the commandment of Torah study is not like what we learned above, that Shema morning and evening or one chapter in the morning and evening is enough. He says that one must study all day and all night, all the time, as much as one can. But from the Talmud itself we can see that this is not correct. Because the Talmud itself—look at section four—“And this disagrees with Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani.” That is, what Rabbi Yishmael says, what Rabbi Yishmael answered his nephew, is contrary to the words of Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani. This is really strange. In sections one and two we saw two opinions, both tannaitic by the way, of Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai, telling us that the commandment of Torah study is one chapter in the morning and one chapter in the evening, or Shema in the morning and Shema in the evening. Rabbi Yishmael disagrees with the tannaim who appear above him. He says that Torah study means all day, as much as you can. So why does the Talmud here say that he disagrees with some Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani, whom it is about to bring, and then we’ll see what it’s about? Say that he disagrees with the opinions we learned until now. Why? How did Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani suddenly enter here? Why him? There are two tannaim who disagree with Rabbi Yishmael. Why is that not mentioned? The answer is because he does not disagree with them. As I said before, Rabbi Yishmael does not disagree with them. Rabbi Yishmael and Ben Dama his nephew both know what Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai said—Rabbi Yishmael was from a generation before him, yes? He was more or less from the generation of Rabbi Akiva. But they know what Rabbi Yosei says, what Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai says, that Shema morning and evening is enough. The discussion here, as I said before, concerning Ben Dama’s question, is about whether there is an obligation beyond the halakhic obligation. The question is not what defines the halakhic obligation. The definition of the halakhic obligation is Shema morning and evening. The question is whether there is an obligation beyond that.
So when Rabbi Yishmael brings this verse, “This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth, and you shall meditate upon it day and night,” he brings it as a source that is not a halakhic source for the definition of the commandment of Torah study, but rather as a source for the idea that we are expected to study as much as we can beyond the halakhic obligation. The halakhic obligation is Shema morning and evening; with that too he agrees. That is why the Talmud does not say that he disagrees with the two tannaim who appear before him. He agrees with them. He added something else. With whom does he disagree? With Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani. Now let’s see section four. “And this disagrees with Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani, for Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani said in the name of Rabbi Yonatan: This verse is neither an obligation nor a commandment, but rather a blessing. The Holy One, blessed be He, saw Joshua that words of Torah were especially beloved to him, as it is said, ‘And his attendant Joshua son of Nun, a youth, did not depart from the tent.’ The Holy One, blessed be He, said to him: Joshua, are words of Torah so beloved to you? ‘This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth.’”
What is Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani saying? There is a very interesting and fairly rare formulation here in the Talmud: “This verse is neither an obligation nor a commandment, but rather a blessing.” There are three categories: obligation, commandment, and blessing. Yes, blessing is not exactly a category, but still: not obligation and not commandment. What is the difference between them? First of all, what is the difference between obligation and commandment? Blessing is clear. The Holy One, blessed be He, blessed Joshua that “this book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth.” So that is a blessing; it is not about halakhic obligations. But what is the difference between obligation and commandment? There are two categories that Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani rejects. It is not an obligation and not a commandment. What is the difference? I think the difference is this: obligation means a mandatory commandment, a commandment one must do. Commandment means what we said before: one should do it, but there is no obligation. It is not a commandment in the usual sense in which we speak about it, that is, in the sense of a halakhic obligation. And therefore Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani says: Torah study beyond Shema in the morning and evening is not an obligation; there is no such commandment, after all, there is Shema in the morning and evening. But he says that even this is not a commandment. On that point Rabbi Yishmael disagrees. Rabbi Yishmael says—and the Talmud says that Rabbi Yishmael disagrees with Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani, not with Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai, not with Rabbi Yosei, who say that Shema morning and evening is enough—because with that Rabbi Yishmael agrees. He too says that Shema morning and evening is enough. By the way, Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani too agrees that Shema morning and evening is enough. So what is the dispute? The dispute is over the question of what happens beyond that. As I said, throughout the entire passage you can see it. The Talmud comes to tell me that what goes beyond Shema morning and evening is a matter of significance; one should do it because we understand what Torah study is—not because of the commandment of Torah study. One should do Torah study. Rabbi Yishmael also accepts this; he just says, fine, but there is significance in studying Torah beyond that as much as we can. Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani says no, there isn’t even that significance. It is neither an obligation nor a commandment; it is only a blessing. So here we already have to discuss: what then—according to Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani is there no such thing as neglect of Torah study at all? So maybe the dispute here is that one defines it as an existential commandment and the other defines it as not a commandment at all. Maybe the one who says it is not an obligation but is a commandment—that is Rabbi Yishmael—means it is an existential commandment. And Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani says it is not even an existential commandment. It is something one should do because we understand what Torah study is.
And now the Talmud concludes in section five: “A teaching from the school of Rabbi Yishmael: Words of Torah should not be to you as an obligation, yet you are not permitted to exempt yourself from them.” What is this? Here they clarify exactly this point. Usually people explain this statement as describing how one should relate to Torah study—that it should not be some burden on you, that you should do it joyfully. But it seems to me that in light of the whole movement of the passage here, it should be interpreted differently. The word “obligation” appears in the words of Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani above as well, when he says that Torah study is neither an obligation nor a commandment but rather a blessing. And what does Rabbi Yishmael say? “Words of Torah should not be to you as an obligation.” Why? Because in truth it is not an obligation. Shema morning and evening—that is the obligation, that’s it; beyond that there is no obligation. “Yet you are not permitted to exempt yourself from them”—although there is no halakhic commandment beyond Shema morning and evening, still you are not permitted to exempt yourself from them. On what basis? Reason. And in this the point of disagreement between him and Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani becomes clarified. Because Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani says: it is neither an obligation nor a commandment, but rather a blessing. Of course, even according to Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani, when the Holy One, blessed be He, blesses Joshua son of Nun that “this book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth,” one can understand that there is value in Torah study even beyond Shema morning and evening, because otherwise what kind of blessing is being given to Joshua son of Nun? But still, from the standpoint of halakhic obligation, he sees it as neither an obligation nor a commandment. Maybe even, as I said before, not even an existential commandment, but rather some sort of matter of significance—I don’t know exactly what to call it.
Now in light of this, in light of this, perhaps we can understand what is written in the Talmud in Berakhot. Many later authorities struggle with a contradiction; apparently there is a frontal contradiction between the passage in Menachot and the passage in Berakhot. In Menachot, Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai says Shema morning and evening, and Rabbi Yishmael is the one who says all day and all night: “Go and choose an hour that is neither of the day nor of the night.” In Berakhot they switch places. “The Rabbis taught: ‘And you shall gather your grain’—what does this come to teach? Since it was said, ‘This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth,’ one might think these words are to be taken literally. Therefore the verse teaches, ‘And you shall gather your grain’—conduct yourself according to the way of the world; these are the words of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai says: Is it possible for a person to plow at the time of plowing and sow at the time of sowing and reap at the time of reaping and thresh at the time of threshing and winnow when there is wind—what will become of Torah? Rather, when Israel do the will of the Omnipresent, their work is done by others, as it is said, ‘And strangers shall stand and pasture your flocks.’ And when Israel do not do the will of the Omnipresent, their work is done by themselves, as it is said, ‘And you shall gather your grain.’ And not only that, but the work of others is done by them,” etc. It doesn’t matter right now. In any event, for our purposes, it seems here that they really exchange positions. Rabbi Yishmael allows doing everything that ordinary worldly life requires, and there is no need to panic because of the commandment of Torah study. Torah study is for the time you have left over. And precisely Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai is the imperialist. He doesn’t even agree that one should work; one must study all the time. This is the same Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai who in Nedarim and in Menachot says that Shema morning and evening is enough, that no more is needed. How are these two things reconciled? And how does Rabbi Yishmael also reverse himself? They swap positions.
The answer is that they do not swap positions. The entire discussion in the Talmud in Berakhot is a discussion about the level beyond the commandment. The commandment is Shema morning and evening, and on that everyone agrees. Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai, Rabbi Yishmael, Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani—everyone agrees about that. The dispute is only over what happens beyond that. Is beyond that an existential commandment, a commandment in the sense referred to there in that Talmudic passage, or is it not even a commandment as Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani says? And if it is a commandment, how far does it obligate? Does it prevent me even from going to engage in ordinary worldly activity, from going to work? Or no—one may go to work, and in the time that remains one must study. But all these disputes are disputes after we have finished the obligation of Torah study. The obligation of Torah study is Shema morning and evening, and that’s it, and everyone agrees. The dispute is over the definition of that obligation beyond the commandment. I reversed the terms. The commandment beyond the obligation, in the language of the Talmud, yes; in our language it really sounds backwards. So what is the nature of that expectation that we study beyond what we are obligated to do? How far does it go? Here there is a dispute. One says not even to work; one says yes, to work, but in what remains beyond that one should study. There is also some comment in the Talmud in Menachot regarding Greek wisdom, but I won’t go into that now. For our purposes, what basically emerges is that the commandment of Torah study has a very special character. Shema morning and evening—that is the obligation. Everything beyond that is essentially some expectation of us: that one who understands what Torah is will study as much as he can. Not because there is a commandment of Torah study. It is Torah study.
Maybe just one example—there are several; I won’t go into details—but a number of later authorities write that the commandments that obligate Noahides also obligate a Jew from the moment he understands, not from age thirteen, not from bar mitzvah, but from the moment he understands, he is obligated in them. There are proofs for this in Talmudic passages; you can show it in several places. What is the meaning of this? It seems to me that what is being said there is really the same principle I’m saying here. If something is founded on a command of the Torah, then the Torah speaks to those who are obligated in commandments. One who has passed the age of bar mitzvah or bat mitzvah is obligated in the commandments the Torah commands, and one who has not—the Torah is not speaking to him. Maybe by the law of education, perhaps, but not a Torah-level obligation. But if there is an obligation whose basis is reason, then whoever is obligated by it is anyone who understands the reasoning. Here there are no formal definitions that until bar mitzvah one is not obligated. If you understand, then anyone who understands is obligated to do it, since the obligation is not founded on command; the obligation is founded on an expectation of one who understands. And since that is so, there are no formal limitations regarding who is obligated in it.
For example, intercourse with an animal—this is one of the examples. The Talmud in Sanhedrin on page 58, in the passage about “stumbling and disgrace,” implies that this is also a transgression for minors. Why? Because this thing, even before the halakhic prohibition, there is also what we might call a moral prohibition—I don’t know exactly how to define it—human decency or morality, I don’t know exactly how to define it, but something that one should understand by reason. And since that is so, if it is an obligation founded on reason, then a minor too is obligated in it. Minors are not obligated in commandments founded on command, because commands are directed only to adults, but commandments founded on reason—even minors are obligated in them.
Maybe one more example if you want. Maimonides, for example, writes—in the laws of hiring, I think—that one does not administer an oath to a minor because he does not know the punishment for an oath. Really, a clever minor who knows the punishment for an oath would make me even more cautious, because he knows there is no punishment for him for an oath. One does not administer an oath to a minor because there is no punishment for him for an oath, not because he does not know the punishment for an oath. On the contrary, if he knows and understands, then he is certainly more likely to lie, because he has no problem—he knows he will not receive punishment. A minor is not obligated. What does “he does not know the punishment for an oath” mean? In Maimonides it seems that there is a punishment for an oath, and a minor simply does not always understand that, and therefore it is not advisable to administer an oath to him. But in principle, if he understands, then there is punishment for his oath. Why? Because the obligation to uphold oaths is also an obligation based on reason, not only on command. There is also a command in the Torah, but beyond that there is also an obligation based on reason. This is what Ri Migash writes, for example, in a responsum about oaths in writing. Ri Migash writes that a written oath, even though an oath and a vow require verbal articulation, a written oath is binding as well. Why is it binding as well? There is no verbal articulation here. Because there is a simple reasoning that if someone swears, he is obligated to fulfill it—obligated by reason, not because of the command in the Torah. There would be no lashes for this, because the Torah prohibition is not there. And then a minor too would be obligated in it, because it is an obligation founded on reason.
If at the giving of the Torah the Jewish people were sworn—after all, we spoke about being already under oath from Sinai at the beginning of the class—so if they were already under oath from Sinai, they made the Jewish people swear to uphold the Torah. On that, the Mishneh LaMelekh asks: what is the point of making the Jewish people swear to uphold the Torah, since the obligation to uphold oaths is itself written in the Torah? So if they do not uphold the Torah, they also will not uphold that oath, so what is the point of making them swear to uphold the Torah? And to that he answers—and the Avnei Nezer in Yoreh De’ah, section 306, answers this—the Avnei Nezer argues, and brings Ri Migash for this, and says that the obligation to uphold oaths is founded on reason, and therefore they made the Jewish people swear to uphold the Torah, because their obligation to stand by their oath or uphold their oath—not to profane their oath—is an obligation based on reason. Even one who did not accept the Torah is obligated in this. And the proof is that the Patriarchs also swore before they received the Torah: Abraham swore to Abimelech, and Eliezer to Abraham, and they even derive laws of oaths from Eliezer and Abraham. And since that is so, an oath—the obligation to uphold an oath—is an obligation founded on reason, and therefore a minor too is obligated in it.
Now I’m coming to Tamar’s question. If that is so, then let us return to our issue. Basically, the commandment of Torah study—Shema morning and evening—that is the definition of the commandment. What goes beyond that is maybe an existential commandment and maybe not even that. Rather, it is simply an expectation of everyone who understands what Torah is to engage in it. This is our way of connecting to the One who spoke and brought the world into being, to the word of the One who spoke and brought the world into being; we have no other way. And since that is so, everyone who understands the meaning of Torah is supposed to engage in it to the best of his ability, not because of the command. On the contrary, the command would ruin it. We are supposed to do it because we understand.
Fine. So if indeed, if indeed the commandment of Torah study is Shema morning and evening, but the obligation to study Torah beyond Shema morning and evening is an obligation based on reason, then as I said before, there is no limitation at all on who is obligated in that obligation. Anyone who understands—minors, women, it doesn’t matter, whoever you want. Anyone who understands the meaning of Torah is essentially obligated to study Torah. The commandment of Torah study, Shema morning and evening—from that women are exempt. Women are exempt from Shema morning and evening. Everything else, the entire Talmud, medieval authorities (Rishonim) and later authorities (Acharonim), all parts of Maimonides and the Shulchan Arukh and the Talmudic text—women are obligated exactly like men. Completely obligated. Not that they fulfill a commandment—no. Obligated in the same sense that men are obligated. Meaning, everything beyond Shema morning and evening is an obligation that is entirely not within the category of the commandment of Torah study, but rather Torah study itself. But in Torah study women are also obligated. From the commandment of Torah study they are exempt. Why? Because in Torah study whose basis is reason, everyone is obligated—whoever understands it is obligated. There is no limitation. The limitations exist where there is a command, because then the command says whom I am addressing and whom I am not addressing. But reason addresses everyone who understands it. Whoever understands it is obligated by it.
In the Shulchan Arukh it says that women are obligated in the blessing over Torah. The commentators there ask—the Magen Avraham, the Mishnah Berurah, and quite a few other commentaries—after all, they are exempt from the commandment of Torah study, so why are they obligated in the blessing over Torah? So the Magen Avraham—and the Mishnah Berurah cites his words—the Magen Avraham says that they are obligated to study the commandments that pertain to them, in Jewish law. This is a very strange answer, because studying the commandments that pertain to them is not Torah study. Torah study is not studying in order to know what to do; studying in order to do means learning Jewish law in order to know what to do. The commandment of Torah study is a value in itself; it is not a means for knowing what to do. And therefore it seems to me that if women are told that they need to study the laws that apply to them, over that I would not recite the blessing over Torah; that is not the commandment of Torah study. So what is it, then? The assumption of the Magen Avraham and the Mishnah Berurah is that this blessing is a blessing over commandments. The blessing over Torah is a blessing over commandments, and one who is not obligated in the commandment ostensibly should not also be obligated in the blessing. But if it seems—and there are quite a few proofs for this, and this is apparently already a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim)—that this is a blessing of praise. We give praise to the Holy One, blessed be He, for having given us the Torah, and these are the blessings over Torah. Now in this respect, what difference is there between women and men? Engagement in Torah because we understand what Torah is should apply to—or obligate—everyone who understands: women, men, everyone. And since that is so, the blessing too, the blessing over Torah that is said over this matter, obligates both men and women. This blessing is not a blessing over commandments; otherwise we would have needed to recite it in Ahavah Rabbah, as appears in the halakhic authorities and as appears in the Talmud, where Ahavah Rabbah also has the status of the commandment of Torah study, the blessing of Shema. That may indeed be the blessing over the commandment of Torah study, because in fact it is recited before performing it, before saying Shema in the morning. But the blessings over Torah that are recited in the morning are blessings—blessings of praise over Torah. Blessings of praise over Torah apply to everyone who understands what Torah is and has received the privilege of learning it, and in that there is no difference at all between women and men. Simple matter. There is no need here to raise difficulties or look for forced answers. Fine then—Purim, happy holiday.